Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
UNITED
AIRLINES,
INC.,
Petitioner
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA, in his personal capacity and
in behalf of his minor son MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel
Bureau in Manila, three Visit the U.S.A. tickets from himself, his wife and
his minor son, Mychal, to visit the cities of Washington DC, Chicago and Los
Angeles. All All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines.
Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles
Airport, Aniceto changed their itinerary, paid the penalty for rewriting their
tickets and was issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the
words: Check-in-required. They were then set to leave but were denied
boarding because the flight was overbooked.
The CA ruled that private respondents failure to comply with the check-in
requirement will not defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules were not
complied with applying the laws of the USA, relying on the Code of Federal
Regulation Part on Oversales of the USA.
ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA.
HELD:
No. According to the doctrine of lex loci contractus, the law of the place
where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature
and validity, obligation and interpretation shall govern. This has been said to
be the rule even though the place where the contract was made is different
from the place where it is to be performed. Hence, the court should apply the
law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, where the passengers
are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State
by the defendant airline. Therefore, although, the contract of carriage was to
be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased through
petitioners agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in
D.C., however, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of
carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B.
EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru
and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDOvs.
PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATIONS
ADMINISTRATOR, NLRC, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC.
(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new complainants joined the case, ang
daming
inavail
na
remedies
ng
both
parties)
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint. At the
same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from said date
within which to submit their respective position papers. On February 24,
1988, AIBC and BRII submitted position paper. On October 27, 1988, AIBC
and BRII filed a Consolidated Reply, POEA Adminitartor rendered his
decision which awarded the amount of $824, 652.44 in favor of only 324
complainants. Claimants submitted their Appeal Memorandum For Partial
Appeal from the decision of the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or appeal
in addition to the Notice of Appeal filed earlier.
NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the POEA. The
resolution removed some of the benefits awarded in favor of the claimants.
NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants and by
AlBC and BRII.
The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the
employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily,
the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund;
interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay;
fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS;
refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing
prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the
accreditation of BRII
The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of the
complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of
Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176, otherwise known
re the Labour Law for the Private Sector. Some of the provision of Amiri
Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the complainants-appellants
are as follows:
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the Motion to Strike Out
of the Records filed by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the
deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.
Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent
to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-rive per centurn
thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum off fifty per
centurn thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed to
being from seven oclock in the evening until seven oclock in the morning .
AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their answer.
The POEA kept on granting such motions.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for
extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII declared in default for failure
to file their answers.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing
AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the order.
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x x x.
Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on any
official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his
normal wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one years continuous service with
his employer shall be entitled to Laos on full pay for a period of not less than
21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after five
continuous years of service.
more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host
country shall form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved the
observation of the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in
the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII
themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to
said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those
stipulated therein. However there was a part of the employment contract
which provides that the compensation of the employee may be adjusted
downward so that the total computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall
be equivalent to the compensation therein agree, another part of the same
provision categorically states that total remuneration and benefits do not fall
below that of the host country regulation and custom.
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted
against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it. Article 1377 of the Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines
provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not
favor the party who caused the obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there
is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment
contract and the employees merely take it or leave it. The presumption is
that there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the
employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining
power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the
provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof. The
parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such
a case, the foreign law is adopted as a system to regulate the relations of
the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract,
the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so
forth. Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may
just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed
incorporated into their contract as a set of terms. By such reference to the
provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract
to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute
but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract.
against the particular rights which the libellant seeks to enforce. The Panama
Labor Code is a statute having broad objectives. The American court applied
the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after
finding that there was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription
was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law
even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum (local Court) on
prescription of actions.
However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law
becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum (local Court) has a
borrowing statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating the
foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A borrowing statute
directs the state of the forum (local Court) to apply the foreign statute of
limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are
several kinds of borrowing statutes, one form provides that an action
barred by the laws of the place where it accrued will not be enforced in the
forum even though the local statute was not run against it.
Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: If by the
laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is
barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot
be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this
jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forums public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive
period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question
would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution
emphasized that:The state shall promote social justice in all phases of
national
development
(Sec.
10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect
the rights of workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial
proceeding.
The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of
the claims is 3 years, as provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as provided
by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article
1144
of
the
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines
provides:
The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accross:
(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon
a
judgment
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the
written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period
provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.
3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is
one of common or general interest to many and the parties are so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. When all the claims
are for benefits granted under the Bahrain law many of the claimants worked
outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia under
different terms and condition of employment.
Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not present (common or
general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only
logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to rile their
claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the
claims is the same (for employees benefits), there is no common question of
law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many
of the claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed elsewhere.
Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in the
claims of the other employees of defendants. A claimant has no concern in
protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by the fact, that
hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into
separate compromise settlements of their respective claims. The claimants
Favorable decision for the respondents. The Order stated that private
respondents had attained the status of regular employees after they had
rendered more than a year of continued service; that the stipulation limiting
the period of the employment contract to 3 years was null and void as
violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and
regulations on regular and casual employment; and that the dismissal,
having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was
illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.
Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari
ISSUE: (Relative to the subject) Which law should govern over the case?
Which court has jurisdiction?
HELD: Philippine Law and Philippine courts
Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment
agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of
the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute
arising out of or in connection with the agreement only [in] courts of Karachi
Pakistan.
We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with
public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and
regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some
other
law
to
govern
their
relationship.
the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed
here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and
respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do
business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines;
lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their
assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point
to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the
resolution
of
contractual
disputes
between
the
parties.
Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement
cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the
jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the
petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan
law on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable
provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of
Philippine
law.
[DOCTRINE
OF
PROCESSUAL
PRESUMPTION,
eh?]
Petition
denied.
_______
NOTES:
Another Issue: petitioner PIA invokes paragraphs 5 and 6 of its contract of
employment with private respondents Farrales and Mamasig, arguing that its
relationship with them was governed by the provisions of its contract rather
than
by
the
general
provisions
of
the
Labor
Code.
INC.
TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. The tickets
airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of
Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith
their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed
reservations.
ISSUE;
the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before
WON TWZ acted with bad faith and would entitle Zalameas to Moral and
them had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Out of the 42
Examplary damages.
names on the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board
RULING:
the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been
were not able to fly. Those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority
proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial
among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written
ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and
by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter,
could not be accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they
were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and
action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage before the
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its
RTC- Makati. The lower court ruled in favor of petitioners . CA held that moral
contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter
authenticated
by
the
seal
of
his
office.
Regulations
has
no
basis
in
fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is
duty to provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must
not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci
contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was
issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents
Respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers
and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the
beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have
defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines,
prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another
airline.
Respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged
policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. Neither did it present any
certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right
to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not,
then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage.
rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in
deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for
New York, that their tickets represented confirmed seats without any
the check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a
moral damages.
In the case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, this Court explicitly held
that a passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he
had to buy for a flight to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being
refunded for the cost of the unused TWA tickets, petitioners should be
awarded the actual cost of their flight from New York to Los Angeles.
jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted,
following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a
system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of
justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in
the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the
judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from
which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of
regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum
Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the
governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and
respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a
foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere,
enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its
jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved,
the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of
overcoming its presumptive validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the
money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered.
Petitioners sole witness, testified to the effect that he is in active practice of
the law profession in Malaysia; that he was connected with Skrine and
Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981; that private respondent, then known
as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, was sued by
his client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the
writ of summons were served on March 17, 1983 at the registered office of
private respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a financial
planning officer of private respondent for Southeast Asia operations; that
upon the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and
Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala
Lumpur, entered their conditional appearance for private respondent
questioning the regularity of the service of the writ of summons but
subsequently withdrew the same when it realized that the writ was properly
served; that because private respondent failed to file a statement of defense
within two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary judgment
and submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its claim;
that the matter was then heard before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a
series of dates where private respondent was represented by counsel; and