Borja vs COMELEC [295 SCRA 157; GR 133495, September 3, 1998]

(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification, Succession Exception to the 3 term limit)

Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the
next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998
elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory
that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be
ineligible to serve for another term after that.
The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco
disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration, majority overturned the original
decision.
Issue: WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?
Held: No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that the term of office of elective local officials shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71) which states that no local elective official
shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
The term served must therefore be one for which [the official concerned] was elected. The purpose of this provision is to
prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a
term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be
considered to have fully served the term not withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office,
he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
David v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127116 April 8, 1997
Sec. 8 Art. X of the Constitution: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law.(term of office of barangay officials)
FACTS:
This case involves the consolidation of 2 petitions that tackle the common question of how long the term of office of
barangay chairmen and other barangay officials who were elected to their respective office on the second of May 1994.
Petitioner in his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as president of the Liga ng mga
Barangay sa Pilipinas filed before this Court on December 2, 1996 a petition for prohibition , under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997. On January 29, 1997, the
Solicitor General filed his four-page Comment siding with petitioner and praying that "the election scheduled on May 12, 1997 be
held in abeyance." Respondent Commission on Elections filed a separate Comment, dated February 1, 1997 opposing the
petition. On February 11, 1997, the Court issued a Resolution giving due course to the petition and requiring the parties to file
simultaneous memoranda within a non-extendible period of twenty days from notice. It also requested former Senator Aquilino
Q. Pimentel, Jr. 1 to act as amicus curiae and to file a memorandum also within a non-extendible period of twenty days. It noted
but did not grant petitioner's Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
dated January 31, 1997 Accordingly, the parties filed their respective memoranda. In a separate case filed before this court
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter represented by its president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a petition, docketed
as G.R. No. 128039, "to seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional: Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which
prescribed the term of barangay officials to be for 3 years which shall begin on the regular election to be held on the second
Monday of May 1994. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the barangay elections on
May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto;
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not the term of office of barangay officials shall be for 3 years as prescribed by RA 7160(The Local
Government Code of ) or 5 years as prescribed by RA 6653.
2.

Whether or not RA 7160 sec 43(c) is unconstitutional

HELD:
1.
Yes , The Court held that term of office of barangay officials shall be for 3 years as prescribed by RA 7160. Since RA
7160 is a newer law than RA 6653, notwithstanding the fact that RA 7160 is a general law since the particular provision on the
term of office of barangay officials is a specific provision which supersedes the provision in RA 6653.

2.
No, The Court held that RA 7160 sec 43(c) is not unconstitutional. Since under Sec 8 Art X of the Constitution the term
of office of barangay officials shall be as determined by law. There is nothing in the Constitution or in the record of the
constitutional commission which would support the view that the term of office of barangay officials could not be for 3 years.
Socrates vs COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457; G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002
(Local Government, Recall Election: Exception to the 3 term limit)
Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa, and
scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election.
Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for
the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth
consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995
and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.
COMELECs First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified
to run in the recall election.
Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election.
Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which
provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official was elected.
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that
only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from
office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from
being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall
election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a
fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth
term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the
term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in any other subsequent election
involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate re-election after his
third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from
seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001.
Adormeo vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga
lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagaraos 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000
wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his
candidacy was challenged on the ground that he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms in violation of the
three term-limit rule. Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration
which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.
Issue:
Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two full terms and he won in the 2000 recall
elections.
Held:

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office,
he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disruptedby his defeat in the 1998
elections. The time between his second term and the recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three
consecutive terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.
Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was defeated in the 1998 elections. His election
during the 2000 recall election is not a continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third term thereby
barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the voluntary renunciation contemplated by
the law.
Latasa vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. In
February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible
therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos
and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's candidacy
since the latter had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms. Petitioner countered that this fact does not bar
him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the 2001 elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the post
of city mayor.
The Comelecs First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his motion for reconsideration was not acted
upon by the Comelec en banc before election day and he was proclaimed winner. Only after the proclamation did the Comelec
en banc issue a resolution that declared him disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in
his favor should not be counted.
Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical
personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it should not be
construed as vying for the same local government post.
Issue:
Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he
served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?
Held:
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them. Article X,
Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions
concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean,
however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be
construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of
the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those
in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine
years.
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them
in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a
prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception.
Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding
office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the
very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.