Escolar Documentos
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KRAMER VS CA ..................................................................... 2
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four years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i. e., from
April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly,
the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year
prescriptive period.
DECISION
For their part, the petitioners contended that maritime collisions have
GANCAYCO, J.:
The principal issue in this Petition for Review is whether or not a Complaint
can properly analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued that the running
of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and
that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the
Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia
The record of the case discloses that in the early morning of April 8, 1976,
Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive period
the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer,
under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said
Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila.
date. The petitioners concluded that inasmuch as the Complaint was filed
Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in
In an Order dated September 25, 1986,[4] the trial court denied the Motion
of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.
filed by the private respondent. The trial court observed that in ascertaining
negligence relating to a maritime collision, there is a need to rely on highly
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine
technical aspects attendant to such collision, and that the Board of Marine
protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard.
On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B
to say that the four-year prescriptive period provided in Article 1146 of the
Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the
Civil Code should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the
employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia
negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had been finally
Philippines during the collision. The findings made by the Board served as
ascertained. The pertinent portions of the Order of the trial court are as
follows --
Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V
Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine
officer.
[1]
against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial
Court in Pasay City.[2] The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 2907-P.
He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within
2|P a g e
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had already definitely ripened at the onset of the collision. For this reason,
he (sic) could cite the negligence on the part of the personnel of the
petitioner to exercise due care and lack of (sic) diligence to prevent the
collision that resulted in the total loss of their xxx boat.
The Court finds reason in the argument of the plaintiff that marine incidents
have those peculiarities which only persons of special skill, training and
exposure can rightfully decipher and resolve on the matter of the
negligence and liabilities of parties involved and inasmuch as the report of
the Board of Inquiry (sic) admittedly came out only on April 29, 1982, the
prescriptive period provided xxx under Art. 1146 of the Civil Code should
begin to run only from that date. The complaint was filed with this Court on
May 10, 1985, hence the statute of limitations can not constitute a bar to
the filing of this case."[5]
The private respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way
of a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging therein that
the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss
the Complaint filed by the petitioners. The case was assigned to the
Second Division of the appellate court and was docketed as Case No. CAG.R. SP No. 12032.[6]
In a Decision dated November 27, 1987,[7] and clarified in a Resolution
dated January 12, 1988,[8] the Court of Appeals granted the Petition filed by
the private respondent and ordered the trial court to dismiss the Complaint.
The pertinent portions of the Decision of the appellate court are as follows -
The petitioners filed a Motion for the reconsideration of the said Decision
but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
May 27, 1988.[10]
Hence, the instant Petition wherein the arguments raised by the petitioner
before the trial court are reiterated.[11] In addition thereto, the petitioner
contends that the Decision of the Court of Appeals runs against the
pronouncement of this Court in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals.[12]
The private respondent filed its Comment on the Petition seeking therein
"It is clear that the cause of action of private respondent (the herein
petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer) accrued from the
occurrence of the mishap because that is the precise time when damages
were inflicted upon and sustained by the aggrieved party and from which
relief from the court is presently sought. Private respondents should have
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actions.
Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has
prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for
damages was filed in court only on May 30, 1985, way beyond the four (4)
On September 19, 1988, the Court resolved to give due course to the
[15]
petition.
After the parties filed their respective memoranda, the case was
The petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an
SO ORDERED.
action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years.
The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed.
In Paulan vs. Sarabia,[16] this Court ruled that in an action for damages
arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a
quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the
day of the collision.
In Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, [17] this Court
held as follows -
"The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an
obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff
xxx. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be
said in law that a cause of action has arisen xxx."
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be
counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of
the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff,
which is the time when the cause of action arises.
It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision
of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted
from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a
determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that
the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before
he can file an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in
this case. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief
from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents
or personnel of the other vessel.
4|P a g e
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behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from
Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First
fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to
Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the
DECISION
defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter
court endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
in the complaint.
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952, bus No. 30 of the Medina
Our New Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of a common
way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There
were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor.
Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right
of the driver, Felipe Lara, seated to the right of Bataclan, another
"Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just
called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated on the left side of
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
the driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the
four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus
was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires
burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on
the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers
managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver,
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth
named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them
named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of
the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and
moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and
Lara, who said that they could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in
the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from the
wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out
or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but
calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. After
half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch
made - of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum.
These men presumably approached the overturned bus, and almost
immediately, a tierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus,
including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the
bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank
on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the
bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought
by one of the men who answered the call for help sot it on fire.
"Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the former's
That same day, the charred bodies of the four doomed passengers inside
the bus were removed and duly identified, specially that of Juan Bataclan.
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope
of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in
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continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effectingThis liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a
lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and
the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the
proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of .contract of
vehicle. But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining' in
the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death
carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City, We also agree with the
of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when
trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through
the vehicle turned not only on its, side but completely on its back, the
his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that
the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the
the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for
help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver
the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of
and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about
the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after
2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and
zigzagging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after
coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were
the blow-out, must have applied the, brakes in order to stop the bus, but
not available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and
because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running", its
what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach
momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the
the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested
from them. In other words, the coming of the men with the torch was to be
expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the
It is as follows:
trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is
more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence
of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the
witnesses, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and
forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the
position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have
leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus,
this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large
area, can be smelt and detected even from a distance, and yet neither the
driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said
negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal
provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
Torts 5
are entitled to attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services rendered
by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial court, but also in the course of
the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by them, the
attorney's fees may well be fixed at Eight Hundred (P800) Pesos. The
award made by the trial court of One Hundred (P100) Pesos for the loss of
the merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will
not be disturbed.
There is one phase of this ease which disturbs if it does not shock us.
According to the evidence, one of the passengers who, because of the
injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she
was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his
visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said
inspector to have the fires, of the bus changed immediately because they
were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver
to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions.
If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had
not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his
passengers.
All in all,
there is reason to believe that the driver operated and drove his vehicle
negligently, resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical
injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of their goods, and
yet the criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and with his
consent, "was provisionally dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the
"witnesses on whose testimony he was banking to support the complaint,
either failed to appear or were reluctant to testify.
driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the
promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses.
Let a copy
In view of the foregoing, with the modification thai the damages awarded
by the trial court are increased from One Thousand (P1,000) Pesos to Six
Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, and from Six Hundred Pesos to Eight Hundred
(P800) Pesos, for the death of Bataclan and for attorney's fees,
respectively, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
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After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision dated March 18, 1997 in
favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, the
DECISION
Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant ordering the latter to pay mitigated damages as follows:
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
1.
2.
3.
[1]
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
the Decision[2] dated May 30, 2002 and Resolution dated November 5,
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57435, entitled "Sebastian
M. Baking, plaintiff-appellee, versus Mercury Drug Co. Inc., defendantappellant."
SO ORDERED.
The facts are:
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, affirmed in toto the RTC
judgment. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in
clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. On the following day, after
undergoing an ECG, blood, and hematology examinations and urinalysis,
Dr. Sy found that respondent's blood sugar and triglyceride were above
normal levels. Dr. Sy then gave respondent two medical prescriptions -
Diamicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride.
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the petition lacks merit and,
tablet.
1.
Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong medicine, respondent
not remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact.
Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical and
mental state at the time of the collision, respondent returned to Dr. Sy's
clinic. Upon being shown the medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to find that
Chapter.
Diamicron.
must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of
the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
Thus, on April 14, 1994, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
Torts 5
interest. The health and safety of the people will be put into jeopardy if
drugstore employees will not exercise the highest degree of care and
xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
Court of Appeals.
herein mentioned prove that they observed the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.
It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the
that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient,
that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the
medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she gave
respondent was indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The care
required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill
on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. [6]
[4]
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury in the cases
such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause
specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. [7]
Respondent has adequately established the factual basis for the award of
moral damages when he testified that he suffered mental anguish and
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner's
employee been
employee.
states:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
here, we are convinced that the amount awarded by the trial court is
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xxx
functions.
part of the employee concerned, she should have been extremely cautious
in dispensing pharmaceutical products. Due to the sensitive nature of its
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
Torts 5
SO ORDERED.
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Furious over the incident, he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged
an immediate verification of his account.
Upon verification, the bank noticed the error. The P32,000.00 deposit
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the respondent court[1] in CAG.R. CV No. 29524 dated May 13, 1992 which ordered petitioner to pay
the private respondent the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as attorney's fees and cost of suit.
The facts as found both by the trial court[2] and the respondent court are:
"As payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes,
not effect a deposit in the amount of P32,000.00. The transfer having been
effected, the bank then honored the October 12, 1979 check (Exh. "C")."
On the basis of these facts, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay to the
private respondent: (1) P200,000.00 as compensatory damages; (2)
P100,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P25,000.00 as attorney's fees, and (4)
the costs of suit. On appeal to the respondent court, the judgment was
modified as aforestated.
To cover the face value of the checks, plaintiff, on October 10, 1979,
so this was the same current account number he placed on the deposit slip
below the depositor's name FLORENCIO REYES.
Noting that the account number coincided with the name Florencio, Efren
[3]
Alagasi, then Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, thought it was First. For Article 2179 of the Civil Code to apply, it must be established
for Florencio Amador who owned the listed account number. He, thus,
posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing that the depositor's
On October 15, 1979, the October 10, 1979 check was redeposited but
was again dishonored. Likewise, the October 12, 1979 check in favor of
Vicente Tui when presented for payment on that same date met the same
xxx
to save his name. The October 12, 1979 check was redeposited on
October 18, 1979, but again dishonored for the reason that the check was
drawn against insufficient fund.
"Applying the test, the bank employee is, on that basis, deemed to have
failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his
duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee posted the cash deposit in the
11 | P a g e
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account of Florencio Amador from his assumption that the name Florencio
appearing on the ledger without, however, going through the full name, is
the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip. He should have continuously
gone beyond mere assumption, which was proven to be erroneous, and
proceeded with clear certainty, considering the amount involved and the
repercussions it would create on the totality of the person notable of which
is the credit standing of the person involved should a mistake happen. The
checks issued by the plaintiff in the course of his business were dishonored
by the bank because the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated a balance
insufficient to cover the face value of checks."
SO ORDERED.
12 | P a g e
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members. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about,
Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing of it.
the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that
the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code.
Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow
DECISION
of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable
damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too. (Exhibit "7-Far
REGALADO, J.:
[2]
November 15, 1996 and its resolution dated July 31, 1997 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 24072, entitled "Philippine Ports Authority, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Far
and the contractor for the rehabilitation of the damaged pier, the same cost
and "E").[3]
On January 10, 1983, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA, for brevity),
through the Solicitor General, filed before the Regional Trial Court of
There is no dispute about the facts as found by the appellate court, thus --
Manila, Branch 39, a complaint for a sum of money against Far Eastern
x x x On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of
Shipping Co., Capt. Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots Association,
the USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company
docketed as Civil Case No. 83-14958,[4] praying that the defendants therein
(FESC for brevitys sake), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver,
be held jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff actual and exemplary
British Columbia at about 7:00 oclock in the morning. The vessel was
damages plus costs of suit. In a decision dated August 1, 1985, the trial
court ordered the defendants therein jointly and severally to pay the PPA
suit.[5]
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals and raised the following
Berth No. 4.
destination, for his negligence? And (2) Would the owner of the vessel be
himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov,
vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine
anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was
When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North
(MPA, for short) and Capt. Gavino.[6] This being so, it ruled instead that the
Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped.
liability of MPA is anchored, not on Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but on
When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino
ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of
accordingly modified said decision of the trial court by holding MPA, along
the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles were
with its co-defendants therein, still solidarily liable to PPA but entitled MPA
dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of
the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew
Torts 5
No. 4 of the Manila International Port. Their concurrent negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of the collision between the vessel and the
Neither Far Eastern Shipping Co. (briefly, FESC) nor MPA was happy with
the decision of the Court of Appeals and both of them elevated their
maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel; and Capt. Kabankov, for
failing to countermand the orders of the harbor pilot and to take over and
steer the vessel himself in the face of imminent danger, as well as for
In G.R. No. 130068, which was assigned to the Second Division of this
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 130150, originally assigned to the Court's
parties solely responsible for the resulting damages sustained by the pier
First Division and later transferred to the Third Division, MPA, now as
2. in holding that the master had not exercised the required diligence
which limits the liability of MPA. Said pilots' association asseverates that it
should not be held solidarily liable with Capt. Gavino who, as held by
happened;
[9]
bears no provision classifying the nature of the liability of MPA for the
negligence its member pilots.[13]
As for Capt. Gavino, counsel for MPA states that the former had retired
who was in command and had complete control in the navigation and
from active pilotage services since July 28, 1994 and has ceased to be a
docking of the vessel. It is the pilot who supersedes the master for the time
being in the command and navigation of a ship and his orders must be
not the owners of the vessel. It claims that the master of the boat did not
ascertaining the liability of MPA, and expressed full accord with the
the orders of the pilot because he did not see any justifiable reason to do
appellate court's holding of solidary liability among itself, MPA and Capt.
so. In other words, the master cannot be faulted for relying absolutely on
the competence of the compulsory pilot. If the master does not observe
liability.[15]
[10]
ruling of respondent court on the solidary liability of FESC, MPA and Capt.
stance it took in G.R. No. 130068 in declaring its total accord with the ruling
of the Court of Appeals that MPA is solidarily liable with Capt. Gavino and
FESC for damages, and in its application to the fullest extent of the
of their solidary liability for damages sustained by PPA. It posits that the
vessel was being piloted by Capt. Gavino with Capt. Kabankov beside him
constitution and by-laws which spell out the conditions of and govern their
all the while on the bridge of the vessel, as the former took over the helm of respective liabilities. These provisions are clear and ambiguous as regards
MV Pavlodar when it rammed and damaged the apron of the pier of Berth
Torts 5
details to implement the law, it is legally binding and has the same
statutory force as any valid statute.
[16]
Upon motion[17] by FESC dated April 24, 1998 in G.R. No. 130150, said
I/we hereby certify that I/we have not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; that to the best of my own
be mentioned that the conduct of the respective counsel for FESC and
the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; that if I/we should
this Court.
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency, I/we undertake to report that fact within five (5) days
[19]
incorporates the
former Circular No. 28-91 which provided for what has come to be known
This motion having been granted, FESC subsequently filed its petition on
petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, aside from
Court therefor, with the end in view of preventing the filing of multiple
xxx
xxx
I, Teodoro P. Lopez, of legal age, after being duly sworn, depose and
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification
state:
under oath that he has not therefore commenced any other action involving
the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different
Certiorari.
3. That I have read the same and the allegations therein contained are true
For petitions for review filed before the Supreme Court, Section 4(e), Rule
45 specifically requires that such petition shall contain a sworn certification
4. That I certify that petitioner has not commenced any other action or
Rule 42.
The records show that the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario through
its associate, Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is the counsel of record for FESC in
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency, I undertake to report the fact within five (5) days
commenced with the filing by FESC through counsel on August 22, 1997 of Reviewing the records, we find that the petition filed by MPA in G.R. No.
a verified motion for extension of time to file its petition for thirty (30) days
from August 28, 1997 or until September 27, 1997.
[20]
Said motion
130150 then pending with the Third Division was duly filed on August 29,
1997 with a copy thereof furnished on the same date by registered mail to
15 | P a g e
Torts 5
counsel for FESC.[23] Counsel of record for MPA, Atty. Jesus P. Amparo, in
that--
xxx
xxx
xxx
of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers
appearing and pleading before them.[28] Candor in all dealings is the very
the same issues in his Honorable Court, the Court of Appeals or different
Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, but to the best of his
therefore, to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
Court, entitled Far Eastern Shipping Co., Petitioner, vs. Philippine Ports
Authority and Court of Appeals with a Motion for Extension of time to file
Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends -- the speedy,
claim filed or pending he undertakes to report such fact within five (5) days
prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain
mail on August 29, 1997 and taking judicial notice of the average period of
administration of justice.[32]
would be fair to conclude that when FESC filed its petition in G.R. No.
130068 on September 26, 1997, it would already have received a copy of
Sad to say, the members of said law firm sorely failed to observe their
the former and would then have knowledge of the pendency of the other
petition initially filed with the First Division. It was therefore incumbent upon
FESC to inform the Court of that fact through its certification against forum
Court to promote respect for law and for legal processes.[33] We cannot
shopping. For failure to make such disclosure, it would appear that the
In view of the fact that at around the time these petitions were commenced,
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure had just taken effect, the Court treated
Even assuming that FESC has not yet received its copy of MPA's petition
infractions of the new Rules then with relative liberality in evaluating full
at the time it filed its own petition and executed said certification, its
signatory did state "that if I should thereafter learn that a similar action or
concerned that the penal provisions of Circular No. 28-91 which remain
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
3. Penalties.-
[25]
Scouring the
xxx
xxx
xxx
concordant with such undertaking was then or at any other time thereafter
ever filed by FESC nor was there any attempt to bring such matter to the
(c) The submission of a false certification under Par. 2 of the Circular shall
existence of such other petition because FESC itself filed the motion for
criminal action against the guilty party. The lawyer may also be subjected
consolidation in G.R. No. 130150 of these two cases on April 24, 1998.
to disciplinary proceedings.
It must be stressed that the certification against forum shopping ordained
It is disturbing to note that counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario
therewith but apparently without full comprehension of and with less than
the best position to know whether he or it actually filed or caused the filing
counsel is a defective certification. It is clearly equivalent to noncompliance with the requirement under Section 2, Rule 42 in relation to
As between the lawyer and the courts, a lawyer owes candor, fairness and
Section 4, Rule 45, and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the
16 | P a g e
Torts 5
petition.
professional courtesy.[39]
Hence, the initial certification appended to the motion for extension of time
to file petition n G.R. No. 130068 executed in behalf of FESC by Atty. Tria
with a mere motion for extension, we shall disregard such error. Besides,
Another thing that baffles the Court is why the OSG did not take the
pointed out. In the same vein, we shall consider the verification signed in
G.R. No. 130150, considering its familiarity with the background of the
case and if only to make its job easier by having to prepare and file only
one comment. It could not have been unaware of the pendency of one or
the other petition because, being counsel for respondent in both cases,
petitioner is required to furnish it with a copy of the petition under pain of
It bears stressing that procedural rules are instruments in the speedy and
[34]
Incidentally, the Manila Pilots' Association (MPA), one of the defendantsCounsel for PPA did not make matters any better. Despite the fact that,
appellants in the case before the respondent Court of Appeals, has taken a
save for the Solicitor General at the time, the same legal team of the Office
separate appeal from the said decision to this Honorable Court, which was
General Roman G. Del Rosario and Solicitor Luis F. Simon, with the
Petitioner, versus Philippine Ports Authority and Far Eastern Shipping Co.,
Respondents.[41]
both G.R. No. 130068 and G.R. No. 130150 and was presumably fully
Incidentally, respondent Far Eastern Shipping Co. (FESC) had also taken
acquainted with the facts and issues of the case, it took the OSG an
an appeal from the said decision to this Honorable Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 130068, entitled "Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. Court of Appeals and
Romeo C. dela Cruz and, finally, Ricardo P. Galvez -- before the comment
In G.R. No. 130068, it took eight (8) motions for extension of time totaling
210 days, a warning that no further extensions shall be granted, and
It must be emphasized that the Court can resolve cases only as fast as the
the filing of such comment before the OSG indulged the Court with the long needlessly extending the pendency of these cases through its numerous
required comment on July 10, 1998.[35] This, despite the fact that said office motions for extension, came very close to exhausting this Court's
was required to file its comment way back on November 12, 1997. [36] A
forbearance and has regrettably fallen short of its duties as the People's
closer scrutiny of the records likewise indicates that petitioner FESC was
Tribune.
The OSG is reminded that just like other members of the Bar, the canons
the point of view of G.R. No. 130068, was a non-party.[37] The OSG fared
slightly better in G.R. No. 130150 in that it took only six (6) extensions, or a
total of 180 days, before the comment was finally filed.[38] And while it
These ethical duties are rendered even more exacting as to them because,
properly furnished petitioner MPA with a copy of its comment, it would have as government counsel, they have the added duty to abide by the policy of
been more desirable and expedient in this case to have furnished its
Torts 5
bureaucracy, to perform and discharge its duties with the highest degree of
professionalism, intelligence and skill[45] and to extend prompt, courteous
f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time
Now, on the merits of the case. After a judicious examination of the records moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order.
of this case, the pleadings filed, and the evidence presented by the parties
in the two petitions, we find no cogent reason to reverse and set aside the
Par. XXXIX. - A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel
from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it anchored free
over, inasmuch as the matters raised in both petitions beg for validation
from shoal; Provided, That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the
finis to the endless finger-pointing in this shipping mishap which has been
stretched beyond the limits of judicial tolerance.
xxx
The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under
Par. XLIV. - Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under
[47]
xxx
xxx
Petitioner FESC faults the respondent court with serious error in not
holding MPA and Capt. Gavino solely responsible for the damages caused
one berth or another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade
to the pier. It avers that since the vessel was under compulsory pilotage at
the time with Capt. Gavino in command and having exclusive control of the
vessel during the docking maneuvers, then the latter should be responsible
the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same
for damages caused to the pier.[48] It likewise holds the appellate court in
error for holding that the master of the ship, Capt. Kabankov, did not
pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot, providing the service to a vessel shall
be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at
ports due to his negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liability if
fault against a moving vessel that strikes a stationary object such as a dock
damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage
or that the collision was occasioned by the fault of the stationary object or
was the result of inevitable accident. It has been held that such vessel
and show that in each, they did all that reasonable care required. [50] In the
the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of
a moving vessel which collides with a fixed object and makes a prima facie
case of fault against the vessel.[51] Logic and experience support this
Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be
presumption:
The common sense behind the rule makes the burden a heavy one. Such
accidents simply do not occur in the ordinary course of things unless the
vessel has been mismanaged in some way. It is not sufficient for the
SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. - The respondent to produce witnesses who testify that as soon as the danger
duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
either that, in spite of the testimony of the witnesses, what was done was
18 | P a g e
Torts 5
too little or too late or, if not, then the vessel was at fault for being in a
position in which an unavoidable collision would occur.
[52]
The task, therefore, in these cases is to pinpoint who was negligent - the
over which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that
and the waters for which he is licensed, such as a particular harbor or river.
a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. In a broad sense, the term He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care, but must
"pilot" includes both (1) those whose duty it is to guide vessels into or out
have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the
of ports, or in particular waters and (2) those entrusted with the navigation
[53]
In Atlee vs. The Northwestern Union Packet Company,[59] Mr. Justice Miller
port.[54]
supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation
of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with
familiar with the appearance of the shore on each side of the river as he
her navigation. He becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all
goes along. Its banks, towns, its landings, its houses and trees, are all
and the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where
him. He must know where the navigable channel is, in its relation to all
these external objects, especially in the night. He must also be familiar with
all dangers that are permanently located in the course of the river, as sand-
law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed
merely the adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the
[55]
constantly informed of the changes in the current of the river, of the sandbars newly made, of logs or snags, or other objects newly presented,
pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching
their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed
xxx
xxx
xxx
under local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen
thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or
depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation.
[56]
It may be said that this is exacting a very high order of ability in a pilot. But
when we consider the value of the lives and property committed to their
control, for in this they are absolute masters, the high compensation they
receive, the care which Congress has taken to secure by rigid and frequent
District, viz. --
well as docking and undocking in any pier or shifting from one berth to
Gavino:
Court:
You have testified before that the reason why the vessel bumped
the pier was because the anchor was not released immediately or
stated that?
Torts 5
that anchor was released immediately at the time you gave the
Furthermore, there is an obligation on all persons to take the care which,
order, the incident would not have happened. Is that correct?
under ordinary circumstances of the case, a reasonable and prudent man
Yes, sir, but actually it was only a presumption on my part because
there was a commotion between the officers who are in charge of
the dropping of the anchor and the captain. I could not understand
their language, it was in Russian, so I presumed the anchor was
not dropped on time.
So, you are not sure whether it was really dropped on time or not?
extraordinary care. Similarly, the more imminent the danger, the higher the
xxxxxxxxx
Q
degree of care.[66]
You are not even sure what could have caused the incident. What
We give our imprimatur to the bases for the conclusion of the Court of
factor could have caused the incident?
Appeals that Capt. Gavino was indeed negligent in the performance of his
Well, in this case now, because either the anchor was not dropped
on time or the anchor did not hold, that was the cause of the
duties:
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x As can be gleaned from the logbook, Gavino ordered the left anchor
and two (2) shackles dropped at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. He ordered
commands as pilot may have. Prudence required that he, as pilot, should
the engines of the vessel stopped at 8:31 o'clock. By then, Gavino must
have made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly followed. As
have realized that the anchor did not hit a hard object and was not clawed
Moreover, assuming that he did indeed give the command to drop the
continued travelling towards the pier at the same speed. Gavino failed to
anchor on time, as pilot he should have seen to it that the order was
react. At 8:32 o'clock, the two (2) tugboats began to push the stern part of
carried out, and he could have done this in a number of ways, one of which
the vessel from the port side but the momentum of the vessel was not
was to inspect the bow of the vessel where the anchor mechanism was
contained. Still, Gavino did not react. He did not even order the other
anchor and two (2) more shackles dropped to arrest the momentum of the
among the crew members which supposedly caused the delay in the
vessel. Neither did he order full-astern. It was only at 8:34 o'clock, or four
execution of the command. This account was reflected in the pilot's report
(4) minutes, after the anchor was dropped that Gavino reacted. But his
prepared four hours later, but Capt. Kavankov, while not admitting whether
momentum of the vessel with the help of the tugboats, Gavino ordered
anchor was followed "immediately and precisely." Hence, the Court cannot
arrested and, barely a minute thereafter, the bow of the vessel hit the
another.
[62]
Those who undertake any work calling for special skills are
after the anchor failed to claw to the seabed. When he reacted, the same
required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do but also
was even (haphazard). Gavino failed to reckon the bulk of the vessel, its
size and its cargo. He erroneously believed that only one (1) anchor would
suffice and even when the anchor failed to claw into the seabed or against
Every man who offers his services to another, and is employed, assumes
a hard object in the seabed, Gavino failed to order the other anchor
dropped immediately. His claim that the anchor was dropped when the
vessel was only 1,000 feet from the pier is but a belated attempt to
extricate himself from the quagmire of his own insouciance and negligence.
In sum, then, Appellants' claim that the incident was caused by "force
20 | P a g e
Torts 5
must cause the ordinary work of the vessel to be properly carried on and
the usual precaution taken. Thus, in particular, he is bound to see that
xxx
xxx
xxx
there is sufficient watch on deck, and that the men are attentive to their
duties, also that engines are stopped, towlines cast off, and the anchors
The harbor pilots are especially trained for this job. In the Philippines, one
may not be a harbor pilot unless he passed the required examination and
training conducted then by the Bureau of Custom, under Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65, now under the Philippine Ports Authority
Administrative Order No. 15-65 provides that "the pilot shall be held
responsible for the direction of the vessel from the time he assumes control
maneuver:
thereof, until he leaves it anchored free from shoal: Provided, that his
responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects or refuse(s) to
Will you please tell us whether you have the right to intervene
Q
in docking of your ship in the harbor?
carry out his instructions." The overall direction regarding the procedure for
docking and undocking the vessel emanates from the harbor pilot. In the
Did you ever intervene during the time that your ship was
Q
being docked by Capt. Gavino?
No sir, I did not intervene at the time when the pilot was
A
docking my ship.
negligence:
This discussion should not however, divert the court from the fact that
negligence in manuevering the vessel must be attributed to Capt. Senen
Gavino. He was an experienced pilot and by this time should have long
familiarized himself with the depth of the port and the distance he could
keep between the vessel and port in order to berth safely.[68]
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Del
Rosario
The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabankov
is no less responsible for the allision. His unconcerned lethargy as master
Yes sir, our ship touched the pier and the pier was damaged.
Court
the command and navigation of a ship and that he becomes master pro
When you said touched the pier, are you leading the court to
Q
understand that your ship bumped the pier?
I believe that my vessel only touched the pier but the impact
A
was very weak.
pilot is not the master. The master is still in command of the vessel
notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. There are occasions when the
master may and should interfere and even displace the pilot, as when the
pilot is obviously incompetent or intoxicated and the circumstances may
xxxxxxxxx
or physical incapacity. If, however, the master does not observe that a
The master is not wholly absolved from his duties while a pilot is on board
his vessel, and may advise with or offer suggestions to him. He is still in
pier?
A
Torts 5
Court:
Q
xxxxxxxxx
Solicitor
the ship?
Abad
Yes sir, during the initial period, of the docking, there was
What about in the last portion of the docking of the ship, was
there anything unusual or abnormal that happened?
point of view?
A
Q
Whatever the pilot can read from the panel of the bridge, you
dropped earlier and with more shackles, there could not have
the anchor was timely because you are not well aware of the
A
Q
That is right.
Now, you said that when the command to lower the anchor
was given, it was obeyed, is that right?
the anchor held its ground so much so that the vessel could
not travel?
That is right.
xxxxxxxxx
That is right.
I don't know the depth of this port but I think, if the anchor was A
And so whatever the pilot saw, you could also see from that
So you could not precisely tell the court that the dropping of
Yes sir, all the time, I was standing with the pilot.
been an incident.
None Your Honor, I believe that Capt. Gavino thought that the
anchor could keep or hold the vessel.
Now, you were standing with the pilot on the bridge of the
vessel before the incident happened, were you not?
Court
You mean you don't know whether the anchor blades stuck to
the ground to stop the ship from further moving?
What is possible?
Q
A
Q
If you knew that the shackles were not enough to hold the
not intervene with the duties of the pilot and that, in your
opinion, you can only intervene if the ship is placed in
imminent danger, is that correct?
because you did not intervene and because you believed that
correct?
Torts 5
xxxxxxxxx
Assuming that you disagreed with the pilot regarding the step
xxxxxxxxx
Solicitor
(to the witness)
Abad
And so after the anchors were ordered dropped and they did
Q
Yes sir, up to the very last moment, I believed that there was
Q
A
Q
correct?
Since it affects not only the safety of the port or pier, but also
That is right.
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Court
And that is the same alertness when the anchor did not hold
onto the ground, is that correct?
Yes sir, me and Capt. Gavino (thought) that the anchor will
hold the ground.
Yes sir, I mean that it was usual condition of any man in time
of docking to be alert.
And that you were also alert for any possible mistakes he
might commit in the maneuvering of the vessel?
And this alert you assumed was the ordinary alertness that
you have for normal docking?
hold the seabed but not done (sic), as you expected, you
already were alerted that there was danger to the ship, is that
Solicitor
(to the witness)
to take hold of the bottom and it did not, there was no danger
to the ship?
Abad
the pilot?
Yes sir, I did not intervene because I believed that the
not take hold of the seabed, you were alerted that there was
danger already on hand?
no imminent danger.
Because of that, did you ever intervene in the command of
Since, as you said that you agreed all the while with the
Q
No sir.
Atty. Del
orders?
Rosario:
May I ask that the question ...
Yes sir.
Because, otherwise, you would have issued order that would
Solicitor
Abad:
xxxxxxxxx
Solicitor
You were in full accord with the steps being taken by Capt.
Abad
Torts 5
Rosario:
For the main reason that the anchor of the vessel did not hold
[73]
Yes, he has just answered yes sir to the Court that there was
to the port.
Atty.
Now, after the anchor was dropped, was there any point in time that
Q
Catris:
No, at that time, the vessel was not in imminent danger, sir."[74]
These conflicting reactions can only imply, at the very least, unmindful
disregard or, worse, neglectful relinquishment of duty by the shipmaster,
In what way?
In any case, which he thinks the pilot is not maneuvering
tantamount to negligence.
The findings of the trial court on this aspect is noteworthy:
For, while the pilot Gavino may indeed have been charged with the task of
docking the vessel in the berthing space, it is undisputed that the master of
the vessel had the corresponding duty to countermand any of the orders
made by the pilot, aid even maneuver the vessel himself, in case of
competent?
capacity, but still, the safety of the vessel rest(s) upon the
In fact, in his testimony, Capt. Kavankov admitted that all throughout the
and even observed that the order given to drop the anchor, was done at
the proper time. He even ventured the opinion that the accident occurred
because the anchor failed to take hold but that this did not alarm him
Court:
May proceed.
Atty.
caused the master of a vessel to take charge of the situation and see to the
Catris:
blindly upon his pilot, who by this time was proven ill-equipped to cope with
the situation.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is apparent that Gavino was negligent but Far Eastern's employee Capt.
Kavankov was no less responsible for as master of the vessel he stood by
the pilot during the man(eu)vering procedures and was privy to every move
Atty. del
the latter made, as well as the vessel's response to each of the commands.
24 | P a g e
Torts 5
His choice to rely blindly upon the pilot's skills, to the point that despite
As early as 1869, the U.S. Supreme Court declared, through Mr. Justice
Swayne, in The Steamship China vs. Walsh,[78] that it is the duty of the
vessel to Gavino, shows indubitably that he was not performing his duties
with the diligence required of him and therefore may be charged with
in cases of danger which he does not foresee, and in all cases of great
[76]
necessity. The master has the same power to displace the pilot that he has
to remove any subordinate officer of the vessel, at his discretion.
As correctly affirmed by the Court of Appeals In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court, this time through Mr. Justice Brown,
We are in full accord with the findings and disquisitions of the Court a quo.
In the present recourse, Captain Viktor Kavankov had been a mariner for
sole charge of the vessel. While the pilot doubtless supersedes the master
thirty-two years before the incident. When Gavino was (in) the command of
for the time being in the command and navigation of the ship, and his
orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation, the
master is not wholly absolved from his duties while the pilot is on board,
was thus fully aware of the docking maneuvers and procedure Gavino
and may advise with him, and even displace him in case he is intoxicated
undertook to dock the vessel. Irrefragably, Kavankov was fully aware of the
bulk and size of the vessel and its cargo as well as the weight of the
vessel. Kavankov categorically admitted that, when the anchor and two (2)
sufficient watch on deck, and that the men are attentive to their duties.
shackles were dropped to the sea floor, the claws of the anchor did not
hitch on to any hard object in the seabed. The momentum of the vessel
xxx (N)otwithstanding the pilot has charge, it is the duty of the master to
was not arrested. The use of the two (2) tugboats was insufficient. The
prevent accident, and not to abandon the vessel entirely to the pilot; but
momentum of the vessel, although a little bit arrested, continued (sic) the
vessel going straightforward with its bow towards the port (Exhibit "A-1").
pilot on board) for the benefit of the owners. x x x that in well conducted
There was thus a need for the vessel to move "full-astern" and to drop the
ships the master does not regard the presence of a duly licensed pilot in
other anchor with another shackle or two '(2), for the vessel to avoid hitting
the pier. Kavankov refused to act even as Gavino failed to act. Even as
the safety of the vessel; but that, while the master sees that his officers and
Gavino gave mere "half-astern" order, Kavankov supinely stood by. The
crew duly attend to the pilot's orders, he himself is bound to keep a vigilant
vessel was already about twenty (20) meters away from the pier when
Gavino gave the 'full-astern" order. Even then, Kavankov did nothing to
exist, not only to urge upon the pilot to use every precaution, but to insist
prevent the vessel from hitting the pier simply because he relied on the
In Jure vs. United Fruit Co.,[80] which, like the present petitions, involved
momentarily arrested the momentum of the vessel, it was, by then, too late. compulsory pilotage, with a similar scenario where at and prior to the time
All along, Kavankov stood supinely beside Gavino, doing nothing but relay
of injury, the vessel was in the charge of a pilot with the master on the
bridge of the vessel beside said pilot, the court therein ruled:
The authority of the master of a vessel is not in complete abeyance while a
xxx
xxx
xxx
foresee, and in all cases of great necessity . The master has the same
the navigator, the master of the vessel or its crew makes the vessel
power to displace the pilot that he has to remove any subordinate officer of
the vessel. He may exercise it, or not, according to his discretion. There
2nd, page 1151). Hence, the Appellant FESC is likewise liable for the
was evidence to support findings that plaintiff's injury was due to the
negligent operation of the Atenas, and that the master of that vessel was
the matter are based, for the conclusions of the Court of Appeals adjudging
both Capt. Gavino and Capt. Kabankov negligent.
Torts 5
and means of avoiding such danger; and that the master's negligence in
failing to give timely admonition to the pilot proximately contributed to the
negligence or default to the owners of the vessel, and to third parties for
tended to prove conduct of the pilot, known to the master, giving rise to a
case of danger or great necessity, calling for the intervention of the master.
the vessel upon which the pilot is, or to another vessel, or persons or
for such negligence shall apply if the pilot is actually in charge and solely in
fault. Since, a pilot is responsible only for his own personal negligence, he
of others,[89] or, if there be anything which concurred with the fault of the
in the words of the court, "he was in a position to exercise his superior
pilot in producing the accident, the vessel master and owners are liable.
Since the colliding vessel is prima facie responsible, the burden of proof is
danger to any craft moored at Gravell Dock and that he should have
upon the party claiming benefit of the exemption from liability. It must be
directed the pilot to reduce his speed as required by the local governmental shown affirmatively that the pilot was at fault, and that there was no fault on
regulations. His failure amounted to negligence and renders the
respondent liable."
[81]
[82]
the part of the officers or crew, which might have been conducive to the
damage. The fact that the law compelled the master to take the pilot does
not exonerate the vessel from liability. The parties who suffer are entitled to
have their remedy against the vessel that occasioned the damage, and are
not under necessity to look to the pilot from whom redress is not always
had for compensation. The owners of the vessel are responsible to the
required to permit him to navigate it, if the master observes that the pilot is
injured party for the acts of the pilot, and they must be left to recover the
amount as well as they can against him. It cannot be maintained that the
refuse to permit the pilot to act. But if no such reasons are present, then
the master is justified in relying upon the pilot, but not blindly. Under the
owner are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs
of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. Where the pilot of a vessel
navigating the vessel that she was going, or was likely to go, into danger,
is not a compulsory one in the sense that the owner or master of the vessel
are bound to accept him, but is employed voluntarily, the owners of the
opportunity for the master to intervene so as to save the ship from danger,
vessel are, all the more, liable for his negligent act.[91]
the master should have acted accordingly.[83] The master of a vessel must
exercise a degree of vigilance commensurate with the circumstances. [84]
In the United States, the owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the
negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or
[85]
we defer to
the findings of the trial court, especially as this is affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
[86]
Kabankov's shared liability is due mainly to the fact that he failed to act
when the perilous situation should have spurred him into quick and
Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole
cause of the injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed
danger, he did not have to wait for the happenstance to occur before
thereto, the owners are liable.[92] But the liability of the ship in rem does not
release the pilot from the consequences of his own negligence. [93] The
rationale for this rule is that the master is not entirely absolved of
the reason why he decided not to countermand any of the latter's orders.
charge.[94]
Torts 5
American maritime cases, we declare that our rulings during the early
years of this century in City of Manila vs. Gambe,
[95]
which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that
such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one
Ltd. vs. Vidal,[96] and Yap Tico & Co. vs. Anderson, et al.[97] have withstood
of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from
the proverbial test of time and remain good and relevant case law to this
his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other
day.
City of Manila stands for the doctrine that the pilot who was in command
not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes
and complete control of a vessel, and not the owners, must be held
and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons
responsible for an accident which was solely the result of the mistake of
although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of
the pilot in not giving proper orders, and which did not result from the
them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured
failure of the owners to equip the vessel with the most modern and
improved machinery. In China Navigation Co., the pilot deviated from the
cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors.
ordinary and safe course, without heeding the warnings of the ship captain.
Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though
It was this careless deviation that caused the vessel to collide with a
pinnacle rock which, though uncharted, was known to pilots and local
navigators. Obviously, the captain was blameless. It was the negligence of
the pilot alone which was the proximate cause of the collision. The Court
since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
The pilot in the case at bar having deviated from the usual and ordinary
having been the proximate cause of the damages, he is liable for such
for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or
damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarity
liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194[101] of the Civil Code.[102]
As for the amount of damages awarded by the trial court, we find the same
management. x x x.
slightly different tack, the Court in Yap Tico & Co. exonerated the pilot from
considerations:
liability for the accident where the order's of the pilot in the handling of the
ship were disregarded by the officers and crew of the ship. According to
So that the cost of the two additional piles as well as the (two)
Q
square meters is already included in this -P1,300,999.77.
the Court, a pilot is "x x x responsible for a full knowledge of the channel
and the navigation only so far as he can accomplish it through the officers
and crew of the ship, and I don't see that he can be held responsible for
Yes sir.
damage when the evidence shows, as it does in this case, that the officers
and crew of the ship failed to obey his orders." Nonetheless, it is possible
for a compulsory pilot and the master of the vessel to be concurrently
negligent and thus share the blame for the resulting damage as Joint
tortfeasors,
[98]
In other words, this P1,300,999.77 does not represent only for the
Q
six piles that was damaged as well as the corresponding two piles.
The area was corresponding, was increased by almost two in the
person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his
negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than
actual payment. That was why the contract was decreased, the real
amount was P1,124,627.40 and the final one is P1300,999.77.
Yes, but that P1,300,999.77 included the additional two new posts.
It was increased.
Torts 5
and you started the repair and reconstruction in 1982, that took
almost two years?
Yes sir.
1980 was aggravated for the 2 year period that the damage portion
was not repaired?
the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel
are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or
Cannot, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
FESC's imputation of PPA's failure to provide a safe and reliable berthing
You said in the cross-examination that there were six piles
Q
In piers where the piles are withdrawn or pulled out, you cannot re-
drive or drive piles at the same point. You have to redesign the
driving of the piles. We cannot drive the piles at the same point
where the piles are broken or damaged or pulled out. We have to
Why not, why could you not drive the same number of piles and on
holding MPA jointly and solidarity liable with its member pilot, Capt.
the Court finds that the amount of P1,053,300.00 is justified. Firstly, the
pilot thereof for the purpose of paying claims for damages to vessels or
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur best expounded upon in the landmark case of
Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. (21 SCRA 279) establishes the
presumption that in the ordinary course of events the ramming of the dock
regulations for damage to any vessel, or other property, resulting from acts
construction price. The new structure constructed not only replaced the
damaged one but was built of stronger materials to forestall the possibility
reserve fund; it being understood that if the association is held liable for an
amount greater than the amount above-stated, the excess shall be paid by
Torts 5
been found at fault, such member shall reimburse the association in the
amount so paid as soon as practicable; and for this purpose, not less than
and for this purpose, not less than twenty-five percentum (25%) of his
twenty-five per centum of his dividends shall be retained each month until
dividend shall be retained each month until the full amount has been
returned to the reserve fund. Thereafter, the pilot involved shall be entitled
to his full dividend.
preceding paragraph, the ten percentum (10%) and the interest withheld
from the shares of the other pilots in accordance with paragraph (4) hereof
property resulting from the individual acts of its members as well as those
which shall promulgate their own By-Laws not in conflict with the rules and
The Court of Appeals, while affirming the trial court's finding of solidary
liability on the part of FESC, MPA and Capt. Gavino, correctly based
MPA's liability not on the concept of employer-employee relationship
between Capt. Gavino and itself, but on the provisions of Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65:
The Appellant MPA avers that, contrary to the findings and disquisitions of
the Court a quo, the Appellant Gavino was not and has never been an
employee of the MPA but was only a member thereof. The Court a quo, it
is noteworthy,, did not state the factual basis on which it anchored its
finding that Gavino was the employee of MPA. We are in accord with
MPA's pose. Case law teaches Us that, for an employer-employee
relationship to exist the confluence of the following elements must be
established: (1) selection and engagement of employees; (2) the payment
of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; (4) the employer's power to control
the employees with respect to the means and method by which the work is
to be performed (Ruga versus NLRC, 181SCRA 266).
xxx
xxx
1) Each pilot in the Association shall contribute from his own account an
amount of P4,000.00 (P6,000.00 in the Manila Pilotage District) to the
reserve fund. This fund shall not be considered part of the capital of the
Association nor charged as an expense thereof.
The liability of MPA for damages is not anchored on Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code as erroneously found and declared by the Court a quo but
under the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, supra, in
tandem with the by-laws of the MPA."[107]
2) Seventy-five percent (75%) of the reserve fund shall be set aside for
use, in the payment of damages referred to above incurred in the actual
performance of pilots' duties and the excess shall be paid from the
personal funds of the member concerned.
xxx
xxx
xxx
members and exercise no control over them once they take the helm of the
29 | P a g e
Torts 5
vessel. They are also not partnerships because the members do not
function as agents for the association or for each other. Pilots' associations
are also not liable for negligently assuring, the competence of their
members because as professional associations they made no guarantee of liability beyond that being for the personal account of the erring pilot and
the professional conduct of their members to the general public.[109]
Where under local statutes and regulations, pilot associations lack the
necessary legal incidents of responsibility, they have been held not liable
[110]
Whether or not
depends wholly on the powers and duties of the members in relation to one (75%) of the member pilots' contribution of P2,000.00 to the reserve fund.
another under the provisions of the governing statutes and regulations. The The law speaks of the entire reserve fund required to be maintained by the
relation of a pilot to his association is not that of a servant to the master,
pilots' association to answer (for) whatever liability arising from the tortious
act of its members. And even if the association is held liable for an amount
greater than the reserve fund, the association may not resist the liability by
[111]
review are DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
regulation under Philippine law. The Court of Appeals properly applied the
AFFIRMED in toto.
clear and unequivocal provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 1565. In doing so, it was just being consistent with its finding of the non-
Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically
The original members of the legal team of the Office of the Solicitor
careful reading and proper analysis of the correlated provisions lead to the
conclusion that MPA is solidarity liable for the negligence of its member
fault.
Article 1207 of the Civil Code provides that there is solidary liability only
when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of
the obligation requires solidarity. Plainly, Customs Administrative Order No. case and to adopt provident measures to avoid a repetition of this incident
15-65, which as an implementing rule has the force and effect of law, can
and which would ensure prompt compliance with orders of this Court
Let copies of this decision be spread upon the personal records of the
out in the law itself. Nonetheless, said administrative order, which adds to
the procedural or enforcing provisions of substantive law, is legally binding
SO ORDERED.
and receives the same statutory force upon going into effect. In that sense,
it has equal, not lower, statutory force and effect as a regular statute
passed by the legislature."[112]
MPA's prayer for modification of the appellate court's decision under review
by exculpating petitioner MPA "from liability beyond seventy-five percent
30 | P a g e
Torts 5
For its part, Comark denied liability for the damages caused to Adworlds
billboard structure, maintaining that it does not have any interest on
Transworlds collapsed billboard structure as it only contracted the use of
the same. In this relation, Comark prayed for exemplary damages from
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Lastly, Ruks admitted that it entered into a contract with Transworld for the
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated
construction of the latters billboard structure, but denied liability for the
November 16, 2011 and the Resolution[3] dated December 10, 2012 of the
its services, there was already an existing foundation for the billboard and
[4]
Decision dated August 25, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
that it merely finished the structure according to the terms and conditions of
City, Branch 142 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 03-1452 holding, inter alia,
The instant case arose from a complaint for damages filed by Adworld
complaint until full payment thereof, plus attorneys fees in the amount of
P50,000.00.[11]
[5]
the RTC. In the complaint, Adworld alleged that it is the owner of a 75 ft.
x 60 ft. billboard structure located at EDSA Tulay, Guadalupe, Barangka
The RTC found both Transworld and Ruks negligent in the construction of
the collapsed billboard as they knew that the foundation supporting the
August 11, 2003, the adjacent billboard structure owned by Transworld and same was weak and would pose danger to the safety of the motorists and
used by Comark collapsed and crashed against it. Resultantly, on August
the other adjacent properties, such as Adworlds billboard, and yet, they did
payment for the repairs of its billboard as well as loss of rental income. On
that Transworld was made aware by Ruks that the initial construction of the
August 29, 2003, Transworld sent its reply, admitting the damage caused
lower structure of its billboard did not have the proper foundation and
demand letter also went unheeded, it was constrained to file the instant
reinforce its lower structure.[13] The RTC then concluded that these
negligent acts were the direct and proximate cause of the damages
[6]
In its Answer with Counterclaim, Transworld averred that the collapse of its
filed a Third-Party Complaint against Ruks, the company which built the
Resolution[17] dated November 23, 2011, the Court declared the case
closed and terminated for failure of Transworld to file the intended petition
that the structure constructed by Ruks had a weak and poor foundation not
suited for billboards, thus, prone to collapse, and as such, Ruks should
22, 2012 in G.R. No. 197601 declaring the Courts November 23, 2011
structure.[7]
31 | P a g e
Torts 5
The CA Ruling
and affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It adhered to the RTCs finding of
negligence on the part of Transworld and Ruks which brought about the
In this case, the CA correctly affirmed the RTCs finding that Transworlds
that Ruks will comply with the approved plans and specifications of the
foundation, and that of Rukss finishing its upper structure and just merely
structure, and that Ruks continued to install and finish the billboard
assuming that Transworld would reinforce the weak foundation are the two
(2) successive acts which were the direct and proximate cause of the
[20]
denied in a Resolution
[21]
neither of them took any positive step to reinforce the same. They merely
relied on each others word that repairs would be done to such foundation,
but none was done at all. Clearly, the foregoing circumstances show that
On the other hand, Transworld filed another appeal before the Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 205120.
[23]
[24]
the same was already bound by the dismissal of its petition filed in G.R.
No. 197601.
approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are also referred
to as those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if
The primordial issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly affirmed the ruling of the RTC declaring Ruks jointly and severally
2194[29] of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the
At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the RTC, when
the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery
affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight by the Court and are
deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record.
[25]
Absent any exceptions to this rule such as when it is established that the
under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was
more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was
the case
[26]
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court sees no cogent reason to acts were the sole cause of the injury.
deviate from the findings of the RTC and the CA and their uniform
conclusion that both Transworld and Ruks committed acts resulting in the
solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
[27]
Torts 5
SO ORDERED.
33 | P a g e
Torts 5
be kept three feet from the building.' Appellant contends that in applying
said regulations to the case at bar the reckoning should not be from the
edge of the 'media agua' but from the side of the house and that, thus
measured, the distance was almost 7 feet, or more than the minimum
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
regulation. Appellant points out, nevertheless, that even assuming that the
distance, within the meaning oft the city regulations, should be measured
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
from the edge of the "media agua', the fact that In the case of the house
involved herein such distance was actually less than 3 feet Was due to the
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio
fault of the owner of said house, because the city authorities gave him a
permit to construct a 'media agua' only one meter or 39% inches wide, but
instead he built one having a width of 65% inches, 17% inches more than
was just below the window of the third story. Standing on said "media
the width permitted by the authorities, thereby reducing the distance to the
agua", Magno received from his son thru that window a 3' X 6' galvanized
iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the
lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the
"It is a fact that the owner of the house exceeded the limit fixed in the
permit given to him by the city authorities for the construction of the 'media
to the edge of the "media agua" and 21/2 feet from it, causing his death by
agua', and that if he .had not done so appellants wire would have been
electrocution. His widow and children filed suit to recover damages from
11% (inches) more than file required distance of three feet from the edge of
the company. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in their
the 'media agua'. It is also a fact, however, that after the 'media agua' was
constructed the owner was given a final permit of occupancy of the house.
***
with costs. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, tha latter affirmed the
judgment with slight modification by reducing the attorney's fees from
"* * * The wire was an exposed, high tension wire carrying a load of 3,600
P3,000 to P1,000 with costs. The electric company has appealed said
decision to us.
The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals which are conclusive are
The theory followed by the appellate court in finding for the plaintiff is that
volts. It was installed there some two years before Penaloza's house was
question exceeded the limits fixed in the permit, still, after making that
constructed. The record shows that during the construction of said house a
"media agua", its construction though illegal, was finally approved because
similar incident took place, although fortunately with much less tragic
he was given a final permit to occupy the house; that it was the company
that was at fault and was guilty of negligence because although the electric
to come in contact with the same wire, producing some sparks. The owner
wire in question had been installed long before the construction of the
of the house forthwith complained to defendant about the danger which the
wire presented, and as' a result defendant moved one end of the wire
mere compliance with the regulations does ,not satisfy the requirement of
farther from the house by means of a brace, but left the other end where it
due diligence nor avoid the need for adopting such other precautionary
was. '
"At any rate, as revealed by the ocular inspection of the premises ordered
minimum conditions and that just because the ordinance required that
by the trial court, the distance from the electric wire to the edge of the
primary electric wires should be not less than 3 feet from any house, the
'media agua' on which the deceased was making repairs was only 30
inches or 2% feet. Regulations of the City of Manila required that 'all wires
distance of 3 feet and one inch, regardless of other factors. The appellate
34 | P a g e
Torts 5
high voltage and uninsulated as they were, but the claim of the company
and the reasons given by it for not insulating said wires were unrefuted as
we gather from the findings of the Court of Appeals, and so we have to
After a careful study and discussion of the case and the circumstances
petitioner Company that the death of Magno was primarily caused by his
own negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity of the
"media agua" or rather its edge to the electric wire of the company by
reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the
say 6 feet or 12 feet would have increased the margin of safety but other
factors had to be considered such as that the wires could not be strung or
the posts supporting them could not be located too far toward the middle of
lacking in due diligence. Although the city ordinance called for a distance of the street. Thus, the real cause of the accident or death was the reckless
3 feet of its wires from any building, there was actually a distance of 7 feet
and 2% inches of the wires from the side of the house of Penaloza. Even
to repair the "meclia agua" just below the third story window, it is to be
presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so.
a building, but to any projecting part thereof, such as a "media agua" had
the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for
experience for the job. So, he could not have been entirely a stranger to
the construction of his "media agua", namely, one meter or 39 3/8 inches
electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the
wide, the. distance from the wires to the edge of said "media agua" would
instant care, his training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he
have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches. In fixing said one meter width for the
was standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms
"media agua" the city authorities must have wanted to preserve the
length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and discretion
distance of at least 3 feet between the wires and any portion of a building.
to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his
exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by 17% inches and leaving only
a distance of 24 feet between the "Media agua" as illegally constructed and In support of its theory and holding that defendant-appellant was liable for
the electric wires. And added to this violation of the permit by the house
damages the Court of Appeals cites the case of Astudillo vs. Manila
owner, was its approval by the city through its agent, possibly an inspector.
Electric Co., 55 Phil., 427. We do not think the case is exactly applicable.
Surely we cannot lay these serious violations of a city ordinance and permit There, the premises involved was that elevated portion or top of the walls
at the door of the Company, guiltless of breach of any ordinance or
of Intramuros, Manila, just above the Sta. Lucia Gate. In the words of the
Court, it was "a public place where persons come to stroll, to rest and to
for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires
and said construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had
its wires so near the place that without much difficulty or exertion, a person
by stretching his hand out could touch them. A boy named Astudillo,
preserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is
placing one foot on a projection,, reached out and actually grasped the
its duty, to be ever on the alert and to see to it that.its ordinances are
electric wire and was electrocuted. The person electrocuted in said case
was a boy who was in no position to realize the danger. In the present
constructions. Of course, in the present case, the viola- tion of the permit
case, however, the wires were well high over the street where there was no
for the construction of the "media agua" was not the direct cause of the
accident. It merely contributed to it. Had said "media agua" been only one
instinctively have stayed closer to or hugged the side of the house in order
person standing on the ''media agua" could not have reached the wires
to keep a safe margin between the edge of the "media agua" and the
with his hands alone. It was necessary , as was done by Magno to hold
yawning , 2-story distance or height from the ground, and possibly if not
something long enough to reach the wire. Furthermore, Magno was not a
probably avoided the fatal contact between the lower end of the iron sheet
trained and experienced in the repair of galvanized iron roofs and "media
agua". Moreover, in that very case of Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co.,
We realize that the presence of the wires in question quite close to the
supra, the court said that although it is a well-established rule .that the
house or its "media agua" was always a source of danger considering their
Torts 5
We realize that the stringing of wires of such high voltage (3,600 volts),
But even assuming for a moment that under the facts of the present case
not adopt the necessary precautions. But may be, the City of Manila
authorities and the ;electric company could get together and devise means
its electric wires so close to the house and "media agua" in question, and
slow down or even stop and take other necessary precaution upon
for the death of Magno, such Supposed negligence of the company must
approaching said lanes, so, a similar way may possibly be found. Since
have been the proximate and principal cause of the1 accident, because if
the act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet
cost, they might perhaps be strung only up to the outskirts of the city where
with his hands was the proximate and principal cause of the electrocution,
there are few houses and few pedestrians and there step down to a
then his heirs may not recover. Such was the holding of this Court in the
voltage where the wires carrying the same to the city could be properly
case of Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, 16 Phil., 8.
In that case the electric company was found negligent in leaving scattered
on its premises fulminating caps which Taylor, a 15-year old boy found and
In view, of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
carried home. In the course of experimenting with said fulminating caps, he is hereby reversed and the complaint filed against the Company is hereby
opened one of them, held it out with his hands while another boy applied a
dismissed. No costs.
lighted match to it, causing it to explode and injure one of his eyes
eventually causing blindness in said eye. Said this 'tribunal in denying
recovery for the injury:
"* * *, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
incurred but for the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate
and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury."
"A prior and remote' cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except because' of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause." (45 C. J. pp. 931-932.)
36 | P a g e
Torts 5
had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital, the
said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries
DECISION
STREET, J.:
the defendant Agaton Araneta, to the runaway. The evidence for the
plaintiff on this point consists chiefly of the testimony of Julio Pagnaya and
of Basilio llano. They both say that while yet in the middle of the street, the
defendant jerked the bridle, which caused the bit to come out of the horse's
mouth, and Julio says that at that juncture the throatlatch of the bridle was
broken. Be this as it may, we are of the opinion that the mere fact that the
manner stated would not make him liable for the death of Proceso
out of the carromata and went to the horse's head to fix the bridle. The
Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay, in the City of Iloilo, with a view
to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the same City. When the driver
of the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction indicated, It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the
the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into the street, and laying his
middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently
hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the
driver that he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, one Julio
by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was
Pagnaya, replied to the effect that he had not heard or seen the call of
the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the
Araneta, and that he had taken up the two passengers then in the
defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from
carromata as the first who had offered employment. At or about the same
time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the
control of Agaton Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing,
Julio Pagnaya testifies to one fact which, if it were fully accredited, would
possibly put a different complexion on the case; for he says that when the
rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the
horse was pulled over to the curb, the defendant, by way of emphasizing
horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out, which he
his verbal denunciation of Pagnaya, gesticulated with one of his arms and
did, in order to fix the bridle. The horse was then pulled over to near the
incidentally brought his hand down on the horse's nose. This, according to
Pagnaya, is what made the horse run away. There is no other witness who
testifies to this; and it is noteworthy that Basilio llano does not mention it. A
decided preponderance of the evidence in our opinion is against it.
While he was thus engaged, the horse, being free from the control of the
bit, became disturbed and moved forward, in doing which he pulled one of
The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it
the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya
over. After going a few yards further the side of the carromata struck a
police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon
in other respects; and we are of the opinion that the several witnesses who
which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an
testified for the defendant gave a more credible account of the affair than
the witnesses for the plaintiff. According to the witnesses for the defendant,
it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the
Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit, Basilio llano, had alighted while
horse's mouth; and they say that Julio, after alighting, led the horse over to
the carromata was as yet alongside the sidewalk; but the other, Proceso
the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle
Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse
37 | P a g e
Torts 5
was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control,
started to go away as previously stated.
Upon the whole we are constrained to hold that the defendant is not legally
responsible for the death of Proceso Gayetano; and though reluctant to
interfere with the findings of fact of a trial court when there is a conflict of
testimony, the evidence in this case so clearly preponderates in favor of
the defendant, that we have no recourse but to reverse the judgment.
38 | P a g e
Torts 5
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 2, as well as its
electricity in the province of Agusan del Norte and in Butuan City. In 1981,
Thousand Pesos [(PHP 16,000.00)] as attorney's fees and the sum of Two
del Norte, with its main distribution line of 13,000 kilovolts traversing
antenna (TV antenna) from Balen's residence. The antenna pole touched
Exclamado died instantly, while Balen and Lariosa suffered extensive third
degree burns.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. It declared that the
proximate cause of the accident could not have been the act or omission of
respondents, who were not negligent in taking down the antenna. The
proximate cause of the injury sustained by respondents was ANECO's
ANECO filed its answer[5] denying the material averments in the complaint,
complaint did not allege any wrongful act on the part of ANECO, and that
respondents acted with gross negligence and evident bad faith. ANECO,
unpopulated area for the said line to traverse. The CA further noted that
ANECO failed to put a precautionary sign for installation of wires over 600
volts, which is required by the Philippine Electrical Code.[8]
SO ORDERED.[9]
ANECO filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on May 26,
2006.[10]
Torts 5
requirement of 3,050 under Part II of the Philippine Electrical Code for the
installation of its main distribution lines above the roofs of buildings or
installed lines were high voltage, consisting of open wires, i.e., not covered
with insulators, like rubber, and charged with 13, 200 volts. Knowing that it
was installing a main distribution line of high voltage over a populated area,
ANECO, however, denied liability, arguing that the mere presence of the
insulated wires, or else found an unpopulated area for the said line to
traverse. The court a quo correctly observed that ANECO failed to show
any compelling reason for the installation of the questioned wires over
the high-tension wires. The findings of the RTC, it argues, patently run
installation of said line were met by ANECO does not suffice to exonerate it
of the RTC.
that ANECO put up the precautionary sign: "WARNING-HIGH VOLTAGEKEEP OUT" at or near the house of MIGUEL BALEN as required by the
performance of the alleged negligent act use reasonable care and caution
which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not,
the defendant's misconduct, his act or omission is the legal cause thereof.
negligent, the defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that
[11]
class of risk which made the actor's conduct negligent, it is obviously the
consequence for the actor must be held legally responsible. Otherwise, the
The issue of who, between the parties, was negligent is a factual issue that
this Court cannot pass upon, absent any whimsical or capricious exercise
of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any
[12]
the time of his misconduct are legally caused by his breach of duty x x x.
their findings and substituting them with our own. The function of this Court
Philippine Electrical Code in installing the subject high tension wires above
is limited to the review of the appellate court's alleged errors of law. We are MIGUEL BALEN's house, still a potential risk existed that people would get
not required to weigh all over again the factual evidence already
considered in the proceedings below.
[13]
BALEN had complained about the installation of said line, but ANECO did
not do anything about it. Moreover, there is scant evidence showing that
[respondents] knew beforehand that the lines installed by ANECO were live
wires.
The evidence extant in the record shows that the house of MIGUEL
BALEN already existed before the high voltage wires were installed by
was ANECO's installation of its main distribution line of high voltage over
40 | P a g e
Torts 5
the house of MIGUEL BALEN, without which the accident would not have
occurred.
xxxx
ANECO's contention that the accident happened only eleven (11) years
after the installation of the high-voltage wire cannot serve to absolve or
mitigate ANECO's liability. As we held in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals:[16]
[A]s an electric cooperative holding the exclusive franchise in supplying
electric power to the towns of Benguet province, its primordial concern is
not only to distribute electricity to its subscribers but also to ensure the
safety of the public by the proper maintenance and upkeep of its facilities.
It is clear to us then that BENECO was grossly negligent in leaving
unprotected and uninsulated the splicing point between the service drop
line and the service entrance conductor, which connection was only eight
(8) feet from the ground level, in violation of the Philippine Electrical Code.
BENECO's contention that the accident happened only on January 14,
1985, around seven (7) years after the open wire was found existing in
1978, far from mitigating its culpability, betrays its gross neglect in
performing its duty to the public. By leaving an open live wire unattended
for years, BENECO demonstrated its utter disregard for the safety of the
public. Indeed, Jose Bernardo's death was an accident that was bound to
happen in view of the gross negligence of BENECO.
Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts' findings, which are amply
substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly point to ANECO's
negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by
respondents Balen and Lariosa. No adequate reason has been given to
overturn this factual conclusion. In fine, the CA committed no reversible
error in sustaining the RTC.
SO ORDERED.
41 | P a g e
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FELICIANO, J:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at about 1:30 a.m. private
respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home he lived in 1214-B
Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting
with his boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation. During the
cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor.
Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal,
Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna
Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He
switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump
truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck,
owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction
Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna
Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction
toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic.
The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such
a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of
oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning"
reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The
dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner
Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his
employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the
following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by
swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the
dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical
injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and
loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Torts 5
There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not
private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that
eventful night; (b) whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before
the collision with the dump truck; (c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned
off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck or whether those
headlights accidentally malfunctioned moments before the collision; and (d)
whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew
pass was found on the person of Dionisio immediately after the accident
nor was any found in his car. Phoenix's evidence here consisted of the
testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken Dionisio, unconscious, to the
Makati Medical Center for emergency treatment immediately after the
accident. At the Makati Medical Center, a nurse took off Dionisio's clothes
and examined them along with the contents of pockets together with
Patrolman Cuyno. 1 Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce
any curfew pass during the trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that his
family may have misplaced his curfew pass. He also offered a certification
(dated two years after the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N.
Libarnes of the Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Camp Olivas,
San Fernando, Pampanga, which was said to have authority to issue
curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila. This certification was to
the effect that private respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This
certification did not, however, specify any pass serial number or date or
period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. We find that private
respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass
during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence
shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. The relevance of
possession or non-possession of a curfew pass that night lies in the light it
tends to shed on the other related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding
home and whether he had indeed purposely put out his headlights before
the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly arrest by the police in
the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of curfew without a
valid curfew pass.
On the second issue whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that
night both the trial court and the appellate court were completely silent.
The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of Patrolman
Cuyno who was at the scene of the accident almost immediately after it
occurred, the police station where he was based being barely 200 meters
away. Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had gathered at the
scene of the accident told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did
not have its headlights on. 2 Dionisio, on the other hand, claimed that he
was travelling at a moderate speed at 30 kilometers per hour and had just
crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna Streets
and had started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the
collision took place. 3
Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's testimony was
hearsay and did not fag within any of the recognized exceptions to the
hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not acquired by him
through official information and had not been given by the informants
pursuant to any duty to do so. Private respondent's objection fails to take
account of the fact that the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not
under the official records exception to the hearsay rule 4 but rather as part
of the res gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence under this exception to the
hearsay rule consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an
occurrence or event sufficiently startling in nature so as to render
inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer and
hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event, and not
the result of reflective thought. 6
We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly
smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently
startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions
from observers who happened to be around at that time. The testimony of
Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and
should have been considered by the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight
should have been ascribed to such testimony, even though it did not, as it
could not, have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at
winch Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump
truck.
A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off his headlights,
or whether his headlights accidentally malfunctioned, just moments before
the accident. The Intermediate Appellate Court expressly found that the
headlights of Dionisio's car went off as he crossed the intersection but was
non-committal as to why they did so. It is the petitioners' contention that
Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the
intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct
which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the
intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible
explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio i.e., that he
had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some
mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he
succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before
contact with the dump truck.
A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the
time of the accident. The evidence here consisted of the testimony of
Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that private respondent Dionisio smelled of
liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed car and brought to the
Makati Medical Center in an unconscious condition. 7 This testimony has to
be taken in conjunction with the admission of Dionisio that he had taken "a
shot or two" of liquor before dinner with his boss that night. We do not
believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily
under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per
se an act of reckless imprudence. 8There simply is not enough evidence to
show how much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his
physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are also
aware that "one shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people
differently.
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is
that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He
was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been.
Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of
General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the
dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the
Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the
accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner
in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of
petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between
petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and
respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly
different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a
natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was
merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent
Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause and that
consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and
proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of
Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a
reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United
States but we are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments have
any validity for our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the United
States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the
'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely
discredited." Professors and Keeton make this quite clear:
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to
distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and
the existing "conditions" upon which that cause
operated. If the defendant has created only a passive
static condition which made the damage possible, the
defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact
of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important part in
producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish
between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter
are the result of other active forces which have gone
before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the
premises creates a "condition," but the act may be
culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark
43 | P a g e
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Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance"
doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck
driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear
chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio
having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries
alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into
our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith 11 but it is a matter for debate whether,
or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate
the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule that of contributory
negligence. 12 The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented
any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the
plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful
act or omission of the defendant. 13 The common law notion of last clear
chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been
negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid
the casualty and failed to do so. 14 Accordingly, it is difficult to see what
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening
role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a
cause is one which in ordinary human experience is
jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as
reasonably to be anticipated or one which the
an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it
defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 15
circumstances, the defendant may be negligence
among other reasons, because of failure to guard
Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be
against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for
extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in
that reason. Thus one who sets a fire may be required
negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so.
to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind
Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine
arising later wig spread it beyond the defendant's own
whose negligence the plaintiff's or the defendant's was the legal or
property, and therefore to take precautions to prevent
proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an
that event. The person who leaves the combustible or
exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the
explosive material exposed in a public place may
use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location
foresee the risk of fire from some independent source.
in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts
... In all of these cases there is an intervening cause
or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into
combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the
account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent
result and in each case the defendant's negligence
act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks
consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that
created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. The
very risk.
petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be
absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from
unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had
liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and
become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's
important part of the risk, to which the defendant has
own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too
subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass.
close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must
Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope
respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or
original risk, and hence of the defendant's
omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens
negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To
intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of
not supersede the defendant's responsibility.
society.
Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required
to anticipate the usual weather of the vicinity, including
all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain,
or snow or frost or fog or even lightning; that one who
leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track
should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into
it; ...
Torts 5
the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the
manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company
premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of
Phoenix.
Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative
negligence of private respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners
Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we believe that the
demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the
damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the
respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by
private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by
petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to
the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and
costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course
entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason
for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent
appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified
by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of
expected income and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is
entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
45 | P a g e
Torts 5
prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover.[6]
THE vehicular collision resulting in damages and injuries in this case could
On October 31, 1995, petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for
have been avoided if the stalled prime mover with trailer were parked
damages[8] against private respondents prime mover owner and driver with
the RTC in Butuan City. The Joana Paula passenger bus was not
sounded the call for strict enforcement of the law and regulation on traffic
RTC Disposition
Butuan City finding private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito
Facts
a) That defendants Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito M. Limbaga pay, jointly
On July 4, 1995, at around 4:45 a.m., Rogelio Ortiz, with helper Romeo
City, going to Surigao City. They were delivering commercial ice to nearby
barangays and municipalities. A Joana Paula passenger bus was cruising
on the opposite lane towards the van. In between the two vehicles was a
parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by private respondent Liberty
c) That defendant Jose Ching is absolved from any civil liability or the case
Forest, Inc.[3]
The night before, at around 10:00 p.m., the prime mover with trailer
national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. He parked the prime
mover with trailer at the shoulder of the road with the left wheels still on the
cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of SO ORDERED.[9]
the highway.[4] The prime mover was not equipped with triangular,
The RTC held that the proximate cause of the three-way vehicular collision
was improper parking of the prime mover on the national highway and the
with leaves on the front and the rear portion of the prime mover to warn
The court finds that the proximate cause of the incidents is the negligence
pulled by the prime mover suffered two (2) flat tires at Sumilihon, the prime
mover and trailer were parked haphazardly, as the right tires of the prime
To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming
mover were the only ones on the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway
passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching
while the left tires and all the tires of the trailer were on the cemented
Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring headlights and the
pavement of the highway, occupying almost the whole of the right lane on
the direction the prime mover and trailer were traveling. The statement of
left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary
Limbaga that he could not park the prime mover and trailer deeper into the
46 | P a g e
Torts 5
sand and gravel shoulder of the highway to his right because there were
never clarified whether or not Boy Ching and defendant Jose Ching is one
banana plants is contradicted by the picture marked Exhibit F. The picture and the same person.[10] Private respondents appealed to the CA.
CA Disposition
shows that there was ample space on the shoulder. If defendant Limbaga
was careful and prudent enough, he should have the prime mover and
trailer traveled more distance forward so that the bodies of the prime mover On August 28, 2003, the CA reversed the RTC decision, disposing as
and trailer would be far more on the shoulder rather than on the cemented
follows:
highway when they were parked. x x x The court has some doubts on the
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Butuan City in Civil Case No. 4360 is
leaves and lighted tin cans with crude oil placed 3 strides in front of the
prime mover and behind the trailer because the testimonies of witnesses
Rogelio C. Ortiz, driver of the ice van, Romeo D. Catamora, helper of the
ice van, and Police Traffic Investigator SPO3 Teofilo M. Pame show that
there were no banana trunks with leaves and lighted tin cans at the scene
of the incident. But even assuming that there were banana trunks with
leaves but they were placed close to the prime mover and trailer as they
STANDS.
were placed 3 strides away which to the mind of the court is equivalent
approximately to 3 meters and with this distance, approaching vehicles
SO ORDERED.[11]
In partly reversing or partly modifying the RTC decision, the CA held that
especially if the vehicles are heavy and loaded. If there were lighted tin
the proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan
cans, it was not explained by the defendants why the driver, especially
van to give way or yield to the right of way of the passenger bus, thus:
It was stated that the Joana Paula bus in trying to avoid a head-on collision
with the truck, sideswept the parked trailer loaded with bulldozer.
xxxx
Evidently, the driver of the Joana Paula bus was aware of the presence on
Defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. did not exercise the diligence of a good
its lane of the parked trailer with bulldozer. For this reason, it proceeded to
occupy what was left of its lane and part of the opposite lane. The truck
record shows that it failed to provide its prime mover and trailer with the
occupying the opposite lane failed to give way or yield the right of way to
required early warning devices with reflectors and it did not keep proper
the oncoming bus by proceeding with the same speed. The two vehicles
maintenance and condition of the prime mover and the trailer. The
were, in effect, trying to beat each other in occupying a single lane. The
circumstances show that the trailer were provided with wornout tires and
bus was the first to occupy the said lane but upon realizing that the truck
with only one (1) piece of spare tire. The pictures marked Exhibit 3 and
refused to give way or yield the right of way, the bus, as a precaution,
4 show that two (2) flat tires suffered by the trailer and these two (2) tires
geared to its right where the trailer was parked. Unfortunately, the bus
were attached to one of the two (2) I-beams or axles attached to the rear of
miscalculated its distance from the parked trailer and its rear right side hit
the trailer which axle is very near but behind the other axle and with the
the protruding blade of the bulldozer then on the top of the parked trailer.
location of the 2 I-beams, it would have the other I-beam that would have
The impact of the collision on its right rear side with the blade of the
suffered the flat tires as it has to bear the brunt of weight of the D-8
bulldozer threw the bus further to the opposite lane, landing its rear portion
bulldozer. The bulldozer was not loaded directly above the two (2) I-beams
as 2 I-beams, as a pair, were attached at the far rear end of the trailer.
xxxx
xxxx
Facts of the case reveal that when Ortiz, the driver of the truck, failed to
However, defendant Jose Ching should be absolved of any liability as there give the Joana Paula bus the space on the road it needed, the latter
is no showing that he is the manager or CEO of defendant Liberty Forest,
vehicle scraped its rear right side on the protruded bulldozer blade and the
impact threw the bus directly on the path of the oncoming truck. This made
its lane which forced Ortiz, the driver of the truck, to swerve to its left and
his testimony mentioned a certain Boy Ching as the Manager but it was
47 | P a g e
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xxxx
comply with the law is untenable. The aforequoted law clearly allows the
use not only of an early warning device of the triangular reflectorized
The trailer was parked because its two (2) rear-left tires were blown out.
plates variety but also parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters
With a bulldozer on top of the trailer and two (2) busted tires, it would be
away. x x x.
dangerous and quite impossible for the trailer to further park on the
graveled shoulder of the road. To do so will cause the flat car to tilt and
negligent in parking the trailer on the scene of the accident. It would have
may cause the bulldozer to fall from where it was mounted. In fact, it
been different if there was only one flat tire and defendant-
appeared that the driver of the trailer tried its best to park on the graveled
shoulder since the right-front tires were on the graveled shoulder of the
immediately.
road.
As such, defendants-appellants/appellees are not liable for the damages
The lower court erred in stating that the Joana Paula bus swerved to the
left of the truck because it did not see the parked trailer due to lack of
warning sign of danger of any kind that can be seen from a distance. The
damage suffered by the Joana Paula bus belied this assessment. As
stated before, the Joana Paula bus, with the intention of passing first which
it did, first approached the space beside the parked trailer, veered too
I.
close to the parked trailer thereby hitting its rear right side on the protruding
bulldozer blade. Since the damage was on the rear right most of the bus, it
was clearly on the space which was wide enough for a single passing
vehicle but not sufficient for two (2) passing vehicles. The bus was thrown
right to the path of the truck by the impact of the collision of its rear right
The CA disagreed with the RTC that the prime mover did not have an early
PRESENCE.
II.
rear of the trailer which, in Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[13] may
act as substitute early warning device. The CA stated:
Likewise, it was incorrect for the lower court to state that there was no
warning sign of danger of any kind, most probably referring to the absence
of the triangular reflectorized plates. The police sketch clearly indicated the
stack of banana leaves placed at the rear of the parked trailer. The trailers
driver testified that they placed kerosene lighted tin can at the back of the
parked trailer.
The meat of the petition is whether or not the prime mover is liable for the
damages suffered by the Nissan van. The RTC ruled in the affirmative
A pair of triangular reflectorized plates is not the only early warning device
holding that the proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the
allowed by law. The Supreme Court (in Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of
without an early warning device on the vehicle. The CA reversed the RTC
x x x Col. Dela Cruz and Romano testified that they did not see any early
decision, holding that the proximate cause of the collision was the
warning device at the scene of the accident. They were referring to the
negligence of Ortiz in not yielding to the right of way of the passenger bus.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission
Ecala placed a kerosene lamp or torch at the edge of the road, near the
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
Traffic Code x x x
Baliwags argument that the kerosene lamp or torch does not substantially
Torts 5
bulldozer may fall off. The photographs taken after the incident show that
it could have been possible for Limbaga to park the prime mover
There is no dispute that the Nissan van suffered damage. That is borne by
the records and conceded by the parties. The outstanding issues are
negligence and proximate cause. Tersely put, the twin issues are: (a)
x x x The statement of Limbaga that he could not park the prime mover and
whether or not prime mover driver Limbaga was negligent in parking the
trailer deeper into the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway to his right
vehicle; and (b) whether or not his negligence was the proximate cause of
Exhibit F. The picture shows that there was ample space on the shoulder.
If defendant Limbaga was careful and prudent enough, he should have the
prime mover and trailer traveled more distance forward so that the bodies
highway; he failed
of the prime mover and trailer would be far more on the shoulder rather
than on the cemented highway when they were parked. Although at the
time of the incident, it was about 4:45 in the morning and it was drizzling
but there is showing that it was pitch dark that whoever travels along the
highway must be extra careful. If the Joana Paula bus swerved to the lane
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers on which the Nissan ice van was properly traveling, as prescribed by
injury.[17] The Supreme Court stated the test of negligence in the landmark
case Picart v. Smith
[18]
as follows:
Traffic Rules and Regulations, it is because the driver of the bus did not
see at a distance the parked prime mover and trailer on the bus proper
lane because there was no warning signs of danger of any kind that can be
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
Limbaga also failed to take proper steps to minimize the risk posed by the
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
employer, private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc., that the prime mover
suffered two tire blowouts and that he could not have them fixed because
he had only one spare tire. Instead of calling for help, Limbaga took it upon
himself to simply place banana leaves on the front and rear of the prime
on the prime mover instead of standing guard beside the vehicle. By his
own account, Limbaga was sleeping on the prime mover at the time of the
collision and that he was only awakened by the impact of the Nissan van
The test, as applied to this case, is whether Limbaga, in parking the prime
mover, used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
drive the prime mover with trailer loaded with a D-8 caterpillar bulldozer.[21]
We find that private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was utterly negligent in
We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover
askew on the right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a
substantial portion of the national road on the lane of the passenger bus. It
was parked at the shoulder of the road with its left wheels still on the
cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of
the highway. It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime
The RTC noted that private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. also failed to
keep the prime mover in proper condition at the time of the collision. The
was incumbent upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent that risk,
prime mover had worn out tires. It was only equipped with one spare tire. It
was for this reason that Limbaga was unable to change the two blown out
tires because he had only one spare. The bulldozer was not even loaded
dangerous and quite impossible to further park the prime mover on the
graveled shoulder of the road because the prime mover may tilt and the
All told, We agree with the RTC that private respondent Limbaga was
49 | P a g e
Torts 5
Limbaga and in ensuring that the prime mover was in proper condition.
ATTY. ROSALES:
Q. Now you mentioned about placing some word signs in front and at the
rear of the prime mover with trailer, will you please describe to us what this
put lighted kerosene tin cans on the front and rear of the prime
A. We placed a piece of cloth on tin cans and filled them with crude oil.
mover.
And these tin cans were lighted and they are like torches. These two lights
or torches were placed in front and at the rear side of the prime mover with
Anent the absence of an early warning device on the prime mover, the CA
trailer. After each torch, we placed banana trunk. The banana trunk is
placed between the two (2) torches and the prime mover, both on the rear
lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the prime mover. The evidence on
Q. How far was the lighted tin cans with wick placed in front of the prime
mover.
First, the traffic incident report did not mention any lighted tin cans on the
ATTY. ASIS:
prime mover or within the immediate vicinity of the accident. Only banana
answer was just limited to the numbers 4 & 5 of the answer. And, therefore,
Agusan del Norte, while traveling along the National Highway, coming from
then the party will not be allowed to introduce evidence to attack jointly or
the east going to the west direction, as it moves along the way and upon
banana trunks, banana items and leaves were filed. He can be cross-
approaching Nissan Ice Van with Plate No. PNT-247, driven by one
Rogelio Cortez y Ceneza. As the result, the Joana Paula Bus accidentally
busideswept (sic) to the parked Prime Mover with Trailer loaded with
COURT:
Bulldozer without early warning device, instead placing only dry banana
Q. Put that on record that as far as this tin cans are concerned, the
leaves three (3) meters at the rear portion of the Trailer, while failure to
plaintiffs are interposing continuing objections. But the Court will allow the
place at the front portion, and the said vehicle occupied the whole lane. As
question.[25]
the result, the Joana Paula Bus hit to the left edge blade of the Bulldozer.
We thus agree with the RTC that Limbaga did not place lighted tin cans on
Thus, causing the said bus swept to the narrow shouldering, removing the
the front and rear of the prime mover. We give more credence to the traffic
rear four (4) wheels including the differential and injuring the above-stated
incident report and the testimony of SPO4 Pame that only banana leaves
twelve (12) passengers and damaged to the right side fender above the
rear wheel. Thus, causing damage on it. While the Nissan Ice Van in
The skewed parking of the prime mover was the proximate cause of
Bulldozer. Thus, causing heavy damage to said Nissan Ice Van including
the collision.
[23]
Second, SPO4 Pame, who investigated the collision, testified[24] that only
banana leaves were placed on the front and rear of the prime mover. He
did not see any lighted tin cans in the immediate vicinity of the collision.
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. More
comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause acting first and producing
Third, the claim of Limbaga that he placed lighted tin cans on the front and
rear of the prime mover belatedly surfaced only during his direct
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of the
50 | P a g e
Torts 5
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
Private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Limbaga are liable for all
damages that resulted from the skewed parking of the prime mover. Their
[27]
therefrom.
taken by other motorist in trying to avoid collision with the parked prime
mover. As We see it, the passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane
of the Nissan van, to avoid colliding with the improperly parked prime
mover. The driver of the Nissan van, Ortiz, reacted swiftly by swerving to
precedent.
[28]
the left, onto the lane of the passenger bus, hitting the parked prime mover.
act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or
Ortiz obviously would not have swerved if not for the passenger bus
abruptly occupying his vans lane. The passenger bus, in turn, would not
have swerved to the lane of the Nissan van if not for the prime mover
[29]
link that must be established between the act or omission and the damage
improperly parked on its lane. The skewed parking is the proximate cause
of the damage to the Nissan van.
or injury, viz.:
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a In Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[30] this Court
passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event,
held that a similar vehicular collision was caused by the skewed parking of
lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is
the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the
that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He
proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the
was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been.
vehicle. But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in
the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death
General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the
of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when
dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that
the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for
Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the
help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver
and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about
which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of
2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and
coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were
petitioner Carbonels negligence on the one hand and the accident and
not available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and
what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach
different manner, the collision of Dionisios car with the dump truck was a
the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested
from them. In other words, the coming of the men with the torch was to be
expected and was natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the
xxxx
We believe, secondly, that the truck drivers negligence far from being a
authority for the proposition that the damage or injury must be a natural or
cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondents
probable result of the act or omission. Here, We agree with the RTC that
car would in all probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been
the damage caused to the Nissan van was a natural and probable result of
parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper
the improper parking of the prime mover with trailer. As discussed, the
parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone
driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the
parking of the prime mover triggered the series of events that led to the
although later in point of time than the truck drivers negligence and,
collision, particularly the swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan
van.
Torts 5
by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had parked the dump
truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private
respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them
because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the
the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisios negligence was not of
which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that
causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the
of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from
supplied)
his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other
passenger bus, if any, because it was not a party to the case; joint
concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would
not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes
and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons
The CA also faults the passenger bus for the vehicular collision. The
although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of
appellate court noted that the passenger bus was aware of the presence
them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured
of the prime mover on its lane, but it still proceeded to occupy the lane of
the Nissan van. The passenger bus also miscalculated its distance from
cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors.
Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though
his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
not a party to the complaint for damages. Due process dictates that the
since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
events before it can be held liable. Any contributory or proportionate liability acting independently, are in combination with the direct and proximate
of the passenger bus must be litigated in a separate action, barring any
proximate cause of the collision was the improper parking of the prime
mover. It was the improper parking of the prime mover which set in motion
and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the
Civil Code. (Underscoring supplied)
Even granting that the passenger bus was at fault, its fault will not
All told, all the elements of quasi delict have been proven by clear and
passenger bus will be a joint tortfeasor along with private respondents. The
liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary. This means that petitioner
may hold either of them liable for damages from the collision. In Philippine
National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
[31]
Final Note
It is lamentable that the vehicular collision in this case could have been
easily avoided by following basic traffic rules and regulations and road
prime mover on the shoulder of the national road. The improper parking of
responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have
vehicles, most especially along the national highways, poses a serious and
caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the
unnecessary risk to the lives and limbs of other motorists and passengers.
Drivers owe a duty of care to follow basic traffic rules and regulations and
to observe road safety standards. They owe that duty not only for their own
safety, but also for that of other motorists. We can prevent most vehicular
person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his
52 | P a g e
Torts 5
The Land Transportation Office (LTO) owes a duty to the public to ensure
that all vehicles on the road meet basic and minimum safety features,
including that of early warning devices. It is most unfortunate that We still
see dilapidated and rundown vehicles on the road with substandard safety
features. These vehicles not only pose a hazard to the safety of their
occupants but that of other motorists. The prime mover truck in this case
should not have been granted registration because it failed to comply with
the minimum safety features required for vehicles on the road.
It is, indeed, time for traffic enforcement agencies and the LTO to strictly
enforce all pertinent laws and regulations within their mandate.
SO ORDERED.
53 | P a g e
Torts 5
GLAN PEOPLES LUMBER AND HARDWARE, GEORGE LIM, FABIO S. For failure to file its answer to the third party complaint, third party
AGAD, FELIX LIM AND PAUL ZACARIAS Y INFANTE, PETITIONERS,
The case filed by the heirs of Engineer Calibo -- his widow and minor
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
Bureau of Domestic Trade; Fabio S. Agad was not a co-owner thereof but
outset. The first, an obvious one, is that it is the objective facts established
no connection whatever with said business, "he being a child only eight (8)
years of age."[5]
"After (trial, and) a careful evaluation of the evidence, both testimonial and
tragically altered their lives. The second is that the doctrine laid down
documentary," the Court reached the conclusion "that the plaintiffs failed to
[1]
many, many years ago in Picart vs. Smith, continues to be good law to
this day.
The facts giving rise to the controversy at bar are tersely and quite
1. Moments before its collision with the truck being operated by Zacarias,
Calibo at the wheel, as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going
towards the direction of Davao City at about 1:45 in the afternoon of July 4,
1979. At about that time, the cargo truck, loaded with cement bags, GI
the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for Glan, South Cotabato,
had just crossed said bridge. At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge,
or give statements to the police officers. This, plus Roranes waiver of the
the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer
right to institute criminal proceedings against Zacarias, and the fact that
Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias
indeed no criminal case was ever instituted in Court against Zacarias, were
was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly
"telling indications that they did not attribute the happening to defendant
damaged while the left side of the jeep, including its fender and hood, was
extensively damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right
side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the
truck stopped on its wheels on the road.
On November 27, 1979, the instant case for damages was filed by the
surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo who are
residents of Tagbilaran City against the driver and owners of the cargo
truck.
54 | P a g e
Torts 5
3) the waiver of the right to file criminal charges against Zacarias should
not be taken against "plaintiffs" Roranes and Patos who had the right,
by the physical facts and the police investigators Dimaano and Esparcia."[8]
4. That there were skid marks left by the truck's tires at the scene, and
The Appellate Court opined that Zacarias' negligence "gave rise to the
none by the jeep, demonstrates that the driver of the truck had applied the
brakes and the jeep's driver had not; and that the jeep had on impact fallen
both primary and solidary." It therefore ordered the defendants jointly and
on its right side is indication that it was running at high speed. Under the
circumstances, according to the Court, given "the curvature of the road and
the descending grade of the jeep's lane, it was negligence on the part of
the driver of the jeep, Engr. Calibo, for not reducing his speed upon sight of (2) P378,000.00 for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased
the truck and failing to apply the brakes as he got within collision range
(3) P15,000.00 for attorney's fees;
with the truck."
(4) Cost of suit."[16]
5. Even if it be considered that there was some antecedent negligence on
the part of Zacarias shortly before the collision, in that he had caused his
The defendants George Lim, Felix Lim, Fabio S. Agad and Paul Zacarias
truck to run some 25 centimeters to the left of the center of the road, Engr.
have appealed to this Court on certiorari and pray for a reversal of the
Calibo had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident because he still
had ample room in his own lane to steer clear of the truck, or he could
or ran counter to the established facts. A review of the record confirms the
merit of this assertion and persuades this Court that said judgment indeed
disregarded facts clearly and undisputably demonstrated by the proofs.
[9]
plaintiffs' appeal,
The finding that "the truck driven by defendant Paul Zacarias occupied the
lane of the jeep when the collision occurred" is a loose one, based on
1) "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep
nothing more than the showing that at the time of the accident, the truck
when the collision occurred," and although Zacarias saw the jeep from a
driven by Zacarias had edged over the painted center line of the road into
distance of about 150 meters, he "did not drive his truck back to his lane in
[11]
fact that by the uncontradicted evidence, the actual center line of the road
truck driver suddenly applied his brakes even as he knew that he was still
within the lane of the jeep;"[12] had both vehicles stayed in their respective
lanes, the collision would never have occurred, they would have passed
of the two officers who investigated the accident, correctly lay thirty-six (36)
[13]
55 | P a g e
Torts 5
renewed just the day before the accident, on July 3, 1979.[21] The Court
least eleven (11) centimeters away from its side of the true center line of
was apparently misled by the circumstance that when said driver was first
the road and well inside its own lane when the accident occurred. By this
asked to show his license by the investigators at the scene of the collision,
same reckoning, since it was unquestionably the jeep that rammed into the
stopped truck, it may also be deduced that it (the jeep) was at the time
Baricuatro, who had left said license in Davao City and had asked Zacarias
travelling beyond its own lane and intruding into the lane of the truck by at
there are also quite a few significant indicators that it was rather Engineer
stripe uncomfortably narrow, given that vehicle's width of two (2) meters
and forty-six (46) centimeters; the adjacent road shoulder was also virtually Zacarias had told Patrolman Dimaano at the scene of the collision and later
impassable, being about three (3) inches lower than the paved surface of
confirmed in his written statement at the police headquarters [23] that the
the road and "soft" -- not firm enough to offer traction for safe passage --
jeep had been "zigzagging," which is to say that it was travelling or being
river below.
[18]
stripe gave said vehicle barely half a meter of clearance from the edge of
the road and the dangerous shoulder and little room for maneuver, in case
Calibo had been drinking shortly before the accident. The decision of the
Trial Court adverts to further testimony of Esparcia to the effect that three
always kept to said lane. It being also shown that the accident happened
of Calibo's companions at the beach party he was driving home from when
[19]
the collision occurred, who, having left ahead of him went to the scene
extra precautions against driving too near the shoulder, it could hardly be
when they heard about the accident, had said that there had been a
drinking spree at the party and, referring to Calibo, had remarked: "Sabi
inches), into the opposite lane in order to insure his vehicle's safety. This,
even supposing that said maneuver was in fact an intrusion into the
opposite lane, which was not the case at all as just pointed out.
It was Calibo whose driver's license could not be found on his person at
the scene of the accident, and was reported by his companions in the jeep
Nor was the Appellate Court correct in finding that Paulino Zacarias had
as having been lost with his wallet at said scene, according to the traffic
acted negligently in applying his brakes instead of getting back inside his
accident report, Exhibit "J". Said license unexplainedly found its way into
lane upon espying the approaching jeep. Being well within his own Iane,
as has already been explained, he had no duty to swerve out of the jeep's
way as said Court would have had him do. And even supposing that he
Reference has already been made to the finding of the Trial Court that
was in fact partly inside the opposite lane, coming to a full stop with the
imprudent action, there also being uncontradicted evidence that the jeep
was zigzagging
[20]
56 | P a g e
Torts 5
the immediate and determining cause of the accident and that of the
Appellate Court or which may be deemed conceded for lack of any dispute, he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong
would still absolve the latter of any actionable responsibility for the accident side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also
negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent
acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of
other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles
[26]
interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the
The private respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full
stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen fit to deny or
impugn petitioners' imputation that they also admitted the truck had been
brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away.
[27]
From these
facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what
Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and his
judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the
employer (and co-petitioner) George Lim, an inquiry into whether or not the
accident, while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by
stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of
selection and supervision of said driver is no longer necessary and will not
be undertaken. The fact is that there is such evidence in the record which
kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that
It must be pointed out, however, that the Intermediate Appellate Court also
clear path.
seriously erred in holding the petitioners Pablo S. Agad and Felix Lim
solidarily liable for the damages awarded in its appealed decision, as
The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a
alleged owners, with petitioner George Lim, of Glan People's Lumber and
defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the
1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, supra, which involved a similar state of facts. not only the certificate of registration issued by the Bureau of Domestic
Of those facts, which should be familiar to every student of law, it is only
decision that:
he improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right. The driver of
the automobile, however, guided his car toward the plaintiff without
diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He then turned to
the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened,
rule binding it to observe and respect the latter's findings of fact. Many of
those exceptions may be cited to support the review here undertaken, but
Plaintiff Picart was thrown off his horse and suffered contusions which
only the most obvious -- that said findings directly conflict with those of the
Trial Court -- will suffice.[29] In the opinion of this Court and after a careful
for the value of his animal, medical expenses and damage to his apparel
review of the record, the evidence singularly fails to support the findings of
and obtained judgment from this Court which, while finding that there was
the Intermediate Appellate Court which, for all that appears, seem to have
negligence on the part of both parties, held that that of the defendant was
been prompted rather by sympathy for the heirs of the deceased Engineer
57 | P a g e
Torts 5
SO ORDERED.
58 | P a g e
Torts 5
PURISIMA, J.:
Court, seeking to review and set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25242, which reversed the Decision[2] of
Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. M-
respondent bank that the execution of subject mortgage over the two
and request that steps be taken to annul and/or revoke the questioned
SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered DISMISSING the complaint
mortgage. On January 18, 1983, petitioner Osmundo Canlas also wrote the
defendant Asian Savings Bank, the plaintiffs Canlas spouses are hereby
heed petitioner Canlas' stance and proceeded with the scheduled auction
attorney's fees.
sale.[7]
SO ORDERED."
[3]
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; and on May 23, 1983, the
trial court issued an Order restraining the respondent sheriff from issuing
the corresponding Certificate of Sheriffs Sale.[8]
For failure to file his answer, despite several motions for extension of time
the capital needed therefor. The former then executed a Special Power of
On June 1, 1989, the lower court a quo came out with a decision annulling
Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-78498 in the name of his wife Angelina
Canlas.
1. Declaring the deed of real estate mortgage (Exhibit 'L') involving the
properties of the plaintiffs as null and void;
which payable within one week, and the balance of P350,000.00 to serve
3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs the
mortgage, plus interest at the legal rate, starting February 3, 1983, the date
when the original complaint was filed, until the amount is fully paid;
59 | P a g e
Torts 5
be required. (1104)"
The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good
SO ORDERED."
[10]
From such Decision below, Asian Savings Bank appealed to the Court of
trust the money of the depositors, which bank deposits the bank should
petitioners found their way to this Court via the present Petition; theorizing
guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith, by reason of which the
that:
bank would be denied the protective mantle of the land registration law,
"I
accorded only to purchases or mortgagees for value and in good faith. [13]
gleaned unerringly that respondent bank did not observe the requisite
VALID.
Canlas. It is worthy to note that not even a single identification card was
exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity; and yet, the
PETITIONERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF BECAUSE THEY WERE certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the signatures
NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE MUST BEAR THE LOSS.
III
Q: According to you, the basis for your having recommended for the
approval of MANASCO's (sic) loan particularly that one involving the
IV
you all the signatures and other things taken into account matches with
that of the document previously executed by the spouses CANLAS?
basis for the recommendation of the approval of the loan are the
financial statement of MAOSCA?
A: Yes, among others the signature and TAX Account Number, Residence
Certificate appearing on the previous loan executed by the spouses
CANLAS, I am referring to EXHIBIT 5, mortgage to ATTY. MAGNO,
"Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consist in the omission
of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171
and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
A: That is just the basis of accepting the signature, because at that time
the loan have been approved already on the basis of the financial
statement of the client the Bank Statement. Wneh (sic) it was approved
we have to base it on the Financial statement of the client, the
signatures were accepted only for the purpose of signing the mortgage
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in
not for the approval, we don't (sic) approve loans on the signature.
60 | P a g e
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ATTY. CLAROS:
Would you agree that as part of ascertaining the identify of the parties
Under the doctrine of last clear chance, which is applicable here, the
particularly the mortgage, you don't consider also the signature, the
respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. In essence, the doctrine of
last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but
the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the
A: I think the question defers (sic) from what you asked a while ago.
Q: Among others?
ATTY. CARLOS:
the simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements for banks
to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them.
What other requirement did you take into account in ascertaining the
A: Residence Certificate.
Thus, armed with the titles and the special power of attorney, Manosca
went to the defendant bank and applied for a loan. And when Maosca
came over to the bank to submit additional documents pertinent to his loan
application, Osmundo Canlas was with him, together with a certain Rogelio
A: We requested for others but they could not produce, and because they
presented to us the Residence Certificate which matches on the
Viray. At that time, Osmundo Canlas was introduced to the bank personnel
as 'Leonardo Rey.
When he was introduced as 'Leonardo Rey for the first time Osmundo
should have corrected Maosca right away. But he did not. Instead, he
father of a family. The negligence of respondent bank was magnified by the at the Metropolitan Club when Maosca invited two officers of the
fact that the previous deed of mortgage (which was used as the basis for
during that meeting, Osmundo did not say who he really is, but even let
spouses) did not bear the tax account number of the spouses,
[15]
as well as
Maosca introduced him again as 'Leonardo Rey, which all the more
indicates that he connived with Maosca in deceiving the defendant bank.
notwithstanding, the bank did not require the impostors to submit additional
61 | P a g e
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of Mr. Maosca.
Maosca to the bank when the loan was released. At that time a manger's
check for P200,000.00 was issued in the name of Oscar Motorworks,
QUESTION:I see ... other than the business of Mr. Maosca, were there
ANSWER: YES.
[18]
however, that the findings arrived at by the Court of Appeals are barren of
xxx xxx xxx"[22]
Verily, Osmundo Canlas was left unaware of the illicit plan of Maosca,
explaining thus why he (Osmundo) did not bother to correct what Maosca
question.
Not only that; while it is true that Osmundo Canlas was with Vicente
parcels of land.
Maosca when the latter submitted the documents needed for his loan
application, and when the check of P200,000.000 was released, the former
did not know that the collateral used by Maosca for the said loan were
Maosca at the time because he wanted to make sure that Maosca would
make good his promise to pay the balance of the purchase price of the said
well explained by the former, he just did not want to embarrass Maosca,
not estop him from assailing the validity of the mortgage because the said
meeting, they did not talk about the security or collateral for the loan of
Maosca with ASB.[21] So also, Mrs. Josefina Rojo, who was the Account
Officer of Asian Savings Bank when Maosca applied for subject loan,
ANSWER: Mr. Mangubat, Mr. Maosca and I did not discuss with respect
to the loan application and discuss primarily his business.
ANSWER: The main topic was then, about his business although, Mr,
Leonardo Rey, who actually turned out as Mr. Canlas, supplier
Canlas and Angelina Canlas, the Court is of the ineluctible conclusion and
finding that subject contract of mortgage is a complete nullity.
62 | P a g e
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SO ORDERED.
63 | P a g e
Torts 5
pick-up.[6] Deocampo alleged that he tried to avoid the pick-up but he was
unable to avoid the collision. Deocampo stated that he did not apply the
DECISION
The Ruling of the Trial Court
CARPIO, J.:
In its 3 March 1995 Decision,[7] the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 25 July 2001
[2]
[3]
On 4 May 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab with plate no. PEC-
2.
3.
4.
Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City.
The trial court found that the crewcab was running very fast while following
The left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper of the pick-up
the pick-up and that the crewcab's speed was the proximate cause of the
were damaged.
accident. The trial court observed that the crewcab stopped 21 meters
away from the point of impact despite Deocampo's claim that he stepped
Respondent filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and Attorney's Fees on the brakes moments after the collision. The trial court ruled that
against LADECO, its administrative officer Henry Berenguel[4] (Berenguel)
and Deocampo. Respondent alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to
about five to ten kilometers per hour (kph) and was making a left turn
The trial court found that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the
screeching sound before the impact. Respondent was seated beside the
The trial court denied petitioners' motion in its 13 June 1995 Order.[10]
driver and was looking at the speedometer when the accident took place.
Respondent testified that Borres made a signal because he noticed a
blinking light while looking at the speedometer.
[5]
reply. Thus, respondent filed the case against LADECO, Berenguel, and
Deocampo.
The Court of Appeals sustained the finding of the trial court that Deocampo
was negligent. The Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of last clear
Deocampo alleged that the pick-up and the crewcab he was driving were
chance and ruled that Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding the
both running at about 40 kph. The pick-up was running along the outer
pick-up.
lane. The pick-up was about 10 meters away when it made a U-turn
towards the left. Deocampo testified that he did not see any signal from the
The Court of Appeals also sustained the solidary liability of LADECO and
64 | P a g e
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Deocampo. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Article 2180 of the Civil
intersection in the lane for traffic to the right of and nearest to the center
line of the highway, and, in turning, shall pass to the left of the center of the
intersection, except that, upon highways laned for traffic and upon one-way
highways, a left turn shall be made from the left lane of traffic in the
Petitioners further allege that since Borres was violating a traffic rule at the
merit, and the assailed Decision of the Court a quo in Civil Case No.
time of the accident, respondent and Borres were the parties at fault.
[11]
SO ORDERED.
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.
We rule that both parties were negligent in this case. Borres was at the
outer lane when he executed a U-turn. Following Section 45(b) of RA 4136,
Borres should have stayed at the inner lane which is the lane nearest to
the center of the highway. However, Deocampo was equally negligent.
The Issues
Deocampo admitted that he noticed the pick-up when it was still about 20
meters away from him.[13] Vehicular traffic was light at the time of the
1.
incident. The pick-up and the crewcab were the only vehicles on the
(RA 4136) and Article 2185 of the Civil road.[14] Deocampo could have avoided the crewcab if he was not driving
very fast before the collision, as found by both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals. We sustain this finding since factual findings of the Court of
2.
Appeals affirming those of the trial court are conclusive and binding on this
awarded.
Court.[15] Further, the crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact.
It would not have happened if Deocampo was not driving very fast.
applies.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Deocampo was at
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are
fault because he was driving very fast prior to the collision. The Court of
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the
Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that Deocampo was running
more than the normal cruising speed. Both the trial court and the Court of
caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
Appeals noted that the crewcab stopped 21 meters away from the point of
impact. Deocampo admitted that he stepped on the brakes only after the
Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since
collision.
Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation
since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.[17]
Petitioners allege that Borres did not take the proper lane before executing
the U-turn. Petitioners allege that Borres violated Section 45(b) of RA 4136
and it was his recklessness that was the proximate cause of the accident.
up. Deocampo was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not
step on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the
brakes after the collision.
(b) The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall approach such
65 | P a g e
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LADECO alleges that it should not be held jointly and severally liable with
Deocampo because it exercised due diligence in the supervision and
selection of its employees. Aside from this statement, LADECO did not
proffer any proof to show how it exercised due diligence in the supervision
and selection of its employees. LADECO did not show its policy in hiring its
drivers, or the manner in which it supervised its drivers. LADECO failed to
substantiate its allegation that it exercised due diligence in the supervision
and selection of its employees.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to give any justification
for the award of attorney's fees. Awards of attorney's fees must be based
on findings of fact and of law and stated in the decision of the trial court.[21]
Further, no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.[22] Hence, we
delete the award of attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
66 | P a g e
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deposits, on all occasions, were not credited to RMC's account but were
Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account with the same bank.
During this period, petitioner bank had, however, been regularly furnishing
MANAGER, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
Challenged in this petition for review is the Decision dated February 28,
The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current
account number. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of
Decision dated November 15, 1985 of the Regional Trial Court, National
her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's
Capital Judicial Region, Branch CLX (160), Pasig City, in Civil Case No.
teller, Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both the
original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original
copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy
was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation,
Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the
duplicate copy and change the account number written thereon, which is
President and General Manager Romeo Lipana, to recover from the former
i.e., C.A. No. 53-01980-3. With the daily remittance records also prepared
by Ms. Yabut and submitted to private respondent RMC together with the
representing various deposits it had made in its current account with said
validated duplicate slips with the latter's name and account number, she
bank but which were not credited to its account, and were instead
made her company believe that all the while the amounts she deposited
were being credited to its account when, in truth and in fact, they were
being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account
of Cotas. This went on in a span of more than one (1) year without private
RMC maintained two (2) separate current accounts, Current Account Nos.
respondent's knowledge.
Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner
bank the return of its money, but as its demand went unheeded, it filed a
collection suit before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160. The
deposits are accepted by the bank on the basis of deposit slips prepared
credited, the name of the depositor or current account holder, the date of
the deposit, and the amount of the deposit either in cash or checks. The
deposit slip has an upper portion or stub, which is detached and given to
the plaintiff, jointly and severally, and without prejudice to any criminal
the depositor or his agent; the lower portion is retained by the bank. In
1.
interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint;
From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to
2.
secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the
3.
current accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out, however, that these
have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his
67 | P a g e
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Yabut will be depositing cash to its account. Thus, it was impossible for the
4.
Costs.
bank to know the fraudulent design of Yabut considering that her husband,
Bienvenido Cotas, also maintained an account with the bank For the bank
[2]
to inquire into the ownership of the cash deposited by Ms. Irene Yabut
would be irregular. Otherwise stated, it was RMC's negligence in entrusting
modifications, viz:
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the proximate cause
sense that the awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees specified
of the loss was the negligent act of the bank, thru its teller Ms. Azucena
therein are eliminated and instead, appellants are ordered to pay plaintiff,
presented by Ms. Yabut to Ms. Mabayad, notwithstanding the fact that one
deposit plus legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint,
P25,000.00 attorney's fees and costs in the lower court as well as in this
Court."[3]
"Art. 2176.
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
dishonest employee.
the bank's statements of account with its own records during the entire
period of more than one (1) year is the proximate cause of the commission
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
Rommel Marketing Corporation are falsified and are not proof that the
4) The duplicate copies of the deposit slips were used by Ms. Irene Yabut
Corporation, and not as records of deposits she made with the bank.[4]
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
The petition has no merit.
Simply put, the main issue posited before us is: What is the proximate
respondent's?
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
Petitioners submit that the proximate cause of the loss is the negligence of
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The
[5]
impossible for the bank to know that the money deposited by Ms. Irene
Yabut belong to RMC; neither was the bank forewarned by RMC that
the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
68 | P a g e
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Q: Now is the depositor's stub which you issued to your clients validated?
A:
Clearly, Ms. Mabayad failed to observe this very important procedure. The
Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena
fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in
Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the
deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact
The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital
that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the
information -- that of the name of the account holder -- should have already
put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the incomplete
duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more
thus:
probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the
duplicate slip was left blank while that in the original was filled up. She
"Q: Now, as teller of PCIB, Pasig Branch, will you please tell us Mrs.
should not have been so naive in accepting hook, line and sinker the too
shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate
A:
copy was only for her personal record, she would simply fill up the blank
encashments.
have given credence to such explanation and would have insisted that the
Q: Now in the handling of current account deposits of bank clients, could
was not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses
A:
deposit slip by filling up the deposit slip with the name, the account
number, the date, the cash breakdown, if it is deposited for cash, and the
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the
check number, the amount and then he signs the deposit slip.
part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms.
Mabayad. This was exemplified in the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio,
then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-
A:
incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in
The bank requires only one copy of the deposit although some of our
the bank on the deposit slips and they validated the same with the
machine, the fact that those deposit slips were unfilled up, is there any
A:
the deposit.
A:
A:
A:
Q: Where does the depositor's stub comes (sic) from Mrs. Mabayad, is it
Q: You did not know that any one in the bank tellers or cashiers validated
A:
A:
The depositor's stub is connected with the deposit slip or the bank's
copy. In a deposit slip, the upper portion is the depositor's stub and the
lower portion is the bank's copy, and you can detach the bank's copy from
A:
observed:
A:
[9]
Yes, sir."[13]
we count the money and then we tally it with the deposit slip sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
69 | P a g e
Torts 5
It was in fact only when he testified in this case in February, 1983, or after
last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of
the lapse of more than seven (7) years counted from the period when the
petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller,
had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply
It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence At this juncture, it is worth to discuss the degree of diligence ought to be
of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller,
which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private
respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest
[17]
[16]
[15]
Vda. de
and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of
the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles
1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. x x x." In this case, absent the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently
be required. (1104a)"
validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene
Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent
their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the
those funds in her husband's current account, and then make plaintiff
every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the
believe that it was in the latter's accounts wherein she had deposited them,
utmost fidelity, whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos
had it not been for bank teller Mabayad's aforesaid gross and reckless
negligence. The latter's negligence was thus the proximate, immediate and
down to the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has to be done
efficient cause that brought about the loss claimed by plaintiff in this case,
if the account is to reflect at any given time the amount of money the
and the failure of plaintiff to discover the same soon enough by failing to
depositor can dispose as he sees fit, confident that the bank will deliver it
bank could not have prevented the fraud and misappropriation which Irene
the failure to duly credit him his deposits as soon as they are made, can
Yabut had already completed when she deposited plaintiff's money to the
cause the depositor not a little embarrassment if not financial loss and
[18]
Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at
times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank
The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of
was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where
the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts
both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later
of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary
nature of their relationship. In the case before us, it is apparent that the
fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had
petitioner bank was remiss in that duty and violated that relationship.
the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is
chargeable with the consequences thereof.[19] Stated differently, the rule
check the bank's statements of account with its own records during the
entire period of more than one (1) year is the proximate cause of the
bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the
Torts 5
Irene Yabut.
Proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.
We do not agree.
71 | P a g e
Torts 5
and presented to Teller No. 6 the deposit slip and check. The teller
HEAD OFFICE" on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip. When Macaraya
asked for the passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that someone got the
DECISION
passbook but she could not remember to whom she gave the passbook.
When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the passbook, Teller No.
CARPIO, J.:
6 answered that someone shorter than Calapre got the passbook. Calapre
was then standing beside Macaraya.
The Case
Teller No. 6 handed to Macaraya a deposit slip dated 14 August 1991 for
dated 27 October 1998 and its Resolution dated 11 May 1999. The
Corporation ("PBC"). This PBC check of L.C. Diaz was a check that it had
insufficient funds and because the signature in the check differed from
liability. The questioned resolution of the appellate court denied the motion
went back to her office and reported the matter to the Personnel Manager
The following day, 15 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive
Officer, Luis C. Diaz ("Diaz"), called up Solidbank to stop any transaction
The Facts
using the same passbook until L.C. Diaz could open a new account. [5] On
the same day, Diaz formally wrote Solidbank to make the same request. It
was also on the same day that L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized
Philippine laws. Private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPA's ("L.C.
withdrawal the day before, 14 August 1991, of P300,000 from its savings
account. The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the signatures of the
authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo.
("Macaraya"), filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for P990 and a savings
(checks) deposit slip for P50. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C.
Court of Manila dismissed the criminal case after the City Prosecutor filed a
Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit
slips and the passbook. The teller acknowledged receipt of the deposit by
returning to Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit slips. Teller No.
6 stamped the deposit slips with the words "DUPLICATE" and "SAVING
Money against Solidbank with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he 8. After trial, the trial court rendered on 28 December 1994 a decision
left the passbook with Solidbank. Calapre then went to Allied Bank. When
the Court of Appeals issued its Decision reversing the decision of the trial
court.
On 11 May 1999, the Court of Appeals issued its Resolution denying the
72 | P a g e
Torts 5
a PBC check "long closed" by L.C. Diaz, which check was deposited on the
attorney's fees.
The trial court debunked L.C. Diaz's contention that Solidbank did not
follow the precautionary procedures observed by the two parties whenever
In absolving Solidbank, the trial court applied the rules on savings account
L.C. Diaz withdrew significant amounts from its account. L.C. Diaz claimed
written on the passbook. The rules state that "possession of this book shall
that a letter must accompany withdrawals of more than P20,000. The letter
must request Solidbank to allow the withdrawal and convert the amount to
by the bank upon the production of the said book and entry therein of the
a manager's check. The bearer must also have a letter authorizing him to
withdraw the same amount. Another person driving a car must accompany
personally."
[9]
the bearer so that he would not walk from Solidbank to the office in making
the withdrawal. The trial court pointed out that L.C. Diaz disregarded these
At the time of the withdrawal, a certain Noel Tamayo was not only in
The trial court further justified the dismissal of the complaint by holding that
the case was a last ditch effort of L.C. Diaz to recover P300,000 after the
withdrawal slip was then given to another officer who compared the
signatures on the withdrawal slip with the specimen on the signature cards.
The trial court concluded that Solidbank acted with care and observed the
to prove that the signatures on the withdrawal slip were forged. The trial
attorney's fees.
court admonished L.C. Diaz for not offering in evidence the National
Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") report on the authenticity of the signatures
on the withdrawal slip for P300,000. The trial court believed that L.C. Diaz
did not offer this evidence because it is derogatory to its action.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Another provision of the rules on savings account states that the depositor
must keep the passbook "under lock and key."[10] When another person
The Court of Appeals ruled that Solidbank's negligence was the proximate
account of L.C. Diaz. The appellate court reached this conclusion after
the passbook. The trial court ruled that the passbook presented during the
questioned transaction was "now out of the lock and key and presumptively Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
ready for a business transaction."[11]
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
Solidbank did not have any participation in the custody and care of the
passbook. The trial court believed that Solidbank's act of allowing the
withdrawal of P300,000 was not the direct and proximate cause of the loss.
The appellate court held that the three elements of a quasi-delict are
The trial court held that L.C. Diaz's negligence caused the unauthorized
present in this case, namely: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault
must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault
Torts 5
the withdrawal slip for P300,000 allowed the withdrawal without making the
attorney's fees was also disallowed pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil
necessary inquiry. The appellate court stated that the teller, who was not
Code. The expenses of litigation and cost of suit were also not imposed on
Solidbank.
was unauthorized. The teller did not even verify the identity of the impostor
who made the withdrawal. Thus, the appellate court found Solidbank liable
The appellate court ruled that while L.C. Diaz was also negligent in
SO ORDERED.[15]
entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its messenger in leaving the
passbook with the teller, Solidbank could not escape liability because of
The Issues
the doctrine of "last clear chance." Solidbank could have averted the injury
suffered by L.C. Diaz had it called up L.C. Diaz to verify the withdrawal.
Solidbank seeks the review of the decision and resolution of the Court of
The appellate court ruled that the degree of diligence required from
Solidbank is more than that of a good father of a family. The business and
functions of banks are affected with public interest. Banks are obligated to
I.
treat the accounts of their depositors with meticulous care, always having
in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their clients. The Court
1.
II.
2.
attorney's fees.
[13]
SO ORDERED.
affirmed its decision but modified the award of damages. The appellate
[14]
Torts 5
III.
IV.
"the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with
relationship."[21]
deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature
of a good father of a family. Article 1172 of the Civil Code states that the
[16]
CONTRIBUTORY.
The rulings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals conflict on the
application of the law. The trial court pinned the liability on L.C. Diaz based
on the provisions of the rules on savings account, a recognition of the
contractual relationship between Solidbank and L.C. Diaz, the latter being
convert the contract between the bank and its depositors from a simple
a depositor of the former. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals applied
the law on quasi-delict to determine who between the two parties was
to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple loan, and not a breach of
trust.[24] The law simply imposes on the bank a higher standard of integrity
the parties.
The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a simple loan into a trust
agreement because banks do not accept deposits to enrich depositors but
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the
to earn money for themselves. The law allows banks to offer the lowest
provisions of the Civil Code on simple loan.[17] Article 1980 of the Civil
belongs to the bank and not to the depositors who are not cestui que trust
of banks. If depositors are cestui que trust of banks, then the interest
the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the
creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay
banking. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8791 ("RA 8791"),[18] which took
effect on 13 June 2000, declares that the State recognizes the "fiduciary
Torts 5
Calapre left the passbook with Solidbank because the "transaction took
The bank must not only exercise "high standards of integrity and
passbook was still in the hands of the employees of Solidbank for the
this is the only way to insure that the bank will comply with its fiduciary
duty. Solidbank failed to present the teller who had the duty to return to
Calapre the passbook, and thus failed to prove that this teller exercised the
guarded by the depositor and kept under lock and key, if possible." When
employees.
the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of
diligence in safeguarding the passbook.
Another point of disagreement between the trial and appellate courts is the
insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his
authorized representative. The tellers know, or should know, that the rules
that L.C. Diaz's negligence in not securing its passbook under lock and key
was the proximate cause that allowed the impostor to withdraw the
is presumptively its owner. If the tellers give the passbook to the wrong
P300,000. For the appellate court, the proximate cause was the teller's
without which the result would not have occurred.[26] Proximate cause is
determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic,
L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the
in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant
was negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established that
Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre, the
the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption
that Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the
Solidbank failed to discharge its burden. Solidbank did not present to the
trial court Teller No. 6, the teller with whom Calapre left the passbook and
who was supposed to return the passbook to him. The record does not
indicate that Teller No. 6 verified the identity of the person who retrieved
ownership of the passbook. Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of
the impostor, the loss of P300,000 would not have happened. Thus, the
cause of the unauthorized withdrawal was the teller's failure to call up L.C.
Diaz to verify the withdrawal. Solidbank did not have the duty to call up
Solidbank and L.C. Diaz to this effect. Even the agreement between
aquiliana.[25]
Solidbank and L.C. Diaz pertaining to measures that the parties must
observe whenever withdrawals of large amounts are made does not direct
76 | P a g e
Torts 5
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the
Diaz therefore had the burden to prove that it is the usual practice of
caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss.[29] Stated differently, the
Teller No. 5 who processed the withdrawal could not have been put on
defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by
impostor deposited with Teller No. 6 the P90,000 PBC check, which later
bounced. The impostor apparently deposited a large amount of money to
We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case.
The appellate court thus erred when it imposed on Solidbank the duty to
call up L.C. Diaz to confirm the withdrawal when no law requires this from
nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant
transaction.
Solidbank continues to foist the defense that Ilagan made the withdrawal.
but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract. [32]
Solidbank claims that since Ilagan was also a messenger of L.C. Diaz, he
was familiar with its teller so that there was no more need for the teller to
Mitigated Damages
Under Article 1172, "liability (for culpa contractual) may be regulated by the
xxx Ilagan also had with him (before the withdrawal) a forged check of PBC courts, according to the circumstances." This means that if the defendant
and indicated the amount of P90,000 which he deposited in favor of L.C.
money, accused Ilagan gave alias Rey (Noel Tamayo) his share of the
courts may reduce the award of damages. In this case, L.C. Diaz was
loot. Ilagan then hired a taxicab in the amount of P1,000 to transport him
and lavishly spent his money but a big part of his loot was wasted in
cockfight and horse racing. Ilagan was apprehended and meekly admitted
his guilt.[28] (Emphasis supplied.)
L.C. Diaz refutes Solidbank's contention by pointing out that the person
who withdrew the P300,000 was a certain Noel Tamayo. Both the trial and
damages between the depositor and the bank on a 40-60 ratio. Applying
appellate courts stated that this Noel Tamayo presented the passbook with
the same ruling to this case, we hold that L.C. Diaz must shoulder 40% of
the actual damages awarded by the appellate court. Solidbank must pay
the other 60% of the actual damages.
We uphold the finding of the trial and appellate courts that a certain Noel
Tamayo withdrew the P300,000. The Court is not a trier of facts. We find
no justifiable reason to reverse the factual finding of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals. The tellers who processed the deposit of the P90,000
respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPA's only 60% of the actual
check and the withdrawal of the P300,000 were not presented during trial
does not categorically state that Ilagan presented the withdrawal slip and
the passbook.
Torts 5
"4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son of plaintiffs spouses Narciso and Adoracion
Himaya; and
"5. Noel Bersamina, 17, son of plaintiffs spouses Jose and Ma.
Commemoracion Bersamina. (Rollo, p. 48)
HIMAYA AND ADORACION MARQUEZ-HIMAYA, AND SPOUSES JOSE During the incident, the cargo truck was driven by defendant Montesiano
BERSAMINA AND MA. COMMEMORACION PEREA-BUSTAMANTE,
PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
FEDERICO DEL PILAR AND EDILBERTO MONTESIANO,
RESPONDENTS.
and owned by defendant Del Pilar; while the passenger bus was driven by
defendant Susulin. The vehicle was registered in the name of defendant
Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus jointly by
defendants Magtibay and Serrado, under a franchise, with a line from Naic,
Cavite, to Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila, and vice-versa, which
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
were approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of the
highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin the bus
which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that
Cavite, Branch XV ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the
the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance
plaintiffs indemnity for death and damages; and in further dismissing the
due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking. Susulin
complaint insofar as defendants-appellants Federico del Pilar and Edilberto shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to
Montesiano are concerned; and its resolution dated August 17, 1989
the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to
The facts giving rise to the controversy at bar are recounted by the trial
overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the truck was approaching the
court as follows:
bus, the two vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left side. After
"At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred
the impact, the truck skidded towards the other side of the road and landed
between a gravel and sand truck, with Plate No. DAP 717, and a Mazda
on a nearby residential lot, hitting a coconut tree and felling it." (Rollo, pp.
passenger bus with Motor No. Y2231 and Plate No. DVT 259 along the
48-50)
national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion
(barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the
After a careful perusal of the circumstances of the case, the trial court
passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver's seat to the last
reached the conclusion "that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed
rear seat.
to or combined with each other in directly causing the accident which led to
the death of the aforementioned persons. It could not be determined from
"Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and
the evidence that it was only the negligent act of one of them which was
died as a result of the injuries they sustained. Among those killed were the
the proximate cause of the collision. In view of thus, the liability of the two
following:
Ricardo Susulin, Efren Novelo, Federico del Pilar and Edilberto Montesiano
are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs, as follows:
"2. Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of plaintiffs spouses Salvador and
Patria Jocson;
"1. To plaintiffs Emma Adriano Bustamante and her minor children, the
sum of P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Rogelio Bustamante; U.S.
"3. Jolet Ramos, 16, daughter of plaintiffs spouses Jose and Enriqueta
$127,680.00 as indemnity for the loss of the earning capacity of the said
Ramos;
deceased, at its prevailing rate in pesos at the time this decision shall have
become final and executory; P10,000.00 as moral damages; and
78 | P a g e
Torts 5
"First. Whether the respondent Court can legally and validly absolve
defendants-appellants from liability despite its own finding, as well as that
truck driver, was driving an old vehicle very fast, with its wheels already
"Second. Whether the respondent court can validly and legally disregard
the findings of fact made by the trial court which was in a better position to
doctrine of last clear chance in the present case despite its own finding
negligent in driving his cargo truck very fast on a descending road and in
the presence of the bus driver coming from the opposite direction.
"The defendants are also required to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of the suit.
"Fourth. Whether the respondent court has applied the correct law and the
correct doctrine so as to reverse and set aside the judgment with respect to
As a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive
and cannot be reviewed on appeal, provided, they are borne out by the
Montesiano, owner and driver, respectively, of the sand and gravel truck
limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings
analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited
this instance.
On March 9, 1989, the plaintiffs-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. (Andres v.
of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision. However, respondent
Court of Appeals in a resolution dated August 17, 1989 denied the motion
findings of fact mainly because the appellate court's findings are contrary
to those of the trial court.
79 | P a g e
Torts 5
deportment.
caused the accident which led to the death of the aforementioned persons,
considered the following:
The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The
"It was negligent on the part of driver Montesiano to have driven his truck
doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
fast, considering that it was an old vehicle, being a 1947 model as admitted preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears
by its owner, defendant Del Pilar; that its front wheels were wiggling; that
the road was descending; and that there was a passenger bus
approaching it. Likewise, driver Susulin was also guilty of negligence in not plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance
taking the necessary precaution to avoid the collision, in the light of his
means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a
of the truck wiggling and that the vehicle was usurping his lane coming
recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear
stopped his bus or swerved it to the side of the road even down to its
him, give more power and speed to his bus in overtaking or passing a hand the accident. (Sangco, Torts and Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. 165).
tractor which was being pushed along the shoulder of the road." (Rollo, p.
50)
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant held liable
The respondent Court of Appeals ruling on the contrary, opined that "the
bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and his reckless
cause of the collision." (Rollo, p. 95). Said court also noted that "the record of due case, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to
also discloses that the bus driver was not a competent and responsible
driver. His driver's license was confiscated for a traffic violation on April
17, 1983 and he was using a ticket for said traffic violation on the day of
the accident in question (pp. 16-18, TSN, July 23, 1984). He also admitted
Appellate Court, et al. (G.R. Nos. 66102-04, August 30, 1990), the Court
that he was not a regular driver of the bus that figured in the mishap and
citing the landmark decision held in the case of Anuran, et al. v. Buno, et
was not given any practical examination. (pp. 11, 96, TSN, supra). (Rollo,
al. (123 Phil. 1073) ruled that the principle of last clear chance" applies "in
p. 96)
a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not
arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce
August 28, 1975 held that "We are not prepared to uphold the trial court's
negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other
finding that the truck was running fast before the impact. The national
road, from its direction, was descending. Courts can take judicial notice of
the fact that a motor vehicle going down or descending is more liable to get
out of control than one that is going up or ascending for the simple reason
into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them
that the one which is going down gains added momentum while that which
should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the
On the other hand, the trial court found and We are convinced that the
pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could have
cargo truck was running fast. It did not overlook the fact that the road was
fact that there is a passenger bus approaching it. In holding that the driver
between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the
of the cargo truck was negligent, the trial court certainly took into account
owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs
all these factors so it was incorrect for the respondent court to disturb the
factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to decide the
Torts 5
SO ORDERED.
81 | P a g e
Torts 5
DECISION
Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. Bascos and Fe O. Ico for
herself and for her minor children, filed separate actions for damages
arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO, respectively docketed as
Civil Case No. 561-R and 589-R of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
In its answer, PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Ico's
alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the accident, invoked the
CORTES, J.:
05494-95 which affirmed the decisions of the then Court of First Instance of PANTRANCO awarding the total amount of Two Million Three Hundred
Rosales, Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 561-R and Civil Case No. 589-R
damages, plus 10% thereof as attorney's fees and costs to Maricar Baesa
in Civil Case No. 561-R, and the total amount of Six Hundred Fifty Two
Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Two Pesos (P652,672.00) as damages,
plus 10% thereof as attorneys fees and costs to Fe Ico and her children in
Civil Case No. 589-R. On appeal, the cases were consolidated and the
At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of June 12, 1981, the spouses Ceasar
and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim, Marcelino and Maricar,
PANTRANCO to pay the total amount of One Million One Hundred Eighty-
together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and
The group, numbering fifteen (15) persons, rode in the passenger jeepney
driven by David Ico, who was also the registered owner thereof. From
Ilagan, Isabela, they proceeded to Barrio Capayacan to deliver some
viands to one Mrs. Bascos and thenceforth to San Felipe, taking the
highway going to Malalam River. Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney
turned right and proceeded to Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph.
I. The plaintiff in Civil Case No. 561-R, Maricar Bascos Baesa, the
following damages:
A)
on the jeepney's lane while negotiating a curve, and collided wit it.
As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn
B)
Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while the
C)
From that time on up to the present, Ramirez has never been seen and
P30,000.00;
respondents settled the case amicably under the "No Fault" insurance
coverage of PANTRANCO.
E)
Torts 5
F)
G)
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior
- P3,727.00
or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance
to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the
H)
I)
II. The plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 589-R, the following damages:
A)
B)
C)
As moral damages for the death of David Ico and the injury of Fe Ico -
intervenes between the accident and the more remote negligence of the
plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith,
supra.]
P30,000.00;
D)
E)
F)
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of
making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to
defeat claim for damages.
original negligence of its driver was not the proximate cause of the accident
and that the sole proximate cause was the supervening negligence of the
jeepney driver David Ico in failing to avoid the accident. It is petitioner's
All the foregoing amounts herein awarded except the costs shall earn
position that even assuming arguendo, that the bus encroached into the
interest at the legal rate from date of this decision until fully paid. [CA
lane of the jeepney, the driver of the latter could have swerved the jeepney
towards the spacious dirt shoulder on his right without danger to himself or
his passengers.
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for not applying the doctrine of the
to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with
"last clear chance" against the jeepney driver. Petitioner claims that under
exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to
the circumstances of the case, it was the driver of the passenger jeepney
avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the
who had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore
existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the
negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then
jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a
distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not
immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he
The doctrine of the last clear chance was defined by this Court in the case
must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane
of Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in this wise:
upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. As held
by this Court in the case of Vda. De Bonifacio v. BLTB, G.R. No. L-26810,
The doctrine of the last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a
approaching vehicle coming towards him on the wrong side, will return to
83 | P a g e
Torts 5
his proper lane of traffic. There was nothing to indicate to David Ico that
jeepney coming from the opposite direction was the sole and proximate
the bus could not return to its own lane or was prevented from returning to
cause of the accident without which the collision would not have occurred.
the proper lane by anything beyond the control of its driver. Leo Marantan,
an alternate driver of the Pantranco bus who was seated beside the driver
jeepney driver which would have made the prior negligence of petitioner's
Ramirez at the time of the accident, testified that Ramirez had no choice
but to swerve the steering wheel to the left and encroach on the jeepney's
lane because there was a steep precipice on the right [CA Decision, p. 2;
II
Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the
Petitioner adduced evidence to show that in hiring its drivers, the latter are
time of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila [CA
Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 45.] By the time David Ico must have realized that
the bus was not returning to its own lane, it was already too late to swerve
the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. The speed at which the
approaching bus was running prevented David Ico from swerving the
jeepney to the right shoulder of the road in time to avoid the collision.
and safety seminars for its drivers, conductors, inspectors and supervisors
Thus, even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few
seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. This
Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where
On this point, the Court quotes with approval the following findings of the
the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot trial court which was adopted by the Court of Appeals in its challenged
be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or
decision:
arises a presumption that the employer has been negligent either in the
Section 43 (c), Article III Chapter IV of Republic Act No. 4136* which
intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching in either
this case. The cited law itself provides that it applies only to vehicles
accident, the jeepney had already crossed the intersection and was on its
is also no proof as to his educational attainment, his age, his weight and
way to Malalam River. Petitioner itself cited Fe Ico's testimony that the
the fact that he is married or not. Neither are the result of the written test,
accident occurred after the jeepney had travelled a distance of about two
psychological and physical test, among other tests, have been submitted in
(2) meters from the point of intersection [Petition p. 10; Rollo, p. 27.] In fact, evidence [sic]. His NBI or police clearances and clearances from previous
even the witness for the petitioner, Leo Marantan, testified that both
that Ramirez actually and really attended the seminars. Vital evidence
50], clearly indicating that the jeepney had already crossed the
intersection.
petitioner's driver in encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney and
classmate in said seminar (should have been presented) [CA Decision, pp.
in failing to return the bus to its own lane immediately upon seeing the
84 | P a g e
Torts 5
Petitioner contends that the fact that Ambrosio Ramirez was employed and
remained as its driver only means that he underwent the same rigid
loss of earning capacity of the deceased victims, the absence thereof does
David Ico and the spouses Baesa, respectively, are sufficient to establish a
basis from which the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the
damages for the loss of earning capacity of the three deceased victims.
The finding of negligence on the part of its driver Ambrosio Ramirez gave
In the instant case, David Ico was thirty eight (38) years old at the time of
its employees but also in adequately supervising their work rests with the
his death in 1981 and was driving his own passenger jeepney. The
spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa were both thirty (30) years old at the
Bacani, G.R. No. L-40570, June 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 623.] Contrary to
time of their death. Ceasar Baesa was a commerce degree holder and the
nurse in 1976 and at the time of her death, was the company nurse,
safety, without showing that they are being complied with, are not sufficient
Isabela. Respondent court duly considered these factors, together with the
amount of damages for the loss of earning capacity of David Ico and the
spouses Baesa.
Hence, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the finding of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by the
error in fixing the compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim
III
Marcelino Baesa." [CA Decision, p.14; Rollo, 57.] In other words, the Court
of Appeals awarded only Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as
indemnity for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and another Fifteen Thousand
erred in fixing the damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased Pesos (P15,000.00) for the death of Marcelino Baesa. This is clearly
victims. Petitioner assails respondent court's findings because no
December 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 518, the indemnity for the death of a
rolls, pay slips or invoices obtained in the usual course of business, were
presented [Petition, p. 22; Rollo, p. 39.] Petitioner argues that the "bare
and self?serving testimonies of the wife of the deceased David Ico and the
(P60,000.00) as indemnity for the death of her brothers, Harold Jim Baesa
and Marcelino Baesa or Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for the death
of each brother.
The other items of damages awarded by respondent court which were not
fixing the amount of damages for the loss of earning capacity of the
Torts 5
Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa are increased to Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) each.
SO ORDERED.
86 | P a g e
Torts 5
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision[1] dated May 31,
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. 36223. The RTC
imprudence, thus:
(a) suffer imprisonment for one month and one day of arresto mayor, (b)
pay private complainant, Mrs. Sheila Seyan, the amount of fifty one
thousand pesos (P51,000) for the total destruction of the Toyota Tamaraw
with Plate No. SAR 117 owned by the Land Bank of the Philippines, did
jeepney, and one hundred ten thousand pesos (P110,000) for her hospital
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and with reckless imprudence drive said
and medical expenses, and (c) pay the costs of suit. The CA increased the
traffic laws and regulations, and as a result of such negligent and reckless
driving the Isuzu Pick-up driven by the accused bumped a Toyota
Tamaraw jeep with Plate No. FBF 601 owned by Joelito and Sheila Seyan
and driven by Edwin Iran thereby causing damage to the Toyota Tamaraw
On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Edwin Iran was
driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. On board
Seyan who was riding said vehicle, the injuries barring complications will
was Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw. While traversing
the road along Barangay Acquit, Barotac Nuevo, the Tamaraw passengers
allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
After trial, the court rendered on August 25, 1994 a decision, disposing as
gradient on the highway. When it was just a few meters away from the
follows:
Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-up's right signal light flashed, at the same time, it
swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed
towards a head-on collision course with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid
the pick-up. Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. with Article 365, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
Thus, the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right
front passenger side. The impact caused the head and chassis of the
Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out of the
Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. The pick-up stopped diagonally astride
Seyan and Iran were brought to Barotac Nuevo Medicare Hospital. [3] Seyan expenses, and to pay the cost of the suit.
was profusely bleeding from her nose and was in a state of shock with her
eyes closed. In the afternoon of the same day, November 29, 1989, she
SO ORDERED.[8]
was transferred to St. Paul's Hospital in Iloilo City where she was confined.
Her medical certificate revealed that she suffered a fracture on the right
dismissed the appeal and affirmed with modification the trial court's
decision, thus:
blunt abdominal injury, and lacerations of the upper-lower pole of the right
kidney.
[4]
She was discharged from the hospital only on January 15, 1990.
Torts 5
[9]
SO ORDERED.
emergency rule petitioner cannot shift the blame to Iran, concludes the
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, the
OSG.
As to petitioner's claim that there was no evidence showing that the pick-up
was running very fast, the OSG avers that this is rebutted by the testimony
of Seyan and Iran who both testified that petitioner drove the pick-up at a
collision.
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the action of petitioner, Rogelio
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. According to him,
Engada, was the proximate cause of the collision? This is the crux of the
the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts, and erred in its conclusion
present petition.
In our view, petitioner's attempt to pin the blame on Edwin Iran, the driver
Tamaraw jeepney, and then failing to return to his original lane at the
the left only to avoid petitioner's pick-up, which was already on a head to
head position going against Iran's Tamaraw jeepney immediately before
the vehicles collided. This fact has been established by the evidence on
relayed his intention to go back to his lane by flashing the pick-up's right
record. No convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that the driver of the
signal light. He submits that at that moment Iran, the driver of the
Tamaraw, had no more reason to swerve to his left. Had Iran not swerved
to the left, according to petitioner, the collision would have been avoided. It
We note that petitioner admitted his Isuzu pick-up intruded into the lane of
was Iran who was clearly negligent, says petitioner. Citing our ruling in
McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[11] petitioner avers that although his who went to the scene of the incident immediately, testified that when he
act of occupying the Tamaraw's lane was the initial act in the chain of
arrived at the place where the collision took place, he saw the pick-up
events, Iran's swerving to the left after petitioner flashed his right turn
positioned diagonally at the center of the road.[12] Its head was towards the
direction of Barotac Nuevo and the rear tires were just a few inches beyond
the center of the lane.[13] Moving backwards facing Barotac Nuevo, at two
arms length away from the pick-up, Alobin also saw a tire mark, 12 inches
Petitioner also claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the long and located at the left side of the center line going to the right side. [14]
pick-up approached the Tamaraw at a fast speed. He maintains that this
was not borne by the evidence on record.
The Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the state, counters that
lane but on the other lane (the left lane rather than the right) directly on
the Court of Appeals did not err in convicting the accused, now petitioner
collision course with the Tamaraw jeepney. The tire mark reveals the short
distance between the two vehicles when the Isuzu pick-up attempted to
according to the OSG, for the following reasons: First, petitioner for no
justifiable reason occupied the opposite lane. Second, while on the wrong
lane, petitioner was driving the Isuzu pick-up fast, and he returned to his
It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose
own lane only at the last minute. This left Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw,
with no opportunity to reflect on the safest way to avoid the accident. Iran's
swerving to the left was his reaction to petitioner's wrongful act, which
safety.[15] This rule is consistent with Section 41, paragraph (a) of R.A.
appropriately calls for the application of the emergency rule. The rationale
might have no time for thought, and he must make a prompt decision
88 | P a g e
Torts 5
approached the Tamaraw, denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder the
vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in
situation at all. There was no clear chance to speak of. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals did not err in holding petitioner responsible for the
unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a
suffered by Mrs. Sheila Seyan and the total loss of the Tamaraw jeepney.
in safety.
It also did not err in imposing on petitioner the sentence of four (4) months
In the present case, there was only a distance of 30 meters from the
of arresto mayor.[20]
Tamaraw jeepney when the Isuzu pick-up abandoned its lane and swerved
to the left of the center line.[16] In addition, petitioner was running at a fast
clip while traversing this lane. This was testified to by Seyan and Iran,
at the point where the head and chassis were separated from the body,
bolsters this conclusion that petitioner was speeding. In our view, petitioner
SO ORDERED.
was negligent in several ways, and his negligence was the proximate
cause of the collision. In abandoning his lane, he did not see to it first that
the opposite lane was free of oncoming traffic and was available for a safe
passage. Further, after seeing the Tamaraw jeepney ahead, petitioner did
not slow down, contrary to the rule set in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Co. v. IAC,[17] thus:
...[O]r if, after attempting to pass, the driver of the overtaking vehicle finds
that he cannot make the passage in safety, the latter must slacken his
speed so as to avoid the danger of a collision, even bringing his car to a
stop if necessary.
For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of
vehicles abandoning their lane, petitioner must be held liable.
Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he
swerved to his left. Petitioner's acts had put Iran in an emergency situation
which forced him to act quickly. An individual who suddenly finds himself in
a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was
brought by his own negligence.[18]
The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last
clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for
the consequences of the accident.[19] But as already stated on this point, no
convincing evidence was adduced by petitioner to support his invocation of
the abovecited doctrine. Instead, what has been shown is the presence of
an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule.
Petitioner's act of swerving to the Tamaraw's lane at a distance of 30
meters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it
89 | P a g e
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SYLLABUS
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and
Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke
up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be
sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of January,
1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but
the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats
against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best
friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmea
Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single
gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson
revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was
recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private
respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of
the same city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances
surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who are the
contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from
their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents
and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted
that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm
and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other
hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their
son, rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third party,
whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work
as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU),
must have caused Wendells death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate
any witness and thereby avoid identification.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R17774 in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents of
Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters vicarious liability
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court below rendered
judgment on October 20, 1980 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is
sometimes a touchstone of love. A tragic illustration is provided by the
instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of their years, a
bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched. While we cannot
expect to award complete assuagement to their families through seemingly
prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should at least terminate the
acrimony and rancor of an extended judicial contest resulting from the
unfortunate occurrence.
In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were
alternately initiated by the parties, petitioners are now before us seeking
the reversal of the judgment of respondent court promulgated on January
2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the following decretal
portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiffs
complaint is hereby reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby rendered
sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the
following amounts:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;
Torts 5
Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiongs in relation to your house?
As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at the
scene of the crime, each of which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann
Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the
Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, 9 shows that
there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at the right temple of
Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna
states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A It is about 8 feet.
"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion collar
widest inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented upward, located at the
head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. behind and 5.5 cms. above right
external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward, upward and to the left,
involving skin and soft tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the temporal
bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating extensively along its
course the brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making an
EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left,
2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left external auditory
meatus.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
x
Torts 5
it was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" of
a man at the gate of the Gotiong house.
We have perforce to reject petitioners effete and unsubstantiated
pretension that it was another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is
significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any suspect
in the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe." Nor
can we sustain the trial courts dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die
by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence testimonial,
documentary and pictorial the confluence of which point to Wendell as
the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his
persistent pleas for a reconciliation.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Petitioners defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime
committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence on record
either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband,
Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a
drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety
deposit box and Amelitas key is always in her bag, all of which facts were
known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using
the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no
longer in the safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but entertain
serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the
diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away.
Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the
safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access
to the bag of his mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and
child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as
parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his
minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of
Wendells death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent
and that Cresencios gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both
parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring
and knowing the activities of their children who, for all they know, may be
engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers, 17 or even drug
users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of
Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18
holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he
was in possession of that firearm.
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners
civilly liable, as explained at the start of this opinion, respondent court
waved aside the protestations of diligence on the part of petitioners and
had this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers obligations which
arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for
the damages caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the
damage is caused with criminal intent. (3 SCRA 361-362).
". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell
Libi somehow got hold of the key to the drawer where said gun was kept
under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing that said gun had
been missing from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi had) a
picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and dedicated this
picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi
was said to have kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed
role of a CANU agent . . ." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
x
Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the
parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary,
and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering
". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who
previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative
may be engaged in this dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs.
analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the
Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of
parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then
their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the
prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:chanrob1es
prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents
virtual 1aw library
is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and
substantial defense.
The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor
their company.
children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and
not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having
for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act
access to said gun which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box,
or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death
defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the natural consequence of of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental
the criminal act of said minor who was living in their company. This
liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article
vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has been reiterated by the 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
Supreme Court in many cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas v. when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages."cralaw virtua1aw
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
library
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor
children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations
arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies
committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
The subsidiary liability of parents arising from the criminal acts of their
minor children who acted with discernment is determined under the
92 | P a g e
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First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for
acts committed by . . . a person under nine years of age, or by one over
nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment,
shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or
control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their
part." (Emphasis supplied.) 21
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the
foregoing provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by
their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the
defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of
the diligence of a good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for
such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes
that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his
own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former.
Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil
Code states that" (i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or
guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property in an
action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil
liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third
paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority,
legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said . . . minor
shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from
execution, in accordance with civil law."cralaw virtua1aw library
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children
contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from the aforecited
case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number of cases adjudicated by this
Court, viz.: Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta v. Arreglado, 23 Salen,
Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano,
et al, v. Hill, Et. Al. 26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically
on the issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their
minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with
discernment, and also of minors 15 years of aye or over, since these
situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both
instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability should be
resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
for the reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases
hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under Article
2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would
result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents
would be liable but not where the damage is caused with criminal intent. In
said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances resulting in a
regrettable inconsistency in the Courts determination of whether the
liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of
their minor children, is primary or subsidiary.
of intent, coupled with mistake," it was ruled that while under Article 2180
of the Civil Code there should be solidary liability for damages, since the
son, "although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence
from him at the time of the occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of
equity" the father was only held subsidiarily liable.
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for
subsidiary liability only for persons causing damages under the compulsion
of irresistible force or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear; 27
innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments; 28
employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in industry; 29
and principals, accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of
their co-accused in the other classes. 30
Also, coming back to respondent courts reliance on Fuellas in its decision
in the present case, it is not exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided
for subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A careful scrutiny shows that
what respondent court quoted verbatim in its decision now on appeal in the
present case, and which it attributed to Fuellas, was the syllabus on the
law report of said case which spoke of "subsidiary" liability. However, such
categorization does not specifically appear in the text of the decision in
Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta and
Salen and the discussions in said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this Court concluded its
decision in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the
basis of evidence submitted therein by both parties, independent of the
criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176
upon which the present action was instituted, is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence under the
Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as
heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minors criminal responsibility is
of no moment."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the
parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising
from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal
authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that
the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto
caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15
years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their
children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or
15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be
imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected
against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This
was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that
the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the
guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or
family friend of the youthful offender. 32 However, under the Family Code,
this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over
through reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action arising from the
the minor offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed
crime the minor and his father were held jointly and severally liable for
by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and
failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a good father of a family. The
2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability was imposed in a
separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was
who was found guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article
caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent
2194 of the Civil Code providing for solidary responsibility of two or more
court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom.
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict.
Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it
therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein explained, we
However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the
arising from the conviction of his son, who was over 15 but less than 18
requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.
years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this time, disregarding Article
2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as already explained, the
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment
petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly in line with Fuellas
of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
which purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil
petitioners.
liability for serious physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On
the other hand, in Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son were
SO ORDERED.
adjudged solidarily liable for damages arising from his conviction for
homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since this is
likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in
Elcano, although the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to "lack
93 | P a g e
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DECISION
motions were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On
28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June
FELICIANO, J.:
1988, the trial court dismissed the notice of appeal, this time ruling that the
notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22
December 1987.
shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in
her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case
certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision dated 3 December 1987 and
the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for
Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or not
exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without
petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the
discernment.
instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take cognizance of
the case even though petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; and (2)
Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in
Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted on 18 November 1982,
adopted child, for acts committed by the latter when actual custody was yet
reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not
reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having complied with the
they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and
requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the
Revised Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and hence did not
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court
held that the motions, not having contained a notice of time and place of
hearing, had become useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt the
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then
actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased
nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for
adoption.
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant Petition,
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling
and in order that substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its
Appeals:[3]
94 | P a g e
Torts 5
the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without
The rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid technical sense,
rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override, substantial
justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim
limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has
would be defeated.
[4]
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-
failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise
due care in the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the
control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.[7]
(Underscoring supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children
living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in
vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious act,
caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code
the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural
reads:
duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.
Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle
xxx xxx
xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person
spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor
under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts
committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he
parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that is, before
Adelberto had shot Jennifer with ad air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend
that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's
[5]
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. The basis for the
doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v.
Article 36. Decree of Adoption. -- If, after considering the report of the
our Legislature has so elected -- to limit such liability to cases in which the
the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is
person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody
95 | P a g e
Torts 5
period has been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be
petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some
shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed. The decree
the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act
(Underscoring supplied)
that they could not have forseen and which they could not have prevented
(since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be
xxx
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto
xxx
xxx
was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the
adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
xxx
xxx
x x x"
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion
reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:
(Underscoring supplied)
Art. 35. Trial Custody. - No petition for adoption shall be finally granted
and urge that their parental authority must be deemed to have been
dissolved as of the time the petition for adoption was filed.
unless and until the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised
trial custody period of at least six months to assess their adjustment and
emotional readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial custody,
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the
basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship
supplied)
existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over
whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the
Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance
of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given
Article 58 Torts -- Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage
actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the
caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the
trial custody period either had not yet begun or had already been
completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody
of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.
[9]
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines has similarly insisted
upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in
the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing
natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought
damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions
jurisdiction.
(Underscoring supplied)
GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is hereby
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
SO ORDERED.
Torts 5
The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the incident, as
QUIBULUE, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
DECISION
With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian of the Manila Police
TEEHANKEE, J.:
traumatic fracture of the ribs (6th and 7th, left),[2] contusion of the pancreas
the deceased were caused 'probably by strong fist blows", the trial court
found defendant Daffon liable for the quasidelict under Article 2176 of the
Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on May 19, 1966, the action
Civil Code.[3] It held that "(T)he act, therefore, of the accused Daffon in
below for damages arising from the death on March 10, 1966 of their son
giving the deceased strong fist blows in the stomach which ruptured his
internal organs and caused his death falls within the purview of this article
of the Code."[4]
Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "(T)he defendant Antonio C.
The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-
Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave rise to this action
[1]
"x x x Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the
'Art. 2180. x x x x
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so
the trial court: "(T)he deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant
In the opinion of the Court, this article of the Code is not applicable to the
case at bar, since this contemplates the situation where the control or
ground floor. At that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and
merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc
was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly
Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow
The clause 'so long as they remain in their custody' contained in Article
on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach.
2180 of the new civil code contemplated a situation where the pupil lives
Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and boards with the teacher, such that the control or influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents. In those circumstances the control or
and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block
which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and
influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil as well as the
fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he
responsibilities for their sort would pass from the father and mother to the
97 | P a g e
Torts 5
"There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his
for the physical injury inflicted by his son on a classmate. [A cut on the
right cheek with a piece of razor which cost only P50.00 by way of medical
cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon."
expenses to treat and cure, since the wound left no scar.] The moral
damages award was after all set aside by the Court on the ground that
none of the specific cases provided in Article 2279, Civil Code, for
awarding moral damages had been established, petitioner's son being only
"1. Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the plaintiffs as heirs
nine years old and not having been shown to have "acted with
case of Exconde vs. Capuno,[8] where the only issue involved as expressly
years, and in good health when he died, and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's
stated in the decision, was whether the therein defendant father could be
held civilly liable for damages resulting from a death caused in a motor
Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal question that under the factual
findings of the trial court, which are now beyond review, the trial court erred
in absolving the defendants-school officials instead of holding them jointly
and severally liable as tortfeasors, with defendant Daffon, for the damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody',
but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to
any academic educational institution. " was expressly cited and quoted in
Mercado.
awarded them as a result of their son's death. The Court finds the appeal,
in the main, to be meritorious.
2. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and
squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under
Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by their pupils and students
against fellow students on the school premises. Here, the parents of the
student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was
already of age at the time of the tragic incident. There is no question,
either, that the school involved is a non-academic school,[9] the Manila
Technical Institute being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial
school.
The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and
teacher of the Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and
The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum
in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals,[7] that "(I)t would seem that the clause 'so
long as they remain in their custody,' contemplates a situation where the
pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil
would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the
responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in
the case at bar: the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and
go back to their homes with their parents after school is over." This dictum
had been made in rejecting therein petitioner-father's contention that his
minor son's school, Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon, Quezon City
[which was not a party to the case] should be held responsible, rather than
him as father, for the moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged against him
98 | P a g e
Torts 5
[10]
3. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the
have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of
tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their
school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands
of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable
[11]
[12]
unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last
paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all
governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and
the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to
proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they
are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take
set by the Court in People vs. Pantoja,[15] and observed in all death
indemnity cases thereafter is well taken. The Court, in Pantoja, after noting
the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, had expressed
its "considered opinion that the amount of award of compensatory
1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc.
[13]
and
per Article 2206, Civil Code, from the old stated minimum of P3,000.00 to
'where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the
teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for
the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the
codal article.
parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with
the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under
instruction." The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or
negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited article.
have awarded exemplary damages and imposed legal interest on the total
[14]
the Court has not been shown any error or abuse in the exercise of such
officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180,
discretion on the part of the trial court.[16] Decisive here is the touchstone
Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fist blows on his
classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in the
No gross negligence on the part of defendants was found by the trial court
cited article -- "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the to warrant the imposition of exemplary damages, as well as of interest and
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
increased attorney's fees, and the Court has not been shown in this appeal
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law
that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously
as follows:
held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde)
on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the pre-
sent decision.
of the school must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the
P5,000.00 for moral damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power
99 | P a g e
Torts 5
and (e) P 2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action in both
instances; 2. absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint;
and 3. dismissing defendants' counterclaims.
100 | P a g e
Torts 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-
Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot to death
DECISION
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the
petitioners consider important because of an earlier incident which they
CRUZ, J.:
claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the
private respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7,
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose
commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the
presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma.
report to the principal or taking any further action.[6] As Gumban was one of
the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo,
though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On
the petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been
April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the
confiscated from Gumban and that their son would not have been killed if it
had not been returned by Damaso. The respondents say, however, that
that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
victim was only seventeen years old.[1]
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. [2] Additionally,
the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for
their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this article reads as follows:
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and
the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through
their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the
dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining
[3]
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under
a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned turtle,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180
resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante was found guilty of
was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the separate civil action filed
of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that
against them, his father was held solidarily liable with him in damages
the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the
under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for the tort
incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear
identification of the fatal gun, and that in any event the defendants had
exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury.[5]
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29,
1957, exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the
101 | P a g e
Torts 5
case) on the ground that it was not a school of arts and trades. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes
concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school authorities who should
be held liable. Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed on (1)
been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180;
and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning. The parties herein have also directly raised the
student cut a classmate with a razor blade during recess time at the
Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the parents of the victim sued are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the
the culprit's parents for damages. Through Justice Labrador, the Court
declared in another obiter (as the school itself had also not been sued) that
the school was not liable because it was not ar establishment of arts and
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
trades. Moreover, the custody requirement had not been proved as this
"contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and influences on the pupil
supersede those of the parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but
by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following
the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who
shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words,
teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except
was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the Manila
where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof
Technical Institute. Although the wrongdoer - who was already of age - was who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
not boarding in the school, the head thereof and the teacher in charge
singulis, "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and
were held solidarily liable with him. The Court declared through Justice
Teehankee:
"The phrase used in the cited article -'so long as (the students) remain in
their custody' - means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students
"I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code to
for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time.
teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial
There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach, the
pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the
school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado
that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so
long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over the
[10]
including Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion, that even
arts and trades' used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words 'arts and
students already of age were covered by the provision since they were
trades' does not qualify 'teachers' but only 'heads of establishments.' The
equally in the custody of the school and subject to its discipline. Dissenting
[11]
interpretation in Mercado and submitted that the rule should apply only to
torts committed by students not yet of age as the school would be acting
authority, it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under
dissent in the Exconde Case but added that "since the school involved at
the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should
be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for
102 | P a g e
Torts 5
the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the
duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the
discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher students. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a
while the child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not
no responsibility."
be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of
arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the
Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even the head of the
personal contact of their heads with the students. Article 2180, however,
school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its
by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the
liability would attach to the teacher or the school head. All other
circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head of the academic
school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the nonacademic school would be held liable, and simply because the latter is a
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is
such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is
exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of their
respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible reason for
relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature and From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while the
for increasing such vigilance where the school is non-academic. Notably,
custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not mean that the
the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the school
student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the
itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The
student should be within the control and under the influence of the school
authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury. This does not
beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and
school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the
excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of
registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in the
influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has
why is it only the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury
is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic
or non-technical school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the
school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before that day
he has already registered and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the
should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of classes
head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his
pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and
clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to
who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets
of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such a master
and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who
usually even boarded with him and so came under his constant control,
was not as involved with his students and exercised only administrative
Torts 5
Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in
the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the
activism among the students that is likely to cause violence and resulting
ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and
Article 2180.
the school that will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due
diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be held answerable as
principal for the acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its employ.
answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way that the parents
are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the
head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the
custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations
sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of
for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases now, in
the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it.
Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers
security force to help the teacher physically enforce those rules upon the
more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him
students. This should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken
as a result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student,
the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was
students.
committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority
could be validly exercised over him.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise
be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage caused by his
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is
students as long as they are in the school premises and presumably under
supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts
his influence. In this respect, the Court is disposed not to expect from the
and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its
teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for their
nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the
influence over the child is not equal in degree. Obviously, the parent can
head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it
expect more obedience from the child because the latter's dependence on
may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the
him is greater than on the teacher. It need not be stressed that such
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by
to pass the course. The parent can instill more lasting discipline on the
the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the
exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, which also
states that:
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or
"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
the head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for the damage
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
therefore less tractable than the minor - then there should all the more be
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable
not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that
long as they can prove reasonable diligence in preventing the injury. After
the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who will be
all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for the student's acts because he
liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the
has reached majority age and so is no longer under the former's control,
law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student's age.
there is then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's
Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the teacher and the head of
the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this
sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.
Torts 5
1.
5.
2.
custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in
the light of the principles herein announced that none of the respondents is
liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Daffon on Alfredo Amadora that
Alfredo's killer.
resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the
3.
petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here
related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they
seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.
costs. It is so ordered.
4.
Torts 5
DECISION
PADILLA , J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the
[2]
indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, (c) P5,000.00
Court), which held, among others, petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B.
as attorneys fees, plus costs; (2) absolving the other defendants; and (3)
dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit.[13] On appeal by
The relevant facts, as found by the Trial Court and adopted by reference by petitioners, the respondent Court affirmed with modification the decision of
the respondent Court, are:
the Trial Court. The modification consisted in reducing the award for loss of
solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges
heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused
[5]
The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its
received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of the
custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and
BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP,[8] as well as orders from
its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as
In the case at bar, in holding that Jimmy B. Abon was still in the protective
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy "it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the
B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an time of the shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening;
unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property
of the BCF.[11] As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was
custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been attending night
classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal
106 | P a g e
Torts 5
time for him or soon thereafter. The time interval is safely within the 'recess
time' that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case,
supra."[16] (Italic supplied)
In line with the case of Palisoc,[17] a student not "at attendance in the
school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is
embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a
situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student
still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the
school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted.
Recess by its nature does not include dismissal.[18] Likewise, the mere fact
of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does
not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory
custody" of the school, as contemplated in the law.
Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident, Roberto B.
Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B. Abon "not
to leave the office and [to keep the armory] well guarded."[19] Apart from
negating a finding that Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of the school
when he committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to be held
liable, this circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be
working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC
Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Petitioners also raise the issue that, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, a
school which offers both academic and technical-vocational courses
cannot be held liable for a tort committed by a student enrolled only in its
academic program; however, considering that Jimmy B. Abon was not in
the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro, the Court deems it
unnecessary to pass upon such other issue.[20]
SO ORDERED.
107 | P a g e
Torts 5
2.
pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages abovestated in the event of insolvency of principal obligor
St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City;
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
3.
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court of
petitioner liable for damages arising from an accident that resulted in the
death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public schools in
Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
4.
The Facts
pp. 205-206).
case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada
Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy
along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep
1.
Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly,
the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep
turned turtle.
a.
b.
accident.[2]
Carpitanos;
In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals.[3]
c.
d.
attorneys fees;
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys Academy filed a motion for
pay costs.
108 | P a g e
Torts 5
the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that
Hence, this appeal.
[6]
1)
2)
cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless
driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the
jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James
death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218[7] and 219[8] of the Family
Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive
and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special
of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a
minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or
custody.[10]
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the
respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that those given
the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor
James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was
Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had
possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he
allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the
accident.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident.[11]
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be
shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence
and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken
by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it
consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of
petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence
of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.[13]
109 | P a g e
Torts 5
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the
decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity
to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of
attorneys fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the rule. [15]
The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification.[16] Thus, the
grant of attorneys fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle
was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this
fact. We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not
used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to
third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being
driven on the highways or streets.[17] Hence, with the overwhelming
evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that
the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the
vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
The Fallo
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
110 | P a g e
Torts 5
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and
Tabugo] alleged that [Jayson] was a grade six pupil of SJC in the school
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision[1] of the
under the guidance and supervision of Tabugo, the class science teacher,
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367, which affirmed in toto the
[2]
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 221, Quezon City, in
elements in a test tube and heating the same. Before the science
experiment was conducted, [Jayson] and his classmates were given strict
instructions to follow the written procedure for the experiment and not to
look into the test tube until the heated compound had cooled off. [Jayson],
however, a person of sufficient age and discretion and completely capable
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph
without waiting for the heated compound to cool off, as required in the
sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of [petitioner] Rosalinda
teacher, violated such instructions and took a magnifying glass and looked
Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee of [petitioner] SJC.
at the compound, which at that moment spurted out of the test tube, a
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having
Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and
middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the assistant leader of one of
hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter cried and apologized to
the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the
his teacher for violating her instructions not to look into the test tube until
test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his
group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that
instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for discharge and an
which hit [Jayson's] eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his
eye test showed that his vision had not been impaired or affected. In order
particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to
spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court,
[Jayson's] wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo
until his wife could arrive from abroad and pay back the money. SJC
another surgery.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances,
[Jayson's] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back home for
wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the medical
which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her salary from expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will be incurred further
November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least
P40,000.00.
dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for SJC, represented by Sr.
Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school cannot accede to the
Then, too, [Jayson] and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental
comply with the written procedure for the experiment and his teacher's
fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence incumbent
repeated warnings and instruction that no student must face, much less
upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral
look into, the opening of the test tube until the heated compound has
cooled.[3]
111 | P a g e
Torts 5
Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jayson's father, on
DAMAGES TO [JAYSON].
of [Jayson] and against [petitioners]. This Court orders and holds the
[petitioners] joint[ly] and solidarily liable to pay [Jayson] the following
amount:
PETITIONERS' COUNTERCLAIM.[6]
We find no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower courts
that petitioners were "negligent since they all failed to exercise the required
when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of
respect and are considered conclusive between the parties.[7] A review of
such findings by this Court is not warranted except for highly meritorious
circumstances when: (1) the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely
[4]
SO ORDERED.
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the
adverted to, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, thus:
appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are
[5]
to the experiment and peeking into the test tube. Petitioners invoke our
Academy from liability for the untimely death of its student during a school
out by the records of this case. Both courts correctly concluded that the
Torts 5
[petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability because it
has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of
its teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring) and in
the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured
In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the negligence of [Jayson] was
the proximate cause of the latter's injury. We find that the immediate cause
still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it
looked into the test tube when the chemicals suddenly exploded which
did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students. The
caused his injury, but the sudden and unexpected explosion of the
fact that there has never been any accident in the past during the conduct
preserving the status quo and do away with creative foresight to install
safety measures to protect the students. Schools should not simply install
safety reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More
"All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are liable for negligence
because all of them are responsible for exercising the required reasonable
and vigilance over their students as well as the supervision and ensuring of
their well-being. Based on the facts presented before this Court, these
that the liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or negligence of its
Tabugo was inside the classroom when the class undertook the science
employee."[10]
was brought to the school clinic for immediate treatment not by [petitioner]
subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody else. The Court is
inclined to believe that [petitioner] subject teacher Tabugo was not inside
instructed her students, including Jayson, at the start of the experiment, not
the classroom at the time the accident happened. The Court is also
to look into the heated test tube before the compound had cooled off.
perplexed why none of the other students (who were eyewitnesses to the
Petitioners would allocate all liability and place all blame for the accident on
Court, however, understands that these other students cannot testify for
[Jayson] because [Jayson] is no longer enrolled in said school and
We disagree.
testifying for [Jayson] would incur the ire of school authorities. Estefania
Abdan is equally at fault as the subject adviser or teacher in charge
As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson's injury was
and the students themselves. It was her obligation to insure that nothing
safely and without any harm or injury to the students. [Petitioner] Sr.
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
direct control and supervision. The negligent acts of the other individual
xxxx
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual,
entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their
113 | P a g e
Torts 5
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
accident.
one is responsible.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
xxxx
petitioner St. Mary's Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence
of the minor's parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.[11]
In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the
mishap which happened during the science experiment was foreseeable by
1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students
Jayson. As we have held in St. Mary's, "for petitioner [St. Mary's Academy]
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class
conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident involving Jayson
cause. The negligence on the part of [petitioner] Tabugo in not making sure
that the science experiment was correctly conducted was the proximate
cause or reason why the heated compound exploded and injured not only
class not to look directly into the heated compound. Neither does our ruling
responsible for his own injury, hence, he should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must likewise bear the consequences of his own
negligence. [Petitioners], therefore, should be held liable only for the
Lastly, given our foregoing ruling, we likewise affirm the lower courts'
recklessness of the minor, James Daniel II, in driving the jeep. We held,
award of actual and moral damages, and grant of attorney's fees. The
thus:
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
petitioners.
114 | P a g e
Torts 5
SO ORDERED.
115 | P a g e
Torts 5
xxx
xxx
xxx
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
functions.
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan appealed on pure
questions of law from the order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
dismissing their complaint against Archimedes J. Balingit.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The dismissal was based on the ground that Balingit as the manager of
"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
The novel and unprecedented legal issue in this appeal is whether the
In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and Pangalangan
article 2180 of the Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the old Code,
that on November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned
We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a
bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and
corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the
could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of
"employer".
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground
that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against
him. As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit.
"ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there politicas, no por eso deja de estar subordinado a la superior autoridad de
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
cited in 12 Manresa, Codigo Civil Espaol, 5th Ed. 662; 1913 Enciclopedia
Chapter.
The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief, injected a new
"ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
factual issue which was not alleged in their complaint. They argue that
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit and
116 | P a g e
Torts 5
his wife had subscribed P40,000 and they paid P10,000 on their
subscription, while the other incorporators, namely, Rodolfo Limjuco,
Ponciano Caparas and Rafael Suntay paid P250.25 and P25, respectively.
That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced
and that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should be
treated as one and the same civil personality.
The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants can ventilate in this appeal,
is one which was raised in the lower court and which is within the issues
framed by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule 46, Rules of Court).
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided
upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his
theory on appeal because, to permit him to do so, would be unfair to the
adverse party (2 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. p.
505).
SO ORDERED.
117 | P a g e
Torts 5
DECISION
litigation.[2]
In its decision[3] of 21 May 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of
vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a
the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability
of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former. It reduced
the award of damages representing loss of earning capacity from
as follows:
bills, from 3% per month to 12% per annum from 5 September 1988 until
fully paid.
a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only
modified its decision by (1) reducing the award of moral damages from
carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand,
deleting the award of attorneys fees for lack of evidence; and (c) reducing
Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no.
GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car
out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmea rotunda he
made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route
Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition contending that the Court of
Appeals erred in (1) applying to the case the fifth paragraph of Article 2180
of the Civil Code, instead of the fourth paragraph thereof; (2) that as a
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided
with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his
within the scope of his assigned task even outside office hours because he
vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to
was using a vehicle issued to him by petitioner; and (3) ruling that
petitioner had the burden to prove that the employee was not acting within
the scope of his assigned task.
which holds fast on the theory of negligence on the part of the deceased.
a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently
driving a vehicle issued by petitioner and who was on his way home from
dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action for damages was
overtime work for petitioner; and that petitioner is thus liable for the
resulting injury and subsequent death of their son on the basis of the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the fourth paragraph of Article 2180 were
Romeo So Vasquez.
[1]
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa
damages when the award made by the trial court was borne both by
evidence adduced during the trial regarding deceaseds wages and by
Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD) and petitioner jurisprudence on life expectancy. Moreover, they point out that the petition
Castilex Industrial Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX) to pay jointly and
explanation for serving the petition upon the Court of Appeals by registered
118 | P a g e
Torts 5
mail, as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure;
and (2) lack of a statement of the dates of the expiration of the original
reglementary period and of the filing of the motion for extension of time to
For its part, respondent Cebu Doctors Hospital maintains that petitioner
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
death of Romeo Vasquez caused by ABAD, who was on his way home
from taking snacks after doing overtime work for petitioner. Although the
incident occurred when ABAD was not working anymore "the inescapable
fact remains that said employee would not have been situated at such time
and place had he not been required by petitioner to do overtime work."
"even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry"
cannot, as the latters employer, inveigle itself from the ambit of liability,
and is thus estopped by the records of the case, which it failed to refute.
holds no water.
the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done
negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task.
the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may
within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in
The explanation why service of a copy of the petition upon the Court of
the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For,
functions which are beyond their office, title or designation but which,
nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.
This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was
to be stated in the petition are the following: (1) the date of receipt of the
judgment or final order or resolution subject of the petition; (2) the date of
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any; and (3) the date of
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any
expiration of the original reglementary period and the filing of a motion for
extension of time to file the petition. At any rate, aside from the material
stated in the first page of the petition the date it filed the motion for
plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of
was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to
Torts 5
the employee.[8]
had the occasion to hold that acts done within the scope of the employees
assigned tasks includes "any act done by an employee in furtherance of
the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time
within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which the court a
quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the
driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of
the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality at
times. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as when the
We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at
the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner
exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the
with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears
finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners
that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his
employment.
Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts
within the range of his employment, we shall first take up the other reason
liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use
liable for ABADs negligence, i.e., that the petitioner did not present
evidence that ABAD was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks
at the time of the motor vehicle mishap. Contrary to the ruling of the Court
of Appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the same. It
It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in
was enough for petitioner CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within
the scope of his duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove this
work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his
negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove). The Court has consistently
applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of
more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an
which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his
employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the
exception or defense.
[10]
vehicle.[13]
established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks.
In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of
the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had
the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at
some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime
the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope
of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle. [14]
No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the
benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as
when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and,
employees action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state
of facts.
[11]
[12]
this Court
work, the courts have frequently applied what has been called the "special
120 | P a g e
Torts 5
errand" or "roving commission" rule, under which it can be found that the
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was
carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he
1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABADs working day had
the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the
ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a
accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home
place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes,
using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe
benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters
personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope
assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well
ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner
Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has
been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where
the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his
employment, and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent
[15]
SO ORDERED.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at
the petitioners office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City.
Thereafter, he went to Goldies Restaurant in Fuente Osmea, Cebu City,
which is about seven kilometers away from petitioners place of
business.[17] A witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor,
testified that Fuente Osmea is a "lively place" even at dawn because
Goldies Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were
drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the
place.[18]
At the Goldies Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with
friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in
question occurred. That same witness for the private respondents testified
that at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman in his
car, who then shouted: "Daddy, Daddy!"[19] This woman could not have
been ABADs daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years old at the time.
121 | P a g e
Torts 5
SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, PETITIONERS, days after the accident.[10]
VS. RODRIGO APOSTOL, FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN,
MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF KORONADAL
Marvin, filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against respondents.[11]
In their complaint, they prayed that all respondents be held solidarily liable
for their loss. They pointed out that that proximate cause of Marvin's death
was Lozano's negligent and reckless operation of the vehicle. They prayed
RESPONDENTS.
for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation
expenses.
DECISION
In their respective Answers, all respondents denied liability for Marvin's
REYES, R.T., J.:
death. Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up truck
without their consent. Likewise, Miguel and Lozano pointed out that
MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the
driver assigned to him, which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian?
Marvin's sudden sprint across the highway made it impossible to avoid the
accident. Yet, Miguel denied being on board the vehicle when it hit Marvin.
The Municipality of Koronadal adopted the answer of Lozano and Miguel.
As for First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc., the vehicle
insurer, it insisted that its liability is contributory and is only conditioned on
the right of the insured. Since the insured did not file a claim within the
prescribed period, any cause of action against it had prescribed.
Mayor Miguel from any liability since it was not he, but the Municipality of
Koronadal, that was the employer of the negligent driver.
The Facts
RTC Disposition
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then
1.
was airlifted to the Ricardo Limso Medical Center in Davao City for more
[9]
fully paid;
122 | P a g e
Torts 5
2.
3.
damages;
damages;
4.
5.
The spouses Jayme have resorted to the present recourse and assign to
Marvin Jayme;
6.
7.
[12]
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, Mayor Miguel interposed an appeal to the
TRIBUNAL;
CA.
II.
CA Disposition
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
In his appeal, Mayor Miguel contended that the RTC erred in ruling that he
was Lozano's employer and, hence, solidarily liable for the latter's
negligent act. Records showed that the Municipality of Koronadal was the
driver's true and lawful employer. Mayor Miguel also denied that he did not
exercise due care and diligence in the supervision of Lozano. The incident,
Our Ruling
IT IS SO ORDERED.[13]
Spouses Jayme contend, inter alia, that vicarious liability attaches to Mayor
The CA held that Mayor Miguel should not be held liable for damages for
Miguel. He was not a mere passenger, but instead one who had direct
control and supervision over Lozano during the time of the accident.
Municipality of Koronadal was the employer of both Mayor Miguel and Miguel, being Lozano's superior, still had control over the manner the
Lozano. Not being the employer of Lozano, Mayor Miguel could not thus
be held liable for the damages caused by the former. Mayor Miguel was a
mere passenger in the Isuzu pick-up at the time of the accident.[14]
Article 2180[16] of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for
(Emphasis supplied)
one's own quasi-delictual acts, but also for those persons for whom one is
The CA also reiterated the settled rule that it is the registered owner of a
vehicle who is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages
Torts 5
during the time of the accident. They, however, failed to buttress this claim.
to him.
[17]
Benson v. Sorrell,[23] the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere
giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has
control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the
Article 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was
committed at the time the employee was performing his functions. [18]
wit:
x x x The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to
the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client
[19]
for their wrongful acts and omissions. Those instructions or directions are
services entered into with the security agency. x x x[25] (Emphasis supplied)
It is an old and well-settled rule of the courts that the burden of proving the
action is upon the plaintiff, and that if he fails satisfactorily to show the facts although the person may have the right to control the manner of the
upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to
prove his exceptions. This rue is in harmony with the provisions of Section
297 of the Code of Civil Procedure holding that each party must prove his
[20]
of the vehicle.[27] Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the
Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano and therefore liable for the
relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This involves: (1) the employer's
Plaintiff was not the master or principal of the driver of the truck, but only
employer's right to control the method of doing the work; and (4) the
[21]
applicable to him. His power to direct and control the driver was not as
master, but only by virtue of the fact that they were both employed by
Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was the
Kruse, and the further fact that as Kruse's agent he was delegated Kruse's
In the case of actionable negligence, the rule is well settled both in this
Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. This Court has, on
the master or principal. (Hilton v. Oliver, 204 Cal. 535 [61 A. L. R. 297, 269
[22]
Pac. 425]; Guild v. Brown, 115 Cal. App. 374 [1 Pac. (2d) 528]; Ellis v.
Thurman v. Pittsburg & M. Copper Co., 41 Mont. 141 [108 Pac. 588]; 2
Cor. Jur., p. 829; and see the elaborate note in 61 A. L. R. 277, and
Spouses Jayme argued that Mayor Miguel had at least supervision and
control over Lozano and how the latter operated or drove the Isuzu pick-up
124 | P a g e
Torts 5
Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and
severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and
The rule was reiterated in Bryant v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co.[30] and again in
[31]
In Swanson v. McQuown,
[32]
as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and
accident, the Colorado Supreme Court adhered to the general rule that a
x.[39]
public official is not liable for the wrongful acts of his subordinates on a
The accidental death of Marvin Jayme is a tragic loss for his parents.
However, justice demands that only those liable under our laws be held
[33]
situation.
The court went on to rule that the only exception is when they
[34]
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's employer nor the
owner of the vehicle are liable for the death of a third person resulting from
him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for
Marvin's death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the
accident.
AFFIRMED.
Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist the SO ORDERED.
driver, by providing him warnings or by serving as lookout does not make
the passenger liable for the latter's negligent acts.[35] The driver's duty is
not one that may be delegated to others.[36]
As correctly held by the trial court, the true and lawful employer of Lozano
is the Municipality of Koronadal. Unfortunately for Spouses Jayme, the
municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged
in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is
illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme,[37] where this
Court held:
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable
because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in
the discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable
only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In
permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the
right to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity
when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.[38]
Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his
direct employer. The CA observation along this line are worth restating:
125 | P a g e
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RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering
from pains. Two (2) weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze
protruding from her vagina. Dr. Ampil was immediately informed. He
proceeded to Natividads house where he managed to extract by hand a
piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. Dr. Ampil then assured
cancer of the sigmoid. Thus, on April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the
gauze had badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had
upon her. During the surgery, he found that the malignancy in her sigmoid
area had spread to her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain
portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Atty. Enrique Agana,
formed in her reproductive organ which forced stool to excrete through the
vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the situation.
Thus, in October 1984, Natividad underwent another surgery.
Torts 5
Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City a complaint for damages against PSI
(owner of Medical City), Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes.
On February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above case, Natividad
As earlier mentioned, the First Division, in its assailed Decision, ruled that
died. She was duly substituted by her above-named children (the Aganas).
On March 17, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of spouses
the Aganas. This ruling proceeds from the following ratiocination in Ramos:
Agana finding PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes jointly and severally liable.
affirmed the assailed judgment with modification in the sense that the
with attending and visiting consultants, who are allegedly not hospital
PSI, Dr. Ampil and the Aganas filed with this Court separate petitions for
review on certiorari. On January 31, 2007, the Court, through its First
Division, rendered a Decision holding that PSI is jointly and severally liable
In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and
with Dr. Ampil for the following reasons: first, there is an employer-
employee relationship between Medical City and Dr. Ampil. The Court
[2]
the lobby of the Medical City the names and specializations of its
who either accept or reject the application. This is particularly true with
respondent hospital.
In its motion for reconsideration, PSI contends that the Court erred in
finding it liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, there being no
PSI stressed that the Courts Decision in Ramos holding that an employer- performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review
employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their
[3]
their attending and visiting consultant staff. While consultants are not,
127 | P a g e
Torts 5
exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill
and their attending and visiting physicians. This being the case, the
question now arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily
liable with respondent doctors for petitioners condition.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence
of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a
person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was
a hospital and its consultants on the bases of certain factors. One such
Novant Health, Inc., 628 S.E.2d 851 (2006) citing Hylton v. Koontz, 138
factor is the control test wherein the hospital exercises control in the
N.C. App. 629 (2000). In this regard, the hospital need not make
hiring and firing of consultants, like Dr. Ampil, and in the conduct of their
work.
Actually, contrary to PSIs contention, the Court did not reverse its ruling in
Ramos. What it clarified was that the De Los Santos Medical Clinic did not
relationship between them. Thus, despite the granting of the said hospitals
motion for reconsideration, the doctrine in Ramos stays, i.e., for the
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon. Estoppel rests on this rule: Whether a party has, by his own
consultants.
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in
any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted
to falsify it. (De Castro v. Ginete, 137 Phil. 453 [1969], citing Sec. 3, par. A,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. See also King v. Mitchell, 31 A.D.3rd 958,
not employees of the hospital. Even assuming that Dr. Ampil is not an
xxx
the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and
Torts 5
[6]
Atty. Agana categorically testified that one of the reasons why he chose Dr. has authority to perform the particular act in question. In these
Unfortunately, PSI had been remiss in its duty. It did not conduct an
prejudice and agony of its patient. Dr. Jocson, a member of PSIs medical
illness.
Atty. Agcaoili
On that particular occasion, April 2, 1984, what was
Clearly, PSI is estopped from passing the blame solely to Dr. Ampil. Its act
of displaying his name and those of the other physicians in the public
directory at the lobby of the hospital amounts to holding out to the public
that it offers quality medical service through the listed physicians. This
the hospital?
justifies Atty. Aganas belief that Dr. Ampil was a member of the hospitals
A
129 | P a g e
Torts 5
The above testimony obviously shows Dr. Jocsons lack of concern for
supervision. Not only did PSI breach its duty to oversee or supervise
all persons who practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to
another question.
Moreover, there is merit in the trial courts finding that the failure of PSI to
conduct an investigation established PSIs part in the dark conspiracy
record custodian?
hear something?
promised me.
xxx
xxx
Q
Atty. Agana
Court
SO ORDERED.
By that answer, would you mean to tell the
Court that you were aware if there was such
a move done by the hospital?
A
130 | P a g e
Torts 5
After taking Edmer's medical history, Dr. Livelo took his vital signs, body
RESPONDENT.
and the chest x-ray test that followed, Dr. Livelo diagnosed Edmer with
"bronchopneumonia."[7] Edmer's blood was also taken for testing, typing,
phlegm.
RESPONDENT.
Mrs. Cortejo did not know any doctor at SJDH. She used her Fortune Care
[G.R. No. 171228]
card and was referred to an accredited Fortune Care coordinator, who was
then out of town. She was thereafter assigned to Dr. Noel Casumpang (Dr.
CORTEJO, RESPONDENT.
At 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Dr. Casumpang for the first time
DECISION
BRION, J.:
At that moment, Mrs. Cortejo recalled entertaining doubts on the doctor's
We resolve the three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari[1]
involving medical negligence, commonly assailing the October 29, 2004
[2]
diagnosis. She immediately advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer had a high
fever, and had no colds or cough[10] but Dr. Casumpang merely told her
[3]
decision and the January 12, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals
that her son's "bloodpressure is just being active,"[11] and remarked that
ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 134, Makati City.
Dr. Casumpang next visited and examined Edmer at 9:00 in the morning
The RTC awarded Nelson Cortejo (respondent) damages in the total
amount of P595,000.00, for the wrongful death of his son allegedly due to
the medical negligence of the petitioning doctors and the hospital.
Factual Antecedents
the following day.[13] Still suspicious about his son's illness, Mrs. Cortejo
again called Dr. Casumpang's attention and stated that Edmer had a fever,
throat irritation, as well as chest and stomach pain. Mrs. Cortejo also
alerted Dr. Casumpang about the traces of blood in Edmer's sputum.
Despite these pieces of information, however, Dr. Casumpang simply
nodded, inquired if Edmer has an asthma, and reassured Mrs. Cortejo that
Forty-five minutes later, Dr. Ruby Sanga-Miranda (Dr. Miranda), one of the
Dr. Ramoncito Livelo (Dr. Livelo) initially attended to and examined Edmer.
resident physicians of SJDH, arrived. She claimed that although aware that
In her testimony, Mrs. Cortejo narrated that in the morning of April 20,
Edmer had vomited "phlegm with blood streak," she failed to examine the
1988, Edmer had developed a slight fever that lasted for one day; a few
blood specimen because the respondent washed it away. She then
hours upon discovery, she brought Edmer to their family doctor; and two
hours after administering medications, Edmer's fever had subsided. [5]
131 | P a g e
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head, eyes, nose, throat, lungs, skin and abdomen; and found that Edmer
ambulance but he was informed that the driver was nowhere to be found.
had a low-grade non-continuing fever, and rashes that were not typical of
This prompted him to hire a private ambulance that cost him P600.00. [23]
distress; the abdomen has negative finding; the patient has low grade fever
and not continuing; and the rashes in the patient's skin were not "Herman's
Rash" and not typical of dengue fever.
[18]
At 3:00 in the afternoon, Edmer once again vomited blood. Upon seeing
attending physician diagnosed "Dengue Fever Stage IV" that was already
Dr. Miranda, the respondent showed her Edmer's blood specimen, and
reported that Edmer had complained of severe stomach pain and difficulty
in moving his right leg.[19]
Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988.[24] His Death
Certificate indicated the cause of death as "Hypovolemic
Dr. Miranda then examined Edmer's "sputum with blood" and noted that he
Believing that Edmer's death was caused by the negligent and erroneous
ice cold normal saline solution, and gave an instruction not to pull out the
against SJDH, and its attending physicians: Dr. Casumpang and Dr.
Miranda (collectively referred to as the "petitioners") before the RTC of
[20]
Makati City.
pressure and some blood tests. Edmer's blood pressure was later found to
be normal.[21]
In a decision[25] dated May 30, 1997, the RTC ruled in favor of the
At 4:40 in the afternoon, Dr. Miranda called up Dr. Casumpang at his clinic
respondent, and awarded actual and moral damages, plus attorney's fees
and told him about Edmer's condition.[22] Upon being informed, Dr.
and costs.
In ruling that the petitioning doctors were negligent, the RTC found
untenable the petitioning doctors' contention that Edmer's initial symptoms
did not indicate dengue fever. It faulted them for heavily relying on the
chest x-ray result and for not considering the other manifestations that
Dr. Miranda advised Edmer's parents that the blood test results showed
that Edmer was suffering from "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever." One hour
illness, the physician's conduct should be judged not only by what he/she
saw and knew, but also by what he/she could have reasonably seen and
known. It also observed that based on Edmer's signs and symptoms, his
consented. Since the ICU was then full, Dr. Casumpang suggested to the
medical history and physical examination, and also the information that the
petitioning doctors gathered from his family members, dengue fever was a
After the respondent had signed the waiver, Dr. Casumpang, for the last
time, checked Edmer's condition, found that his blood pressure was stable,
The trial court also found that aside from their self-serving testimonies, the
petitioning doctors did not present other evidence to prove that they
132 | P a g e
Torts 5
admissible. It gave credence to his opinion[26] that: (1) given the exhibited
The RTC also held SJDH solidarity liable with the petitioning doctors for
could have been detected earlier than 7:30 in the evening of April 23, 1988
because the symptoms were already evident; and agreed with the RTC
that the petitioning doctors should not have solely relied on the chest-x-ray
based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The CA opined that the control
which the hospital exercises over its consultants, the hospital's power to
her services; the hospital also exercised control over her work.
Lastly, the CA held that SJDH failed to adduce evidence showing that it
against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay solidarity and severally
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and the
The Petitions
SO ORDERED.
Dr. Casumpang contends that he gave his patient medical treatment and
care to the best of his abilities, and within the proper standard of care
required from physicians under similar circumstances. He claims that his
In its decision dated October 29, 2004, the CA affirmed en toto the RTC's
ruling, finding that SJDH and its attending physicians failed to exercise the
Dr. Casumpang also contends that dengue fever occurs only after several
The CA found the petitioning doctors' failure to read even the most basic
signs of "dengue fever" expected of an ordinary doctor as medical
Torts 5
Furthermore, SJDH claims that the CA erroneously applied the control test
In her petition, Dr. Miranda faults the CA for holding her responsible for
which the employer exercises over the: (i) end result; and the (ii) manner
and means to be used to reach this end, and not any kind of control,
"bronchopneumonia."
Dr. Miranda also alleged that she exercised prudence in performing her
duties as a physician, underscoring that it was her professional intervention considered employees and not merely consultants of the hospital, SJDH
that led to the correct diagnosis of "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever."
cannot still be held solidarity liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
viral in nature.
Dr. Miranda as well argued that there is no causal relation between the
of pediatrics.[27]
SJDH likewise faults the CA for ruling that the petitioning doctors are its
agents, claiming that this theory, aside from being inconsistent with the
Lastly, she claimed that Dr. Jaudian is not a qualified expert witness since
behalf.
"consultants" (not employees) of the hospital. SJDH alleges that since it did Edmer's signs and symptoms at the time of admission (i.e., one day
not exercise control or supervision over the consultants' exercise of
there was no reasonable indication yet that he was suffering from dengue
them, and consequently, Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not apply.
fever, and accordingly, their failure to diagnose dengue fever, does not
constitute negligence on their part.
In his comment, the respondent submits that the issues the petitioners
ordinary employee; (3) the consultants earn their own professional fees
raised are mainly factual in nature, which a petition for review on certiorari
directly from their patients; SJDH does not fire or terminate their services;
and (4) SJDH does not control or interfere with the manner and the means
the consultants use in the treatment of their patients. It merely provides
Torts 5
of the appellate court's factual findings and conclusions; this Court is not a
trier of facts.[31]
The respondent also alleges that there is a causal connection between the
not equipped with proper paging system, has no bronchoscope, and its
claim damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code for the petitioners'
doctors are not proportionate to the number of its patients. He also pointed
out that out of the seven resident physicians in the hospital, only two
resident physicians were doing rounds at the time of his son's confinement.
The Issues
1.
issues raised.
2.
3.
the death of, a patient.[33] As the term is used, the suit is brought whenever
4.
To successfully pursue a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff (in this case,
witness.
the deceased patient's heir) must prove that the doctor either failed to do
what a reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or did what a
Our Ruling
reasonably prudent doctor would not have done; and the act or omission
had caused injury to the patient.[34] The patient's heir/s bears the burden of
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited only to the review of
pure questions of law. It is not the Court's function to inquire on the veracity
135 | P a g e
Torts 5
[35]
or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result, or a
reasonably probable consequence of the physician's negligence. [45]
services of a physician,
[36]
Casumpang and Edmer was created when the latter's parents sought the
and the acceptance by the physician essential. The mere fact that an
The consent needed to create the relationship does not always need to be
With respect to Dr. Miranda, her professional relationship with Edmer arose
when she assumed the obligation to provide resident supervision over the
doctor. In this case, we can infer, based on the established and customary
latter. As second year resident doctor tasked to do rounds and assist other
exists.
Edmer.
The undisputed evidence shows that Dr. Miranda examined Edmer twice
(at around 12:00 and 3:30 in the afternoon of April 23, 1988), and in both
instances, she prescribed treatment and participated in the diagnosis of
Breach of duty occurs when the doctor fails to comply with, or improperly
both factual and legal, and is specific to each individual case. [42]
In Jarcia, Jr. v. People of the Philippines,[46] the Court found the doctors
who merely passed by and were requested to attend to the patient, liable
[43]
damages.
To successfully claim damages, the patient must lastly prove the causal
relation between the negligence and the injury. This connection must be
direct, natural, and should be unbroken by any intervening efficient causes.
testimony, that the negligence played an integral part in causing the injury
136 | P a g e
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supervision at a teaching hospital, and the patient with whom the doctor
had twice vomited fresh blood and thrombocytopenia has already occurred,
the doctor should order blood transfusion, monitoring of the patient every
duty. We do not find Dr. Miranda liable for the reasons discussed
matters clearly falling within the domain of medical science, and legal,
below.
insofar as the Court, after evaluating the expert testimonies, and guided by
medical literature, learned treatises, and its fund of common knowledge,
similar circumstances.
[49]
given by the patient or the latter's parents, and the patient's medical
standards observed in the medical community, but also that the physician's
Edmer had low breath and voluntary submission, and that he was up and
about playing basketball.[56] He based his diagnosis of bronchopneumonia
It will be recalled that during Dr. Casumpang's first and second visits to
Both the RTC and the CA relied largely on Dr. Jaudian's expert testimony
blood in the sputum). However, these information did not lead Dr.
Dr. Jaudian testified that Edmer's rapid breathing, chest and stomach pain,
fever, and the presence of blood in his saliva are classic symptoms of
dengue fever. According to him, if the patient was admitted for chest pain,
abdominal pain, and difficulty in breathing coupled with fever, dengue fever
should definitely be considered;[51] if the patient spits coffee ground with the In other words, it was lost on Dr. Casumpang that the characteristic
presence of blood, and the patient's platelet count drops to 47,000, it
breathing; chest and stomach pain; fever; and the presence of blood in his
137 | P a g e
Torts 5
saliva. All these manifestations were present and known to Dr. Casumpang Q: Do you know what action was taken by Dr. Casumpang when you
at the time of his first and second visits to Edmer. While he noted some of
these symptoms in confirming bronchopneumonia, he did not seem to have A: No action. He just asked me if my son has an asthma but I said
considered the patient's other manifestations in ruling out dengue fever or
dengue hemorrhagic fever.
[58]
appreciated some, and not all of the symptoms; worse, he casually ignored
none.
Q: So how long did Dr. Casumpang stay and attended your son on
April 23?
the pieces of information that could have been material in detecting dengue A: More or less two (2) minutes then I followed him up to the door
fever. This is evident from the testimony of Mrs. Cortejo:
We also find it strange why Dr. Casumpang did not even bother to check
Edmer's throat despite knowing that as early as 9:00 in the morning of April
23, 1988, Edmer had blood streaks in his sputum. Neither did Dr.
Casumpang order confirmatory tests to confirm the source of bleeding. The
xxxx
Q: Q: When Dr. Casumpang arrived at 9:00 o'clock a.m. on April 23, what
did you tell him, if any?
xxxx
generally inconclusive.[61]
Significantly, it was only at around 5:00 in the afternoon of April 23, 1988
(after Edmer's third episode of bleeding) that Dr. Casumpang ordered the
conduct of hematocrit, hemoglobin, blood typing, blood transfusion and
tourniquet tests. These tests came too late, as proven by: (1) the blood test
results that came at about 6:00 in the evening, confirming that Edmer's
illness had developed to "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever" and (2) Dr.
Jaudian's testimony that "dengue fever could have been detected earlier
than 7:30 in the evening of April 23, 1988 because the symptoms were
already evident."[62]
Q: So what did Dr. Casumpang do after you have narrated all these
complaints of your son?
A: Nothing. He also noticed the rapid breathing of my son and my
son was almost moving because of rapid breathing and he is
138 | P a g e
Torts 5
illness. Despite the doctors' suspicion that the patient could be suffering
Third, we also note that medicine is not an exact science;[66] and doctors,
from diabetes, the former still proceeded to the D&C operation. In that
case, expert testimony showed that tests should have been ordered
treating patients who come to their clinic for consultations. Error is possible
conclusions. But in doing all these, the doctor must have acted according
symptoms should, at the very least, alert the physician of the possibility
petitioner doctors failed to take this into consideration and proceeded with
some and not all of the symptoms presented, and failed to promptly
the D&C operation. Thus, the Court ruled that they failed to comply with
hyperglycemic/diabetic patients.
[64]
Similarly, in Jarcia,
Apart from failing to promptly detect dengue fever, Dr. Casumpang also
the extent of Roy Jr.'s injuries, Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan were remiss
sake of argument that they did not have the capacity to make such
thorough evaluation at that stage, they should have referred the patient to
As Dr. Jaudian opined, the standard medical procedure once the patient
had exhibited the classic symptoms of dengue fever should have been:
him and his mother that everything was all right. [Emphasis supplied]
and once the patient had twice vomited fresh blood, the doctor should have
instead of blood transfusion. The tourniquet test was only conducted after
reflected in the records) did not include antibiotic therapy and complete
physical examination.
139 | P a g e
Torts 5
A: Yes, sir.
As the lower courts did, we rely on the uncontroverted fact that he failed,
A: During those times, the blood pressure of the patient was even normal
In considering the case of Dr. Miranda, the junior resident physician who
was on-duty at the time of Edmer's confinement, we see the need to draw
In his testimony, Dr. Pasion declared that resident applicants are generally
Q: While monitoring the patient, all his vital signs were ________; his
like to pursue a particular specialty.[70] They are usually the front line
doctors responsible for the first contact with the patient. During the scope
A: In the evening of April 23, 1988,1 stayed in the hospital and I was
evening that the blood pressure of the patient went down to .60
palpatory.
the IV fluid from the present fluid which was D5 0.3 sodium
Q: You mean to say you increased the dengue [sic] of the intervenus
[sic] fluid?
A: We changed the IV fluid because lactated ringers was necessary
for the diagnosis and treatment of the patient, the standards applicable to
and the liability of the resident for medical malpractice is theoretically less
Jagonap and Dr. Ellewelyn Pasion (Dr. Pasion), Personnel Officer and
care for residents,[76] or from the responsibility arising from their own
Livelo and Dr. Reyes (the radiologist who read Edmer's chest x-ray result),
negligent act.
these witnesses failed to dispute the standard of action that Dr. Jaudian
established in his expert opinion. We cannot consider them expert
In Jenkins v. Clark,[77] the Ohio Court of Appeals held that the applicable
witnesses either for the sole reason that they did not testify on the standard standard of care in medical malpractice cases involving first-year residents
of care in dengue cases.[69]
On the whole, after examining the totality of the adduced evidence, we find
that the lower courts correctly did not rely on Dr. Casumpang's claim that
140 | P a g e
Torts 5
about the incident. Indubitably, her medical assistance led to the finding of
dengue fever.
physician or surgeon of ordinary skill, care and diligence would not have
done under like or similar conditions or circumstances, or that he failed or
Miranda failed to immediately examine and note the cause of the blood
ordinary skill, care and diligence would have done under like or similar
specimen. Like Dr. Casumpang, she merely assumed that the blood in
Q: Let us get this clear, you said that the father told you the patient cocked
[sic] out phlegm.
A: With blood streak.
Q: Now, you stated specimen, were you not able to examine the
specimen?
A: No, sir, I did not because according to the father he wash [sic] his
hands.
xxxx
unlimited licenses to practice." The Indiana Court held that although a firstyear resident practices under a temporary medical permit, he/she impliedly
contracts that he/she has the reasonable and ordinary qualifications of her
profession and that he/she will exercise reasonable skill, diligence, and
care in treating the patient.
Q: Now, from you knowledge, what does that indicate if the patient expels
a phlegm and blood streak?
A: If a patient cocked [sic] out phlegm then the specimen could have
come from the lung alone.[82] [Emphasis supplied]
xxxx
Q: So what examination did you specifically conduct to see that there was
In this case, before Dr. Miranda attended to Edmer, both Dr. Livelo and Dr.
Casumpang had diagnosed Edmer with bronchopneumonia. In her
testimony, Dr. Miranda admitted that she had been briefed about Edmer's
condition, his medical history, and initial diagnosis;[79] and based on these
pieces of information, she confirmed the, finding of bronchopneumonia.
no internal bleeding?
A: At that time I did not do anything to determine the cause of
coughing of the blood because I presumed that it was a mucous
(sic) produced by broncho pneumonia, And besides the patient
did not even show any signs of any other illness at that time.[83]
Based on her statements we find that Dr. Miranda was not entirely
141 | P a g e
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in the hospital hierarchy; hence, she should not be held liable for medical
match the physicians' practice area only constituted, at most, one of the
negligence.
considerations that should not be taken out of context. After all, the sole
function of a medical expert witness, regardless of his/her specialty, is to
One of the critical issues the petitioners raised in the proceedings before
the lower court and before this Court was Dr. Jaudian's competence and
that the expert witnesses possess a sufficient familiarity with the standard
testimony on the ground that he lacked the proper training and fellowship
status in pediatrics.
US jurisprudence on medical malpractice demonstrated the trial courts'
Criteria in Qualifying as an Expert Witness
[84]
case, the court held that since negligence was not predicated on the
claim that the pre-operative histories and physicals were inadequate, the
In Ramos v. Court of Appeals,[85] the Court found the expert witness, who is Frost v. Mayo Clinic[89] also allowed an orthopedic surgeon to testify
a pulmonologist, not qualified to testify on the field of anesthesiology.
[86]
Interestingly in this case, Dr. Jaudian, the expert witness was admittedly
It did not appear to the court that a medical doctor had to be a specialist in
A close scrutiny of Ramos and Cereno reveals that the Court primarily
Torts 5
expert witness:
(1) has the required professional knowledge, learning and skill of the
subject under inquiry sufficient to qualify him to speak with authority
the question of the degree of his knowledge goes more to the weight of the
failure to timely diagnose Edmer with dengue, the latter was not
immediately given the proper treatment. In fact, even after Dr. Casumpang
had discovered Edmer's real illness, he still failed to promptly perform the
xxxx
As the respondent had pointed out, dengue fever, if left untreated, could be
medical attention.[93] With the correct and timely diagnosis, coupled with the
mortality rate of dengue fever should fall to less than 2%. Hence, the
the illness.[95]
required." Most courts allow a doctor to testify if they are satisfied of his
familiarity with the standards of a specialty, though he may not practice the
specialty himself. One court explained that "it is the scope of the witness'
knowledge and not the artificial classification by title that should govern the
tourniquet tests and series of blood tests) and promptly administered the
proper care and management needed for dengue fever, the risk of
In the case and the facts before us, we find that Dr. Jaudian is competent
had attended not less than 30 seminars held by the Pediatric Society, had
Stage IV," a severe and fatal form of dengue fever, established the causal
exposure in pediatrics, had been practicing medicine for 16 years, and had
Torts 5
Liability of SJDH
Edmer's case. In these lights, the petitioning doctors were not employees
of SJDH, but were mere independent contractors.
The respondent submits that SJDH should not only be held vicariously
liable for the petitioning doctors' negligence but also for its own negligence.
He claims that SJDH fell short of its duty of providing its patients with the
As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its independent
contractors. However, it may be found liable if the physician or independent
contractor acts as an ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is
also known as the "doctrine of apparent authority."[99]
We affirm the hospital's liability not on the basis of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, but on the basis of the doctrine of apparent authority or agency by
estoppel.
Control, which is the most crucial among the elements, is not present in
this case.
144 | P a g e
Torts 5
b. Patient's reliance
conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and
prudence.[104]
xxxx
the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and
prudence. (Citation omitted)
Thus, this requirement is deemed satisfied if the plaintiff can prove that
In sum, a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a
he/she relied upon the hospital to provide care and treatment, rather than
the plaintiff can prove these two factors: first, the hospital's manifestations;
a. Hospital's manifestations
SJDH impliedly held out and clothed Dr. Casumpang with apparent
of the hospital.
Nogales, the hospital need not make express representations to the patient
that the physician or independent contractor is an employee of the hospital; Based on the records, the respondent relied on SJDH rather than upon Dr.
representation may be general and implied.[102]
Casumpang, to care and treat his son Edmer. His testimony during trial
showed that he and his wife did not know any doctors at SJDH; they also
[103]
"what acts by the hospital or its agent are sufficient to lead a reasonable
They brought their son to SJDH for diagnosis because of their family
doctor's referral. The referral did not specifically point to Dr. Casumpang or
ruling that the hospital's manifestations can be proven without the express
representation by the hospital, the court relied on several cases from other
jurisdictions, and held that:
(1) the hospital, by providing emergency room care and by failing to advise
patients that they were being treated by the hospital's agent and not its
employee, has created the appearance of agency; and
(2) patients entering the hospital through the emergency room, could
properly assume that the treating doctors and staff of the hospital were
acting on its behalf.
In this case, the court considered the act of the hospital of holding itself out
as provider of complete medical care, and considered the hospital to have
145 | P a g e
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We also stress that Mrs. Cortejo's use of health care plan (Fortune Care)
did not affect SJDH's liability. The only effect of the availment of her
Fortune Care card benefits is that her choice of physician is limited only to
physicians who are accredited with Fortune Care. Thus, her use of health
care plan in this case only limited the choice of doctors (or coverage of
services, amount etc.) and not the liability of doctors or the hospital.
SO ORDERED.
146 | P a g e
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As a result of the incident, Perez, as well as the helpers on board the Isuzu
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Additionally, respondents averred that the mishap deprived them of a daily
Assailed in the present appeal by certiorari is the Decision[1] dated 29
[2]
For their part, petitioners capitalized on the issue of ownership of the bus in
question. Respondents argued that although the registered owner was Lim,
well as attorney's fees and costs of the suit in favor of respondent Spouses
the actual owner of the bus was SPO1 Cirilo Enriquez (Enriquez), who had
Antecedent Facts
On 7 March 1997, an Isuzu Elf truck (Isuzu truck) with plate number UAW
Transport is a business name registered under her name, and that such
[7]
the name of petitioner Elvira Lim (Lim) and driven by petitioner Mariano
C. Mendoza (Mendoza).[8]
After weighing the evidence, the RTC found Mendoza liable for direct
separate complaint for damages against Mendoza and Lim, seeking actual
personal negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and it also found
[10]
she is the registered owner of the bus in question. Although actually owned
of the case, at around 5:30 a.m., the Isuzu truck, coming from Katipunan
Road and heading towards E. Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, was travelling along
the downward portion of Boni Serrano Avenue when, upon reaching the
corner of Riviera Street, fronting St. Ignatius Village, its left front portion
was hit by the Mayamy bus.
[11]
bus, while traversing the opposite lane, intruded on the lane occupied by
1.
Avenue by one Traffic Enforcer Galante and a security guard of St. Ignatius
[13]
Village.
2.
Torts 5
3.
4.
5.
[18]
RTC, such were affirmed by the CA with the exception of the award of
The judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172
dated January 31, 2001, is MODIFIED, in that the award of P1,000.00 per
259.
[19]
[20]
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Torts 5
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
indemnified and the person causing the damage is charged with the
corresponding duty of repairing the damage. The reason for this is found in
the obvious truth that man should subordinate his acts to the precepts of
The first question to address, then, is whether or not Mendozas negligence prudence and if he fails to observe them and causes damage to another,
was duly proven. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the
he must repair the damage.[24] His negligence having caused the damage,
As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the CA, Mendoza was negligent in
person who has not committed the act or omission which caused damage
driving the subject Mayamy bus, as demonstrated by the fact that, at the
time of the collision, the bus intruded on the lane intended for the Isuzu
violation of traffic laws. Article 2185 of the Civil Code provides that unless
2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages in the action under said
article is the direct and primary negligence of the employer in the selection
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating
any traffic regulation. In the case at bar, Mendozas violation of traffic laws
In the case at bar, who is deemed as Mendozas employer? Is it Enriquez,
the actual owner of the bus or Lim, the registered owner of the bus?
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more
vicariously liable under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil
that in so far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
owner who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.
[22]
The evidence on record shows that before the collision, the Isuzu truck was As early as Erezo v. Jepte,[30] the Court, speaking through Justice Alejo
in its rightful lane, and was even at a stop, having been flagged down by a
security guard of St. Ignatius Village.
[23]
encroached on the lane rightfully occupied by said Isuzu truck, and caused
that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the
the latter to spin, injuring Perez, Anla, Banca, and Repisada, and
Having settled the fact of Mendozas negligence, then, the next question
Torts 5
sustained. They simply make good or replace the loss caused by the
of the vehicle and of the operator, in case of accident; and another is that
wrong.[34]
the knowledge that means of detection are always available may act as a
deterrent from lax observance of the law and of the rules of conservative
Article 2202 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes and quasi- delicts, the
defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and
the violator of the law or of the rules of safety shall not escape because of
lack of means to discover him. The purpose of the statute is thwarted, and
middleman between them and the public, and escape liability by the
the negligent act and, moreover, the claimant must adequately prove the
amount of such damage.
found that the total repairs on the Isuzu truck amounted to P142,757.40,
and that the full hospitalization and medical expenses of Perez, Anla,
damages.
However, with the enactment of the motor vehicle registration law, the
Isuzu truck caused them the loss of a daily income of P1,000.00, such
defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code - that the employee
claim was not duly substantiated by any evidence on record, and thus
acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due
[33]
Moral Damages. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party
to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable
As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold Lim vicariously liable
action.[35]
with Mendoza.
In prayers for moral damages, however, recovery is more an exception
This does not mean, however, that Lim is left without any recourse against
rather than the rule. Moral damages are not meant to be punitive but are
Enriquez and Mendoza. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment,
the actual employer of the driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code,
may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of
prove that he has suffered damages and that the injury causing it has
the claim.
sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil
Code. Moreover, the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of
Having identified the persons liable, our next question is what may be
a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish the factual
awarded.
basis of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant.[36]
Torts 5
the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; (3) and it is
done with intent to injure.[43] In the present case, it can hardly be said that
the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and 4) the
Mendozas negligent driving and violation of traffic laws are legal acts.
Moreover, it was not proven that Mendoza intended to injure Perez, et al.
[37]
All in all, we find that the RTC and the CA erred in granting moral damages
to respondents.
this:
[38]
Q: Aside from the actual damage that you have mentioned x x x, how much
more would you like this Court to award you by way of moral damages?
A: P100,000.00, sir.
A: P50,000.00, sir.
Q: What happened to you, what did you feel when the defendants failed to
Second, the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate,
A: I have incurred expenses and I was forced to apply for a loan, sir.
In Kierulf v. CA,
[39]
and the bar often enough that in order that moral damages may be
there must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental
suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as
cannot be awarded.
positive misconduct which will support a claim for punitive damages, the
courts have used such descriptive terms as willful, wanton, grossly
Moreover, respondents were not able to show that their claim properly falls
under Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Respondents cannot rely
on Article 2219 (2) of the Civil Code which allows moral damages in quasi-
damages are recoverable only by the injured party,[41] and in the case at
bar, herein respondents were not the ones who were actually injured.
them.[46]
In B.F. Metal (Corp.) v. Sps. Lomotan, et al.,[42] the Court, in a claim for
damages, exemplary damages are also in order, given the fact that
Mendoza was grossly negligent in driving the Mayamy bus. His act of
vehicle, when neither of them figured in the accident and sustained injuries. intruding or encroaching on the lane rightfully occupied by the Isuzu truck
shows his reckless disregard for safety.
Neither can respondents rely on Article 21 of the Civil Code as the RTC
erroneously did. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has
Torts 5
and consequently collided with a dump truck, the Court held the driver of
the bus grossly negligent and affirmed the award of exemplary damages.
Attorneys Fees. Article 2208 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances
Costs of suit. The Rules of Court provide that, generally, costs shall be
course, but the court shall have power, for special reasons, to adjudge that
either party shall pay the costs of an action, or that the same be divided, as
may be equitable. No costs shall be allowed against the Republic of the
Philippines, unless otherwise provided by law.
court.
reasonable.
Generally, interest is allowed as a matter of right for failure to pay
From the very opening sentence of Article 2208 of the Civil Code, it is
clearly intended to retain the award of attorneys fees as the exception in
our law, as the general rule remains that attorneys fees are not
recoverable in the absence of a stipulation thereto, the reason being that it
unliquidated in the sense that petitioners cannot know for sure, before
judgment, the exact amount that they are required to pay to respondents,
the award of actual or compensatory damages, however, such as the truck
repairs and medical expenses, is arguably liquidated in that they can be
measured against a reasonably certain standard.[55] Moreover, justice
would seem to require that the delay in paying for past losses which can be
made reasonably certain should be compensated through an award of
interest.[56]
In the case at bar, the RTC Decision had nil discussion on the propriety of
attorneys fees, and it merely awarded such in the dispositive. The CA
Decision, on the other hand, merely stated that the award of attorneys fees
Torts 5
SO ORDERED.
153 | P a g e
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DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
which reads:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] and
1.
At around 8:45 in the morning of December 12, 1993, Loreta J. Yu, after
3.
4.
the north-bound lane of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA), was hit
5.
and run over by a bus driven by Antonio P. Gimena, who was then
6.
Costs of suit.[7]
Yu, filed a Complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
by the records of the case, and that no evidence of whatever nature was
Manila Transport Corporation (MMTC) for the death of his wife. MMTC
denied its liability reasoning that it is merely the registered owner of the bus selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner, as the employer of
involved in the incident, the actual owner, being petitioner R Transport. [4] It
Gimena, may be held liable for the damage caused. The CA noted that the
fact that petitioner is not the registered owner of the bus which caused the
others, for resale to petitioner R Transport, which will in turn operate the
same within Metro Manila. Since it was not actually operating the bus
which killed respondents wife, nor was it the employer of the driver thereof,
MMTC alleged that the complaint against it should be dismissed.[5] For its
of its employees and drivers and that its buses are in good condition.
Meanwhile, the driver Antonio Gimena was declared in default for his
I.
favor of respondent Yu ruling that petitioner R Transport failed to prove that WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
it exercised the diligence required of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its driver, who, by its negligence, ran over the
Petitioner insists that the CA and the RTC were incorrect in ruling that its
deceased resulting in her death. It also held that MMTC should be held
driver was negligent for aside from the mere speculations and
accident, no other evidence had been adduced to prove that its driver was
154 | P a g e
Torts 5
reckless speed. As testified by the police officer on duty at the time of the
findings of the courts below, the bus from which the victim alighted is
incident[16] and indicated in the Autopsy Report,[17] not only were the
actually the proximate cause of the victims death for having unloaded its
deceaseds clothes ripped off from her body, her brain even spewed out
passengers on the lane where the subject bus was traversing. Moreover,
from her skull and spilled over the road. Indeed, this Court is not prepared
petitioner reiterates its argument that since it is not the registered owner of
the bus which bumped the victim, it cannot be held liable for the damage
speed in preparation for a full stop in view of the fatal injuries sustained by
the deceased. Moreover, the location wherein the deceased was hit and
run over further indicates Gimenas negligence. As borne by the records,
We disagree.
Time and again, it has been ruled that whether a person is negligent or not
such a busy part of EDSA should have already cautioned the driver of the
is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass upon in a petition for
bus. In fact, upon seeing that a bus has stopped beside his lane should
[10]
This Court is not bound to weigh all over again the evidence adduced by
have signalled him to step on his brakes to slow down for the possibility
that said bus was unloading its passengers in the area. Unfortunately, he
the parties, particularly where the findings of both the trial and the appellate did not take the necessary precaution and instead, drove on and bumped
courts on the matter of petitioners negligence coincide. As a general rule,
whose findings on these matters are binding on this Court, more so where
these have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals,[11]save for the following
slackening his speed and proceeding cautiously while passing the area.
Under Article 2180[18] of the New Civil Code, employers are liable for the
conjectures; (3) when the lower courts inference from its factual findings is
appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain
convincing proof that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
findings of fact are themselves conflicting; and (8) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are
based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by
Unfortunately, however, the records of this case are bereft of any proof
[12]
evidence on record.
reverse the rulings of the courts below for none of the aforementioned
exceptions are present herein. Both the trial and appellate courts found
petition, apart from denying the negligence of its employee and imputing
driver Gimena negligent in hitting and running over the victim and ruled that the same to the bus from which the victim alighted, petitioner merely
his negligence was the proximate cause of her death. Negligence has been reiterates its argument that since it is not the registered owner of the bus
defined as "the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
which bumped the victim, it cannot be held liable for the damage caused by
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
Verily, foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence.
[14]
the same. Nowhere was it even remotely alleged that petitioner had
[13]
It is the
[15]
In this case, the records show that driver Gimena was clearly running at a
it is not the registered owner of the bus which killed the deceased.
155 | P a g e
Torts 5
contends that it is the registered owner of the vehicle, rather than the
actual owner, who must be jointly and severally liable with the driver
Article 2194 of the Civil Code. The following considerations must be borne
vehicle.
the truck, his responsibility to the public or to any passenger riding in the
vehicle or truck must be direct, for the reasons given in our decision in the
The contention is devoid of merit. While the Court therein ruled that
case of Erezo vs. Jepte, supra, as quoted above. But as the transferee,
who operated the vehicle when the passenger died, is the one directly
severally liable with the driver of the said vehicle for damages
responsible to the registered owner for what the latter may have been
or death sustained in the operation of the said vehicle, the Court did
adjudged to pay. In operating the truck without transfer thereof having been
registered owner), for any damages that he may cause the latter by his
Code. In no case did the Court exempt the actual owner of the
negligence.[24]
However, it must be noted that the case at hand does not involve a breach
operator has the right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the
2176,[25] in relation to Article 2180[26] of the New Civil Code. As such, the
amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused.
liability for which petitioner is being made responsible actually arises not
from a pre-existing contractual relation between petitioner and the
Petitioner cannot, therefore, rely on our ruling in Tamayo and escape its
[23]
solidary liability for the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of
its subordinate is direct and primary, subject only to the defense of due
owner and actual operator of a truck which caused the death of its
passenger is not solidary, We noted therein that the same is due to the fact
Indeed, this Court has consistently been of the view that it is for the better
that the action instituted was one for breach of contract, to wit:
protection of the public for both the owner of record and the actual operator
to be adjudged jointly and severally liable with the driver.[28] As aptly stated
by the appellate court, the principle of holding the registered owner liable
that inasmuch as the third-party defendant had used the truck on a route
not covered by the registered owner's franchise, both the registered owner
take refuge in, inorder to free itself from liability arising from its own
negligent act.[29]
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict is solidary.
But the action instituted in the case at bar is one for breach of
proven by the records of the case, and that no evidence of whatever nature
contract, for failure of the defendant to carry safely the deceased for
her destination. The liability for which he is made responsible, i.e., for
Gimena, may be held liable for damages arising from the death of
Torts 5
SO ORDERED.
157 | P a g e
Torts 5
Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin
RESPONDENTS.
Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free
board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.
RESOLUTION
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was
clear. (TSN, April 4, 1983, pp. 78-79) According to Allan's testimony, a fast
moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve
(Filamer Christian Institute v. Court Appeals, 190 SCRA 477) reviewing the
something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check.
Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular
Court ruled that the petitioner is not liable for the injuries caused by
traffic, and hit him. Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to
Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for
swerve to the right. (Ibid., p. 79) At the time of the incident (6:30 P.M.) in
whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable, and
that Funtecha was merely a working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule
X, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is
Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard
of the petitioner-school. He further said that there was no specific time for
him to be off-duty and that after driving the students home at 5:00 in the
afternoon, he still had to go back to school and then drive home using the
present case call for the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since
same vehicle.
Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where
recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for whom, at the time
the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive home the school
interest and for the benefit of the petitioner. Funtecha allegedly did not
jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school
steal the school jeep nor use it for a joy ride without the knowledge of the
day.
school authorities.
It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had
After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the facts found by the trial
knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose.
court and the appellate court, the Court reconsiders its decision. We
desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his
classrooms.
affirmed the trial court decision which ordered the payment of the
P20,000.00 liability in the Zenith Insurance Corporation policy, P10,000.00
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of
Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was
attorney's fees.
not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
722 [1932]; See also Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v.
an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only
Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. 124 SCRA 618 [1983]). Therefore, the
Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the
steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which
act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it
158 | P a g e
Torts 5
was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the
appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held
responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of
driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner.
Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting
within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the
driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a
burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence
question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident
supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having
937 [1937])
The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on
rules and regulation for the guidance of its employees and the issuance of
which the petitioner anchors its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons
of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of administering and
with whom the employer has relations through his employees. (Bahia v.
rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking
substantive law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction and so
control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the
holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law
driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another employee
to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove
that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of
itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising
from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. (Cangco
invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the
evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the
disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil
Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989]; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v.
Baesa, 179, SCRA 384 [1989]) The liability of the employer is, under
There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-
Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have
recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to
It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa,
was not made a party defendant in the civil case for damages. This is quite
understandable considering that as far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff
159 | P a g e
Torts 5
Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was Funtecha who was the one
driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the school to
drive. The plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left to suffer without
simultaneous recourse against the petitioner for the consequent injury
caused by a janitor doing a driving chore for the petitioner even for a short
while. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing
circumstances, it is enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent
heirs were able to establish the existence of employer-employee
relationship between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that
Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an independent purpose of his
own but in furtherance of the business of his employer. A position of
responsibility on the part of the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily
demonstrated.
SO ORDERED.
160 | P a g e
Torts 5
project and the employees of the labor only contractor (Industrial Timer
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four (4) dump trucks owned by the National
Consequently, we hold Phesco not liable for the tort of driver Gavino
Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi city bound for Iligan city.
Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the trucks with plate no.
driver Gavino Ilumba. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, to hold the
employer liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of
collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three their assigned task, there must exist an employer-employee relationship.
(3) persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to
(PHESCO) before the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte,
and costs.
Marawi City. When defendant PHESCO filed its answer to the complaint it
contended that it was not the owner of the dump truck which collided with
SO ORDERED.
the Toyota Tamaraw but NPC. Moreover, it asserted that it was merely a
contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians
for the latters projects. On the other hand, NPC denied any liability and
countered that the driver of the dump truck was the employee of PHESCO.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision dated July 25,
The principal query to be resolved is, as between NPC and PHESCO, who
rendered ordering PHESCO, Inc. and Gavino Ilumba upon receipt hereof:
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION FINDING THAT PETITIONER
1. To pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs thru the Dansalan College the
SO ORDERED.
As earlier stated, NPC denies that the driver of the dump truck was its
employee. It alleges that it did not have the power of selection and
November 10, 1994 reversed the trial courts judgment. We quote the
161 | P a g e
Torts 5
However, NPC maintains that even assuming that a labor only contract
exists between it and PHESCO, its liability will not extend to third persons
contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to
who are injured due to the tortious acts of the employee of the labor-only
his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his
work except to the result thereof; and (b) the contractor has substantial
capital or investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
To bolster its position, NPC cites Section 9(b), Rule VII, Book III of the
premises and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his
[5]
(b) Labor only contracting as defined herein is hereby prohibited and the
the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly
[6]
employed by him. Taking into consideration the above distinction and the
same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.
In other words, NPC posits the theory that its liability is limited only to
parties, viz.:
only contract, should, consistent with the terms expressed in the rule, be
[9]
The reliance is misplaced. It bears stressing that the action was premised
on the recovery of damages as a result of quasi-delict against both NPC
and PHESCO, hence, it is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code which is
the applicable law in resolving this case.
disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil
Corollarily from the above doctrine, the ruling in Cuison v. Norton &
Harrison Co.,[19] finds applicability in the instant case, viz.:
It is well to repeat that under the civil law an employer is only liable for the
negligence of his employees in the discharge of their respective duties.
162 | P a g e
Torts 5
SO ORDERED.
power of directing and controlling the work. The chauffeur and the two
persons on the truck were the employees of Ora, the contractor, but Ora,
the contractor, was an employee of Norton & Harrison Co., charged with
the duty of directing the loading and transportation of the lumber. And it
was the negligence in loading the lumber and the use of minors on the
truck which caused the death of the unfortunate boy. On the facts and the
law, Ora was not an independent contractor, but was the servant of the
defendant, and for his negligence defendant was responsible.
Given the above considerations, it is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil
Code and not the Labor Code will determine the liability of NPC in a civil
suit for damages instituted by an injured person for any negligent act of the
employees of the labor only contractor. This is consistent with the ruling
that a finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to
a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the
owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor, including the
latters workers.[20]
With respect to the liability of NPC as the direct employer, Article 2180 of
the Civil Code explicitly provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
In this regard, NPCs liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO
and the driver.[21] Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied
by it, shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed
the negligence which gave rise to the action.[22]
Finally, NPC, even if it truly believed that it was not the employer of the
driver, could still have disclaimed any liability had it raised the defense of
due diligence in the selection or supervision of PHESCO and Ilumba.[23]
However, for some reason or another, NPC did not invoke said defense.
Hence, by opting not to present any evidence that it exercised due
diligence in the supervision of the activities of PHESCO and Ilumba, NPC
has foreclosed its right to interpose the same on appeal in conformity with
the rule that points of law, theories, issues of facts and arguments not
raised in the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on
appeal.[24] Consequently, its liability stands.
163 | P a g e
Torts 5
DECISION
affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was
driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the
KAPUNAN, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for injuries
vehicle, and bumped plaintiffs car, which he did not see because it was
midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and
1990. The facts found by the trial court are succinctly summarized by the
the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear
after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit
another car parked on the sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for
damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not a
morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a
licensed driver.
blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her restaurant at
Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was
The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the vehicular
accident report and the sketch of the three cars involved in the accident,
testified that the plaintiffs car was "near the sidewalk"; this witness did not
noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place
remember whether the hazard lights of plaintiffs car were on, and did not
where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit
notice if there was an early warning device; there was a street light at the
help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right
corner of Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100 meters away. It was not
tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that cars condition, she mostly dark, i.e. "things can be seen" (p. 16, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, put on her emergency
lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that after plaintiff
was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a
alighted from her car and opened the trunk compartment, defendants car
man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a
came approaching very fast ten meters from the scene; the car was
"zigzagging." The rear left side of plaintiffs car was bumped by the front
plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant,
swerved to the right and hit the parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was
which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from
under defendants car. Plaintiffs left leg was severed up to the middle of
landed under the car. He stated that defendant was under the influence of
her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body.
liquor as he could "smell it very well" (pp. 43, 79, tsn., June 17, 1991).
She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was
found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above
knee)." She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiffs submissions and found
eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander
Commercial, Inc., Lis employer, jointly and severally liable for damages
pursuant to Article 2180. It ordered the defendants to jointly and severally
Torts 5
Li because he noticed that the latter was under the influence of liquor,
because he "could smell it very well" (p. 36, et. seq., tsn, June 17, 1991).
He knew that plaintiff owned a beerhouse in Sta. Mesa in the 1970s, but
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized profits because of the
stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant three (3) weeks after the
accident on June 24, 1990; (b) P20,000.00, a month, as unrealized profits
of the plaintiff in her Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until
In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the
the date of this judgment; and (c) P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized
profits in plaintiffs two (2) beauty salons from July, 1990 until the date of
however, absolved the Lis employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any
this decision;
6. Costs.
contends that he should not be held liable for damages because the
proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuelas own
negligence. Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds
for New Trial and for Reconsideration, citing testimony in Criminal Case
negligence of Valenzuela.
O.C. No. 804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to show that the point of
impact, as depicted by the pieces of glass/debris from the parties cars,
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails
appeared to be at the center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trial court
Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner of the car driven by Richard Li
and insofar as it reduces the amount of the actual and moral damages
Court of Appeals found that there was "ample basis from the evidence of
record for the trial courts finding that the plaintiffs car was properly parked
at the right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendants car."[1] As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are hereby consolidated.
Dismissing the defendants argument that the plaintiffs car was improperly
It is plainly evident that the petition for review in G.R. No. 117944 raises no
parked, almost at the center of the road, the respondent court noted that
substantial questions of law. What it, in effect, attempts to have this Court
evidence which was supposed to prove that the car was at or near center
review are factual findings of the trial court, as sustained by the Court of
of the right lane was never presented during the trial of the case.
[2]
The
Appeals are binding and conclusive upon us, and this Court will not
normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of fact of the said
June 24, 1990 when his attention was caught by a beautiful lady (referring
to the plaintiff) alighting from her car and opening the trunk compartment;
he noticed the car of Richard Li "approaching very fast ten (10) meters
away from the scene"; defendants car was zigzagging, although there
were no holes and hazards on the street, and "bumped the leg of the
plaintiff who was thrown against the windshield of defendants car, causing
its destruction. He came to the rescue of the plaintiff, who was pulled out
from under defendants car and was able to say "hurting words" to Richard
just ten to twenty feet away from the scene of the accident, when he saw
165 | P a g e
Torts 5
the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of the
arrived at the scene only in response to a telephone call after the accident
defendants Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she eventually fell under the
had transpired (pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). We find no substantial
street, noting that a man reeking with the smell of liquor had alighted from
[7]
even know the accident victim personally and who immediately gave a
conclude that his version of the accident was merely adroitly crafted to
The issue is one of credibility and from Our own examination of the
transcript, We are not prepared to set aside the trial courts reliance on the
maroon lancer right in front of him, which was (the) plaintiffs car." He
alleged that upon seeing this sudden "apparition" he put on his brakes to
of speed is not necessarily impaired. He was subjected to crossexamination and no attempt was made to question his competence or the
accuracy of his statement that defendant was driving "very fast." This was
the same statement he gave to the police investigator after the incident, as
motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes
to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the
should be - to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the
accident was across the street where his beerhouse is located about ten to
twenty feet away (pp. 35-36, tsn, June 17, 1991). He did not state that the
avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both
registered in the name of his mother, but he explained that he owns the
of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified
suddenly apply his brakes. As the trial court noted (quoted with approval by
streetlight at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and F. Roman Street (p. 45,
respondent court):
immediately after the incident, he said that while driving along Aurora Blvd.,
only a drizzle, not a heavy rain and the rain has stopped and he was
out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in front of him, which
outside his establishment at the time the accident transpired (pp. 64-65,
was plaintiffs car, indicating, again, thereby that, indeed, he was driving
tsn., June 17, 1991). This was consistent with plaintiffs testimony that it
very fast, oblivious of his surroundings and the road ahead of him, because
was no longer raining when she left Bistro La Conga (pp. 10-11, tsn., April
if he was not, then he could not have missed noticing at a still far distance
29, 1991). It was defendant Li who stated that it was raining all the way in
the parked car of the plaintiff at the right side near the sidewalk which had
an attempt to explain why he was travelling at only 50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn.,
its emergency lights on, thereby avoiding forcefully bumping at the plaintiff
Oct. 14, 1991). As to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that it was raining, he
who was then standing at the left rear edge of her car.
166 | P a g e
Torts 5
dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful
his brakes when he saw the plaintiffs car in front of him, but that it failed as
the road was wet and slippery, this goes to show again, that, contrary to his threatening conditions.[15] Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this
claim, he was, indeed, running very fast. For, were it otherwise, he could
have easily completely stopped his car, thereby avoiding the bumping of
the plaintiff, notwithstanding that the road was wet and slippery. Verily,
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
kilometers per hour, then, inspite of the wet and slippery road, he could
have avoided hitting the plaintiff by the mere expedient or applying his
swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting two children suddenly darting
which is contrary to what he told the police immediately after the accident
into the street, we held, in Mc Kee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[18] that
and is, therefore, more believable, that he did not actually step on his
the driver therein, Jose Koh, "adopted the best means possible in the given
brakes, but simply swerved a little to the right when he saw the on-coming
situation" to avoid hitting the children. Using the "emergency rule" the court
car with glaring headlights, from the opposite direction, in order to avoid it.
concluded that Koh, in spite of the fact that he was in the wrong lane when
the collision with an oncoming truck occurred, was not guilty of
For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped the car of the
negligence.[19]
plaintiff which was properly parked at the right beside the sidewalk. And, it
was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to
safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car, considering that Aurora
paint, and there is plenty of space for both cars, since her car was running
at the right lane going towards Manila and the on-coming car was also on
[13]
woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will
not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do
so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run
the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or
alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous
for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire
parking her car alongside Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li points
vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the
instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of
close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself
contributory negligence.
and other motorists in danger, she did what was best under the situation.
As narrated by respondent court:
[14]
she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the
people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach
to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her own protection
her home she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind a
was not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone.
Toyota Corona Car."[20] In fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos,
We cannot agree.
prepared after the incident showed Valenzuelas car partly straddling the
right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was itself corroborated by the
167 | P a g e
Torts 5
company car was partly required by the nature of his work, but the privilege
of using it for non-official business is a benefit, apparently referring to the
Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of his
amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her
to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own
making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
which theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his servant (Cuison v. Norton and Harrison
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the
Co., 55 Phil. 18). Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence
of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage must have
others."
[23]
tasks or duties (Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 341).
In defining an employers liability for the acts done within the scope of the
employees assigned tasks, the Supreme Court has held that this includes
[25]
Company,
circumstances.
The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court below Court, 212 SCRA 637). An employer is expected to impose upon its
plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi
employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act
Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00
A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the street
slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he
In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial courts finding
was under the influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of
appear to be a fringe benefit, one of the perks attached to his position. But
to impose liability upon the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
child on the curb may be required to anticipate its sudden dash into the
earlier quoted, there must be a showing that the damage was caused by
street, and his failure to act properly when they appear may be found to
amount to negligence.
[26]
fail.[27]
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is not
There is no evidence, not even defendant Lis testimony, that the visit was
ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of
visit buyers and company clients, but he admitted that on the night of the
expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code,[28] we are of the opinion that
from the company (pp. 25-26, tsn, Sept. 23, 1991). The use ofthe
Lis employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for
168 | P a g e
Torts 5
the first plan, require rigorous tests of road worthiness from their agents
prior to turning over the car (subject of company maintenance) to their
First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals[29] upon
which respondent court has placed undue reliance, dealt with the subject of the company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the employee to
a school and its teachers supervision of students during an extracurricular
whom the car has been given full use of the said company car for company
activity. These cases now fall under the provision on special parental
car to its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good father,
school premises.
satisfied that its employee will use the privilege reasonably and
responsively.
Second, the employers primary liability under the concept of pater familias
embodied by Art. 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-
In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are given
than those cited in the example of the preceding paragraph, the privilege
that the employer exercised the required amount of care in selecting its
an entity intends to present to its clients and to the public in general, or for
employment.
situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use
a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who
Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is
actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent.
As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the
car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly.
representatives.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial,
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their
Inc. In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as
employees with courtesy vehicles. These company cars are either wholly
Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office
hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the office,
rank to purchase cars, which, given the cost of vehicles these days, they
representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients were both
Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains the car
example, the car is really owned and maintained by the employee himself.
and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.
Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the
Torts 5
his officemates place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and
his officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of the nature
satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the
functional restoration of the motor functions of the lower limb. The sensory
ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
[31]
its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater
are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial
familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the
court is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical
accident.
be commensurate to the suffering inflicted. In the instant case we are of the Regional Trial Court.
opinion that the reduction in moral damages from an amount of P
1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 by the Court of Appeals was not justified
SO ORDERED.
Torts 5
Respondents.
The trial court found driver Copsiyat negligent in the operation of his truck
DECISION
and ruled that his negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries
suffered by De Vera, Jr. It also ruled that Lampesa did not exercise due
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision dated August
reads:
21, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49778 which had
affirmed the Decision[2] dated March 22, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of
San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57, finding petitioners Cornelio
Lampesa and Dario Copsiyat liable for damages on account of the injury
reaching the Km. 4 marker of the national highway, the jeepney came to a
complete stop to allow a truck,[4] then being driven by Dario Copsiyat, to
SO ORDERED.[11]
cross the path of the jeepney in order to park at a private parking lot on the
Upon review, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial courts findings of
right side of the road. As Tollas began to maneuver the jeepney slowly
along its path, the truck, which had just left the pavement, suddenly started
to slide back towards the jeepney until its rear left portion hit the right side
of the jeepney. De Vera, Jr., who was seated in the front passenger seat,
Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch 57, in Civil Case No. SCC-
noticed his left middle finger was cut off as he was holding on to the handle
of the right side of the jeepney. He asked Tollas to bring him immediately
to the hospital. The Medical Certificate[5] dated June 19, 1989, described
SO ORDERED.[12]
I.
[6]
WHO BETWEEN THE TWO (2) DRIVERS (COPSIYAT WHO WAS THE
investigated and recorded the incident in his Police Investigation Report [7]
ELF TRUCK DRIVER AND TOLLAS FOR THE PASSENGER JEEP) WAS
NEGLIGENT?
The defense, for its part, presented the following version of the incident:
II.
While the rear of the truck was still on the pavement of the highway, an
III.
support, but the latter demanded P1 million although this amount was later
lowered to P75,000. The parties failed to settle amicably; thus, De Vera, Jr.
OF THE EVIDENCE.[13]
Torts 5
Simply put, the issues for our resolution are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals
err in affirming the trial courts ruling that petitioners are liable for the injury
Lampesa claims he did his legal duty as an employer in the selection and
sustained by De Vera, Jr.? and (2) Did it err in awarding moral damages
supervision of Copsiyat. But the record is bare on this point. It lacks any
showing that Lampesa did so. Admitting arguendo that Copsiyat did show
his professional license when he applied for the job of truck driver,
Petitioners insist that it was Tollas, the jeepney driver, who was negligent.
They maintain that Tollas should have first allowed the truck to park as he
had a clear view of the scenario, compared to Copsiyat, the truck driver,
who had a very limited view of the back of the truck. Lampesa also avers
he did his legal duty in the selection and supervision of Copsiyat as his
also show that he exercised due supervision over Copsiyat after his
driver. He alleges that before hiring Copsiyat, he asked the latter if he had
For their part, respondents adopt the findings of the trial and appellate
courts. They contend that it was Copsiyat who was negligent in driving the
truck and the testimony of De Vera, Jr. on this matter was more than
On a final note, petitioners liability for moral damages and attorneys fees
sufficient to prove the fact. De Vera, Jr. also contends that petitioners are
liable for moral damages and attorneys fees under Articles 2217
[14]
and
damages in this case is justifiable under Article 2219 (2)[21] of the Civil
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission
Article 2208 (2)[23] of the Civil Code, considering that De Vera, Jr. was
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
[16]
In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found Copsiyat
SO ORDERED.
negligent in maneuvering the truck and ruled that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by De Vera, Jr. Lampesa was also
held accountable by both courts because he failed to exercise due
diligence in the supervision of his driver. This Court is not bound to weigh
all over again the evidence adduced by the parties, particularly where the
findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter of
petitioners negligence coincide. The resolution of factual issues is a
function of the trial court, whose findings on these matters are, as a
general rule, binding on this Court more so where these have been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[17]
Torts 5
DECISION
In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and proximate cause of
PUNO, C.J.:
car bumped the truck's front right tire. The truck then swerved to the left,
CA-G.R. CV No. 83981, dated February 16, 2006 and March 30, 2006,
smashed into an electric post, crossed the center island, and stopped on
the other side of the highway. The car likewise crossed over the center
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, dated September 29, 2004. The trial court
island and landed on the same portion of C-5. Further, petitioner Mercury
for the injuries sustained by respondent Stephen Huang, son of respondent the selection and supervision of all its employees.
spouses Richard and Carmen Huang.
The trial court, in its Decision dated September 29, 2004, found petitioners
First, the facts:
Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and severally liable to pay
respondents actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
owner of a six-wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi Truck with plate number PRE 641
Corporation, Inc. and Rolando del Rosario, jointly and severally liable to
respondent Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI
2.
As compensatory damages:
petitioner Del Rosario was driving the truck, weighing 14,058 kg. Both were
traversing the C-5 Highway, north bound, coming from the general
a.
direction of Alabang going to Pasig City. The car was on the left innermost
lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right, when the truck
suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of the car.
Stephen;
The collision hurled the car over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun
around and landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit a lamppost, ran
b.
over the car and zigzagged towards, and finally stopped in front of Buellah
Land Church.
Stephen;
At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a Traffic
Violation Receipt (TVR). His driver's license had been confiscated because
he had been previously apprehended for reckless driving.
3.
4.
5.
Torts 5
On February 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court but reduced the award of moral damages to P1,000,000.00. The
G.
1.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES.[5]
We affirm the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that
petitioner Del Rosario was negligent. The evidence does not support
petitioners' claim that at the time of the accident, the truck was at the left
inner lane and that it was respondent Stephen Huang's car, at its right,
which bumped the right front side of the truck. Firstly, petitioner Del
Rosario could not precisely tell which part of the truck was hit by the car, [6]
despite the fact that the truck was snub-nosed and a lot higher than the
A.
car. Petitioner Del Rosario could not also explain why the car landed on the
opposite lane of C-5 which was on its left side. He said that "the car did not
pass in front of him after it hit him or under him or over him or behind
him."[7] If the truck were really at the left lane and the car were at its right,
B.
C.
and the car hit the truck at its front right side, the car would not have
landed on the opposite side, but would have been thrown to the right side
of the C-5 Highway. Noteworthy on this issue is the testimony of Dr. Marlon
HEREIN;
1.
2.
the other;
3.
D.
hour;
RESPONDENTS HEREIN;
4.
E.
Dr. Daza testified that given the foregoing assumptions, if the lighter
vehicle hits the right front portion of the heavier vehicle, the general
PETITIONER COMPANY;
direction of the light vehicle after the impact would be to the right side of
the heavy vehicle, not the other way around. The truck, he opined, is more
F.
would move to the right of, and away from the truck. Thus, there is very
little chance that the car will move towards the opposite side, i.e., to the left
174 | P a g e
Torts 5
of the truck.
ATTY. DIAZ:
Dr. Daza also gave a further study on the basis of the same assumptions
except that the car is on the left side of the truck, in accordance with the
And this was despite the fact that you were only traveling at the speed of
seventy five kilometers per hour, jumped over the island, hit the lamppost,
general direction of the car after impact would be to the left of the truck. In
and traveled the three lanes of the opposite lane of C-5 highway, is that
this situation, the middle island against which the car was pinned would
slow down the car, and enable the truck to catch up and hit the car again,
before running over it.[8]
WITNESS:
To support their thesis, petitioners tried to show the damages that the truck
Yes, sir.[10]
sustained at its front right side. The attempt does not impress. The
We therefore find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and
photographs presented were taken a month after the accident, and Rogelio
Pantua, the automechanic who repaired the truck and authenticated the
photographs, admitted that there were damages also on the left side of the
truck.
[9]
reasonable and prudent man would have done under the circumstances.
Worse still, petitioner Del Rosario further admitted that after the impact, he
lost control of the truck and failed to apply his brakes. Considering that the
car was smaller and lighter than the six-wheeler truck, the impact allegedly
caused by the car when it hit the truck could not possibly be so great to
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
cause petitioner to lose all control that he failed to even step on the brakes.
He testified, as follows:
ATTY. DIAZ:
Chapter.
May I proceed, Your Honor. You were able to apply the brakes, were you
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
sir?
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
WITNESS:
xxx
No more, sir, because I went over the island.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
ATTY. DIAZ:
functions.
WITNESS:
xxx
The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or
Yes, sir.
ATTY. DIAZ:
In other words, sir from the time your truck was hit according to you up to
the time you rested on the shoulder, you traveled fifty meters?
WITNESS:
Torts 5
a.
[13]
Stephen;
b.
Stephen;
3.
Truck Man. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that petitioner Del Rosario used a
Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of a truck during the driving tests.
Further, no tests were conducted on the motor skills development,
4.
5.
7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended before the accident which
occurred in 1996 was held twelve years ago in 1984.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced
the award of moral damages to P1,000,000.00.
It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide for a back-up
driver for long trips. At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario has
With regard to actual damages, Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides that
been out on the road for more than thirteen hours, without any alternate.
Mrs. Caamic testified that she does not know of any company policy
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
[14]
proved x x x." In the instant case, we uphold the finding that the actual
damages claimed by respondents were supported by receipts. The amount
the day of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a
respondent Stephen from December 20, 1996, the day of the accident,
reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was
not suspended or reprimanded.[15] No disciplinary action whatsoever was
Petitioners are also liable for all damages which are the natural and
taken against petitioner Del Rosario. We therefore affirm the finding that
petitioner Mercury Drug has failed to discharge its burden of proving that it
that his chances of walking again and performing basic body functions are
nil. For the rest of his life, he will need continuous rehabilitation and
therapy to prevent further complications such as pneumonia, bladder and
We now consider the damages which respondents should recover from the
rectum infection, renal failure, sepsis and severe bed sores, osteoporosis
petitioners.
the award of P23,461,062.00 for the life care cost of respondent Stephen
Huang, based on his average monthly expense and the actuarial
1.
2.
As compensatory damages:
probable life expectancy, the state of his health, and his mental and
176 | P a g e
Torts 5
physical condition before the accident. He was only seventeen years old,
nearly six feet tall and weighed 175 pounds. He was in fourth year high
school, and a member of the school varsity basketball team. He was also
class president and editor-in-chief of the school annual. He had shown very Maybe words cannot describe the anger that we feel towards the
good leadership qualities. He was looking forward to his college life, having
defendants. All the time that we were going through the crisis, there was
none (sic) a single sign of nor offer of help, any consolation or anything
De La Salle University, and the University of Asia and the Pacific. The
scholarship, but the accident prevented him from attending the basketball
probably met only once, when they found out, they make a call, they sent
card, they write small notes, but from the defendant, absolute silence. They
didn't care, and worst, you know, this is a company that have (sic) all the
resources to help us. They were (sic) on our part, it was doubly painful
[18]
because we have no choice but to go back to them and buy the medicines
that we need for Stephen. So, I don't know how someone will really have
banking career, get married and raise children. Taking into account his
what is his condition, or if there is anything that they can do to help us.[22]
On the matter of exemplary damages, Art. 2231 of the Civil Code provides
no bank has ever hired a person suffering with the kind of disability as
defendant acted with gross negligence. The records show that at the time
Stephen Huang's.
[19]
shows that he failed to step on his brakes immediately after the impact.
attorney's fees.
Had petitioner Del Rosario done so, the injuries which respondent Stephen
sustained could have been greatly reduced. Wanton acts such as that
[20]
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused
justified.
Richard and Carmen Huang testified to the intense suffering they continue
to experience as a result of the accident. Stephen recounted the
nightmares and traumas he suffers almost every night when he relives the
accident. He also gets depression when he thinks of his bleak future. He
of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 2006 and March 30, 2006,
respondent spouses and the rest of the family undergo their own private
suffering. They live with the day-to-day uncertainty of respondent Stephen
SO ORDERED.
Huang's condition. They know that the chance of full recovery is nil.
Moreover, respondent Stephen Huang's paralysis has made him prone to
many other illnesses. His family, especially respondent spouses, have to
make themselves available for Stephen twenty-four hours a day. They
have patterned their daily life around taking care of him, ministering to his
daily needs, altering the lifestyle to which they had been accustomed.
177 | P a g e
Torts 5
Petitioners question several factual findings of the trial court, which were
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, namely:[5]
1.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This petition started with a tort case filed with the Regional Trial Court of
2.
[1]
alleged that during the school year 1990-1991, Timothy was a Grade IV
3.
5, 1991, between 1 and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the boy's comfort room at
the third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of nature. He,
however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out. Timothy
4.
started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several
times for help. When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call
for help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went right through
and fell down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical
alleged malfunctioning;
An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by respondents
against the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors, namely Spouses
Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso Cruz, Carmelo Narciso and Luningning
Salvador, and the Administrative Officer of Marymount School, Ricardo
6.
Pilao. In its defense,[2] CLC maintained that there was nothing defective
about the locking mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy was
not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further maintained that it had
employees;
exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure
the safety, well-being and convenience of its students.
7.
After trial, the court a quo found in favor of respondents and ordered
negligence;
8.
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. The trial court disregarded the
corporate fiction of CLC and held the Spouses Limon personally liable
because they were the ones who actually managed the affairs of the CLC.
9.
Petitioners CLC and the Spouses Limon appealed the decision to the Court
of Appeals.
toto. Petitioners elevated the case to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules
Torts 5
whether the door knob specified in his plans during the construction [was]
Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The actually put in place. This is so because he did not verify whether the door
established exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly
knob he specified w[as] actually put in place at the particular comfort room
where Timothy was barred from getting outside. (TSN, pp. 19-20,
December 8, 1994).
The Court of Appeals held that there was no reason to disturb the factual
assessment:[10]
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
After having perused the records, We fail to see any indication of whim or
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are
facts of the case. That said, We deem it not to be within Our business to
(8) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
Petitioners would make much of the point that no direct evidence was
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify
presented to prove that the door knob was indeed defective on the date in
a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the Court of
question.
The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the
door could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points to the
On the basis of the records of this case, this Court finds no justification to
fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under
reverse the factual findings and consider this case as an exception to the
the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies
general rule.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to
plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to
for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect
Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of
their school toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact that a
student had to go through the window, instead of the door, shows that
damage to the right of another giving rise to an obligation on the part of the
actor to repair such damage. Negligence is the failure to observe for the
protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Fault requires the
was no such requirement under the Building Code. Nevertheless, the fact
approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was within reach of a
another.[8]
student who finds the regular exit, the door, not functioning. Petitioners,
with the due diligence of a good father of the family, should have
attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get out. Considering
instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite having been
notified of the problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on the window
The door knob was defective. After the incident of March 5, 1991, said door decisive. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is
knob was taken off the door of the toilet where Timothy was in. The
applicable where the employer is being held responsible for the acts or
architect who testified during the trial declared that although there were
omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.[12] In this case,
CLC's liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact
of its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly
179 | P a g e
Torts 5
maintained.
We, however, agree with petitioners that there was no basis to pierce
CLC's separate corporate personality. To disregard the corporate
existence, the plaintiff must prove: (1) Control by the individual owners, not
mere majority or complete stock ownership, resulting in complete
domination not only of finances but of policy and business practice in
respect to a transaction so that the corporate entity as to this transaction
had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) such
control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to
perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a
dishonest and unjust act in contravention of the plaintiff's legal right; and
(3) the control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or
unjust loss complained of. The absence of these elements prevents
piercing the corporate veil.[13] The evidence on record fails to show that
these elements are present, especially given the fact that plaintiffs'
complaint had pleaded that CLC is a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines.
On 9th and 10th points raised concerning the award of damages, the
resolution would rest on factual determinations by the trial court, affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, and no legal issue warrants our intervention.
SO ORDERED.
180 | P a g e
Torts 5
As a result of the incident, Perez, as well as the helpers on board the Isuzu
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Additionally, respondents averred that the mishap deprived them of a daily
Assailed in the present appeal by certiorari is the Decision[1] dated 29
[2]
For their part, petitioners capitalized on the issue of ownership of the bus in
question. Respondents argued that although the registered owner was Lim,
well as attorney's fees and costs of the suit in favor of respondent Spouses
the actual owner of the bus was SPO1 Cirilo Enriquez (Enriquez), who had
Antecedent Facts
On 7 March 1997, an Isuzu Elf truck (Isuzu truck) with plate number UAW
Transport is a business name registered under her name, and that such
[7]
the name of petitioner Elvira Lim (Lim) and driven by petitioner Mariano
C. Mendoza (Mendoza).[8]
After weighing the evidence, the RTC found Mendoza liable for direct
separate complaint for damages against Mendoza and Lim, seeking actual
personal negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and it also found
[10]
she is the registered owner of the bus in question. Although actually owned
of the case, at around 5:30 a.m., the Isuzu truck, coming from Katipunan
Road and heading towards E. Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, was travelling along
the downward portion of Boni Serrano Avenue when, upon reaching the
corner of Riviera Street, fronting St. Ignatius Village, its left front portion
was hit by the Mayamy bus.
[11]
bus, while traversing the opposite lane, intruded on the lane occupied by
1.
Avenue by one Traffic Enforcer Galante and a security guard of St. Ignatius
[13]
Village.
2.
Torts 5
3.
4.
5.
[18]
RTC, such were affirmed by the CA with the exception of the award of
The judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172
dated January 31, 2001, is MODIFIED, in that the award of P1,000.00 per
259.
[19]
[20]
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Torts 5
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
indemnified and the person causing the damage is charged with the
corresponding duty of repairing the damage. The reason for this is found in
the obvious truth that man should subordinate his acts to the precepts of
The first question to address, then, is whether or not Mendozas negligence prudence and if he fails to observe them and causes damage to another,
was duly proven. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the
he must repair the damage.[24] His negligence having caused the damage,
As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the CA, Mendoza was negligent in
person who has not committed the act or omission which caused damage
driving the subject Mayamy bus, as demonstrated by the fact that, at the
time of the collision, the bus intruded on the lane intended for the Isuzu
violation of traffic laws. Article 2185 of the Civil Code provides that unless
2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages in the action under said
article is the direct and primary negligence of the employer in the selection
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating
any traffic regulation. In the case at bar, Mendozas violation of traffic laws
In the case at bar, who is deemed as Mendozas employer? Is it Enriquez,
the actual owner of the bus or Lim, the registered owner of the bus?
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more
vicariously liable under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil
that in so far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
owner who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.
[22]
The evidence on record shows that before the collision, the Isuzu truck was As early as Erezo v. Jepte,[30] the Court, speaking through Justice Alejo
in its rightful lane, and was even at a stop, having been flagged down by a
security guard of St. Ignatius Village.
[23]
encroached on the lane rightfully occupied by said Isuzu truck, and caused
that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the
the latter to spin, injuring Perez, Anla, Banca, and Repisada, and
Having settled the fact of Mendozas negligence, then, the next question
Torts 5
sustained. They simply make good or replace the loss caused by the
of the vehicle and of the operator, in case of accident; and another is that
wrong.[34]
the knowledge that means of detection are always available may act as a
deterrent from lax observance of the law and of the rules of conservative
Article 2202 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes and quasi- delicts, the
defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and
the violator of the law or of the rules of safety shall not escape because of
lack of means to discover him. The purpose of the statute is thwarted, and
middleman between them and the public, and escape liability by the
the negligent act and, moreover, the claimant must adequately prove the
amount of such damage.
found that the total repairs on the Isuzu truck amounted to P142,757.40,
and that the full hospitalization and medical expenses of Perez, Anla,
damages.
However, with the enactment of the motor vehicle registration law, the
Isuzu truck caused them the loss of a daily income of P1,000.00, such
defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code - that the employee
claim was not duly substantiated by any evidence on record, and thus
acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due
[33]
Moral Damages. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party
to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable
As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold Lim vicariously liable
action.[35]
with Mendoza.
In prayers for moral damages, however, recovery is more an exception
This does not mean, however, that Lim is left without any recourse against
rather than the rule. Moral damages are not meant to be punitive but are
Enriquez and Mendoza. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment,
the actual employer of the driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code,
may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of
prove that he has suffered damages and that the injury causing it has
the claim.
sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil
Code. Moreover, the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of
Having identified the persons liable, our next question is what may be
a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish the factual
awarded.
basis of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant. [36]
Torts 5
the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; (3) and it is
done with intent to injure.[43] In the present case, it can hardly be said that
the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and 4) the
Mendozas negligent driving and violation of traffic laws are legal acts.
Moreover, it was not proven that Mendoza intended to injure Perez, et al.
[37]
All in all, we find that the RTC and the CA erred in granting moral damages
to respondents.
this:
[38]
Q: Aside from the actual damage that you have mentioned x x x, how much
more would you like this Court to award you by way of moral damages?
A: P100,000.00, sir.
A: P50,000.00, sir.
Q: What happened to you, what did you feel when the defendants failed to
Second, the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate,
A: I have incurred expenses and I was forced to apply for a loan, sir.
In Kierulf v. CA,
[39]
and the bar often enough that in order that moral damages may be
there must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental
suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as
cannot be awarded.
positive misconduct which will support a claim for punitive damages, the
courts have used such descriptive terms as willful, wanton, grossly
Moreover, respondents were not able to show that their claim properly falls
under Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Respondents cannot rely
on Article 2219 (2) of the Civil Code which allows moral damages in quasi-
damages are recoverable only by the injured party,[41] and in the case at
bar, herein respondents were not the ones who were actually injured.
them.[46]
In B.F. Metal (Corp.) v. Sps. Lomotan, et al.,[42] the Court, in a claim for
damages, exemplary damages are also in order, given the fact that
Mendoza was grossly negligent in driving the Mayamy bus. His act of
vehicle, when neither of them figured in the accident and sustained injuries. intruding or encroaching on the lane rightfully occupied by the Isuzu truck
shows his reckless disregard for safety.
Neither can respondents rely on Article 21 of the Civil Code as the RTC
erroneously did. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has
Torts 5
and consequently collided with a dump truck, the Court held the driver of
the bus grossly negligent and affirmed the award of exemplary damages.
Attorneys Fees. Article 2208 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances
Costs of suit. The Rules of Court provide that, generally, costs shall be
course, but the court shall have power, for special reasons, to adjudge that
either party shall pay the costs of an action, or that the same be divided, as
may be equitable. No costs shall be allowed against the Republic of the
Philippines, unless otherwise provided by law.
court.
reasonable.
Generally, interest is allowed as a matter of right for failure to pay
From the very opening sentence of Article 2208 of the Civil Code, it is
clearly intended to retain the award of attorneys fees as the exception in
our law, as the general rule remains that attorneys fees are not
recoverable in the absence of a stipulation thereto, the reason being that it
unliquidated in the sense that petitioners cannot know for sure, before
judgment, the exact amount that they are required to pay to respondents,
the award of actual or compensatory damages, however, such as the truck
repairs and medical expenses, is arguably liquidated in that they can be
measured against a reasonably certain standard.[55] Moreover, justice
would seem to require that the delay in paying for past losses which can be
made reasonably certain should be compensated through an award of
interest.[56]
In the case at bar, the RTC Decision had nil discussion on the propriety of
attorneys fees, and it merely awarded such in the dispositive. The CA
Decision, on the other hand, merely stated that the award of attorneys fees
Torts 5
SO ORDERED.
187 | P a g e
Torts 5
DECISION
back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely
unconscious.
"The marks revealed" that he had one or more fractures of the skull and
that the grey matter and brain mass had suffered material injury. At ten
TRENT, J.:
o'clock of the night in question, which was the time set for performing the
operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there
was little hope that he would live. His right leg was broken in such a way
Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741,
that the fracture extended to the outer skin in such manner that it might be
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the
general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000
"At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby
as claimed in the complaint" and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was
noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half
entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the
and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the
functions of the brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf,
had a slight weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. This latter
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court
weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult
erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and
the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the
mathematical calculations.
even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the
plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent,
chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum
and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his
of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could
as follows:
not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work
"As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his
south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side
Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the
center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having
sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the
was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post placed
effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the
there.
ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the
chauffeur.
"By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured
that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn
in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the amount awarded for
depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in the
permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of
188 | P a g e
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wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his
is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the
increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and
the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were
worth Pl,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to two months
and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the
hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was clearly established
that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of six months. The
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its
mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one
immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only
days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would
the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of
not prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the
amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part,
is P18,075.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an
an individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is
by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look
carefully into the terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.
order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and
the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the
"Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine
determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be
decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the
that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look
is entitled; and
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the
"Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General
Federal and State Governments in the United States," we may look to the
decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the
Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that said
Legislature, that:
person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that
First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties
Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his
vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U. S. vs, Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat,
720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs. State, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
189 | P a g e
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In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover
immunity from suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the
damages from the state for personal injuries received on account of the
negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created
disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, or
that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act
opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the
the state, being objects similar to those sought by the public school
question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of
system. In passing upon the question of the state's liability for the
the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended to change the
rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the part of
the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference, but
its officers or agents." (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269; Clodfelter
vs. State, 86 N. C, 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal.,
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893,
690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93
Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on Agency, sec. 319.)
"All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the
negligence against the state not allowed by the state board of examiners,
state where the cause of action arises out of either tort or contract, the rule
bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of
competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules
"By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It
does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of
otherwise provided."
action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose
any lawful defense."
"This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases,
arising under different facts, and in both it was held that said statute did not
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April
create any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed
16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)"
settling and determining all controversies which he may now have with the
the mill property of said George Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State
construing this statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth
of Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at
the lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of
said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha,
Wisconsin."
"Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims
liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit
had, by the terms of the statute of New York, jurisdiction of claims for
damages for injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff
see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's
had sustained, Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the
190 | P a g e
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state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its
in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to
liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the
examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the
because and only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original
basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is
not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the
petitioners by an executive official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in
"That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes
Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or
negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused
"That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case
the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions
wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense
in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and
fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office
branches of the public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the
This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of
the active administration and who on his own responsibility performs the
order that each branch of service serves the general weal and that of
functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which
private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the
are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May
can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person
capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations." (Supreme Court of "That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the
Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904,
in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
"That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations
which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the first article
thereof, No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a
which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or
technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner
laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in
the damage, the following article refers to third persons and imposes an
identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by
superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that
of the Civil Code." (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ.,
negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof, 146.)
however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903,
responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned
191 | P a g e
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It is, therefore, evident that the State (the Government of the Philippine
Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees
when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of
article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed,
without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make
itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the
plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its
employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds
therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with
the Legislature and not with the courts.
192 | P a g e
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RESPONDENT
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
DECISION
" 'That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor denying the claim
negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused
the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions
which according to the appellant's claim were destroyed by fire that came
Jose Frayno y Panlilio in igniting recklessly his cigarette-lighter near a branches of the public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the
five gallon drum into which gasoline was being drained, and of the officers
order that each branch of service serves the general weal and that of
private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the
City of Manila.
It is not necessary for us to pass upon the facts alleged by the appellant,
but only on the question whether, assuming them to be true, the Insular
The claimant contends that the Auditor General erred in not finding that the
government agency or instrumentality known as the Emergency Control
'That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case
wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense
in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and
fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office
liable for the damages sustained by the claimant under article 1903 of the
the active administration and who on his own responsibility performs the
not only for personal acts and omissions but also for those persons for
functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which
*
'That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the
"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but
not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom it
In the case of Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil.,
purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on
"*
Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said
properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which cast the provisions of entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the
193 | P a g e
Torts 5
(Supreme Court
The case of Marine Trading vs. Government, 39 Phil., 29, cited by the
appellant, is inapplicable, because the plaintiff in that case recovered under
the special provisions of articles 826, 827, 828 and 830 of the Code of
Commerce and the Philippine Marine Regulations of the Collector of
Customs, regarding collision of vessels, and not on the ground of tort in
general provided for in article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Act No. 327, in authorizing the filing of claims against the Government with
the Insular Auditor, and appeal by private persons or entities from the
latter's decision to the Supreme Court, does not make any and all claims
against the Government allowable, and the latter responsible for all claims
which may be filed with the Insular Auditor under the provisions of said Act.
194 | P a g e
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Jose City, for damages in connection with the death of their son resulting
from the aforestated accident.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
Francisco Fontanilla; and to pay the costs." (Brief for the petitioners
spouses Fontanilla, p. 4; Rollo, p. 132)
In G.R. No. 55963, the petition for review on certiorari seeks the affirmance
of the decision dated March 20, 1980 of the then Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII, at San Jose City, and its modification with
respect to the denial of petitioner's claim for moral and exemplary damages court denied in its Order of June 13, 1980. Respondent National Irrigation
and attorney's fees.
Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals (C.A.G.R. NO. 67237-R) where it filed its brief for appellant in support of its
position.
reversal of the aforesaid decision of the lower court. The original appeal of
this case before the Court of Appeals was certified to this Court and in the
Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case,
resolution of July 7, 1982, it was docketed with the aforecited number. And petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court.
in the resolution of April 3, 1989, this case was consolidated with G.R. No.
55963.
The sole issue for the resolution of the Court is: Whether or not the award
of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally
It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pick-up owned
Petitioners allege:
1.
paragraph 3 of Article 2206 of the New Civil Code which provides that the
injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital
where he died.
the death of the deceased. Should moral damages be granted, the award
should be made to each of petitioners-spouses individually and in varying
Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional same, which should not be less than P50,000.00 for each of them.
driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of
respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic
2.
Administration authorities.
The within petition is thus an offshoot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56)
before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII at San
195 | P a g e
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3.
special agent who was performing a job or act foreign to his usual duties.
Hence, the liability for the tortious act should not be borne by respondent
government agency but by driver Garcia who should answer for the
consequences of his act.
4.
This petition has been filed only for the purpose of reviewing the
findings of the lower court upon which the disallowance of moral damages,
6.
exemplary damages and attorney's fees was based and not for the
the selection and supervision of its employee, the matter of due diligence is
not an issue in this case since driver Garcia was not its special agent but a
The Solicitor General, taking up the cudgels for public respondent National
The filing of the instant petition is not proper in view of the appeal award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees can very well
be answered with the application of Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil
Code.
that the trial court decision does not categorically contain such finding.
2.
the appeal (CA-G.R. NO. 67237-R; and G.R. NO. 61045) of the respondent
National Irrigation Administration before the Court of Appeals, is an explicit
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
the findings of fact in the Court of Appeals, they present only questions of
law before this Court which posture confirms their admission of the facts.
3.
the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176
shall be applicable."
final as to the petitioners and for this reason alone, the petition should be
dismissed.
1.
2.
In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage
caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent.
196 | P a g e
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Under the aforequoted paragraph 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily
"(d)
assumed liability for acts done through special agents. The State's agent,
particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual
governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is
assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such
for its agent's tort. Where the government commissions a private individual damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driverfor a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within
the meaning of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984
Ed.)
This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the
character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand,
a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and
At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA
"proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents
away from the point of impact while Restituto Deligo was thrown a little bit
called the NIA for short, which shall be organized immediately after the
further away. The impact took place almost at the edge of the cemented
approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of portion of the road." (Underlining supplied) [page 26, Rollo]
Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces for the proper
conduct of its business.'
The lower court further declared that "a speeding vehicle coming in contact
with a person causes force and impact upon the vehicle that anyone in the
Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary functions.
vehicle cannot fail to notice. As a matter of fact, the impact was so strong
Thus -
as shown by the fact that the vehicle suffered dents on the right side of the
radiator guard, the hood, the fender and a crack on the radiator as shown
"Sec. 2. Powers and objectives. - The NIA shall have the following powers by the investigation report (Exhibit "E"). (Underscoring supplied) [page 29,
and objectives:
Rollo]
"(a)
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
"(b)
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area.
Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the
point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at
"(c)
a high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered
substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the fact that the
the system and reimburse within a certain period not less than twenty-five
NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible",
as shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have
been their normal and initial reaction.
197 | P a g e
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Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the
reason that they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and
yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the
driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under
the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach
their destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered
damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and
recklessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.
Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the
diligence in the selection and supervision (the latter aspect has not been
established herein) of the employee, still if he ratifies the wrongful acts, or
take no step to avert further damage, the employer would still be liable.
(Maxion vs. Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil. 597).
Thus, too, in the case of Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B.L.T. Bus Co. (L-26810,
August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618), this Court held that a driver should be
especially watchful in anticipation of others who may be using the highway,
and his failure to keep a proper look out for reasons and objects in the line
to be traversed constitutes negligence.
SO ORDERED.
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