Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No.

135385, December 6, 2000

Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically
enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural
resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and
3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was
dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources
somehow against the regalian doctrine.
G.R. No. 135385

December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO
CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES,
BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU
BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO
SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN,
TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING,
DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA
SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T.
PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY,
VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL
S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE
CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY,
CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO
CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO
C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O.

SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H.

MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN,
PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY,
LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG,
MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO,
JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING,
SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA,
NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T.
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI,
MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by
her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO
D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M.
EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR.,
SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTERPEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. 1 In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP),
the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998
their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the
petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor
General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and
prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the
IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and
members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene.
They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the
petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or
to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae
and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene
with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is
consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective
memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the
hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules
on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in
turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable
public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but
community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development
and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more
than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and
conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and
"ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and
ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an
ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of
Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples
shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession
and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall
be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No.
1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program
coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the
NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to
cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of
R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural
resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of
R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with
the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza
voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law,
which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by
the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of
R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration (CLR) to petition his inscription
as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only
presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring
that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed.
Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and
occupation as in the previous cases Cansino vs Valdez and Tiglao vs Government; and that the right of the
State over said land has prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some
time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the
absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of
such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was
never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the
insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by Cario for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute
owner.

Notes:
This case is closely related to the other Mateo Cario vs Insular Government case promulgated on March
25, 1907.
This case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The latter reversed this decision (as well as the 1907
case): Full Text Case Digest
The decision laid down by the US Supreme Court was a landmark case which helped in the protection of
indigenous communities.
G.R. No. 2869

March 25, 1907

MATEO
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.

CARIO, petitioner-appellant,

Coudert
Brothers
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.

for

appellant.

ARELLANO, C.J.:
Mateo Cario, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in the Court of Land
Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are,
and 13 centares, and situated in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together with a house erected
thereon and constructed of wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded as follows: On the north, in lines
running 1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cario, H. Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on
the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with the land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of
the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of 115 meters and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca;
and on the west, in lines running 982 meters and 20 decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cario and
Mayengmeng.
By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo and Vicente
Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the reason that the latter petition claimed a small
portion of land included in the parcel set out in the former petition.
The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the whole parcel of land is
public property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or through any
title of egresionfrom the State.
After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land Registration rendered its
judgment in these terms:
Therefore the court finds that Cario and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively and
adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on which Cario constructed the house
now there that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cario held possession for some years
afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title. Both petitions are dismissed and
the property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of exceptions, p. 15.)
The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court below are the
following:
From the testimony given by Cario as well as from that of several of the witnesses for the
Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884 Cario erected and utilized as a domicile
a house on the property situated to the north of that property now in question, property which,
according to the plan attached toexpediente No. 561, appears to be property belonging to
Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cario sold said house to one Cristobal Ramos, who in
turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim, moving to and living on the adjoining property, which
appears on the plan aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps Whitmarsh, a place where the father
and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega and Minse, had lived . . ..

In or about the years 1898 Cario abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located on the
property described in the plan attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a house thereon
in which he now lives, and which house is situated in the center of the property, as is indicated on
the plan; and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of the property now
claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)
1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the superficial extension of
the land described in the petition and as appears on the plan filed herein, such extension containing 40
hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, inasmuch as the documentary evidence accompanying the petition is
conclusive proof against the petitioners; this documentary proof consists of a possessory information
under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of the same month and year; and, according to
such possessory information, the land therein described contains an extension of only 28 hectares limited
by "the country road to the barrio of Pias," a road appearing on the plan now presented and cutting the
land, as might be said, in half, or running through its center from north to south, a considerable extension
of land remaining on the other side of the said road, the west side, and which could not have been included
in the possessory information mentioned.
2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is made in said possessory
information, and upon which is situated the house now actually occupied by the petitioner, all of which is
set forth as argument as to the possession in the judgment, is "used for pasture and sowing," and belongs
to the class called public lands.
3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin, presumptively belonged
to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by
private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State. And there is no
evidence or proof of title ofegresion of this land from the domain of the Spanish Government, nor is there
any possessory information equivalent to title by composicion or under agreement. 4, The possessory
information filed herein is not the title to property authorized in substitution for that of adjustment by the
royal decree of February 13, 1894, this being the last law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty
applicable to the present subject-matter of common lands: First, for the reason that the land referred to
herein is not covered nor does it come within any one of the three conditions required by article 19 of the
said royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of
six years last past; or that the same has been possessed without interruption during a period of twelve
years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information and during the three years
immediately preceding such information; or that such land had been possessed openly without interruption
during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated; nor is it
necessary to refer to the testimony given by the two witnesses to the possessory information for the
following reason: Second, because the possessory information authorized by said royal decree or last legal
disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or for the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right,
equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish Government and required and necessary at all times until
the publication of said royal decree was limited in time to one year, in accordance with article 21, which is
as follows: " A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify the possessory informations
which are referred to in articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators
and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full possession
reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the said possessors and cultivators or

their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general title of average in the event that the land
is sold within a period of five years immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included
under this chapter can only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in
accordance with common law."
5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cario, if it be certain that he
was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in case the Government or State
could have sold the same within the period of five years immediately following for example, if the
denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person, as appears from the
record of the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in such event, his possession as attested in the
possessory information herein could not, in accordance with common law, go to show any right of
ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from the expiration of twenty years from the
verification and registry of the same in conformity with the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law
and other conditions prescribe by this law.
6. The right of possession in accordance with common law that is to say, civil law remains at all
times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when pertaining
to royaltransferable or alienable lands, which condition and the determination thereof is reversed to the
government, which classified and designated the royal alienable lands for the purpose of distinguishing
them from those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which could at no time pass to private
ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal decree of February 13, 1894.
7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands and
particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands then
appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called public lands, the alienation of which was reserved to
the Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, 1 and in
conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by the Philippine Commission prescribing
rules for the execution thereof, one of which is Act No. 648, 2 herein mentioned by the petitioner, in
connection with Act No. 627,3 which appears to be the law upon which the petition herein is founded.
8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions contained in Act No.
190, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claims title under the period of
prescription of ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use thereof
from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits such prescription for the purpose of obtaining
title and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.) The
land claimed by Cario is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into consideration his petition, or an extension
of 28 hectares, according to the possessory information, the only thing that can be considered. Therefore,
it follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and now appealed from was strictly in accordance
with the law invoked herein.
9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same, according to
the testimony of Cario, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not determined. From all of
which it follows that the precise extent has not been determined in the trial of this case on which judgment
might be based in the event that the judgment and title be declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo
Cario. And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress in granting

ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cario and his children have already exceeded such amount
in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown in different cases decided by the said Court of
Land Registration, donations or gifts of land that could only have been made efficacious as to the
conveyance thereof with the assistance of these new laws.
By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err:
1. In finding that Mateo Cario and those from whom he claims his right had not possessed and
claimed as owners the lands in question since time immemorial;
2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that, on the contrary, it
was the property of the Government. (Allegation 21.)
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be entered in
accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from whence it came
for proper action. So ordered.

Chavez v Public Estate AuthorityGR No. 133250, July 9, 2002

Facts: On November 20, 1973, the government through the Commissioner of Public Highways signed a
contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore
and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the ManilaCavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed
land. On April 25, 1995 the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to develop the Freedom
Islands. This JVA was entered into through negotiation without public bidding. The Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
conducted a joint investigation. Among the conclusion are: that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI
under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA
cannot alienate these lands, the certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, President Ramos created a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the
JVA. The Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions of the Senate Committees. On April 27,
1998, Petitioner as taxpayer filed the instant petition for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and TRO. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the
reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA.
Furthermore, petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domains as blatant violation of
Sec 3, Art XII of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.
Petitioner assert that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billion of pesos in properties of the State that are of public
dominion.
Issue:Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit.
Ratio Decidendi:The petitioner has standing to bring the taxpayers suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply
with its constitutional duties. This duties are particularly in answer of the right of citizens to information on matters of public
concern, and of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the
public domain among Filipino citizens. Furthermore, the court considered that the petition raised matters of
transcendental importance tot eh public. The mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal

interest when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right. Also, ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and
prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities if the issues raise are
of paramount public interest and if they immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the people. The
amended JVA does not make the issue moot and academic since this compels the court to insure the government itself does
not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safe guard the national patrimony. The content of the amended JVA
seeks to transfer title and ownership of reclaimed lands to a single corporation. The court does not hesitate to resolve the
legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public.
The instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. Court can resolve this
case without determining any factual issue related to the case. The instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls
under the original jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose
to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply when the issue involved is purely legal or constitutional question. The right to information includes
official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement as required by the constitution. The
Supreme Court granted the petition. PEA and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are permanently enjoined from
implementing the amended JVAwhich is hereby declared null and void ab initio.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CELESTINA NAGUIAT

(GR.NO. 134209, Jan. 24, 2006)
Facts:
This is an application for registration of title to four parcels of land by CelestinaNuguiat located at
Botolan, Zambales. Applicant(respondent) alleges that she is theowner of the said parcels of land having
acquired them by purchase from the LIDCorporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria
Calderon, JosefinaMoraga, and Fausto Monje and their predecessor in-interest who have been
inpossession thereof for more than 30 years.The Republic filed an opposition to the application on the
ground that neitherthe applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusiveand notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since June12, 1945 orprior
thereto; that the monuments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do notconstitute competent and
sufficient evidence of a bonafide acquisition of the landsapplied for, and that the parcels of land applied
for are part of the public domainbelonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation.
Issue:Whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forestor other inalienable
lands of the public domain and the applicants registration of titlewill prosper.
Held:
Applicants registration of title for said parcels of land will not prosper because
the said land is a public forest lands. Forest lands unless declassified and released bypositive act of the
Government so that they may form part of the disposable andagricultural lands of the public domain, are
not capable of private appropriation.Forests, in the context of both Public Land act and the Constitution
classifyinglands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and nationalparks
do not necessarily refer to a large tract of woodland or an expanse covered bydense growth of trees and
underbrush.Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the propergovernment agency
or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for asalienable and disposable. For unclassified
land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverseoccupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long,
cannot ripen into privateownership and be registered as title.