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G.R.No.167057

RepublicofthePhilippines

SupremeCourt
BaguioCity

FIRSTDIVISION

NERWININDUSTRIES
G.R.No.167057

CORPORATION,
Present:
Petitioner,

CORONA,C.J.,Chairperson,

LEONARDODECASTRO,
versus
*BRION,

BERSAMIN,and
PNOCENERGY
VILLARAMA,JR.,JJ.
DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION,and
Promulgated:
ESTERR.GUERZON,

Chairman,BidsandAwards

Committee,
April11,2012
Respondents.
xx

DECISION

BERSAMIN,J.:

[1]

Republic Act No. 8975 expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court, from
issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory
injunctiontorestrain,prohibitorcompeltheGovernment,oranyofitssubdivisionsorofficials,or
any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the Governments direction, from: (a)
acquiring, clearing, and developing the rightofway, site or location of any National Government
project (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the National Government (c)
commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such contract or project (d)
terminatingorrescindinganysuchcontractorprojectand(e)undertakingorauthorizinganyother
lawfulactivitynecessaryforsuchcontractorproject.

Accordingly,aRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)thatignoresthestatutoryprohibitionandissuesa
TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against a government
contractorprojectactscontrarytolaw.

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Antecedents

ThefollowingantecedentsareculledfromtheassaileddecisionoftheCourtofAppeals(CA)
[2]

promulgatedonOctober22,2004, viz:

In1999,theNationalElectrificationAdministration(NEA)publishedaninvitationtoprequalifyandto
bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of about sixty thousand
(60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the countrys
RuralElectrificationProject.Thesaidcontractconsistedoffour(4)components,namely:PIA,PIBandPIC
or woodpoles and P3 or crossarms, necessary for NEAs projected allocation for Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao.Inresponsetothesaidinvitation,bidders,suchasprivaterespondent[Nerwin],wererequiredto
submit their application for eligibility together with their technical proposals. At the same time, they were
informed that only those who would pass the standard prequalification would be invited to submit their
financialbids.

Followingathoroughreviewofthebiddersqualificationsandeligibility,onlyfour(4)bidders,including
privaterespondent[Nerwin],qualifiedtoparticipateinthebiddingfortheIPB80contract.Thereafter,the
qualified bidders submitted their financial bids where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest
bidderforallschedules/componentsofthecontract.NEAthenconductedapreawardinspectionofprivate
respondents [Nerwins] manufacturing plants and facilities, including its identified supplier in Malaysia, to
determineitscapabilitytosupplyanddeliverNEAsrequirements.

In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 IBP No. 80 [for the]
SupplyandDeliveryofWoodpolesandCrossarmsdatedOctober4,2000,NEAadministratorConrado
M. Estrella III recommended to NEAs Board of Directors the approval of award to private respondent
[Nerwin]ofallschedulesforIBPNo.80onaccountofthefollowing:

a.Nerwinisthelowestcomplyingandresponsivebidder

b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules between the bid of Nerwin Industries (lowest
responsiveandcomplyingbidder)andthesecondlowestbidderintheamountof$1.47millionfor
thepolesand$0.475millionforthecrossarms,isdeemedsubstantialandextremelyadvantageous
tothegovernment.The price difference is equivalent to 7,948 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of
crossarms

c.Thepricedifferenceforthethree(3)schedulesbetweenthebidsofNerwinandtheTriState
PoleandPiling,Inc.approximatelyintheamountof$2.36millionforthepolesand$0.475million
forthecrossarmsareequivalenttoadditional12.872pcs.ofpolesand20.967pcs.ofcrossarms
and

d.Thebidderandmanufacturerarecapableofsupplyingthewoodpolesandspecifiedinthebid
documentsandasbasedonthepreawardinspectionconducted.

However,onDecember19,2000,NEAsBoardofDirectorspassedResolutionNo.32reducingby50%
the material requirements for IBP No. 80 given the time limitations for the delivery of the materials,
xxx,andwiththeloanclosingdateofOctober2001fastapproaching.Inturn,itresolvedtoawardthe
four(4)schedulesofIBPNo.80atareducednumbertoprivaterespondent[Nerwin].Privaterespondent
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[Nerwin] protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was a ploy to accommodate a losing
bidder.

On the other hand, the losing bidders TriState and Pacific Synnergy appeared to have filed a complaint,
citingallegedfalseorfalsifieddocumentssubmittedduringtheprequalificationstagewhichledtotheaward
oftheIBP80projecttoprivaterespondent[Nerwin].

Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA officials sought the opinion of the
Government Corporate Counsel who, among others, upheld the eligibility and qualification of private
respondent[Nerwin].Dissatisfied,thesaidofficialsattemptedtoseekarevisionoftheearlieropinionbutthe
GovernmentCorporateCounseldeclaredanewthattherewasnolegalimpedimenttopreventtheawardof
IPB80 contract to private respondent [Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA allegedly held negotiations with
otherbiddersrelativetotheIPB80contract,promptingprivaterespondent[Nerwin]tofileacomplaintfor
specificperformancewithprayerfortheissuanceofaninjunction,whichinjunctiveapplicationwasgranted
byBranch36ofRTCManilainCivilCaseNo.01102000.

Intheinterim,PNOCEnergyDevelopmentCorporationpurportingtobeundertheDepartmentofEnergy,
issuedRequisitionNo.FGJ30904R1oraninvitationtoprequalifyandtobidforwoodenpolesneededfor
itsSamarRuralElectrificationProject(OILAWproject).

Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the OILAW Project,
Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 03106921 entitled
NerwinIndustriesCorporationv.PNOCEnergyDevelopmentCorporationandEsterR.Guerzon,
as Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an
attempttosubjectaportionoftheitemscoveredbyIPBNo.80toanotherbiddingandprayingthat
aTROissuetoenjoinrespondentsproposedbiddingforthewoodenpoles.

Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that the complaint
averred no cause of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be
subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition against nonforum shopping, and the
corporatepresidenthadnoauthoritytosignandfilethecomplaint.

[3]

OnJune27,2003,afterNerwinhadfileditsrejoindertorespondentsreply,theRTCgranteda
TROinCivilCaseNo.03106921.

[4]

[5]

OnJuly30,2003,theRTCissuedanorder, asfollows:

WHEREFORE,fortheforegoingconsiderations,anorderisherebyissuedbythisCourt:

1.DENYINGthemotiontoconsolidate

2.DENYINGtheurgentmotionforreconsideration
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3.DISQUALIFYINGAttys.MichaelA.Medado,DatuOmarS.SinsuatandMarianoH.Papsfrom
appearingascounselforthedefendants

4.DECLARINGdefendantsindefault

5.GRANTINGthemotionforissuanceofwritofpreliminaryinjunction.

Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the defendant PNOCEDC and its
Chairman of Bids and Awards Committee Esther R. Guerzon from continuing the holding of the subject
bidding upon the plaintiffs filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 to answer for any damage or
damageswhichthedefendantsmaysuffershoulditbefinallyadjudgedthatpetitionerisnotentitledthereto,
untilfinaldeterminationoftheissueinthiscasebythisCourt.

This order shall become effective only upon the posting of a bond by the plaintiffs in the amount of
P200,000.00.

Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the defendants and strict compliance herein is
enjoined.FurnishtheOfficeoftheGovernmentCorporateCounselcopyofthisorder.

SOORDERED.

Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 30, 2003, and also to set
asidetheorderofdefaultandtoadmittheiranswertothecomplaint.

OnJanuary13,2004, the RTC denied respondents motions for reconsideration, to set aside
orderofdefault,andtoadmitanswer.

[6]

Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for
certiorari (CAGR SP No. 83144), alleging that the RTC had thereby committed grave abuse of
discretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictioninholdingthatNerwinhadbeenentitledtothe
issuanceofthewritofpreliminaryinjunctiondespitetheexpressprohibitionfromthelawandfrom
the Supreme Court in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established
jurisprudence in declaring respondents in default and in disqualifying respondents counsel from
representingthem.

[7]

[8]

OnOctober22,2004,theCApromulgateditsdecision, towit:

WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheassailedOrdersdatedJuly30andDecember29,2003are
hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 03106921, private respondents
complaintforissuanceoftemporaryrestrainingorder/writofpreliminaryinjunctionbeforeBranch37ofthe
RegionalTrialCourtofManila,isDISMISSEDforlackofmerit.
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SOORDERED.

Nerwinfiledamotionforreconsideration,buttheCAdeniedthemotiononFebruary9,2005.
[9]

Issues

Hence,Nerwinappeals,raisingthefollowingissues:

I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the
issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme
Court,ongovernmentprojects.

II.WhetherornottheCAerredinorderingthedismissaloftheentirecaseonthebasisofRep.Act8975
whichprohibitstheissuanceonlyofapreliminaryinjunctionbutnotinjunctionasafinalremedy.

III.WhetherornottheCAerredindismissingthecaseconsideringthatitisalsoonefordamages.

Ruling

Thepetitionfails.

In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled and set aside the
assailedordersoftheRTCissuedonJuly20,2003andDecember29,2003,andwhyitaltogether
dismissedCivilCaseNo.03106921,asfollows:
It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respondent Judges issuance of a
preliminaryinjunction,ortheearlierTRO,forthatmatter.

RespondentJudgegravelyabusedhisdiscretioninentertaininganapplicationforTRO/preliminaryinjunction,
andworse,inissuingapreliminaryinjunctionthroughtheassailedorderenjoiningpetitionerssoughtbidding
foritsOILAWProject.ThesameisapalpableviolationofRA8975whichwasapprovedonNovember7,
2000, thus, already existing at the time respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders dated July 20 and
December29,2003.

Section3ofRA8975statesinnouncertainterms,thus:

Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunctions and

Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporaryrestrainingorder,preliminaryinjunctionorpreliminarymandatoryinjunctionagainstthe
government,oranyofitssubdivisions,officials,oranypersonorentity,whetherpublicorprivate,
actingunderthegovernmentsdirection,torestrain,prohibitorcompelthefollowingacts:
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xxx
(b)Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under
Section2hereof
xxx
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party,
including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such
bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of
extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is
issued,graveinjusticeandirreparableinjurywillarise.xxx

Thesaidproscriptionisnotentirelynew.RA8975merelysupersedesPD1818whichearlierunderscored
the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the
government.Thislawwas,infact,earlierupheldtohavesuchamandatorynaturebytheSupremeCourtin
anadministrativecaseagainstaJudge.

Moreover,tobolsterthesignificanceofthesaidprohibition,theSupremeCourthadthesameembodiedinits
AdministrativeCircularNo.112000whichreiteratesthebanonissuanceofTROorwritsofPreliminary
ProhibitoryorMandatoryInjunctionincasesinvolvingGovernmentInfrastructureProjects.Pertinent is the
rulinginNational Housing Authority vs. Allarde As regards the definition of infrastructure projects, the
Court stressed in Republic of the Phil. vs. Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha Construction: The term
infrastructure projects means construction, improvement and rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways,
airports,seaports,communicationfacilities,irrigation,floodcontrolanddrainage,watersupplyandsewerage
systems,shoreprotection,powerfacilities,nationalbuildings,schoolbuildings,hospitalbuildingsandother
relatedconstructionprojectsthatformpartofthegovernmentcapitalinvestment.

Thus,thereisnothingfromthelaworjurisprudence,orevenfromthefactsofthecase,thatwouldjustify
respondent Judges blatant disregard of a simple, comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818)
prohibitingtheissuanceofinjunctivewritsrelativetogovernmentinfrastructureprojects.Respondent Judge
did not even endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant case falls under the single exception
where the said proscription may not apply, i.e., when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
irreparableinjurywillarise.

RespondentJudgecouldnothavelegallydeclaredpetitionerindefaultbecause,inthefirstplace,heshould
nothavegivendue course to private respondents complaint for injunction.Indubitably, the assailed orders
wereissuedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.

[10]
Perforce,thisCourtnolongerseestheneedtoresolvetheothergroundsprofferedbypetitioners.

The CAs decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its discretion, firstly,
when it entertained the complaint of Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was
therebycontraveningtheexpressprovisionsofSection3andSection4ofRepublicActNo.8975
foritsseekingtoenjointhebiddingoutbyrespondentsoftheOILAWProjectand,secondly,when
itissuedtheTROandthewritofpreliminaryprohibitoryinjunction.

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Section3andSection4ofRepublicActNo.8975provide:

Section3.ProhibitionontheIssuanceofTemporaryRestrainingOrders,PreliminaryInjunctions
andPreliminaryMandatoryInjunctions.Nocourt,excepttheSupremeCourt,shallissueanytemporary
restrainingorder,preliminaryinjunctionorpreliminarymandatoryinjunctionagainstthegovernment,oranyof
its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the governments
direction,torestrain,prohibitorcompelthefollowingacts:

(a)Acquisition,clearanceanddevelopmentoftherightofwayand/orsiteorlocationofanynational
governmentproject

(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under

Section2hereof

(c)Commencement,prosecution,execution,implementation,operationofanysuchcontractorproject

(d)Terminationorrescissionofanysuchcontract/projectand

(e)Theundertakingorauthorizationofanyotherlawfulactivitynecessaryforsuchcontract/project.

Thisprohibitionshallapplyinallcases,disputesorcontroversiesinstitutedbyaprivateparty,including
butnotlimitedtocasesfiledbybiddersorthoseclaimingtohaverightsthroughsuchbiddersinvolvingsuch
contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutionalissue,suchthatunlessatemporaryrestrainingorderisissued,graveinjusticeandirreparable
injurywillarise.Theapplicantshallfileabond,inanamounttobefixedbythecourt,whichbondshallaccrue
infavorofthegovernmentifthecourtshouldfinallydecidethattheapplicantwasnotentitledtotherelief
sought.

If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if
appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a
rebiddingofthesame,withoutprejudicetoanyliabilitythattheguiltypartymayincurunderexistinglaws.

Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. Any temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunctionorpreliminarymandatoryinjunctionissuedinviolationofSection3hereofisvoidandof
noforceandeffect.

Thetextandtenoroftheprovisionsbeingclearandunambiguous,nothingwasleftfortheRTCto
doexcepttoenforcethemandtoexactuponNerwinobediencetothem.TheRTCcouldnothave
beenunawareoftheprohibitionunderRepublicActNo.8975consideringthattheCourthaditself
instructedalljudgesandjusticesofthelowercourts,throughAdministrativeCircularNo.112000,to
comply with and respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary
prohibitoryormandatoryinjunctioninvolvingcontractsandprojectsoftheGovernment.

ItisofgreatrelevancetomentionatthisjuncturethatJudgeVicenteA.Hidalgo,thePresidingJudge
ofBranch37oftheRTC,thebranchtowhichCivilCaseNo.03106921hadbeenraffled,wasinfact
already found administratively liable for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law as the
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resultofhisissuanceoftheassailedTROandwritofpreliminaryprohibitoryinjunction.TheCourt
could only fine him in the amount of P40,000.00 last August 6, 2008 in view of his intervening
retirement from the service. That sanction was meted on him in A.M. No. RTJ082133 entitled
Sinsuatv.Hidalgo,

[11]
wherethisCourtstated:

The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross misconduct. As the CA explained in its
abovestatedDecisioninthepetitionforcertiorari,respondentfailedtoheedthemandatorybanimposedby
P.D.No.1818andR.A.No.8975againstagovernmentinfrastructureproject,whichtheruralelectrification
project certainly was. He thereby likewise obstinately disregarded this Courts various circulars enjoining
courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against government infrastructure projects in line with the
proscription under R.A. No. 8975. Apropos are Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Burgos and National Housing
Authority v. Hon. Allarde wherein this Court stressed that P.D. No. 1818 expressly deprives courts of
jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of a government infrastructure
project.

Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in Atty. Caguioa v. Judge Lavia
faultedajudgeforgravemisconductforissuingaTROagainstagovernmentinfrastructureprojectthus:

xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning a misunderstanding of the law or openly
manifestingacontumaciousindifferencethereto.Inanycase,hisdisregardoftheclearmandateof
PD 1818, as well as of the Supreme Court Circulars enjoining strict compliance therewith,
constitutes grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. His
claimthatthesaidstatuteisinapplicabletohisJanuary21,1997OrderextendingthedubiousTRO
isbutacontrivedsubterfugetoevadeadministrativeliability.

Inresolvingmattersinlitigation,judgesshouldendeavorassiduouslytoascertainthe
facts and the applicable laws. Moreover, they should exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintancewithstatutesandproceduralrules.Also,theyareexpectedtokeepabreast
of and be conversant with the rules and the circulars which the Supreme Court has
adoptedandwhichaffectthedispositionofcasesbeforethem.

Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in the
performance of their judicial functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable
termsofthelawobviatesthispresumptionandrendersthemsusceptibletoadministrative
sanctions.(Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)

ThepronouncementsinCaguioaapplyaswelltorespondent.

The questioned acts of respondent also constitute gross ignorance of the law for being patently in
disregard of simple, elementary and wellknown rules which judges are expected to know and apply
properly.

IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, which are
seriouschargesunderSection8ofRule140oftheRulesofCourt.Hehavingretiredfromtheservice,afine
intheamountofP40,000isimposeduponhim,themaximumamountfixedunderSection11ofRule140as
[12]
analternativesanctiontodismissalorsuspension.

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EvenastheforegoingoutcomehasrenderedanyfurthertreatmentanddiscussionofNerwins
other submissions superfluous and unnecessary, the Court notes that the RTC did not properly
appreciatetherealnatureandtruepurposeoftheinjunctiveremedy.ThisfailingoftheRTCpresses
theCourttousethisdecisiontoreiteratethenormsandparameterslongstandingjurisprudencehas
settocontroltheissuanceofTROsandwritsofinjunction,andtonowinsistonconformitytothem
by all litigants and lower courts. Only thereby may the grave misconduct committed in Civil Case
No.03106921beavoided.

Apreliminaryinjunctionisanordergrantedatanystageofanactionorproceedingpriorto
the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or person, to refrain from a
particularactoracts.

[13]

Itisanancillaryorpreventiveremedyresortedtobyalitiganttoprotector

preservehisrightsorinterestsduringthependencyofthecase.Assuch,itisissuedonlywhenitis
establishedthat:

(a)Theapplicantisentitledtothereliefdemanded,andthewholeorpartofsuchrelief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetuallyor

(b)Thecommission,continuanceornonperformanceoftheactoractscomplainedof
duringthelitigationwouldprobablyworkinjusticetotheapplicantor

(c)Aparty,court,agencyorapersonisdoing,threatening,orisattemptingtodo,oris
procuringorsufferingtobedone,someactoractsprobablyinviolationoftherights
of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
renderthejudgmentineffectual.

[14]

Theexistenceofarighttobeprotectedbytheinjunctivereliefisindispensable.InCityGovernment
of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc.,

[15]

the Court elaborated on this

requirement,viz:

Aswithallequitableremedies,injunctionmustbeissuedonlyattheinstanceofapartywhopossesses
sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the
applicantappearstobeentitledtothereliefdemandedinthecomplaint,whichmustavertheexistenceofthe
rightandtheviolationoftheright,orwhoseavermentsmustintheminimumconstituteaprimafacieshowing
ofarighttothefinalreliefsought.Accordingly,theconditionsfortheissuanceoftheinjunctivewritare:(a)
thattherighttobeprotectedexistsprimafacie(b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that
rightand(c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An
injunctionwillnotissuetoprotectarightnotinesse,orarightwhichismerelycontingentandmay
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neverariseortorestrainanactwhichdoesnotgiverisetoacauseofactionortopreventthe
perpetrationofanactprohibitedbystatute.Indeed,aright,tobeprotectedbyinjunction,meansa
[16]
rightclearlyfoundedonorgrantedbylaworisenforceableasamatteroflaw.

Conclusiveproofoftheexistenceoftherighttobeprotectedisnotdemanded,however,for,asthe
CourthasheldinSaulogv.CourtofAppeals,

[17]
itisenoughthat:

xxxforthecourttoact,theremustbeanexistingbasisoffactsaffordingapresentrightwhichis
directlythreatenedbyanactsoughttobeenjoined.Andwhileaclearshowingoftherightclaimedis
necessary,itsexistenceneednotbeconclusivelyestablished.Infact,theevidencetobesubmittedto
justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete but need only be a
samplingintendedmerelytogivethecourtanideaofthejustificationforthepreliminaryinjunctionpendingthe
decision of the case on the merits. This should really be so since our concern here involves only the
proprietyofthepreliminaryinjunctionandnotthemeritsofthecasestillpendingwiththetrialcourt.

Thus,tobeentitledtothewritofpreliminaryinjunction,theprivaterespondentneedsonlytoshowthatit
[18]
hastheostensiblerighttothefinalreliefprayedforinitscomplaintxxx.

In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial courts considering that
conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ more often than not involve and require a
factualdeterminationthatisnotthefunctionoftheappellatecourts.

[19]
Nonetheless,theexerciseof

such discretion must be sound, that is, the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be
uponthegroundsandinthemannerprovidedbylaw.

[20]
Whenthatisdone,theexerciseofsound

discretionbytheissuingcourtininjunctivemattersmustnotbeinterferedwithexceptwhenthereis
manifestabuse.

[21]

Moreover,judgesdealingwithapplicationsfortheinjunctivereliefoughttobewaryofimprovidently
or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of injunction that tend todispose of the merits without or
before trial. Granting an application for the relief in disregard of that tendency is judicially
impermissible,

[22]

merits of a case,

for it is never the function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the

[23]

or to decide controverted facts.

missionistopreventthreatenedwrong,

[25]

[24]

furtherinjury,

It is but a preventive remedy whose only

[26]

[27]

andirreparableharm

[28]

orinjustice

untiltherightsofthepartiescanbesettled.Judgesshouldthuslookatsuchreliefonlyasameans
to protect the ability of their courts to render a meaningful decision.

[29]

Foremost in their minds

should be to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of

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properreliefsafteratrialonthemerits.

[30]

Itiswellworthrememberingthatthewritofpreliminary

injunction should issue only to prevent the threatened continuous and irremediable injury to the
applicantbeforetheclaimcanbejustlyandthoroughlystudiedandadjudicated.

[31]

WHEREFORE,theCourtAFFIRMSthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsandORDERS
petitionertopaythecostsofsuit.

TheCourtAdministratorshalldisseminatethisdecisiontothelowercourtsfortheirguidance.

SOORDERED.

LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice
Chairperson

TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTROARTUROD.BRION
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJustice

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CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinion
oftheCourtsDivision.

RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice

*ViceAssociateJusticeMarianoC.DelCastillowhoconcurredwiththedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals,pursuanttotheraffleofApril11,
2012.
[1]
AnActtoEnsuretheExpeditiousImplementationandCompletionofGovernmentInfrastructureProjectsbyProhibitingLowerCourts
from issuing Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions, Providing Penalties for
Violationsthereof,andforOtherPurposes.
[2]
Rollo,pp.1121pennedbyAssociateJusticeMagdangalM.DeLeon,andconcurredinbyAssociateJusticesRomeoA.Brawner(later
PresidingJustice)andAssociateJusticeMarianoC.DelCastillo(nowaMemberofthisCourt).
[3]
Id.,p.14.
[4]
Id.,pp.1415.
[5]
Id.,p.15.
[6]
Id.,p.16.
[7]
Id.,p.60.
[8]
Supra,note2.
[9]
Rollopp.6769pennedbyAssociateJusticeMagdangalDeLeon,andconcurredinbyAssociateJusticeBrawnerandAssociateJustice
DelCastillo.
[10]
Boldunderscoringispartoforiginaltext.
[11]
561SCRA38.
[12]
Sinsuatv.Hidalgo,A.M.No.RTJ082133,August6,2008,561SCRA38,4850.
[13]
Sec.1,Rule58,1997RulesofCivilProcedure.
[14]
Sec.3,Rule58,1997RulesofCivilProcedure.
[15]
G.R.No.157315,December1,2010,636SCRA320.
[16]
CityGovernmentofButuanv.ConsolidatedBroadcastingSystem(BS),Inc.,G.R.No.157315,December1,2010,636SCRA320,336337
(Boldemphasissupplied).
[17]
Saulogv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.119769,September18,1996,262SCRA51.
[18]
Id.,p.60(Boldemphasissupplied).
[19]
Urbanes,Jr.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.117964,March28,2001,355SCRA537,548.
[20]
RepublicTelecommunicationsHoldings,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.135074,January29,1999,302SCRA403,409.
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[21]
Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. 64220, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 622, 628 S & A Gaisano, Inc. v. Judge
HidalgoG.R.No.80397,December10,1990,192SCRA224,229Genoblazov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.79303,June20,1989,174SCRA
124,133.
[22]
SearthCommoditiesCorporationv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.64220,March31,1992,207SCRA622,629630Rivasv.Securitiesand
ExchangeCommission,G.R.No.53772,October4,1990,190SCRA295,305GovernmentServiceInsuranceSystemv. Florendo, G.R. No.
48603,September29,1989,178SCRA76,8889Ortigasv.Co.Ltd.Partnershipv.CourtofAppeals,No.L79128,June16,1988,162SCRA
165,169.
[23]
43CJSInjunctions5,citingB.W.PhotoUtilitiesv.RepublicMoldingCorporation,C.A.Cal.,280F.2d806Duckworthv.James,C.A.
Va.267F.2d224WestinghouseElectricCorporationv.FreeSewingMachineCo.,C.A.Ill,256F.2d806.
[24]
43CJSInjunctions5,citingLonerganv.CrucibleSteelCo.ofAmerica,229N.E.2d536,37Ill.2d599Comptonv.PaulK.Harding
RealtyCo.,285N.E.2d574,580.
[25]
Doeskin Products, Inc. v. United Paper Co., C. A. Ill., 195 F. 2d 356 Benson Hotel Corp. v. Woods, C. C. A. Minn., 168 F. 2d 694
Spickermanv.Sproul,328P.2d87,138Colo.13UnitedStatesv.NationalPlastikwearFashions,368F.2d845.
[26]
CareerPlacementofWhitePlains,Inc.v.Vaus,354N.Y.S.2d764,77Misc.2d788Toushinv.CityofChicago,320N.E.2d202,23Ill.
App.3d797H.K.H.DevelopmentCorporationv.MetropolitanSanitaryDistrictofGreaterChicago,196N.E.,2d494,47Ill.App.46.
[27]
ExhibitorsPosterExchange,Inc.v.NationalScreenServiceCorp.,C.A.La.,441F.2d560MarineCooks&Stewards,AFLv.Panama
S.S.Co.,C.A.Wash.,362U.S.365.
[28]
CityofClevelandv.Division268ofAmalgamatedAssociationofSt.Elec.Ry.&MotorCoachEmp.OfAmerica,81.N.E.2d310,84
OhioApp.43Slottv.PlasticFabricators,Inc.,167A.2d306,402Pa.433.
[29]
Meisv.SanitasServiceCorporation,C.A.Tex.,511F.2d655Gobelv.Laing,12OhioApp.2d93.
[30]
UnitedStatesv.AdlersCreamery,C.C.A.N.Y.,107F.2d987AmericanMercuryv.Kiely,C.C.A.N.Y.,19F.2d295.
[31]
Republicv.Silerio,G.R.No.108869,May6,1997,272SCRA280,287.

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