Choice of Short-Term and Long-Term Debt in Five Eastern European Rai

Journal of International Business and Law
Volume 4 | Issue 1
Article 2
2005
Choice of Short-Term and Long-Term Debt in Five

Eastern European Countries
Anoop Rai
Victoria Danilevskaia
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl

Recommended Citation
Rai, Anoop and Danilevskaia, Victoria (2005) "Choice of Short-Term and Long-Term Debt in Five Eastern European Countries,"
Journal of International Business and Law: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol4/iss1/2
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Rai and Danilevskaia: Choice of Short-Term and Long-Term Debt in Five Eastern European
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW
CHOICE OF SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM DEBT IN FIVE

EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
By: Dr. Anoop Rai & Victoria Danilevskaial
I. Introduction
The capital structure of a firm refers to the proportion of debt and
equity maintained by a firm. In 1958, Nobel laureates Franco Modigliani and
Merton Miller published a paper theorizing that in a perfectly competitive
market with no taxes, asymmetric information or bankruptcy costs, the debtequity level of a firm is irrelevant in the valuation of a firm. Financial
economists thereafter have studied this issue extensively, proving the existence
of an optimal capital, but only by relaxing one of the assumptions.
The choice between debt and equity creates a problem because of the
different risk return characteristics associated with each type of financing. In
debt financing, the interest payments are tax-deductible offering significant
savings to the shareholders. However, too much debt increases the likelihood
of bankruptcy. requiring shareholders to demand a higher rate of return. The
use of debt also leads to conflicts between shareholders and creditors. At high
levels of debt, shareholders may opt for riskier projects than desired by
creditors. An equilibrium capital structure is attained at the point where the risk
and return of the two competing groups are satisfied.
Another area of interest in capital structure is the choice between
short- and long-term debt. Short-term debt is less expensive than long-term
debt but is riskier because they need to be renewed periodically. A firm may
find itself in a crisis if they are unable to renew their debt. usually because of
some negative news, real or otherwise. Most failures of large corporations are
precipitated by the unavailability of short term funding, as was the case for
Drexel Burnham Lambert. Enron and WorldCom. Long-term debt offers more
stability but is more expensive than short-term debt.
The ability to borrow short-term debt also depends on the maturity
and depth of the market. In the U.S., the market for short-term instruments like
commercial paper and repos (repurchase agreements) are well developed.
Consequently, large firms can access these funds quickly and efficiently. In
other countries, the lack of an efficient short-term capital market may limit
their choices of debt. When comparing the capital structure of firms in different
countries: not only does the cultural, social and institutional factors make an
impact but also the level of development of capital markets.
The focus of this paper is to examine the choice of short- and longterm debt by firms in five countries that moved from a centrally planned
economy to a market based system. These five countries, Russian Federation
The article ishascl on the Honor's ssy "xrittcnb \Victoria l)anilexskaia at Hofstra
Univ(rsit. undLr the surxnision of Profc.,cr Anoop Rai.
Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005
Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2

(RU) Poland (PO), Hungary (HU), the Czech Republic (CZ) and Slovakia (SL),
have yet to develop a well functioning capital market that is fully conducive for
private industries to operate competitively. Reforms have been slow to
implement and rules on corporate governance are not as transparent as those in
other major markets. Due to the limited choice of capital instruments, firms are
forced to optimize under constraints that include a lack of liquidity, legal
protection and transparency. Different factors will therefore play a role in
determining the choice of debt in each country. We first examine whether the
choice of debt is similar in the five countries. We next attempt to identify some
factors that can explain the differences.
II. Literature Review
A substantial volume of research has examined capital structure of
firms globally, with significant differences observed in different parts of the
world. We however focus our literature review on the capital structure of
European and Eastern European firms.
Wanzenried (2002) found that there are considerable differences
between the capital structure of the continental European countries and the UK.
In using financial data from 167 firms over a time period from 1989 to 1998,
Wanzenried found that British and continental companies finance an average of
16% of their assets with external long-term capital and both have higher
leverage as the firm size increases. European firms, however, raise most of
their funds through banks. which may also hold a large stake in the company.
In a time-series study, Bevan & Danbolt (2000) analyzed the
determinants of capital structure of 1,054 UK companies from 1991 to 1997.
Companies with high levels of growth opportunities are found to utilize more
long-term and short-term debt, although over time there is a shift towards
equity finance.
Antoniou, et. al. (2002) researched the capital structure of firms in
the UK, France, and Germany during the years 1969, 1983, 1987 and 2000.
The research indicates that the market interest rate plays a role in determining
levels of long-term debt. They conclude that companies preferred not to
borrow long-term when the market interest rates were high. France and
Germany had higher leverage than UK. which confirms the traditional belief
that European companies take on more debt, while UK firms prefer to use more
equity.
In a more comprehensive study, Rajan and Zingales (1995) analyzed
leverage of 8.000 companies from G-7 countries for the years of 1987-1991.
They did not find significant differences in leverage between bank-oriented and
Tangibility was found to be an important
market-oriented countries.
determinant of debt. Size had a positive correlation to leverage in all countries
except Germany while profitability was negatively correlated in all countries
except Germany. All the countries utilized public financing more heavily then
private financing based on the percentage of GDP. The US had by far the
highest utilization of private financing. but it was still small compared to public
capitalization. Japan and the UK., after the US, had the highest private
financing capitalization. while France and Italy had the lowest.
http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol4/iss1/2
The capital structure of a company is also affected by the legal

system of a country due to the laws that regulate the corporate governance of
firms. For example. the depth of legal protection affects investor protection,
which in turn can influence the choice of debt or equity. La Porta et al. (2000)
analyzed the effects of investor protection on dividends paid to shareholders in
33 countries around the world. They found that firms operating in protective
legal environments paid lower dividends. Fast growing companies in those
countries tended to pay smaller dividends than slow growing companies. In
poorly protected countries, shareholders opted to take any dividends they could
get, regardless of the investment quality.
Aussenegg and Jelic (2002) studied the effects of privatization in
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The study focused on 154
companies listed on the National Stock Exchanges in Poland on April 16. 1991,
Hungary on June 21, 1990 and the Czech Republic on April 6, 1993 and found
a decline in profitability, output, employment, efficiency, and sales per
employee. These results have not been experienced in industrial countries,
suggesting that the market economies have not fully matured. They also report
that leverage has remained constant except for slight increases in dividend
payout ratios.
Csermely and Vincze (2000) conducted a detailed research on the
privatization of firms in Hungary through 1996. Their study finds that firms in
Hungary have capital structures that resemble those of a transitional economy.
Foreign investment was found to be an important indicator of a firm's
creditworthiness.
Koke and Schroder (2003) analyzed the security exchanges in Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE). They found that the markets were significantly
smaller than that of Western Europe. Further, the CEE markets had a
capitalization of approximately 18% compared to the above 50% capitalization
rates in Western Europe. The Czech Republic. Hungary. and Poland had the
most developed stock exchanges. with the largest stock exchange in Poland.
The Warsaw exchange showed a continuous increase in listed companies while
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakian exchanges exhibited stagnant or
decreasing growth. The corporate bond markets were found to be insignificant
in all these countries, the largest being in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland.
There is not much literature on the use of short- and long-term debt
by firms in these countries. The few existing works on the analysis of capital
structure in Eastern European Countries have focused mostly on one or two
countries at a time. We focus on five countries at a time and test the
significance of four variables on the choice between short- and long-term debt.
The variables are size. tangibility, profitability and growth. The scope of the
paper is similar to Bevan & Danbolt (2000) who also focused on the choice
between short- and long-term debt.
III. Hypothesis
Four hypotheses are tested in this study. Since long-term debt and
short-term debt do not show high correlation, we are able test the variables

together. Unlike in developed countries, large companies in these five countries

are expected to prefer long-term debt because of the lack of a well-developed
equity market. Smaller banks may have no option but to opt for short-term bank
debt.
Hypothesis 1:
Company size is positively related to Long-term

Debt and negatively related to Short-term Debt.
Company size is hypothesized to be positively related to long-term

debt. Since the equity markets in Eastern European countries are not yet fully
developed, companies may be forced to rely on long-term debt.
Large
companies have the ability to borrow long-term debt because they have a lower
possibility of bankruptcy than smaller companies. Smaller companies are
likely to be considered riskier by investors for lending long-term. As
Wanzenried (2002) pointed out, larger firms are also less likely to face
bankruptcy than smaller firms because they usually have diversified portfolios.
Further, we expect to see changes between 1997 and 2000. If longterm equity markets are developing, then size and long-term debt may decrease
in 2000 relative to 1997. If equity markets continue to be under-developed, it is
likely that size and long-term debt will increase in 2000.
Hypothesis 2:
Tangibility is positively related to Long-term

Debt and negatively related to Short-term Debt.
The relationship between tangibility and debt levels should be

positive because tangible assets can serve as collateral for loans. In the
literature, fixed costs are often used as proxies for tangibility. The larger the
tangible assets, the higher the probability that the company will repay the loans.
since tangible or fixed assets such as machinery can be liquidated.
We therefore hypothesize that tangibility is positively related to longterm debt and negatively related to short-term debt.
Hypothesis 3:
Growth opportunities are negatively

related to Long-term Debt and
positively related to Short-term Debt.
Wanzenried (2002) and Bevan and Danbolt (2000) both hypothesize

that high growth companies have lower long-term debt. Wanzenried bases her
argument on the costs of long-term debt, which she believes are higher while
Bevan and Danbolt base their hypothesis on the empirical findings of other
studies. However, both studies are based on firms in developed markets.
Companies that exhibit higher growth rates are not necessarily more
profitable, since they need to invest a significant amount of money into
achieving further growth. If the equity markets in Eastern Europe are still
underdeveloped, then companies may seek to finance their growth through
debt. In terms of the choice between short- and long-term debt. it is likely that
growth companies are perceived to be riskier. Under such circumstances.
banks may be the only lenders willing to lend to risky companies through short-
term loans. However, it is also likely that growth companies will have the
capacity to borrow directly, domestically or internationally. This would result
in a positive relationship between growth and long-term debt.
Hypothesis 4:
Profitability is positively related to

Long-term Debt and negatively related
to Short-term Debt.
Profitability and leverage may have a negative or positive

relationship. If companies are profitable, they may take on debt to increase their
tax shields in line with the Modiglianni and Miller proposition. However,
empirically Rajan and Zingales (1995) find debt to be negatively related to
profitability.
As for the relationship between short and long-term debt, profitable
companies are more likely to have greater access to equity and long-term debt.
However, profitable companies may also have excessive risk that may make it
difficult for them to raise debt capital. Since debt and equity markets are still
not fully developed in the five countries, firms may have to rely more on bank
debt. Thus, the relationship between profitability and short- and long-term debt
is an empirical question.
V. Data:
The data consists of firms operating in Hungary, Poland, Russian
Federation. the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Income statement and balance
sheet data are available for the years 1992 to 2001 for a total of 259 companies,
with 46 in Russia, 93 in Poland. 44 in Hungary, 57 in Czech Republic, and 19
in Slovakia. Of them. 142 companies had data from five to nine years and 117
had data for less than five years. Russia and Slovakia had the least available
historical data. while Poland and Hungary had the most. There was not a
significant amount of data reported for years 1992 through 1994 except for
Poland and Hungary. We selected the years 1997 and 2000 for our study since
they had the most data. All data was obtained from Worldscope.
Exhibit A shows the breakdown of companies in each country by
industry groups. There are 5 transportation firms. 181 industrial firms, 24
banking firms, 41 utilities firms, and 8 insurance and financial firms. Industrial
firms dominated the sample with Poland having the largest number (67) and
Slovakia the lowest (17).
Exhibits B and C show the summary statistics of the data for the
years 1997 and 2000, respectively. The data is broken down by country. A
detailed description of these variables, provided by Thomson Data, is shown in
Exhibit D.
The 1997 data in Exhibit B shows that Russia has the largest average
assets followed by Poland. Poland had the largest long-term debt ratio while
Slovakia had the largest short-term debt ratio. Poland also had the highest profit
ratio followed by Hungary while Russia had the lowest. The Czech Republic
had the highest tangibility ratio.

The 2000 data in Exhibit C demonstrates that the Russian Federation

continues to have the largest firms in the sample by total assets. Although the
total assets for firms in all countries increased in local currencies, they declined
in dollar terms because of the exchange rates. Hungary and the Czech Republic
saw an increase in the use of long-term debt while they declined in other
countries. Hungary and Slovakia saw some increases in the use of short-term
debt while they declined for other countries.
VI. Tests and Results:
A standard regression is used to test the four hypotheses. We used
SAS to compute the following four equations.
SIZE = a + 3, (LTDi) + 32(STDi) + ri
TANGIBILITY, = a + 31 (LTD) + 032 (STD) + ci
GROWTHi = a + 3, (LTDi~n) + f2 (STD) + Fi
PROFITABILITY = a + 031(LTD) + P32(STD) + ei

Where i = ith firm. LTD = long-term debt and STD = short-term debt.
The regressions were run separately for each country and separately
for the years 1997 and 2000. We used LTD and STD as independent variables
instead of dependent variables to be consistent with Bevan and Danbolt (2000).
The results of the tests are given in Exhibit E for 1997 and Exhibit F for 2000
and are discussed below.
A. Size
Hypothesis I was tested by running a regression with long-term debt
(LTD) and short-term debt (STD) as the independent variables and Size as the
dependent variable. Our proxy for Size was the log of net sales. The
relationship between short-term debt (STD) and Size was positive for all
countries in 1997, but the result was significant only for Poland at the 1%
significance level. In 2000 the positive relationship remained the same for all
countries except Slovakia. but was significant again only for Poland at the 5%
level of significance. The results therefore do not indicate that the large firms
prefer to carry more short-term debt.
The relationship between long-term debt (LTD) and Size is also not
significant or consistent. In 1997 CZ. PO. and SL had a negative relationship
between LTD and Size. while HU and RU both had a positive relationship
between LTD and Size. However, since none of the results are significant. we
summarize that long-term debt is unrelated to size for the 1997 sample.
In 2000 there was a positive correlation between LTD and Size for all
countries, but only the results for CZ were significant at a 5% level. The
changes in the relationships from negative to positive are likely to be the result
of developments in the long-term debt markets.
In sum. it appears that no clear relationship between short-term and
long-term borrowing and company size can be established. Our results are
consistent with Bevan & Danbolt who also find no clear positive relationship
between debt and size.
B.
Tangibility
The second hypothesis, that tangibility is positively related to longterm debt, is tested by regressing LTD and STD against Tangibility as the
dependent variable. The ratio of fixed assets to total assets served as a proxy
for tangibility. There is a clear and significant negative relationship for all
countries between STD and Tangibility in 1997. The significance level is 10%
for HU and 1% for all others. The negative and significant relationship remains
the same for CZ and PO in 2000, but becomes insignificant for the other
countries.
The tests indicate that there is a positive correlation between LTD
and Tangibility for HU at a 1% significance level in 1997. The results for other
countries are mostly positive, but insignificant. In 2000 there is a significant
and positive correlation between LTD and Tangibility for CZ at a 5% level of
significance and for PO at a 1% level of significance. The remaining countries
have a positive relationship but are statistically insignificant.
Our findings are consistent with our hypothesis that tangibility is
negatively related to short- term debt and positively related to long-term debt.
These results are robust and suggest that firms with large fixed assets are more
likely to have longer-tem debt, most likely because fixed assets serve as
collateral against bankruptcy.
C.
Growth
The third hypothesis tests the relationships between LTD and STD as
the independent variables, while maintaining Growth as the dependent variable.
We estimate Growth only for year 2000, by estimating the difference between
log sales of 2000 and 1997. The growth for 1997 was not estimated because
the data prior to 1997 is scattered and incomplete. The results indicate that
there is a significant positive relationship between Growth and LTD for HU
and PO. Hungary has a 10% level of significance, while Poland has a 5% level
of significance.
The outcomes for STD and Growth are mixed and mostly
insignificant. CZ, HU. and SL had a negative relationship, while RU and PO
had a positive relationship. The t-value was only significant for CZ and HU, at
a 5% level of significance, providing no support for our hypothesis.
Thus it appears that growth firms are more likely to borrow long-term
debt than short-term debt.
D. Profitability
The final hypothesis tests the relationship between profitability and
debt by regressing the dependent variable Profitability against independent
variables Long-term Debt (LTD) and Short-term Debt (STD). Our proxy for
profitability is net sales divided by total assets.

The relationship was mostly negative between STD and Profitability

in 1997. but only significant at a 1% level for Poland. In 2000, the negative
correlation changed to positive for Poland but insignificant. Only Slovakia
had significant negative results, at a 10% level of significance.
The results in 1997 for LTD and Profitability were also mostly
negative and only significant at a 5% level for the Czech Republic. In 2000,
the results remained mostly negative, but were significant for Poland and
Slovakia at 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.
The findings suggest that profitability is negatively related to both
short- and long-term debt for both periods. A likely explanation is that
profitable companies may be using their own internal funds to finance their
capital requirements.
The tables also report estimates of the variance inflation factor from
the regressions. The results indicate that multicollinearity is not a factor in the
tests. Similarly, the estimates of the Durbin-Watson tests are also provided.
They too indicate no significant serial correlation. Thus, the regression
estimates should be considered as robust and reliable.
VII. Conclusion:
The focus of this study is to determine the factors that affect the
choice of short- and long-term debt of firms in the five Eastern European
countries of Russian Federation, Poland. Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech
Republic. These countries are in various stages of economic development,
specifically in the development of their capital markets. As these countries
move from a centrally planned system. firms have to finance their own capital.
If debt markets are underdeveloped, the firms are often forced to rely on bank
financing. As the capital markets develop, firms have the option of not only
obtaining equity financing but also choosing between short- and long-term
debt.
We specify four hypotheses related to the choice between short- and
long-term debt. First, large firms are hypothesized to prefer long-term over
short-term debt. Second. firms with more tangible assets are expected to have
more long-term debts, with tangible assets serving as collateral for lenders.
Third. we specify that growth may have a positive or negative relationship to
long-term debt. This is because even though growing firms may have the
ability to borrow long-term, they may be viewed as being too risky for longterm commitments. Fourth, similar to growth, profitable firms are also
hypothesized to have a positive or negative relationship with long-term debt.
A total of 259 firms from the five countries were obtained and tested
for two periods, 1997 and 2000. The overall results support some of the
hypotheses. Size does not appear to be an important factor and is not related to
either short- term or long-term debt. Tangible assets are a significant factor in
the choice of debt. The results indicate that firms with more tangible assets are
more likely to borrow long-term than short-term debt, consistent with
expectations. Similarly, high growth firms also show a positive relationship to
long-term debt. Although high growth firm may be considered riskier and are
more likely candidates for venture capital, the lack of such capital may explain
the positive relationship with long-term debt. Finally, profitability is shown to

have a negative relationship with both short- and long-term debt suggesting that
these firms are probably using their internal funds to meet their financing
needs.

REFERENCES
Antoniou, Antonios. Guney, Yilmaz and Paudyal, Krishna. 2002. Detenninants

of Corporate Capital Structure: Evidence from European Countries, Working
Papers, Centre for Empirical Research in Finance, University of Durham.
Aussenegg, Wolfgang and Jelic. Ranko, 2002, Operating Performance of
Privatized Companies in Transition Economies- The Case of Poland, Hungar,
and the Czech Republic, Working Papers, Vienna University of Technology,
The University of Birmingham.
Bevan, Alan A. and Danbolt. Jo, 2000, DYnamics in the Detenninants of
Capital Structure in the UK, Department of Accounting and Finance.
University of Glasgow.
Csermely. Agnes and Vincze, Janos. 2000, Leverage and Foreign Ownership in
Hungay, Russian and East European Finance and Trade, vol. 36. no. 3. pp. 630.
Koke, Jens and Schroder, Michael, 2003, The Prospects of CapitalMarkets in
Central and Eastern Europe, Eastern European Economics, vol. 41, no. 4. pp.
5-37.
La Porta, Rafael., Lopez-De-Silantes, Florencio., Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny.
Robert. 2000, Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World, The
Journal of Finance, Vol. LV, No. 1, pp. 1-33.
F. Modigilani and M. Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and
the Theory of Investment." American Economic Review (June 1958)
Rajan, Raghuram G. and Zingales, Luigi. 1995. What Do We Know about
Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data, The Journal of
Finance, Vol, L, No. 5, pp. 1421-1460.
Wanzenried, Gabrielle, 2002, Capital Structure Dynamics in UK and
Continental Europe, Working Papers, University of California Berkeley, Haas
School of Business and Institute of Economics, University of Bern.
10
Exhibit A
COMPANIES IN SAMPLE BY INDUSTRY GROUP
Countries: Russian Federation. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia
Country
Russian
Federation
Poland
Hungary
Czech
Republic
Slovakia
Total
Transportation
Industry Group
hIdustrial Banking
Utilities
24
1
1
1
67
32
41
0
5
17
181
Total
19
Insurance
Financial
0
46
17
2
3
4
7
11
4
2
1
93
44
57
1
24
0
41
1
8
19
259
Notes for Exhibits B and C

*
All data is stated in millions
* Exhibit B:
o
The exchange rates used in conversions:
" $0.00491/HUF- Hungary
" $0.02874/SKK - Slovakia
" $0.17/RUB - Russian Federation
" $0.02898/CZK - Czech Republic
" $0.28490/PLN - Poland
" Source: http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistorv
" Exhibit C:
o The exchange rates used in conversions:
" $0.003562/HUF - Hungary
" $0.02139/SKK - Slovakia
* $0.035050/RUB - Russian Federation
* $0. 02659/CZK - Czech Republic
* $0. 24213 1/PLN - Poland
* Source: http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistori
" LDEBT = Long-term debt over Total Assets
" SIZE = Log of Sales
" SDEBT + Total Liabilities - Long-term debt over Total Assets
*
PROF = Net Income over Total Assets
* TANG = Fixed Assets over Total Assets
*
GROWTH = Log of 2000 Sales - Log of 1997 Sales
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23

Choice of Short-Term and Long-Term Debt in Five Eastern European Rai

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Choice of Short-Term and Long-Term Debt in Five Eastern European Rai

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Journal of International Business and Law

Choice of Short-Term and Long-Term Debt in Five

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl

CHOICE OF SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM DEBT IN FIVE

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2

The capital structure of a company is also affected by the legal

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2

together. Unlike in developed countries, large companies in these five countries

Company size is positively related to Long-term

Company size is hypothesized to be positively related to long-term

Tangibility is positively related to Long-term

The relationship between tangibility and debt levels should be

Growth opportunities are negatively

Wanzenried (2002) and Bevan and Danbolt (2000) both hypothesize

Profitability is positively related to

Profitability and leverage may have a negative or positive

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2

The 2000 data in Exhibit C demonstrates that the Russian Federation

PROFITABILITY = a + 031(LTD) + P32(STD) + ei

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2

The relationship was mostly negative between STD and Profitability

the positive relationship with long-term debt. Finally, profitability is shown to

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2

Antoniou, Antonios. Guney, Yilmaz and Paudyal, Krishna. 2002. Detenninants

Notes for Exhibits B and C

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

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