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MUST READ CASES (CRIMINAL LAW)

BOOK I
I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
1. Magno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992

Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law,


"affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic)
of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear
whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed
the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the
other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina
Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should
also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public
will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The
Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that
"criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions
which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is
generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral
opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external
means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment
is in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v.
Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in
People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment
imposed upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged
society, should be directed against the "actual and potential
wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four

(4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to


cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was
absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere
issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in
petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be
a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.
Mala In se and Mala Prohibita
2. Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157171, March 14, 2006
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised
Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they
are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law.
Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other
elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other
hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not
inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says
they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law
has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are
prohibited for reasons of public policy.
Proximate Cause
3. People v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011
Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that
in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be
held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted
upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus infection,
and not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
Impossible Crimes

4. Intod v. CA, G.R. No. 103119

Intod fired at Palangpangan's room, although in reality, the latter was


not present in his room; thus, Intod failed to kill him. The factual
situation in the case at bar presents an inherent impossibility of
accomplishing the crime. Under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. Legal
impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if completed, would
not amount to a crime.
5. Jacinto v. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009

In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that


involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat
pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets
nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual
impossibility given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the
acts to consummate the crime ofqualified theft, which is a crime against
property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of
unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to
gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check
bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not
rightfully hers.
Stages of Execution
6. People of the Philippines v. Malisce, G.R. No. 190912. January 12,
2015
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The essential
elements of an attempted felony are as follows: a) The offender
commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; b) He
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the

felony; c) The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous


desistance.
7. Rait v. People, G.R. No. 180425, July 31, 2008

Unlike in Baleros, the acts of petitioner clearly establish his intention to


commence the act of rape. Petitioner had already successfully removed
the victims clothing and had inserted his finger into her vagina. It is not
empty speculation to conclude that these acts were preparatory to the
act of raping her. Had it not been for the victims strong physical
resistance, petitioners next step would, logically, be having carnal
knowledge of the victim. The acts are clearly the first or some
subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the
offense after the preparations are made.
8. Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, January 25, 2006

In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of


evidence to prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and
Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to the
ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained
assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block.
Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to hit
the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a lacerated wound and
cerebral contusions.
That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial
and could not have produced his death does not negate petitioners
criminal liability for attempted murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the
victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for
attempted murder.
9. Aristotle Valenzuela v. People, G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007

Theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or


consummated.
10. Ramie Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 149988, August 14, 2009

Considering further that the victim sustained wounds that were not
fatal and absent a showing that such wounds would have certainly
caused his death were it not for timely medical assistance, we declare
the petitioners guilt to be limited to the crime of attempted homicide.
11. People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 188979, September 5, 2012

Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is an


attempt when the offender commenced the commission of the crime
directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. In People v. Publico, we ruled that when the "touching" of
the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate,
attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely
acts of lasciviousness.
Conspiracy and proposal
12. People v. Carandang, G.R. No. 175926, July 6, 2011

In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with
Carandang was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the
victims (Milans closing the door when the police officers introduced
themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the
shooting (Chuas directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and
Milans following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of
appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by
inducement, or that Milans act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what
made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are
convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds
of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals by
direct participation.
As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milans act of closing
the door facilitated the commission of the crime, allowing Carandang to
wait in ambush. The sudden gunshots when the police officers pushed
the door open illustrate the intention of appellants and Carandang to

prevent any chance for the police officers to defend themselves.


Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is decisive for this
qualifying circumstance is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.
13. People v. Bokingco, G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011

Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill


Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he
sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco
was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to
rob the pawnshop.
14. People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 196960, March 12, 2014

Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who


inflicted the fatal wounds on Joey during the commotion, Erwins
liability is not diminished since he and the others with him acted with
concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy makes all
the assailants equally liable as co-principals by direct participation.
15. People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158754, August 10, 2007

Petitioners second and third arguments focus on the possible degrees of


participation of Jinggoy in the crime of Plunder. Noticeably, both
arguments, if pursued to their respective logical conclusions, tend to
cancel each other out, one leading as it were to a direction quite the
opposite of the other. For while the second argument attempts to
establish animplied conspiracy between Jinggoy and his father - hence,
the guilt of one is the guilt of the other - the third argument eschews the
idea of conspiracy, but respondent Jinggoy is nonetheless equally
guilty as President Estrada because of his indispensable cooperation
and/or direct participation in the crime of Plunder.
16. Fernan v. People G.R. No. 145927, August 24, 2007

It is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the general
voucher cannot be prepared and completed. Without the general
voucher, the check for the payment of the supply cannot be made and
issued to the supplier. Without the check payment, the defraudation

cannot be committed and successfully consummated. Thus, petitioners


acts in signing the false tally sheets and/or delivery receipts are
indispensable to the consummation of the crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents.
17. Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563 December 19, 1989

Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department


secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, and all chief
auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from
disbursements which they have approved. The department head or
chief auditor would be guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the
last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon or affixed
their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more
knowing, personal, and deliberate participation of each individual who
is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.
Continuing Crime
18. People v Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974
Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be
characterized as theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the
accused were animated by single criminal impulse. The conduct of the
accused reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters. The taking is
punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that the taking
of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give
rise to two crimes of theft.
19. Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993

The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny"


doctrine, that is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to the
same or different owners, at the same time and place constitutes but
one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny
doctrine," under which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of
each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine that the government has
the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many
distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407,
1410-1414).

The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the
commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous act
involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same "occasion"
(State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81
Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
20. Ilagan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110617 December 29, 1994

The crime of estafa committed against respondent corporation, on the


one hand, and those committed against the lot buyers, on the other, are
definitely separate felonies. They were dictated by different criminal
intents, committed under different modes of commission provided by the
law on estafa, perpetrated by different acts, consummated ondifferent
occasions, and caused injury to different parties.
Compound Crime/Complex Crime
21. Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-10364 and L-10376, March
31, 1958
There is no question that appellant cooperated in the commission of the
complex offense of estafa through falsification by reckless imprudence
by acts without which it could not have been accomplished, and this
being a fact, there would be no reason to exculpate him from liability.
Even assuming that he had no intention to defraud the offended party if
his co-defendants succeeded in attaining the purpose sought by the
culprits, appellant's participation together with the participation of his
co-defendant the commission of the offense completed all the necessary
for the perpetration of the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of commercial document
22. People v. Castromero, G.R. No. 118992, October 9, 1997

In relation to the charge that rape was complexed with the crime of
serious physical injuries, we stress the settled principle that a person
who creates in anothers mind an immediate sense of danger that causes
the latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever the other person
may consequently suffer. In this case, Josephine jumped from a window
of her house to escape from Appellant Castromero; as a result, she
suffered serious physical injuries, specifically a broken vertebra which
required medical attention and surgery for more than ninety days. This

being the case, the court a quo correctly convicted Appellant


Castromero of the complex crime of rape with serious physical injuries.
23. People v. Punzalan, G.R. No. 199892, December 10, 2012

Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel,


and committed a single act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to
the right side of the road ramming through the navy personnel, causing
the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same time,
constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and
SN1 Domingo.The crimes of murder and attempted murder are both
grave felonies as the law attaches an afflictive penalty to capital
punishment (reclusion perpetua to death) for murder while attempted
murder is punished by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty.
24. People v. Robios, G.R. No. 138453. May 29, 2002

Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with


unintentional abortion, the penalty to be imposed on him should be that
for the graver offense which is parricide.This is in accordance with the
mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: When a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, x x x, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, x x x.
25. People v. Villaflores, G.R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012

There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and
a complex or compound crime under Article 48, on the other hand. In a
composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a
complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not
specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense
being the necessary means to commit the other. For a composite crime,
the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a
complex or compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the
most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light
felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed; a light felony
that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may
be the subject of a separate information.
II. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Justifying Circumstances

- Self-Defense
26. Nacnac v. People, G.R. No. 191913, March 21, 2012
Ordinarily, as pointed out by the lower court, there is a difference
between the act of drawing ones gun and the act of pointing ones gun at
a target. The former cannot be said to be unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim. In People v. Borreros, We ruled that for unlawful
aggression to be attendant, there must be a real danger to life or
personal safety. Unlawful aggression requires an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude x x x. Here, the act of the [deceased]
of allegedly drawing a gun from his waist cannot be categorized as
unlawful aggression. Such act did not put in real peril the life or
personal safety of appellant. The facts surrounding the instant case
must, however, be differentiated from current jurisprudence on
unlawful aggression. The victim here was a trained police officer. He
was inebriated and had disobeyed a lawful order in order to settle a
score with someone using a police vehicle. A warning shot fired by a
fellow police officer, his superior, was left unheeded as he reached for
his own firearm and pointed it at petitioner. Petitioner was, therefore,
justified in defending himself from an inebriated and disobedient
colleague.
27. People v. Campos, G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011

An intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. In this


case, other than the self-serving allegation of Danny, there is no
evidence sufficiently clear and convincing that the victim indeed
attacked him. The prosecutions rebuttal witnesses Jaime Maquiling and
Francisco Austerowho admittedly were among those whom Danny and
Bingky had an encounter with on the night of August 19, 2001, never
said in their testimonies that Romeo attacked Danny and a bladed
weapon was used. These witnesses were categorical that Romeo was
not with them during the incident. This testimonial evidence was not
refuted by the defense. Even Bingky who claimed to be a friend of
Romeowas not able to identify the latter as one of those present at the
time. Candid enough, Bingky declared that it was only a certain Ago and
Jaime who confronted Danny. Resultantly, Danny failed to discharge his
burden of proving unlawful aggression, the most indispensable element

of self-defense. Where no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense


may be successfully pleaded.
28. People v. Mapait, G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful


aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material
unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a
weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an
attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist
in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but
must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at
another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as
if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere
threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his
hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry
countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
29. People v. Patotoy, G.R. No. 102058, August 26, 1996

Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected


attack, or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude. There must exist a real danger to the life or
personal safety of the person claiming self-defense.[18] This element, in
the case before us, is sorely wanting. No veritable physical force on the
part of Manuel has been shown that could have really endangered
appellant's life. Manuel's alleged act of drawing "something" from his
waist certainly is not the "unlawful aggression" meant in the law that
would justify a fatal strike at the victim with such lightning-speed as
appellant has delivered. In fact, no weapon, supposedly in the person of
Manuel, is shown to have been found. Without unlawful aggression, selfdefense cannot exist nor be an extenuating circumstance.
30. People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 195534, June 13, 2012

The existence of unlawful aggression is the basic requirement in a plea


of self-defense. In other words, no self-defense can exist without
unlawful aggression since there is no attack that the accused will have
to prevent or repel. In People v. Dolorido, we held that unlawful

aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger


not merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when
the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life. The
unlawful aggression may constitute an actual physical assault, or at least
a threat to inflict real imminent injury upon the accused. In case of a
threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the x x x
intent to cause injury.
31. People v. Credo, G.R. No. 197360, July 3, 2013

As found by the trial court, there can be no unlawful aggression on the


part of Joseph because at the time of the incident, he was only holding a
lemon and an egg. According to the trial court, the fact that Joseph was
unarmed effectively belied the allegation of Ronald that he was
prompted to retaliate in self-defense when Joseph first hacked and hit
him on his neck. The trial court further pointed out that if Joseph indeed
hacked Ronald on the neck, "it is surprising that the latter did not suffer
any injury when according to them (Ronald, Rolando and Flora Credo),
Joseph was running fast and made a hard thrust on Ronald, hitting the
latters neck."
- State of Necessity
32. Ty v. People, G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater
injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or
imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the
issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure
to pay her mothers hospital bills.
-Fulfillment of Duty
33. Cabanlig v. Sandiganabayan, G.R. No. 148431, July 28, 2005
Certainly, an M16 Armalite is a far more powerful and deadly weapon
than the bamboo lance that the fugitive had run away with in People v.
Delima. The policeman in People v. Delima was held to have been
justified in shooting to death the escaping fugitive because the
policeman was merely performing his duty.

In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the presence of the


policemen when Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite from Mercado and
jumped from the jeep to escape. The policemen would have been
justified in shooting Valino if the use of force was absolutely necessary
to prevent his escape.[22] But Valino was not only an escaping detainee.
Valino had also stolen the M16 Armalite of a policeman. The policemen
had the duty not only to recapture Valino but also to recover the loose
firearm. By grabbing Mercados M16 Armalite, which is a formidable
firearm, Valino had placed the lives of the policemen in grave danger.
- Obedience to a lawful order of a superior
34. Tabuena v. People, G.R. No. 103501-03. February 17, 1997
This is not a sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience
in good faith of a duly executed order. Indeed, compliance to a patently
lawful order is rectitude far better than contumacious disobedience. In
the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the
President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest
official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was
regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for
no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled
with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly
without question. Obedientia est legis essentia.
Battered Woman Syndrome
35. People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their
children's bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a
great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted
graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life
would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already
suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the
time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually
have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an
obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to
sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'" Still, impending danger
(based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes)

prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening


behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of
danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, selfdefense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not
warrant self-defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no
self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim. Thus,
Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified under the
circumstances.
36. Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought


about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the
CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific
measures focused on women does not discriminate against men.
Petitioner's contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and
that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law
deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the
Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify the
social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view
to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women." Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift
changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a
public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the
part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."
Exempting Circumstances
- Insanity
37. People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence
while committing the act; i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he
acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence
of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the
will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if
the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by

a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties and is


manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full and
clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts.
- Minority
38. Llave v. People, G.R. No. 166040, April 26, 2006
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person
over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal
liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic reason behind the
exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of
action of the offender which is an essential element of a felony either by
dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the
morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the
other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to
prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical
appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The
surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew
what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes
the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and
shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the
resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house
to insure that passersby would not be able to discover his dastardly
acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him,
the petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the
prodding of his father and her mother, he hid in his grandmothers house
to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained thereat until
barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody.
39. Madali v. People, G.R. No. 180380, August 4, 2009

As to the criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by the


Court of Appeals, Raymund, who was only 14 years of age at the time he
committed the crime, should be exempt from criminal liability and
should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to
Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344. Although the crime was
committed on 13 April 1999 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only
on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor
of Raymund who was not shown to be a habitual criminal. This is based
on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the sentence to be
imposed against Rodel should be suspended pursuant to Section 38 of
Republic Act No. 9344, which states: SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of
Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which
may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child
in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application. Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still
be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
40. People v. Sarcia G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009

The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the


offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No.
603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule
provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a
child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been
convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is
guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344
does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a
capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense,
the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic
suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been
found guilty of a heinous crime.

To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of


the RTC had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No.
9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of
sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall
be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344,
which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and
Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.
41. People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21)
years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA
9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and
academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA,
when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the
appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal
at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006,
appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA,
the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because
he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law,
which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of
the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D.
603.
- Accident
42. Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004
It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the
same time because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There
is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal
law.

Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code


necessarily implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to
prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of another with the use of
reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of
the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on
necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master of men of all
human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it,
proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does,
and ends where it ends. Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the
victim, however, his act is in accordance with law so much so that the
accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from
both criminal and civil liabilities. On the other hand, the basis of
exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is
the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the
absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of the
exemption in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of
negligence and intent. The accused does not commit either an
intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there is
no criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the
conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act. An
accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which
under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to
whom it happens.
43. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 172695, June 29, 2007

Accident is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to


prove, with clear and convincing evidence. The defense miserably failed
to discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites for this
exempting circumstance, are: 1. A person is performing a lawful act; 2.
With due care; 3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; 4.
Without fault or intention of causing it. By no stretch of imagination
could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as
performing a lawful act. Thus, on this ground alone, appellants defense

of accident must be struck down because he was performing an


unlawful act during the incident.
Mitigating Circumstances
-Praeter Intentionem
44. People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different
from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a
felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the
perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar
and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct
consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellants
criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
-Immediate vindication of a grave offense
45. People v. Rebucan, G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011
As regards the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a
grave offense, the same cannot likewise be appreciated in the instant
case. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the
act be committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the
one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants,
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity
within the same degrees. The established rule is that there can be no
immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had
sufficient time to recover his equanimity. In the case at bar, the accusedappellant points to the alleged attempt of Felipe and Timboy Lagera on
the virtue of his wife as the grave offense for which he sought
immediate vindication. He testified that he learned of the same from his
stepson, Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four days thereafter, on
November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant carried out the attack that led
to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our mind, a period of four days was
sufficient enough a time within which the accused-appellant could have
regained his composure and self-control. Thus, the said mitigating
circumstance cannot be credited in favor of the accused-appellant.
- Sufficient Provocation
46. Urbano v. People, G.R. No. 182750, January 20, 2009

Petitioner, being very much smaller in height and heft, had the good
sense of trying to avoid a fight. But as events turned out, a fisticuff still
ensued, suddenly ending when petitioners lucky punch found its mark.
In People v. Macaso, a case where the accused police officer shot and
killed a motorist for repeatedly taunting him with defiant words, the
Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation
or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the
shooting. The Court had the same attitude in Navarro v. Court of
Appeals, a case also involving a policeman who killed a man after the
latter challenged him to a fight. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why
the same mitigating circumstance should not be considered in favor of
petitioner.
- Passion/Obfuscation
47. People v. Ignas, G.R. No. 140514 , September 30, 2003
The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave
offense and passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same
time, if they arise from the same facts or motive. In other words, if
appellant attacked his victim in proximate vindication of a grave
offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath that passion and
obfuscation also blinded him. Moreover, for passion and obfuscation to
be well founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there should
be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of
mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral
equanimity. To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which spanned the
discovery of his wifes extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover
was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and cool off.
48. People of the Philippines v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159. March 18,

2015
To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation, the accused must be able to prove the following
elements: 1. that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such condition of mind; and 2. that said act which produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a

considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover


his normal equanimity.
49. Romera v. People, G.R. No. 151978. July 14, 2004

But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not
two separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if
these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be
treated together as one mitigating circumstance. From the facts
established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from
the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated
as two separate mitigating circumstances.
-Voluntary Surrender
50. People v. Viernes, G.R. No. 136733, December 13, 2001
The act of surrender must be spontaneous, accompanied by an
acknowledgment of guilt, or an intention to save the authorities the
trouble and the expense that search and capture would require. Going to
the police station to clear his name does not show any intent of
appellant to surrender unconditionally to the authorities
51. People v. Abolidor, G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2004

In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more


than one year had lapsed since the incident and in order to disclaim
responsibility for the killing of the victim. This neither shows
repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the
government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search
and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender, there was a pending
warrant of arrest against him. Hence, he should not be credited with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Aggravating Circumstances
52. People v. Cortes, G.R. No. 137050. July 11, 2001
As to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the same could not be
considered for the simple reason that it was not specifically sought in
the commission of the crime. "Night-time becomes an aggravating
circumstance only when (1) it is specially sought by the offender; (2)

the offender takes advantage of it; or (3) it facilitates the commission of


the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from identification or
capture." In the case at bar, no evidence suggests that accused purposely
sought the cover of darkness to perpetrate the crime, or to conceal his
identity.
"The trial court erred in further appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superior strength
is absorbed in treachery, so that it can not be appreciated separately as
another aggravating circumstance." Here, treachery qualified the
offense to murder.
As to the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex, the same could
not be considered as it was not shown that accused deliberately
intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed manifest
disrespect for her womanhood. In fact, the accused mistook the victim
for a man.
- Recidivism
53. People v Molina, G.R. Nos. 134777-78. July 24, 2000
On the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the trial court properly
appreciated the same though not alleged in the information. Article
14(9) of the Revised Penal Code defines a recidivist as "one who, at the
time of his trial for one crime shall have been previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code." To
prove recidivism, it is necessary to allege the same in the information
and to attach thereto certified copies of the sentences rendered against
the accused. Nonetheless, the trial court may still give such aggravating
circumstance credence if the accused does not object to the
presentation of evidence on the fact of recidivism.
-Reiteracion
54. People v. Cajara, G.R. No. 122498. September 27, 2000
The records show that the crime was aggravated by reiteracion under
Art. 14, par. 10, of The Revised Penal Code, the accused having been

convicted of frustrated murder in 1975 and of homicide, frustrated


homicide, trespass to dwelling, illegal possession of firearms and
murder sometime in 1989 where his sentences were later commuted to
imprisonment for 23 years and a fine of P200,000.00. He was granted
conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines on 8 November
1991. Reiteracion or habituality under Art. 14, par. 10, herein cited, is
present when the accused has been previously punished for an offense
to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty than that attached
by law to the second offense or for two or more offenses to which it
attaches a lighter penalty. As already discussed, herein accused can be
convicted only of simple rape and the imposable penalty therefor
is reclusion perpetua.Where the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shall be applied regardless of the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attendant to the crime, such as in the instant case.
- Treachery
55. People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the
aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance
to defend himself. Even when the victim was forewarned of the danger
to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive is
that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself or to retaliate. Records disclose that Jesus was stabbed
by the group on the lateral part of his body while he was under the
impression that they were simply leaving the place where they had [a]
shabu session. Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle driver
is seated on the motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the level of
the roof of the side car which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers
who are seated in the side car. Hence, there was no way for Jesus to
even be forewarned of the intended stabbing of his body both from the
people seated in the side car and those seated behind him. Thus, the
trial courts finding of treachery should be affirmed. There is treachery
when the means, methods, and forms of execution gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and such
means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. What
is decisive in an appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the
attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself.

56. People v. Yam-Id, G.R. No. 126116. June 21, 1999

Treachery attended the killing of the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo for when
an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his
death, treachery exists.
57. People v. Latag, G.R. No. 153213. January 22, 2004

In the present case, we find nothing in the records that shows the exact
manner of the killing. Though Atienza turned around immediately after
hearing a gunshot, he could not, and in fact did not, testify as to how the
attack had been initiated. The fact that appellant was standing behind
some shrubs when he shot the victim does not by itself sufficiently
establish that the method of execution gave the latter no opportunity for
self-defense. Nor was the attack deliberately and consciously adopted
by the former without danger to himself.
58. People v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 101312. January 28, 1997

The Revised Penal Code provides that "(t)here is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make." In the case at bench,
the presence of treachery or alevosia which qualified the killing to
murder was correctly appreciated by the trial court because the manner
by which the perpetrators commenced and consummated the stabbing
of the victim Efren Lasona showed conclusively that the latter was
totally surprised by the attack and not afforded an opportunity to raise
any defense against his attackers. Efren Lasona could not have expected,
while riding in that tricycle, that he would be savagely and fatally
assaulted by knife-wielding attackers. The victim was defenseless
during the attack as his hands were restrained by the accused-appellant
to facilitate the stabbing of the victim by the other perpetrators. It is
well-settled that "(a)n unexpected and sudden attack under
circumstances which render the victim unable and unprepared to
defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack,
constitutes alevosia." Parenthetically, the fact that the attack on
deceased Efren Lasona was frontal does not preclude the presence of

treachery in this case as the same made the attack no less unexpected
and sudden.
- Ignominy
59. People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-62116 March 22, 1990
The trial court is correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
ignominy because of the greater perversity displayed by the offenders.
The testimony of the examining physician that he did not find mud on
the victim's private organ, does not necessarily belie the latter's
asseveration that the accused "plastered" (in the words of the lower
court) mud on her private part. It is worthwhile mentioning that the
victim was examined and treated by Dr. Claudio at 3:55 p.m. or about
almost two (2) hours after the rape was committed. 17 Given this
circumstance, the absence of mud in the victim's private part when she
was examined by the physician, may be attributed to the possibility that
the mud washed or fell off even before the victim left the house for her
physical examination. Moreover, Rebecca's testimony was corroborated
by that of Amelita Malong who swore that she saw mud smeared on
Rebecca's private part when she (Amelita) saw Rebecca right after the
incident. It is also difficult to conceive why the offended party, young as
she was, and with a chaste reputation, would go to the extent of
fabricating this portion of her testimony notwithstanding the
consequent humiliation on her person and disgrace on her womanhood.
We cannot but agree with the trial court's finding that the offense was
aggravated by ignominy. We are of the opinion, however that the word
"cruelty" used in the dispositive portion of the judgment, to describe an
alternative aggravating circumstance, is unnecessary. The act of
"plastering" mud on the victim's vagina right after she was raped, is
adequately and properly described as "ignominy" rather than "cruelty
or ignominy."
Alternative Circumstances
60. People v. Fontillas, G.R. No. 184177, December 15, 2010
Accused appellant did not present any evidence that his intoxication
was not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the rape. The
person pleading intoxication must likewise prove that he took such

quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as


would blur his reason. Accused-appellant utterly failed to present clear
and convincing proof of the extent of his intoxication on the night of
December 8, 2001 and that the amount of liquor he had taken was of
such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. Not one of accusedappellants drinking buddies testified that they, in fact, consumed eight
bottles of gin prior to the rape incident.
III. PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
Principal
61. People v. Janjalani et. al. G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second
paragraph, or the provision on principal by inducement. The
instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make bombs
coupled with their careful planning and persistent attempts to
bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats confirmation
that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their
mission prove the finding that Rohmats co-inducement was the
determining cause of the commission of the crime. Such command
or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the crime would not
have materialized.
Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the
criminal act that without it, the act would not have been
performed. In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that,
notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime
scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal
act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez
was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and because the act of one
conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered liable for all
the resulting crimes. The same finding must be applied to the case
at bar.
62. People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 193854, September 24, 2012

Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be considered a


principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable
cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must
participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal

purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by


performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution
does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in
the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA,
from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant
received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not
indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied
AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA
could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own
services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being
raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in
the crime of rape. While this Court does not find appellant to have
committed the crime of rape as a principal by indispensable
cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610,
or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act
Accomplice
63. People v. Tampus, G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009
All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to
Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was
community of design between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of
ABC. Ida had knowledge of and assented to Tampus intention to have
sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer, and
when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with the
knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus plan to have
sexual intercourse with her daughter.
It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the
accomplice should not be indispensable to the commission of the crime;
otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable
cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are
not indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First, because
it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and second
because Tampus already had the intention to have sexual intercourse
with ABC and he could have consummated the act even without Idas
consent.

Accessories
64. Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held
liable as an accessory, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised
Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an accessory is obviously light
under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the Revised
Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article 60 thereof.
Nothing, however, the reports from law enforcement agencies that
"there is rampant robbery and thievery of government and private
properties" and that "such robbery and thievery have become profitable
on the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready
buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties," P.D.
No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit
by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the
accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as
such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in
the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes
aprincipal in the crime of fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of robbery
and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and
distinct offenses.
Anti Fencing Law
65. Dimat v. People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012
The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed;
2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells,
or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery
or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing
derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain
for himself or for another. evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari
he bought was not properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed
him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this
certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped,
Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to
make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly
confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit

source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently
made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase.
IV. PENALTIES
66. People v. Rocha, G.R. No. 173797, August 31, 2007
It should be kept in mind that accused-appellants could not avail
themselves of parole if their appeal is dismissed, unless they also apply
for executive clemency and ask for the commutation of their reclusion
perpetua sentences. Republic Act No. 4108, as amended, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, does not apply to persons
convicted of offenses punishable with death penalty or life
imprisonment. In several cases, we have considered the penalty of
reclusion perpetua as synonymous to life imprisonment for purposes of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and ruled that said law does not apply
to persons convicted of offenses punishable with the said penalty.
67. People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006

Henceforth, "death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code,


shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties.
For example, in the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty
for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than
death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the
maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as
ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead,prision mayor.
There should be little complication if the crime committed was
punishable by the free-standing penalty of "death," as utilized in Rep.
Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged penalty of "reclusion perpetua to
death," as often used in the Revised Penal Code and other penal laws.
The facts of the present case do not concern the latter penalty, hence
our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof. However, we
did earlier observe that both "reclusion perpetua" and death are
indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code,
"[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two
indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in degree shall be that
immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the
respective graduated scale." Hence, as we earlier noted, our previous

rulings that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to
death" isprision mayor.
68. Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan,G.R. Nos. L-51065-72, June 30, 1987

Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set


forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken
into account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with
the service of the sentence imposed (People v. Escares, 102 Phil. 677
[1957]). Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of penalty
and penalty "to be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything
mentioned about the "imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the
prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most
severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty years.
69. People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008

As a general rule, the application of modifying circumstances, the


majority being generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating
circumstances, does not result to a maximum term fixed beyond the
prescribed penalty. At most, the maximum term is taken from the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Since the maximum term is
taken from the prescribed penalty and the minimum term is taken from
the next lower penalty, then, in this limited sense, the difference would
naturally be only one degree. Concretely, in the case of homicide with
one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the maximum term is taken
from reclusin temporal in its maximum period which is within the
prescribed penalty of reclusin temporal, while the minimum term is
taken from prisin mayor which is the penalty next lower to reclusin
temporal; hence, the one-degree difference observed by the dissent.
In comparison, under the incremental penalty rule, the maximum term
can exceed the prescribed penalty. Indeed, at its extreme, the maximum
term can be as high as 20 years of reclusin temporal while the
prescribed penalty remains at prisin correccional maximum to prisin
mayor minimum, hence, the penalty next lower to the prescribed
penalty from which the minimum term is taken remains at anywhere
within prisin correccional minimum and medium, or from 6 months and

1 day to 4 years and 2 months. In this sense, the incremental penalty


rule deviates from the afore-stated general rule.
70. Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014

The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not


three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the
division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of
time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of
the three portions.
- Subsidiary Imprisonment
71. Narte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132552, July 14, 2004
This Court clarified in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 dated
February 14, 2001 that there is no legal obstacle to the application of
the RPC provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should only a fine be
imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine. This should finally
dispel the petitioners' importunate claim that the imposition of
subsidiary imprisonment in this case is improper.
- Indeterminate Sentence Law
72. Spouses Bacar v. Judge De Guzman Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-96-1349. April
18, 1997
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the
indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the
accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence,
depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral
record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all
criminal offenses whether punishable by the RPC or by special laws,
with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper
within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law must,
therefore, be deemed mandatory.
In crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term
of the indeterminate penalty is determined in accordance with the rules

and provisions of the Code exactly as if the Indeterminate Sentence Law


had never been enacted.
73. Romero v. People, G.R. No. 171644, November 23, 2011

In Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the


application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory to
both the Revised Penal Code and the special laws, and in the same
ruling, this Court summarized the application and non-application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to wit:
x x x It is basic law that x x x the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is mandatory where imprisonment exceeds one (1)
year, except only in the following cases:
a. Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.
b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114) conspiracy or proposal to
commit treason (Art. 115).
c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion
(Art. 134), sedition (Art. 139) or espionage (Art. 117).
d. Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).
e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5).
Recidivists are entitled to an Indeterminate sentence. (People v.
Jaramilla, L-28547, February 22, 1974) Offender is not disqualified
to avail of the benefits of the law even if the crime is committed
while he is on parole. (People v. Calreon, CA 78 O. G. 6701,
November 19, 1982).

f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded


sentence.
g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of
the same. (People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359).
h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed
one (1) year.
Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one (1) year,
the accused cannot avail himself of the benefits of the law, the
application of which is based upon the penalty actually imposed in
accordance with law and not upon that which may be imposed in
the discretion of the court. (People v. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No. 00452CR, January 22, 1962).
i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the
indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and
excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic
usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving
the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical,
mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing an
indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether
punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by special laws, with
definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper
within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law must,
therefore, be deemed mandatory.
74. People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can


now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion

perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus,


applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one
degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been
appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall
be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no
other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. The
ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has
been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death),
where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion
temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority.
75. People v. Gunda, G.R. No. 195525, February 5, 2014

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. There being no other aggravating
circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the
CA correctly held that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties. "It must be
emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole pursuant
to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that persons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act,
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
- Probation Law
76. Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty
imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or
P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and

applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the


plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim,index
animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention. Furthermore, there is
the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.
77. Almero v. People, G.R. No. 188191, March 12, 2014

Petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment,


or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right
to appeal. While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation,
he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition
supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted
to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to
make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
78. Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011

One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing
Arnel to apply for probation after he appealed from the trial courts
judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the provision of
Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to provide an
opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender. An accused like
Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows
no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment
of conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime,
frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can
the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court
now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide
with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to
under the reduced penalty, it would be sending
bars. It would be robbing him of the chance
reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the
probation law.

apply for probation


him straight behind
to instead undergo
very purpose of the

79. Moreno v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006

Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of


grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which is
granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme
rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was
convicted.[15] Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent
standards regarding who are qualified for probation. For instance, it
provides that the benefits of probation shall not be extended to those
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six
(6) years; convicted of any offense against the security of the State;
those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and
one (1) day and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those who have been
once on probation; and those who are already serving sentence at the
time the substantive provisions of the Probation Law became
applicable.
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable
offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission is
significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat
probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered by the
disqualification.
80. Bala v Judge Jimenez, G.R. No. L-67301, January 29, 1990

The probation having been revoked, it is imperative that the


probationer be arrested so that he can serve the sentence originally
imposed. The expiration of the probation period of one year is of no
moment, there being no order of final discharge as yet, as we stressed
earlier. Neither can there be a deduction of the one year probation
period from the penalty of one year and one day to three years, six
months, and twenty-one days of imprisonment because an order placing

the defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence," but is in effect


a suspension of the imposition of the sentence. 12 It is not a final
judgment but an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional
order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the
court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of
discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a
final judgment if the conditions are violated."

- Modification and Extinction of Criminal Liability


81. Yapdiangco v. Buencamino, G.R. No. L-28841, June 24, 1983
The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code
and Section 1, Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court deal with the
computation of time allowed to do a particular act, such as, the filing of
tax returns on or before a definite date, filing an answer to a complaint,
taking an appeal, etc. They do not apply to lengthen the period fixed by
the State for it to prosecute those who committed a crime against it. The
waiver or loss of the right to prosecute such offenders is automatic and
by operation of law. Where the sixtieth and last day to file an
information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period
cannot be extended up to the next working day. Prescription has
automatically set in. The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution to file
the information on the last working day before the criminal offense
prescribes.
82. Romualdez v Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006

Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to
run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted
when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide
that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the
running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be

gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No.
3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines
as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period.Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.
83. People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012

Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment


of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine
for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance
with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period,
however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against
the guilty person.
In the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, which is in all
fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP
Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their
rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their
control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of
the investigating agencies.
84. Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation v. Lidua, G.R. No. 169588,

October 7, 2013
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this
already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent
People v. Pangilinan categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not
controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to
other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of
Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court
and not on any date before that, is applicable to ordinances and their
prescription period.
85. People v. Lim, February 13, 1992 G.R. No. 95753

To warrant the dismissal of the complaint, the victim's retraction or


pardon should be made prior to the institution of the criminal action
(People v. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250 [1991]). The present case was filed on
February 24, 1988 while the Affidavit was executed only on March 1,
1988.
86. People v. Bacang, July 30, 1996 G.R. NO. 116512

While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during
the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and,
therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of
the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under
Proclamation No. 347, 3 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in
by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution No.12 adopted on
2 June 1994.
87. People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 185843, March 3, 2010

In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code


reads
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
xxxx
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of
this Code.
Article 344 of the same Code also provides
ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. x x x.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the
marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. x x x.

On several occasions, we applied these provisions to marriages


contracted between the offender and the offended party in the crime of
rape as well as in the crime of abuse of chastity to totally extinguish the
criminal liability of and the corresponding penalty that may have been
imposed upon those found guilty of the felony.

BOOK II
Crimes Against National Security (Arts. 114-123)
- Treason
88. Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 856
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy, giving the latter aid and comfort
during the Japanese occupation, cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
treason for the reasons that: (1) the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic. The Supreme Court dismissed
the petition and ruled that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de
jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not
transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the
legitimate government.
89. People v. Perez, 83 Phil 314

7 counts of treason were filed against Perez for recruiting,


apprehending and commandeering numerous girls and women against
their will for the purpose of using them to satisfy the immoral purposes
of Japanese officers. The Supreme Court held that his "commandeering"
of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the
women and the entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the
enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the

women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly


had surrendered their bodies or organized the entertainment.
- Piracy
90. People v. Catantan, G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997
Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as
penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely
within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan
Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination,
such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat.
Crimes Against Fundamental Laws of the State
- Arbitrary Detention
91. People v. Flores, G.R. No. 116488. May 31, 2001
Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee
who, without legal grounds, detains a person. Since it is settled that
accused-appellants are public officers, the question that remains to be
resolved is whether or not the evidence adduced before the trial court
proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained by accusedappellants.
Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the
proseuction. According to him, he and Samson Sayam went to Barangay
Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on September 29, 1992. At around
six in the evening, while on their way home, they passed by the store of
Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw the four accused
drinking beer. Samson Sayam told him to go home because he had to
show his residence certificate and barangay clearance to accusedappellant Aaron Flores. Jerry Manlangit then proceeded to his residence
in Hacienda Shangrila, located about half a kilometer away from the
center of Barangay Tabu. Later, he told his father that Samson Sayam
stayed behind and asked him to fetch Samson. He also testified that he
heard gunshots coming from the direction of the detachment
headquarters.
The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of
the crime of arbitrary detention. Neither does it support nor
corroborate the testimony of his father, Carlito, for they dealt on a

different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see any of accusedappellant apprehend or detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see if
accused-appellant Flores really inspected the residence certificate and
barangay clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony
comprised of hearsay evidence, which has no probative value. In
summary, Jerry Manlangits testimony failed to establish that accusedappellants were guilty of arbitrary detention.
92. People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1

When the accused is arrested on the sole basis of a verbal report, the
arrest without a warrant under Section 6(a) of Rule 113 is not lawful
and legal since the offense must also be committed in his presence or
within his view. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime for an
essential precondition under the rule is that the crime must in fact or
actually have been committed first.
93. Albor v. Aguis, A.M. No. P-01-1472, June 26, 2003

Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the


accused and his relatives. But as an officer of the court, he should be
aware that by issuing such detention order, he trampled upon a
fundamental human right of the accused. Because of the unauthorized
order issued by respondent, the accused Edilberto Albior was deprived
of liberty without due process of law for a total of 56 days, counted from
his unlawful detention on January 27, 1999 until the issuance of the
appropriate order of commitment by the municipal judge on March 25,
1999.
- Expulsion
94. Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778
The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials of that city,
who handed them over to other parties and deposited them in a distant
region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they had been imprisoned. There is no law expressly
authorizing the deportation of prostitutes to a new domicile against
their will and in fact Article 127 punishes public officials, not expressly

authorized by law or regulation, who compel any person to change his


residence.
- Search Warrants Maliciously Obtained
95. Burgos v Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800
When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, the application and/ or its supporting affidavits must contain
a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material
he has published or intending to publish since mere generalization will
not suffice. Also, ownership is of no consequence and it is sufficient that
the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought to be seized.
Crimes Against Public Order
-Rebellion
96. People v. Loverdioro, G.R. 112235, November 29, 1995
If no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be
convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of
rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and
of itself, suffice.
97. People v. Geronimo, October 23, 1956 G.R. L-8936

Not every act of violence is deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion


solely because it was committed simultaneously with or in the course of
the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes
or profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be
separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the rebellion and
the individual misdeed could not be taken with the rebellion to
constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be
unrelated to each other. The individual crime would not be a means
necessary for committing the rebellion, as it would not be done in
preparation or in furtherance of the latter.

- Sedition
98. People v. Hadji October 24, 1963 G.R. L-12686
The rule in this jurisdiction allows the treatment of the common
offenses of murder etc. as distinct and independent acts separable from
sedition. Where the acts of violence were deemed absorbed in the crime
of rebellion, the same does not apply in the crime of sedition.
-Inciting to Sedition
99. Mendoza v. People, G.R. L-2990, December 17 1951
A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and
dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e.
dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a
feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the
government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government. Any citizen
may criticize his government and government officials and submit his
criticism to the "free trade of ideas" but such criticism should be specific
and constructive, specifying particular objectionable actuations of the
government. It must be reasoned or tempered and not a contemptuous
condemnation of the entire government set-up.
Illegal Possession of Firearms
100. Celino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170562, June 29, 2007
When the other offense is one of those enumerated under RA 8294, any
information for illegal possession of firearms should be quashed
because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together
with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of
rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d etat and
conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those
enumerated under RA 8294, then the separate case for illegal
possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted. The
constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply since these
offenses are quite different from one another, with the first punished

under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law.
R.A 10591, SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a
Crime. The use of a loose firearm, when inherent in the
commission of a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or
other special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance: Provided, That if the crime committed with the use
of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty
which is lower than that prescribed in the preceding section for
illegal possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal possession of
firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime
charged: Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the
use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum
penalty which is equal to that imposed under the preceding section
for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the
crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special
laws of which he/she is found guilty.
If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of rebellion of insurrection, or
attempted coup d etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted
coup d etat.
If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose
firearm, the violation of this Act shall be considered as a distinct
and separate offense.
- Direct Assault
101. Justo v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil 453
The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will,
but attaches to a public official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming
that the complainant is not actually performing the duties of his office

when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of
assault upon a person in authority, so long as the impelling motive of
the attack is the performance of official duty. Also, where there is a
mutual agreement to fight, an aggression ahead of the stipulated time
and place would be unlawful since to hold otherwise would be to
sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair
play.
102. People v. Dollantes, June 30, 1987 G.R. 70639

When a barangay Captain is in the act of trying to pacify a person who


was making trouble in the dance hall, he is therefore killed while in the
performance of his duties. As the barangay captain, it was his duty to
enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay and if in the
enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter
treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with assault
upon a person in authority.
103. Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010

The prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable


doubt the commission of the crime of direct assault. The appellate
court must be consequently overruled in setting aside the trial
courts verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held
guilty of direct assault since Gemma was no longer a person in
authority at the time of the assault because she allegedly
descended to the level of a private person by fighting
with Lydia. The fact remains that at the moment Lydia initiated her
tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official functions as a
teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they
could talk properly, but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a
barrage of verbal invectives. WhenLydia continued with her
abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a
similarly situated person. Lydia aggravated the situation by
slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a wall divider
while she was going to the principals office. No fault could
therefore be attributed to Gemma.
- Evasion of Service of Sentence
104. Pangan v. Gatbalite, G.R. No. 141718. January 21, 2005

Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence


can be committed only by those who have been convicted by final
judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal
parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means
unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly,
one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have
escaped therefrom.
Crimes Against Public Interest
-Falsification
105. Galeos v. People, G.R. Nos. 174730-37, February 9, 2011
In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in the SALN involves
merely a description of such relationship; it does not call for an
application of law in a particular set of facts. On the other hand, Articles
963 to 967 of the Civil Code simply explain the concept of proximity of
relationship and what constitute direct and collateral lines in relation to
the rules on succession. The question of whether or not persons are
related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth
degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners assertion, statements
concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth or falsity, and thus
do not amount to expression of opinion. When a government employee
is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such
information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of facts
contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. Further, it bears to stress that the untruthful statements on
relationship have no relevance to the employees eligibility for the
position but pertains rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law
on the appointing power.
Since petitioner Galeos answered No to the question in his 1993 SALN if
he has relatives in the government service within the fourth degree of

consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement therein as in fact he


was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the
fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their
mothers are sisters). As to his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN, Galeos left in
blank the boxes for the answer to the similar query. In Dela Cruz v.
Mudlong, it was held that one is guilty of falsification in the
accomplishment of his information and personal data sheet if he
withholds material facts which would have affected the approval of his
appointment and/or promotion to a government position. By
withholding information on his relative/s in the government service as
required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that
the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong
would have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent appointment
pursuant to Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160)
106. Luagge v. CA, 112 SCRA 97

If the accused acted in good faith when she signed her spouse's name to
the checks and encashed them to pay for the expenses of the spouses
last illness and burial upon the belief that the accused is entitled to them
and considering that the government sustained no damage due to such
encashment, criminal intent may not be ascribed, and the accused
should be acquitted to such crime.
107. People v. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120

If the falsification is resorted to for the purpose of hiding the


malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses.
Thus, where the provincial treasurer, as the custodian of the money
forming part of the road and bridge fund, effected payments to his coaccused for construction materials supposedly delivered to the province
for various projects when in fact no such materials were delivered, and
to camouflage or conceal the defraudation, the accused used six
vouchers which had genuine features and which appear to be
extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically fake, the crimes
committed are not complex but separate crimes of falsification and

malversation and the falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting


one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse.
108. Tenenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013
All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case.
First, petitioner is a private individual. Second, the acts of
falsification consisted in petitioners (1) counterfeiting or imitating
the handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to appear that
the same is true and genuine in all respects; and (2) causing it to
appear that Tan has participated in an act or proceeding when he
did not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification was committed
in promissory notes and checks which are commercial documents.
Commercial documents are, in general, documents or instruments
which are "used by merchants or businessmen to promote or
facilitate trade or credit transactions." Promissory notes facilitate
credit transactions while a check is a means of payment used in
business in lieu of money for convenience in business transactions.
A cashiers check necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it
allows the person whose name and signature appear thereon to
encash the check and withdraw the amount indicated therein.
-Usurpation
109. Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 186739-960. April 17, 2013
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on
the prosecutions theory that the DENR is the only government
instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest
products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official
functions that properly belong to the DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government
agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to the
transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to
the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also,
as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were
meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit
issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject
permits under his authority as municipal mayor and independently of
the official functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise
bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false

pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an
excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.
Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs
110. People v. Edgardo Fermin, G.R. No. 179344, August, 3, 2011
While Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9165 excuses non-compliance with the afore-quoted
procedure, the same holds true only for as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers. Here, the failure of the buy-bust team to comply
with the procedural requirements cannot be excused since there was a
break in the chain of custody of the substance taken from appellant. It
should be pointed out that the identity of the seized substance is
established by showing its chain of custody.
The following are the links that must be established in the chain of
custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover
by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
111. People v. Chua 396 SCRA 657
The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of
criminal intent or good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal
liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
112. Del Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012

While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized


should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under
appellants control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one.
Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion
and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise

dominion and control over the place where it is found. The records are
void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in
question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop.
The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the
said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner
being an electrician by profession.
113. David v. People, G.R. No. 181861, October 17, 2011

The deliberate elimination of the classification of dangerous drugs is the


main reason that under R.A. 9165, the possession of any kind of
dangerous drugs is now penalized under the same section. The
deliberations, however, do not address a case wherein an individual is
caught in possession of different kinds of dangerous drugs. In the
present case, petitioner was charged under two Informations, one for
illegal possession of six (6) plastic heat-sealed sachets containing
dried marijuanaleaves weighing more or less 3.865 grams and the other
for illegal possession of three (3) plastic heat-sealed sachets
containing shabu weighing more or less 0.327 gram.
114.

People v. Sadablab, G.R. No. 186392, January 18, 2012

As this Court held in People v. Berdadero,[27] the foregoing provision,


as well as the Internal Rules and Regulations implementing the same, is
silent as to the consequences of the failure on the part of the law
enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buybust operation x x x. [T]his silence cannot be interpreted as a legislative
intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or
evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.[28] In the
case at bar, even if we assume for the sake of argument that Narciso
Sabadlab and accused-appellant Marcos Sabadlab y Narciso alias Bong
Pango could have been different persons, the established fact remains
that it was accused-appellant who was caught in flagrante delicto by the
buy-bust team. Following the aforementioned jurisprudence, even the
lack of participation of PDEA would not make accused-appellants arrest
illegal or the evidence obtained pursuant thereto inadmissible. Neither
is prior surveillance a necessity for the validity of the buy-bust
operation.

115. People v. Amansec, G.R. No. 186131, December 14, 2011

The failure of the police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buybust money is not an indication that the buy-bust operation was a
sham. The use of initials to mark the money used in [a] buy-bust
operation has been accepted by this Court.
116. People v. Dequina, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011

Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean to


carry or convey from one place to another. The evidence in this case
shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants were caught in
flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their
traveling bags. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco need not even open
Dequinas traveling bag to determine its content because when the latter
noticed the police officers presence, she walked briskly away and in her
hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag, causing the zipper to
open and exposed the dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime was
then actually being committed by the accused-appellants, their
warrantless arrest was legally justified, and the following warantless
search of their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their lawful
arrest.
117. People v. Dumalag, G.R. No. 180514, April 17, 2013

It has already been settled that the failure of police officers to mark the
items seized from an accused in illegal drugs cases immediately upon its
confiscation at the place of arrest does not automatically impair the
integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items
inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Resurreccion, the Court explained
that "marking" of the seized items "immediately after seizure and
confiscation" may be undertaken at the police station rather than at the
place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an accused in
illegal drugs cases. It was further emphasized that what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
118. People v. Laylo, G.R. No. 192235, July 6, 2011

PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they were the poseur-buyers in

the sale. Both positively identified appellant as the seller of the


substance contained in plastic sachets which were found to be positive
for shabu. The same plastic sachets were likewise identified by the
prosecution witnesses when presented in court. Even the consideration
of P200.00 for each sachet had been made known by appellant to the
police officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police
officers introduced themselves as cops and immediately arrested
appellant and his live-in partner Ritwal. Thus, the sale was not
consummated but merely attempted. Thus, appellant was charged with
attempted sale of dangerous drugs.
Crimes Against Public Morals
- Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and Exhibits
119. Fernando v. CA, December 6, 2006 G.R. No. 159751
To be held liable for obscenity, the prosecution must prove that (a) the
materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the
offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials; that
which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. A
picture being obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances
of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the
judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it. It is an
issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case
to case basis and on the judges sound discretion.
-AntiTrafficking Persons Act
120. People v. Lali y Purih, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011

The testimony of Aringoys niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling
to Malaysia to work in bars cannot be given credence. Lolita did not
even have a passport to go to Malaysia and had to use her sisters
passport when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos first recruited her. It is
questionable how she could have been travelling to Malaysia previously
without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover, even if it is true that
Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the crime of
Trafficking in Persons can exist even with the victims consent or
knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.

Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only


limited to transportation of victims, but also includes the act of
recruitment of victims for trafficking. In this case, since it has been
sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt, as discussed in Criminal
Case No. 21930, that all the three accused (Aringoy, Lalli and
Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to illegally
recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are
also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking
in Persons committed by a syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime
of recruitment for prostitution also constitutes trafficking.
Crimes Committed by Public Officers
- Malversation
121. Torres v. People, G.R. No. 175074, August 31, 2011
Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of
misappropriation of public funds or property, or passively through
negligence. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be
criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a
case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it
will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of
negligence because both are equally punishable under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code.
More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it
is committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable
and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the Information
charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through
negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves the
mode of commission of the offense.
122. Cua v. People, G.R. No. 166847, November 16, 2011

This Court has held that to justify conviction for malversation of public
funds or property, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused
received public funds or property and that he could not account for
them, or did not have them in his possession and could not give a
reasonable excuse for their disappearance. An accountable public officer

may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of


misappropriation, and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his
accounts which he has not been able to satisfactorily explain.
In the present case, considering that the shortage was duly proven by
the prosecution, petitioners retaliation against the BIR for not
promoting him clearly does not constitute a satisfactory or reasonable
explanation for his failure to account for the missing amount.
123. Labatagos v. Sandiganbayan, 183 SCRA 415

When a collecting officer of a government institution assigns his or her


work to another without the former being the one to misappropriate a
government fund or property malversation may still be at hand.
Malversation consists not only in misappropriation or converting public
funds or property to ones personal use but also by knowingly allowing
others to make use of them.
-Technical Malversation
124. Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 96025, May 15, 1991
In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public
funds for his own personal use or allows any other person to take such
public funds for the latter's personal use. In technical malversation, the
public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his
or another's personal use, but to a public use other than that for which
the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance.
Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it
necessarily include the crime of malversation of public funds charged in
the information.
125. Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005

The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary


differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA
6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which
requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by
law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of
Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos

(P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34


secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
-Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)
126. Ambil Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 175457, July 6, 2011
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use private party
rather than private person to describe the recipient of the unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. The term party is a
technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance as
distinguished from person which, in general usage, refers to a human
being. Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a public
officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean
either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to
protect his personal interest.
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from
the provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.s residence,
they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a
mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of
applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a
private party.
127. Alvarez v. People, G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011

Despite APIs obvious lack of financial qualification and absence of basic


terms and conditions in the submitted proposal, petitioner who chaired
the PBAC, recommended the approval of APIs proposal just forty-five
(45) days after the last publication of the invitation for comparative
proposals, and subsequently requested the SB to pass a resolution
authorizing him to enter into a MOA with API as the lone bidder for the
project. It was only in the MOA that the details of the construction,
terms and conditions of the parties obligations, were laid down at the
time API was already awarded the project. Even the MOA provisions
remain vague as to the parameters of the project, which the
Sandiganbayan found as placing API at an arbitrary position where it
can do as it pleases without being accountable to the municipality in any
way whatsoever. True enough, when API failed to execute the
construction works and abandoned the project, the municipality found

itself at extreme disadvantage without recourse to a performance


security that API likewise failed to submit.
128. Plameras v. People, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013

As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules,


regulations and policies of the Commission on Audit and those
mandated under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160)
were knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which
enabled CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment for
the school desks and armchairs, despite non-delivery an act or
omission evidencing bad faith and manifest partiality.
129. Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 187340, August 14, 2013

In the present case, petitioner is solely charged with violating Section


3(e) of R.A. 3019. He is being held liable for gross and inexcusable
negligence in performing the duties primarily vested in him by law,
resulting in undue injury to private complainant. The good faith of
heads of offices in signing a document will only be appreciated if they,
with trust and confidence, have relied on their subordinates in whom
the duty is primarily lodged. Moreover, the undue injury to private
complainant was established.
The cutting down of her palm trees and the construction of the canal
were all done without her approval and consent. As a result, she lost
income from the sale of the palm leaves. She also lost control and use of
a part of her land. The damage to private complainant did not end with
the canals construction. Informal settlers dirtied her private property
by using the canal constructed thereon as their lavatory, washroom, and
waste disposal site.
130. Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007

As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v.


Estrella, the Court had ascertained the scope of Section 3(g) of RA 3019
as applying to both public officers and private persons: x x x [T]he act

treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g) of RA 3019] partakes the


nature of malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined
by law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or
not the provision has been violated. And this construction would be in
consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019
was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers
and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which
may lead thereto.

131. Caunan v. People, G.R. Nos. 181999 & 182001-04, September 2, 2009

In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the Sandiganbayan
relied on the COAs finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on
the special audit teams report. The audit teams conclusion on the
standard price of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the
following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of walis
tingting without handle actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey
forms on the walis tingting accomplished by the street sweepers; (3)
invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit team purchased
walis tingting; (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement Service; and (5)
documents relative to the walis tingting purchases of Las Pias City.
These documents were then compared with the documents furnished
by petitioners and the other accused relative to Paraaque Citys walis
tingting transactions.
Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed
out, the evidence of the prosecution did not include a signed price
quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Paraaque City. In fact,
even the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the
other accused was different from the walis tingting actually utilized by
the Paraaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by the
audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the
prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing,
should have been identical to the walis tingting purchased in 1996-

1998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting purchases
were disadvantageous to the government because only then could a
determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so
manifest and gross as to make a public official liable under Section 3(g)
of R.A. No. 3019.
132. Trieste v. Sandiganbayan, 146 SCRA 508

An official involved need not dispose of his shares in a corporation as


long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with another.
The matter contemplated in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is the
actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or
pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach.
-Anti-Plunder Act
133. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 2, 2001
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous
offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does
not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since
in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in
se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as
though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check
Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard
to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October12, 2009
Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a
repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute
which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer
who by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at
least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature,
in that it does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring
during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of
proportion of his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to
enforce the right of the State to recover the properties which were not
lawfully acquired by the officer.

134.

Crimes Against Persons


Parricide
135. People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is
killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or
other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first
element, that is, a person was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar
did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from
the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar
dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar
the next day and then buried him the day after. Noemars Death
Certificate was also presented in evidence.
People v. De la Cruz, February 11, 2010 G.R. No. 187683
In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship
between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage
certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was
married to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the
testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest. Clearly,
then, it was established that Victoriano and Anna were husband and
wife.

136.

Death under Exceptional Circumstances


137.
People v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, Sept.14, 1987
There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her
paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a
result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate
outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a
legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These
elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the
accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.

Murder
People v. Peteluna, G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013
To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a
person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with
the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes
parricide nor infanticide.

138.

Aguilar v DOJ, G.R. No. 197522, September 11, 2013


Records bear out facts and circumstances which show that the elements
of murder namely: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused
killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the
killing is not parricide or infanticide are, in all reasonable likelihood,
present in Dangupons case. As to the first and second elements,
Dangupon himself admitted that he shot and killed Tetet. Anent the
third element, there lies sufficient basis to suppose that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery attended Tetets killing in view of the
undisputed fact that he was restrained by respondents and thereby,
rendered defenseless. Finally, with respect to the fourth element, Tetets
killing can neither be considered as parricide nor infanticide as the
evidence is bereft of any indication that Tetet is related to Dangupon.

139.

People v. Galicia, G.R. No. 191063, October 9, 2013


Since the crime has already been qualified to murder by the attendant
circumstance of treachery, the other proven circumstance of evident
premeditation should be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. In this case, it was clearly shown that the two accused
who were "riding in tandem" hatched the means on how to carry out
and facilitate the commission of the crime. The time that had elapsed
while the accused were waiting for their victim to pass by, is indicative
of cool thought and reflection on their part that they clung to their
determination to commit the crime; hence evident premeditation is duly
proved.

140.

Homicide
Abella v. People, G.R. No. 198400, October 7, 2013
In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accuseds intent
to take his victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and

141.

convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal


intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things,
the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of
wounds he inflicted on his victim.
Escamilla v. People, G.R. No. 188551, February 27, 2013
The intent to kill was shown by the continuous firing at the victim even
after he was hit.

142.

Anti-Hazing Law
143.
Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012
In Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now
retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent
history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct
constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal. Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter
dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the
conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological
suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 AntiHazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was
not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on
the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the
accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is
constrained to rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to
inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical
injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering
the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and
absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however,

that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal


liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are
committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof,
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Unintentional Abortion
144.
People v. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884, March 30, 1988
The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to
cause an abortion because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach
which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find that appellant's
intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere
boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of
the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an
abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim
but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
Mutilation
Aguirre v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the
elements of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the
Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation
of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused
purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of
some essential organ for reproduction. According to the public
prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation
as defined and penalized above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy operation did not
in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still
very much part of his physical self. Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however,
would want this Court to make a ruling that bilateral vasectomy
constitutes the crime of mutilation. This we cannot do, for such an
interpretation would be contrary to the intentions of the framers of our
penal code.

145.

Less serious physical injuries


146.
Pentecostes v. People, G.R. No. 167766, April 7, 2010
Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the
latters body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have shot the
victim multiple times or even ran him over with the car. Favorably to

petitioner, the inference that intent to kill existed should not be drawn
in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond
reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted
upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries
only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by the doctor who
attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require ten (10) days
of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the following day,
the crime committed is less serious physical injuries only. The less
serious physical injury suffered by Rudy is defined under Article 265 of
the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "(A)ny person who inflicts
upon another physical injuries not described as serious physical injuries
but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10)
days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period,
shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor."
Rape
People v. Orita, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008
For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential.
Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ without rupture of the
hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female
organ because although the offender has commenced the commission of
a felony directly by overt acts, not all acts of execution was performed.

147.

People v. Achas, G.R. No. 185712, August 4, 2009


The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainants
body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape. This is
because hymenal laceration is not an element of the crime of rape, albeit
a healed or fresh laceration is a compelling proof of defloration.

148.

People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 186129, August 4, 2009


Most important in a prosecution for statutory rape is to prove the
following elements: 1. that the accused had carnal knowledge with a
woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age. These
elements were sufficiently established during trial and were not
rebutted by the defense with any solid evidence to the contrary.

149.

150.

De Castro v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 155041, February 14, 2007

Petitioner insists that a finger does not constitute an object or


instrument in contemplation of RA 8353. The insertion of ones finger
into the genital of another constitutes rape through sexual assault.
Hence, the prosecutor did not err in charging petitioner with the crime
of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
151.
People v. Penilla, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013
In rape cases, the moral character of the victim is immaterial. Physical
resistance need not be established in rape when threats and
intimidation are employed, and the victim submits herself to her
attacker because of fear. Physical resistance is not an essential element
of rape. Also, delay in revealing the commission of a crime such as rape
does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This is
because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her
defilement to the cruelty of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is
unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant.
Neither does an inconclusive medical report negate the finding of rape.
A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if
credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime and the medical
certificate will then be rendered as merely corroborative.
152.

People v. Funesto, G.R. No. 182237, August 3, 2011

In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any certificate of


live birth or any similar authentic document to prove the age of AAA
when she was sexually violated.Neither did the appellant expressly
admit AAAs age.
This conclusion notwithstanding, we find that the prosecution
sufficiently proved that force and intimidation attended the commission
of the crime, as alleged in the Information. Jurisprudence firmly holds
that the force or violence required in rape cases is relative; it does not
need to be overpowering or irresistible; it is present when it allows the
offender to consummate his purpose. In this case, the appellant
employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate rape. In fact,
the medical findings confirmed AAAs non-virgin state.
Thus, the appellant is guilty of simple rape under Article 335(2) of the
Revised Penal Code, and was properly sentenced with the penalty

of reclusion perpetua
People v. Dahilig G.R. No. 187083, June 13, 2011
As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all the
elements of both crimes are present in this case. The case of People v.
Abay, however, is enlightening and instructional on this issue. It was
stated in that case that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender
should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the
Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both
crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will
be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability
for a single criminal act.

153.

154.

People v. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term


homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder
and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the
rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of
superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information
have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would not
qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is
still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the
aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance only.
People v. Cadellada, G.R. No. 189293, July 10, 2013
A father who rapes his own minor daughter do not need to use any
physical force or intimidation because in rape committed by a close kin,
such as the victim's father, it is not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the
place of violence or intimidation.

155.

Anti Child Abuse Law


Garingarao v. People, G.R. No. 192760, July 20, 2011
In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAAs

156.

breasts and inserted his finger into her private part for his sexual
gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by pretending
that his actions were part of the physical examination he was doing.
Garingarao persisted on what he was doing despite AAAs objections.
AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that
he was just examining her.
The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse
when the child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult.16 In lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion
equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the
offended partys free will.17 In this case, Garingarao coerced AAA into
submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was examining
her.
Roallos v. People, 198389, December 11, 2013
Roallos assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in
prostitution is plainly without merit. "[T]he law covers not only a
situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in which a
child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious
conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and
Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A. No. 7610 shows that it applies not only to a
child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other
sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to "other sexual abuse" when
he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence
of any adult.

157.

Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security


Kidnapping
158.
People v. Muit, G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
are the following: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused
kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) the
commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in
Article 267 is present. The totality of the prosecutions evidence in this

case established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with


homicide.
People v. Niegas, G.R. No. 194582, November 27, 2013
If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is
kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom,
the duration of his detention is immaterial.

159.

People v. Baluya y Notarte, G.R. No. 181822, April 13, 2011


Appellant's arguments that the victim is free to go home if he wanted to
because he was not confined, detained or deprived of his liberty and
that there is no evidence to show that Glodil sustained any injury,
cannot hold water. The CA is correct in holding that for kidnapping to
exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure
or treated him harshly. Where the victim in a kidnapping case is a
minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender forcibly
restrained the victim. As discussed above, leaving a child in a place from
which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to
roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of
liberty. For under such a situation, the childs freedom remains at the
mercy and control of the abductor. It remains undisputed that it was his
first time to reach Novaliches and that he did not know his way home
from the place where he was left. It just so happened that the victim had
the presence of mind that, when he saw an opportunity to escape, he ran
away from the place where appellant left him. Moreover, he is
intelligent enough to read the signboards of the passenger jeepneys he
saw and follow the route of the ones going to his place of residence.

160.

161.

People v. Jacalne, G.R. No. 168552, October 3, 2011

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the


victims liberty, coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It
includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation
of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It
involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of
confinement or detention, or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to
move.

In this case, appellant dragged Jomarie, a minor, to his house after the
latter refused to go with him. Upon reaching the house, he tied her
hands. When Jomarie pleaded that she be allowed to go home, he
refused. Although Jomarie only stayed outside the house, it was inside
the gate of a fenced property which is high enough such that people
outside could not see what happens inside. Moreover, when appellant
tied the hands of Jomarie, the formers intention to deprive Jomarie of
her liberty has been clearly shown. For there to be kidnapping, it is
enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Because of her
tender age, and because she did not know her way back home, she was
then and there deprived of her liberty. This is irrespective of the length
of time that she stayed in such a situation. It has been repeatedly held
that if the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is
immaterial. This notwithstanding the fact also that appellant, after more
or less one hour, released Jomarie and instructed her on how she could
go home.
People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417 July 27, 2011
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in
the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime
is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite acts
are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659
punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659
depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times
the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime
committed the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.

162.

However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the
offender should not have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise,
it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In People v.
Garcia, we explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the
woman was raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible
abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other
counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate count of rape.
Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor
163.
People v. Marquez, G.R. No. 181440, April 13, 2011

It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with
the custody of Justine. Whether this is due to Meranos version of
Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to Marquezs version that
Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions,
Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of
Justine. It does not matter, for the first element to be present, how long
said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez was the one
entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first element
of the crime is satisfied.
As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6,
1998, the custody of Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez.
Whether this lasted for months or only for a couple of days, the fact
remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual
custody of Justine. Marquezs deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor
at that time, when demanded to do so by the latters mother, shows that
the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this case.
Grave Threats
164.
Caluag v. People, 171511, March 4, 2009
In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may
or may not be accompanied by a condition. Considering the mauling
incident which transpired earlier between petitioner and Julias
husband, petitioners act of pointing a gun at Julias forehead clearly
enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her
person which constituted grave threat.
Grave Coercion
165.
Alejandro v. Bernas, G.R. No. 179243, September 7, 2011
We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to
cause intimidation to the petitioners.
There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon
his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse,
descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. Material violence is not

indispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear produced in the


mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is
sufficient.
In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and
cut off the facilities in the presence of security guards. As aptly held by
the CA, it was not alleged that the security guards committed anything
to intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not
customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on the part of
petitioners. To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex
and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. Here, the petitioners
who were allegedly intimidated by the guards are all lawyers who
presumably know their rights. The presence of the guards in fact was
not found by petitioners to be significant because they failed to mention
it in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they insist is that, the mere
padlocking of the Unit prevented them from using it for the purpose for
which it was intended. This, according to the petitioners, is grave
coercion on the part of respondents.
166.

People v. Astorga, G.R. No. 110097. December 22, 1997

This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or


restraint of the victim, which is the primary element of
kidnapping. 31 Appellant's apparent intention was to take Yvonne
against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not
materialize, however, because Fabila's group chanced upon them. The
evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much
less, that he actually detained her. Appellant's forcible dragging of
Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual
confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no
"lockup." Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article
286 of the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three
elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing

something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against


his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or
compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a
display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control
over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who
restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other
words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the
exercise of any lawful right. When appellant forcibly dragged and
slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan.
Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from going
home, and we cannot find any.
Consulta v. People, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009
The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the
commission of the act. The motives of the accused are the prime
criterion:

167.

The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to
robbery and the other to coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the
accused. Was the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of
another by use of force or intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery.
Was the purpose, without authority of law but still believing himself the
owner or the creditor, to compel another to do something against his
will and to seize property? Then, conviction for coercion under Article
497 of the Penal Code. The motives of the accused are the prime
criterion. And there was no common robber in the present case, but a
man who had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate, taking the
law into his own hands and attempting to collect what he thought was
due him. Animus furandi was lacking.
Unjust Vexation
168.
Maderazo v. People, G.R. No. 165065, September 26, 2006
Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the
contents thereof taken from the stall and brought to the police station,
the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime
to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present when the
crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private

complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when


she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed, by their
collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from her stall and prevented
her from selling therein, hence, losing income from the business.
Verutiao was deprived of her possession of the stall from January 21,
1997.
Anti-Wire Tapping Act
169.
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 112
(1986)
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of
RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case
was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and
phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
170.

Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, Sept. 28, 1995

Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in


Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows
the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of
absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting,
as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad
enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include
the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.

Crimes Against Property


Robbery with Homicide
171.
People v. Comiling, G.R. No. 140405, March 4, 2004
The rule is, whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the
occasion of a robbery, all those who take part as principals in the
robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide.
While we are convinced that appellants are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of robbery with homicide, we cannot impose the penalty of death
on them. Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
robbery carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In imposing
the death penalty, the trial court appreciated the aggravating
circumstances of band, evident premeditation, craft and disguise against
appellants. However, these circumstances were not specifically alleged
in the information as required under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hence, inasmuch as no aggravating and
mitigating circumstances can be deemed to have attended the
commission of the offense, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua
should be imposed on them.
People v. Hijada, G.R. No. 123696, Mar. 11, 2004
There is no crime of Robbery with Multiple Homicide under the Revised
Penal Code. The crime is Robbery with Homicide notwithstanding the
number of homicides committed on the occasion of the robbery and
even if murder, physical injuries and rape were also committed on the
same occasion.

172.

People v. Diu, G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013


In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor
is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the
taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or
after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or
distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into
consideration. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery

173.

and homicide, must be consummated.


It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or
that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that
two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape,
intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by
reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact
that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still
be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the
occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide.
All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide,
thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide. When homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took
part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals
of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although
they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears
that they endeavored to prevent the same. If a robber tries to prevent
the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is
guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who
conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of
such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One
who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his coconspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has
materialized.
People v. Barra, G.R. No. 198020, July 10, 2013
In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated
because the victim refused to give his money to appellant and no
personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason
that the victim was shot. Accused can only be found guilty of attempted
robbery with homicide. The fact of asportation must be established
beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact was not duly established,
accused should be held liable only for the crime of attempted robbery
with homicide.

174.

Robbery with Rape

People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011


For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be
shown that the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of
a robbery and not the other way around. This special complex crime
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation
where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain,
personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the
occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. In the case at bar, the
original intent of the appellant and his co-accused was to rob the victims
and AAA was raped on the occasion of the robbery.

175.

People v. Dinola, G.R. No. L-54567, March 22, 1990


If the intention of the accused was to commit robbery but rape was also
committed even before the robbery, the crime of robbery with rape is
committed however, if the original design was to commit rape but the
accused after committing rape also committed robbery because the
opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should be viewed as two
distinct offenses. In the case at bar, after the complainant was raped by
the accused, the latter threatened to kill her if she did not give watch on
her wrist to him and forcibly took it from her. Hence, the accused was
convicted for two crimes of rape and robbery.

176.

People v. Moreno, G.R. No. 140033, January 25, 2002


Accused Juan Moreno, who took no part in the rape, is guilty of robbery
only under Article 294, No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code but as to
appellant Reynaldo Maniquez, who had raped Mary Ann Galedo, he
should be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape,
under Article 294, No. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

177.

Theft
Pidelli v. People, G.R. No. 163437, February 13, 2008
There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner received
the final payment due the partners Placido and Wilson under the
pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH. Under the terms
of their agreement, petitioner was to account for the remaining balance
of the said funds and give each of the partners their respective shares.
He, however, failed to give private complainant Placido what was due
him under the construction contract.

178.

Qualified theft
179.
Zapanta v. People, G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation
to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the
taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another;
(c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the
owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done
under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC,
i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.18
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecutions evidence
proved, through the prosecutions eyewitnesses, that upon the
petitioners instruction, several pieces of wide flange steel beams had
been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001,
along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner
betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him when he, as project
manager, repeatedly took construction materials from the project site,
without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of
the construction materials.
Ringor v. People, G.R. No. 198904, December 11, 2013
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of the felony of qualified theft,
must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence,
guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended
party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which
the appellant abused. The element of grave abuse of confidence is
present in this case. Verily, the petitioner, as sales clerk/agent of PCS, is
duty-bound to remit to Ingan the payments which she collected from
the customers of PCS. She would not have been able to take the money
paid by LACS if it were not for her position in PCS. In failing to remit to
Ingan the money paid by LACS, the petitioner indubitably gravely
abused the confidence reposed on her by PCS.

180.

Anti-Carnapping Law
181.
People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the

important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not


merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which
in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is
performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the
owners consent constitutes gain.
182.

People v. Lagat, G.R. No. 187044, September 14, 2011

The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as


evidenced by the registration papers, was found in Lagat and Palalays
possession. Aside from this, the prosecution was also able to establish
that Lagat and Palalay fled the scene when the Alicia PNP tried to
approach them at the palay buying station. To top it all, Lagat and
Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biags tricycle. Their
unexplained possession raises the presumption that they were
responsible for the unlawful taking of the tricycle.
183.

People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 138470, April 1, 2003

The acts committed by appellant constituted the crime of carnapping


even if the deceased was the driver of the vehicle and not the owner.
The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property through
intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully
divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. What is simply
required is that the property taken does not belong to the offender.
Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed suffices.
So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from another
against the latter's will through violence or intimidation, with animo de
lucro, unlawful taking of a property belonging to another is imputable to
the offender.
People v. Nocom, G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013
To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there
must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also
that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was
perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof."

184.

Estafa

Espino v. People, G.R. No. 188217, July 3, 2013


When the information alleges the crime of estafa specified under
paragraph 1(b) and yet what was proven was estafa under paragraph
2(a) of the same Art. 315 of the RPC, what determines the real nature
and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of
facts stated in the information and not the caption of the information.
The information in this case may be interpreted as charging the accused
with both estafa under paragraph 1 (b) and estafa under paragraph
2(a). It is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal law that one act
can give rise to two offenses, all the more when a single offense has
multiple modes of commission.

185.

Brokmann v. People, G.R. No. 199150, February 6, 2012


the offense of estafa, in general, is committed either by (a) abuse of
confidence
or
(b)
means
of
deceit. The
acts
constituting estafa committed with abuse of confidence are enumerated
in item (1) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; item
(2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa committed by means of deceit.
Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa by abuse of confidence; the
breach of confidence takes the place of fraud or deceit, which is a usual
element in the other estafas. In this case, the charge against the
petitioner and her subsequent conviction was for estafa committed by
abuse of confidence. Thus, it was not necessary for the prosecution to
prove deceit as this was not an element of the estafa that the petitioner
was charged with.

186.

Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 199294, July 31, 2013


Unlike estafa under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Code, estafa
under paragraph 2(a) of that provision does not require as an element
of the crime proof that the accused misappropriated or converted the
swindled money or property. All that is required is proof of pecuniary
damage sustained by the complainant arising from his reliance on the
fraudulent representation. The prosecution in this case discharged its
evidentiary burden by presenting the receipts of the installment
payments made by Sy on the purchase price for the Club share.
Petitioner and Ragonjan knew that the Club was a bogus project.

187.

188.

2013

Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 187919, February 20,

Despite the charge against the respondent of qualified theft, the mere
filing of a formal charge, to our mind, does not automatically make the
dismissal valid. Evidence submitted to support the charge should be
evaluated to see if the degree of proof is met to justify respondents
termination. The affidavit executed by Montegrico simply contained the
accusations of Abis that respondents committed pilferage, which
allegations remain uncorroborated. "Unsubstantiated suspicions,
accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal
justification for dismissing employees. The other bits of evidence were
also inadequate to support the charge of pilferage.
People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like
the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable
doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the
check. Hence, he cannot be convicted of estafa.

189.

Milla v. People, G.R. No. 188726, Jan. 25, 2012


In the case at bar, the acceptance by MPI of the Equitable PCI checks
tendered by Milla could not have novated the original transaction, as the
checks were only intended to secure the return of the P2 million the
former had already given him. Even then, these checks bounced and
were thus unable to satisfy his liability. Moreover, the estafa involved
here was not for simple misappropriation or conversion, but was
committed through Millas falsification of public documents, the liability
for which cannot be extinguished by mere novation.

190.

BP 22
People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58. June 3, 2004
It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that
appellant received the demand letter prepared and sent by her lawyer.
She was not certain if appellant indeed received the notice of dishonor
of the checks. All she knew was that a demand letter was sent by her
lawyer to the appellant. In fact, right after complainant made that
presumption, her lawyer filed the criminal cases against appellant at the
Fiscals office without any confirmation that the demand letter

191.

supposedly sent through registered mail was actually received by


appellant.
With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant
cannot be held guilty of violation of BP 22. The lack of such notice
violated appellants right to procedural due process. It is a general rule
that when service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the
notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of proving
receipt of notice rests upon the party asserting it and the quantum of
proof required for conviction in this criminal case is proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes.
A suit on the check can be filed in any of the places where any of the
elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn,
issued, delivered or dishonored.

192.

Dico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141669, February 28, 2005


A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is
thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice of
dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The
notice must be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check
will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution.

193.

The requirement of notice, its sending to, and its actual receipt by, the
drawer or maker of the check gives the latter the option to prevent
criminal prosecution if he pays the holder of the check the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that the
check has not been paid.
Resterio v. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012
What Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a
worthless check. The law did not look either at the actual ownership of
the check or of the account against which it was made, drawn, or issued,
or at the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer. Also, that the check

194.

was not intended to be deposited was really of no consequence to her


incurring criminal liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
195.

Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, February 2, 2001

The clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of


knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions
(1) presentment within 90 days from date of the check, and (2) the
dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make arrangements
for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That the
check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the
conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of
funds to arise. It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it
discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the
account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be presented for payment
within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged
from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By
current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6)
months,23 or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks
157 days after the date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be
considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or
circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private respondent
did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that
he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was
constrained to deposit the said checks. After the checks were
dishonored, petitioner was duly notified of such fact but failed to make
arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days thereof.
There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had knowledge of
the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the
time of issuance of the checks. And despite petitioners insistent plea of
innocence, we find no error in the respondent courts affirmance of his
conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law.
Tan v. People, G.R. No. 141466, January 19, 200
The check in question was not issued without sufficient funds and was
not dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. What was stamped on the
check in question was Payment Stopped-Funded at the same time DAUD

196.

meaning drawn against uncollected deposits. Even with uncollected


deposits, the bank may honor the check at its discretion in favor of
favored clients, in which case there would be no violation of B.P. 22.
Nissan Gallery Ortigas v. Felipe, 199067, November 11, 2013
A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily
civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal
prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that
required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to
be completely free from civil liability, a persons acquittal must be based
on the fact he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based
merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable
since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of.
Though the accused has been acquitted from the criminal charge, the
acquittal was just based on reasonable doubt and it did not change the
fact that she issued the subject check which was subsequently
dishonored upon its presentment.

197.

- Other Deceits
198.
Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822, August 25, 2005
For one to be liable for other deceits under the law, it is required that the
prosecution must prove the following essential elements: (a) false
pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the preceding
articles; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made
or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.[40] It
is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation
constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private complainant to
part with her property.
The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those
enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. It is intended
as the catchall provision for that purpose with its broad scope and
intendment.
-Arson
People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006
In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine
what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or

199.

arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main


objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the
building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of
arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;
(b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person
who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the
means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only;
lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in
fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means
to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes
committed homicide/murder and arson.
Lihaylihay v. People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31, 2013
Petitioners were property convicted of the crime of violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 which has the following essential elements: (a) the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action
caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions. Having affixed their signatures on the
disputed documents despite the glaring defects found therein,
petitioners were properly found to have acted with evident bad faith in
approving the "ghost" purchases. Their participation in facilitating the
payment of non-existent CCIE items resulted to a loss on the part of the
government.

200.

Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008


The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning;
and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing elements here.
However, the information failed to allege that what was intentionally
burned was an inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal.

201.

- Malicious Mischief
202.
Taguinod v. People, G.R. No. 185833, October 12, 2011
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution
had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the foregoing elements.

First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the petitioner was clearly
deliberate as indicated by the evidence on record. The version of the private
complainant that the petitioner chased him and that the Vitara pushed the
CRV until it reached the stairway railing was more believable than the
petitioner's version that it was private complainant's CRV which moved
backward and deliberately hit the Vitara considering the steepness or angle of
the elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and dangerous for the
private complainant and his family to move the CRV backward when it would
be hard for him to see his direction as well as to control his speed in view of
the gravitational pull. Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV
does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when
the Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just giving vent to his anger
and hate as a result of a heated encounter between him and the private
complainant.
In sum, this Court finds that the evidence on record shows that the
prosecution had proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of malicious mischief.
Crimes Against Chastity
-Qualified Seduction
203.
People v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-25354, June 28, 1968
While deceit is an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, it
does not have to be proved or established in a charge of qualified
seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. Under Art. 337 of the
Revised Penal Code, the seduction of a virgin over twelve and under
eighteen years of age, committed by any person in public authority,
priest, house servant, domestic guardian, teacher, or any person who, in
any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the
woman seduced is "constitutive" of the crime of qualified seduction
even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge
was voluntary on the part of the virgin.
204.

Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80838, November 29,

1988
There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified
Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that
she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age.
However, Consented Abduction, in addition to the two common

elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party must
be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and,
(2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs
while Qualified Seduction requires that: (1) the crime be committed by
abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has
sexual intercourse with the woman.
- Acts of Lasciviousness
205.
Sombilon v. People, G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009
In cases of acts of lasciviousness, it is not necessary that intimidation
be irresistible. It being sufficient that some compulsion equivalent
to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the
offended party. Here, the victim was locked inside a windowless room
together with her aggressor who poked a gun at her forehead. Even a
grown man would be paralyzed with fear if threatened at gunpoint,
what more the hapless victim who was only 15 years old when she was
subjected to such atrocity.
206.

Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143838, May 9, 2002

Petitioners acts of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and


kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and
touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable
acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that
petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainants
sexual organ. Rather, these acts constitute acts of lasciviousness. The
elements of said crime are: (1) that the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force and
intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12
years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either
sex.
207.

People v Bonaagua , G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011

Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of


R.A. No. 7610. It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of
rape whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ or even its

slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina
already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act
of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be
considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual
assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the
present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be
pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her private
part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina. This
testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretation,
since it cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled
by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle that the guilt of an
accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot
be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual
assault.
-Forcible Abduction
208.
People v. Ablaneda, G.R. No. 131914, April 30, 2001
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article
342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any
woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is
taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
On the other hand, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman by force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of
reason or is unconscious, or when she is under twelve years of age.
All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a
woman, was taken against her will, as shown by the fact that she was
intentionally directed by accused-appellant to a vacant hut. At her
tender age, Magdalena could not be expected to physically resist
considering that the lewd designs of accused-appellant could not have
been apparent to her at that time. Physical resistance need not be
demonstrated to show that the taking was against her will. The
employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking,
especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering
that it was raining, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as

probably the purpose was to seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly
prone to deception. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that
makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. Finally, the evidence
shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was effected
in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd designs in
forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim.
209.

People v. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012

The principal objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting


AAA from Dapitan Street and in bringing her to another place was to
rape and ravish her. This objective became evident from the successive
acts of Sabadlab immediately after she had alighted from the car in
completely undressing her as to expose her whole body (except the eyes
due to the blindfold), in kissing her body from the neck down, and in
having
carnal knowledge of
her (in
that
order). Although forcible abduction was seemingly committed, we
cannot hold him guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape. Under
the circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.
People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 141125, February 28, 2002
There can only be one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape.
Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as
separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should
be detached from and considered independently of the forcible
abduction. Therefore, accused-appellant should be convicted of one
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and three separate acts
of rape.

210.

- Anti Sexual Harassment Act


211.
Bacsin v. Wahiman, G.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008
The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The AntiSexual Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered
and penalized by said law. Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the
demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v.
Rayala, it was held, It is true that this provision calls for a demand,
request or requirement of a sexual favor. But it is not necessary that the

demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a


categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal
certitude, from the acts of the offender. The CSC found, as did the CA,
that even without an explicit demand from petitioner his act of mashing
the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual
harassment. Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual
harassment in an education or training environment is committed
(w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or
offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice. AAA even
testified that she felt fear at the time petitioner touched her. It cannot
then be said that the CSC lacked basis for its ruling, when it had both the
facts and the law. The CSC found the evidence presented by the
complainant sufficient to support a finding of grave misconduct. It is
basic that factual findings of administrative agencies, when supported
by substantial evidence, are binding upon the Court.
212.

Alegria v Duque, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2019, 04 April 2007

Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking


advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire it is about power being
exercised by a superior over his women subordinates. That power
emanates from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse his
amorous advances. Under Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule on
Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines
on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary), work-related sexual
harassment is committed by an official or employee in the Judiciary
who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a
work environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual
favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the latter. It is committed
when the sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms,
conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual
favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which

in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment


opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.
In the case at bar, while it is true that the element of moral ascendancy
is present, respondent being the person who recommended
complainant to her present position, complainant has failed to prove the
alleged sexual advances by evidence other than her bare allegations in
the affidavit-complaint. Even her own actions or omissions operate to
cast doubt on her claim.
Crimes Against Civil Status
-Bigamy
213.
Teves v. People, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011
The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the
CA was correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner.
Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or
subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage
with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the
decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only
on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage to
Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with
Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact
not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.
It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged.
His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family
Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.
Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis

acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal


infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
214.

Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the
petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.
No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus,
needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more,
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
215.

Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18,

2004
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not
without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or
born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the
law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce

legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring


criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States
penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise
of futurity and commitment.
Crimes Against Honor
- Libel
216.
Alcantara v. Ponce, G.R. No. 156183, February 28, 2007
The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code,
has the following elements: (1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance; (2)
publicity or publication; (3) malice; (4) direction of such imputation at a
natural or juridical person, or even a dead person and (5) tendency to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the person defamed.
Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 172203, February 14, 2011
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the
commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which
tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to
blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine whether a
statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading
them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another
sense. Moreover, [a] charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to
induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or
persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses
or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold
the person or persons up to public ridicule.

217.

Tested under these established standards, we cannot subscribe to the


appellate courts finding that the phrase CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND

SAGAY NEVER tends to induce suspicion on private respondents


character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no
derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause
his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any
unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would
reflect on private respondents integrity. Obviously, the controversial
word NEVER used by petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary
sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private respondents
integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of
any offense. Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption
and dishonesty in government service, it is our considered view to
appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on
private respondents performance of official duty and not purposely
designed to malign and besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to
deprive him of public confidence.
Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 159787, May 25, 2007
The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable
from the contents of the libelous article. In order to maintain a libel suit,
it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary
that the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the
allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description
or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the
article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by
extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and
did understand that he was the person referred to.5 Kunkle v.
Cablenews-American and Lyons6 laid the rule that this requirement is
complied with where a third person recognized or could identify the
party vilified in the article.

218.

The libelous article, while referring to "Miss S," does not give a sufficient
description or other indications which identify "Miss S." In short, the
article fails to show that "Miss S" and Florinda Bagay are one and the
same person.

219.

Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008

Proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of
the publication without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he
was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the
matter contained in the said libelous article. Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, however, includes not only the author but also the person
who prints or published it. Thus, proof of knowledge or participation in
the publication of the offending article is not required.
220.

Tulfo v. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008

Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous
articles that appear on their paper by simply saying they had no
participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo
was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which the subject articles
appeared, when they themselves clearly hold positions of authority in
the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president in the
publishing company.
As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill
his responsibility as a journalist, the other petitioners cannot simply say
that they are not liable because they did not fulfill their responsibilities
as editors and publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper, who
has active charge and control of its management, conduct, and policy,
generally is held to be equally liable with the owner for the publication
therein of a libelous article. On the theory that it is the duty of the editor
or manager to know and control the contents of the paper, it is held that
said person cannot evade responsibility by abandoning the duties to
employees, so that it is immaterial whether or not the editor or manager
knew the contents of the publication.
Bonifacio v. RTC Makati, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first
published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the
criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where
the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or

221.

supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business


offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This
pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to
harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to
defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there
would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first
publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to
the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing
and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to
Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly
requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in
situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone
who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the
Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed
the offending website.
- Slander
Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006
Moreover, pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the
phrase Fuck You, which
is
similar
to
the
expression Puta or Putang Ina mo, in local parlance. Such expression
was not held to be libelous in Reyes v. People, where the Court said
that: This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often
employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer,
that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. Following Reyes, and in
light of the fact that there was a perceived provocation coming from
complainant, petitioners act of pointing a dirty finger at complainant
constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu
of the case that the act complained of was employed by petitioner "to
express anger or displeasure" at complainant for procrastinating the
approval of his leave monetization. While it may have cast dishonor,
discredit or contempt upon complainant, said act is not of a serious
nature, thus, the penalty shall bearresto menor meaning, imprisonment
from one day to 30 days or a fine not exceeding P200.00. We opt to
impose a fine following Mari.

222.

Victorio v. CA, G.R. Nos. L-32836-37, May 3, 1989


Appellant-petitioner admitted having called Atty. Vivencio Ruiz,
kayabang, tunaw na utak, swapang, and "estapador", which
attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting
imputation. Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer
when touching on his profession are libellous per se.

223.

- Intriguing Against Honor


224.
Betguen v Masangcay 238 Scra 475
Article 364 of the Revised Penal Code defines "intriguing against honor"
as any intrigue which has for its principal purpose to blemish the honor
and reputation of a person. This felony undoubtedly falls under the
coverage of crimes involving moral turpitude, the latter term having
been defined as "an act of baseness, vileness, depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes his fellow man, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty
and good morals."
Criminal Negligence
225.
Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 172716, November 17, 2010
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are
distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of
the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by
rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition
that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it x x x on three points of analysis: (1) the object of
punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the
legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed
to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal
intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes