Courchaine 1

Matthew F. Courchaine
Professor John K. Dunn, Esq.
BUS 345, section 1
September 28, 2016
George Washington: Reluctant Leader of an Impossible Rebellion
In David McCulloughs 1776, George Washington is described as a strapping man of
commanding presence [and] having so much martial dignity [] that you would distinguish
him to be a general and a soldier among 10,000 people (McCullough, 42-43). As one of his
most important generals, Nathaniel Greene of Rhode Island, described it, it seemed as though
the spirit of conquest breathed through the whole army (Ibid, 43). Perhaps one of the most
important factors in the Continental Armys ultimate victory in the American Revolution was this
devotion to Washington and to American independence, a devotion due in large part to his
charisma. However, Washingtons leadership capability notwithstanding, the position of
commander-in-chief of the Continental Army was position taken reluctantly, writing to his wife
Martha Custis that [] far from seeking this appointment, I have used every endeavor in my
power to avoid it (Ibid, 49), believing himself ill-experienced for the task. This was certainly
the case William Howe, the British commander, was not only significantly more experienced
than Washington, but commanded an army of soldiers with much better training and much better
equipment (Ibid, 77). Given the British militarys experience, the Continental Armys lack
thereof, and a host of other issues with the latter, the British should have easily suppressed the
so-called rebellion of the American Revolution. The Americans victory was largely due to
Washingtons leadership, however reluctant, and to several arguably lucky events throughout the
course of the war.

Courchaine 2
Washington himself was well aware of the advantage held from the outset by the British,
writing to his secretary Joseph Reed that The reflection upon my situation and that of this army
produces many an uneasy hour [] few people know the predicament we are in (Ibid, 79).
However, through the selection of officers similar in temperament, such as Greene and Henry
Knox, two officers more devoted and loyal than any of the others under his command. In these
two men, Washington found men who would never lose sight of what the war about, no matter
what was to come (Ibid, 111), persistence that would prove invaluable during the war. Greene
even went on to name his child after Washington (Ibid, 131). Certainly, a similar devotion was
inspired in all ranks of the Continental Army as Lt. Joseph Hodgkins states, I would not be
understood that I should choose to march, but as I am engaged in this glorious cause, I am
will[ing] to go where I am called (Ibid, 115). Washingtons leadership, and that from his
officers, was arguably invaluable in this time, given the amount of unruly behavior, cowardice,
and desertion with which he was dealing, on top of his disadvantage relative to the British. By
late spring of 1776, the Washington had approximately 7,000 soldiers that were fit for duty,
compared to the British militarys 30,000 (including the hired Germans, the Hessians) (Ibid 131).
On the whole, British soldiers were far better trained, better disciplined, better equipped, and
more regularly paid and were in far better health overall (Ibid, 166-67).
Washington did, unfortunately, have errors in judgment during 1776 that resulted in a
number of setbacks for the Continental Army, and for the movement for American independence
as a whole. One of the most significant and consequential of these errors was dividing his army
in his defense of New York and Long Island. Perhaps the most egregious part of this lapse in
judgment was that the Jamaica Pass road was left virtually unguarded only five militia men
were patrolling it, and were subsequently captured when they thought the column of the British
Army they encountered was the Continental Army. Following their defeat in the Battle of Long

Courchaine 3
Island, Washington and his officers had not only failed, they had been made to look like fools,
having ignored General Lees assertion that they must control the sea if they are to control New
York and Long Island (Ibid, 193). Further failure at Kips Bay resulted in a similar lack of
confidence, attributable to inadequate leadership by ill-trained, inexperienced officers, and a
woefully overworked commander-in-chief according to Henry Knox (Ibid, 215). The capture of
1,000 American soldiers in November at Fort Washington, and the capture of General Lee had
many in America convinced that the war for independence was going to be lost. As Thomas
Paine said, There are the times that try mens souls (Ibid, 251).
Ultimately, however, the tides turned in favor of the Continental Army. Washington was
able to retake Trenton and defeat the occupying Hessians at the conclusion of the year, and had
been granted emergency powers by Congress to rebuild the Continental Army by whatever
means necessary (Ibid, 287). It was through Washingtons leadership and some of the lucky
victories they experienced, namely those at Boston and Trenton, that the Continental Army was
able to stay resolute, and reinforced the confidence of those everywhere in the country who saw
Washington and his army as the one means of deliverance of American independence (Ibid,
291). The second half of 1776 led one to believe that the Americans would in fact lose the war,
but that had changed because of a small band of determined men and their leader (Ibid).
Certainly, the wars success was not entirely attributable to Washington or to his luck, but also to
support provided by France and the Netherlands. As McCullough succinctly concludes, give it
was how often circumstance, storms, contrary winds, the oddities or strengths of individual
character had made the difference (Ibid, 294).