2013 - A Literature Review of Cognitive Biases in Negotiation Processes - Caputo

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A literature review of cognitive biases in

negotiation processes
Article in International Journal of Conflict Management September 2013
DOI: 10.1108/IJCMA-08-2012-0064
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Caputo, Andrea (2013) A literature review of cognitive biases in negotiation processes.
International Journal of Conflict Management, 24 (4). pp. 374-398. ISSN 1044-4068
Abstract
Purpose What is the disciplines current grasp of cognitive biases in negotiation processes?
What lessons can be drawn from this body of literature? The purpose of this paper is to review and
discuss the limited research on cognitive biases in the context of negotiations.
Design/methodology/approach This article reviews research from judgment and decisionmaking, conflict management, psychology, and management literatures to systematize what we
already know about cognitive biases in negotiations.
Findings Decision-making studies have mainly identified 21 biases that may lead to lower
quality decisions. Only 5 of those biases have been studied relating to negotiations: the anchoring,
the overconfidence, the framing, the status quo and the self-serving bias. Moreover, negotiation
literature has identified 5 additional biases that affect negotiation processes: the fixed-pie error, the
incompatibility error, the intergroup bias, the relationship bias and the toughness bias. Biased
behavior differs across cultures and emotional mood.
Research implications Implications for future research include building comprehensive
models of how negotiators can overcome cognitive biases, studying interconnections between
different biases, increasing complexity of the studies to provide practitioners with more practical
advice.
Originality/value The literature reviewed in this paper spans diverse disciplines and
perspectives. This paper can be a starting point for researchers interested in understanding how
cognitive biases affect negotiations. Moreover, it could be a starting point for future research on this
field.
Keywords: Negotiation, Decision making, Bias, Heuristic, Cognition.
Paper type: literature review
Caputo, Andrea (2013) A literature review of cognitive biases in negotiation processes. International Journal of Conflict Management, 24 (4). pp.
374-398. ISSN 1044-4068
A literature review of cognitive biases in negotiation

processes
Introduction
Negotiations are essential and fundamental moments of life. Improving negotiation skills, as
well as increasing the ability to negotiate effectively, is crucial in managerial, political, and business
contexts. Simons bounded rationality (1957) acknowledges that individuals, while attempting to
make rational decisions, often lack important information and the relevant criteria of problems, and
prior literature in psychology has demonstrated that negotiators do not always act rationally.
What is the disciplines current grasp of cognitive biases in negotiation processes? What
lessons can be drawn from this body of literature? Decision-making studies about cognitive biases
have mainly focused on individual decision-making. However, negotiation decisions are often made
in conjunction with other parties, which may commonly have different interests (Bazerman and
Carroll, 1987, Fisher et al., 1981, Lax and Sebenius, 1986, Lewicki et al., 2005, Pruitt, 1981, Raiffa,
1982, Thompson, 2001, Walton and McKersie, 1965, Zartman, 1977). As individual decisions are
often affected by cognitive biases, which rarely make these decisions completely rational1, the same
applies to negotiated decisions between several parties.
The topic of cognitive biases within negotiations has been analyzed in the International
Journal of Conflict Management on a few occasions with reference to the perception of fairness
(Paese and Yonker, 2001) and multilateral negotiations (Traavik, 2011). Some recent reviews of the
literature on cognitive biases appeared in the literature, but they focused only on biased decisionmaking processes (i.e. Bazerman and Moore, 2009, Brooks, 2011, Eberlin and Tatum, 2005,
Morgeson and Campion, 1997).
Although it is commonly seen as an important topic, the investigation of cognitive biases in
the field of negotiations is under-researched. A gap in the literature is identified in journal articles
systematizing the intersection of negotiation studies, from the group decision-making literature, and
cognitive biases studies, and from the judgment and decision-making literature. While Thompson,
Nadler and Lount (2006) critically reviewed the implications of biased decision-making processes
for negotiations, this work intends to help to fill this gap through a systematic review of the
literature that bridges the two areas of research.
The aim of this study is to systematically review those studies in the management literature
that analyzed the concept of bias within the negotiations field, and to suggest a series of new
research trajectories that might emerge as a result. In fact, cognitive misperceptions can highly bias
human behavior when making judgments and decisions in negotiations. In this paper I provide a
theoretical background on decision makers cognition to introduce the research and provide context;
then the literature is systematically reviewed and its results are discussed. This leads me on to
conclude that limited research, with alternate results, has been done with reference to the interaction
between biases, on the role of culture, mood and personality, and on the effects of learning and
experience on negotiators judgment. Finally, I suggest that further trajectories of research might be
In this paper the term rationality refers to the decision-making process that is logically expected to
lead to the optimal result, given an accurate assessment of the negotiators values and risk preferences
(Bazerman and Moore, 2009: 4)
374-398. ISSN 1044-4068
3
on integrative and multilateral negotiations, on the role of third parties, and, finally, on a more deep
understanding of how to overcome biases in negotiations.
Theoretical framework
This section of the paper presents a brief introduction about the so-called Negotiation Theory
and about Judgment and Decision-Making literature, which have been used during the research as
theoretical background. Among this literature, it is commonly acknowledged that negotiation is a
process through which two or more parties could reach a needed joint decision, while having
different preferences (Fisher et al., 1981, Gulliver, 1977, Lax and Sebenius, 1986, Lewicki et al.,
2005, Pruitt, 1981, Raiffa, 1982, Rubin and Brown, 1975, Zartman, 1977). Due to the
interdependence (Thompson, 1967) that reigns over and inside multi-actor decision-making
processes, negotiation-outcomes are affected by the decisions taken by all the parties involved. This
can make decision-making in negotiation even more complicated than individual decision-making
(Bazerman and Moore, 2009). Thus, the quality of the negotiated agreement is affected by the
rationality of those decisions that led to the agreement: this implies that the decisions and behaviors
of each party matter.
Decision-making studies can most often be divided within three perspectives: the normative,
the descriptive, and the prescriptive (Bell et al., 1988). In particular, the normative approach has
tended to find the rules of individual behaviors. This approach is founded on the economic concepts
of absolute rationality and optimization, and takes into account how decisions should be made.
Economists, through the so-called Game Theory, were the first to provide normative advice to
negotiators and decision-makers. The primary advantage of those studies is that, given absolute
rationality, they provide the most precise prescriptive advice available to negotiators (Bazerman and
Moore, 2009). The descriptive approach, conversely, has tended to study how decision are really
made, basing its analysis on real observation and on the concepts of bounded rationality (Simon,
1957). Descriptive studies have contradicted Game Theorists rely on two aspects: the human ability
to be fully informed about all options, combinations and associated outcomes, and the human
ability to act in a fully rational way. Finally, the prescriptive approach has tried to merge the former
approaches to study how decisions could be made better (Bell et al., 1988).
As an alternative to Game Theory, Howard Raiffa (1982, 2002) was among the first to
develop a decision-analytic approach to negotiations, focusing on how erring individuals actually
behave. His goal was to provide guidance for negotiators involved in real conflicts, given the most
likely profile of the other parties expected behavior. Thus, a prescriptive theory has been
developed as he tried to give advice in real situations. Other interdisciplinary studies have built the
so-called Negotiation Theory, in order to consider how a rational negotiator should behave in real
negotiations (Fisher et al., 1981, Komorita, 1985, Kramer, 1991, Lax and Sebenius, 1986, Lewicki
et al., 1992 1992, Raiffa, 1982, Sheppard, 1984, Walton and McKersie, 1965, Zartman, 1977). The
Negotiation Theory takes into account the negotiations structure and the other negotiator
(Hammond et al., 2001), as well as the common errors that negotiators and their opponents make
(Bazerman et al., 1992, Bazerman et al., 2000, Thompson, 2001).
This theory implies that humans are not perfectly rational, and have emotional and cognitive
limitations (Cyert and March, 1963, Simon, 1957). Furthermore they lack a perfect and common
knowledge of a situation and of the possible interests and behaviors of the counterpart (Lax and
Sebenius, 1986). The negotiating structure is composed of three basic elements: i) the parties
involved, ii) the subjects or issues under negotiation, iii) the preferences, and thus the interests and
374-398. ISSN 1044-4068
4
positions of the parties. Consequently, a rational negotiator should assess the key information about
each partys alternative to a negotiated agreement (Fisher et al., 1981), each partys set of interests,
and the relative importance of each partys interests (Lax and Sebenius, 1986, Raiffa, 1982, Raiffa
et al., 2002). Those studies have provided plenty of tools to increase the negotiators performance in
achieving satisfactory agreements, but are we so rational to use it when we need it?
During the last four decades, bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) served as the integrating
concept for the field of behavioral decision research. Simons bounded rationality (1957)
acknowledges that individuals, while attempting to make rational decisions, often lack important
information and relevant criteria of problems. Additionally, decision-makers have time and cost
constraints that limit the quality and quantity of information, and they retain only a relatively small
amount of those. Finally, decision-makers cannot calculate the optimal choice in a variety of
alternatives, due to perceptual errors and computational limitations. Consequently, decision-makers
simply search until they find a satisfactory solution that leads to an acceptable level of performance.
In addition, some studies have begun to relate individual errors to motivational and emotional
influences (i.e. Alloy and Abramson, 1979, Bodenhausen et al., 1994, Park and Banaji, 2000).
Stemming from Herbert Simons studies on bounded rationality, the literature has addressed
the issue of cognitive biases affecting decision-making processes, trying to explain why human
misperceptions can occur. According to cognitive studies (i.e. Neale and Bazerman, 1985,
Thompson and Hastie, 1990), negotiation processes can be better understood when they are viewed
as cognitive decision-making tasks, where individuals construct mental representations of the
conflict situation, the issues, and the other parties positions. This involves the examination of how
negotiators information-processing capabilities influence negotiators judgment formation and
behavioral processes. In this regard, the aim is to identify the faulty assumptions of negotiators
cognition during negotiation processes (i.e. Bazerman and Carroll, 1987, Pruitt and Carnevale,
1993, Thompson and Hastie, 1990).
Regarding human cognition, Stanovich and West (2000) have made a distinction between
System 1 and System 2 within cognitive functioning. The first is intuitive, automatic, effortless,
implicit and emotional, while the second is reflective, slower, conscious, determined and rational
(Kahneman, 2003). On the one hand, the automatic system, or gut feeling, is rapid and is or feels
instinctive: when we duck because a ball is thrown at us unexpectedly or we get nervous when our
airplane shakes because of turbulence (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Gut feelings can be quite
accurate, but people, even executives, often make mistakes because they rely too much on the
automatic system (Chung, 2004). On the other hand, the reflective system is more deliberate and
self-conscious. We use it when deciding which route to take for a trip, or which course to attend the
following semester. Since System 1 is faster than System 2 in making decisions, people have
developed thousands of simplifying strategies or rules of thumb, so-called heuristics.
We use rules of thumb to help us make judgments; although they can be very helpful, their
use can also lead to systematic biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Heuristics are simplifying
strategies to cope with complex issues and problems. Newell and Simon (1972) defined the
heuristics as those cognitive shortcuts that the human brain tends to use when its decision-making
process is limited, in terms of time and availability of data. Heuristics produce correct or partially
correct judgments and it may be inevitable that people will adopt some of them (Bazerman and
Moore, 2009). Unfortunately, they often lead to systematic biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
The bias is the human tendency to make systematic errors in certain circumstances based on
cognitive factors rather than evidence (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). These errors, are much more
likely to occur in System 1 thinking than in System 2 (Bazerman and Moore, 2009).
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The literature chiefly presents the following heuristics:
i)
the availability heuristic exists when people assess the frequency, probability, or likely
causes of an event by the degree to which instances or occurrences of that event are
readily available in memory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973);
ii)
the representativeness heuristic exists when making a judgment about an individual, an

object, or an event, people tend to look for traits it may have that correspond with
previously formed stereotypes (Nisbett and L., 1980);
iii)
the confirmation heuristics appears when people use selective data when testing
hypothesis, such as instances in which the variable of interest is present (Baron et al.,
1988, Klayman and Ha, 1987);
iv)
the affect heuristics is based on the fact that judgments are mostly evoked by an
affective, or emotional, evaluation that occurs even before any higher-level reasoning
takes place (Kahneman, 2003);
v)
the bounded awareness affects the information selection process of individuals; in order
to avoid information overload people often filter information unconsciously and
automatically. This could lead to ignore or neglect useful, observable, and relevant data
(Bazerman and Chung, 2005);
vi)
the risk aversion concerns the fact that individuals treat risks relating to perceived gains
differently from risks relating to perceived losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979);
vii)
individuals emotions could lead to errors and biases in correlation with positive and
negative moods. In particular, a good mood and happiness increases the reliance on
heuristics (Alloy and Abramson, 1979, Bodenhausen et al., 1994), while a negative
mood decreases reliance on stereotypes or heuristics? (Park and Banaji, 2000).
These heuristics not only concern particular individuals, they can be applied by almost
everyone, as research has demonstrated (i.e. Bazerman and Moore, 2009, Brooks, 2011, Eberlin and
Tatum, 2005, Plous, 1993, Wickham, 2003, Workman, 2012). According to Bazerman and Moore
(2009) common biases can be associated and categorized with the emanating heuristic as shown
in table 1.
----------------------------------Table 1 - Common biases and emanating heuristics
Bias
Description
1
Ease of recall
Individuals judge events that are more easily recalled from memory,
based on vividness or recency, to be more numerous than events of
equal frequent instances, which are less easily recalled.
2
Retrievability
Individuals are biased in their assessments of the frequency of events
based on how their memory structures affect the search process.
3
Insensitivity to base
When assessing the likelihood of events, individuals tend to ignore
rates
base rates if any other descriptive information is provided - even if it
is irrelevant.
4
Insensitivity to sample When assessing the reliability of sample information, individuals
size
frequently fail to appreciate the role of sample size.
5
Misconceptions of
Individuals expect that a sequence of data generated by a random
chance
process will look "random", even when sequence is too short for those
expectations to be statistically valid.
6
Regression to the mean Individuals tend to ignore the fact that extreme events tend to regress
towards the mean on subsequent trials.
Emanating Heuristics
Availability Heuristics
Availability Heuristics
Representativeness
Heuristics
Representativeness
Heuristics
Representativeness
Heuristics
Representativeness
Heuristics
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6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
The conjunction fallacy Individuals falsely judge that conjunctions - two events occurring Representativeness
are more probable than a more global set of occurrences of which the Heuristics
conjunction is a subset.
The confirmation trap
Individuals tend to seek confirmatory information for what they think Confirmation Heuristics
is true and fail to search for disconfirmatory evidence.
Anchoring
Individuals make estimates for values based upon an initial value Confirmation Heuristics
derived from past events, random assignment, or whatever
information is available - and typically make insufficient adjustments
from that anchor when establishing a final value.
Conjunctive - and
Individuals exhibit a bias toward overestimating the probability of
Confirmation Heuristics
disjunctive - events
conjunctive events and underestimating the probability of disjunctive
bias
events.
Overconfidence
Individuals tend to be overconfident of the infallibility of their
Confirmation Heuristics
judgments when answering moderately to extremely difficult
questions.
Hindsight and the curse After finding out whether or not an event occurred, individuals tend to Confirmation Heuristics
of knowledge
overestimate the degree to which they would have predicted the
correct outcome. Furthermore, individuals fail to ignore information
they have that others do not when predicting others behavior.
Information selection
Individuals tend to ignore accessible, perceivable, and important
Bounded Awareness
information, while paying attention to other equally accessible but
irrelevant information.
Inattentional blindness Individuals fail to see the obvious because it violates common
Bounded Awareness
assumptions about our visual awareness. People have the tendency not
to see what they are not looking for, even when they are looking
directly at it.
Change blindness
Individuals tend to fail to notice visual change in their physical
Bounded Awareness
environments.
Focalism
Individuals tend to focus too much on a particular event and too little Bounded Awareness
on other events that are just as likely to occur.
Framing
Individuals have different perceptions and different reactions based on Risk aversion
how the problem is posed to them. Alternative wordings of the same
objective information can significant alter the decisions that people
typically make despite the fact that differences between frames should
have no effect on the rational decision.
Status quo
Individuals tend to maintain the status quo rather than acting to
Risk aversion
improve their outcomes.
Emotion and cognition Emotional response is often in disagreement with the decision that an Affect Heuristics
collision
individual would make after more thoughtful reasoning.
Self-serving
When presented with identical information, individuals perceive a
Affect Heuristics
situation in dramatically different ways, depending on their role in the
situation.
Emotional bias
A good mood increases the reliance on heuristics and results in more
Emotions
biased judgments.
Source: adapted and integrated from Bazerman and Moore (2009:41)
----------------------------------In terms of these biases, one of the most straightforward interpretations was provided by
Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa (2001), who proposed the concept of hidden traps in decisionmaking for considering all those situations in which the human brain abnormally deviates from
deciding rationally. In sum, cognitive misperceptions can highly bias human behavior when making
judgments and decisions, and this is true in negotiations too (Thompson et al., 2006).
Method
This section of the article describes the method used to produce the systematic literature
review (i.e. Cook et al., 1997, Cooper, 1998, Denyer and Tranfield, 2008, Tranfield et al., 2003),
which is a method of conducting research that emerged within the UK medical profession because
of the need for better evidence-based research. Since then it has been used across many disciplines,
374-398. ISSN 1044-4068
7
including management research (Thorpe et al., 2005). The aim is to collect and link together as
many already existing studies as possible, relevant to the defined topic of research. The basic
principles behind adopting a systematic review method are (Thorpe et al., 2005): i) transparency; ii)
clarity; iii) focus; iv) unifies research and practitioner communities; v) equality; vi) accessibility;
vii) broad coverage; viii) synthesis.
This systematic review followed three stages: planning the review; conducting the review;
and finally reporting and dissemination (Tranfield et al., 2003). Thus, consistent with several recent
systematic assessments of the management literature (Crossan and Apaydin, 2010, David and Han,
2004, Newbert, 2007), a set of criteria has been established. A review panel was formed by some
academics with the aim of defining the field of research, choosing the keywords and the databases,
and developing the inclusion and exclusion criteria. The research string was developed through the
previous knowledge on the negotiation literature and through the advice of experts panels in the
field of study. The chosen root search string was set in order to broaden the reviews scope.
As shown in table 2, the following set of criteria has been established. The review comprises
English peer reviewed journal articles only, by using ProQuest as the research platform2. The
substantive relevance of the articles focusing on negotiation theory was ensured by requiring all the
selected articles to contain the word negotiation*. In addition, in order to ensure the substantive
relevance of the articles focus on biases, it has been requirement was set for all the selected articles
to contain the word bias*. A total number of 84 results, after checking for duplicates, was taken
into consideration for a critical abstract reading to ensure substantive context. Finally, a
snowballing technique was adopted to support the results from the previous phases.
----------------------------------Table 2 - Summary of the results
Phase Description
3
4
5
6
Total
All the articles containing the "bias*" and "negotiation*" search words in their
84
abstract
All the articles whose abstracts are substantively relevant
23
All the articles whose texts are relevant
19
Snowballing technique
25
Source: Elaboration on the dataset
----------------------------------The final number of articles for the research piece was 25, covering a time span between 1985
and 2012. This size is consistent with the results of other reviews published in management journals
in the last decade (i.e. Abatecola et al., 2011, Brooks, 2011, Cafferata et al., 2009, Campbell-Hunt,
2000, Carpenter et al., 2004, Dalton et al., 1998, Eberlin and Tatum, 2005, Ketchen et al., 1997,
Stankovic and Luthans, 1997).
Results of literature review

This section shows the findings from the 25 relevant articles, on which some
recommendations, expressed in the next sections, are drawn from. Some statistics on the articles
time and journal distribution are provided too. Figure 1 lists the temporal trends of the articles. One
can see a consistent interest in the researched topic during the time period.
2
The chosen databases were ABI/INFORM Complete, Accounting & Tax, Banking Information Source,
ProQuest Asian Business & Reference and ProQuest European Business.
374-398. ISSN 1044-4068
8
----------------------------------Figure 1 - Articles' distribution over the time period
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0
1985
1987
1990
1992
1993
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2002
2004
2007
2008
2010
2011
2012
0.5
Source: elaboration on the dataset.
----------------------------------Table 3 categorizes the overall population per academic journal. Results show that the works
within the dataset are published in 16 different international journals. Many of these journals are
classified as top journals by most of the existing international journal ratings. Results show a strong
interest on the presented topic coming from Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, as 36 % (N = 9) of the articles have been published by this journal.
----------------------------------Table 3 - Articles' distribution per journal
N
Journal
Articles
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Group Decision and Negotiation
Academy of Management Journal
Accounting, Organizations and Society
Games and Economic Behavior
International Journal of Business and Social Science
International Journal of Conflict Management
Journal of Applied Psychology
Journal of Consumer Policy
Journal of Economics and Business
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Journal of World Business
Judgment and Decision Making
The American Economic Review
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vanderbilt Law Review
Total
9
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
25
----------------------------------Caputo, Andrea (2013) A literature review of cognitive biases in negotiation processes. International Journal of Conflict Management, 24 (4). pp.
374-398. ISSN 1044-4068
9
Within the population, most of the articles are laboratory experiments (76 %, N = 19), four
articles (16 %) are surveys and two articles (8 %) are theoretical. Studies on laboratory experiments
use all multiple dyad negotiation simulations, while they are heterogeneous in regard to the size and
nature of their samples, thus warranting additional discussion. The number of samples used fall in a
range between 48 and 302 participants in the experiments (Mean = 174,26, SD = 70,42). The type
of participants used for the experiments can be grouped in three categories: 57,89% (N = 11) of the
population used undergraduate students, 36,83% (N = 7) used graduate students, and 5,26% (N = 1)
used managers. No significant correlations emerge between the type of participants and the bias
studied in the experiments.
Considering the distribution of the bias analyzed, a descriptive set of statistics is presented
below. From the articles, eleven biases have been studied, all of which are presented below. In
general, every study analyzed one bias, but the few of them that analyzed two biases have been
counted twice in order to provide normalized statistics, as shown in Table 4.
----------------------------------Table 4 - Distribution of Bias
N
Bias
Studies
Fixed-pie error
17,86%
Framing
17,86%
Self-serving
17,86%
Anchoring
14,29%
Emotional bias
7,14%
Overconfidence
7,14%
Incompatibility error
3,57%
Intergroup bias
3,57%
Relationship bias
3,57%
10
Status quo
3,57%
11
Toughness bias
3,57%
Total biases in the dataset
28
100,00%
----------------------------------Almost all the studies in the population dataset analyzed the bias in a dyadic negotiation
context, only one, very recent study undertook the experiment in a multiparty negotiation context
(Traavik, 2011).
Regarding integrative and distributive negotiations, 48% (N = 12) of the studies used a
distributive negotiation context, 32% (N = 8) of the studies used an integrative negotiation context,
while 12% (N = 3) of the population used both integrative and distributive contexts. However, 8%
(N = 2) of the studies have been considered not applicable for these categories, but no significant
correlations emerge between these categories and the bias studied.
In term of the context of the negotiation used for the analysis of the bias, seven different
contexts have been found as shown in the table below.
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10
----------------------------------Table 5 - Negotiations context
N
Negotiation's context
Buyer-seller
Studies
13
52,00%
Labor
20,00%
Legal
8,00%
Accounting
4,00%
Crisis
4,00%
Producer-director
4,00%
Climate change
4,00%
N/A
4,00%
25
100,00%
Total
----------------------------------The Buyer - Seller context is the most used within these studies, and it has been used mostly
in those studies analyzing anchoring bias, fixed-pie error and framing effects. Moreover,
simulations regarding labor negotiations have been mainly used by those analyzing the self-serving
bias. While the emotional bias has only been analyzed within negotiations on crisis and producerdirectors conflict on a movie project. The main findings from these studies are taken into analysis
in the following section of the paper.
Discussion
In this section, the findings from the literature review are discussed in order to systematize
knowledge and to draw some recommendations and implications for future research. According to
the biases found in the articles, the articles are grouped within the dataset into 11 clusters, as shown
in table below, namely Fixed-pie error, Framing, Self-serving, Anchoring, Emotional
bias, Overconfidence, Incompatibility error, Intergroup bias, Relationship bias, Status
quo and Toughness bias.
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11
----------------------------------Table 6 - Bias studied
N Bias
1
Framing
2
Fixed-pie error
Self-serving
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Anchoring
Emotional bias
Overconfidence
Incompatibility error
Intergroup bias
Relationship bias
Status quo
Toughness bias
Study
Neale and Bazerman (1985); Bazerman, Magliozzi and Neale (1985); Neale, Huber and
Northcraft (1987); Bottom and Studt (1993); Chang, Cheng and Trotman (2008)
Thompson and Hastie (1990); Gelfand and Christakopoulou (1999); Mumpower, Sheffield,
Darling and Miller (2004); Larrick and Wu (2007); Traavik (2011)
Thompson and Loewenstein (1992); Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff and Camerer (1995);
Babcock, Wang and Loewenstein (1996); Gelfand, Higgins, Nishii, Raver et al. (2002);
Kriss, Loewenstein, Wang and Weber (2011)
Ritov (1996); Whyte and Sebenius (1997); Kristensen and Garling (2000); Wilson (2012)
Gladwin and Kumar (1987); Kramer, Newton and Pommerenke (1993)
Neale and Bazerman (1985); Kramer, Newton and Pommerenke (1993)
Thompson and Hastie (1990)
Lewis (2011)
Reb (2010)
Korobkin (1998)
Heifetz and Segev (2004)
Source: elaboration on the dataset
----------------------------------Framing
The framing effect emerges as the starting point of the studies on cognitive biases in
negotiation. According to it, individuals manifest varying perceptions and reactions based on how
the problem is posed to them. In particular, decision-makers treat the prospect of gains differently
than the prospect of losses, and this directly interacts with their risk propensity (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). A variety of published literature analyzed the sources of framing influences on
negotiator behavior (Neale et al., 1987), the impact of framing influence on negotiation outcome
(Bazerman et al., 1985, Bottom and Studt, 1993, Neale and Bazerman, 1985), and the effects of
framing on perceptions of fairness (Chang et al., 2008). Changing the frame of the situation results
in a very different predicted outcome. According to Neale and Bazerman (1985), when positive
frames exist, risk aversion dominates, and a negotiated settlement is predicted. Further research
(Bazerman et al., 1985) found that positively framed negotiators completed significantly more
transactions than negatively framed negotiators, consistent with Kahneman and Tversky's (1979)
Prospect Theory. Based on those studies, it appears that both parties become risk-seekers when
considering potential outcomes in terms of what they have to lose (negative frame), while if they
evaluate potential outcomes in terms of gains (positive frame), they become risk-averse which
increases the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. Positively framed bargainers seem to be more
cooperative, more likely to settle, achieve greater profits, and achieve greater joint benefits than
negatively framed bargainers do (Bazerman et al., 1985, Neale and Bazerman, 1985, Neale et al.,
1987).
Neale, Huber and Northcraft (1987) found that the rights, obligations, and expectations
associated with a role within the negotiation, frame the participants social interactions. In addition,
Bottom and Studt (1993), sought to develop a comprehensive explanation of the role of framing and
analyzed it in terms of the integrative and distributive aspects of bargaining. Risk attitude and
framing affects the approach negotiators take in dealing with the dilemma between claiming
value and creating value (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). Negatively framed bargainers appear to
perform better than their positively framed counterparts in distributive situations, and appear to be
more affected by self-serving bias (Chang et al., 2008). Notwithstanding, the latter appears to reach
more integrative settlements than the formers (Bottom and Studt, 1993). This implies further
explanation. A risk-seeking negotiator should be more willing to employ tactics that threaten both
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bargainers with the disagreement outcome, also called claiming tactics (Lax and Sebenius, 1986).
Because risk-averse negotiators want to avoid disagreement, they should be unlikely to engage in
these risky tactics and should be susceptible to exploitation from those who do employ them.
Fixed-pie and Incompatibility error
Scholars have been studying the fixed-pie error to answer the question on why do negotiators
frequently fail to reach integrative agreements, or win-win solutions (i.e. Bazerman and Moore,
2009, Lax and Sebenius, 1986, Raiffa et al., 2002). Studies on the fixed-pie error mainly focus on
negotiators perceptions, specifically on the accuracy of negotiators perceptions of both the
negotiation process and the counterparts interests and preferences (Gelfand and Christakopoulou,
1999, Thompson and Hastie, 1990). The fixed-pie (or fixed-sum) judgmental error is defined as
the tendency to assume that the other party places the same importance or has the same
priorities as the self on the to-be-negotiated issues when the potential for mutually beneficial
trades exists (Thompson and Hastie, 1990: 101). This means that negotiators may fail to accurately
understand their counterparts interests, judging that ones own interests are diametrically opposed
to ones opponent (Gelfand and Christakopoulou, 1999, Mumpower et al., 2004, Pruitt and Lewis,
1975). The fixed-pie perception often concludes with a faulty decision because most situations
provide an opportunity for joint gain (Lax and Sebenius, 1986, Raiffa, 1982). Incompatibility error
occurs in integrative negotiations when negotiators assume the other party's preferences for
alternatives are incompatible with their own in cases in which their preferences are perfectly
compatible (Thompson and Hastie, 1990:113). Thompson and Hastie (1990) found that this error
is not related with the fixed-sum error, even if the theory predicted it to be, and it affects a
significant number of negotiators.
Negotiators often demonstrate modest levels of interpersonal understanding, as measured in
terms of predictive accuracy regarding the other negotiator's payoff. However, research showed that
an accurate interpersonal understanding was most strongly associated with better payoffs
(Mumpower et al., 2004, Thompson and Hastie, 1990, Traavik, 2011). Thus, the fixed-pie bias is
erroneous and can reasonably be expected to impede the achievement of integrative agreements
(Gelfand and Christakopoulou, 1999, Mumpower et al., 2004, Thompson and Hastie, 1990). The
fixed-pie bias can be considered a bias only within integrative negotiations. In fact, in distributive
problems the fixed-pie perception is not a bias, but reflects the accuracy of the understanding of the
problem structure (Mumpower et al., 2004).
Thompson and Hastie (1990) found that individuals enter negotiation situations with fixed-pie
perspectives and often fail to realize that their counterparts have priorities opposite to theirs by the
end of negotiations. This has been shown to be more prevalent in the United States, because of the
individualistic culture, as compared to Greece, a collectivistic culture (Gelfand and
Christakopoulou, 1999). Interestingly, this suggests that cultural processes might be involved in the
perpetuation of such biases. Negotiators mainly seem to begin the negotiation with accurate
perceptions and then become less accurate as a result of the negotiation dynamic. One implication
of these biases is that negotiators, over time, may become overconfident about their negotiating
abilities (Gelfand and Christakopoulou, 1999, Larrick and Wu, 2007).
Another negotiation characteristic that could affect fixed-pie errors is the number of parties
involved. In this regard, Traavik (2011) demonstrated that the more the parties the higher the fixedpie bias, in addition, dyads outperform groups on both the economic and subjective measures of
outcomes. As a consequence of the fixed-pie bias, in distributive negotiations, two related errors
emerge: the small-pie bias and the large-slice bias (Larrick and Wu, 2007). Negotiators consistently
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13
underestimate the size of the bargaining zone the small-pie bias and, by implication,
overestimate the share of the surplus they claim the large-slice bias (Larrick and Wu, 2007).
Self-serving and Anchoring

Self-serving bias is commonly defined in literature as a judgmental error that effect individual
perception of a situation in a self-serving way. Drawing upon psychological research documenting
systematic biases in individual judgments of fairness, scholars speculate that predictions of judicial
decisions will be systematically biased in ways that favor the individuals position. In particular,
this bias has been analyzed with regard to distributive negotiations (Babcock et al., 1995, Gelfand et
al., 2002, Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992). Self-serving has mainly been found as a predictive
cause of impasse during the negotiation process: high self-serving bias leads to rejecting a
counterparts offers, as they are perceived as unfair (Babcock et al., 1995, Gelfand et al., 2002,
Kriss et al., 2011, Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992). This is particularly true in an individualistic
culture, such as the United States (Gelfand et al., 2002). Based on Messick and Sentis (1979) study
on egocentric judgments of fairness, Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) state that egocentric biases
in negotiation may stem from biased encoding of information, selective recall, or differential
weighting of information. In sum, even though negotiators were presented with identical, unbiased
information about a dispute, they recalled more information that favored their own position. This
leads them to come to different conclusions about what a fair settlement would be and base their
predictions and behavior on their own views of what is fair (Babcock et al., 1995, Gelfand et al.,
2002, Kriss et al., 2011, Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992).
The anchoring effect relates to the decision-making process when individuals make estimates
for values. Anchoring on unreliable information appears to pose a significant risk to the quality of
individual judgment, even when objectively appropriate anchors are available, the recency effect
wins (Whyte and Sebenius, 1997). In addition, the same kind of anchoring effects have been
observed among experienced managers and students (Whyte and Sebenius, 1997). The anchoring
effect in negotiations has been typically analyzed through buyer-seller simulated experiments where
participants negotiated about a price settlement (Kristensen and Garling, 2000, Ritov, 1996, Whyte
and Sebenius, 1997). The so-called competitive market simulation (Bazerman et al., 1985) has been
mainly used to explore anchoring effects in negotiation. Research shows also that the anchoring
effect is related to the way the schedule of payoffs given to participants is framed (Ritov, 1996).
Anchoring could manifest itself in negotiation in a variety of ways. For example, anchoring could
affect the initial positions, aspirations, or bottom lines of negotiators (Ritov, 1996, Whyte and
Sebenius, 1997, Wilson, 2012). Initial offers were found to significantly affect final profit, serving
as anchors for both parties during the negotiation process. This has been demonstrated in controlled
experiment (Ritov, 1996) as well as in real negotiations (Wilson, 2012). Even if an anchor should
not affect the reservation price, results support the hypothesis that subjects anchor their reservation
price on unreliable information (Kristensen and Garling, 2000).
Emotional bias and Overconfidence

Little attention has been given to understanding how emotional processes influence
negotiations, and the few studies that have been executed combine emotional bias with negotiators
overconfidence. Overconfidence is a bias emanated by confirmation heuristics that lead to
individuals tending to become overconfident in the infallibility of their judgments (Bazerman and
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Moore, 2009, Kramer et al., 1993, Neale and Bazerman, 1985). This reduces concessionary
behavior and negotiator success in reaching agreement (Neale and Bazerman, 1985:37).
Emotional bias is a bias that depends on the emotional mood in which an individual is when
he/she has to make a decision. In general, a good mood increases the reliance on heuristics and
results in more biased judgments (Bazerman and Moore, 2009). Gladwin and Kumar (1987),
presented a contingency model of crisis negotiation, stating that crisis perception induces strong
negative affects within a bargaining unit, and that this induced affect restricts and biases cognition
by an increased reliance on heuristics. This assumption was later demonstrated by Kramer, Newton,
and Pommerenke (1993) in an experimental study. They found that positive mood contributed to
negotiator overconfidence and overly positive self-evaluation, in addition, positive mood facilitates
integrative behavior (Kramer et al., 1993).
Intergroup bias, relationship bias, status quo and toughness bias

An evolution within the studies leads, in the recent years, to the identification of new biases
affecting the negotiation process, such as the intergroup bias and the relationship bias. Intergroup
bias was analyzed by Lewis (2011) in a study based on a survey that revealed how, in a negotiation
context, performance expectations for group members are unrealistically inflated and that
evaluations of group performance might be based on unrealistic expectations. Both could affect the
counterparts selection process, which is called relationship bias and has been found by Reb (2010).
As negotiation preparation also includes the searching and selection for potential counterparts with
whom to negotiate (Raiffa et al., 2002), an influence in this process by situational determinants of
past negotiations experience emerges.
Status quo bias meets little focus in the respective articles studied. Korobkins (1998)
evidence suggest that individuals negotiating contracts have a preference for inaction, that exists in
situations in which legal defaults and standard form contracts will govern absent action. Which
means a biased judgment against alternative solutions. Finally, Heifetz and Segev (2004), in a
theoretical study, found support for the existence of a toughness bias, which is similar to the socalled endowment effect that affect sellers behavior (Kahneman et al., 1990). In the course of
bargaining a buyer with a toughness bias believes the object is worth to him less than the objective
worth (Heifetz and Segev, 2004).
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Table 7 - Biases influences and effects in negotiations

Bias
Influenced by
Framing
How the problem is

posed; Role in the
negotiation.
Fixed-pie
Culture; Number of
parties; Learning
and experience;
Interpersonal
understanding.
Self-serving
Role in the
negotiation; Culture;
Interpersonal
understanding.
Anchoring
Overconfidence
Emotional Bias
Learning and
experience; Recency
effect
Mood; Learning and
experience;
Precedent
negotiations
Mood
Evidenced
interactions with
other biases
Supposed
interactions with
other biases
Anchoring; Selfserving;
Overconfidence;
Fixed-pie
Relationship bias;
Emotional bias
Overconfidence;
Framing; Selfserving; Relationship
bias
Confirmation trap
Framing; Fixed-pie
Overconfidence;
Relationship bias;
Confirmation trap
Framing
Self-serving
Likelihood for agreement (-)
Emotional Bias;
Framing; Fixed-pie
Relationship bias;
Self-serving
Performance in integrative
negotiations (+)
Overconfidence
Effect on
Positive framing: Likelihood for
agreement (+); Performance in
integrative negotiations (+);
Performance in distributive
negotiations (-).
Negative framing: Likelihood for
agreement (-); Performance in
integrative negotiations (-);
Performance in distributive
negotiations (+)
Performance in integrative
negotiations (-); Performance in
distributive negotiations (+);
Satisfaction (+)
Likelihood for agreement (-);
Performance in distributive and
integrative negotiations (-);
Satisfaction (-); Impasse (+);
Perception of fairness (-)
Performance in distributive and
integrative negotiations (+/-);
Perception of fairness (+/-)
Overconfidence;
Framing; Selfserving
Legend: (+) means a positive correlation with the variable, i.e. positive framing is associated with an increased likelihood for
agreement; (-) means a negative correlation with the variable, i.e. negative framing is associated with low performances in
integrative negotiations; (+/-) means the effect on the variable depends, i.e. anchoring is associate with performance and depends
on the anchor (low, high).
Relationship
Bias
Precedent
negotiations
Counterpart selection (+)
Fixed-pie
Table 7 shows a synthesis of prominent findings within the analyzed literature, by relating
each bias with those variables that have influence on it and the effect on the negotiation. In the right
section, interactions with other biases, as presented in the literature or supposed from the
systematization of the literature, are presented. For example, the role played in the negotiation leads
to different frames of the situation and affects self-serving interpretation of information.
Consequently, depending on which role individuals are playing, even when presented with identical
information set, this will affect the probability of reaching a negotiated settlement (Thompson and
Loewenstein, 1992), the final profit achieved (Bazerman et al., 1985, Bottom and Studt, 1993,
Neale and Bazerman, 1985), and finally the satisfaction over the negotiation experience (Babcock et
al., 1995, Gelfand et al., 2002, Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992).
Implications and conclusions

Cognitive biases were deeply addressed by decision-making literature. Prevalent literature has
implied that individuals are not perfectly rational and they have emotional and cognitive limitations
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(Cyert and March, 1963, Simon, 1957). Cognitive misperceptions mainly arise from the systematic
biased judgment emanated by heuristics, that are simplifying strategies to cope with complex issues
and problems (Newell and Simon, 1972, Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Less was done with
reference to negotiating contexts. The present study found only 23 articles, which analyze how,
why, and when cognitive biases affect negotiations. We all negotiate in almost every field of our
life, managers also negotiate almost everywhere. As is known, negotiation processes are affected by
a strong interdependence that reign over them, thus negotiation outcomes are affected by the
decisions of all the bounded rational parties involved. In sum, cognitive misperceptions can highly
bias the human behavior when making judgments and decisions, even in negotiations.
Decision-making studies have mainly identified 21 biases that may lead to lower quality
decisions, and not all of them have been analyzed within the negotiation literature. Only 5 of those
biases have been studied: the anchoring, the overconfidence, the framing, the status quo and the
self-serving bias. Moreover, negotiation literature has identified 5 additional biases that affect
negotiation processes: the fixed-pie error, the incompatibility error, the intergroup bias, the
relationship bias and the toughness bias. These biases were studied in the last decade, while the
others have been studied mostly in the 80s and 90s. Thus, it can be assumed an evolutionary process
in the literature on bias in negotiation. A process that may need additional efforts to be further
developed. A systematic research program grounded in the management literature can help provide
additional insights and knowledge. Additionally, a grounded theory could provide practical
recommendations for negotiators and managers. The following are some implications for future
research, and some suggestions for practitioners based on existing research.
By comparing the findings from the analyzed literature, it is possible to point to some
interactions between the studied biases, as shown in table 7. The emotional bias, which is affected
by the mood and affects pre-negotiation expectations and in-negotiation judgments, has influence
on the level of negotiators overconfidence (Kramer et al., 1993). In fact, positive mood leads to
excessive optimism, which then increases overconfidence. The latter is correlated with framing and
fixed-pie error as well. Negative frame induces negotiators to seek and take risk; this behavior
increases levels of overconfidence and leverages the negative correlation with the likelihood of
reaching an agreement (i.e. Neale and Bazerman, 1985).
Furthermore, the large-slice bias, as a consequence of the fixed-pie assumption, leads
negotiators to be overconfident with their abilities (Larrick and Wu, 2007). Thus, in integrative
negotiations the fixed-pie error not only can lead to a poorer outcome, but can also decrease the
likelihood of reaching an agreement. The fixed-pie error is also related with framing, self-serving
and relationship bias. Since negotiators start negotiations with a fixed-pie assumption, this will
interact with framing causes and consequences (Bazerman et al., 1985). The fixed-pie error has an
effect on the perception of fairness and is affected by the level of interpersonal understanding
(Mumpower, 2004, Thompson and Hastie, 1990, Thompson and Loewestein, 1992). Consequently,
the satisfaction over the negotiation experience is also affected, namely the large slice bias increases
the level of satisfaction, and this will have a bearing on the relationship bias about the future
selection of counterparts (Reb, 2010).
Interactions between biases. Stemming from the above-mentioned interactions, it is also
possible to hypothesize relations between self-serving and anchoring, and overconfidence and selfserving biases. In fact, high levels of self-serving bias should affect anchoring selection in a way
that favors a negotiators position. In the same way, a high level of overconfidence should increase
the reliability on information that favors the self. This topic needs further studies on how these
biases interact with each other. In addition, a non-studied bias in negotiation context such as the
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confirmation trap should be related with overconfidence, fixed-pie error and self-serving. In fact,
the confirmation trap is related to information selection, and individuals tend to choose information
confirming their idea over a situation (Bazerman and Moore, 2009). This bias should be studied
within negotiation contexts and in relation with the above mentioned studies.
Future research on under-researched biases. The same issue affects other biases, which
should be studied in negotiation contexts too. They are focalism (Bazerman and Moore, 2009),
which has not been studied at all, and status quo, which has been under-researched (Korobkin,
1998). Focalism should have the same impact as anchoring on a negotiation. As anchoring affects
numbers within a negotiation, focalism affects concepts. Since negotiators enter the negotiation
with their positions and interests, they may be affected by focalism on those issues, especially in
negotiations that have concepts rather than numbers i.e. price as main issues. Lets take as an
example the negotiation for Chryslers bailout in 2009, where as long as the parties were
negotiating on the debt issue they were at an impasse and the negotiation could have failed. Once
they moved the topic and started taking into account broader interests and externalities they finally
solved the debt issue too (Caputo, 2012). In fact, negotiations on international laws, or strategic
alliances involving companies in great crisis are for example, representative of contexts where
concepts can lead over numbers.
The role of culture. Culture is another variable affecting biases. As said, being in a
collectivistic culture rather than an individualistic one can dim the impact of fixed-pie and selfserving biases (Gelfand and Christakopoulou, 1999, Gelfand et al., 2002). Thus, culture will have
impacts on the negotiated agreement and satisfaction over it and the process. This could imply, for
example, different reactions and behavior on implementation of agreements in different cultures. As
Gelfand et al. (2002) said, some biases, such as self-serving, may be rational depending on the
culture in which the negotiation is taken. The majority of organizations, both business and political,
operate globally, and a fortiori evaluating biases in light of cultural perspectives is crucial for the
success of such global negotiations. Notwithstanding the wealth of literature on cultural differences
in negotiations, more needs to be done about how biases differ across cultures. In addition, the need
for a more global rather than western approach on cultural differences and biases in negotiation has
been advocated in the literature (Gelfand et al., 2002). The rise of China and India, and maybe
Africa and South America too will shift the field of the majority of negotiations from westernculture contexts to different contexts where tactics and behavior are different too. Managers,
negotiators, mediators as well as individuals and professionals could then benefit from a body of
literature advocating these issues.
Learning and experience. Negotiators learn during the negotiation process. For example they
enter the negotiation with a fixed-pie view and then learn about their counterpart; the faster they
learn the better the negotiated outcome they reach (Thompson and Hastie, 1990, Thompson and
Loewenstein, 1992). This learning effect is not relevant in diminishing the anchoring bias;
individuals are affected by it no matter what is their level of education or experience (Whyte and
Sebenius, 1997). Those studies prescribed that the higher the level of interpersonal understanding
the better the outcome, while the analysis from Mumpower (2004) did not support this result.
Although there were some attempts to understand the role of learning and experience in handling
the cognitive misperceptions within negotiations, there are still contradictions among the studies.
Learning and experience have been considered to enhance negotiators decision-making process by
some scholars (Bazerman et al., 1985, Ritov, 1996, Thompson and Hastie, 1990). While others have
stated that negotiators over time may become overconfident about their negotiating abilities and
may trust more in heuristics (Gelfand and Christakopoulou, 1999, Larrick and Wu, 2007). A need
for further studies is advocated.
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Mood and personality. Negotiators mood plays an important role too, impacting on
overconfidence and creating the so-called emotional biases (Reb, 2010). Mood and emotions can
also be affected by framing effect. Lets take an example of this; in a multilateral negotiation
presenting two different members on the opposite side with same information pitched with a
different emotional content can leave them confused, especially when the negotiation is very time
sensitive. On a talk with an experienced negotiator he told a story of when he used this tactic in a
competitive way:
I used this with a man and woman team, both of whom I knew didn't care for
each other business wise. They spent their time arguing with each other while I made
sure I was sympathetic with their viewpoints, individually. They forgot about their
company's needs and I got a great deal for our company. They may still be arguing.
Although this topic is researched in the decision-making literature (i.e. Bazerman and Moore,
2009), it needs more understanding within negotiation contexts. In addition, and partially related
with that, there is the issue about personality factors, which is an emergent topic of research in
decision-making literature (Furnham and Boo, 2011). How does personality influence the reliability
on heuristics and biases in negotiation contexts? This could be an additional research question that
future research could address.
Integrative and multilateral negotiations. Although most negotiations in business and
political context have a potential for creating value and are performed by more than two parties (i.e.
Caputo, 2012, Lax and Sebenius, 1986, Leiwicki et al., 2005, Raiffa et al., 2002, Traavik, 2011), the
role of biases in integrative negotiations and multilateral negotiations was under-researched by the
literature. It is obvious that the complexities of such negotiations (Kramer, 1991) are an obstacle for
controlled experimental studies, but there is a need for a deep understanding of this issue. Perhaps
case study and qualitative research could help in filling this gap. Additionally, the role of third
parties (Leiwicki et al., 1992) as helping to overcome cognitive biases in negotiations is underresearched too.
Future research on cognitive biases in the context of negotiations should move beyond the
current state of the art, to build comprehensive models of how negotiators can deal with cognitive
biases. Negotiation theory is mainly built upon a prescriptive approach. Current research on
cognitive biases in negotiations seems to be based on a descriptive approach. In fact, every study
analyzed just one bias, only a few studies analyzed two biases. Moreover, connections among
biases seem to be under-researched by the literature. What about situations where more than one
bias at the time effects the negotiation? Is it possible to understand connections among biases
during a negotiation process? Are there biases that can help overcome others? All those questions
seem to remain unanswered, and they deserve specific research attention.
Finally, it emerges that a lack of studies concerning a systemic governance model of the
negotiations that would take into account negotiators cognition and heuristics in order to guide, or
nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) them through better decisions and better agreements. In fact,
heuristics as errors presupposes that the traditional subjective maximization of utility thesis is
correct in the main, but that these outliers are errors or deviations. Why dont we look also at
heuristics as shortcuts that work? Mediators could benefit from such insights, instead of studying
just the way they were not rational. Eventually, a focused program of research on cognitive biases
in negotiations could help in systematizing knowledge and building a prescriptive theory on it. This
could provide more practical advice on how to overcome biases within negotiations.
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A literature review of cognitive biases in

All in-text references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate,

Available from: Andrea Caputo

A literature review of cognitive biases in negotiation

the representativeness heuristic exists when making a judgment about an individual, an

Results of literature review

Source: elaboration on the dataset.

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Source: Elaboration on the dataset

Total biases in the dataset

Source: Elaboration on the dataset

Source: Elaboration on the dataset

Self-serving and Anchoring

Emotional bias and Overconfidence

Intergroup bias, relationship bias, status quo and toughness bias

Table 7 - Biases influences and effects in negotiations

How the problem is

Likelihood for agreement (-)

Counterpart selection (+)

Implications and conclusions

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