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7. Closing & re-opening of sections of industry, temporary stoppage of work and right and liabilities
of the employer and workmen arising therefrom.
8. Termination of employment, and notice thereof to be given by employer and workmen.
9. Suspension or dismissal for misconduct, and acts or omission which conduct misconduct.
10. Means of redress for workmen against unfair treatment or wrongful exactions by the employer or
his agents or servants.
11. Any other matter which may be prescribed.
any industry to which the provisions of Chapter VII of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act,
1946 apply; or
any industrial establishment to which the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961 apply:
Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1961, the provisions of this Act shall apply to all industrial establishments
under the control of the Central Government.
Statuary in nature
Earlier the High Courts were divided on issue whether IESOA is statuary in nature or not. While most of
Courts titled on the side of statutory nature of contract, like in case of Tata Chemical Ltd. v. Kailash C.
Adhvaryu 1965 (Gujarat) & Behar Journals Ltd. v. Ali Hasan 1959 (Patna).
Both High Court said that the certified Standing Orders have statutory force . And it is binding
on the employer and the workmen, therefore it could not be possible in law for partiesto enter into
a contract overriding the statutory contract under certified Standing Order and any contract contrary
to this orders must be ignored.
These views of High Court received the approval of Supreme Court in Bagalkot Cement Company Ltd. v.
Pathan (K. K.). 1962 followed by Workmen of Dewan Tea Estate v. Their Management 1964 in which
Court held that: Standing Orders can only be overridden by specific provision of the Act, which may have
been introduced after the Standing Order was certified.
In Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Company 1984 it was clearly stated by Supreme Court
that the conditions of service laid down in the Standing Order is either Statutory in character or has the
statutory flavor.
ii.
The Other view is that of the Standing Orders is a special kind of contract. In Buckingham and Carnatic
Co. v. Venkatayga 1964, Justice Gajendragadkar said: The certified standing order represent the
relevant terms and conditions of service in a statutory form and they are binding on the parties at least as
much, if not more, as private contract embodying similar terms and conditions of services.
In Mettur Industries v. Verma 1958 Madras High Court observed that: Reading the Act as whole it is
clear that the Standing orders from part of the contract between the management and every one of its
employees.
iii.
Award
This is argued on the basis of Section 4(b) which says that it shall be function of certifying officer to
adjudicate upon the fairness and reasonableness of the provisions of any standing orders.
In Indian Air Gases Mazdoor Sangh v. Indian Air Gases Ltd. 1977 in which it was ruled that the function
of the certifying officer is quasi judicial.
However under Section 2(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Standing Orders cannot be an award.
Who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 or the Army Act, 1950 or the Navy Act, 1957; or
Who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or
Who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
Who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six
hundred rupees per month or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the
office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial
nature.
(iii)
In a factory, any person named under 4[clause (f) of sub-section (I) of section 7, of the
Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948)], as manager of the factory;
In any industrial establishment under the control of any department of any Government in
India, the authority appointed by such Government in this behalf, or where no authority is so
appointed, the head of the department;
In any other industrial establishment, any person responsible to the owner for the supervision
and control of the industrial establishment.
Certification Process
According to section 3(1) of IESOA requires every employer of an industrial establishment to submit
draft Standing Orders i.e. , rules relating to matter set out in the Schedule proposed by him for adoption
in his industrial establishment.
Section 4 sets out certain condition for certification of Standing Orders which are as follows:
a) Provision is made therein for every matter set out in the schedule which is applicable to the
industrial establishment; and
b) They are otherwise in conformity with the provisions of this Act; and
c) They are fair and reasonable.
The draft of standing orders should contain every matter set out in the schedule of the Act with the
additional matter prescribed by the Government as are applicable to the industrial establishment.
In Indian Express Employees Union v. Indian Express (Madurai) Ltd. 1998 the Kerala High Court held
that the framing of the Standing Orders is to be conformity with the provisions of the Act. In Rashtriya
Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. v. General Secretary, FCI Workers Union 1997 the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court held that the word conformity means that it should not be inconsistent.
Prior to 1956 the Certifying Officer has no power to question the reasonableness and fairness of the draft
standing orders submitted to him by the employers, his only function was to see that the draft must
incorporate all matters contained in the schedule and that it was otherwise certifiable under the Act. In
1956, the Parliament amended the Act and thereby no only considerably widened the scope of the Act
through Section 4 which imposed a duty upon the Certifying Officer and the appellate authority to
adjudicate upon the fairness and reasonableness of the Standing Orders. If they find some provisions are
unreasonable they mist refuse to certify the same. (A.G. Mazdoor Sangh v. Indian Air Gases Ltd. 1997)
Appeal Section 6
An aggrieved party may appeal to the appellate authority within thirty days from the date on which the
copies of the standing orders were sent to it by the certifying officer. The order of the authority shall be
final.
Section 6(1) empowers the appellate authority to do only two things:
I.
II.
Confirm the standing orders in the form certified by the certifying officer
Confirm the standing orders after amending them by making the necessary modifications or
additions.
The certified standing orders become enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date on which the
authenticated copies of the same are sent to the parties by the certifying officer. If an appeal has been
filed, it shall come into operation on the expiry of 7 days from the date on which copies of the order of the
appellate authority are sent to the parties.
PENALTIES
Section 13(1) prescribes a fine extending to rupees 5,000 on those employers who fail to submit draft
Standing Orders under Section 3, or who modifies his Standing Orders otherwise than in accordance with
Section 10. If the offence is continuing one, he shall be liable for further fine extending to rupees 200
every day after the first during which the offence continues.
The Act also imposes a fine extending to rupees 100 upon employer who contravenes any provision for
the finally certified Standing Orders under the Act. If the offence is a continuing one he shall be liable to a
further fine extending to 25 rupees every day after the first during which the offence continues.[Section
13(2)].
But in order to be prosecuted for the aforesaid offence the prior sanction of the appropriate Government is
essential [Section 13(3)]. However, no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial
Magistrate of the second class shall try any offence under this Section [Section 13(4)].
However IESOA does not invest the Labour Court with the power to grant relief in enforcement of the
rights and liabilities created by the Standing Orders.