Statutory Interpretation

As problem questions are a bit long I would suggest do statutory as your first or second
question. Those attempting a problem question should know that you score better for
SIMPLY attempting such a question as the examiner knows how time consuming they
are.
For all type of problem questions, you will need an introduction which WILL include a summary
of your basic knowledge worded as such that it relates to the question
Pattern:
1) Before you start your question, just write a line which says that in order to advise A, B
and C some light needs to be shed on the development of different styles of
interpretation. (Such a line will therefore make all the general information you give seem
relevant).
2) A recommended intro would start with the history of how statutes gained importance for
e.g.:
In early times there were few statutes, these were regulations were made by King
in Council. They were written in a straightforward manner and were easy to
interpret. The bulk of law was case law and statutes were of secondary
importance.
From the Tudor period onwards, Parliament became more and more independent
and the practice of law making through statutes increased. But statutes did not
become an important source of law till the beginning of the 19th century.
Since the late 18th century, the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy has been
accepted. It states that Parliament is omnipotent and Omni competent, that is, it
can command everything and anything that is not logically impossible.

(Therefore) The Basic Norms of Interpretation are:

1. There are no limits upon the power of Parliament to make law.
2. The judge ought to give effect to the intention of Parliament.
3. As a reflection of what judges say they do, interpretation should start with the presumption
that one should apply the ordinary, literal meaning of the words Parliament has used.

Very important point: from the following list for all the rules choose one or two cases for
the introduction, dont use more as you should save some for the rest of the question.

Okay, one very important point in the three situations that you discuss in the question, you will
apply first the literal, then the purposive and then see if there is infringement of any HRA
articles. Therefore, we will discuss the golden and mischief, their criticisms in the intro which will
justify not using these in the rest of the question.

Literal Rule:
Give Definition:
Must give words their plain, ordinary or literal meaning even if result is absurd, disliked by the
judge or it inflicts hardship on those affected.
R v Harris:
The statute made it an offence for somebody to maliciously stab, cut or wound another person.
Harris bit off her friends nose in a fight and the policemans finger. Was she guilty under the
statute? No. This was further given force by the fact that elsewhere in the section, references
were made to weapons with words such as shooting.
In R v The judge of City of London Court, Lord Esher:
If the words of the statute were clear, they must be followed even if the result is not sensible,
and even if it is absurd and unjust. Thus he argued that it had nothing to do with the courts if
Parliament had caused such an absurdity.
Whitely v Chappel:
The statute made it an offence for anyone during an election to impersonate another person
entitled to vote.
In this case the D had impersonated a dead person, the court found him not guilty. Although a
fraud had taken place here, the D was let go because the judges followed a narrow
interpretation of the statute.
In Sussex peerage case:
Tindall LJ said:
Words themselves alone do best declare intention of the law given...
Duport Steel v Sirs:

Lord Diplock:
Where meaning plain and unambiguous... it is not for judges to invent fancied ambiguities
Fisher v Bell
Under Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 it was an offence to sell or hire or offer to sell
or hire certain offensive weapons such as flick knives. A shop keeper kept a flick knife on
display with a price ticket. He was prosecuted for offering to sell an offensive weapon.
The Divisional Court said that the phrase offer to sell was to be taken literally in accordance
with contract law. It was just an invitation to treat.

Criticism: In 1969 the Law Commission produced a Report on the Interpretation of statutes and
found the Literal Rule to be unsatisfactory:

It places undue emphasis on the literal meaning of the words of provision is to

assume an unattainable perfection in draughtsmanship;
It presupposes that the draftsman can always choose words to describe the
situation intended to be covered by the provision which will leave no room for
difference of opinion as to their meaning;
Such an approach ignores the limitation of language

Golden rule:
The golden rule is called an adaptation of the literal rule.
It tells you to read the words in the context of the statute as a whole. The literal rule demands
you to look to what was said and not what it might mean in a wider context.
Write at least two of the following cases in the intro.
The words of Parke B in Becke v Smith (who became Lord Wensleydale):
It is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning of words
used, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature or leads to manifest
absurdity in which case the language may be varied so as to avoid such inconvenience but no
further.
This was followed in Mattison v Hart.
As you can all see I have used an extraordinary large font, ALL OF YOU give wrong definitions
of the golden rule. So I am highlighting areas of persistent stupidity!

If ordinary meaning produce such absurdity that it appears that this could not have been
intended by Parliament, then the words can be modified but must not be taken beyond that.
The literal approach was still put as the first step.
In River Wear Commisioners v Adamson,
Lord Blackburn:
We are to take the whole statute together, construe it all together,
giving the words their ordinary signification, unless when so applied they produce
an inconsistency, or an absurdityso great to convince the court that the
intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary signification and to
justify the court in putting on them some other signification which, though less
proper, is one which the court thinks the words will bear
Grey v Pearson, this phraseology was adopted by Lord Wensledayle:
If the words of a statute in terms of their ordinary meaning produce an absurd result, these
words may be modified in order to avoid the absurdity, but it must not be taken beyond that.
This rule can be seen as a backup for the literal rule when it has failed. Usually focusing on
secondary meanings the word or phrase.
R v Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367, CCR
The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 made it an offence to marry another partner
while already married, and D was prosecuted under this Act. He claimed that since his
second "marriage" was not legally valid, he had not committed the offence defined. The
Court said the phrase "to marry" was capable of more than one interpretation: it could mean
"to enter lawful matrimony with" or "to go through a form of marriage with". Parliament could
not have intended to create an offence that it was logically impossible to commit, so the
second interpretation was the one to be preferred.
Ruther v Harris (1876) LR 1 Ex D 97, Grove J
The Salmon Fishery Act 1861 provided that if salmon poachers were caught then the bailiff
could confiscate "all fish taken and any net used in taking the same". In an action based on
such a seizure, the judge said this should be taken to allow the confiscation of nets even
where the poachers had been apprehended before they had actually caught any fish.
Meah v Roberts [1978] 1 All ER 97, DC
A customer ordering lemonade for his children in an Indian restaurant was served with caustic
soda, which was used for cleaning the beer pipes and had been stored in a lemonade bottle
under the bar. The restaurant manager was convicted of selling food intended for but unfit for
human consumption, contrary to the Food and Drugs Act 1955, and appealed on the grounds
that what he had sold was not food (which under the statute expressly includes drink).
Dismissing his appeal, the Divisional Court said the supply of something purporting to be
lemonade was a supply of food for the purposes of the Act

Re Sigsworth
Mrs. Sigsworth was found dead, it was discovered that she had been murdered by her son who
was also found dead. Her will left everything to the son, old rules of public policy dictated that
the son could not inherit in these circumstances. Therefore, Mrs. Sigsworth died intestate.
Under the Administration of Estates Act 1925, s 46 the person entitled on intestacy was her son
and through him his estate. The statute dealing with intestacy said nothing about murderers
being barred from inheriting. The court held that the statute could have been intended to allow
murderers to inherit despite being silent on the point.

In Stock v Frank Jones, Lord Simon:

Departure from literal rule only when:
a) there is a clear and gross anomaly,
b) Parliament could not have envisaged the anomaly and would not have accepted its
presence;
c) The anomaly can be obviated without detriment to the legislative intent; and
d) The language of the statute allows for such modification.
Therefore the golden rule can be seen to be a bridge between literalism and
purposiveness.
Criticism:
The 1969 Law commission said that the approach provides no clear means to test absurdity and
did not favour it.

Mischief Rule:
This is one of the oldest rules, it dates back to the 16 th century when common law was
the primary source of law and parliamentary supremacy was not established.
Like the golden and purposive rule, the mischief rule stresses the need to interpret an
enactment in such a way to give effect to its objectives.
The classic expression of this approach comes from the:
Re Heydons case, four tasks:
1) What was the common law before the making of the act?
2) What was the mischief and defects for which the common law did not provide?
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3) What remedy did Parliament intend to provide?

4) What was the true reason for that remedy?

Basically, the judge needed to interpret the Act in such a way that will best advance the remedy
and suppress the mischief (get rid of the defect).
Elliott v Grey [1959] 3 All ER 733, DC
A man A appealed against his conviction for using a motor car on a road without a valid
insurance policy, contrary to s.35 (1) of the Road Traffic Act 1930. The car was parked
outside A's house; it had broken down some months before, the engine would not work, and
there was no petrol in the tank. A had therefore cancelled his insurance, but said (and it was
accepted) he would have renewed it before driving the car again. The Divisional Court
affirmed his conviction: Lord Parker CJ said the mischief was the protection of third parties,
so "use" should be taken to mean "have the use of". Quite apart from the fact that another
vehicle had collided with the stationary car, it was on a hill and could have rolled away if
someone had let the brake off.

Alphacell v Woodward [1972] 2 All ER 475, HL

A company AA were convicted under s.2 (1) (a) of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act
1951 of polluting a river. AA were unaware causing this pollution, and there was no evidence
of negligence on their part, but their conviction was upheld by the House of Lords. It is of the
utmost importance that rivers should not be polluted, and if no conviction could be secured
unless the prosecution could discharge the often impossible burden of proving the pollution
had been caused intentionally or negligently, a great deal of pollution would go unpunished
and undeterred, and rivers would become even filthier.

Bradford v Wilson (1983) 78 Cr App R 77, DC

A man D was arrested in his car, where he had been sniffing glue. He was convicted under
s.5 (2) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 with being in charge of a motor vehicle while unfit
through drink or drugs. He appealed on the ground that neither glue nor any of its
constituents is a drug. Dismissing his appeal and affirming the justices' decision, Goff LJ
said the list of prohibited drugs in Schedule 2 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 could not be
taken as conclusive: the considerations relevant to illegal possession were different from
those relevant to driving. The natural meaning of "drug" might have medicinal connotations,
but that was not necessary, as shown by the example of LSD. The mischief aimed at in the
statute was persons being in charge of motor vehicles when they had taken substances
impairing their control of their body movements. Accordingly, he would interpret "drug" for
the purposes of the RTA as being any substance taken into the body, except drink (which
was expressly mentioned in the section) or food, which affected the person's control of his
body.

Tesco v Brent LBC [1993] 2 All ER 718, DC

A youth of 14 was sold a video with a "18" classification, and the supermarket chain were
prosecuted for an offence under the Video Recordings Act 1984. The Act provided that it
would be an offence to sell such a video where the seller had reason to believe the buyer
was under age; on the facts, this applied to the checkout operator but not to the company
itself. Staughton LJ said Parliament clearly intended the company to be liable on the
strength of its employee's knowledge; otherwise no national company could ever have been
prosecuted.

Smith v Hughes:
Section 1 of the SOA 1959:
(It shall be an offence to) solicit in the street (for the purposes of prostitution).
The accused was in a house, tapping on the window to attract the attention of passers-by.

Parker LCJ:
What is the mischief aimed by this Act to clean up the streets- to enable people to
walk along the streets without being molested by common prostitutes.
Secondary meaning found by him was that it is the solicitations which must take
place in the street, not the person who does the soliciting.
.
Now that you have given criticism for the golden and the mischief rule you will justify why in the
question you will talk about the Purposive, as the trend is towards a purposive approach now.

What is the issue with the rule?

Previously statutes used to have a preamble detailed reasons given for the acts. Therefore a
judge did not have to go beyond the act.
Lord Diplock recognized this in Black- Clawson International Ltd:
So, when it was laid down, the mischief rule did not require the court to travel beyond actual
words of the statute itself to identify the mischief and defect for which the common law did not
provide.
M.R must be used with caution to justify any reference to extraneous document for this purpose.
Mischief is extremely difficult to define as every act came about for some reason.
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An Act may have more than one mischief Lord Bingham in R.V Sec. of state ex parte Spath
Holme.
Gorris v Scott
Scott Contracted to transport some sheep by sea, the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act 1869
required that the sheep should have been put in pens. Scott had not fenced them properly and
the sheep were swept overboard. Gorris claimed Scott was in breach of the contract.
The Court of Exchequer held purpose of the Act (which was clear from the preamble) was to
prevent spread of diseases among sheep/cattle not to give any such right to Gorris.
In the 16th century, the judiciary would often draft acts on behalf of the King and were therefore
well qualified in what mischief the act was meant to remedy.
1969 Law Commission Commented:

Somewhat more satisfactory approach, but somewhat outdated because it assumes

that statute is subsidiary or supplement to common law whereas in modern conditions
many statutes mark a fresh point of departure.

Do not miss this one in intro!!

Important:
Royal College of Nursing v DHSS:
(no need to write facts in the intro.)
Distinction between the mischief and golden rules in the mind of some judges is so fine that it is
virtually non-existent. It could be argued that both rules have become subsumed within a
general purposive approach.
The Abortion Act 1967 made it lawful under certain circumstances for a pregnancy to be
terminated by a registered medical practitioner.
At that time surgery was the only usual method of termination but subsequent medical
technology made it possible and generally preferable to induce the expulsion of the fetus by
means of drugs.
The DHSS advised in a circular that nurses and midwives carrying out this procedure (Under
the general supervision of a doctor) would have the protection of the Act.
But the RCN sought a declaration that this advice was wrong and the nurses could not be
expected to administer the drugs.
The HOL reversed the COAs decision and restored Woolf Js ruling that the advice was correct.
The majority adopted a purposive approach:
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The Act was clearly meant to legitimize therapeutic abortions and to ensure that they were
carried out proper hygienic conditions.
The section was given a broad interpretation rather than literal/narrow one.
Lord Diplock: Began by looking at what was the state of law before the passing of the Act
What was the mischief? How was the law unclear?
Then, he looked at the whole context of the abortion problem, its social, economic as well as the
legal history.
He said wordings of the section are far from elegant but policy is clear and there re two aspects
to it:
1) Broaden the grounds, upon which abortion may be obtained.
2) That the abortion is carried out with proper care and skill and in hygienic conditions.

The Purposive Approach:

In the past thirty years or so, the English courts have increasingly taken a "purposive" approach
to purely domestic legislation too.
It encourages the judge to look for the spirit of the Act and to read words into or out of the Act
when this is necessary.
No need to wait for absurdity. Or any such pre condition therefore it is more practical than the
mischief or the golden rule.
In the past thirty years or so, the English courts have increasingly taken a "purposive" approach
to purely domestic legislation too.
Kammins Ballrooms v Zenith Investments [1970] 2 All ER 871, HL
AA sought renewal of a lease, and legal problems arose as to the status of various time
limits set out in the relevant Act. Lord Reid said that if the words of an Act are so inflexible
that they are incapable in any context of having more than one meaning, the courts must
apply that meaning however unreasonable it might be. But Lord Diplock suggested obiter
that the courts were moving towards a purposive approach to the interpretation of
legislation, in which the judges used their good sense to interpret the statute - by reading
words into it if necessary - so as to do what Parliament would have done had they had the
instant situation in mind.

Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1980] 2 All ER 696, HL

A traveller P claimed compensation for damage to a case and loss of some of its contents in
course of transit. The Carriage by Air Act 1961 provided that claims for damage should be made
within seven days, and P's initial claim had made no mention of the losses. Kerr J and the Court
of Appeal found in P's favour, but the House of Lords disagreed. The Act was meant to
implement the Warsaw Convention, and the text of the Convention (in both English and French)
should be examined to see whether "damage" was meant to include "loss". In the event the
result was still inconclusive, so the House adopted a purposive interpretation and said the
provision was clearly meant to give the carrier early notice so that they could take appropriate
steps to look for any missing items; P's claim for loss therefore failed
Jones v Tower Boot Company [1997] 2 All ER 406, Times 16/12/96, CA
A young black worker was abused physically and verbally by some of his workmates, and
brought proceedings against his employer under the Race Relations Act 1976. The
Employment Appeal Tribunal found in favour of the employer because the workmates had
not been acting "in the course of their employment", but this decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeal. Waite LJ said the Act should be construed according to its legislative
purpose and by giving the words in the statute their normal meaning, not by importing
narrow constructions from other areas of law. The general thrust of the Act was educative,
persuasive, and where necessary coercive: it was designed as much to eliminate the
occasions for discrimination as to compensate victims or punish perpetrators. A purposive
construction required the section to be given a broad interpretation.
Inco Europe v First Choice Distribution (2000) Times 10/3/00, HL
A question arose as to whether in certain circumstances s.18 of the the Supreme Court Act
1981 excluded appeals to the Court of Appeal. Lord Nicholls said it has long been
established that the role of the courts in construing legislation is not confined to resolving
ambiguities: the court must be able to correct obvious drafting errors. Where the court is
sure of the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question; and is sure that by
inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament had failed to give effect to that purpose in the
provision in question; and (crucially) can be sure how Parliament would have dealt with the
error had it been noticed (even if not its exact words), then (subject to any other
considerations) it should apply a construction that accords with the intention of the
legislature.
G v F (Non-molestation order) (2000) Times 24/5/00, Wall J
Magistrates refused to hear an application for a non-molestation order, on the grounds that
W and M lived for much of the time in separate households and so were not strictly
"associated persons" for the purposes of s.42 of the Family Law Act 1996. Remitting the
matter for rehearing (and continuing an existing order in the mean time), Wall J said the
courts should give the relevant provisions a purposive construction - they were intended to
provide a swift and effective remedy to the victims of domestic violence - and should not
decline jurisdiction unless the facts of the case were plainly incapable of being brought
within the statute.

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PEPPER V. HART
(No need to write the facts in an introduction of a problem question on statutory interpretation)
The plaintiff claimed that irrespective of the clear words of the Act, the movers of the Bill had a
quite different interpretation than put forth by the Inland Revenue.
The HOL considered whether they could refer to Hansard as evidence of Parliaments intent or
only consider words of the Act.
Reference would be allowed:
1) legislation is ambiguous or obscure or leads to absurdity
2) the material relied upon consists of one or more statements made by a minister or
promoter of the Bill, together if necessary with such other Parliamentary material as is
necessary to understand such statements and their effect,
3) the statements relied upon are clear.
In this case permitting reference to Hansard was that the literal meaning of the statute was not
followed.
Where the words used by Parliament are obscure or ambiguous, Parliamentary material may
throw considerable light not only on the mischief which the Act was designed to remedy but also
on the purpose of the legislation and its anticipated effect.
This stresses that there is a historical shift in judicial interpretation. This is in part due to impact
of purposive styles of European interpretation.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson:
Very important that you at least know the bit I have underlined!
the courts have departed from the old literal approach of statutory construction and now adopt
a purposive approach, seeking to discover the Parliamentary intention behind the words used
and construing the legislation so as to give effect to, rather than thwart, the intention of
Parliament.
(You dont need to write this approach in the introduction, use it in addressing the parties where
appears suitable)
The De Bene Esse Approach:
This approach is used to avoid circular arguments or confusions with regard to any of
the preconditions to the use of Hansard (especially the question of whether or not there
is any ambiguity)
This means For what its worth. To take a point de ben esse is to allow it to be argued for the
present but to make no ruling on whether, once things have been more fully argued, it will be
accepted.
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The court is said to admit the evidence contained in Hansard without deciding on the weight to
be attached to it. The application can be seen in the case R v Deegan and Shippleys
Application.

European Interpretation
The European Union (EU) is an economic and political union or confederation of 27 member
states which are located primarily in Europe. The EU traces its origins from the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC), formed by six
countries in 1958. The EU has developed a single market through a standardized system of
laws which apply in all member states. EU policies aim to ensure the free movement of people,
goods, services, and capital, enact legislation in justice and home affairs, and maintain common
policies on trade.
The European Communities Act 1972 is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom
providing for the incorporation of European Community law into the domestic law of the United
Kingdom.
Impact on statutory interpretation (impact on purposive styles of interpretation):
Now the purpose of any act needs to be understood in light of Community law. This may even
go on to mean that courts have to follow European law instead of English law if there is a
conflict.
Also, the fact that since the ECJ employs teleological styles of interpretation, this too shall have
an impact on interpretation styles of domestic courts. You can add a line saying: if the judge in
the case of either A, B or C finds European Union law on a matter, it appears that an
interpretation that favors the Community law will be preferred as opposed to English law.
Then you can go on to write at least TWO of the cases below.
In Bulmer v Bollinger,
Lord Denning:
no longer must judges examine words in meticulous detailThey must look to purpose or
intent.To quote the words of the European Court in Da costa case they must deduce from the
wording and the spirit of the Treaty meaning of the community rules..

This goes on to show influence of European courts in promoting a purposive approach.

Macarthys v. Smith:
Lord Denning:

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 Community law is now part of our law: and whenever there is any inconsistency,
Community law has priority. It is part of our law which overrides any other part which is
inconsistent with it
Marleasing:
Relying on Van Colson:
A court had to interpret national law as consistent with European obligations whether or not the
national law pre or post dated a directive.
It appears courts have a much bolder role to play in interpretation of national law.
Pickstone v. Freemans:
In this key q: whether an amendment to a section of the Act had helped give effect to obligations
under the treaty (Treaty of Rome). Lordships began from purposive interpretation and stated
that only express wordings of a statute passed prior to the UK joining the European Community
would allow a court to conclude that it was not intended to comply with European law (Lord
Diplock in Garland).Therefore wide departures could be made here, to achieve consistency.
Literal interpretation would compel courts to believe the Act is inconsistent with EL.
Lord Oliver held that the Act was capable of meaning to make it consistent with EL. Ultimately it
was held a purposive interpretation helped the court reach this end by taking the Regulation into
acct. which aimed at bringing the Act in line with EL.
Litster
Court went further than Pickstone and implied words to make compatible with EL. It was held
that UK legislation must be purposively interpreted so as to give effect to EL. This approach can
allow t he courts to depart from the literal meaning of the words used.
Impact:
Pickstone and Litster show the development of a new judicial practice, however wrong to
presume literal interpretation is dead. Literal approach still is the starting point as sometimes
there is no need to distort the language of the statute or alter literal sense.
VERY IMP CASE!
R v Registrar- General, ex parte Smith
Slowly but surely one can detect an increasing tendency towards the purposive approach.
If there is European law governing a certain point of law similar to that of an Act then in order to
fill gaps and understanding meaning of Act the spirit of the European law must be taken into
account to interpret the Act. This deviates from the literal reading of the Act. Probably fair to say
that the purposive approach is now the favored method both as regards Community derived
legislation and more home-grown material.
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Now please do not make a monster out of HRA. You can go to the OTHER notes I have mailed
you for detail for an essay question, I am giving you a summary here for as far as statutory
interpretations problem question

Human Rights Act

The Human Rights Act 1998 is an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom which received
Royal Assent on 9 November 1998, and mostly came into force on 2 October 2000. Its aim is to
"give further effect" in UK law to the rights contained in the European Convention on Human
Rights. The Act makes available in UK courts a remedy for breach of a Convention right, without
the need to go to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
1. S. 3(1): in so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights
So far as it is possible to do so; judges will have this in mind when adopting a
purposive approach.
2. S.4 where it is not possible to give an interpretation that is compatible with the
Convention; the higher court may issue a declaration of incompatibility.
3. The declaration will not affect the validity of the statute... Its enforcement or operation...
4. Human rights principles are not totally foreign to English law, most of these have been
recognized by the English legal system; right to fair trial, right to privacy, freedom of
speech
5. Judges are not empowered to strike down incompatible legislation as this would lead to
usurpation of fundamental constitutional
.
The words in so far as possible have given the judiciary a lot of POWER and DISCRETION.
Some judges have been mindful of their boundaries while some used or rather abused their
powers.
The most expansive interpretation of section 3(1) was taken by Lord Steyn in the case of RvA
where he inserted an entire section into Youth Justice and Criminal Act 1999. Lord Steyns
approach was followed in Goode v Martin. However, the trend changed towards a more
restrictive approach: In Re S Lord Nicholls proposes rule of thumb test: A meaning which
departs from a substantially fundamental feature of an act of Parliament is likely to have crossed
the boundary btw interpretation and amendment. In Bellinger v Bellinger a declaration of
incompatibility was made. Lord Nicholls test was applied in the case of Ghaidan.

So, you can see that it is LEGIT for courts to interpret in a way which makes the UK Act
Convention compliant; if it is in line with fundamental features and POLICY of the UK Act.

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After the intro and describing the rules, EU and HRA just write a line saying that these are just
so called rules and a judge may be influenced by his personal opinion, bias, religious and
political opinions.
Okay now that you know all the details that need to go into your intro, when you are advising
each person.
1) You will say as stated above, the presumptions of interpretation state that a judge will
always start with the literal rule. Then you will apply to the Act in question this rule, by
giving words their plain and ordinary meaning and applying it to the situation. Then you
will say in my opinion if judge applies literal rule to situation he may hold A guilty/not
guilty. You can write a case of the literal rule here which you didnt mention in
intro.
2) Then to As situation you will apply purposive approach. See what the spirit of the Act is.
Write a case, can either pick one from EU case law or ones stated above under
purposive. (As we criticized the mischief and the golden, you do not have to discuss
them while advising A, B and C. Just discuss literal, purposive and see whether HRA
articles being infringed)
3) An important point to note is that in some situations the literal and purposive rule will
give you same results (as discussed in class). Naturally because both are trying to
ascertain intent of Parliament. For extra marks you can quote:
Mention if literal and purposive yield same result.
Twining:
He says that there is another misleading aspect of statutory interpretation, it suggests there
is more of a difference between literal and purposive interpretation than there is in practice.
It suggests a rather artificial approach that imagines a judge first asking whether words are
unambiguous and if not, then, how can they be read so as to give effect to the intention of
Parliament
4)

Then to the facts you will see whether there is any HRA violation. In order to know if
there is an HRA article violation, you need to know them (SEE PAGE 283). Also talk
about the exception (as stated above) if claim not against public authority.
IF you spot such an issue you will say that as such and such rights under the ECHR are
protected through the HRA in domestic courts, we will need to assess whether A, B or C
is caught under it.
You will start this part by saying that as sec 3(1) gives judges power to interpret UK
legislation in so far as possible in line with Convention rights. Basically your argument
will be some judges took it too far (R v A), but later narrower approach followed
(Bellinger v Bellinger, Re S, R v Sec. of State and most modern approach is in Ghaidan.
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And in light of Ghaidan you will judge; if the Act is not directly giving the HRA right, can
the Act be interpreted as such that it will not go against the policy/spirit of the legislation.
You will be able to judge (in your opinion) what the fundamental feature of the UK act is,
and if it protects such rights then if A, B or C are in violation of it. Then write that; in your
opinion the judge may hold them guilty or not (whatever your conclusion is). Dont say he
WILL do this, leave it open ended say in my opinion if he follows this or that approach
this may be the conclusion.
5) Remember one important point is that a claim can only be made against a public
authority. A person may indirectly rely on the rights contained in the HRA in actions
against people who are not public authorities, but only to back up existing legal rights,
i.e., they cannot sue for breach of human rights per se but can sue for sat, breach of
contract and then ask the court to interpret or apply the law so as to comply with the
rights set out in the HRA. This is because, as the courts fall within the definition of public
authority in the HRA, any decision they reach must comply with the Convention Rights
.

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