THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PROTASIO EDUAVE, defendant-appellant.
Manuel Roxas for appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
We believe that the accused is guilty of frustrated murder.
We are satisfied that there was an intent to kill in this case. A deadly weapon was used. The blow
was directed toward a vital part of the body. The aggressor stated his purpose to kill, thought he
had killed, and threw the body into the bushes. When he gave himself up he declared that he had
killed the complainant.
There was alevosia to qualify the crime as murder if death had resulted. The accused rushed upon
the girl suddenly and struck her from behind, in part at least, with a sharp bolo, producing a
frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to the side eight and one-half inches long and two
inches deep, severing all of the muscles and tissues of that part.
The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl for the reason that she had
theretofore charged him criminally before the local officials with having raped her and with being
the cause of her pregnancy. He was her mother's querido and was living with her as such at the
time the crime here charged was committed.
That the accused is guilty of some crime is not denied. The only question is the precise crime of
which he should be convicted. It is contended, in the first place, that, if death has resulted, the
crime would not have been murder but homicide, and in the second place, that it is attempted and
not frustrated homicide.
As to the first contention, we are of the opinion that the crime committed would have been murder
if the girl had been killed. It is qualified by the circumstance of alevosia, the accused making a
sudden attack upon his victim from the rear, or partly from the rear, and dealing her a terrible blow
in the back and side with his bolo. Such an attack necessitates the finding that it was made
treacherously; and that being so the crime would have been qualified as murder if death had
resulted.
As to the second contention, we are of the opinion that the crime was frustrated and not attempted
murder. Article 3 of the Penal Code defines a frustrated felony as follows:
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.

An attempted felony is defined thus:

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which constitute the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own voluntarily desistance.
The crime cannot be attempted murder. This is clear from the fact that the defendant performed all
of the acts which should have resulted in the consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from
further acts. A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the
commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from
performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. In other words, to be an attempted
crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes
and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should
produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has performed
all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from
proceeding further, it can not be an attempt. The essential element which distinguishes attempted
from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause
or agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the
acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime; while in the former
there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts
which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his
voluntary desistance.
To put it in another way, in case of an attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of the
offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes before the
subjective phase is passed.
On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes the subjective phase is completely passed.
Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing through
the subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of
causes independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime.
If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to something beyond his control.
The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act
which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with
the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward the phase is
objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he
has control that period between the point where he begins and the points where he voluntarily
desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his
own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not
so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated.
That the case before us is frustrated is clear.

The penalty should have been thirteen years of cadena temporal there being neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed with costs. So ordered.
THIRD DIVISION
FELIX RAIT,
Petitioner,

- versus -

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 180425
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 31, 2008
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] in CA-G.R. CR No. 23276 dated
January 26, 2006 and its Resolution[2] dated October 10, 2007. The Court of Appeals upheld the
Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 20, wherein
petitioner Felix Rait was convicted of attempted rape.
On November 18, 2003, AAA[4] asked permission from her parents to go to her brothers house in
Nazareth Street to get her athletic pants. When she was there, her brother requested her to buy
cigarettes from a nearby store. While in the store, petitioner Rait and one Janiter Pitago arrived.
The two ordered beer and invited AAA to join them. She initially refused. However, when Aurora
Raez, another neighbor, joined them, AAA was forced to drink beer. After drinking a glass of beer,
she became drunk. When she was feeling weak, petitioner and his co-accused brought her out to
20th and 21st Streets where the petitioner and his co-accused brought her to the side of the street
and forcibly removed her pants and underwear. Petitioner then forcibly inserted his finger into her
vagina. AAA tried to shout for help but petitioner covered her mouth while Pitago held her feet.
Petitioner was on top of her and about to insert his penis into her vagina but she was able to kick
both men and run away.[5]
AAA then went to her brothers house and related the incident to him. Her brother went out to find
petitioner. When AAAs brother did find petitioner, he tried to beat petitioner with a stick but the
latter ran away. AAA and her brother then went home to their parents house in Tambo,
Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City and told them what happened. At about 3:00 a.m. of November
19, AAA was accompanied by her brother and stepmother to Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw to
report the incident. They also went to Bombo Radyo to appeal for help in apprehending petitioner.
From there, they went to the Provincial Hospital for AAA to undergo medical examination.[6]
They then proceeded to the police station where the incident was recorded on the police blotter
under Entry No. 8085.[7]
On May 26, 1994, Rait and Pitago were charged in an Information, which reads:
That on or about November 19, 1993, at 2:00 oclock in the morning, more or less (sic) at
Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another,
did then and there, wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the
crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, on the person of a [17-year-old] minor, [AAA], by then and
there (sic), with force and against the latters will while she was in a state of intoxication, touching
her breasts, removing her panty, holding her feet (by Janiter Pitago) and lying on top of her (by
Felix Rait), but did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Rape,
by reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, that in when (sic) offended
party was able to kick them and the two ran away.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 335 in relation to Article 6, of the Revised Penal Code.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby finds the accused Felix Rait guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape.
The basic penalty for Attempted Rape under Article 335 is two degrees lower than Reclusion
Perpetua or Prision Mayor in its full extent. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
accused is entitled to a penalty lower to (sic) Prision Mayor or that of Prision Correccional in its
full extent, (sic) hence, accused FELIX RAIT is sentenced to an Indeterminate Sentence of
PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its medium period as the minimum to PRISION MAYOR in its
medium period as the maximum under the same law.
The accused is entitled to his credit in full (sic) in his favor the period during which he was under
preventive imprisonment pending litigation.
Accused herein is further ordered to pay the complainant the sum of P20,000.00 pesos (sic) as
indemnity for Attempted rape to the complainant (sic); P5,000.00 pesos (sic) for actual damages
and expenses and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]

Petitioner appealed the judgment to the CA-Cagayan de Oro. Petitioner alleged that the RTC erred
in: (1) giving credence to the prosecution witnesses despite their inconsistent, contradictory and
incredible testimonies; (2) in not finding that petitioner was implicated in the case by reason of
spite and vengeance; and (3) in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted rape despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt.[9]
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the trial courts ruling in all respects.[10] Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Petitioner now comes before this Court on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT CONVICTING THE PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED RAPE,
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW ON RAPE
AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN [NOT
DOWNGRADING] THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED RAPE TO ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
IF NOT THAT OF UNJUST VEXATION.[11]

Petitioner argues that he should be acquitted of the crime of attempted rape. If he is to be found
guilty of any offense, he puts forward the theory that based on this Courts ruling in Baleros, Jr. v.
People,[12] he should be convicted only of unjust vexation.
The petition is bereft of merit. We deny the Petition for Review.
First, the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive
upon this Court. In this case, the trial court found the acts imputed to petitioner to have been duly
proven by the evidence beyond reasonable doubt. We are bound by such finding.
On the strength of those proven facts, the next question is: what was the offense committed?
Petitioner argues that this Courts ruling in Baleros is applicable to his case.
In Baleros, accused was convicted of attempted rape. The CA sustained the conviction. Upon
review, this Court reversed the conviction and found accused guilty of light coercion. The Court
declared:
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro M. Recto
in People vs. Lamahang, stated that the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a
logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of the execution of
the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation.
Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect,
as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature of the
act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to commit an
indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code.
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the
present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the
petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt
act of rape.
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles
nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense.
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe
petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her
to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did
not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It
cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his

part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the
complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybodys guess. The CA
maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top of the
complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated the next step that the petitioner
would have taken if the victim had been rendered unconscious. Wrote the CA:
The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have to come later. His
sexual organ is not yet exposed because his intended victim is still struggling. Where the intended
victim is an educated woman already mature in age, it is very unlikely that a rapist would be in his
naked glory before even starting his attack on her. He has to make her lose her guard first, or as in
this case, her unconsciousness.
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice disfavored under the
rule on evidence in criminal cases. For, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for
proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the premises, of
any wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained an allegation that
he forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And during the
trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and having
struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily, while the series of acts
committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute
unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring an accused of a crime
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, it cannot be said that petitioner
was kept in the dark of the inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the
information against petitioner contains sufficient details to enable him to make his defense. As
aptly observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege malice, restraint or
compulsion in information for unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the
element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any
human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly
annoy or irritate an innocent person. The paramount question is whether the offenders act causes
annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is
directed. That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she
perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond
cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner.[13]

We are not persuaded by petitioners argument. Several facts attendant to this case distinguish it
from Baleros, enough to convince us to arrive at a different conclusion.
Unlike in Baleros, the acts of petitioner clearly establish his intention to commence the act of rape.

Petitioner had already successfully removed the victims clothing and had inserted his finger into
her vagina. It is not empty speculation to conclude that these acts were preparatory to the act of
raping her. Had it not been for the victims strong physical resistance, petitioners next step would,
logically, be having carnal knowledge of the victim. The acts are clearly the first or some
subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations
are made.[14]
Under Article 6, in relation to Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance.[15]
This Court has held that an overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime,
more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The
raison detre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the
accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is
necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be
lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission
of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and
this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty
what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate
step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the first or some subsequent
step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made.
The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however,
that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt
acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.[16]

Thus, we find that petitioner was correctly convicted of attempted rape.

A final observation. We note that the trial courts Decision sentenced petitioner to a prison term
without specifying the period this sentence covers. We will rectify this error even as we affirm
petitioners conviction.
The penalty for attempted rape is prision mayor, or two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the
penalty for consummated rape. Petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence the
minimum of which is in the range of prision correccional, or within six months and one day to six
years, and the maximum of which is prision mayor medium, or within eight years and one day to
ten years. In this case, the trial court sentenced petitioner to an Indeterminate Sentence of
PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its medium period, as the minimum, to PRISION MAYOR in its

medium period, as the maximum.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23276 dated January 26, 2006 and its Resolution dated October 10, 2007 affirming petitioners
conviction for ATTEMPTED RAPE are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The petitioner is
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of
prision correccional medium, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as its
maximum. In all other respects, the trial courts Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
BINGKY CAMPOS and DANNY "BOY" ACABO, Appellants.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
We reiterate in this case the time-honored doctrine that although it is a cardinal principle in
criminal law that the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused, the rule is
reversed where the accused admits the commission of the crime and invokes self-defense.
This is an appeal from the September 25, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CEB-CR H.C. No. 00241. The CA affirmed in toto the April 2, 2004 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 37, Dumaguete City finding appellants
Bingky Campos (Bingky) and Danny "Boy" Acabo (Danny) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder.
In an Information filed by the Assistant Prosecutor of Dumaguete City, Bingky and Danny were
charged with the crime of murder committed as follows:
That on August 19, 2001 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening at Arellano Street, Poblacion
Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other,
with deliberate intent to kill, armed with a "plamingco" - a bladed weapon of which said accused
were armed and provided, and [by] means of treachery, and disregard of the respect due the
offended party on account of his age, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, stab and wound ROMEO F. ABAD, 64 years of age, thereby inflicting upon the latter "stab
[sic] wound with injury to the liver, gallbladder thru/thru; duodenum thru/thru; pancreas", which
cause[d] his death on the following day while undergoing medical treatment at the Holy Child
Hospital.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.3

Arraigned on September 25, 2001, appellants, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial
was deemed terminated on March 25, 2002. Trial on the merits thereafter proceeded.
Version of the Prosecution
A brief summary of the pertinent facts constituting the prosecutions version of the incident was
unveiled by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in this manner:
[A]t around [8:00] oclock in the evening of August 19, 2001, prosecution eyewitness Lester
Huck Baldivino (Lester) was tending his sari-sari store near his house located at Arellano St.,
Brgy. Calango, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental when [the victim] Romeo Abad (Romeo), his
maternal uncle, came to buy cigarettes and candies. Lester was about to call it a night and was
already preparing to close his store, but Romeo lit up a cigarette and started to converse with him.
Romeo was jesting about Lesters skin rashes, as the latter was applying medicine on his irritated
skin.1avvphi1 They were in this bantering mood, when Lester, who was facing the highway,
suddenly heard footsteps and immediately saw Danny Boy Acabo (Acabo) running towards his
uncles direction, closely followed by Bingky Campos (Campos). Before Lester can utter a word
of warning, Danny swiftly stab[bed] Romeo at the lower right side of the latters abdomen with a
"plamingko" while Bingky stood nearby. Immediately after stabbing Romeo, Danny and Bingky
fled.
Lester was shocked but darted out of his store to apply pressure on Romeos wound when he
heard the latter cry out for help. Lester told Romeo to hang on and ran inside his house to call his
mother and Romeos son and told them to prepare the car.
Romeo was brought to the Holy Child Hospital where he died.
The medical examination conducted by Dr. Johnny B. Yee (Dr. Yee), the attending physician at the
Holy Child Hospital who prepared the Certificate of Death, revealed that Romeo sustained a
stab[bed] wound that could have been inflicted by a sharp and pointed long instrument. The
weapon hit him at the right upper quadrant of the abdomen, penetrating and causing injury to the
liver, with through and through laceration of the gall bladder and the duodenum, and transecting
the whole length of the pancreas. Dr. Yee further testified that the injury to the pancreas caused the
massive blood loss which [made] Romeo to suffer hypovolemic shock [resulting to] cardiopulmonary arrest [and, eventually, his] death.4
Version of the Defense
For the defense, the following is their own version of the incident as narrated in their Brief:
On August 19, 2001 while on their way to the house of their uncle, Danny and Bingky met four
men who mauled Bingky. When Bingky was able to run away, they approached Danny and kicked

his buttocks. Danny pulled out a knife and thrust it towards one of the men. Danny then ran away
to escape.5
Bingky corroborated the testimony of Danny that four men approached him (Bingky) and mauled
him. He does not know who these persons were.6
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On April 2, 2004, after evaluating the conflicting evidence before it, the RTC meted out a
judgment of conviction and sentenced both Bingky and Danny to reclusion perpetua and ordered
them to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Romeo the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages plus cost.7
Appellants appealed to this Court in view of the penalty imposed on them. On September 15,
2004, this Court accepted the appeal and notified the parties to file briefs.8 On March 7, 2005,9
the Court transferred the case to the CA in conformity with the Decision in People v. Mateo.10
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA found no error in the appreciation of the evidence and applicable law by the trial court.
On September 25, 2006, the appellate court, in rendering its assailed Decision, dispositively ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered affirming the Decision of the
trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this appeal.
On May 3, 200712 and May 7, 2007,13 appellants and appellee People of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respectively, filed similar manifestation that they are no
longer filing their supplemental briefs.
Appellants pray for the reversal of their conviction alleging that the prosecution failed to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They claim that the stabbing of the victim was done in selfdefense. They take exception to the finding of the trial court regarding the presence of conspiracy
asserting that the mere presence of Bingky at the scene of the crime does not prove the existence
of conspiracy.
For the appellee, the OSG argues that Danny failed to prove his plea of self-defense; that
conspiracy attended the killing of the victim and that appellants guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Appellee thus prays for the affirmance of the judgment of conviction with
modification as to the award of civil indemnities.

Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Well-settled is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.14 However, once the accused admits the
commission of the offense charged but raises a justifying circumstance as a defense, the burden of
proof is shifted to him. He cannot rely on the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution for
even if it is weak, it cannot be doubted especially after he himself has admitted the killing.15 This
is because a judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order.
Danny categorically admits that he stabbed Romeo. However, he boldly claims that he did it in
self defense. He avers that on that fateful night of August 19, 2001, he and Bingky were attacked
along the way home by four unknown persons for no apparent reason. He observed that one of the
men was pulling an object from his waistband which he thought was a bladed weapon so he drew
his own knife and thrust it at the man rushing at him, hitting the latter on the right side of his body.
His reaction, he asserts, was defensive arising from a prior act of aggression and provocation by
the victim and his companions.
The essential elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, which the accused must
prove by clear and convincing evidence are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused defending himself.16
The first element of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense
unless there was unlawful aggression from the person injured or killed by the accused; for
otherwise, there is nothing to prevent or repel.
In the present case, Dannys claim of self-defense is belied by his own testimony:
Q Now after they attacked Bingky Campos what did they do?
A They were not able to hit again Bingky because Bingky ran away.
Q How about you? What did they do to you?
A I was held by the other person when he approached me because Bingky was no longer there.
Q And who was that person who held you?
A I do not know him.
Q How about now, do you know his name?
A What I know only was Jaime and Iko.

Q Who [between] the two, Jaime and Iko [took] hold of you?
A Jaime and Iko were not able to hold me.
Q Was there an attempt by Jaime and Iko to maul you also?
A Yes.
Q What did they do?
A They kicked my left butt and the other person held me.
Q Then what did you do?
A I pulled a knife from my waist.
Q Who [between] the two kicked you at your butt and who was the person who took hold of you?
A It was Iko who kicked my buttocks but the other person who held me, I do not know his name.
Q Now what happened when you drew you[r] knife?
A The two persons who attempted to attack me, when I pulled a knife, I thrust the knife to the
person who rushed at me.
Q Did you hit that person?
A Yes, he was hit.
Q Where was he hit?
A At the side.
Court Interpreter:
The witness is touching his lower right side.
Atty. Vailoces:
Q And what were the other companions doing at that time?
Witness:

A After thrusting the knife to the person, I ran away and the three (3) ran after me.17
As can be gleaned from the foregoing narration, there is no mention at all that Romeo was among
the four persons who allegedly attacked Danny and Bingky. Likewise, there is nothing in the
narration which evinces unlawful aggression from Romeo. Dannys testimony shows that there
was only an attempt, not by Romeo but by Jaime and Iko, to attack him. Following his version,
Danny then became the aggressor and not the victim. Even if the version of Danny is given a
semblance of truth, that there was an attempt to hurt him, though intimidating, the same cannot be
said to pose danger to his life and limb. This conclusion was drawn from the fact that no bladed
weapon was found at the alleged scene of the crime and nobody testified about it. For unlawful
aggression to be appreciated, there must be an "actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent
danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude"18 and the accused must present
proof of positively strong act of real aggression. For this reason, Dannys observation that one of
the men was pulling an object from his waist is not a convincing proof of unlawful aggression.
"[A] threat, even if made with a weapon or the belief that a person was about to be attacked, is not
sufficient."19 An intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. In this case, other
than the self-serving allegation of Danny, there is no evidence sufficiently clear and convincing
that the victim indeed attacked him. The prosecutions rebuttal witnesses Jaime Maquiling and
Francisco Austero20 who admittedly were among those whom Danny and Bingky had an
encounter with on the night of August 19, 2001, never said in their testimonies that Romeo
attacked Danny and a bladed weapon was used. These witnesses were categorical that Romeo was
not with them during the incident. This testimonial evidence was not refuted by the defense. Even
Bingky who claimed to be a friend of Romeo21 was not able to identify the latter as one of those
present at the time. Candid enough, Bingky declared that it was only a certain Ago and Jaime who
confronted Danny.22 Resultantly, Danny failed to discharge his burden of proving unlawful
aggression, the most indispensable element of self-defense. Where "no unlawful aggression is
proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded."23
Moreover, as testified to by the attending physician Dr. Yee, Romeo sustained a stab wound
causing injuries on his liver, gall bladder, duodenum and the pancreas which resulted to massive
blood loss.24 He eventually died of multiple vital organ failure. Clearly the wound inflicted by
Danny on Romeo indicate a determined effort to kill and not merely to defend.25 As has been
repeatedly ruled, the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim disprove a
plea of self-defense.26
Furthermore, Dannys actuation in not reporting the incident immediately to the authorities
cannot take out his case within the ambit of the Courts jurisprudential doctrine that the flight of
an accused discloses a guilty conscience. The justifying circumstance of self-defense may not
survive in the face of appellants flight from the scene of the crime coupled with his failure to
promptly inform the authorities about the incident.27
Indeed, appellants conviction was principally anchored on the testimony of Lester as an
eyewitness. Like the courts below, we too find Lesters testimony consistent, credible and
trustworthy. We have reviewed his declaration in court as contained in the pertinent transcript of

stenographic notes and we discern nothing therein that casts doubt on his credibility. His
testimony is clear, positive in its vital points and full of details substantiating the circumstances of
how, where and when the offense charged happened including the identity of the knife wielder,
Danny. It is most unlikely that he could narrate all the details of the crime with clarity and lucidity
unless he was personally present at the situs criminis before and during the incident. The
testimony of a witness, giving details of a startling incident that cannot easily be fabricated,
deserves credence and full probative weight for it indicates sincerity and truthfulness in the
narration of events.28 Findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are
binding upon this Court.29 Though there are recognized exceptions to this rule, none is present in
this case. We are bound by the trial courts assessment, as affirmed by the appellate court, that
the stabbing of Romeo took place in the manner proven by the prosecution, that is, in front of the
store of Lester and not elsewhere, at the time the victim was buying cigarette and candies.
Treachery attended the killing of the victim
The trial court, in convicting appellants of murder, ruled that the killing was qualified by
treachery.
We agree.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to ensure
the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.30 To establish treachery, two elements must concur: (a) that at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and, (b) that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means of attack employed.31
In this case, it is at once evident that Dannys attack on the victim was sudden and deliberate as
testified by eyewitness Lester. The attack was unexpected and without the slightest provocation on
the part of the unarmed Romeo considering that he was casually talking to Lester after buying
something from the store with no inkling that an attack was forthcoming. The attack was executed
in a manner that Romeo was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. The severity of the lone
stab wound forestalled any possibility of resisting the attack. Danny without doubt took advantage
of this situation. As correctly held by the trial court, the act of Danny in positioning himself in a
place where Romeo could not see him and then suddenly and deliberately inflicting a fatal wound
are clear indications that he employed means and methods which tended directly and specifically
to ensure the successful execution of the offense.32
Conspiracy adequately established
Notably, a relevant portion of the appellants brief was focused on the discussion of the
conspiracy angle in the commission of the crime. The defense challenges the trial courts finding
of conspiracy, arguing that Bingkys mere presence at the scene of the crime does not prove the
existence of conspiracy.

Appellants argument is untenable.

Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.33 "Direct proof is not essential to prove
conspiracy [for] it may be deduced [from] the acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime charged, from which it may be indicated that there is a common purpose
to commit the crime."34
Indeed, mere presence at the scene of the incident, by itself, is not a sufficient ground to hold a
person liable as a conspirator. However, conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which when taken together indicate that they are parts of the scheme to commit the
crime. In the present case, Bingkys presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission as testified to by prosecution eyewitness Lester was never rebutted. According to
Lester, Danny arrived first at the scene of the crime followed by Bingky. During the stabbing
incident, Bingky was around three meters away from Danny. Immediately after the incident, both
appellants scampered away.35 To the mind of the Court, Bingkys presence at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission was not just a chance encounter with Danny. His overt act of
keeping himself around served no other purpose than to lend moral support by ensuring that no
one could give succor to the victim. His presence at the scene has no doubt, encouraged Danny
and increased the odds against the victim. One who participates in the material execution of the
crime by standing guard or lending moral support to the actual perpetration thereof is criminally
responsible to the same extent as the actual perpetrator.36 Moreover, the record is bereft of any
hint that Bingky endeavored to avert the stabbing of the victim despite the particular distance
between them. Under the circumstances, we can hardly accept that Bingky has nothing to do with
the killing. No conclusion can be drawn from the acts of Bingky except that he consented and
approved the acts of his co-accused in stabbing the victim. Once conspiracy is established, the act
of one is deemed the act of all. It matters not who among the accused actually killed the victim.
Thus, the trial court did not err in its ruling that conspiracy existed between appellants in the
commission of the crime charged.
The Proper Penalty
Treachery qualifies the killing to murder.37 Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The two penalties being both indivisible and
there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance to consider, the lesser of the two penalties
which is reclusion perpetua should be imposed pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 6338
of the RPC. Hence the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the
appellate court is proper.
As to Damages
The trial court likewise correctly awarded civil indemnity and moral damages to the heirs of the
victim. However, in line with prevailing jurisprudence the award of civil indemnity shall be

increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. This amount is granted to the heirs of the victim
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. We retain the award of P50,000.00
as moral damages. Moral damages are awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and
emotional suffering of the victims heirs.
Significantly, both lower courts failed to award exemplary and actual damages to the heirs of the
victim. Exemplary damages should be awarded in accordance with Article 223039 of the Civil
Code given the presence of treachery which qualified the killing to murder. We therefore award
the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim.40
Settled is the rule that only duly receipted expenses can be the basis of actual damages.lawphi1
Dominic Abad, son of the victim testified that the family spent P65,000.00 for the hospitalization
of the victim, P45,000.00 for the coffin and P35,000.00 for the wake but failed to present receipts
to prove these expenses.41 However, notwithstanding the absence of receipts to prove actual
damages, we find it imperative to award the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu
of actual damages. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as
it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount
was not proved.42
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for
damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
wherefore, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that appellants
Bingky Campos and Danny "Boy" Acabo are ordered to jointly and severally pay the heirs of the
victim Romeo Abad, the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages, all in addition to the P50,000.00 moral damages
which is retained, as well as interest on all these damages assessed at the legal rate of 6% from
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 141154-56. January 15, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO "Ando" COSTALES and
FERNANDO RAMIREZ (at-large), accused.
FERNANDO "Ando" COSTALES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Traditionally, religious fervor nourishes love, respect and concern for one another among brethren;
it was not so however in the case of one whose adherence to his faith became the harbinger of his
tragic end, sending his wife hanging by the thread of death, and worse, the crimes were
perpetrated apparently by their brethren professing to be "denizens of the temple."

Accused Fernando "Ando" Costales and Fernando Ramirez, the latter being still at large, stood
charged with the murder of Miguel Marcelo and the frustrated murder of Crispina Marcelo. As the
perpetrators were found to be in unlawful possession of firearms they were also charged with
violation of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294.
Since accused Fernando Ramirez remained at large, only accused Fernando "Ando" Costales was
arraigned and tried.
For violation of Sec. 1, PD 1866, as amended (Crim. Case No. T-2054), accused Fernando "Ando"
Costales was found guilty and sentenced[1] to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay a fine
of P30,000.
For the murder of Miguel Marcelo (Crim. Case No. T-2057), accused Fernando "Ando" Costales
was found guilty and meted the ultimate penalty of death.
For the frustrated murder of Crispina Marcelo (Crim. Case No. T-2056) he was found guilty only
of attempted murder and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. Additionally, he was
ordered "to pay the heirs of the two (2) victims P250,000.00 in damages to be shared by and
among them in a manner that suits them best."
Sitio Raniag, Barangay Capas, was a placid but forlorn barrio in Pangasinan where the spouses
Miguel and Crispina Marcelo resided in a small one-room shanty with concrete flooring and
cogon roofing. Although their married daughters Donabel, Jessie and Erlinda already had their
own houses they would spend the night with them every once in a while. And so it was on the
night of 27 November 1997.
Jessie Molina recalled that at around 11:30 o'clock in the evening of 27 November 1997, she and
her sisters Donabel and Erlinda together with their parents Miguel and Crispina had taken their
own corners of their small house to prepare for the night. Miguel laid in a folding bed beside the
door while the others occupied a bamboo bed with the exception of Jessie who for want of
available space settled instead on the concrete floor. Jessie and Erlinda had just watched tv when
two (2) persons suddenly barged into their house passing through the door kept ajar by sacks of
palay and strangled her father Miguel. Jessie readily recognized the two (2) intruders because the
entire room was illuminated by a nightlamp which the family kept burning overnight.
Jessie narrated that Fernando "Ando" Costales, one of the assailants, poked a gun at the head of
her father and shot him once in cold blood. Thereafter the other assailant Fernando Ramirez
sprayed on their faces what she described as "something hot and pungent," and with his firearm
pumped a bullet on her mother's chest.
Erlinda Marcelo was also awakened when the two (2) accused suddenly entered their house and

strangled their father after which Fernando Costales shot him point blank in the head. According
to Erlinda, when tear gas was sprayed by Ramirez, she ducked and almost simultaneously she
heard a gunshot towards the direction of her mother. When she opened her eyes, she saw her
mother Crispina clutching her breast, reeling from the blow and collapsing on the floor in a heap.
In her testimony Crispina herself confirmed that Ramirez shot her once on the right chest which
caused her to bleed and lose consciousness.
Both Jessie and Erlinda affirmed that they were familiar with the two (2) accused because, like the
rest of the family, they were members of the "Baro a Cristiano" also known as Lamplighter, of
which Fernando "Ando" Costales and Fernando Ramirez were the high priests in their respective
areas. According to Jessie, her parents decided to quit the brotherhood because Ramirez warned
them not to sever their ties with the sect if they did not want any harm to befall them. In fact,
according to her, a month earlier Ramirez even threatened her sister Erlinda with bodily harm.
Like her sister, Erlinda stated that their family distanced themselves from the congregation when
Ramirez threatened her father. According to her, on 16 November 1997, Miguel tried to fetch her
from the house of Ramirez but Miguel relented only after Ramirez threatened her with a bolo. Her
father tried to get her when he learned that Ramirez was molesting her every time his wife was
away. She however did not report this matter immediately to the authorities because she feared for
her life.
Dr. Alex E. Trinidad, Rural Health Physician of Umingan, Pangasinan, after conducting an
autopsy on the body of Miguel Marcelo reported: (a) The gunshot wound penetrating the left lobe
of the liver of deceased Miguel Marcelo was fatal; (b) Considering the trajectory of the gunshot
wound, the assailant was probably pointing slightly downward; (c) The cause of death of the
deceased was internal hemorrhage arising from the gunshot wound; and, (d) Considering the
wound of the victim, he could have survived for a few minutes after he was shot.
To show that he could not have been a party to the crimes charged, accused Fernando Costales
gave a detailed account of his activities by retracing his steps from late afternoon of 27 November
1997 until dawn of the following day. He narrated that at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 27
November he was irrigating his land in Barangay Libeg, then proceeded to a nearby chapel to
pray. At past 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he went to see a certain Isidro who was irrigating his
own land with the use of his (Fernando's) water pump. That being done he went back home.
A couple of hours later, in the company of his wife and children, he returned to the mission house
to attend another religious service. At past 9:00 o'clock that same evening he dropped by Isidro's
farmland to verify if the latter had finished irrigating. He went back home at around 11:00 o'clock
to sleep and was awakened by Isidro at about 11:45 o'clock only to inform him that he (Isidro) was
through. When Isidro left, Fernando went back to sleep only to be roused again by Gregorio
Baguio who also wanted to borrow his water pump. With his sleep disrupted, he decided around
midnight to visit as he did the nearby mission house to pray. Shortly after, he resumed his sleep
but woke up again at 4:00 o'clock in the morning to see if Baguio had already finished watering
his farm.

Defense witnesses Isidro Costales and Gregorio Baguio corroborated the claim of Fernando
Costales that he could not have perpetrated the crimes as he was with them all the time they were
irrigating their farms. Likewise, Elvie Costales, wife of accused Fernando Costales, presented an
"attendance notebook," purportedly prepared by her, showing that her husband, who was the
chapter's religious leader, was worshipping in the Barangay Libeg chapel from 4:45 to 4:47
o'clock and from 5:30 to 5:37 o'clock at daybreak,[2] from 7:22 to 8:00 o'clock after sunset,[3] and
from 12:10 to 12:15 o'clock midnight[4] of 27 November 1997, although he would periodically
leave the prayer meeting to check if Isidro had already finished watering his farm so that Baguio
could also use the pump.
But the trial court viewed the alibi of the defense with askance and assigned full credit to the
declarations of the prosecution witnesses.
In disbelieving the veracity of the "attendance notebook," the court a quo opined that Exh. "2"
could have been more impressive had it borne the confirming signatures or thumbmarks of the
"Baro a Cristiano" faithful, including their leader Fernando Costales, or had Exhs. "2-B" and "2C" been corroborated on the witness stand by a less interested member, or had the church secretary
who allegedly kept record of attendance been some member other that Mrs. Costales or the nearest
of kin.[5]
The court below also virtually jettisoned the testimonies of Isidro Costales and Gregorio Baguio
when it said that "they had every reason to come to the rescue of the accused Costales, their
admittedly common nephew." Further, it pointed out that the accused and his witnesses issued
contradictory and irreconcilable statements when, on one hand Isidro testified that before midnight
of 27 November 1997 he went to the house of his nephew Fernando Costales to inform him that
the irrigation of his farm was already through; on the other hand, Baguio claimed that at around
11:00 o'clock that night he roused the accused who thereafter went to operate the pump and stayed
put beside it until Baguio's farm was completely irrigated at 4:00 o'clock the next morning.
The above statements, the court a quo observed, did not jibe with those made by the accused that
his uncle Isidro woke him up at around 11:45 o'clock in the evening and told him that the
irrigation of his farm was finished, after which he returned to bed and when he awakened at past
4:00 o'clock the following morning, he met Baguio who told him that he too was through
irrigating.
In contrast, the trial court saw no dark motives behind the respective testimonies of Crispina
Marcelo and her two (2) daughters. The Costaleses and the Marcelos used to be members of the
same religious sect and accused "Ando" Costales even stood as a sponsor at the wedding of Jessie
Marcelo, and again when Crispina's brother got married. In short, the Marcelos could not have
mistaken "Ando" Costales and Fernando Ramirez for other felons.
In this automatic review, accused Fernando Costales takes exception to the findings of the trial
court and thus seeks reversal of his convictions on the ground that it erred: (a) in according

credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses although the same are perforated with
material inconsistencies and bias; (b) in not giving weight to the defense of alibi despite the
weakness of the prosecution evidence; (c) in convicting him of violation of Sec. 1, PD 1866, as
amended, since the same was absorbed in the crime of murder; (d) in finding that the crime was
attended by conspiracy despite the fact that no aggravating circumstance was established beyond
reasonable doubt; and, (e) in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
in his favor.
The first and second assigned errors will be discussed jointly since they are interrelated.
Accused-appellant argues that the seemingly flawless and unwavering testimonies of the three (3)
key prosecution witnesses on the assault of the Marcelo household are obviously biased that they
invite suspicion and disbelief.
Concededly, the prosecution witnesses gave almost uniform observations on how the malefactors
carried out their detestable crimes, i.e., the identity of the assailants, that Miguel was strangled by
both intruders and almost simultaneously shot on the head, that one of them sprayed a chemical on
the other occupants of the house and after a split second fired at Crispina. Such consistency and
uniformity may be irregular at first blush, but accused-appellant failed to take into account the
following factors which account for the "near flawless" statements of the prosecution witnesses:
(a) the one-room shanty was very small with no substantial obstruction to impede the vision of the
occupants; (b) the room was lighted by a kerosene lamp sufficient enough for the occupants to
recognize accused-appellant and his cohort, especially so since the assailants were prominent and
venerated leaders of their church; and, (c) at the time of the incident the Marcelo spouses and their
children were lying very near each other because of the very limited space of their shanty such
that every perceived action could be seen, felt, or at least sensed, by all of them.
Accused-appellant is seeing ghosts where there is none. Contrary to his submission, it would be
highly irregular indeed if the prosecution witnesses failed to observe the events that transpired on
that fateful night of 27 November 1997 and their statements did not dovetail, at least on material
points, despite very favorable conditions for a fairly accurate observation.
Neither should we ascribe importance, as the accused-appellant seems to suggest, to an apparent
"inconsistency" by witness Jessie Molina when she mentioned that the unwanted intrusion
occurred shortly after she turned off the television set, contrary to her earlier claim that barangay
Capas was without electricity. Jessie Molina dispelled this obscurity when she clarified that the
television set was powered by Motolite battery which is in fact a common practice in unenergized
"barrios," as the trial court would put it,[6] and Sitio Raniag, Barangay Capas did not still have
electricity at that time.
Clearly, the straightforward and consistent narration of facts, as the trial court observed, by the
three (3) prosecution witnesses, especially Crispina Marcelo, a victim herself, immensely fortifies
the conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty as charged. Moreover, no impure motive on their
part has been established by the defense to sully their truthfulness and erode their credibility.

Accused-appellant cannot insist on his alibi, especially so since he and his co-accused were
positively identified by the prosecution witnesses. More so when it is undisputed that the
proximity of their place to the scene of the crimes did not preclude the possibility that they were in
fact present at the time of their commission.
On the third issue, accused-appellant decries the Decision of the court a quo in qualifying the
crimes of murder and attempted murder with illegal possession of firearm and at the same time
convicting him for violation of PD 1866, as amended.
We agree. Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm
under PD 1866 was committed, RA 8294, which took effect 7 July 1997, amended the decree and
now considers the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance in murder and
homicide, and not as a separate offense.[7]
As it should be, possession and use of firearm without license should aggravate the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder as herein charged but, fortunately for accused-appellant, Secs. 8 and
9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect 1 December 2000, now require
the qualifying as well as aggravating circumstances to be expressly and specifically alleged in the
complaint or information, otherwise the same will not be considered by the court even if proved
during the trial. Withal, in the absence of any allegation in the Information in Crim. Case No. T2057 that accused-appellant committed murder with the use of unlicensed firearm, the same
cannot be appreciated in imposing the proper penalty.
Moving now to the modifying circumstances raised under the fourth assigned error, accusedappellant points out that the trial court grievously erred in appreciating unlicensed firearm, evident
premeditation and nighttime which were alleged in the Informations in Crim. Case No. T-2056 for
frustrated murder and Crim. Case No. T-2057 for murder.
While we yield to the trial court's finding of treachery, we take exception to its view that evident
premeditation and nighttime also aggravated the offenses. Without doubt, treachery has been
established by the prosecution evidence which showed that accused-appellant Fernando Costales
and his confederate Fernando Ramirez swiftly and unexpectedly barged into the Marcelo
residence in the middle of the night, shot Miguel Marcelo to death as well as his wife Crispina
who almost lost her life, and sprayed a substance which temporarily blinded the other occupants of
the house. The suddenness of the attack gave the victims no opportunity whatsoever to resist or
parry the assault thereby ensuring the accomplishment of their dastardly deed without risk to
themselves. Since the attack on the victims was synchronal, sudden and unexpected, treachery
must be properly appreciated.
We cannot however give our assent to the view that nighttime and evident premeditation
accompanied the commission of the crimes. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime is
absorbed by treachery,[8] while evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in the absence of
proof of the planning and preparation to kill or when the plan was conceived.[9]

The convergence of the wills of the two (2) executioners amply justifies the imputation that they
acted in concert and in unity in their unlawful objective when in the stillness of the night they both
crashed into the Marcelo residence, strangulated the victim Miguel, then one of them shot him in
the head while the other sprayed tear gas on the other members of the family obviously to disable
them, and thereafter pumped a bullet at the horrified Crispina. This series of actions betrays a
concerted design and concurrence of sentiments to cause mayhem and murder. Accordingly,
conspiracy was properly appreciated by the trial court.
Neither can we sympathize with accused-appellant's misplaced sentiment that he had been denied
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. As found by the trial court, his alleged
surrender was made too late, and in a place too distant from the crime site as well as his place of
residence.[10]
We observe that the trial court awarded P250,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased on the
justification that the same had been stipulated upon by the parties. This is patently wrong. Award
of damages is dictated, not by the agreement of the parties; worse, "in a manner that suits them
best,"[11] but by the mandate of law and jurisprudence. Accordingly in conformity with
established law and jurisprudence, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indmenity and another
P50,000.00 as moral damages should be awarded to the heirs of the victim.
Pursuant to Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659, the penalty for murder
is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances found in Crim. Case No.
T-2057, and applying par. 2 of Art. 63 of the Code, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed.
In Crim. Case No. T-2056, accused-appellant was charged by the trial court with frustrated murder
but was convicted only for attempted murder. In its Decision, the trial court explained that the
failure of the prosecution to present a medical certificate or competent testimonial evidence
showing that Crispina would have died from her wound without medical intervention, justified the
accused's conviction for attempted murder only.
We call to mind People v. De La Cruz11 where this Court ruled that the crime committed for the
shooting of the victim was attempted murder and not frustrated murder for the reason that "his
injuries, though no doubt serious, were not proved fatal such that without timely medical
intervention, they would have caused his death." In fact, as early as People v. Zaragosa,[12] we
enunciated the doctrine that where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would
be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as
attempted, not frustrated murder.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision finding accused-appellant Fernando "Ando" Costales guilty
of murder and attempted murder is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION: In Crim.
Case No. T-2057, the crime of murder not being considered to have been attended by any generic

mitigating or aggravating circumstances, accused-appellant Fernando "Ando" Costales is

sentenced to suffer only the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In Crim. Case No. T-2056, the crime of
attempted murder not likewise considered to have been attended by any generic mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, accused-appellant Fernando "Ando" Costales is accordingly sentenced
in addition to his penalty imposed in Crim. Case No. T-2057 herein before mentioned, to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional medium as
minimum, to eight (8) years and six (6) months of prision mayor minimum as maximum;
Accused-appellant Fernando "Ando" Costales is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
Miguel Marcelo P50,000.00 as death indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] Decision penned by Judge Ulysses Raciles Butuyan, RTC-Br. 51, Tayug, Pangasinan.
[2] Exh. "2-A."
[3] Exh. "2-C."
[4] Exh. "2-B."
[5] Rollo, p. 49.
[6] TSN, 17 November 1998, p. 30.
[7] People v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 109279-80, 18 January 1999, 301 SCRA 66; People v. Lumilan,
G.R. No. 102706, 25 January 2000, 323 SCRA 170, citing People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, 232
(1996).
[8] People v. Abitona,G.R. Nos. 96943-45, 20 January 1995, 240 SCRA 335, People v. Broncano,
G.R. No. 104870, 22 August 1996, 260 SCRA 724.
[9] People v. Tampon, G.R. No. 105583, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 115.
[10] As evidenced by a certification (Exh. 8) By the PNP Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando,
Launion, showing that accused-appellant surrendered to one SPO2 Maximiano R. Peralta on 9
June 1998, or roughly six (6) months after the issuance of warrants for his arrest on 4 December
1997.
[11] Rollo, p. 56.

11 G.R. Nos. 109619-23, 26 June 1998, 291 SCRA 164.

[12] 58 O.G. 4519.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONINO HERNANDEZ, defendant-appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

AVANCEA, C.J.:
In the judgment appealed from the appellant was convicted of arson and sentenced to eight years
and one day presidio mayor, with the accessaries of law, and the costs.
On February 3, 1929, Miguel Dayrit, the offended party, was living with his children in his house
situated in the barrio of Duque, municipality of Mabalacat, Province of Pampanga. At a little past
midnight on that date, and after Miguel Dayrit had retired, he noticed that the thatched roof of his
house was on fire. He got up to fetch some water with which to extinguish the fire, when, looking
out of the window, he saw the appellant beside the house, carrying a stick (Exhibit A). Miguel
Dayrit shouted for help, and started to put out the fire, which he succeeded in doing, after a small
part of the roof had burned. In answer to his cries for help, Artemio Tanglao repaired to the place
and saw the defendant running away. Daniel Mallari also came, and on his way to the house met
the defendant.
The appellant knew that Miguel Dayrit and his children lived and were in the house that night.
The testimony of the offended party, corroborated by that of Artemio Tanglao and Daniel Mallari,
establishes beyond all doubt the fact that it was the appellant who set fire to the house. The stick
which Miguel Dayrit saw in the appellant's possession on that night was found leaning against the
house with the end burnt and a rag soaked with petroleum dangling from it. Daniel Mallari
recognized it as the stick which the appellant used in getting guava fruits.
It should be noted, moreover, that prior to the crime, the appellant and the offended party, Miguel
Dayrit, had some disagreements because the offended party suspected that the appellant was
stealing his paddy piled up behind his house. The offended party communicated his suspicions to
the barrio lieutenant, who, together with the complainant, went to the appellant's house, but the
latter armed with a bolo, barred their way, saying that he would cut them to pieces, and that he
recognized no authority. This characteristic violence on the part of the appellant was also shown
when, in pursuance of this information, he was arrested; for he refused to give himself up.

The trial court held that the crime committed was only frustrated arson. We agree with the
Attorney-General that the crime was consummated. The appellant did in fact, set fire to the roof of
the house, and said house was in fact partially burned. With this, the crime of arson was
consummated, notwithstanding the fact that the fire was afterwards extinguished, for, once the fire
has been started, the consummation of the crime of arson does not depend upon the extent of the
damage cause. This court has so held in the cases of United States vs. Go Foo Suy and Go Jancho
(25 Phil., 187) and United States vs. Po Chengco (23 Phil., 487).
The crime of arson having been consummated, as it appears from the facts thoroughly proved,
article 549 of the Penal Code is applicable herein, with the corresponding penalty of cadena
temporal to life imprisonment. And as the aggravating circumstance of nighttime must be taken
into consideration, as having been doubtless sought by the appellant in order to insure the
commission of the crime, the penalty must be imposed in its maximum degree.
In view of these considerations, the judgment appealed from is modified, and in accordance with
article 549 of the Penal Code the appellant is found guilty of the crime of arson, committed in a
dwelling, knowing that within it were the offended party and his children; and, considering one
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the defendant is sentenced to life
imprisonment, with the accessaries, and the costs.
The appellant is an old man, about 85 years of age, and in view of this, and of the fact that the
damage caused was very slight, the Attorney-General recommends that, in pursuance of the
second paragraph of article 2 of the Penal Code, these facts be explained to the Executive, for the
exercise of his clemency to such an extent as he may deem proper. The suggestion is accepted, and
it is hereby ordered that the clerk forward a copy of this decision, once it becomes final, to the
Governor-General for consideration. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito," defendant-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
C. Manalo for defendant-appellant.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 83031-B before the Regional Trial Court, Branch II, Borongan, Eastern Samar. The information filed

in the said case reads as follows (p. 47, Rollo):

The undersigned Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal upon prior complaint under oath by the
offended party, accuses CEILITO ORITA alias LITO of the crime of Rape committed as follows:
That on March 20, 1983, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning inside a boarding house at Victoria
St., Poblacion, Borongan, Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above named accused with lewd designs and by the use of a Batangas knife he
conveniently provided himself for the purpose and with threats and intimidation, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with and succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with Cristina S. Abayan against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged. After the
witnesses for the People testified and the exhibits were formally offered and admitted, the
prosecution rested its case. Thereafter, the defense opted not to present any exculpatory evidence
and instead filed a Motion to Dismiss. On August 5, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 59-60, Rollo):
WHEREFORE. the Court being morally certain of the guilt of accused CEILITO ORITA @ LITO,
of the crime of Frustrated Rape (Art. 335, RPC), beyond reasonable doubt, with the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and nightime (sic) with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same,
and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imposes on accused an
imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, PRISION MAYOR, as minimum to
TWELVE (12) YEARS PRISION MAYOR, maximum; to indemnify CRISTINA S. ABAYAN, the
amount of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied with the decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. On December 29,
1988, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 102,
Rollo):
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is hereby MODIFIED, and the appellant found guilty of
the crime of rape, and consequently, sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
On January 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting aside its December 29, 1988
decision and forwarded the case to this Court, considering the provision of Section 9, paragraph 3
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in conjunction with Section 17, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1 of the

Judiciary Act of 1948.

The antecedent facts as summarized in the People's brief are as follows (pp. 71-75, Rollo):
Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's College at
Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier.
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house. Her
classmates had just brought her home from a party (p. 44, tsn, May 23, 1984). Shortly after her
classmates had left, she knocked at the door of her boarding house (p. 5, ibid). All of a sudden,
somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized appellant who was a
frequent visitor of another boarder (pp. 8-9, ibid).
She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the door
which led to the first floor was locked from the inside, appellant forced complainant to use the
back door leading to the second floor (p. 77, ibid). With his left arm wrapped around her neck and
his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, appellant dragged complainant up the stairs (p. 14,
ibid). When they reached the second floor, he commanded her to look for a room. With the
Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room.
Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall. With one
hand holding the knife, appellant undressed himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her
clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off her bra, pants and panty (p. 20, ibid).
He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and
insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said
position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her
as she kept on moving (p. 23, ibid).
Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a
small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his
hands flat on the floor. Complainant thought of escaping (p. 20, ibid).
She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. Appellant pursued her and climbed the
partition. When she saw him inside the room, she ran to another room. Appellant again chased her.
She fled to another room and jumped out through a window (p. 27, ibid).
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which was about eighteen meters in front of the
boarding house, and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building
and knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were inside the building opened the door,
they found complainant naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see
her, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. When they discovered what happened, Pat.
Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house. They heard a sound at the second
floor and saw somebody running away. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend appellant.

Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where
she was physically examined.
Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who examined complainant, issued a Medical
Certificate (Exhibit "A") which states:
Physical Examination Patient is fairly built, came in with loose clothing with no under-clothes;
appears in state of shock, per unambulatory.
PE Findings Pertinent Findings only.
Neck- Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck.
Breast Well developed, conical in shape with prominent nipples; linear abrasions below (L)
breast.
Back Multiple pinpoint marks.
Extremities Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees.
Vulva No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the vulva, errythematous (sic)
areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice, tender, hymen intact; no laceration fresh and old noted;
examining finger can barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no discharges noted.
As aforementioned, the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.
In this appeal, the accused assigns the following errors:
1) The trial court erred in disregarding the substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses; and
2) The trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the
accused.
The accused assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat. Donceras because they "show
remarkable and vital inconsistencies and its incredibility amounting to fabrication and therefore
casted doubt to its candor, truth and validity." (p. 33, Rollo)
A close scrutiny of the alleged inconsistencies revealed that they refer to trivial inconsistencies
which are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt on the witnesses' straightforward attestations. Far
from being badges of fabrication, the inconsistencies in their testimonies may in fact be justifiably
considered as manifestations of truthfulness on material points. These little deviations also
confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. The most candid witnesses may make mistakes

sometimes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair their intrinsic credibility (People v.
Cabato, G.R. No. L-37400, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 98). Rather than discredit the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, discrepancies on minor details must be viewed as adding credence and
veracity to such spontaneous testimonies (Aportadera et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L41358, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 695). As a matter of fact, complete uniformity in details would
be a strong indication of untruthfulness and lack of spontaneity (People v. Bazar, G.R. No. L41829, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 609). However, one of the alleged inconsistencies deserves a
little discussion which is, the testimony of the victim that the accused asked her to hold and guide
his penis in order to have carnal knowledge of her. According to the accused, this is strange
because "this is the only case where an aggressor's advances is being helped-out by the victim in
order that there will be a consumation of the act." (p. 34, Rollo). The allegation would have been
meritorious had the testimony of the victim ended there. The victim testified further that the
accused was holding a Batangas knife during the aggression. This is a material part of the victim's
testimony which the accused conveniently deleted.
We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it has the
advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is telling the truth
(People v. Samson, G.R. No. 55520, August 25, 1989). We quote with favor the trial court's
finding regarding the testimony of the victim (p 56, Rollo):
As correctly pointed out in the memorandum for the People, there is not much to be desired as to
the sincerity of the offended party in her testimony before the court. Her answer to every question
profounded (sic), under all circumstances, are plain and straightforward. To the Court she was a
picture of supplication hungry and thirsty for the immediate vindication of the affront to her honor.
It is inculcated into the mind of the Court that the accused had wronged her; had traversed
illegally her honor.
When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape was committed provided her testimony is clear and free from contradiction and her
sincerity and candor, free from suspicion (People v Alfonso, G.R. No. 72573, August 31, 1987,
153 SCRA 487; People v. Alcid, G.R. Nos. 66387-88, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 280; People
v. Soterol G.R. No. 53498, December 16, 1985, 140 SCRA 400). The victim in this case did not
only state that she was raped but she testified convincingly on how the rape was committed. The
victim's testimony from the time she knocked on the door of the municipal building up to the time
she was brought to the hospital was corroborated by Pat. Donceras. Interpreting the findings as
indicated in the medical certificate, Dr. Reinerio Zamora (who was presented in view of the
unavailability of Dr. Abude) declared that the abrasions in the left and right knees, linear abrasions
below the left breast, multiple pinpoint marks, circumscribed hematoma at the anterior neck,
erythematous area surrounding the vaginal orifice and tender vulva, are conclusive proof of
struggle against force and violence exerted on the victim (pp. 52-53, Rollo). The trial court even
inspected the boarding house and was fully satisfied that the narration of the scene of the incident
and the conditions therein is true (p. 54, Rollo):

. . . The staircase leading to the first floor is in such a condition safe enough to carry the weight of
both accused and offended party without the slightest difficulty, even in the manner as narrated.
The partitions of every room were of strong materials, securedly nailed, and would not give way
even by hastily scaling the same.
A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging rape complaints (People v. Torio, et
al., G.R. No. L-48731, December 21, 1983, 126 SCRA 265). Thus, the trial court added (p. 55,
Rollo):
. . . And the jump executed by the offended party from that balcony (opening) to the ground which
was correctly estimated to be less than eight (8) meters, will perhaps occasion no injury to a
frightened individual being pursued. Common experience will tell us that in occasion of
conflagration especially occuring (sic) in high buildings, many have been saved by jumping from
some considerable heights without being injured. How much more for a frightened barrio girl, like
the offended party to whom honor appears to be more valuable than her life or limbs? Besides, the
exposure of her private parts when she sought assistance from authorities, as corroborated, is
enough indication that something not ordinary happened to her unless she is mentally deranged.
Sadly, nothing was adduced to show that she was out of her mind.
In a similar case (People v. Sambili G.R. No. L-44408, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 312), We
ruled that:
What particularly imprints the badge of truth on her story is her having been rendered entirely
naked by appellant and that even in her nudity, she had to run away from the latter and managed to
gain sanctuary in a house owned by spouses hardly known to her. All these acts she would not
have done nor would these facts have occurred unless she was sexually assaulted in the manner
she narrated.
The accused questions also the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses to corroborate
the allegations in the complaint and the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually
examined the victim. Suffice it to say that it is up to the prosecution to determine who should be
presented as witnesses on the basis of its own assessment of their necessity (Tugbang v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56679, June 29, 1989; People v. Somera, G.R. No. 65589, May 31,
1989). As for the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually examined the victim,
the trial court stated that it was by agreement of the parties that another physician testified
inasmuch as the medico-legal officer was no longer available. The accused did not bother to
contradict this statement.
Summing up, the arguments raised by the accused as regards the first assignment of error fall flat
on its face. Some were not even substantiated and do not, therefore, merit consideration. We are
convinced that the accused is guilty of rape. However, We believe the subject matter that really
calls for discussion, is whether or not the accused's conviction for frustrated rape is proper. The
trial court was of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ
of the victim and thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only.

The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape. The Solicitor General shares the
same view.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of rape:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1.

By using force or intimidation;

2.

When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a
woman (Black's Law Dictionary. Fifth Edition, p. 193).
On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated felonies as well as
those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment
are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages
apply to the crime of rape.1wphi1 Our concern now is whether or not the frustrated stage applies
to the crime of rape.
The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrator's will. In the leading case of United States v. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209,
212, Justice Moreland set a distinction between attempted and frustrated felonies which is readily
understood even by law students:

. . . A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of
the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all
of the acts which should produce the crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose
of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him
to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime
as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts
which should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding
further, it can not be an attempt. The essential element which distinguishes attempted from
frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or
agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the
acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime; while in the former
there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts
which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his
voluntary desistance.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he
actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense
have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has
performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long
line of cases (People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People v. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v. Royeras,
G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666; People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August
21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect
penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient.
Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration
of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan et al., 53 Phil. 694; United
States v. Garcia: 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender
merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the
nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it
is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Eria 50 Phil. 998
[1927] where We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive evidence
of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. However, it appears that this is a "stray"
decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions. Likewise, We are
aware of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 2632 (dated
September 12, 1960) and Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29, 1965) which provides, in its
penultimate paragraph, for the penalty of death when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof. We are of the opinion that this
particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead provision. The Eria case, supra, might have
prompted the law-making body to include the crime of frustrated rape in the amendments
introduced by said laws.

In concluding that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim,
the trial court relied on the testimony of Dr. Zamora when he "categorically declared that the
findings in the vulva does not give a concrete disclosure of penetration. As a matter of fact, he
tossed back to the offended party the answer as to whether or not there actually was penetration."
(p. 53, Rollo) Furthermore, the trial court stated (p. 57, Rollo):
. . . It cannot be insensible to the findings in the medical certificate (Exhibit "A") as interpreted by
Dr. Reinerio Zamora and the equivocal declaration of the latter of uncertainty whether there was
penetration or not. It is true, and the Court is not oblivious, that conviction for rape could proceed
from the uncorroborated testimony of the offended party and that a medical certificate is not
necessary (People v. Royeras People v. Orteza, 6 SCRA 109, 113). But the citations the people
relied upon cannot be applicable to the instant case. The testimony of the offended party is at
variance with the medical certificate. As such, a very disturbing doubt has surfaced in the mind of
the court. It should be stressed that in cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a
medical certificate, both should in all respect, compliment each other, for otherwise to rely on the
testimony alone in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be
productive of mischievous results.
The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical certificate does not
exist. On the contrary, it is stated in the medical certificate that the vulva was erythematous (which
means marked by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion, as in inflammation)
and tender. It bears emphasis that Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the genital organ of
the victim. He merely testified that there was uncertainty whether or not there was penetration.
Anent this testimony, the victim positively testified that there was penetration, even if only
partially (pp. 302, 304, t.s.n., May 23, 1984):
Q

Was the penis inserted on your vagina?

It entered but only a portion of it.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q What do you mean when you said comply, or what act do you referred (sic) to, when you said
comply?
A

I inserted his penis into my vagina.

And was it inserted?

Yes only a little.

The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of
the victim's testimony if credible (People v. Tabago, G.R. No. 69778, November 8, 1988, 167
SCRA 65; People v. Aragona, G.R. No. L-43752, September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 569; People v.

Taduyo, G.R. Nos. L-37928-29, September 29, 1987, 154 SCRA 349). Moreover, Dr. Zamora's
testimony is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of this
case (People v. Alfonso, supra).
Although the second assignment of error is meritorious, it will not tilt the scale in favor of the
accused because after a thorough review of the records, We find the evidence sufficient to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape.
Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The
trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. Thus, the proper
imposable penalty is death. In view, however, of Article 111, Section 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution and Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al., G.R. Nos. L-38968-70, February 9, 1989,
that the cited Constitutional provision did not declare the abolition of the death penalty but merely
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the
death penalty whenever it was called for under the Revised Penal Code but instead reduced the
same to reclusion perpetua (People v. Solis, et al., G.R. Nos. 78732-33, February 14, 1990).
Reclusion perpetua, being a single indivisible penalty under Article 335, paragraph 3, is imposed
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances (in relation to Article 63, paragraph 1,
Revised Penal Code; see People v. Arizala, G.R. No. 59713, March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA 615;
People v. Manzano, G.R. No. L38449, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 705; People v. Ramirez,
G.R. No. 70744, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 702).
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused
Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Valenzuela v. People
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007
Lessons Applicable: frustrated or consummated theft
Laws Applicable: Art. 6
FACTS:
May 19, 1994 4:30 pm: Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside the

Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by

Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the
supermarket. Lago saw Valenzuela, who was wearing an ID with the mark Receiving
Dispatching Unit (RDU) who hauled a push cart with cases of detergent of Tide brand and
unloaded them in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. He then returned inside the
supermarket and emerged 5 minutes after with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again
unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. Thereafter, he left the parking
area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where
Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then
boarded the vehicle. As Lago watched, he proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open
parking area and asked Valenzuela for a receipt of the merchandise but Valenzuela and Calderon
reacted by fleeing on foot. Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards.
Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended at the scene and the stolen merchandise recovered
worth P12,090.
Valenzuela, Calderon and 4 other persons were first brought to the SM security office before
they were transferred to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National Police but only Valenzuela
and Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor.
They pleaded not guilty.
Calderons Alibi: On the afternoon of the incident, he was at the Super Sale Club to

withdraw from his ATM account, accompanied by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada. As the queue
for the ATM was long, he and Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside the supermarket. While they
were eating, they heard the gunshot fired by Lago, so they went out to check what was
transpiring and when they did, they were suddenly grabbed by a security guard
Valenzuelas Alibi: He is employed as a bundler of GMS Marketing and assigned at
the supermarket. He and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela, had been at the parking lot, walking
beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they saw
the security guard Lago fire a shot causing evryon to start running. Then they were apprehended
by Lago.
RTC: guilty of consummated theft
CA: Confirmed RTC and rejected his contention that it should only be frustrated theft since at
the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles
stolen.
ISSUE: W/N Valenzuela should be guilty of consummated theft.
HELD: YES. petition is DENIED
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted

felonies.
o
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present.
o It is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
o It is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of

some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a:
o subjective phase - portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which
begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior
acts, should result in the consummated crime
if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely attempted
o objective phase - After that point of subjective phase has been breached
subjective phase is completely passed in case of frustrated crimes
the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial

concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender
The determination of whether the felony was produced after all the acts of execution had
been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony.

actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea - ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an
unlawful act for there to be a crime or there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting
In crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as a guilty mind, a guilty or

wrongful purpose or criminal intent and essential for criminal liability.

Statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the mens rea of the
crime is and overt acts that constitute the crime
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (Elements of Theft):
1. that there be taking of personal property - only one operative act of execution by the actor
involved in theft
2. property belongs to another
3. taking be done with intent to gain - descriptive circumstances
4. taking be done without the consent of the owner - descriptive circumstances
5. taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things - descriptive circumstances
Abandoned cases:
o U.S. v. Adiao: failed to get the merchandise out of the Custom House - consummated theft
o Dio: Military Police inspected the truck at the check point and found 3 boxes of army rifles frustrated theft
o
Flores: guards discovered that the empty sea van had actually contained other
merchandise as well - consummated theft
o Empelis v. IAC: Fled the scene, dropping the coconuts they had seized - frustrated qualified
theft because petitioners were not able to perform all the acts of execution which should have
produced the felony as a consequence
cannot attribute weight because definition is attempted
The ability of the actor to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only

momentary.
o We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was completed in
this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a
considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long
enough to load these onto a taxicab.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be
attempted (no unlawful taking) or consummated (there is unlawful taking).

US
(22 Phil. 252)

vs.

Jose

Laurel

FACTS: On the night of December 26, 1909, while the girl Concepcion Lat was walking along the
street accompanied by several young people, including Exequiel Castillo, theyre on their way
from the house of the latter, situated in the pueblo of Tanauan, Province of Batangas. Concepcion
was approached by Jose Laurel who suddenly kissed her and immediately ran off in the direction
of his house, pursued by Lats companions among them was Exequiel Castillo, but they did not
overtake him.
On the second night after the occurrence, early evening of 28th of December, Jose Laurel with
several young people went to parochial building for the purpose of attending an entertainment
program. While sitting in the front row of the chairs, and watching the said program, Jose Laurel
was approached by Domingo Panganiban who told him that Exequiel Castillo wished to speak
with him, Laurel replied that he should wait a while and Panganiban went away. A short time
afterwards, he was also approached by Alfredo Yatco who gave him a similar message, and
afterwards Felipe Almeda came up and told him that Exequiel Castillo was waiting for him on the
ground floor of the building.
This being the third summons addressed to him, he arose and went down to ascertain what
Exequiel Castillo wanted. When they met, Castillo asked Laurel why he kissed Concepcion Lat
(Castillo was Lats current suitor). Laurel replied that he had done so because she was very
fickle and prodigal of her use of word yes on all occasions, Exequiel Castillo said to him that
he ought not to act that way and immediately struck him a blow on the head with a cane or club,
which assault made Laurel dizzy and caused him to fall to the ground in a sitting posture and that,
as Laurel feared that his aggressor will continue to assault him, he took of the pocketknife which
he was carrying in his pocket and therewith stabbed Exequiel. Among the wounds inflicted on
Exequiel, the wound on the left side of his breast penetrated the lungs causes him to spit blood.
He would have died, had it not been for the timely medical aid rendered.
ISSUE: Is Justifying circumstance of Self- defense valid on the part of Jose Laurel?
HOLDING: The court ruled in view of the findings of facts the defendants are acquitted and
exempted from all responsibility. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Laurel, who did not
provoke the occurrence, nor did he direct that Exequiel Castillo be invited to come down from the
parochial building and to clarify the last incident which Castillo was alone interested, and because
in defending himself, Laurel used his pocketknife against the assault made upon him with a cane
or club, which may also be a deadly weapon, employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the
same. By the three requisites of Unlawful aggression on the part of Exequiel Castillo the defensive
act executed by Jose Laurel was justified.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NARCISO CABUNGCAL, defendant-appellant.

Esteban del Rosario for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
AVANCEA, C.J.:
The appellant, Narciso Cabungcal, was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas for the
crime of homicide to fourteen years, eight months and one day reclusion temporal, with the
accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the
costs of the action.
On March 21, 1926 the appellant invited several persons to a picnic in a fishery of his property in
the barrio of Misua, municipality of Infanta, Province of Tayabas. They spent the day at said
fishery and in the afternoon returned in two boats, one steered by the appellant and the other by an
old woman named Anastasia Penaojas. Nine persons were in the boat steered by the appellant, the
great majority of whom were women and among them the appellant's wife and son and a nursing
child, son of a married couple who had also gone in this boat. The deceased Juan Loquenario was
another passenger in this boat. Upon reaching a place of great depth the deceased rocked the boat
which started it to take water, and the appellant, fearing the boat might capsize, asked the deceased
not to do it. As the deceased paid no attention to this warning and continued rocking the boat, the
appellant struck him on the forehead with an oar. The deceased fell into the water and was
submerged, but a little while after appeared on the surface having grasped the side of the boat,
saying that he was going to capzise it and started to move it with this end in view, seeing which
the women began to cry, whereupon the appellant struck him on the neck with the same oar, which
submerged the deceased again. With the movement that the appellant made in giving him the
second blow, the boat upset and then the appellant proceeded to save his passengers. In the
meantime the aged Anastasia Penaojas, who steered the other boat, and who at that time was about
200 or 300 meters away, having heard the cries of the wrecked persons, quickened its speed,
repaired to and arrived in time to pick up the passengers who are clinging to the side of the
capsized boat, taking them later to the river bank. The appellant, after having thus saved his
passengers, proceeded to search for the deceased but was unable to find him and his body was
recovered later.
The Attorney-General is of the opinion that the mitigating circumstances described in the first,
third, fourth and seventh paragraphs of article 9 of the Penal Code are present without any
aggravating circumstance, and the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be one or two
degrees less than that prescribed by the law.
In view of the facts stated, we are of the opinion that the appellant is completely exempt from all
criminal liability.
Due to the conditions of the river at the point where the deceased started to rock the boat, if it had
capsized the passengers would have run the risk of losing their lives, the majority of whom were
women, especially the nursing child. The conduct of the deceased in rocking the boat until the
point of it having taken water and his insistence on this action, in spite of the appellant's warning,

gave rise to the belief on the part of the plaintiff that it would capsize if he did not separate the
deceased from the boat in such a manner as to give him no time to accomplish his purpose. It was
necessary to disable him momentarily. For this purpose the blow given him by the appellant on the
forehead with an oar was the least that could reasonably have been done. And this consideration
militates with greater weight with respect to the second blow given in his neck with the same oar,
because, then the danger was greater that the boat might upset, especially as the deceased had
expressed his intention to upset it.
In view of all the circumstances of the case, in doing what the appellant did was in lawful defense
of the lives of the passengers of the boat, two of whom were his wife and child. The recourse of
taking the boat to the shore was not adequate in those circumstances, because that would require
sometime, whereas the deceased might in an instant cause the boat to capsize without giving time
to arrive at the shore.
The appellant having acted in defense of his wife and child and the other passengers in the boat
and the means employed having been reasonably necessary in this defense, while it was at the cost
of the life of the deceased, he is completely exempt from criminal liability.
Reversing the judgment appealed from, the appellant is acquitted, with the costs de oficio. So
ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTERO GAMEZ y BALTAZAR, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review1 is the Decision2 dated May 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 00671 which affirmed the Judgment3 dated May 9, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
RTC) of Burauen, Leyte, Branch 15 convicting and sentencing accused-appellant Antero Gamez y
Baltazar accused-appellant) to reclusion perpetua for the crime of parricide.
The Facts
Accused-appellant was accused of killing his own father, Apolinario Gamez (Apolinario) through
an Information articulating the following criminal charges, viz:

That on or about the 21st day of August, 2004, in the Municipality of Burauen, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, hack and wound one APOLINARIO GAMEZ y AMORILLO, his father, with the use of a
long bladed weapon (sundang) and sickle (sarad) which the accused provided himself for the
purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon Apolinario Gamez y Amorillo multiple hacking and
incised wounds on the different parts of his body which were the direct and approximate cause of
his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, he entered a "Not Guilty" plea. He thereafter desired to amend his plea to
"Guilty" during the pre-trial conference held on September 26, 2005 but the RTC denied the said
plea bargaining. In view however of the accused-appellants invocation of self-defense, an
inverted trial scheme ensued.5
Through the testimonies of the accused-appellant himself, Dr. Irene Astilla Dacut, his attending
physician, and eyewitness Bienvenido Buhalog, the defense narrated the events that culminated
into the encounter that claimed Apolinarios life.6
The accused-appellant and 69-year old Apolinario had a less than ideal father and son relationship
with the former claiming that the latter did not treat him well when he was a child. Their
relationship got more strained when Apolinario meddled with the accused-appellants personal
relationship with his wife. Apolinario apparently told the accused-appellant that his wife was
being unfaithful. The unsolicited information irked the accused-appellant.
On August 21, 2004, the accused-appellant had a drinking spree in his house at Barangay Gamay,
Burauen, Leyte, with his two brothers, Nicolas and Cornelio from 12 noon until 3:00 p.m. As he
was about to go out of the kitchen door, the accused-appellant saw Apolinario standing at the
doorway with a long bolo. Apolinario appeared to be drunk.
To prevent any commotion, Nicolas held Apolinario but he was able to free himself from his
sons grip. The accused-appellant then spoke to Apolinario: " I think that you are looking for me
and I believe it is since last night ." An argument ensued between them. In order not to prolong the
spat, the accused-appellant and his brothers took their father to his nipa hut about 500 meters
away. But before the accused-appellant could leave, he got into another argument with Apolinario.
The accused-appellant then set out to the place where he gathered tuba while his brothers went
back to his house. After gathering tuba and tethering his carabao, the accused-appellant proceeded
home. He met Apolinario along a pathway. With no one to pacify them, they decided to resume
their quarrel.
The accused-appellant first remarked: "Father, what are the words that you uttered?" to which
Apolinario responded, "It is better if one of us will perish." Apolinario then instantaneously

hacked the accused-appellant with a long bolo hitting him twice on the head for which he
sustained a 5-centimeter long and scalp-deep incised wound with fracture of the underlying bone
and another 5-cm long incised wound on the frontal right portion of his head.
The accused-appellant fell to his knees as Apolinario delivered another blow which the former was
able to parry by raising his left arm. The accused-appellant was wounded on the left 3rd
interdigital space posterior to his palm.
The accused-appellant then held Apolinarios hands, grabbed the bolo and used the same to hack
the latter several times, the count of which escaped the accused-appellants consciousness as he
was already dizzy. The accused-appellant thereafter left the scene and went home. His brother
brought him to the hospital upon seeing that his head was teeming with blood. He was
hospitalized for six (6) days before he was taken to the municipal hall by the police officers.
The rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, on the other hand, principally consisted of the testimony
of Maura Anadia (Maura), Apolinarios daughter and the accused-appellants sister. According
to Maura, at around 4:30 p.m. of August 21, 2004, she was with her father at their house located at
Barangay Gamay, Burauen, Leyte when his elder brother, the accused-appellant, arrived. He was
carrying a long bolo and a scythe was tucked on his waist.
He approached her and said: "Will you join the killing spree today including your child that you
are carrying? "before turning to Apolinario with this query: "What are the stories that you were
talking?"
Frightened, Maura ran away and hid at a grassy portion near the house. She then saw her father
flee but the accused-appellant gave him a chase. Apolinario was able to run for about 20 m before
the accused-appellant was able to catch up.
The accused-appellant then hacked the unarmed Apolinario on the right side of his head using the
bolo. Apolinario fell down and the accused-appellant finished him off by slashing his neck with
the scythe. Maura thereafter left to report the incident to the police.
The autopsy conducted on Apolinarios cadaver by Dr. Leonita Azores, MD,7 showed that he
sustained two (2) fatal wounds one of which almost decapitated his head while the other hit the
parietal aspect thereof exposing the skin and connective tissue. Apolinario also obtained two (2)
incised wounds on his neck and left forearm and two (2) lacerations on his fingers. He perished at
the crime scene.8
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment9 dated May 9, 2006, the RTC found that both the prosecution and the defense
deliberately withheld vital details of the incident. The prosecution did not reveal that the initial
unlawful aggression was committed by Apolinario who, based on medical records, hacked the
accused-appellant in the parietal area of his head. The defense, on the other hand, concealed that

accused-appellant pursued the victim after the latter fled. These findings completed the sequence
of the incident and revealed that the accused-appellants claim of self-defense is unmeritorious.
The RTC held that when accused-appellant hacked and killed Apolinario, the unlawful aggression
which the latter initially perpetrated has already ceased because he has already ran away for 20 m.
Hence, accused-appellants act was not self-defense but rather one of retaliation which, in turn,
props up the conclusion that he intentionally killed his father. The decretal portion of the RTC
decision thus reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused ANTERO GAMEZ y Baltazar
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Parricide penalized under Art. 246
of the Revised Penal Code and considering the presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance
without any aggravating to offset it, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA; to pay the Heirs of Apolinario Gamez Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death
and to pay the costs of this suit.
The accused who underwent preventive imprisonment since August 21, 2004 shall be credited
with the full time during which he was deprived of his liberty if he agreed voluntarily and in
writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he
will be entitled to only four-fifths (4/5) thereof.10
Ruling of the CA
The CA adopted the RTCs findings and similarly concluded that the accused-appellant put up
retaliation and not self-defense because the aggression proffered by the victim has already ended
when the accused-appellant attacked him. From the time Apolinario ran away and was disarmed
by the accused-appellant, the aggression originally heaved by the former has ceased. Hence, when
the accused-appellant chased and hacked Apolinario several times, self-defense can no longer be
invoked. The CA affirmed the conviction and sentence rendered by the RTC as well as the award
of civil indemnity but an additional award of moral damages was granted for Apolinarios heirs.
The CA Decision11 dated May 25, 2011 disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the assailed May 9, 2006 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Burauen, Leyte, Branch 15, in CRIM. CASE NO. Bn-05-03-4125, is
hereby AFFIRMED with modification. Aside from the civil indemnity already awarded, the
accused is also hereby directed to pay the heirs of Apolinario Gamez the amount of Php50,000.00
as moral damages in accordance with the recent jurisprudence.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.12
The accused-appellant manifested before the Court that in the present review, he is adopting the
arguments contained in his Brief filed before the CA whereby he argued that his guilt for the crime

of parricide was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in ruling that he
failed to prove self-defense.
The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms the accused-appellants conviction.
The arguments proffered by the accused-appellant essentially attack the evaluation by the trial
court of the testimony of the prosecutions principal witness, Maura, and its ruling that the same
satisfactorily repudiate his claim of self-defense.
This Court has consistently adhered to the rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations
on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the
unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various
indicia available but not reflected on the record. Hence, the corollary principle that absent any
showing that the trial court overlooked substantial facts and circumstances that would affect the
final disposition of the case, appellate courts are bound to give due deference and respect to its
evaluation of the credibility of an eyewitness and his testimony as well as its probative value
amidst the rest of the other evidence on record.13
We see no compelling reason to depart from the foregoing tenets especially in view of the
accused-appellants failure to identify significant details, which if considered, will alter the
outcome of the trial courts judgment and the affirmation accorded it by the CA. At any rate, an
examination of the records at hand shows that the factual basis of accused-appellants plea of
self-defense cannot relieve him from criminal liability.
Self-defense, when invoked, as a justifying circumstance implies the admission by the accused
that he committed the criminal act.14 Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in fact
innocent. However, if the accused admits killing the victim, but pleads self-defense, the burden of
evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his part.15
In order to escape criminal liability, it becomes incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the concurrence of the following requisites under the second paragraph of
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, viz: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.16
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be
invoked.17 "There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or
imminent danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be actual
physical force or actual use of a weapon."18 It is present only when the one attacked faces real

and immediate threat to ones life. It must be continuous; otherwise, it does not constitute
aggression warranting self-defense.19
Here, the accused-appellant, miserably failed to discharge his burden of proving that unlawful
aggression justifying self-defense was present when he killed Apolinario.
The aggression initially staged by Apolinario was not of the continuous kind as it was no longer
present when the accused-appellant injured Apolinario. As testified by the accused-appellant
himself, he was able to grab the bolo from Apolinario. From that point on, the aggression initially
staged by Apolinario ceased to exist and the perceived threat to the accused-appellants life was
no longer attendant.
Hence, the accused-appellant was no longer acting in self-defense, when he, despite having
already disarmed Apolinario, ran after the latter for about 20 m and then stabbed him. The
accused-appellants claim of self-defense is further negated by the fatal incision on
Apolinarios neck that almost decapitated his head, a physical evidence which corroborates
Mauras testimony that after stabbing Apolinario with the bolo, the accused-appellant pulled out
the scythe on his waist and used the same to slash Apolinarios neck. The use of a weapon
different from that seized from the victim and the nature of the injury inflicted show the accusedappellants determined resolve to kill Apolinario.
When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to kill or wound the
original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation against the
original aggressor. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that
was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him; while in selfdefense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused.20
The CA was thus correct in upholding the findings and conclusions of the RTC, thus:
Although, it is supported by the medical report, that the accused-appellant was indeed initially
attacked by the victim, the act of the accused-appellant of going after the victim, who was already
running away from the accused-appellant after the latter has gained possession of the weapon, is
anathema to the self-defense theory invoked by the accused appellant.
xxxx
In the instant case, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witness that
the victim tried to run away from the accused-appellant but the accused-appellant ran after him.
When the accused-appellant was able to overtake the victim, the latter was hacked on the right
side of his head. To finish him off, the accused-appellant slashed the victims neck with the use
of a scythe until the victim (his own father) died. Thus, assuming arguendo that the father was
indeed the first aggressor, the aggression ceased the moment the accused-appellant disarmed him
and the victim tried to run away from the accused-appellant. When the accused-appellant then
continued to chase his 69 year-old father and hacked several times the already disarmed victim,

self-defense can no longer be invoked.21

In fine, there is no justifiable cause exempting the accused-appellant from criminal liability and
the courts a quo were correct in convicting him for parricide.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.22 Here, it is an
undisputed fact that Apolinario was the accused-appellants father.
Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal, the crime of parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death.1wphi1 It must be noted that the declaration of the RTC in its Judgment dated May 9,
2006 on the presence of a mitigating circumstance is not supported by any allegation or evidence
on record. Nonetheless, in view of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 934623 prohibiting the imposition of
death penalty, the courts a quo correctly sentenced the accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua.24
It must be emphasized, however, that the accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole
pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 which states that "persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua , or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua , by reason of
this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended."25
The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of Apolinario is proper and in line with
current jurisprudence.26 Civil indemnity is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the
victim and the culpability of the accused for such death.27 The award of P50,000.0028 as moral
damages is likewise correct. Even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs
emotional suffering, it has been recognized that the loss of a loved one to a violent death brings
emotional pain and anguish.29
The Court finds that an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.0030 is in order
considering that the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present in the crime of parricide.31
Lastly, in conformity with current policy, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages an
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.32
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00671 finding the accused-appellant, Antero Gamez y Baltazar, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. Antero Gamez y Baltazar is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Apolinario
Gamez, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of
six percent (6) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
BIENVEDNIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court s Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Pursuant to People v. Mateo G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640, 653-658.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, with Associate Justices Ramon Paul L.
Hernando and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, concurring; CA rollo pp. 73-81.
3 Issued by Executive Judge Yolan9a U. Dagandan; id. at 10-17.
4 Id. at 10.
5 Id. at 74.
6 As culled from accused-appellants Brief filed before the CA, id. at 27-30; and from the
narration of facts in the RTC Judgment dated May 9, 2006, id. at 12-13 and CA Decision dated
May 25, 2011, id. at 74-75.

7 His testimony was dispensed with on account of the admission by the defense of the authenticity
and due execution of the medical certificate he issued for the victim, Apolinario Gamez; id. at 11.
8 As culled from the appellees Brief filed before the CA, id. at 54-65; and from the narration of
facts in the RTC Judgment dated May 9, 2006, id. at 12-13 and CA Decision dated May 25, 2011,
id. at 76.
9 Id. at 10-17.
10 Id. at 16-17.
11 Id. at 73-81.
12 Id. at 80-81.
13 People of the Philippines v. Ronald Credo aka "Ontog", Randy Credo and Rolando Credo y
Buenaventura, G.R. No. 197360, July 3, 2013.
14 People v. Maningding, G.R. No. 195665 , September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 804, 813.
15 Simon A. Flores v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013.
16 People v. Concillado, G.R. No. 181204, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 363, 379.
17 People v. Paycana, Jr., 574 Phil. 780, 787 (2008).
18 People v. Comillo, Jr., G.R. No. 186538, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 756, 772.
19 Simon A. Flores v. People of the Philippines, supra note 15.
20 Id.
21 CA rollo, pp. 79-80.
22 People v. Paycana, Jr., supra note 17, at 789.
23 An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.
24 See People v. Tibon, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 510, 521.
25 See People v. Dejillo, G.R. No. 185005, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 537, 556, citing
People v. Tadah, G.R. No. 186226, February 1, 2012, 664 SCRA 744, 747.

26 People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 03, 2011, 658 SCRA 367, 381.
27 People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 187683, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 364, 374.
28 Supra note 26.
29 Supra note 24, at 522.
30 Supra note 26.
31 Supra note 24, at 523.
32 Supra note 26.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated
November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo
City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to
casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner
approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry
on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to
petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's
necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a
receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if
unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner

remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant
was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said
items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received from one
Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's
bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth P12,000.00, or in
the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under
expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items
or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to
defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his
aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the
proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to
return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00),
Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy.
On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be
summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in
the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they earn
a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made
to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as
evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he
did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony
of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;

there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the
penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty
consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND
TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN
(14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS
MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as
actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed
the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the
RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the
imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as
maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the
decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present
petition stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION
AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE,
INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES
THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT
FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE
UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT 1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES
OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE
REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION
AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY

THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY,
IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE
WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH 1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD
AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the following
counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of the
offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight
when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are
totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual
findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both procedural and substantive
issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in
evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the
same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show
that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified,
marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that

petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of
evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a
party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence,
such objection shall be considered as waived.5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information
filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces of
jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different
from the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in
finding that the Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the
matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is
true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of
the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
owner6 and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the
Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the
offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the
subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of
the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the
prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the
precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation
or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the
fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein
charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information
ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which accusedappellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified
upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant,
therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges
proferred against him.7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow.

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received
such money, goods, or other property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on
the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated
how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces
of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have been
finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?
a Yes, sir.

q Did you find him?

a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
a I talked to him, sir.
q How many times?
a Two times, sir.
q What did you talk (sic) to him?
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items are and
he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?
a No, sir.9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand need not even be
formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has
indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the
money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v.
People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of
estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard
to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the
law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general
meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present
a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to
the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:

x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of
embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held
in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by
other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the existence
of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust,
or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or
return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner
failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return
the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the private
complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the same
is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives
great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the
appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court
is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16
Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in
determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not
numbered.17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the
question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property
came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property
in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no
unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the
case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited
at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter. Among those that
graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor
Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The
parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista
appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the
following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts
continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage
measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the
said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's
perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied

through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of
the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be
appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this
matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any
act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the
proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal
legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when
a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly
excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which is
not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper
decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a
deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to
inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The
second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already
punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy
therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to
the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate
with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the
need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in
Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation
for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that
there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal
statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to
prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to
punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the

ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh
penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief
Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which
it believes to be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino
and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code,21
echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must be
tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the
penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of
violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to which
commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the
legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class
of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed
to the Chief Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the
current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 . However, it would be dangerous
as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must
be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in
crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC,
a self-amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided
the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume
why the present legislature has not made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to
conform with the present times. For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the same
penalties in order to deter the further commission of those punishable acts which have increased
tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it
aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its
original minimum amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it to
P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which the
Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to
be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the
provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing
stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in
this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty

which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the
thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value
of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the
circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing
stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the
thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger,
poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above-provision states that the
penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the penalty is
imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum period (2
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty
imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one
degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2
months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole after serving
the said minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the
minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum
period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the
minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed
under the law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the crime
of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the
maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be

too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act committed and
the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the penalties
are not changed:
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punished by prision
mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punished by prision
correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years).24
3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by prision
correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).
4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor medium
to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and
1 day to 6 months).
6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the
penalties are not changed, as follows:
1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punishable by
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8
years).25
2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punishable by prision
correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).26
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1
day to 6 months).

An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the
incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a
valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of
reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial
distinctions as P10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which
violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher
amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a person
who steals P142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of
millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that
the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no
longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental
penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is the
penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds
P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more questions than answers, which leads us even
more to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to
exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the
remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as
unconstitutional because it is absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty-Two
Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule
unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00)
Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(P22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right?
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ... (interrupted)
DEAN DIOKNO:
....then....

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the
amount ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Could not be.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The only remedy is to go to Congress...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:

That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two
Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.
x x x x29
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal
Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting
cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court
therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a
specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the
penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e.,
whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3)
Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem what
respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota after
it took into account the latters recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a "no
account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would have been five years
imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole under South Dakotas recidivist statute because of his six prior
felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present
controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty for the
offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a
domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely
abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the
helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and

safekeeping of the employers loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so
repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such
wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the subject
matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious implications. For
example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money
malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved
in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is
more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand
pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved
is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount
exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of
the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which
he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that
he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to the
unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed is P200.00
(under the existing law), the amount now becomes P20,000.00 and the penalty is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The
penalty may not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement of P20,000.00 compared to the acts

committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the
government is not generally defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to
15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the case,
because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public position to
embezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or
uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the
bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of
imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the thing
unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value
of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in entering the
premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling
under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a
fine not exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the
premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas
in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6
years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the fact
that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful
taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can be
imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months)
if the value of the damage caused exceeds P1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the
damage will now become P100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month
and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property does not exceed P200.00, the
penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more
than P200.00, if the amount involved does not exceed P200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the
proposal, P200.00 will now become P20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of P200.00
under the existing law will now become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation will
now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense is categorized as a
light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also amend
Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the
same through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally
feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected by the
proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of
the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library and National
Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property),

Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article
317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious
mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other
crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the
public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of
accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to
render accounts before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes
which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended.34 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and
possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent
to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty
imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest products involved in
the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of
Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned because the penalty is
dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in the negative because the
soundness of this particular law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special Laws,
and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed to
determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that should be
amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers
of the Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties
imposable in the present times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of the
Legislature which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries
and who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned
law or other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code.
During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56)
bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code,37 each one
proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago
when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far different from todays
conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not
usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation,
modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is
repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to

their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put,
the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of
the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation
of powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can
be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least
three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding
five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by
the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in
a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender,
the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of
civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a
thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain
crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense
cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is
apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil
indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum
amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be
validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral
damages under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can
be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of
the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be
adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount
to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether

or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to
lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and
not subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpios opinions is that the
incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only
impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of P22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount
involved exceeds P22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until the law is properly amended
by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A
conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of
the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that should be
imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs
counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal justice
by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993. The said
law has been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel than that
of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by
Republic Act No. 9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on the
ground that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of the
Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death
penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the
provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present
action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the concerned parties
were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the
constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality issues must
be pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more so in the present controversy wherein the issues
never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally
aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or
amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for
instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on
the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the
prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe
does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under
the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to
the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."45

Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our
modern time.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned
monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are
other factors and variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated
upon before the said values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society,
the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly
evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be
made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks
sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect
these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and appropriately belongs to
Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you have
to take into consideration several factors.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Consumer price index.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of
those economic terms.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, but ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I dont think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to
One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the adjustment
that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that
the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice.
Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not impose an
obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply
compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration
"changed conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the
substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Courts adjustment of indemnity in
crimes against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in
the case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my Colleagues,
all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as
extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such
immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut
divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is
awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of
money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only
based on the value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the
maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount
granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the
RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00,
or a total of seven (7) years.

In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People48 is
highly instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case,
Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three
equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three
portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the
penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisin correccional maximum to
prisin mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion
shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present
case, the amount involved is P98,000.00, which exceeds P22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty
imposable should be within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of
prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for
every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the total
penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than the P22,000.00 ceiling set by
law, then, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking
the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum
of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa

charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty
next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and
enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a
dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito
Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution
dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision
dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS,
TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15)
YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
See Dissenting Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice See: Concurring Opinion

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
I take no part due to prior action in the CA
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
Associate Justice I join the Dissent of J. Abad
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
See Dissenting Opinion
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
BVIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice No Part
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* No part.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of the Supreme Court),
with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of the Supreme
Court), concurring; rollo, pp. 31-41.
2 Rollo, p. 43.
3 Id. at 48-52.
4 Libuit v. People, 506 Phil. 591, 599 (2005).

5 Blas v. Angeles- Hutalla, 482 Phil. 485, 501 (2004).

6 Quinto v. People, 365 Phil. 259, 270 (1999).
7 Rollo, p. 37. (Citations omitted.)
8 Diaz v. People, 585 Phil. 318, 332 (2008), citing Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 670,
675 (1999).
9 TSN, December 17, 1992, pp. 9-10. (Emphasis supplied.)
10 Tan v. People, 542 Phil. 188, 201 (2007).
11 Id., citing Lee v. People, 495 Phil. 239, 250 (2005).
12 Id.
13 555 Phil. 106 (2007).
14 Id. at 114. (Citations omitted.)
15 Cosme, Jr. v. People, 538 Phil. 52, 66 (2006), citing People v. Garillo, 446 Phil. 163, 174-175
(2003).
16 Id., citing Sullon v. People, 500 Phil. 39, 45 (2005) ; People v. Bulan, 498 Phil. 586, 598
(2005).
17 Id. at 67, citing People v. Gaspar, 376 Phil. 762, 779 (1999).
18 Emphasis supplied.
19 Third Edition, 1940.
20 Id. at 16. (Emphasis supplied)
21 1997 Edition.
22 Id. at 93, citing United States v. Valera Ang Y, 26 Phil. 598 (1914); People v. Salazar y Gabriel,
102 Phil. 1184 (1958); Tiu Ua, 51 O.G. 1863; Limaco, 99 Phil. 35 (1956), and People v. Del
Rosario y Natividad, 62 Phil. 824 (1936). (Emphasis supplied.)
23 Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the
fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided
that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
(a) By altering the substance, quantity, or quality or anything of value which the offender shall
deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be based on an immoral or
illegal consideration.
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received
such money, goods, or other property.
(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank, and by writing any
document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice of the offended party or of any third
person.
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
(b) By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining to his art or business.
(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to the action for
calumny which the offended party may deem proper to bring against the offender. In this case, the

offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty.

(d) [By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender
therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check
to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice
from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack of
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act. (As amended by R.A. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)]
(e) By obtaining any food, refreshment or accommodation at a hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding
house, lodging house, or apartment house and the like without paying therefor, with intent to
defraud the proprietor or manager thereof, or by obtaining credit at hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding
house, lodging house, or apartment house by the use of any false pretense, or by abandoning or
surreptitiously removing any part of his baggage from a hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house,
lodging house or apartment house after obtaining credit, food, refreshment or accommodation
therein without paying for his food, refreshment or accommodation.
3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:
(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.
(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling game.
(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record, office files,
document or any other papers.
24 May be entitled to Probation.
25 May be entitled to Probation if the maximum penalty imposed is 6 years.
26 May be entitled to Probation.
27 Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010, 613 SCRA 385, 414.
28 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939).
29 TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, pp. 192-195.
30 463 U.S. 277 (1983)
31 Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense.
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for
himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law.
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material
benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or
capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in
consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise
which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after
its termination.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act
within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly
or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or
discriminating against any other interested party.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in
any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member,
and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not
participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.
Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the

approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or
group to which they belong.
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any
person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of
a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on
account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance
of its authorized release date.
The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b)
and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d);
or urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in
subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished
under Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disqualified in the
discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government.
32 R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 9.
33 Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. A fine, whether imposed as a single
of as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a
correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light
penalty if it less than 200 pesos.
34 Revised Forestry Code, as amended by E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987.
35 Taopa v. People, 592 Phil. 341, 345 (2005).
36 Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher
by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a
domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle,
mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic erruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
37 TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, p. 167.
38 People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505, 548 (1996).
39 Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

40 AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES,

AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
41 AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES.
42 Section 19.
1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. x x
x.
43 Gutierrez v. Department of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 153266, 159007, 159029,
170084, 172713, 173119, 176477, 177990, A.M. No. 06-4-02-SB, March 18, 2010, 616 SCRA 1,
25.
44 People v. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906, 908 (1953); People v. Tongko, 353 Phil. 37, 43 (1998).
45 People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647, 655 (1953); People v. Dionisio, No. L-15513, March 27, 1968,
22 SCRA 1299, 1301-1302.
46 TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, pp. 183-185.
47 No. L-18793, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468.
48 Supra note 15.
49 Id. at 71-72.
50 ART. 65. Rule in Cases in Which the Penalty is Not Composed of Three Periods. In cases in
which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the
rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions the time included in the
penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three portions.
51 People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008, 574 SCRA 258, 284.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERARDO CORNEL, defendant-appellant.
Pablo Anzures for appellant.

Office of the Assistant Solicitor General Gianzon and Solicitor Jimenez for appellee.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Albay sentencing the
defendant, for the crime of homicide, to an indeterminate prison term ranging from 8 years and 1
day of prision mayor to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, with corresponding
accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Fabian Burac, in the sum of P2,000,
and to pay the costs.
The first feature of appellant's case as presented by his counsel de oficio, refers to the alleged
inadequacy of the evidence for the prosecution establishing appellant's identity. Trinidad Coral,
however, personally saw (1) the appellant suddenly assault her deceased husband (Fabian Burac)
with a bolo as the latter was descending the stairs of his house in the Barrio of San Miguel,
Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of June 8, 1945; (2)
after Fabian Burac (then wounded in the forehead) fell, the appellant threw a stone which hit
Fabian's right clavicle, and (3) the appellant thereafter fled in the direction of his house. The
positive testimony of Trinidad was given full credit by the trial court, and the latter's advantage of
observing and hearing the witness should not be disregarded particularly where, as in this case,
Trinidad knew the appellant well and the latter merely relies on the conjecture that Trinidad might
have made a mistake in identifying her husband's assailant, considering the time of the attack.
Apart, therefore, from the testimony of another witness for the government (Caspara Bendicio) to
the effect that when she asked Fabian not long after the incident in question as to what had
happened, Fabian replied that he had been boloed by the appellant, which testimony (alleged by
the appellant to be inadmissible) was accepted by the trial court under the rule of the res gestae,
there is sufficient proof regarding appellant's identity. Moreover, it should be remembered that the
appellant was prosecuted, though only for physical injuries, even before Fabian's death which
occured several day after June 8, 1945.
Under the third assignment of error, counsel for the appellant adopts the view that the wound on
Fabian's forehead, described by Dr. Mariano Cruel, a government witness, as "an incised vertIcal
wound extending from a little above the middle of the eyebrows down to the lower root of the
nose," and cutting "the frontal and the nasal bones also," was produced not by a bolo or any long,
sharp-cutting weapon but by an irregular and hard object with a sharp edge such as a heavy piece
of stone with one or more sharp edges which, when thrown forcibly from a distance, will
necessarily produce, a small apparently "incised" wound and render the victim unconscious. This
contention may be tenable in forensic medicine, but it is still conjectural and cannot be accepted
where a criminal assault is proved through an eyewitness.
Contrary to appellant's pretension, the death of Fabian Burac is established by the testimony of his
wife and mother-in-law. The certificate of the civil registrar of Tabaco dated August 3, 1945, to the
effect that the matter had not been registered in his office, merely shows that no report was made
up to the date mentioned, but it cannot conclusively negate the fact of Fabian's death.

We have no doubt that Fabian Burac died, as certified by Dr. Mariano Cruel, "of tetanus secondary
to the infected wound." When Fabian last reported for treatment on June 15, 1945, Dr, Cruel
already noticed Fabian's rigid muscles and slight lock-jaw, and this is the very reason why he
prescribed anti-tetanic serum, which, not being then available in the place, was never actually
administered on the patient. Appellant's surmise that Fabian might not have died of tetanus,
because there are other diseases sometimes exhibiting symptoms of tetanus, cannot prevail against
the conclusion of Dr. Cruel who in fact treated Fabian's wound and saw the manifestations of
tetanus. The appellant must of course be held responsible for the natural consequences of his
unlawful act. (People vs. Borbano, 76 Phil., 702.)
Appellant's defense of alibi that between 5 p.m. of June 8, 1945 and the morning of June 9,
1945, he was in Tabaco, Albay, may be worth inquiring into, if Trinidad Coral (already found to
the truthful) was not an eyewitness to appellant's criminal attack. The motive for the offense is
undoubtedly supplied by the circumstance that Fabian once arrested and threatened the appellant
during the Japanese occupation.
The appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Hontiveros, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus -

ORLITO VILLACORTA,

Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 186412

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:

September 7, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On appeal is the Decision[1] dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 02550, which affirmed the Decision[2] dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, finding accused-appellant
Orlito Villacorta (Villacorta) guilty of murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz (Cruz) the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, plus the costs of suit.
On June 21, 2002, an Information[3] was filed against Villacorta charging him with the crime of
murder, as follows:
That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with
intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ,
thereby inflicting upon the victim serious wounds which caused his immediate death.

When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta pleaded not guilty.[4]

During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina Mendeja (Mendeja) and Dr. Domingo
Belandres, Jr. (Dr. Belandres).
Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her sari-sari store located at C-4
Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers at Mendejas store.
At around two oclock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering bread at Mendejas store, Villacorta
suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruzs body using
a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruzs body. Immediately after
the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to catch Villacorta. When
Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the broken bamboo stick from
Cruzs body.[5] Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.[6]
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital. When Cruz
sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where
he was treated as an out-patient. Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on February
14, 2002, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. While admitting that he did not
personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to determine, using Cruzs medical chart and
diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.[7] Dr. Belandres
specifically described the cause of Cruzs death in the following manner:
The wound was exposed x x spurs concerted, the patient developed difficulty of opening the
mouth, spastivity of the body and abdominal pain and the cause of death is hypoxic
encephalopathy neuro transmitted due to upper G.I. bleeding x x x. Diagnosed of Tetanus, Stage
III.[8]

The prosecution also intended to present Dr. Deverni Matias (Dr. Matias), who attended to Cruz at
the San Lazaro Hospital, but the prosecution and defense agreed to dispense with Dr. Matias
testimony based on the stipulation that it would only corroborate Dr. Belandres testimony on Cruz
dying of tetanus.
For its part, the defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz. Villacorta
recounted that he was on his way home from work at around two oclock in the morning of January
21, 2002. Upon arriving home, Villacorta drank coffee then went outside to buy cigarettes at a
nearby store. When Villacorta was about to leave the store, Cruz put his arm around Villacortas
shoulder. This prompted Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went home. Villacorta did
not notice that Cruz got hurt. Villacorta only found out about Cruzs death upon his arrest on July
31, 2002.[9]
On September 22, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder,
qualified by treachery. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Orlito Villacorta guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for the death of said victim plus the costs of suit.[10]

Villacorta, through his counsel from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), filed a notice of appeal to
assail his conviction by the RTC.[11] The Court of Appeals directed the PAO to file Villacortas
brief, within thirty days from receipt of notice.
Villacorta filed his Appellants Brief[12] on May 30, 2007; while the People, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Appellee's Brief[13] on October 2, 2007.
On July 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC
judgment of conviction against Villacorta.
Hence, Villacorta comes before this Court via the instant appeal.
Villacorta manifested that he would no longer file a supplemental brief, as he was adopting the
Appellant's Brief he filed before the Court of Appeals.[14] The OSG, likewise, manifested that it
was no longer filing a supplemental brief. [15]
In his Appellants Brief, Villacorta raised the following assignment of errors:

I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
III
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A CRIME, HE COULD
ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.[16]

Villacorta assails the credibility of Mendeja, an eyewitness to the stabbing incident. It was
Mendeja who positively identified Villacorta as the one who stabbed Cruz in the early morning of
January 23, 2002. Villacorta asserts that Mendejas account of the stabbing incident is replete with

inconsistencies and incredulities, and is contrary to normal human experience, such as: (1) instead
of shouting or calling for help when Villacorta allegedly stabbed Cruz, Mendeja attempted to run
after and catch Villacorta; (2) while, by Mendejas own account, there were other people who
witnessed the stabbing and could have chased after Villacorta, yet, oddly, only Mendeja did; (3) if
Cruz was stabbed so swiftly and suddenly as Mendeja described, then it would have been
physically improbable for Mendeja to have vividly recognized the perpetrator, who immediately
ran away after the stabbing; (4) after the stabbing, both Villacorta and Cruz ran in opposite
directions; and (5) Mendeja had said that the bamboo stick, the alleged murder weapon, was left at
her store, although she had also stated that the said bamboo stick was left embedded in Cruzs
body. Villacorta maintains that the aforementioned inconsistencies are neither trivial nor
inconsequential, and should engender some doubt as to his guilt.
We are not persuaded.
To begin with, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of
witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great
respect, if not conclusive effect. Such determination made by the trial court proceeds from its firsthand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under
grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess the witnesses'
credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.[17]
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave full faith and credence to the testimony
of prosecution witness Mendeja. The Court of Appeals rejected Villacortas attempts to impugn
Mendejas testimony, thus:
Appellants reason for concluding that witness Mendejas testimony is incredible because she did
not shout or call for help and instead run after the appellant, fails to impress the Court because
persons who witness crimes react in different ways.
x x x the makings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react differently and there is no
standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.
Equally lacking in merit is appellants second reason which is, other persons could have run after
the appellant after the stabbing incident. As explained by witness Mendeja, the other person whom
she identified as Aron was left to assist the appellant who was wounded. Further, the stabbing
occurred at 2:00 oclock in the morning, a time when persons are expected to be asleep in their
house, not roaming the streets.
His [Villacortas] other argument that the swiftness of the stabbing incident rendered impossible or
incredible the identification of the assailant cannot likewise prosper in view of his admission that
he was in the store of witness Mendeja on January 23, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the morning and that
he assaulted the victim by boxing him.
Even if his admission is disregarded still the evidence of record cannot support appellants
argument. Appellant and the victim were known to witness Mendeja, both being her friends and

regular customers. There was light in front of the store. An opening in the store measuring 1 and
meters enables the person inside to see persons outside, particularly those buying articles from the
store. The victim was in front of the store buying bread when attacked. Further, immediately after
the stabbing, witness Mendeja ran after the appellant giving her additional opportunity to identify
the malefactor. Thus, authorship of the attack can be credibly ascertained.[18]

Moreover, Villacorta was unable to present any reason or motivation for Mendeja to fabricate such
a lie and falsely accuse Villacorta of stabbing Cruz on January 23, 2002. We have ruled time and
again that where the prosecution eyewitness was familiar with both the victim and accused, and
where the locus criminis afforded good visibility, and where no improper motive can be attributed
to the witness for testifying against the accused, then her version of the story deserves much
weight.[19]
The purported inconsistencies in Mendejas testimony pointed out by Villacorta are on matters that
have no bearing on the fundamental fact which Mendeja testified on: that Villacorta stabbed Cruz
in the early morning of January 23, 2002, right in front of Mendejas store.
In the face of Mendejas positive identification of Villacorta as Cruzs stabber, Villacorta could only
muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification, is inherently
weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes selfserving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[20]
Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found to
have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab
wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus infection, and
not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.[21]
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of January 23,
2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On February
14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection,
where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The prosecution did not present evidence
of the emergency medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits
by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up medical treatment of his stab
wound, or Cruzs activities between January 23 to February 14, 2002.

In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[22] the Court was confronted with a case of very
similar factual background as the one at bar. During an altercation on October 23, 1980, Urbano
hacked Javier with a bolo, inflicting an incised wound on Javiers hand. Javier was treated by Dr.
Meneses. On November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital with lockjaw and convulsions.
Dr. Exconde, who attended to Javier, found that Javiers serious condition was caused by tetanus
infection. The next day, on November 15, 1980, Javier died. An Information was filed against
Urbano for homicide. Both the Circuit Criminal Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court found
Urbano guilty of homicide, because Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of
Urbano's unlawful act. Urbano appealed before this Court, arguing that Javiers own negligence
was the proximate cause of his death. Urbano alleged that when Dr. Meneses examined Javiers
wound, he did not find any tetanus infection and that Javier could have acquired the tetanus germs
when he returned to work on his farm only two (2) weeks after sustaining his injury. The Court
granted Urbanos appeal.
We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano:
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanusThe incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable
symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic
within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur
within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are
encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the
jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the disease progresses, stiffness gives way to
rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus is the
commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of
lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions
called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a
small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In
the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and
symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms, an interval referred to as
the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor
prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery,
which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or
inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which

prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system
damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more
than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief
and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time;
trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate
even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset
time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized
convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005;
Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the
incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the
bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22
days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle
spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs
at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild
case of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should
have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The
more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the
severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could
have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not
20 to 22 days before he died.[23]

The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between the hacking incident
and the manifestation of severe tetanus infection created doubts in the mind of the Court that
Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from the hacking incident. We explained in Urbano
that:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing
with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the
proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in
Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because
of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances, which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."
(45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)[24]

We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the conviction of
Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and
the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus
infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would
have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus
infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with
two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can
only deduce that Cruzs stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with
tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruzs stab wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the
time of his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight physical
injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz.
Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of
slight physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in
the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form part of
those constituting the offense of murder.[25]
We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder because the
prosecution was not able to establish Villacortas intent to kill. In fact, the Court of Appeals
expressly observed the lack of evidence to prove such an intent beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:
Appellant stabbed the victim only once using a sharpened bamboo stick, hitting him on the left
side of the body and then immediately fled. The instrument used is not as lethal as those made of
metallic material. The part of the body hit is not delicate in the sense that instant death can ensue
by reason of a single stab wound. The assault was done only once. Thus, there is doubt as to

whether appellant had an intent to kill the victim, which should be resolved in favor of the
appellant. x x x.[26]

The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the
homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor. The onus probandi lies not on accused-appellant
but on the prosecution. The inference that the intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the
absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent
is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical injuries only.
[27]
Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical Center for medical treatment
immediately after the stabbing incident. Right after receiving medical treatment, Cruz was then
released by the Tondo Medical Center as an out-patient. There was no other evidence to establish
that Cruz was incapacitated for labor and/or required medical attendance for more than nine days.
Without such evidence, the offense is only slight physical injuries.[28]
We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being sufficiently alleged in the
Information and proved during trial.
The Information specified that accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ x x x.
Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the
offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make. This definition sets out
what must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment
of such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. To reiterate,
the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation that
the attack will take place, thus, depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while
ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.[29] Likewise, even when the
victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is
decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or
to retaliate.[30]
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly proven in this case, and we
sustain such finding. Cruz, the victim, was attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without
provocation. It was two oclock in the morning of January 23, 2002, and Cruz, who was out buying
bread at Mendejas store, was unarmed. Cruz had his guard down and was totally unprepared for an
attack on his person. Villacorta suddenly appeared from nowhere, armed with a sharpened bamboo
stick, and without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz at the left side of his body, then swiftly ran away.
Villacortas treacherous mode of attack left Cruz with no opportunity at all to defend himself or

retaliate.
Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the
offended party from labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the
same period.

The penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1) day to thirty (30) days.[31] The Indeterminate
Sentence Law does not apply since said law excludes from its coverage cases where the penalty
imposed does not exceed one (1) year.[32] With the aggravating circumstance of treachery, we can
sentence Villacorta with imprisonment anywhere within arresto menor in the maximum period,
i.e., twenty-one (21) to thirty (30) days. Consequently, we impose upon Villacorta a straight
sentence of thirty (30) days of arresto menor; but given that Villacorta has been in jail since July
31, 2002 until present time, already way beyond his imposed sentence, we order his immediate
release.
Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in a
criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Moral damages compensate for the mental anguish,
serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by the victim and his family as being a proximate result
of the wrongful act. An award requires no proof of pecuniary loss. Pursuant to previous
jurisprudence, an award of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) moral damages is appropriate for
less serious, as well as slight physical injuries.[33]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 02550, affirming the Decision dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
judgment is entered finding Villacorta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight
physical injuries, as defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of thirty (30) days arresto menor. Considering that Villacorta has
been incarcerated well beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause Villacortas immediate release, unless Villacorta is being
lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision, of the compliance with such order. Villacorta is ordered to pay the heirs of the late
Danilo Cruz moral damages in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 2-16; penned by Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr. with Associate Justices
Amelita G. Tolentino and Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 58-60; penned by Presiding Judge Benjamin T. Antonio.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4] CA rollo, p. 6.
[5] TSN, October 20, 2003, pp. 2-9.
[6] Records, p. 72.
[7] TSN, May 5, 2003, pp. 1-11; Dr. Domingo Belandres, Jr. was also referred to as Dr. Domingo
Melendres, Jr. in the TSN.
[8] Id. at 6.
[9] TSN, March 6, 2006, pp. 2-5.
[10] CA rollo, p. 60.
[11] Records, p. 144.
[12] CA rollo, pp. 37-57.
[13] Id. at 67-96.
[14] Rollo, pp. 30-32.
[15] Id. at 35.
[16] CA rollo, p. 39.
[17] People v. Mayingque, G.R. No. 179709, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 123, 140.
[18] CA rollo, pp. 9-10.
[19] People v. Alcantara, 471 Phil. 690, 700 (2004).
[20] People v. Barde, G.R. No. 183094, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 187, 211.
[21] Calimutan v. People, 517 Phil. 272, 284 (2006).
[22] 241 Phil. 1 (1988).
[23] Id. at 9-11.
[24] Id. at 11-12.

[25] People v. Vicente, 423 Phil. 1065, 1078 (2001).

[26] CA rollo, p. 13.
[27] People v. Pagador, 409 Phil. 338, 351-352 (2001).
[28] Li v. People, 471 Phil. 128, 150 (2004).
[29] People v. Casta, G.R. No. 172871, September 16, 2008, 565 SCRA 341, 356-357.
[30] People v. Napalit, G.R. No. 181247, March 19, 2010, 616 SCRA 245, 252.
[31] Revised Penal Code, Article 27.
[32] People v. Tan, 411 Phil. 813, 843 (2001).
[33] Aradillos v. Court of Appeals, 464 Phil. 650, 679 (2004); People v. Loreto, 446 Phil. 592, 614
(2003).
Estrada vs. Arroyo
G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto
March 2, 2001
FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend the President,
alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank
account known as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons allegation
also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives
filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny
Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate
and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer.
Estrada, pleaded not guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at
EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the
group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar
associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue,
stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not
run in this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada constructively resigned his post. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the
Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the legality
and constitutionality of her proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his office to
avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a
peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not
until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the
Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not
petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The
Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of
the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the
Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution,
wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the
previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held
that the issue is legal and not political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent
must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that
struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from
the Angara diaries, detailed Estradas implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he
issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his
questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace.
The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on
the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioners contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that
petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the
petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal
acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear
that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during
which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may
claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another).