How Development Policies Fail to Promote Democracy in Afghanistan

Focus
State Building in a Rentier State: How Development

Policies Fail to Promote Democracy in Afghanistan
Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis
ABSTRACT
State building is considered to be the solution to Afghanistans ills. Statebuilding efforts largely aim to mirror Afghanistan to a market democracy.
However, a market democracy is the outcome of specific historical and geographical circumstances, and cannot be replicated easily. This article explores four models of state formation: the Western, developmental, rentier
and predatory state. Afghanistan can be characterized as a weak rentier
state, subsisting on aid. Generally, the structural consequences of such aid
rentierism are underestimated. State building in this context cannot be
successful. More aid ownership and a strengthening of the Afghan bureaucracy will simply consolidate aid rentierism rather than reverse-engineer a
market democracy. A greater focus on economic policy is required to direct
Afghanistans rulers towards a more viable path of state formation. In this
regard, the developmental state offers some insights.
INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have witnessed the rise of the premise of international state building in countries affected by war, instability and chronic
poverty. The idea that Western-style states can be built in unstable developing countries via outside intervention is, however, questionable. The state
as we know it has come about within the context of specific historical and
geographical circumstances, which cannot readily be replicated elsewhere.
Developing countries are unlikely to follow the same war makes states
trajectory (Tilly, 1985: 170) as the West has done, given the different international context then and now (Clapham, 2002; Leander, 2004). Other
authors have already noted that todays fixed borders guarded by international norms (Jackson, 1990), the predominance of a different kind of war
(Srensen, 2001) and new opportunities offered by the global economy
The authors are grateful to the three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments which
helped to strengthen the article. They would also like to thank Rodrigo Bueno Lacy and Anton
van Wijk for their helpful thoughts and assistance.
Development and Change 44(3): 501526. DOI: 10.1111/dech.12029
2013 International Institute of Social Studies.
Published by John Wiley & Sons, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and
350 Main St., Malden, MA 02148, USA

C
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(Reno, 1998) render the comparison inappropriate. In this article, we add

another, somewhat ironic, factor that hampers Western-style state formation
in so-called fragile states. We argue that international aid itself throws up
an additional barrier. In that, we are in agreement with a number of recent
publications. In contrast to what others suggest, however, we argue that increasing ownership of international aid by the Afghan bureaucracy is not
a viable alternative.
We are not the first to take the case of Afghanistan to illustrate the negative
effects that aid can have on state formation. Our argument gratefully builds
upon the observations of authors such as Ghani et al. (2007), Goodhand and
Sedra (2010), Rubin (2002, 2006), Suhrke (2006, 2008), and shares some
of their conclusions. However, the main shortcoming of the existing literature is that it underestimates the structural consequences of aid rentierism.
Where others call for a better connection between aid and capacity building,
we emphasize how aid rentierism limits the possibilities for capacity building altogether. Like Khan (2005), we highlight how economic structures
determine the political constellation. There is little point in increasing aid
ownership and investing in the strengthening of government bureaucracy
if economic relations do not change. In a rentier state, the bureaucracy will
be used to allocate resources to supporters and not for tax collection and productivity enhancement, as intended by state builders. Aid simply sustains
aid rentierism. Although this aid rentier path could in theory also lead to state
formation, it has two problems: first, the type of state that emerges from such
processes is generally not a democratic one and, second, this outcome is less
stable and sustainable.
This article draws on secondary sources, bringing together insights from
different backgrounds and fields, including state-building literature from
peace and conflict studies, development literature, and political science
works on state formation trajectories. After briefly elaborating upon the
rise of state building in international discourse and policies for war-torn
countries, we describe different trajectories of state formation, including
the Western path, the developmental state path, the rentier path and the
predatory path. Next, we illuminate the case of Afghanistan. We describe
how aid functions as a rent, keeping the country on its rentier path of state
formation. In such a context, we argue, efforts to strengthen state institutions
will not work. What options, then, are left for Afghanistan, and how may aid
better support it? In the final sections of the article, we argue that investing
in economic productivity should be a central element of any strategy for
Afghan development and state formation, and that the developmental state
model could provide inspiration in this regard.
THE STATE-BUILDING AGENDA
In recent decades, the idea that poverty and instability are the result of weak
or fragile states, and therefore that the solution lies in strengthening such
State Building in a Rentier State: Afghanistan
503
states, has gained ground among policy makers, academics and NGOs. On
11 September 2001, fragile states suddenly became regarded as a threat to
the interests of rich countries (Fearon and Laitin, 2004), which provided an
important impetus to the state-building agenda.
This agenda takes on different forms. Some exponents of state building
emphasize the democratic nature of the state, whilst others prioritize strong
institutions over democracy. Most often the assumption is that the two go
hand-in-hand, because democratic legitimacy makes for stronger and more
sustainable institutions. In a democracy, opponents of the government can
express their concerns in a non-violent manner and thus have less reason
to organize a rebellion. The government in turn does not need to invest as
many resources in the security sector as would otherwise have been the case,
enabling it to strengthen its capacity in other sectors. Thus, although the socalled state-building agenda in fact comprises a multitude of views,1 most
people assume that some form of democracy should be part of the package.
Critics have emphasized that this package is not value neutral but carries
a clear Western imprint, basing itself on the model of the Western state
(Kelsall and Booth, 2010). So far experiences with state building have not
been particularly encouraging. At best, attempts at state and democracy
building in post-war societies have led to hybrid outcomes, in which regular
elections mask an essentially authoritarian system. At worst, the introduction
of electoral democracy has led to renewed violence (Mansfield and Snyder,
2007). More often than not, such attempts have created highly aid-dependent
protectorate states (Chandler, 2006; Fearon and Laitin, 2004). Even cases
that are seen by some as relatively successful, such as East Timor, are
strongly criticized by others for the superficiality of reform, the lack of local
ownership and the continued threat of violence (Hohe, 2004; Hughes, 2009).
All in all, the evidence suggests that externally-driven attempts to build
states modelled after those in the West have not come close to achieving the
hoped-for results.
In response, authors have suggested a range of reasons why state building
has been unsuccessful. Strikingly, the vast majority blames the modality of
intervention, claiming for example that interveners should leave more space
for local ideas and bottom-up processes (Menkhaus, 2007; Paris and Sisk,
2009), or that democratization should proceed more gradually (Ottaway,
2007; Paris, 2004). Rarely is the final aim of state building, or the idea that
this aim can be achieved through outside intervention, really challenged.2
1. Hampson and Mendeloff (2007: 679700) group the various state-building positions into the
following three categories: the fast-track democratization school, the slow democratization
or institutionalization before democratization school, and the school that contends that
intervention should focus first and foremost on providing security, leaving the rest to the
locals.
2. There are exceptions. Indeed, a body of critical state-building literature is emerging (e.g.
Chandler, 2006; Pugh, 2004; Pugh et al., 2008). Such authors question both the feasibility
and the morality of installing Western-inspired states through intervention. The themes they
focus on include the way in which the self-interest and (neoliberal) values of developed
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However, can the Western state model really be treated as the norm for the
entire world? How do states actually come about, historically?
TRAJECTORIES OF STATE FORMATION
Warfare and State Formation in Europe
It is an oft-cited fact that the formation of European states was closely connected to warfare (Tilly, 1975). Indeed, under Europes distinctive historical
and geographic circumstances, warfare played an important role in turning
coercive would-be rulers into legitimate governments. In Europe the prominence of external threats had created overlapping interests between would-be
kings, landowning nobles, and merchants who each had different ideas about
how society should be organized in the early modern period (Schwartz, 2000:
1821). Compromises between the three groups were reached, which developed into constitutions that defined rights and obligations. The monopoly
on violence a major characteristic of the modern state was granted
to rulers. The development of a centralized professional army in turn led to
the creation of fiscal bureaucracies to ensure the revenue extraction needed
to sustain the monopoly on violence. These bureaucracies developed into
full-fledged state institutions (Tilly, 1985: 172). Meanwhile, the nobles gave
up their claims to sovereignty as rulers of their land, but this was substituted
with the introduction of private property rights: now they did not rule the
land, they owned it. In addition, in order to exercise some influence over the
waging of violence by the king, they pressed for the creation of parliaments
(Schwartz, 2000).
In due course, the increasing importance of the local economy for the
states ability to levy taxes created more demands (and need) for the state to
take up responsibility for production, distribution and the rule of law (Tilly,
1990). The state increasingly had an interest to invest in the development
of internal markets. Over the centuries, citizens became more educated, the
middle classes grew, and the urban bourgeoisie began to outweigh the rural
aristocracy. This led to new pressures on the existing balance of power,
culminating in the French and American revolutions. In return for their
tax payments citizens began to demand a say in how their money gets
spent. Hence the slogan of the American Revolution: no taxation without
representation.
Some authors (e.g. Duyvesteyn, 2009) have drawn parallels between the
historical role of warfare in the development of European states and presentday state building. As war created states in Europe, their advice is to give
war a chance in contemporary developing countries (Luttwak, 1999). Less
states are intertwined with the state-building agenda and the necessity of understanding the
political economy of state building.
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extreme accounts (e.g. Weinstein, 2005) draw on the history of European

state formation to explore the potential for autonomous recovery after wars.
Indeed, parallels exist between early modern Europe, and contemporary
weak or failed states. In weak states, alternative providers of protection
tend to emerge (or exist). Whether referred to as security communities,
warlords, rebel groups, terrorist organizations or criminal protection rackets,
these security providers perform functions that are normally considered to
be the monopoly of the state encompassing not only security but also
taxation, regulation and service provision. Volkov (2000) describes how
protection rackets in Russia in the 1990s developed from largely predatory
actors into productive economic and political ones, a process he compares
to the development of states out of competing violent actors in early modern
Europe.
However, although it remains true that there is often a connection between
violence and development (Cramer, 2006), it does not mean as Tilly himself has acknowledged that Tillys argument can simply be applied to the
developing world today. There are at least four reasons for this.3 The first is
that, with borders fixed by strong international norms, present-day civil wars
nearly always take place without the external threats that had forced European would-be rulers to seek compromises with citizens (Leander, 2004:
6; Srensen, 2001: 346). The second reason is the cross-border nature of
contemporary civil wars. Notwithstanding these more fixed borders, the international dimension is very present in contemporary conflict. For weak
states, the most viable option might be to build alliances with foreign commercial parties to exploit opportunities in the global economy, rather than
to develop internal markets (Reno, 1998). However, non-state actors can
equally benefit from such sources of financing, adding to the pervasiveness
of these wars. Guaranteed sovereignty did not liberate developing countries
from outside interference by foreign states and companies pursuing their political and economic interests (Srensen, 2001: 348). Clapham (2002: 794)
speaks of the mythology of unfettered state sovereignty that conceals the
fact that states can aspire only to the role of managers or mediators of the
impact of global forces on their domestic political, economic, and cultural
arenas.
This brings us to the third difference, and one that is discussed throughout this article, namely rentierism as an obstacle to state formation. Weak
rentier states sustained by aid are neither sufficiently weak to disappear, nor
sufficiently capable of developing into genuine strong and extractive states
(Schwarz, 2008). In this regard, Leander (2004) notes that state building
nowadays is much more driven by external actors, and that the resources
invested in it by foreign actors discourage the development of national
taxation.
3. See Taylor and Botea (2008) for an overview of the debate on Does Tilly Apply in the
Contemporary Developing World?.
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Finally, the globalized, neoliberal context also presents radically altered

conditions for capital accumulation; while European would-be rulers could
use mercantilist, and subsequently state-led production strategies, the current
international environment has made such strategies much harder to pursue
for developing countries. Those developing countries most applauded for
succeeding in creating economically viable states did so under specific circumstances that temporarily allowed them to pursue similar state-led strategies, as we will see in the next paragraph.
The Developmental State
To catch up with the West, some developing countries, mainly in East

Asia, adopted a kind of short-cut approach to state formation. The strategy
employed by these developmental states, which included Japan, Taiwan,
South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia, prioritized rapid industrial development through active state involvement in the economy.
To finance their aspirations, developmental states relied upon agriculture,
high savings and, as industrialization advanced, manufactured exports. Taiwan and South Korea used direct taxation (made possible by land reform)
and control over credit, prices and exports to divert agricultural production earnings to industrial investment (Kohli, 1999; Schwartz, 2000: 253;
Srensen, 2001: 34950). The low tax revenues (e.g. 15 per cent of GDP
in the period 198588) generated by East Asian states were comparable to
those of sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. However, they stood out
in terms of high savings (Di John, 2006: 4), which were facilitated by restrictions on consumer credit and mandatory pension contributions (Di John,
2008: 9).
Thus, the role of the developmental state in the economy was not limited
to taxation; many other instruments were employed to realize its industrial
policies. States efforts to steer the private sector resulted in a wide range of
practices, instructions, incentives and political and economic rewards, such
as price distortions, low-interest capital and limiting open competition. This
was not only about bureaucrats picking winners, but also a continuous
process of incremental pulling and pushing (Wade, 2010: 156). Although
the developmental states were, at least initially, authoritarian in nature, they
paid careful attention to the demands of economic players. Doner et al.
(2005: 331) argue that the key to the [developmental states] robust economic institutions lies in how popular sectors have been compensated for
their political marginalization. Indeed, these states managed to develop a
close relationship with local businesses, a collusion favouring growth. The
balanced relative power between the two meant that reciprocal control mechanisms could be used to have firms meet performance targets in exchange for
special favours (Wade, 2010: 155). Wade argues that one of the conditions
for its pro-developmental effects was that the state should create bifurcated
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political and economic administrative structures, such that political patronage can be given via political channels without sacrificing economic efficiency (ibid.: 158). The balanced political power between the state and
business ensured the relatively benign effects of patronage.
Developmental states prioritized development investments over social
spending. Welfare benefits were largely limited to industrial workers,
through social insurance programmes, rather than welfare programmes
(Kwon, 2005: 479). It is often maintained that the state was relatively strong
in relation to society, while harsh suppression of organized labour and the
outside threat from Asian communism ensured social compliance with a
centralized state (Woo-Cumings, 1998: 323). At the same time, however,
the state was not entirely autonomous, being dependent on economic success, and on side payments to economically powerful actors (Doner et al.,
2005). Indeed, developmental states were often associated with high levels
of corruption.
As in the war-makes-states model described above, violence and external
threats have played an important role in the developmental trajectory. Not
only had these countries been heavily affected by the Second World War
and the Korean War, but the external threat of communism in Asia loomed
large. This is likely to have contributed to generating societal support for
the policies adopted. Indeed, some argue that developmental states can only
arise in contexts where political leaders confront extraordinarily constrained
political environments, which includes the credible threat that any deterioration in the living standards of popular sectors could trigger unmanageable
mass unrest (Doner et al., 2005). This may also be part of the reason why,
after the end of the Cold War, many developmental states became increasingly democratic. The external threat having faded, internal pressures for
democracy became too strong. With the end of the Cold War, external patronage by the US also subsided, which may have forced governments (as
in many other parts of the world) to become more responsive to their own
populations.
Some (e.g. Mkandawire, 2010) are more optimistic than others (e.g.
Minns, 2001; Stubbs, 2009) about the ability of developmental states to maintain their features whilst becoming more democratic. Many agree, however,
that opportunities for other developing countries to create developmental
states were increasingly restricted due to donor demand for state withdrawal,
a lean bureaucracy, privatization of state assets and foreign/donor control
over public money (Mkandawire, 2001: 306). Still, the 2008 global financial
and economic crisis has led to increased debate regarding these mainstream
ideas in policy-making circles, which could provide more room for a new
generation of developmental states (Wade, 2010).
Developmentalism has thus been based on a strong role of the state in
the economy. Though this is currently controversial among donors, it may
nonetheless lend inspiration to alternative policy making in countries like
Afghanistan as we will see below.
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The Rentier Path to State Formation
States that derive most of their income from external rents that are the
prerogative of the state (such as mining and oil revenues, and official development assistance), rather than taxes, tend to follow a different path to state
formation than market democracies and developmental states. They represent a third scenario, that of a rentier state. The government of a rentier
state controls such rents and does not depend on the economic activity of its
citizens to generate revenue (Beblawi, 1987; Daudersta dt and Schildberg,
2006). This gives citizens little leverage to hold the government accountable
and enter into a social contract with the state.
Lacking in popular legitimacy, rentier states develop other strategies to
keep their citizens at bay in order to hold on to power. The primary strategy
is usually by buying off their populations. Politicians secure the loyalty
of (groups of) citizens by bringing material benefits to the local community in the form of jobs, loans, or cash (Bates, 2008: 38). To a large
extent the state apparatus is used for the allocation of rents. Citizens strive to
gain access to these rents by establishing connections to government functionaries. These connections often take the form of patronage networks, or
(neo-)patrimonialism: Neo-patrimonial systems are markedly personalistic and clientilistic. Governments of men, not of laws, they are associated
in the literature with high levels of rent-seeking, corruption, waste, authoritarianism, arbitrariness and political instability (Kelsall and Booth,
2010: 2).
Elections in a clientelistic context will often function to strengthen personal ties. As Khan (2005) notes, trying to turn rentier states into Westernstyle democracies is futile because the structure of the economy creates
strong incentives for patronage-based rule. This is not only because of the
predominance of rents, but also because of the fact that informal economic
activities (which are not taxed) make up the major part of the economy in
many developing countries. In some cases the introduction of institutions
from a liberal market democracy might even destroy delicate balances of
power among elites and lead to violent internal conflict (Di John and Putzel,
2012; North et al., 2009: 265).
In addition to buying off their population and fomenting patronclient
networks, another strategy rentier states can employ to solidify their rule is
repression. Rents are invested in the organization of a repressive security
apparatus. In theory, both rent-based strategies (buying off and repression)
can lead to relatively stable states. Indeed, some (e.g. Kelsall and Booth,
2010) argue that rentier states can take a path of developmental patrimonialism. They note that the Asian developmental states, too, have exhibited
patrimonial features and that it is possible for patrimonial states to become
developmental. According to this scenario, centralization of rents and the
introduction of a central bureaucracy can produce stable and sustainable
states in spite of patrimonial structures. As also argued by Bates (2008),
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this requires a long time horizon, which cautions against pressures to introduce democracy because vigorous multi-party competition may encourage
leaders to take a short term view of rent allocation (Kelsall and Booth,
2010: 27).
However, Kelsall and Booth (ibid.: 2627) conclude that the conditions
(including skilful and far-sighted leadership) in which developmental patrimonialism emerges are rare. Sustaining such a path is even more difficult:
whereas Kelsall and Booth identify a few African countries where such a
trajectory took place during certain periods, in none of the cases could it be
sustained. An important reason for this seems to be a lack of democracy:
whilst a necessary feature to start off developmental patrimonialism, authoritarianisms lack of mechanisms for the stable transfer of power becomes a
weakness in the longer term. When the strong man dies or is overthrown,
everything can change from one day to the next.
North et al. (2009) speculate that patronage-based systems may in fact
transition into democracies if a number of conditions are met. In this reading, the mutual recognition among elites of each others political and economic privileges provides stability and order. If this recognition becomes
institutionalized in a rule of law for elites, a shared control of the military
and impersonal organizations, there is the possibility of a transition towards
Western-style democracies. Unfortunately few developing countries today
meet these criteria and it is only the recognized self-interest of elites that will
lead them there. It would therefore appear that two disadvantages of rentier
states remain: a lack of democracy and, by implication, a lack of longer-term
stability (Karl, 2004).
As we shall see below, aid rentierism is particularly problematic. Aid
funds are not owned by the state; here, the donors call the shots.4 This leads
to additional legitimacy issues. The government is not accountable to its
citizens, but to foreign donors. Transferring aid funds to a rentier bureaucracy
simply reinforces its patronage-based allocation function. Also, aid funds
might dry up more suddenly than oil income, rendering aid rentierism a
particularly problematic strategy in sustainable state formation.
Predatory States
Some of the weakest rentier states have abandoned the way to economic
development through state institutions altogether a fourth scenario. They
purposely weaken the states capacity and rework patronage politics into
warlord politics aided by alliances with foreign business interests and private
militias (Reno, 1998). Sierra Leone is a good example of a government
4. The reliance on external sources of finance (foreign aid, debt, the sale of [legal and illegal]
services and commodities and customs) is mirrored by an externalisation of economic
management and political accountability (Leander, 2004: 11).
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that turned from using rents to keep the population happy and enhance
productivity (for example, by investing in education) to simply exploiting
them for personal benefit: a strategy of predation. The privatization of the
diamond trade transferred this trade to the private hands of the Sierra Leonean
ruling elite who ceased to invest in government services, putting income
generated into their own pockets as well as in those of a small group of loyal
clients. The result was a collapse of infrastructure, education and health care,
which contributed finally to the outbreak of war (Reno, 2003).
As to why and when rentier states turn from a strategy of buying off and
repression to one of predation, Bates (2008) suggests that developments in
international markets directly influence this choice through their effect on
the costs and benefits of either option. Rising prices increase the temptation
to exploit natural resources for personal rather than public benefit (ibid.: 24
28). However, the question remains: why would governments adopt policies
that impoverish their citizens? Why would they over-extract wealth from
their domains? Why would they alter the distribution of income so grossly
that it would become politically unsustainable? (ibid.: 131).
Bates (ibid.: 2627) comes up with a rather ironic explanation for predatory behaviour, namely that it can be attributed to increasing international
pressure on developing countries to democratize. In a democracy, the political timeline for rulers is much shorter than in a dictatorship, which creates
the incentive for rulers to extract as much income from their economies as
possible. If a ruler knows he is only going to be in office for a few more years,
the concern about personal short-term gain resulting in longer-term impoverishment of his country (which would decrease future gains) diminishes.
Reno (1998) also attributes predatory behaviour of rulers to changes in the
global economy and post-Cold War politics, which offered new opportunities for accumulation through alliances with foreign firms, while patronage
politics became more difficult to sustain due to diminishing aid or aid with
more reform conditions attached. In these ways, international circumstances
contributed to rulers shifting their strategy from buying off to predation. The
explanations by Bates and Reno also illustrate the problematic consequences
of economic and political liberalization strategies in weak rentier states.
In his book The Art of Coercion, Giustozzi (2011) explores how predatory
states may develop into developmental states. Processes of war accumulation (of financial, ideological or political capital) through coercion and
force gradually change the political and economic landscape, until one actor
or coalition is able to impose its own settlement. It may be that one actor
emerges stronger than the others, or a range of (opposing) actors may develop a shared interest in securing the material and political gains they have
accumulated. We shall return to this idea below when discussing the case of
Afghanistan.
Before we do, we should emphasize that the different trajectories outlined
above are nothing more than ideal types, ignoring the wide variety of trajectories of individual countries. Any given context can (and often does)
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contain elements of several of these trajectories at the same time. The purpose of studying different historical trajectories, however, is to understand
the drivers that affect the direction that state formation is likely to take.
This helps us understand how circumstances interact with policy choices to
shape the direction of development. Although agency (in the form of policy
and leadership) remains important, it is constrained by a countrys history,
context and economy.5
THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN
Against this background, how can we broadly classify Afghanistans trajectory? Most authors who have written on the issue consider Afghanistan to
be a weak rentier state: it has rentier characteristics, but decades of violence
and other problems have limited its capacity to pursue any development trajectory (Ghani et al., 2007; Goodhand and Sedra, 2010; Rubin, 2002, 2006;
Suhrke, 2008). This is perhaps why most of these authors as well as many
international aid agencies and donors continue to place some confidence
in the strategy of state building through the strengthening of government
bureaucracy. The idea is that if we can reduce the weakness of the state, then
we may also be able to alter its development path.
This is overly optimistic. First, even though the Afghan state is indeed
weak, rentierism may be more firmly rooted in Afghan history than people
realize. Second, aid only reinforces rentierism. In this section, we start with
these two points, and then move on to the difficulties associated with the
strategy of bureaucracy building. Finally, we discuss the state-formation
options open to Afghanistan.
Rentierism in Afghanistan
To classify Afghanistan as a rentier state, and evaluate its persistence, clarity

is needed on the main sources of income of the Afghan state. Let us start
with direct taxation, the means of generating revenue historically related
to the Western state formation path. With the exception of King Amanullah (191929), who raised direct tax as a proportion of domestic revenues
5. Regarding the African state, a consensus is emerging that challenges the fragile state
literature, and centres around four arguments, which concern the historicity of the state in
Africa, the embeddedness of bureaucratic organizations in society, the symbolic and material
dimensions of statehood and the importance of legitimacy (Hagmann and Peclard, 2010:
539). While we agree with the criticism of the inappropriateness of stereotyped Western
states as the (only) point of reference for analysing state failure and the depiction of state
formation as simply linear processes, we see it fit to use the above-mentioned trajectories
of state formation as analytical lenses. We thus ascribe more weight to path dependency
than most of these authors would probably agree with.
512
to unprecedented levels, most Afghan leaders favoured the less intrusive

trade taxation and foreign aid to fill the coffers of the state. By declaring
Afghanistan independent, Amanullah opted out of British subsidies. Instead
he opted for direct taxes on agriculture, a typically coercion-intensive way
of revenue collection. In 1926 taxes on land and livestock comprised 62.5
per cent of total revenues (Fry, 1974: 155). When fierce opposition from
landowning khans and border tribes ensued, he did not have the coercive
capacities to offer effective resistance. He had neglected the army while his
other modernization efforts had alienated the clergy and the tribal powerbase
(Giustozzi, 2008: 8; Rubin, 2002: 57), and in 1929 he was overthrown. Subsequent rulers reduced their reliance on direct taxes, relying instead upon
alliances with the merchant class for indirect trade taxes and increasingly
as of 1957 foreign aid.6 Since the end of Amanullahs rule, Afghanistans
tax-raising efforts have been scant, with domestic revenues ranging between
2 and 8 per cent of GDP in the period 193572 (Rubin, 2002: 634).
The Karzai government has not reversed this trend. Revenues from direct taxes have increased since 2001 but remain marginal. To finance
Afghanistans post-2001 reconstruction, most external actors focused on
mobilizing aid resources, rather than increasing domestic revenue collection (Barakat, 2008; Lockhart, 2007: 7).7 The government of Afghanistan
focuses its direct taxation efforts on a limited number of big corporate actors
largely located in Kabul (IMF, 2006b). At the same time, the Taliban derives
much of its financing from taxes collected, according to Ruttig (2009: 20),
on property, business and trade profits in a rather systematic way from
NGOs, private companies including the big telecom companies and
individuals as well as from humanitarian goods delivered by UN agencies.8
Poppy cultivation (like any other agricultural crop), opiate production and
trafficking in Taliban-controlled areas are taxed as well.9
Rentier income government income through foreign aid and, as of
1967, sales of natural gas has long played an important role in financing the
Afghan government. It varied between 30 and 62 per cent of total government
financing in the period 195788 (Rubin, 2002: 29697). Since 2001 a similar
reliance on rentier income can be observed, ranging from 46 to 67 per cent
6. For figures in relative terms, see Rubin (2002: 6061, 113, 29697); in absolute terms, see
Fry (1974: 16061, 17273).
7. Even so, in the period 2003/42008/9 the Afghan government realized a fourfold increase in
domestic revenue. Although this looks impressive, as a proportion of GDP this increase was
smaller, from 4.5 to 6.9 per cent of GDP. Moreover, the highest domestic revenues-to-GDP
ratio reached was about 8.9 per cent in 2009/2010 still one of the lowest ratios in the
world. Figures based on IMF (2006a: 267; 2010a: 13, 245; 2010b: 1).
8. Other Taliban sources of revenue are allegedly foreign donations and, increasingly, abductions.
9. Estimated at US$ 125 million per year (UNODC, 2009: 111); however, private appropriation
and other actors involved means that not all this money is going to Taliban operations, which
are estimated to cost US$ 7080 million annually (Giustozzi, 2009: 296; Ruttig, 2009: 20).
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between 2003 and 2009.10 In both periods, foreign aid accounted for the
vast majority of rentier income.11 Afghanistan has thus largely retained its
character as an aid rentier state.
To increase revenue in the future, the most obvious sources for the government will continue to be the typical rent sectors:
r Foreign aid: although future donor funding is difficult to predict (OECD,
2010: 94), IMF predictions suggest a growing volume of grants for at
least a few more years.12
r The extractive industry (oil and mining): the Afghan state has been particularly active in securing investments in natural resource extraction.
The exploitation of the Aynak copper deposit by a Chinese company is
estimated to generate US$ 390 million in annual government revenues
(IWA, 2008).
r Indirect taxes, such as customs revenues: although custom revenues
might be more problematic to increase, as the Taliban and regional
leaders13 control many border areas, often raising customs tax in place
of the Afghan state. For example, Kandahar collected a semi-official
tax on export and import revenues during the first seven months of 2004
and 2005 that exceeded its full year allotment (Evans and Osmani, 2005:
67).
r With the expansion of shadow economies, interest groups within the
state have also increasingly tried to benefit from profitable informal
trade and the poppy economy that are located in the borderlands (Goodhand, 2009). Power-holders thus might increasingly attempt to create
alliances with warlords to retain power, especially if access to other
resources becomes more difficult, for example due to a decrease in aid.
Aid and its Problems
Much of the debate about the negative impact of aid in Afghanistan has
focused on the fact that the Afghan government does not control most of the
10. Rentier income (percentage) = (Grants to operational budget + grants to development
budget + mining revenues) / total expenditures. Only for 2007/8 and 2008/9 have mining
revenues been included. The percentages mentioned by Rubin include both commodity
income and project aid, but exclude technical assistance. When off-budget donor-managed
aid is included, the figure since 2001 increases to more than 80 per cent. Rentier income (including off-budget) (percentage) = Total grants (including off-budget) / total expenditures
(Core budget + off-budget grants). Figures based on IMF (2006a: 26; 2008: 31; 2009: 75;
2010a: 24).
11. Except for 198083, when sales of natural gas accounted for a larger proportion than aid
(Rubin, 2002: 297).
12. IMF (2010a: 26) estimates suggest a decrease in grants contributing to public finance from
11.8 per cent in 2009/10 to 9.8 per cent in 2014/15 of GDP, but with estimates of GDP
growing in the same period, in absolute figures this implies an increase in donor funding.
13. Following Giustozzis (2004) differentiation between warlord, militia leader and regional leader.
514
foreign aid that is spent in the country despite donor rhetoric of Afghan
ownership (Barakat, 2008: 30; OECD, 2005).14 This is seen to undermine
attempts at state building. Although this is a valid point, channelling aid
through government coffers is also problematic. High on the list of risks
are corruption and inefficiency which are advanced as the most important
reasons why aid outside the state remains the preferred option. However,
these problems are merely symptoms of a more structural problem, namely
that aid to the government increases its rent income and thereby reinforces
its aid rentier path to state formation.
Before proceeding with the discussion, we would like to take a closer look
at the issues surrounding aid outside the state. First, an estimated 77 per
cent of aid disbursed between 2002 and 2010 was donor-managed, running
outside the governments treasury and policy frameworks, with varying
levels of coordination with or oversight by line ministries (IRoA, 2009:
42). Of the 23 per cent of aid that is part of the official Afghan budget, a
large proportion is earmarked according to donor preferences (ibid.: 42).
Second, the problem of internal brain drain is by now well known. Due to
active recruitment by international agencies, salaries are inflated and the best
and brightest are lured out of government. Third, consultation mechanisms
established by donors to involve citizens in decisions on how money is spent
have mushroomed since 2001, and since 2004, also outside of Kabul at the
provincial and lower level (Lister, 2005: 8). Many of them have access to
substantial funding, but are only awkwardly, if at all, linked to government
bodies.
The governments ability to direct funding according to national objectives and priorities is therefore largely undermined. Neither does this structure help the development of democratic accountability at national level,
since, as Rubin (2006: 182) writes, it is the process of mobilizing these
resources domestically, and particularly the struggle over the budget, which
is at the centre of the process of state formation and legitimation. Along
similar lines, Suhrke argues that Afghanistans dependency upon aid impedes democratization. As the central institution of a liberal democracy,
the legislature is deprived of its meaning: a parliament without the power
of the purse was destined to remain more a forum for debate than an instrument for channelling popular demands into national-level decisions and
for holding the executive branch accountable (Suhrke, 2008: 644). Ghani
et al. (2007: 154), too, argue that aid outside the governments budget process
hinders democratic state building by preventing the development of a social contract, a legitimate government, and a sustainable fiscal basis from
domestic revenue. Indeed, as Barakat (2008: 31) writes, the over reliance
upon external funding . . . has pushed Afghanistan beyond any reasonable
hope of fiscal independence, perhaps requiring substantial levels of external
14. Another important issue, but beyond the scope of this article, concerns how the influx of aid
creates an unsustainable bubble economy (Goodhand, 2004: 167).
515
support over the next twenty to thirty years or more (thus re-creating one of
the primary impediments to effective, domestic state-building).
Although these critics make an important point, they place too much hope
in reorienting aid towards the government. Their assumption seems to be
that if aid were to be channelled through the government, a social contract
would ensue. Such faith underestimates the structural constraints of rentierism and the way in which aid only reinforces this structure. The question
of why todays rulers of Afghanistan would be interested in being accountable to their citizens and reorienting their efforts towards tax collection, is
left unanswered.
Goodhand and Sedra (2010) and Fearon (2008) favour Afghan-managed
aid, but give more attention to its limitations. The first two authors focus on
the limits posed by the presence of substantial reform-resistant groups within
the government and bureaucracy. In the aid-driven urgency to start reforms,
donors have selectively worked with a small cohort of largely Westernoriented technocrats, bypassing reform-resistant ministries, thereby undermining the very principle of domestic ownership. Goodhand and Sedra
(2010: S97) also point to Afghanistans fragmented sovereignty: ownership
is still very much contested by local power holders and informal institutions.
Still, they see no other option in the medium term than for aid to be channelled through the state and geared towards building the fiscal capacity of
the state, despite the risk of recreating the rentier state of the past (ibid.:
S89). Suhrke (2008: 645) also recognizes that more national control over the
budget would add to sovereignty but not necessarily to democracy.
Such a path could turn Afghanistan from a weak rentier state into a stronger
one that is, as long as the aid flows last. Whether aid could strengthen
the Afghan state sufficiently to counter its opponents depends not only upon
access to resources, but also on the resources mobilized by those opponents.
Building a State Bureaucracy
Many have thus placed their faith in strengthening Afghan state institutions.
Advocates of Afghan-managed aid hold that the effects of external rents
can be mitigated by consistent external support for democratization, building fiscal capacity, and allowing the newly elected government budgetary
authority (e.g. Ghani et al., 2007; Rubin, 2006: 179). This suggests that we
can reverse-engineer the state-formation path of the West: first we create
a tax bureaucracy, and then we build a need and basis for taxation. This
assumption that aid can help build the fiscal capacity of the state ignores
the bargaining game over taxation that has been key to democratic state
formation.
What has the Afghan experience with state building been so far, and what
can we expect in the future? Attempts at state and bureaucracy building
are not new to Afghanistan. Throughout its history there have been several
516
attempts to increase the states bureaucratic capacity, both by its rulers

and foreigners (see, e.g., Fry, 1974; Rubin, 2002). Indeed, its bureaucracy
expanded from 40,000 in 1950 to 100,000 by the 1970s (Giustozzi, 2008:
17). Did this lead to enhanced fiscal capacity, as hoped by state builders?
The answer is no: the growing bureaucracy was not used to raise revenue,
nor to prepare and implement development projects (Fry, 1974: 1589).
Instead, as can be expected in a rentier state, it functioned as an apparatus
of distribution (Rubin, 2002: 69).
We have seen that, through setting up parallel structures and removing
decision-making power from the government, aid since 2001 has not helped
the Afghan bureaucracy. At the same time, some dedicated state-building
projects were undertaken to reform and train the central and sub-national
administration,15 and to improve its infrastructure.16 However, these efforts
to strengthen the capacity of the Afghan bureaucracy to at least effectively
regulate policy areas within its control have not been considered very successful. To explain this lack of success, some analysts have pointed to flaws
in implementation. For example, state-building efforts relied largely on international consultants who generally were not recruited for their training
skills, did not speak the language, and primarily reported to the donors that
paid their high salaries (OECD, 2010: 25). These efforts thus bought capacity rather than built capacity (Nixon, 2007: 10). However, as we have
been suggesting, the lack of success was more structural: in a rentier state, a
bureaucracy is more likely to be used for the distribution of resources among
supporters than for the mobilization of revenues. Government officials act
as gatekeepers to the state and its resources (Lister, 2009: 997), as illustrated by attempts to introduce a merit-based system of recruitment and
reward of civil servants. For instance, the Priority Reform and Restructuring
Programme (200205), which was intended to restore administrative capacity in key departments, has in many cases been used to increase salaries
rather than to restructure the unit or reward merit (Lister, 2006: 10; 2009:
996). Based on missions to six provinces between November 2004 and
January 2005, Evans and Osmani (2005: 31) concluded that while senior
provincial administration appointments are going through the Independent
15. Counting around 348,000 civil servants in 2007 (World Bank, 2008: 7).
16. Pre-2006 examples include: Afghanistan Stabilization Programme funding for priority
provincial projects; approval of the Priority Reform and Reconstruction (PRR) Decree;
Ministry of Finance reforms; and the establishment of the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). As of 2006 strengthening sub-national
governance structures received even more donor attention. In 2006 UNDP launched the
Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Programme; in June 2007 the World Bank published
the report Service Delivery and Governance at the Sub-National Level in Afghanistan;
the Afghan government launched in September 2007 the Independent Directorate of Local
Governance (IDLG); and in 2008 USAID committed to the IDLG Strategic Work Plan with
US$ 94.6 million in project activities.
517
Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC), political

and ethnic considerations continue to feature prominently in recruitment.
In such a system, what aid officials call corruption is not an excess
that can be eliminated, but a central feature of governance. Rather, the high
frequency and amount of bribes paid to public servants illustrate the continuation of patronclient relations.17 The growing role of commissionkars in
urban areas (intermediary agents who act with the consent of a state official
to collect bribes required to access specific public services) and the greater
importance attributed to bribes as opposed to relations suggest respectively
an institutionalization and a monetarization of patronclient relations
(Gardizi et al., 2010). While previously relationships with civil servants
played a central role in accessing services, since 2001 such connections are
often not enough; bribes have to be paid as well (ibid.: 8). This amounts to
an institutionalized allocation bureaucracy.
Thus, despite the intention to build an efficient and merit-based bureaucracy, informal practices generally persisted beneath superficial Westernstyle public administration structures. Where the Afghan state could control aid flows, it has largely used them to consolidate its weak powerbase
through entrenched patronage patterns. Rather than explaining the persistent
failure to build a merit-based bureaucracy in terms of capacity (and thus
recommending more capacity building), a better explanation is that powerful
interests resist such changes. This is closely related to the rentier character
of the Afghan state.
OPTIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN
State formation essentially reflects economic developments and relations.

State building therefore cannot be seen in isolation from economic conditions and policy making. As has become clear from the previous section,
state and democracy building have little chance of success in a situation
where government is largely dependent on rents, especially foreign aid. If
the aim in Afghanistan is indeed democratic state formation and one
reason to support this aim could be that the rentier path is less stable
international efforts should be aimed at making it more attractive for current
rulers of Afghanistan to improve economic productivity, stimulate domestic
business and collect taxes. The additional difficulties that democracy implies
for rentier states (e.g. a shorter time horizon for its rulers which increases
predation) suggest that economic development may initially need to be
17. Two surveys of UNODC (2010) and Integrity Watch Afghanistan (2010) recently reported
on corruption. Amongst their interviewees, 52 per cent (UNODC, 2010: 17) and 14 per
cent, or 28 per cent at the household level (IWA, 2010: 35), had paid a bribe to a public
official during the course of a year. The total annual amount of bribes was estimated at about
US$ 2.5 billion (UNODC, 2010: 4) and close to US$ 1 billion (IWA, 2010: 10).
518
prioritized over democracy, as was the case for developmental states. There
is another reason why stimulating domestic business is of great significance:
employment. The importance of employment for peace building can hardly
be overstated, because paid work is the only thing that can offer an alternative to those who have come to depend on warfare and instability for survival
(Salomons, 2005).
The importance of strengthening the licit economy is widely acknowledged (Goodhand, 2004; Rubin, 2006). More importantly, however, economic productivity needs to be improved. Where programmes appear to
have aimed at stimulating private sector-led growth, like the privatization of
state-owned enterprises, failure dominates. But the reason is one that can be
overcome: the companies on which these policies focused were remnants of
the communist days. As organizations they were probably too far removed
from the demands of current international markets to enable a viable transformation towards growth.18 Many of these projects are ad hoc and donordriven;19 they try to revive the Afghan economy based on pre-1979 comparative advantages and fail to take into account current market demands.
An obvious candidate for private sector development in Afghanistan is
agriculture. The current predominance of poppy cultivation provides much
space for improved productivity. This improvement could come about after
investments in facilitating conditions such as infrastructure, storage and
quality certification (for the latter, see Barakat, 2008: 3940). Likewise,
manufacturing and services will also benefit from investments in facilitating
(infra)structure. However, measures that set out the infrastructure for markets
for the first time require strong and detailed government involvement, which
has been controversial among donors. Indeed, Barakat (ibid.: 36) writes that
Afghan government actors proposed divergences from the free market model
that were considered embarrassing by donors.
The economic reflex of international actors in post-war settings is to move
as quickly as possible to a business as usual development trajectory which
emphasizes small government and a free market (Del Castillo, 2008). Even
in normal economies this model is not uncontroversial, however, and the
recent global financial-economic crisis has re-ignited debates about stronger
government involvement in the economy. In a war-torn context, neoliberal
policies are even more problematic. The war economy, a mix of shadow,
subsistence and other informal economic activities, does not just disappear
when a peace agreement is signed (and in Afghanistan a peace agreement
is still lacking). Rather it is complemented by an international aid economy
that is unsustainable and creates dependence (Kamphuis, 2005).
In contrast to the current overemphasis on free market orthodoxy, targeted
policies to improve the conditions for private sector development are called
18. Examples include the New Afghan Project for Cotton and Oil Development (NAPCOD)
and the New Baghlan Sugar Company Ltd. (Paterson et al., 2006: 8).
19. Interviews conducted by author, Jalalabad, 2007.
519
for. In particular, infrastructure development comes to mind. Barakat (2008:

39) writes that investments in transit and storage infrastructure could shift
the countrys geographic characteristics . . . from a liability to an asset.
Afghanistan would reclaim its role as a trade route and would be able to
better exploit domestic natural resources. Another priority area is electricity, currently a major constraint to much economic activity. Infrastructure
projects would not only facilitate transport and trade in the medium to long
term, but would also create short-term employment opportunities.
In addition, a strong coalition between government and companies, inspired by the developmental state model, may help to kick-start domestic
economic development in Afghanistan. The success of developmental states
is generally attributed to balanced and close statebusiness relations in which
a range of economic and political favours were traded for a business strategy
directed at growth and enhanced productivity. Close statebusiness relations are not uncommon to Afghanistan. However, Afghanistans warlordsturned-businessmen or politicians generally lack a long-term perspective and
have largely invested in areas where the most profits could be made, namely
consumer products imports. As short-termism in Afghanistan can largely
be attributed to insecurity, development policies can effect positive change
through the provision of access to credit, grants and technical assistance
based upon performance criteria.
Contrary to the often-heard argument that those profiting from the war
economy have an interest in continued insecurity, the post-2001 period
shows that these strongmen can have an interest in stabilization. Giustozzi
(2007: 76) speculates that once large fortunes have been accumulated, the
priority is no longer to predate or to smuggle, but to defend the capital.
Law and order become attractive concepts once again. This possibility is
confirmed by the fascinating study by Volkov (2000) of a protection racket
in the Russian Ekaterinburg which developed into a significant actor in the
licit economy. Negotiations among the various armed forces in Afghanistan
may contribute to developing a common economic strategy and drawing
former warlords into the licit economy (Giustozzi, 2011). Following the
US-led intervention in 2001, most of the more powerful warlords sought
official positions, whilst investing their war-time profits into post-conflict
recovery business ventures, generally channelled through informal business
partnerships. These strongmen-turned-businessmen not only relied upon
their continued political and military leverage to control their (dummy)
licit business partners, they also used their businesses to consolidate their
political power (Giustozzi, 2007: 82). Although these strongholds might
have an interest in stability, it remains questionable whether they have a
similar stake in democratization.20
20. This would sharpen another dilemma common to many experiences of post-war state building: the choice between justice and security or indeed between justice and development. For
520
The challenge, then, is to develop policies that maximize the opportunities presented by the current business sector while minimizing the risk of
reinforcing predatory behaviour. First, as Cramer (2009: 139) points out, the
choice is not between subsidies and no subsidies, but to distinguish between
subsidies that increase productivity, employment and other benefits, and
those that do not. Second, the choice can even be between distinguishing
between genuinely wasteful corruption and corruption that is value enhancing. In the Afghan context, for example, instead of breaking the hold of
warlords or faction-affiliated businessmen over markets, a better way forward could be to forge a coalition around this type of imperfect market
structure in a manner that enhances productivity. Third, it would require
allowing the Afghan state to strategically tax the shadow, informal and
international aid segments of the economy. In this way, the economy could
grow and progressively be formalized, which would enhance tax revenues.
The middle class, of which often very little is left after years of warfare,
can also grow over time as can its democratic potential, as it is this
group which historically has been the driving force behind civil society and
democratization (Lipset, 1960).
It seems, then, that the developmental trajectory may lend some inspiration to policy makers in Afghanistan. However, earlier in this article we
have also seen how difficult it is for countries to move from rentierism to
developmentalism (or developmental patrimonialism). It requires strong
leadership and citizen support, neither of which is available in abundance
in Afghanistan today. A complicating factor in this regard is that long-term
horizons are needed in order to establish and realize a developmentalist
policy, whilst an electoral democracy does not provide such horizons. At
the same time, authoritarianism is not only normatively undesirable but also
unstable in the longer term, for instance when succession issues present
themselves, as discussed above.
The feasibility of developmentalist policies in Afghanistan will also depend upon the international context. Although the global economic crisis has
created conditions relatively favourable to acceptance of state interference
in the economy, easy market access to absorb Afghanistans (sub-quality)
exports seems less forthcoming. The broader economic context in which all
this can be made possible also deserves much more attention. How does
Afghanistans development strategy fit into the international division of
labour, also given the murderous competition from India and China? As
Wade (2010: 156) argues, this last issue presents an additional argument in
favour of industrial policy. Merely granting trade protection without performance conditions is probably not sufficient in this regard, but thought
needs to be given to the sectors in which comparative advantage may be
developed. New opportunities need to be sought pro-actively.
such an option would rule out any concept of transitional justice in Afghanistan, which
would target many if not all the leading strongmen (Giustozzi, 2006: 86).
521
CONCLUSION
The Western trajectory of state formation leading to market democracies

appears to be the implicit reference point of most international policies
regarding Afghanistan. However, this trajectory cannot so readily be replicated there, if only because the international context has changed. Market
democracies are the outcome of overlapping interests and bargaining between state, society and business under specific historical and geographical
circumstances. This process cannot be reverse-engineered. Efforts intended
to support democratic state building neglect to ask why todays rulers of
Afghanistan would be interested in such a path. What incentives do they
have for strengthening a state bureaucracy, being accountable to their citizens, investing in the domestic economy, and reorienting their extraction
efforts towards tax collection? The nature of the Afghan economic structure
seems to point in a different direction.
We have explored three other models to identify the drivers of state
formation in the developing world: the developmental, rentier and predatory
path. Afghanistan can be typified as a weak rentier state, relying largely
on aid rentierism. In the context of aid rentierism, channelling more aid
through the government budget and strengthening government institutions
will not promote a trajectory of Western state formation. Instead it will
simply consolidate rentierism. The bureaucracy that is strengthened will not
focus its efforts on (creating the conditions for) taxation but on the allocation
of rents in accordance with a logic of patronage.
Some argue that consolidating aid rentierism is a risk that needs to be
accepted as a possible alternative outcome to the market democracy model.
However, while the aid rentier path could lead to state formation, it is problematic in two ways: first, the resulting state is undemocratic, and second,
it is unstable. In addition, in the Afghan case, the amounts of aid to the
state have to be substantial, as options for warlord politics in its vibrant
shadow and informal economy are widely present, making the predatory
path a potentially attractive alternative.
The developmental state and the recent idea of developmental patrimonialism may offer some inspiration when it comes to finding ways to
alter incentives for states and businesses alike towards an alliance favouring
economic development. Closely working together with business interests,
such as the warlords-turned-businessmen, would be a core component of
such a strategy, even if it raises difficult practical and ethical issues. Current
aid practices, donor demands and international conditions provide limited
room for such a strategy. Credit, grants and technical assistance could be
directed to enhancing economic productivity and facilitating market access
to absorb Afghanistans (sub-quality) exports. Given the harsh competition
from China and India, industrial policy should pro-actively seek out and
support innovative market niches. Some degree of corruption should probably be accepted so long as productivity is improved or employment created;
522
this includes exploring revenue collection opportunities in the shadow and

informal economy.
Difficult dilemmas, for instance with regard to democracy, make it unlikely that international actors will be able to adopt a strategy of developmental patrimonialism. As a consequence, the way forward in Afghanistan
is more likely to continue to contain a mix of elements of different trajectories. Perhaps building a (strong) state should not even be an aim at all,
given our present inconclusive knowledge of the ways in which states can
move from rentier (or even predatory) towards developmental and democratic trajectories. Although more research is thus needed, our overview of
different trajectories in connection with the case of Afghanistan yields some
important insights. Investing in the capacity of democratic state institutions
cannot work in a rentier state. Reverse-engineering a democratic state trajectory is not possible. International actors in Afghanistan (and elsewhere)
should let go of the orthodoxy of state-building policy, which constrains
thinking about solutions for the country. Instead, it is necessary to search
for perhaps radically alternative directions.
This article has focused on the economic dimension of the state, showing
its importance for state formation and development. There is of course
also a more explicitly political dimension involved. At the heart of state
formation lies the fight against internal and external enemies of the state.
Politically accommodating these enemies will most likely be a prerequisite to
achieving developmental success. As we have shown, bargaining is central
to state formation. No amount of investment in bureaucracy building can
ever replace it.
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Focus

State Building in a Rentier State: How Development

Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis

(Reno, 1998) render the comparison inappropriate. In this article, we add

State Building in a Rentier State: Afghanistan

Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis

TRAJECTORIES OF STATE FORMATION

Warfare and State Formation in Europe

State Building in a Rentier State: Afghanistan

extreme accounts (e.g. Weinstein, 2005) draw on the history of European

Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis

Finally, the globalized, neoliberal context also presents radically altered

The Developmental State

To catch up with the West, some developing countries, mainly in East

State Building in a Rentier State: Afghanistan

Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis

The Rentier Path to State Formation

State Building in a Rentier State: Afghanistan

Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis

State Building in a Rentier State: Afghanistan

THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN

To classify Afghanistan as a rentier state, and evaluate its persistence, clarity

Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis

to unprecedented levels, most Afghan leaders favoured the less intrusive

State Building in a Rentier State: Afghanistan

Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis

State Building in a Rentier State: Afghanistan

Building a State Bureaucracy

Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis

attempts to increase the states bureaucratic capacity, both by its rulers

State Building in a Rentier State: Afghanistan

Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC), political

OPTIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN

State formation essentially reflects economic developments and relations.

Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis

State Building in a Rentier State: Afghanistan

for. In particular, infrastructure development comes to mind. Barakat (2008:

Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis

State Building in a Rentier State: Afghanistan

The Western trajectory of state formation leading to market democracies

Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis

this includes exploring revenue collection opportunities in the shadow and

State Building in a Rentier State: Afghanistan

Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis

State Building in a Rentier State: Afghanistan

Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis

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