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ENBANC

[G.R.No.146865.February18,2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ELGIN LATAYADA (at large),

appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN,J.:

When the evidence falls short of proving all the elements of carnapping with homicide, but the
killing is conclusively established, the accused may be convicted only of homicide when the
Informationdoesnotallegeanyqualifyingcircumstance.
TheCase
ForautomaticreviewbeforethisCourtistheDecember29,2000Decision[1]oftheRegionalTrial
Court(RTC)ofCagayandeOroCity(Branch18)inCriminalCaseNo.97917,findingElginLatayada
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with homicide. The decretal portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby nds accused ELGIN LATAYADA,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE, in violation of RA
6539, known as Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended by Sec. 20 of Republic Act 7659, and there being one
generic aggravating circumstance of treachery without any mitigating circumstances, the said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. He is also directed to pay the heirs of
the victim the sum of P18,899.70 as hospitalization expenses, another P7,300.00 as burial expenses, P50,000.00
moral damages and further directed to pay the cost of this proceeding. Let another Warrant of Arrest be issued to
the convict for him to serve his sentence. Pursuant to R.A. 7975 and Rule 122, Sec. 10 of the Rules of Court, let
the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.[2]
InanInformationdatedMarch7,1997,appellantwaschargedwithcarnappingwithhomicideas
follows:
That on or about 6:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, of October 29, 1995 at Sitio Hanopolan, Claveria,
Misamis Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and drive away one (1) unit Honda TMX Motorcycle, color blue, bearing plate No. 9B-6096-T, with
Serial Chassis No. 951-50025, with Motor No. KCOIE-028425 PH, Model 1995, owned and belonging to
Rodrigo Estrada, valued at P63,000.00 to his damage and prejudice and in the course of the commission of the
carnapping of the vehicle, accused with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stab one Pedro Payla, the driver of the motorcycle, with the use of a sharp bladed weapon, thus hitting the victim
on different parts of his body causing his death thereafter.[3]
DuringhisarraignmentonSeptember12,1997,[4]appellant,withtheassistanceofhiscounselde
oficio, [5] pleaded not guilty to the charge. After trial in due course, the court a quo rendered the
assailedDecision.
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TheFacts
VersionoftheProsecution
InitsBrief,theOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG)quotedfromappellantsBriefthesummaryof
theevidencefortheprosecution,whichisasfollows:
Sometime on October 29, 1995 at about 6:00 o clock in the evening, Pedro Payla arrived at the house of Vicenta
Cordino at Sitio Hanopolan, Claveria, Misamis Oriental. Pedro Payla allegedly told Vicenta Dont be afraid,
Nang, I am the son of Lucia Payla, I was stabbed by Elgin Latayada, bring me to the hospital. Vicenta, who was
already old, then called her neighbor Joseph Tion for help and the latter responded. Joseph treated the wounds of
Pedro and asked what happened. Pedro allegedly told Joseph that Elgin asked to be brought to Hanopolan,
Claveria, Misamis Oriental. On their way, Elgin told Pedro to stop because he wanted to answer the call of
nature. After Elgin relieved himself, instead of boarding at the back of the motorcycle, he stabbed Pedro and
escaped on board the motorcycle.
When a passenger jeepney passed by, Pedro was loaded and brought to Claveria Hospital. When they passed by a
police station, the conductor of the passenger jeep reported the stabbing incident. At Claveria Hospital, Pedros
wound was treated and sutured. However, due to inadequate medical facilities at Claveria Hospital, the doctor
thereat advised Gina Payla, wife of Pedro, to bring Pedro to Cagayan de Oro. On that same night, Pedro Payla
was brought to [the] Medical Center in Cagayan De Oro City. Pedro died on October 30, 1995.
On October 30, 1995, at around 9:00 oclock in the morning, Gina Payla, Pedros wife, was able to converse with
him. Again, Pedro pointed to appellant as his assailant and further narrated the circumstances surrounding his
stabbing.
At around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, SPO1 Victorino Busalla arrived at the hospital and then
proceeded to take the ante-mortem statement of Pedro. Pedro could not write because of his injuries; hence, he
placed his thumb mark using his own blood in lieu of his signature on the said statement. The same statement
was signed by Gina Payla who was present when the statement was taken. Pedro died on the same day.
The motorcycle driven by Pedro with Chassis No. 951-50025, color blue, was originally owned by Rodrigo
Estrada. He later sold the same to [Kagawad Verano] Caabay for P10,000.00. It was [Kagawad] Caabay who had
an arrangement with Pedro regarding the use of the motorcycle to transport passengers.
The motorcycle was recovered only on November 4, 1995, already cannibalized, at Cugman, Cagayan de Oro
City.
After the prosecution rested its case on June 21, 2002, appellant escaped from prison which is evidenced by a
Notice of Escape submitted to the court a quo. He has remained at large.[6] (Citations omitted)
VersionoftheDefense
InitsBrief,thedefenseaverredthattheaccusedhadescapedfromjailafterthepresentationof
theprosecutionsevidence[7]andthereforefailedtotestify.
RulingoftheTrialCourt

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The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with homicide. Held as
partoftheresgestaewerePedroPaylasstatementsutteredbeforehisdeathtohiswife,Ginaandto
ProsecutionWitnessesJosephTionandVicentaCordinothatitwasappellantwhohadstabbedhim.
His Statement taken by a police officer a day after the incident and on the same day he died, was
admittedbythecourtaquoasadyingdeclaration.Itadmittedthesepiecesofprosecutionevidence
asexceptionstothehearsayrule.
The lower court also ruled that circumstantial evidence indicated that appellant was responsible
forthedisappearanceofthemotorcycle.
Further,theRTCupheldJosephTionstestimonythatonthepretextofwantingtoanswerthecall
of nature, the accused had asked Payla to stop the motorcycle and, without any warning or
provocation, stabbed the latter on the back. Finding treachery to have qualified the killing, the lower
courtimposedontheaccusedthesupremepenaltyofdeath.
Hence,thisautomaticreview.[8]
TheIssues
Inhis7pageBrief,appellantraisesthisloneerrorforourconsideration:
The trial court gravely erred in imposing the penalty of death upon the accused-appellant when x x x treachery
was not alleged in the Information either as [a] qualifying or as a generic aggravating circumstance.[9]
In addition to the issue raised by appellant, we find it proper to review first his conviction for
carnappingwithhomicide,aswellasthecivilliabilitiesimposedtherefor.Sinceanappealinacriminal
actionopensthewholecaseforreview,itbecomesthedutyofthisCourttocorrectanyerrorinthe
appealedjudgment,whetherithasbeenassignedornot.[10]
TheCourtsRuling
Theappealispartlymeritorious.Appellantisguiltyofhomicideonly,notcarnappingwithhomicide.
FirstIssue:
CulpabilityoftheAccused
In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required to prove two things beyond reasonable
doubt:first,thefactofthecommissionofthecrimecharged,orthepresenceofalltheelementsofthe
offenseandsecond,thefactthattheaccusedwastheperpetratorofthecrime.[11]
ElementsofCarnapping
withHomicide
The charge filed against appellant for which he was convicted carnapping with homicide is
punishableunderSection2,inrelationtoSection14ofRA6539[12]asamendedbyRA7659.[13]Under
Section 2 of RA 6539, carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
anotherwithoutthelattersconsentorbymeansofviolenceagainstorintimidationofpersonsorwith
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theuseofforceuponthings.Ontheotherhand,Section14ofthesameact,asamendedbyRA7659,
provides:
SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. --- Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is dened in
Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment
for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things, and by imprisonment
for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle
is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Italics supplied)
RA7659introducedthreeamendmentstothelastclauseofSection14:[14](1)thechangeofthe
penaltyfromlifeimprisonmenttoreclusionperpetua,(2)theinclusionofrape,and(3)thechangeof
thephraseinthecommissionofthecarnappingtointhecourseofthecommissionofthecarnapping
orontheoccasionthereof.[15]
TheCourthasheldthatthethirdamendmentclarifiestheintentionofthelawtomaketheoffense
aspecialcomplexcrime,inthesamewaythatrobberywithviolenceagainstorintimidationofpersons
is treated under paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).[16] Hence, the
prosecutionmustprovenotonlythattheessentialrequisitesofcarnapping[17]werepresentbutalso
thatitwastheoriginalcriminaldesignoftheculprit,andthatthekillingwasperpetratedinthecourse
of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.[18] In the present case, the
prosecution had the burden of proving that 1) appellant took the motorcycle 2) his original criminal
design was carnapping 3) he killed Payla and 4) the killing was perpetrated in the course of the
commissionofthecarnappingorontheoccasionthereof.
It is undisputed that the motorcycle driven by Payla had been taken without his consent on
October29,1995,andrecovereddayslaterinacannibalizedcondition.Theelementsoftakingand
intenttogainwerethusestablished.Theprosecutionalsoproveditwasappellantwhohadkilledhim.
Itfailed,however,todischargeitsburdenofprovingthetwootherrequisitesofcarnapping.
InsufficiencyofProof
ofCarnapping
Thetrialcourtsfindingwasthattherewasindeednodirectevidenceshowingthatappellanthad
takenthemotorcycledrivenbyPayla.[19]Theculpabilityoftheformerwasdeducedfromthefollowing
piecesofcircumstantialevidence:1)themotorcyclewasleftwithhimafterPaylahadrunforhislife2)
asshownbythepoliceblotter,thestabbingandcarnappingincidentwasimmediatelyreportedtothe
police3)thevehiclewasrecovered,itspartsmissing,fivedaysaftertheaccusedhadbeenarrested
onJune2,1997inCugman,CagayandeOroCity,whichwasonlyabout25kilometersfromthescene
of the crime and 4) the accused escaped while in detention at the provincial jail, 33 days after the
prosecutionhadresteditscase.
Tobesufficientforaconviction,circumstantialevidencemustprovethat(1)thereismorethanone
circumstance(2)thefactsfromwhichtheinferencesarederivedhavebeenestablishedand(3)the
combinationofallthecircumstancesissuchastoproduceaconvictionbeyondreasonabledoubt.[20]
Thepiecesofcircumstantialevidencemustalsoconstituteanunbrokenchainleadingtoonefairand
reasonableconclusion:thattheaccused,totheexclusionofallothers,istheguiltyperson.[21]
Thecircumstantialevidenceintheinstantcaseisnotsufficienttoshowthatappellantisguiltyof
carnapping.Onthecontrary,therecordsandthetranscriptsofstenographicnotesoftheproceedings

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castdoubtonthecorrectnessofthetrialcourtsconclusionthatafterstabbingPayla,hefledonboard
themotorcycleorwasthelastpersonseenwithit.
First,thereisnomentioninthepurportedantemortemStatement[22]ofPaylaorinhisstatementto
his wife and the other prosecution witnesses that appellant carnapped his motorcycle. Payla merely
statedthatappellanthadstabbedhimtwiceinthebackandonceintheface.Infact,theformerdidnot
knowwhyhehadbeenstabbed,ashesaidinresponsetoaqueryfromhiswife[23]andfromJoseph
Tion.[24] If appellant had wanted to carnap the motorcyle, Payla would have pointed this out as the
reasonfortheattack.Yet,therecordsshowthattheformerintendedonlytokillthelatter.Tiontestified
asfollows:
PROS.B.APEPE:xxx
QSoafterPedroPaylatoldyouthathewasstabbedatthebacktwicebyElginLatayada,whatelse
happenedaccordingtoPedroPayla,ifany?
AAfterhewasstabbedtwice,heaskedElginwhatisthisnowandElginLatayadaansweredthat[D]ontask
questionsanymore,thisiskillingalready[]andafterthat,Elginstabbedhim(PedroPayla)onhisleft
cheek(witnesspointingtoportionofhisleftcheekbelowtheear)andPedroPaylaranawayleaving
hismotorcyclebehind.
QWheredidPaylagoxxxwhenheranaway?
ATTYBAGABUYO:
Weobject,yourHonor.
COURT:
Onwhatground?
ATTY.BAGABUYO:
Hejustranaway.
COURT:(tothewitness)
QDidhetellyouwhereheranawayto?
AYes,yourHonor,tothehouseofMrs.Condino.
PROS.B.APEPE:
QDid he tell you where was Elgin Latayada after he ran towards the direction of the house of Mrs.
Condino?
ANo,sir,ElginLatayadafollowedhim(P.Payla)about30metersfromwherethemotorcyclewasand
afterthatdistance,IdontknowanymorewhereElginLatayadaproceeded.[25]

Ontheotherhand,GinaPaylatestifiedinthiswise:
QWhenyourhusbandtoldyouthatitwasElginLatayadawhostabbedhim,didyouaskhimwhy?
AYes,sir,IaskedmyhusbandwhyxxxElginLatayadastabbedhimandheanswered[I]donotknow
whyhestabbedme[]andItoldhimmaybeyouhaveamisunderstandingwithhimandhetoldme
theyhavenomisunderstanding.InfactmyhusbandandElginLatayadaareschoolmatesbefore
andinfacttheyarealsobarkadaorfriend[s].xxx[T]hattime,Elginrequestedhimtobringhimto
Hinopolanbutmyhusbandtoldhim[]NoGaw,IcannotbringyoutherebecauseIamgoingtogo
home[]butElgininsistedtobringhimtothatplaceandhewillpayP30.00.[M]yhusbandagreed
andwhentheywereintheisolatedplacejustbeforethehouseofCondino,Elgintoldmyhusband
Gaw, stop the motor because I am going to urinate so my husband stopped the motor[cycle].
When Elgin rode at the back of the motorcycle], Elgin tapped the back of my husband (witness
demonstrating by placing her two hands on her back just below the shoulder) and when my
husbandstartedthemotor[cy]cle,putmoregasontheengine,rightthereandthenElginstabbed
myhusband(witnesspointingtoherbackrightbelowhisleftshoulder)andafterthathepulledout
theknifeandagainstabbedhim(witnesspointingtoherbackjustbelowherrightback)andmy
husbandsaidWhatisthisGaw,isthiskillingalready?andElginansweredYes,Gaw,acceptyour
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lastmomentandafterthathewasabouttostabmyhusbandxxx(witnesspointingtotheleftside
ofhern[e]ck)butmyhusbandwasabletocrouchandthatiswhyhewashitontheleftcheekand
hewasabletoruntowardsthehouseofCondino.[26](Italicssupplied)

Second, still according to Tions testimony, appellant followed Payla for about 30 meters from
wherethemotorcyclestood,thenstabbedthelatter,whothenrantoVicentaCondinoshouseforhelp.
[27]
Thereisnoevidenceshowingthatappellantwentbacktotakethemotorcyclehence,thereisno
basis for concluding that he stole it. On crossexamination, Tion wavered on whether it was his
neighborhereinappellantwhomhehadseenwiththemotorcyclewhentheformertriedtoretrieve
it.ItislikewiseunclearfromthetestimonyofTionwhetherthemotorcyclewasalreadymissingatthe
time.Hefurthertestifiedthus:
ATTY.R.BAGABUYO:(xxx)
QYoustatedhereinthisaffidavitthatyouwenttowherethemotorcyclewasdrivenbyPedroPaylato
usethesameintransportingPedroPaylatothehospital?
AYes,sir.
QAndwereyoualoneingoingthere?
AYes,sir.
QAndyousawthemotorcycledrivenbyPedroPayla,isitnot?
ANo,sir.
QWhenyousaid,sadihaakonauntakuhaonangMotorngagimanihoniPedro,aronmaoyamong
sakyanpaingon sa hospital, naa may tawo nga nagsandig sa motor ug nag tanao kanamo nga
nagpaingon dito sa motor . . . , which x x x in English means, when I was about to get the
motorcycledrivenbyPedroforthepurposeofusingitintransportinghim(Pedro)tothehospital,I
sawapersonstandingbythemotorcycle[,]hewaslookingatus.Whatdoyoumeanbythat?
COURT:(tothewitness)
QBeforethat,whichiswhich,youtoldtheCourtjustnowinyourlastanswerthatthemotorcyclewas
not already there, you did not find the motorcycle there, but in your affidavit, you said the
motorcycle was there and there was somebody standing near the motorcycle, which is which,
whichiscorrect?Whatisyouranswer?
AWhat happened, sir, was that as we were about to go to that direction, we met on the way some
peopleandwewerenotsureiftheseweretheoneswhostabbed[Payla],sowewerereluctantto
proceed,thatswhywedidnotgoanymore.
QWhenyousaywe,whomareyoureferringto,whowaswithyouwhenyouwereonthewaytogo
there?
AThemembersofMrs.Condinoshouseholdparticularlyhergrandchildrenandchildren.
QHowmanywereyouwhowentthereontheway?
ATherewere4or5ofus,Iwasnotsosurebecausetheywereonlyfollowingme.
QDid you not say a while ago that you were alone when you went to the motorcycle, you went by
yourself?
AActually,itwasIwhosuggestedtogotowherethemotorcyclewas,Iwentaheadandtheyfollowed.
xxxIbelieveitwasonlytheirapprehensionastowhatwillhappentomethatswhytheyfollowed.
Q You told the Court that you asked Pedro Payla when you arrived at the Condinos house or
residence, you asked Pedro Payla several times who stabbed him. [And] several times he
answered,hetoldyouthatitwasElginLatayada,youremembertellingtheCourtthen?
AYes,sir.
QAndyoualsotoldtheCourtthatevenbeforethatdateyoualreadyknewElginLatayadaforalong
timebecause,infact,youwereneighbors,isnotthatcorrect?
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AYes,sir.
QAlright,thosepeoplewhomyoumet,bytheway,yousaidyoumetsomepeoplewhenyouwereon
thewaytowherethemotorcyclewas,howmanyweretheywhomyoumetontheway?
AOnlyone(1),sir.
QThispersonwhomyoumetonthewaywasnotElginLatayada?
AItwasnotElginLatayada.
QAnd yet, youre telling the Court that you were somewhat reluctant or worr[ied] to proceed farther
because that person you met might have been the one x x x responsible, and yet you told the
CourtthatwhatPedroPaylatoldyouthatitwasElginLatayadaandthepersonyoumetwasnot
Elgin Latayada, how come? Explain to the Court why did you think that probably this was the
person thats responsible when Pedro Payla already told you that it was Elgin Latayada and this
personyoumetwasnotElginLatayada?YouexplaintotheCourt.
A Actually, it did not enter my mind whether that person I met was the one responsible or the
perpetratorinPedroPaylaswounding,thatdidnotentermymind.
Q[W]henyoufirsttestifiedonthatparticularpointyousaidtherewerepeopleyoumetthatswhythe
question now did you not tell the Court a while ago that you were reluctant to go any farther
becausethosemightbethepersons?
PROS.B.APEPE:
Hesaidhemetonlyone(1)person.
Q Alright, let me clarify that point. Earlier on you said on the way to the motorcycle you met some
people then later on x x x, you said there was only one person you met on the way, which
statementiscorrect,yourstatementthatyoumetsomepeopleoryourlateststatementthatthere
wasonlyone?
AIonlymetoneperson,sir.[I]nfact,whenwepass[ed],hewasatadistanceandIcouldnotclearly
seewhohewas.
QSo,ineffect,youarecorrectingwhatyousaidearlierthatthereweresomepeopleyoumetbecause
actually,therewasonlyonepersonyoumet?
AYes,sir.
QAnd you said just now that that person is somewhat at a distance, you could not recognize really
whohewas,thatiswhatyousaidjustnow,isitnotcorrect?
AYes,sir.
QDidyounottelltheCourtwhenIwasaskingyouearlier,[and]thatyousoundedtobequitesure,that
thatpersonyoumetwasnotElginLatayada,youtoldtheCourtthatearlier,isntit?
AYes,sir.
QNowyouaretellingtheCourtthatyoucannotclearlyseeoridentifyandyetyoutoldtheCourtearlier
thatthatwasnotElginLatayada?
PROS.B.APEPE:
Whathesaid,YourHonor,wastheydidnotactuallymeeteachother.
COURT:
QYes,yousaidthatyousawthepersononlyfromadistancethatswhyyoucouldnotclearlyseeor
identifywhohewasbutearlieryoutoldtheCourtthattheoneyoumetwasnotElginLatayada?
YoutrytoexplaintotheCourt.
AItwasonlymyassumption.Ibaseditonhisphysicalappearance,built,thewayhecarr[ied]himself,
thewayhewalk[ed]andIthoughtthatthisisnotElginLatayadabythewayhewalk[ed].
QAlright,proceedcounsel.Youhavemorequestions?
ATTY.R.BAGABUYO:
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Yes,YourHonor,basedonthisquestionandanswer.
QNow,yousaidyoumetnotmanybutone[person]onyourwaytothemotorcycle,isthatcorrect?
AYes,sir.
QAndtherefore,thepersonyoumetwasnotgoingtothatmotorcyclebutawayfromthemotorcycle,
correct?
AHewasgoingup,sir.
QInyouraffidavitonparagraph6,yousaidyousawapersonstandingbythemotorcycle.Kindlylook
againatyouraffidavit?
ANo,sir,thisisnotcorrect.Wewereonourwaytothemotorcyclewhenwemetthatperson.
QIsitnotafactthatbeforeI[had]thisAffidavitmarked,xxxIallowedyoutoreaditandafterreading
it,Iaskedyouwhetheryouaregoingtoaffirmandconfirmthestatementintheaffidavit?
AThisportionwasnotverycleartome(witnessreferringto1B).
Q Is it not also a fact that you x x x mentioned that you read that affidavit before you affixed your
signature?
AYes,sir.
QAtthetimexxxyoureadtheaffidavit,youreadtheentirecontentsofthisaffidavitmarkednowas
Exhibit1,isitnot?
AYes,sir.
QAnd at that time, you found the Question and Answer on paragraph 6 to be true and correct, is it
not?
AYes,sir.
QNow,youaresayingthatthatisnotcorrect,isthatwhatyouaresaying?
ANo,sir,thepolicemanwhowastakingthisaffidavitdidnotgetmecorrectlyuponmystatementhere,
maybethepolicemanbasedthis[on]thestatementofMrs.Condinoxxxthathergrandchildren
wenttotheplacewherethemotorcyclewas[.B]utactually,Ididnotgotowherethemotorcycle
was[. Maybe] this statement here was based by the policeman who made this affidavit on what
Mrs.Condinotoldthem.
QButatthetimewhenyoureadthisoneyoudidnottellthepolicemanthatthatisnotcorrect,isitnot?
AIdidnot,sir.
QAsamatteroffact,youdidnottellanybodyuntilnowthatthatisnotcorrect?
AYes,sir.
QWhatisthetruththatyoudidnotevenattempttogotowherethemotorcyclewas,isthatthetruth?
AThetruthisthatwetriedtogotowherethemotorcyclewasbutwewereonly10metersawayfrom
thehouseoftheCondinos.
QAndwhatmadeyoudecidenottoproceed?
COURT:
Healreadyexplain[ed]that.[28](Italicssupplied)

Onwhetherthestabbingandcarnappingincidentwasimmediatelyreportedtothepolice,sufficeit
tostatethatentriesinthepoliceblottershouldnotbegivenunduesignificanceorprobativevalue,for
thesearenormallyincompleteandinaccurate.[29]Thisdictumappliestothepresentcasewithgreater
force, because the report was made by a truck conductor[30] who was a complete stranger to the
incident.

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Asthecarnappingbyappellantwasnotprovedbeyondreasonabledoubt,itcannotbesaidthat
thekillingofPaylawasanincidentthereof,orthatitwascommittedinthecourseofthecarnappingor
on the occasion thereof. The provisions of the AntiCarnapping Act are therefore inapplicable. The
killingofPaylaispunishableundertheRevisedPenalCode,eitherashomicideorasmurder.[31]
ProofofHomicideSufficient
WenowgototheissueoftheculpabilityofappellantforthekillingofPayla.InhisComment[32]to
theprosecutionsFormalOfferofExhibits,theformerquestionedtheadmissibilityofthelattersalleged
antemortem Statement or dying declaration, which had been taken by SPO1 Victorino Q. Busalla.
AskingtheRTCtodisregardtheStatement,appellantpointedoutthatwhenitwasmade,Paylawas
unaware of his impending death. He also averred that on it appeared a thumbprint that allegedly
belongedtoPayla,butthathasnotbeenauthenticated.
Adyingdeclarationpertainstoonesstatement,madeunderaconsciousnessofimpendingdeath,
onthecauseandthesurroundingcircumstancesthereof.Itisgivencredenceonthepremisethat
noonewhoknowsofonesimpendingdeathwillmakeacarelessandfalseaccusation.[34]
[33]

Foradyingdeclarationtobeadmissibleinevidence,itmustbeshownthat1)deathwasimminent
and the declarant was conscious of that fact 2) the declaration refers to the cause and the
surrounding circumstances of the death 3) the declaration relates to facts that the victim was
competent to testify on 4) the declarant thereafter died and 5) the declaration is being offered in a
criminalcaseinwhichthedeclarantsdeathisthesubjectofinquiry.[35]
True,Paylamadenoexpressstatementshowingthathewasconsciousofhisimpendingdeath.
Thelaw,however,doesnotrequirethedeclaranttostateexplicitlyaperceptionoftheinevitabilityof
death.[36]Theforebodingmaybegleanedfromsurroundingcircumstances,suchasthenatureofthe
declarants injury and conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was consciousness of
impendingdeath.[37]
Inthiscase,Paylacouldnottalkwhenhiswifearrivedatthemunicipalhospitalwherehehadfirst
beenbrought.[38]Hekeptmoaninginpainandbleedingprofuselyfromthestabwoundsonhisback,
whilehewasbeingtransportedtothemedicalcenterinCagayandeOroCity.[39]Withinminutesafter
arriving there, he lost consciousness[40] as a result of one of the stab wounds that penetrated his
lungs.[41]Onthemorningbeforehedied,inhiswifespresencehelamentedthathecouldnolonger
raisehischildrenasaresultofhiscondition.[42]Hediedabouteighthoursafterexecutinghiswritten
StatementbeforeSPOIBusalla.[43]
There is no merit in the averment that the thumbmark of the victim, imprinted on his Statement
with his own blood, has not been authenticated. His wife, Gina, testified that he could not sign the
Statementbecauseofthewoundonhisbackbelowhisrightshoulder.[44]Thus,SPO1Busallaheldthe
handofherhusbandandimprintedthelattersthumbmarkontheStatement,[45]whichshesigned [46]
asawitness.
Her testimony was corroborated by SPO1 Busalla. As the police officer[47] who had taken the
Statement of the victim, the former identified the thumbprint appearing thereon as the latters.[48]
Further testifying that Payla could no longer move his hand to sign the Statement, SPO1 Busalla
allegedlyplacedtheformersrightthumbprintonit,usingasinktheblooddrawnfromtheleftsideof
thevictimsface.[49]
In the light of these circumstances, the trial court did not err in admitting Paylas antemortem
Statement.

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ResGestae
No error was committed, either, when the trial court admitted the testimonies of Gina, Vicente
Condino and Joseph Tion on the declaration of Payla that it was appellant who stabbed him. The
utterancesseparatelymadebythevictimtoeachofthewitnesseswerecorrectlyappreciatedaspart
of the res gestae, since they had been made immediately after a startling occurrence[50] and had
complied with the following requirements: 1) the statements were spontaneous 2) they were made
immediately before, during and after the startling occurrence and 3) they related the circumstances
thereof.[51]
Most telling was the declaration made by Payla within minutes after the stabbing, and while he
wascallingforVicentaCondinotoaskforhelp.Condinotestifiedthus:
ATTY.I.LICO:xxx
QYourresidenceis[in]whatbarangay?
AAnopolan.
QWhattown?
AClaveria.
QDoyouownthehousewhereyouareliving?
AYes,sir.
QWherewereyouonOctober29,1995atabout6:00oclockintheafternoon?
AIwasinthehouse.
QDoyourecalliftherewasanunusualincidentthathappenedatth[at]time?
AYes,sir.
QKindlyrelatetotheHonorableCourtwhat[was]thisunusualincidentthathappenedonOctober29,
1995ataboutxxx6:00oclock.
AAtthattime,wewereabouttotakeoursupper.WhenIwasonthetable,somebodycameuptothe
kitchenandIwasafraidbecauseIdidnotknowhimandhetoldme[D]ontbeafraid,Nang,Iam
thesonofLuciaPayla,IwasstabbedbyElginLatayadaandbringmetothehospital.
QAndthenwhathappenedafterthat?
AI[had]myneighborJosephTioncalledandwhenhearrived,Itoldhim[he]willbetheonetobring
[Payla] to the municipal hospital and [to] inform his parents because I am old, I cannot manage
anymore.[52](Italicssupplied)

Verily,theutterancesofPaylatoCondinowereinstinctivelymadeatatimewhenhehadnomore
opportunity to concoct a fabricated version of the startling event hence, the words he spoke were
credible.[53]
In the same category were the statements uttered by Payla to his wife, Gina and to Tion. The
transcriptofstenographicnotesoftheproceedingsamplyshowsthatthevictimidentifiedappellantas
theassailant,andthattheformernarrateddetailsofthestabbingtohiswifeandtoTionshortlyafter
theincident.
SecondIssue:
Treachery
Appellant contends that the RTC erred in appreciating treachery, since it was not alleged as an
aggravatingcircumstanceintheInformationasrequiredbySections8and9oftheRevisedRulesof
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[54]

Court. Hearguesthatthemaximumpenaltythatmaybeimposedonhimisreclusionperpetua,not
death.TheOSGagreeswithhissubmission.
We sustain their position that treachery should not have been considered by the court a quo.
Sections8and9ofRule110oftheRevisedRulesofCourtrequirethatthecomplaintorinformation
shallstate,amongothers,thequalifyingandaggravatingcircumstancesasfollows:
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense
given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily
those in the language used in the statute but in terms sufcient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment. (Italics supplied)
Indeed,aperusaloftheInformationinthiscasereadilyrevealsthattreacherywasnotallegedas
anaggravatingoraqualifyingcircumstanceinthecommissionofthecrimecharged.Consistentwith
thenewRules,treacherymaynotbeappreciated,becauseitwasnotallegedintheInformation.[55]Itis
settledthatproceduralrulesareapplicabletoactionspendingandundeterminedatthetimetheywere
approved,especiallywhentheyaremorefavorabletotheaccused.[56]Intheabsenceofanyqualifying
circumstance,appellantmaybeconvictedofhomicideonly.
ThirdIssue:
PenaltyandIndemnity
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal, the range of which is 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. Since appellant escaped from
confinement after the prosecution had rested, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable.[57]
Therebeingnoaggravatingormitigatingcircumstances,heshouldbesentencedtoreclusiontemporal
initsmediumperiod.[58]
As to his civil liability, prevailing jurisprudence imposes the amount of P50,000 as indemnity ex
delicto for homicide.[59] The award of actual damages in the form of hospitalization and burial
expenses, which were adequately proved by receipts,[60] is affirmed. Being adequately supported by
theevidenceonrecord,thegrantofmoraldamagesintheamountofP50,000isalsoaffirmed.
In addition, the heirs of the victim must also be indemnified for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased.[61] The widow, Gina, testified that her husbands net daily income was P250.[62] She also
testified that they had three children,[63] and that the deceased was 27 years old at the time of his
death.[64]Thelossofearningcapacityisthuscomputedasfollows:[65]
Net earning capacity = life expectancy[66] x (gross annual income less
living expenses[67])
= 2 ( 80 - 27) x (P90,000[68] - P45,000)
3
= 35.33 x P45,000
= P1,589,850.00
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EffectofAppellantsEscape
Whenanappellantescapesdetentionpendingappeal,theappealisnormallydismissed,andthe
lowercourtsjudgmentthusbecomesfinalandexecutory.[69]However,thisCourthasheldinPeoplev.
Esparas,[70] People v. Prades,[71] and People v. Raquino [72] that this rule does not apply to death
cases,inwhichanautomaticreviewismandatedbylawevenifappellanthasabsconded.[73]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
CagayandeOroCity(Branch18)inCriminalCaseNo.97917isherebyMODIFIEDasfollows:
1.AppellantisfoundGUILTYofHOMICIDEandissentencedtosufferimprisonmentof14years,
8monthsand1day.
2.AppellantislikewiseorderedtopaytotheheirsofthedeceasedtheamountofP50,000ascivil
indemnityexdelicto,P26,199 as actual damages, P50,000 as moral damages, and P1 ,589,850 for
lossofearningcapacity.
Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria
Martinez,Corona,CarpioMorales,Callejo,Sr.,Azcuna,andTinga,JJ.,concur.
Vitug,J.,intheresult.
[1]Rollo,pp.2030.WrittenbyJudgeEdgardoT.Lloren.
[2]RTCDecision,p.10rollo,p.29.
[3]Rollo,p.10.SignedbyAssistantProvincialProsecutorMa.AnitaEsguerraLucagbo.
[4]SeeOrderdatedSeptember12,1997records,p.59.
[5]Atty.RogelioBagabuyo.
[6]Appellees Brief, pp. 35 rollo, pp. 9698. Signed by Solicitor General Simeon V. Marcelo, Assistant Solicitor General

AmparoM.CabotajeTang,andAssociateSolicitorJosephAndrewR.Salazar.
[7]AppellantsBrief,p.4rollo,p.61.SignedbyAtty.TeresitaS.deGuzmanandAtty.FranciscoL.SalomonofthePublic

AttorneysOffice(PAO).
[8]This case was deemed submitted for decision on December 27, 2002, upon receipt by this Court of appellants Reply

Brief.AppellantsBriefwasreceivedbythisCourtonMay15,2002appelleesBrief,onSeptember27,2002.
[9]AppellantsBrief,pp.45rollo,pp.6162.Originalinuppercase.
[10]Peoplev.Tolentino,380SCRA171,174,April3,2002Peoplev.Nuevo,420Phil.421,431,October26,2001.
[11]Peoplev.Santos,388Phil.993,1004,June8,2000.
[12]EntitledAntiCarnappingActof1972.
[13]OtherwiseknownastheDeathPenaltyLaw.
[14] Prior to its amendment, the last clause of Section 14 of RA 6539 was as follows: x x x and the penalty of life

imprisonmenttodeathshallbeimposedwhentheowner,driveroroccupantofthecarnappedvehicleiskilledin
thecommissionofthecarnapping.
[15]Peoplev.Santos,supra,p.1005Peoplev.Mejia,341Phil.118,142,July7,1997.
[16]Peoplev.Mejia,pp.142143.

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[17]The elements of carnapping are the following: 1) there is a taking of a motor vehicle that belongs to another 2) the

takingiswithouttheconsentoftheownerorbymeansofviolenceagainstorintimidationofpersonsorbytheuse
of force upon things and 3) the taking is done with intent to gain. (People v. Calabroso, 340 SCRA 332, 342,
September14,2000)
[18]Peoplev.Santos,supra.
[19]RTCDecision,pp.78rollo,pp.7172.
[20]Section4ofRule133oftheRulesofCourt.SeealsoPeoplev.Sirad,335SCRA114,124,July5,2000.
[21]Peoplev.Silvano,381SCRA607,619,April29,2002,citingPeoplev.Comesario,366Phil.62,67,April29,1999and

Peoplev.Canlas,372SCRA401,411,December14,2001.
[22]Records,p.15.TheEnglishtranslationappearsonp.358.
[23]TSN,November1012,1997.pp.6768.
[24]TSN,December9,1997,pp.810.
[25]TSN,December9,1997,pp.810pp.1011.
[26]TSN,November1012,1997,pp.6769.
[27]Supraatnote23.
[28]Id.,pp.3443.
[29]Peoplev.Mejia,341Phil.118,147,July7,1997citingPeoplev.Casinillo,213SCRA777,780,September11,1992.
[30]TSN,December9,1997,p.13.
[31]Peoplev.Santos,supra,p.1006.
[32]Records,pp.364365.
[33]Peoplev.Calago,381SCRA448,456,April22,2002Peoplev.Preciados,349SCRA1,19,January5,2001.
[34]Peoplev.Cortezano,375SCRA95,112,January29,2002.
[35]Peoplev.Amaca,342Phil.900,911,August12,1997Peoplev.Calago,supra,p.459Peoplev.Preciados,supra.
[36]Peoplev.Narca,341Phil.696,711,July21,1997.
[37]Peoplev.Calago,supra.
[38]TSN,November1012,1997,pp.3637.
[39]Id.,pp.5455.
[40]Id.,p.57.
[41]Id.,p.44.
[42]TSN,November1012,1997,p.77.
[43] Exhibit A records, p. 310. The Certificate of Death of Pedro Payla showed that he died at 9:30 p.m. at the CDG

MedicalCenterinCagayandeOroCity.
[44]TSN,November1012,1997,p.85.
[45]Id.,p.87.
[46]Id.,pp.8586.
[47]TSN,January23,1998,pp.1516.
[48]Id.,p.16
[49]Id.,pp.2223.
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[50]Peoplev.Mosende,371SCRA446,455,December5,2001.
[51]Peoplev.Amaca,supra,pp.914915.
[52]TSN,November1012,1997,pp.9294.
[53]Peoplev.Calago,supra.
[54]EffectiveJanuary1,2000.
[55]Peoplev.Baroy,382SCRA56,70,May9,2002Peoplev.Obosa,380SCRA22,35,April2,2002Peoplev.Vicente,

372SCRA765,775,December21,2001.
[56]Ibid.Peoplev.Labeo,373SCRA461,474,January16,2002Peoplev.DeGuzman,418Phil.625,641,October2,

2001Peoplev.Vicente,id.,pp.775776.
[57]Section2oftheIndeterminateSentenceLaworActNo.4103,asamended,providesthattheActshallnotapplyxxx

tothosewhoshallhaveescapedfromconfinementorevadedsentencexxx.
[58]Article64(1)oftheRevisedPenalCode.
[59]Peoplev.Delim,GRNo.142773,pp.4546,January28,2003Peoplev.Yatco,379SCRA432,446,March19,2002

Peoplev.Verde,362Phil.305,320,February10,1999.
[60]ExhibitsBtoB39records,pp.311347.
[61]Article2206(1)oftheCivilCode.
[62]TSN,November1012,1997,pp.1415
[63]Ibid.
[64]Ibid.
[65]Peoplev.Sirad,335SCRA114,128,July5,2000.
[66]Lifeexpectancyiscomputedusingtheformula2/3x(80ageofthevictimatthetimeofhisdeath),whichisbasedon

theAmericanExpectancyTableofMortality.
[67] In the absence of proof, living expenses are estimated to be 50 percent of the gross annual income (People v.

Dinamling,379SCRA107,124,March12,2002).
[68]SincePaylawasearningP250aday,hisincomewasP7,500monthlyorP90,000annually.
[69]Par.2,Sec.8,Rule124,RulesofCourt.
[70]260SCRA539,August20,1996.
[71]293SCRA411,July30,1998.
[72]315SCRA670,September30,1999.
[73]Foradiscussion,seePanganiban,Battles in the Supreme Court, 1998 ed., pp. 6871, and Leadership by Example,

1999ed.,pp.9697.Thehereinponenteis dutybound to follow the ruling in these Decisions and to decide this
caseaccordingly,althoughhedissentedfromthem,andalthoughhestillbelievesthatthereviewofdeathcases
shouldbemadebytheCourtonlyafterappellant(whoisatlarge)isapprehendedandplacedunderthejurisdiction
oftheCourt.

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