Plotinus on Number

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Plotinus on Number
Svetla Slaveva-Grifn

1
2009

3
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Slaveva-Grifn, Svetla.
Plotinus on number / Svetla Slaveva-Grifn.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 978-0-19-537719-4
1. Plotinus. On numbers. 2. One (The One in philosophy).
3. Many (Philosophy). 4. Symbolism of numbers. I. Title.
B693.E593S53 2009
119.092dc22
2008026670

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper

To Don
for his undying optimism

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A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

Behind every book lies a personal story. The nal result printed on these
pages has transcended, for me, the bounds of intellectual satisfaction to
become a celebration of life. As a survivor of leukemia, I regard this book as
not only the result of my scholarly research, but as a symbol of my victory
over a disease that nearly claimed my life. First I would like to thank my
family for everything they have done for me: my husband, Donald Grifn,
for always hoping that things will turn out for the better and for participating
wholeheartedly in every stage of this project; my son, Youlian Simidjiyski,
for reading sections of the manuscript with the uncompromisingly critical
eye of a theoretical mathematician; and my mother, Lubomira Lazarova, and
my brother, Tsvetomir Ross-Lazarov, for being next to me in all the important moments of my life. I would also like to thank my colleagues and friends
at the Florida State University for their kind understanding and unfailing
support. My intellectual debt is immense and goes to mentors, colleagues,
and friends: John Finamore, John Dillon, the late Henry Blumenthal, Luc
Brisson, Suzanne Stern-Gillet, Kevin Corrigan, David Depew, Sarah Pessin,
Emilie Kutash, and Russ Dancy, who have read, commented on, or discussed
in person different sections of the work. My warmest gratitude goes to the
anonymous reviewers whose invaluable suggestions have strengthened and
expanded the manuscript, to my colleagues Kathryn Stoddard and Nancy
de Grummond for saving the text from my non-English idiosyncrasies, and
to Nikolay Balov, who designed the gures with the inspiration of a mathematician and an artist. I would also like to thank Christopher Pelling for
encouraging me in this enterprise, Stefan Vranka for his editorial expertise, and my copy editor, Eileen Markson, for her expeditious and meticulous work. This project has beneted from two major research grants from
the Florida State University, which enabled me to complete the manuscript
in the ideal atmosphere of the Firestone Library at Princeton University in

viii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

the summer of 2007. I appreciate the generosity of Cambridge University

Press for allowing me to reprint my article Unity of Thought and Writing:
Enn. 6.6 and Porphyrys Arrangement of the Enneads, CQ 58.1 (2008) as
chapter 6 of this book.
Aware that words are but a pale expression of the self, I move on.

C O N T E N T S

Abbreviations

xi

Introduction: One by Number

1.

Platonic Cosmology on Plotinian Terms

Ennead VI.6 and the Timaeus
Origin of Multiplicity in Plotinus
Plotinus Apostasis and Numenius Stasis
The Universe as Degrees of Separation from the One

24
24
28
31
37

2.

Multiplicity as Number
Surfacing from the Neopythagorean
Underground
Outward and Inward Direction of Multiplicity
in Ennead VI.6
Multiplicity as Efuence and Unity

42

The Number of Innity

Platos Position
Aristotles Criticism of Plato and the Platonists
Plotinus Answer

54
56
58
63

4. Number and Substance

Plotinus Three Hypotheses about Number in the
Intelligible Realm
Is Substantial Number Discrete and Incidental?
The Whole Number of Beings
Substantial and Monadic Number

71

3.

42
46
49

71
76
81
85

5.

6.

CONTENTS

Number and the Universe

Substantial Number and the One
Substantial Number and Absolute Being
Substantial Number and Intellect
Substantial Number and Beings
Substantial Number and the Complete
Living Being
Soul and Number
The Ungured Figure of Souls Dance

95
95
100
103
106

Unity of Thought and Writing

Porphyry and the Enneads
Ennead VI.6
Six Along with the Nines

131
132
134
135

Conclusion: In Defense of Plato

141

Bibliography

147

Index of Names and Subjects

161

Index Locorum

167

107
112
118

A B B R E V I A T I O N S

The abbreviations are according to H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. R. Jones,

A Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
Ar.

Nicomachus of Gerasa. Arithmetica Introductio. Ed.

R. Hoche. Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1846.

Comm.Math.

Iamblichus, De Communi Mathematica Scientia. Ed.

U. Klein. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1894.

D-K

Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 6th ed. Eds. H. Diels

and W. Kranz. 3 vols. Berlin: Weidmann, 19511952.

Enn.

Plotini Enneades. Eds. P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer.

3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19641983.

Epin.

Epinomis in Platonis Opera. Ed. J. Burnet. 5 vols.

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19001907.

Expos. rer. math.

Metaph.
Ph.

Philosophi Platonici Expositio Rerum Mathematicarum

ad Legendum Platonem Utilium. 2nd ed. Ed. E. Hiller.
Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1995.
Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introduction and
Commentary. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924.
Physics. Ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936.

Phlb.

Philebus in Platonis Opera. Ed. J. Burnet. 5 vols.

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19001907.

Prm.

Parmenides in Platonis Opera. Ed. J. Burnet. 5 vols.

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19001907.

xii

ABBREVIATIONS

R.
Sph.
Theol. Ar.
Tht.

Respublica in Platonis Opera. Ed. J. Burnet. 5 vols.

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19001907.
Sophista in Platonis Opera. Ed. J. Burnet. 5 vols.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19001907.
Theologoumena Arithmeticae. Ed. V. de Falco. U. Klein
rev. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1975.
Theaetetus in Platonis Opera. Ed. J. Burnet. 5 vols.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19001907.

Ti.

Timaeus in Platonis Opera. Ed. J. Burnet. 5 vols.

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19001907.

VP

Vita Plotini in Plotini Enneades. Eds. P. Henry and

H.-R. Schwyzer. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
19641983.

Plotinus on Number

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Introduction: One by Number

Plotinus concept of number and Ennead VI.6 are not among the mainstream
topics in Neoplatonic scholarship. In the general introductions to Plotinus
philosophy, both of them usually lie either buried in the footnotes or hidden
in the context between the lines.1 This should be surprising, however, because
Plotinus makes number the primary activity of substance, which orders the
unfolding of the universe from its absolute source into a nite multiplicity.
More important, number, as underlying the existence of Intellect and Being,
is the building block, so to speak, of the intelligible realm. If number has
such a paramount ontogenetic role in the intelligible, it seems strange that it
does not gure more prominently in all scholarly presentations of Plotinus
architecture of the universe. I can nd no reason for this omission other
than to suspect that the concept has been simply overlooked, despite the
red ags raised in more specialized studies of Plotinus ontology. This book,
therefore, aims at lling the current gap in the scholarship by demonstrating
the primary role of number in Plotinus philosophy and its signicance for
Porphyrys organization of the Enneads.
A perspicuous understanding of any Plotinian concept inevitably requires
a consideration of the subject from the Presocratics to the Neopythagoreans.
It is particularly difcult to grasp Plotinus understanding of number,
because of the controversial nature of the concept in the philosophical tradition before him and especially because of Platos enigmatic view that the
Forms are numbers.

Historical and Philosophical Background

The question of how to explain the overwhelming diversity in physical reality
and the underlying principle of order in it is the foundation of ancient philosophy. The concepts of multiplicity and number are concomitant with the development of Greek philosophical thought itself. From the sixth century B.C.E. to
1. Omitted in Brhier (1958), footnoted or slightly referenced but not
discussed in OMeara (1993) and Gerson (1994, 1996), briey mentioned or
summarized in Corrigan (2005: 37, 181).
3

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

the fth century C.E., from the early Presocratics to the late Neoplatonists, every
philosophical school has striven to explain the tangible order of multiplicity.
Very generally, the ancients conceived of the universe as a multiplicity
of material elements that are organized in a sense-perceptible way by intelligible principles. In these terms, one side of the above question is cosmogonical, as it searches for the origin of multiplicity from some physical or
metaphysical source. Another side is cosmological, as it searches for a way
to explain the innumerable diversity of material world in an orderly fashion. Yet a third side of it is epistemological, as it attempts to comprehend
the visible and invisible constituents of the universe in a rational form. The
concepts of multiplicity and number seem to be innately related as a pair, if
not completely of opposites, at least of opposite nature. Multiplicity denotes
the innumerable, discrete, and continuous things that exist; number conveys
the notion of limited, ordered, and dened multiplicity.
The Pythagorean maxim that all is number best captures the philosophical background of the two concepts.2 The understanding of the universe
as a unity of one and many begins with the early Presocratics search for the
primary originative substance (arch) as the source and the unifying element
of physical reality.3 Next, the Pythagoreans postulate that numbers organize the universe in one harmonious unity, which is interwoven by unlimited
(apeira) and limiting (perainonta) elements.4
Later philosophers said that Plato Pythagorizes.5 In the Metaphysics,
Aristotle compares and distinguishes the philosophical views of Plato and
the Pythagoreans.6 According to him, the doctrines that numbers are the
causes of the substance of everything and that unity is a substance, not an
attribute, of that which exists, are similar. The doctrines that numbers exist
apart from the sensibles, that mathematical objects are an intermediate class
between sensibles and nonsensibles, and that the indenite is a dyad of great
and small, are different. With the exception of the last pronouncement, as
will be discussed at length later,7 Aristotles list is quite accurate and has
inuenced the reading of Plato for all generations to follow.
2. Strictly speaking, Philolaus, in his later years a contemporary of Plato,
is the rst Pythagorean for whom we have written evidence for a doctrine of
numbers (Zhmud 1989).
3. Successively, the originative principle is water for Thales, the indenite
for Anaximander, and air for Anaximenes.
4. D-K 44B.2: Angka t nta emen pnta peranonta
peira peranont te ka peira.
5. Pseudo-Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum 887c4 (in Moralia, vol. 5);
Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica 15.37.6.1; Cicero, De Finibus 5.87.49. Burkert
(1972: 15).
6. Metaph. 987a29ff.
7. See chapter 3.

INTRODUCTION

The Timaeus and the Philebus contain dominant Pythagorean themes.8

For anyone who is interested in the Pythagorean elements in Plato, the
Timaeus comes rst to mind with the stark mathematical explanations of
the psychogony (Ti. 34b1036d7), the creation of time and the celestial clock
(Ti. 37c639e2), and the construction of the four primary bodies (Ti. 53a2
55c6). The origin of Platos interest in Pythagoreanism and arithmogony is
not perfectly clear. It is clear, however, from Phlb. 16c510, that Plato considers the Pythagorean cosmological view that everything which exists consists
of one and many and has in its nature a conjunction of Limit (peras) and
Unlimited (apeiria) to be primary for the understanding of the universe.
He even compares the importance of Pythagoras teachings to Prometheus
gift of re.9 In the dialogue, Plato transforms Socrates initial perspective
that any generic unity (One) contains a denite number of kinds (Many)
mediating between itself and the innity of particulars into which it ultimately vanishes10 from logical into ontological. His search for the intelligible
paradigm that underlies physical reality originates from the Pythagorean view
that Limit orders and informs the unintelligible chaos of the Unlimited
(apeiron).11
In addition to the Pythagorean cosmogonical and cosmological themes
in the Timaeus and the Philebus, the Parmenides raises the ontological questions of unity (one) and multiplicity.12 It investigates eight possible ways,
commonly known as hypotheses, of understanding the relationship between
one and many, of which the rst two are considered to be of primary significance for Plotinus ontology. The rst hypothesis (Prm. 137c4142a8) demonstrates that the unity of one (to hen) absolutely excludes any predicates and
therefore plurality, including even the predicate of being one, in a series of
deductions, the most popular of which state that the one is not a whole and
yet it does not have parts; it does not have a beginning nor an end, nor does
it have shape or place; it is neither in motion nor at rest, and neither is it
8. The chronology of the works has been long debated and there is no
prospect of settling it soon. The general consensus, reached not too long ago
(Zeyl 2000: xvixx), is that the dialogues belong to Platos later period. See
W. Guthrie (1978: vol. 5, 241244).
9. Phlb. 16c510: Yen mn ew nyrpouw dsiw, w ge
katafanetai mo, poyn k yen rrfh di tinow Promhyvw
ma fanott tin pur: ka o mn palaio, krettonew mn ka
ggutrv yen okontew, tathn fmhn pardosan, w j nw mn
ka polln ntvn tn e legomnvn enai, praw d ka peiran
n atow smfuton xntvn.
10. Hackforth (1945: 2021).
11. Hackforth (1945: 21).
12. The Parmenides predates, with more certainty, the Timaeus and the
Philebus.

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

the same as, nor other than, itself. Exposing the self-contradictory nature of
the rst hypothesis, which denies even existence to a one, The Parmenides
proposes a second hypothesis (Prm. 142b1151e2), which suggests that the
one consists of unity (to hen) and being (ousia, to einai, and to on). This
hypothesis allows the one to partake of being which qualies it for a wide
range of attributions considered in relation to other things,13 thus implying
that being partakes of multiplicity. The nal result of the second hypothesis,
which is most important for our investigation, is that one, as unity, and multiplicity interact at an ontological level, especially as represented in Plotinus
concepts of the Indenite Dyad and Intellect.14
In Platos so-called unwritten doctrines (agrapha dogmata),15 the concepts of one and many crystallize as the principles of all things: a One and
an Indenite Dyad.16 The two principles are in the foundation of Platonic
metaphysics and shape the interpretation of Platos written works by both
Platonists and Peripatetics. The immediate successors of the Academy,
Speusippus and Xenocrates, face the challenging and yet inspiring task of
explicating the meaning of Platos rst principles in light of Aristotles criticism in Metaphysics M and N that numbers are not beings and do not have
intelligible substance.
Speusippus renames Platos principles of a One and an Indenite Dyad
as a One and Multiplicity (plthos) and renes the derivation of beings from
them into a system that is best documented in Iamblichus De Communi
Mathematica Scientia (Comm. Math.) chapter 4, if we accept, with Dillon
and Merlan,17 Speusippus authorship. According to this system, the rst
level of reality that derives from the union of a One and Multiplicity is the
rst principle of number, which in turn unites with multiplicity once again
13. Sayre (1996: 271).
14. The subject of chapter 3.
15. The debate over the relationship between Platos written works and
his oral unwritten doctrines is ceaseless. Although I am sympathetic with
Krmers position (1990: 177) that the direct and indirect Platonic traditions
have a reciprocal relationship and are in agreement and partly coincide, partly
complete one another, I believe, with Dillon (2003: viii), this relationship to be
more uid and developmental. For a detailed survey of the issue, see
W. Guthrie (1978: vol. 5, 418442).
16. Simplicius, In Metaph. 187a: Alexander says that according to Plato
the One and the Indenite Dyad, which he spoke of as Great and Small, are the
Principles of all things and even of the Forms themselves. . . . It is very likely
that Plato made the One and the Indenite Dyad the Principles of all things,
since this was the doctrine of the Pythagoreans whom Plato followed at many
points.
17. Dillon (2003: 41) and Merlan (1960: 98140).

INTRODUCTION

to produce the sequence of numbers and geometrical gures. In this process,

oversimplied here, the One imposes limit and quality onto Multiplicity,
being innite divisibility. As will be analyzed at length in chapter 3, Aristotle
interprets multiplicity quantitatively as multiplicity of units and number as a
composition of units, while Speusippus and, in retrospect, Plato view them
as ontologically primal.18
Speusippus successor as the head of the Old Academy, Xenocrates,
understands the two rst principles as the Monad and the Dyad. The former
is characterized as male and Intellect, the latter as female and an Indenite
Dyad containing multiplicity (plthos) and unlimitedness (apeiria).19 From
the union of these two principles derives a World Soul, which is the creative repository of the Forms, and projector of them onto the physical
plane.20
The metaphysical schemes of Speusippus and Xenocrates construct,
very much in the manner of Platos Philebus, the universe as a product of
the imposition of Limit onto the Unlimited. Although they adopt Platos two
rst principles, they take opposite views of the place of the Forms in their
systems. In this respect, Aristotles summary of the Platonic positions on the
issue has gained the popularity of a purple passage in every book on the
history of philosophy and deserves to be mentioned in this survey too: some
[sc. Plato] recognize these as two classesthe Forms (ideas) and the mathematical numbers (mathmatikous arithmous)and others [sc. Xenocrates]
regard both as having one nature (mian physin amphotern), and yet others
[sc. Speusippus] hold that only the mathematical substances are substances
(mathmatikas monon ousias einai). 21 Aristotle adds Plato to the rift between
Speusippus and Xenocrates on the issue of the relationship between the Forms
and numbers in order to compose the big picture of the debate. Speusippus
radical rejection of Platos Forms in favor of numbers as the ontological reality that fashions the material world is not so much a conceptual negation
of Platos Forms as it is an aftermath of the difculty of the problem itself.
Perhaps forced by Aristotles avid criticism, Speusippus decisively makes
numbers to be the intelligible paradigm of the universe. Xenocrates, in his
turn, perhaps in response to Speusippus position, takes a moderate path
by arguing that the Forms and numbers have the same nature, that is, have
ontological value. For Aristotle, of course, the ontological relation between the
Forms and numbers is an insurmountable stumbling block because, for him,
numbers have only arithmetical and quantitative value. Aristotles position
18. Metaph. 1085b; see chapter 3.
19. Plutarch, De Procreatione Animae 1012d1013b and De Defectu
Oraculorum 409e. Dillon (2003: 99).
20. Dillon (2003: 107).
21. Metaph. 1076a1922. Dillons translation and brackets (2003: 108).

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

on the question of number and being offers a suitable point to conclude the
survey of the philosophical background of the concepts of number and multiplicity before Plotinus, as we will return to examine it in chapter 3.
The conation of the universal order and the concept of number, and
the ensuing debates thereon, shape the course of Middle Platonism and lead
to the revival of Pythagoreanism in the rst and second centuries,22 resulting in the Neopythagorean teachings of Moderatus, Nicomachus, Numenius,
and Ammonius Saccas. Unfortunately, the paucity of biographical information about them and the fragmentary nature of their extant works,
with the exception of Nicomachus Arithmetica Introductio (Ar.), present
a major obstacle not only for understanding their views but also for elucidating Plotinus immediate philosophical background. In Vita Plotini (VP),
Porphyry emphasizes that the originality of Plotinus thought surpasses the
philosophical acumen of his Neopythagorean predecessors or contemporaries.23
As chapters 1 and 2 will demonstrate, the Neopythagorean inuence on
Plotinus concepts of number and multiplicity is crucial, if not absolutely
vital. Both Moderatus and Nicomachus coin denitions of number that lie
in the foundation of Plotinus view of multiplicity and its dynamic state of
unfolding and enfolding.
In the third century, Plotinus stands at the important crossroads of
conuent and sometimes conicting inuences of Platonic, Neopythagorean,
and Aristotelian thought.24 As a devoted Platonist and a student of the
Neopythagorean Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus, while rejecting Aristotles
quantitative view of number, is naturally inclined to give numbers a more
prominent ontological role in the structure of the universe.

Plotinus Philosophy, Concept of Number, and

Ennead VI.6: Difculties
Before the difculties with Plotinus concept of number and Ennead VI.6
are introduced, it may be helpful to sketch, in broad strokes, the big picture
of his philosophical system. Plotinus conceives of the universe as a unityin-multiplicity that is hierarchically ordered by three underlying principles of
existence (hypostases). The rst principle is the Oneitself simple, completely
unied, nondiscursive, supranoetic, the single source from which everything
exists. The second principle is Intellect, containing the intelligible principles
22. All dates refer to the Common Era unless noted otherwise.
23. VP 1721. Discussed in chapter 2.
24. The debate on whether the Forms are numbers very much shapes
Aristotles criticism of Platonic philosophy and his (usually acerbic) relationship
with Platos immediate successors Speusippus and Xenocrates.

INTRODUCTION

of physical reality. Intellect comes into existence by contemplating the One

and by comprehending itself as homogenous multiplicity that possesses one
and the same nature. The third principle is Soul, which translates the intelligible principles into sense-perceptible reality. Soul is also a principle of
multiplicity, but it has a heterogeneous nature. Parts of it pertain to the intelligible realm, and parts of it associate with the material realm. These three
hypostases organize the multiplicity of the universe in one unied organism
that unfolds from and enfolds to its source, the One.
According to Plotinus, this one-in-many nature of the universe is best
understood only through contemplation. In the treatise on nature and contemplation (III.8), he artistically makes nature itself describe its origin from
and existence in contemplation (theria): And my act of contemplation
makes what it contemplates, as the geometers draw their gures while they
contemplate. But I do not draw, but as I contemplate, the lines which bound
bodies come to be as if they fell from my contemplation. 25 The mathematical content of the comparison immediately invokes Platos elaborate conceptual use of arithmetic and geometry as intermediate tools in studying the
higher level of reality. But the impelling simplicity of the image also reveals
the principal difference of how Plato and Plotinus use mathematics. While
Plato, as illustrated by the examples in the preceding section,26 uses mathematics with deliberate and painstaking precision, Plotinus uses it with what
Armstrong has called intuitive spontaneity, 27 which entails not numerical
precision but an intellectual and spiritual ight of abstraction. The imaginary sphere on the front cover of this book is constructed according to the
different aspects that Plotinus conceives as constituting number in the intelligible. It visualizes geometrically the ungured gure of the intelligible
whose elements, he argues, have ontological and not quantitative meaning.28
As the sphere is not a result of someone who drew the lines but is an expression of the mathematical formula written in the graphing program, so does
number in the intelligible realm provide the blueprint for its quantitative
expression in physical reality.
Unfortunately, Plotinus contribution to the concept of number has
been often omitted, if not even ignored. It is not reasonable, however, to lay
all the blame for the obscurity of the concept on its difculty or Plotinus
seemingly disorganized presentation of his philosophy in the Enneads, for
there is not an easy concept in Plotinus, nor has his style hampered the
25. III.8.4.710.
26. P. 5.
27. Armstrong (1967: vol. 3, p. 368, n. 1).
28. In VI.6.17.2526, Plotinus introduces the term ungured gure
(aschmatista schmata) to explain that, in the intelligible realm, gures, just like
numbers, have only ontological, not quantitative, meaning. Below, pp. 120122.

10

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

pursuit of other multifaceted concepts such as Intellect, Soul, or contemplation. The main reason for this omission, I suggest, is that Plotinus does not
treat the subject of number in the Enneads as pervasively as, let us say, the
Neopythagoreans, or even as his own successors, Iamblichus, Syrianus, and
Proclus. Nevertheless, a close examination of the Enneads reveals Plotinus
systematic discussion of number in relation to each of the three hypostases.
Particularly focusing on the role of number in the putting together (systasis)
of the intelligible realm (kosmos notos),29 he anticipates the subject of VI.6
twice in the Enneads.
In the treatise which explains that the intelligibles are not outside of
Intellect (V.5),30 Plotinus announces the approach of VI.6 with the remark
that if there are any difculties about [the concept of number], they will
be addressed later (V.5.4.38).31 In the treatise on the Platonic primary kinds
(VI.2), a second remark assures the reader that the properties of number and magnitude will be discussed later (VI.2.13.31).32 In his thematic
arrangement, Porphyry places VI.6 to succeed immediately the treatises on
the primary kinds of being (VI.2VI.3), as if to acknowledge formally the
association of number with the intelligible realm. The rst remark (in V.5)
connects VI.6 with the treatises explicating the core of Plotinus metaphysics
and thus identied as the Groschrift (III.8, V.5, V.8, and II.9).33 The second
remark (in VI.2) thematically links the treatises on the nature of the intelligible with the last two treatises in the collection, devoted to the One.34 This
arrangement suggests that number relates being to the One and VI.6 brings
together the core treatises and the last treatises of the collection.
Since VI.6 has long had the reputation among scholars of being obscure
and difcult, Plotinus concept of number takes, as mentioned earlier, a backseat in Neoplatonic scholarship. Admittedly, it is true that number is one
of the most aporetic concepts in Plotinus. Losev, the patriarch of Russian
classical scholarship, begins his commentary on VI.6 with the warning that
Plotinus study of number is the most difcult topic not only in the history

29. VI.2.2.1011.
30. Respectively, V.5 is the thirty-second treatise and VI.6 is the thirtyfourth in Porphyrys chronological order reported in VP 5.
31. The intermediate treatise is II.9, Against the Gnostics, which Porphyry
judiciously places, according to his thematical arrangement in the second
Ennead.
32. Respectively, numbers 44 and 43 on Porphyrys chronological list.
33. On the Groschrift, Roloff (1970). See pp. 1820.
34. The placement of VI.6 in the thematic and chronological arrangement
of the treatises is discussed on pp. 1721.

INTRODUCTION

11

of Greek, but also of worlds philosophy, 35 while Kirchner remarks in a footnote that the concept of the Forms as numbers form the main content of
the sixth treatise of the sixth Ennead, which is perhaps the most difcult
of all treatises Plotinus wrote. 36 Although these initial evaluations are not
very encouraging, I am compelled to investigate the source of their skepticism. In this, I stand in the same eld with Losev, who poetically justies
his interest in the concept of number by admitting that he does not choose
only the strawberries, not even only the owers of ancient philosophy, but
is interested in all the grass and the fertilizer upon which the strawberries
and other owers of philosophy grow.37
The fates of Plotinus concept of number and Ennead VI.6 have changed
since their black-and-white phase in the nineteenth century, in which the
two were either denigrated or exalted. Krmer, Szlezk, OMeara, and Horn
each in turn have discussed the topic in chapters within larger frameworks,38
while Charles-Saget, and Nikulin have elucidated it as a part of a broader
historical and comparative study of the concept in late antiquity and early
modern philosophy. 39 Yet something is left to be desired. To date, no comprehensive analysis of Plotinus concept of number alone has been published.
Charles-Saget examines it in the shadow of Proclus elaborated theology
of number. Nikulin traces the conceptual development of number from
Plotinus to Descartes. The two studies, on the one hand, deservedly ascribe
to Plotinus understanding of number a prominent place in the history of
post-Platonic metaphysics. On the other hand, since the subject is consistently treated as a part of other topics, they give the erroneous impression
that the concept of number in Plotinus can be grasped rmly only in relation
to his successors more advanced views. Yet, as I demonstrate in this work,
Plotinus conception of number is the fundamental framework on which his
entire philosophical system is built. This premise requires a comprehensive

35. Losevs study of the dialectic of number (1928: 5) is virtually

unknown to Western scholarship. I have perused and referred to it in this book
with great satisfaction and I hope my effort will bring due attention to his work.
36. Kirchner (1854: 49, n. 18). It should also be noted that the concept of
number is not discussed at any length, save a few lines, in his study. Thus, the
mention of VI.6 only in a footnote correctly reects the lack of interest in and
attention to its subject.
37. Losev (1928: 5).
38. Krmer (1964: 292311); Szlezk (1979: 92104); OMeara (1975: 7985);
and Horn (1995b: 149169).
39. Charles-Saget in Bertier et al. (1980, reprinted in Charles-Saget 1982);
and Nikulin (2002).

12

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

and systematic examination of the concept and the treatise that is devoted to
it, without making them complementary to another subject.

Chapter Synopsis
This study offers the rst comprehensive analysis of Plotinus concept of
number alone, beginning from its origin in Plato and the Neopythagoreans
and ending with its inuence on Porphyrys arrangement of the Enneads.
Its goals are to examine the Platonic and Neopythagorean contexts in which
Plotinus develops the concept; to demonstrate that the concept is at the
foundation of Plotinus denition of the universe as multiplicity, and thus
bears paramount signicance for understanding the intelligible realm; to
reveal Plotinus contribution to the defense of Platos Ideal Numbers against
Aristotles persistent criticism; to show that Plotinus is the rst post-Platonic
philosopher who purposefully and systematically develops what we may call
a theory of number, distinguishing between number in the intelligible realm
and quantitative mathematical number; and nally, to draw attention to
Plotinus concept as a necessary and programmatic link between the Platonic
and later Neoplatonic doctrines of number.
The book contains six chapters, and, unlike the arrangement of the
Enneads by Porphyry, the numerical symbolism is unintended. I begin by
investigating the origin of Plotinus cosmology in the Timaeus and end by
examining the signicance of the concept for Porphyrys arrangement of the
Enneads. It is a curious, but telling, fact for the Plotinian introspective order
of the topics of each chapter that my rst interest in the subject started from
the last chapter, dealing with Porphyrys arrangement of the multiplicity of the
treatises according to number. I successively moved to the role of number in
the intelligible realm, to Plotinus defense of Platos ontological view of number against Aristotles criticism, to Plotinus understanding of multiplicity,
and nally to the Neopythagorean and Platonic background of number. This
introspective order has allowed me to study the concept in the most Plotinian
fashion, I believe, beginning with the physical appearance of number in the
multiplicity of the treatises and systematically peeling away the conceptual
layers until reaching the Platonic core of Plotinus understanding that the
universe is multiplicity separated from the One according to substantial number. This multiplicity is unied, divided, and circumscribed into existence by
number, and therefore this universe is one by virtue of number.
This chapter arrangement presents the subject more suitably to our analytically trained minds, but, above all, it follows Plotinus explanation of the
universe from the inside out, that is, from its source to its periphery. With
this arrangement, I hope to show that my examination of Plotinus concept
of number is a book that is also one by number.

INTRODUCTION

13

The rst chapter examines the Platonic origin of Plotinus presentation

of the universe as multiplicity separated from the One. He uses the term
separation (apostasis), which stands in stark opposition to Platos account
of the Demiurges composition of the universe as composition (systasis) in
the Timaeus. The two terms characterize the top-down approach in VI.6 and
the bottom-up approach in the Timaeus. Although the antithesis between the
two terms does not stem from any conceptual opposition between Plotinus
and Plato, it raises the question of the relationship between Plotinus cosmology in VI.6 and Platos cosmogony in the Timaeus. A close examination of
the two works reveals that Plotinus bases his denition of apostasis precisely
on Platos account of the composition of universal order (tou kosmou systasis)
in the Timaeus.40 Both terms express the notion of motion and otherness in
the origin and organization of the universe. The two works achieve the same
goal, the explanation of the universe, with the same meansaccording to
numberbut from opposite starting points.
The missing conceptual link between the two approaches, I suggest, is
found in Numenius concept of the Three Gods, ordering the universe: the
Father, the Maker, and the Creation. The characteristics of Numenius First
God convey the dichotomy between rest, as being and stability, and motion,
as change, in the rst principle. The explicit paradox of ontological stability (stasis) and innate motion (symphytos kinsis) in Numenius First God is
implicitly present in Plotinus explanation of the origin of the universe as
apostasis. This discovery further warrants the examination of the rst separation from the One and the origin of Intellect. The term apostasis denotes
the cosmological process in which the universe exists as multiplicity abiding
in different degrees of separation from the One. The major conclusion of this
chapter is that Plotinus induces the concept of multiplicity as a measurement
of the ontological distance from the One, which opens the possibility for
stronger Neopythagorean inuences.
Chapter 2 investigates the Neopythagorean roots of Plotinus concept.
Porphyrys numerous reports of his teachers involvement with Neopythagorean
circles, and especially with Numenius and Ammonius Saccas,41 do not require
much searching throughout the Enneads to be validated. Numenius inuence
on the denition of multiplicity as apostasis demonstrates the central role
Neopythagorean views play in Plotinus cosmology.
The notion of stability and motion in the origin of multiplicity also
characterizes Moderatus denition of mathematical number as a system of
monads (systma monadn), which either progresses (propodismos plthous)
from the rst monad into multiplicity or regresses (anapodismos plthous)

40. Ti. 32c56.

41. VP 3, 14, 1721.

14

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

from multiplicity to the rst monad.42 He further distinguishes between the

monad as the principle of numbers (tn arithmn arch) and the one as the
principle of enumerated things (tn arithmtn arch).43 This distinction leads
to a number of questions about Moderatus inuence on Plotinus two kinds
of numbers; about Plotinus use of the mathematical denition of number in
the formation of the outward and inward directions of the existence of multiplicity; and about Moderatus doctrine of three separate Ones as underlying
principles of existence and Plotinus hypostases. After examining these questions, I conclude that Plotinus views multiplicity as nothing else but number
that preserves it from dissipating into innity and nonexistence.
The prominent Neopythagorean overtones of Plotinus concept of multiplicity and the origin of the universe as separation from the One compel
an examination of the difference between numbers, which are related to the
intelligible realm, and quantitative numbers, which enumerate things. For
Plotinus, this difference directly exposes Aristotles misconception of the
Indenite Dyad, not as a principle of potentiality of existence in the intelligible, but as the actual creator of quantitative numbers. The third chapter,
therefore, analyzes Plotinus refutation of Aristotles criticism of the Platonic
view of number. By rejecting any quantitative value of number in the intelligible, Plotinus specically focuses on Aristotles inability to understand the
Monad and the Indenite Dyad as the principles of creation and order of the
intelligible realm.
The postulate that number lies at the ontological foundation of the
universe characterizes the early Pythagoreans and, later, Plato as well.
Aristotle, in his turn, advocates the rejection of the ontological value of number in the construction of the universe, thus partially causing the Middle
Platonic and Neopythagorean conceptual uprising in Platos defense. Also in
chapter 3, I show that Plotinus not only follows the steps of his Platonic and
Neopythagorean predecessors in defense of Platos position, but ingeniously
uses Aristotles ideas in arguing that number in the intelligible is activity and
a property of primary substance. The result is an original and ontologically
elaborate theory of substantial number (ousids arithmos), which fullls two
major purposes: (1) it offers a new and more successful defense of Platos
true numbers against Aristotles persistent criticism; and (2) it explains
the relationship between substantial nonqualitative number and arithmetical
quantitative number as that between intelligible paradigm and its material
copy.
42. Stobaeus, Anthologia 1, 2122. Moderatus dates are unknown but it is
safe to place him in the rst century. Dillon (1996: 344346).
43. Capitalized One refers to the One as a primary principle;
noncapitalized one refers to all other uses of one. More details are explained
in the last section of this introduction.

INTRODUCTION

15

Chapter 4 focuses on Plotinus analysis of the relationship between number and substance in the intelligible. Based on the distinction between substance (ousia) as ontological actualization of beings and quantity (posots) as
the numerable count of individual units, Plotinus conceptualizes a similar
division for number itself. Contrary to Aristotle and in support of Plato, he
conceives of two kinds of number: substantial number (ousids arithmos) that
is itself by itself, which is the activity (energeia) of substance and a power
(dynamis) of being; 44 and monadic number (monadikos arithmos), which simply enumerates individual things.45 As an activity of substance, substantial
number enacts the limiting role of the Monad, while as a power of substance, substantial number enacts the role of the Indenite Dyad as potentiality that is limited into existence by the Monad. As a property of substance,
number is the productive power and activity of substance. While substantial
number actualizes the existence of that which has separated from the One
in the intelligible, monadic number expresses quantitatively that which has
been already dened by substantial number in the intelligible. In this light,
substantial number is the intelligible paradigm of monadic number. As the
former determines the existence of multiplicity in the intelligible, so does the
latter preserve sensible multiplicity from dissipation in innity. Mathematics
and the numerability of individual things use monadic numbers.
To explain the nature of substantial number, Plotinus denes Absolute
Being as unied number (arithmos hnmenos), Intellect as number moving
in itself (arithmos en heauti kinoumenos), beings as unfolded number (arithmos exelligmenos), and the Complete Living Being as encompassing number
(arithmos periechn).46 Number identies the primary property of substance
in every aspect of the intelligible realm. As such, substantial number acts
as a principle (arch) constituting Intellect. In due order, chapter 5 analyzes
the ontological meaning of the above denitions. Their closer examination
reveals that the four aspects of substantial number correspond to the primary
kinds of rest, movement, otherness, and sameness respectively. Heinemann,
OMeara, and Horn have noted the similarity between the structure of the
intelligible in VI.6 and the Platonic primary kinds (megista gen) in VI.2VI.3
and have interpreted it differently. Heinemann just acknowledges the relationship between the treatises.47 OMeara concludes that the correspondence
44. VI.6.4.10: atw f' auto riymw noyh; VI.6.9.26: to
riymo dnamiw postsa mrise t n; VI.6.9.28: nrgeia
riymw stai.
45. This does not mean that the number of the material copies of
something is limited to its substantial number, but that the overall number of
material things is limited to the number of all intelligible beings.
46. VI.6.9.2931.
47. Heinemann (1921: 181184).

16

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

between the intelligible structures in the two treatises is not conceptual,

because the two treatises deal with different problems.48 Horn understands
them as an expression of the dialectic of the Indenite Dyad.49 I have reached
the conclusion that the properties of substantial number enact the four primary kinds of rest, motion, otherness, and sameness, while the fth primary
kind, that of being, is the common denominator that represents them all.
This conclusion also elucidates the relationship of substantial number with
the One and Soul, as Plotinus does not identify them with a particular property of number. Since the properties of substantial number order Intellect on
the inside and since both the One and Soul stand on the outside of Intellect,
they do not inherit a particular property of number. Substantial number is
an ontological expression of the One beyond Being, which does not possess any particular characteristic. Soul, however, as an image of Intellect,
possesses all the properties of substantial number. The world soul encompasses the sphere of the universe in its dance according to the paradigms of
substantial number, while the individual soul expresses the nonquantitative
substantial numbers in quantitative monadic numbers.
Chapter 6 examines the relationship between Plotinus concepts of number and multiplicity, and Porphyrys organization of the Enneads. Porphyrys
thematical arrangement of the Enneads is traditionally considered to be
more detrimental than benecial for understanding Plotinus thought. This,
I think, is an issue that is worth reexamining. Perhaps there is something
more than personal eagerness and Neopythagorean numerical extravagance
that inspired Porphyrys organization of the works in six groups of nine
according to his notorious perfect ratio of six and nine (VP 24). That
Porphyry publishes the collection in a particular numerical arrangement may
even be more signicant for the later Neoplatonists attempts to overcome
the limitations of discursive thought.50 In the Neopythagorean tradition, the
number six is considered to be the rst perfect number and the hexad is
identied as the number of Soul.51 Furthermore, the completion of the universe is represented by the number nine, which is called ennead as if it
were the henad of everything within it, by derivation from the one. 52 The
individual treatises are consequently grouped in nines, because they enclose
the numerical essence of the universe from henad to ennead. As number is
the constituting element of the existence of Being, Intellect, and Soul, so

48. OMeara (1975: 8283).

49. Horn (1995b: 169).
50. The numerical symbolism of the Enneads is perhaps a distant echo of
the pantheistic unity of the divine Ennead in Plotinus homeland of Egypt.
51. Ar. 33.2.
52. Ar. 57.45.

INTRODUCTION

17

does the concept, I suggest, outgrow the pages of VI.6 to construct both the
Neoplatonic universe and Porphyrys organization of the treatises.

Plotinus Concept of Number and Ennead VI.6:

Content and Form
Often in the Enneads, individual treatises deal with a particular subject that
has come up during lectures in the school.53 Sometimes the treatises form
natural groups of works on the same topic, such as IV.1IV.5 examining questions about soul or VI.1VI.3 dealing with the primary kinds of being. The
reality of Plotinus thought, however, is that any given concept is referred
to and discussed throughout the entire collection. A study of a Plotinian
concept is grounded originally in a particular treatise, then gradually builds
relations with other concepts and treatises, and inevitably engages the entire
collection. Consequently, a recent trend in Neoplatonic studies is to evaluate a specic treatise in the context of the entire collection.54 This approach
merges the boundaries separating the chronological from the thematic organization of the Enneads and provides an integrated contextual analysis of the
treatise as both an individual work and a part of the fty-four treatises. To
defend this unitary approach, DAncona Costa draws a comparison with the
traditional attitude toward the works of Plato and Aristotle:
Again, a look at the contemporary scholarship on Plotinus suggests
that the main strategy in approaching his philosophical thought
consists in dealing with single treatises, devoting to them a careful
textual and philosophical analysis in precisely the same way as to a
Platonic dialogue or an Aristotelian treatise. This fact shows on its
own account the abandonment of the two hidden assumptions that
made scholars in the past refrain from considering late Platonism as
a proper philosophical subject matter, namely, its picture as a counterfeit of Platos thought, and its interpretation as a barely deductive
a priori chain whose ultimate principle escapes rational analysis.55
Any modern student of late ancient philosophy is no stranger to this sentiment, although the passage refers specically to the disparity of the scholarly
approach to Neoplatonic works in the past.
53. VP 5.5964.
54. DAncona Costa (1997: 367403) juxtaposes the treatment of Plotinus
philosophy in Zeller (1923) to the approaches of OMeara (1993) and Gerson
(1994).
55. DAncona Costa (1997: 371).

18

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

On the smaller, microcosmic scale of the individual treatises, the same

disparity is found in the dichotomy between a privileged chronological reading or a thematic reading of the corpus. The latter is more popular among
studies of a certain Plotinian concept, rather than a particular treatise.56 The
goal of this section of the introduction is to broaden the unitary approach to
include the importance of the relationship between a particular concept and
a particular treatise.
The two concepts of multiplicity and number are discussed throughout
the Enneads, but VI.6 is specically devoted to them. Porphyry lists the treatise with the title On Numbers and makes it the fty-rst treatise in his
thematic arrangement,57 thus placing it among the most difcult topics for
discussion pertinent to the One. OMeara has examined the thematic proximity of VI.6 with the treatises on the primary kinds of being (VI.1VI.3).58
To underline this signicance, I would also point out the placement of VI.6
in the sixth Ennead. It follows the treatises on the kinds of being (VI.1VI.3)
and on the presence of being everywhere (VI.4VI.5) and immediately precedes the thematicly culminating point of the collectionthe treatises dealing with the One (VI.7VI.9). In this ascending sequence, VI.6 is the formal
link between the treatises on the nature of the intelligible and those on the
One. As we will discover later, this thematic arrangement is conceptually and
iconically justied since substantial number as an ontological expression of
the One gives existence to the intelligible. As a result, both the treatise and
the concept of number prove to be of crucial importance for understanding
Plotinus universe.
The chronological sequence of the Enneads also demonstrates the importance of VI.6. The treatise is the thirty-fourth on Porphyrys list (VP 5) and
immediately succeeds the Groschrift, which includes III.8 [30], On Nature
and Contemplation, and the One; V.8 [31], On the Intelligible Beauty; V.5
[32], That the Intelligibles Are Not Outside the Intellect; and II. 9 [33],
Against the Gnostics.59 According to VP 5.35, Plotinus wrote the Groschrift
and VI.6 in Rome with the encouragement of his long-time disciples,
Porphyry and Amelius. The subject of the architecture of the intelligible
realm and the specic relationships between Soul, Intellect, and the One
56. For other examples of the unitary approach, see Tornau (1998) and
Stern-Gillet (2000).
57. Edwards (2000: 52, n. 312): The late position of this treatise justies
the numerological interests of the life [VP].
58. OMeara (1975: 7980).
59. The titles are given according to Porphyrys entries in VP 45. On
the thematic integrity of the treatises and Porphyrys detrimental division, see
Harder (1960: 303313). On the structure of the Groschrift, see Roloff (1970).
The new French edition revives the chronological reading of the Enneads.

INTRODUCTION

19

must have been the center of heated debates in contemporary philosophical

circles. The novelty of the concept of three underlying principles, germinating in the Neopythagorean doctrines of the second and third centuries,
perhaps stimulated Plotinus to espouse in writing his own understanding of
the bondlike organization of the universe.
The four treatises explicate the core of Plotinus metaphysics. That
these references relate specically to the exegesis of multiplicity and number
in VI.6, however, deserves a closer look. The discussions of contemplation
in III.8, knowledge in V.8.56, the origin of multiplicity in V.5.46, and the
refutation of the notion that multiplicity is evil in II.9 anticipate the main
topics of VI.6.
The four treatises in the Groschrift, although chronologically successive, are also organized thematically in such a way that their topics ascend
the path taken by Soul (and by the philosophers mind) 60 to reunite itself
with Intellect and the One. This path, Armstrong observes, is twofold.61 The
rst path, ascending from Soul to the One, is laid out in the rst Groschrift
treatise (III.8). The other path, ascending from Intellect to the One, is the
subject of the second and third treatises (V.8 and V.5). The last treatise (II.9),
written immediately before VI.6, concludes the theme of ascent by refuting
the Gnostic anti-Platonic arguments against a single unied being, generating and transcending the noetic cosmos.62
The thematic connection of VI.6 with the Groschrift suggests that we
should take the treatise more seriously and reevaluate its place in the Enneads,
since VI.6 continues the major themes of the Groschrift and answers the
questions that it has left unanswered. VI.6 repeats the thematic organization
of the Groschrift on a smaller scale. The composition of the work conspicuously unfolds in a circular fashion, as noted by Charles-Saget, but omitted
by Krmer and OMeara.63 The beginning of the treatise, like the awake Soul
in III.8, explores the origin and existence of multiplicity in the intelligible
realm. The rst chapter denes multiplicity and innity. Chapters 2 and 3
60. The philosopher who has transcended sense-perception and has
already nished reasoning (III.8.6.3638).
61. Armstrong (1988: vol. 5, 152).
62. Seeking a more appropriate, thematic, arrangement of the treatises,
Porphyry bisects V.5 [32] and II.9 [33] and places them in the fth and the
second Enneads as they deal respectively with the intelligible realm and physical
reality. Perhaps the fact that II.9 defends the goodness of the physical reality
against the Gnostic doctrines that it is evil is the reason for which Porphyry
severs this part of the text and places it in the second Ennead, dealing with
topics related to material world.
63. Charles-Saget (1982: 18); Krmer (1964: 298299); and OMeara
(1975: 80).

20

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

defend Platos understanding of the number of innity against Aristotles

criticism.64 Following the themes of V.8 and V.5, chapters 48 systematically
reveal the dominant role of number in the intelligible. Chapter 9 is the center of the treatise, outlining the participation of number in every intelligible
entity. Chapters 1016 refute once again Aristotles polemics on number and
also summarize the constitutive role of substantial number in the intelligible;
chapter 17 brings back the discussion of the number of innity, introduced
in chapters 23; and chapter 18 concludes the investigation of how multiplicity ascends to the transcending One by closing the discussion of multiplicitys descent in chapter 1.
The structure of VI.6 is symmetrical and self-contained, integrating
concentrically the concept of multiplicity with the focal discussion of substantial number. It can be schematized as in gure 1. Multiplicity begins
and ends the thematic composition of the treatise. This circular arrangement
iconically brings Plotinus examination of number to a full closure. As multiplicity unfolds from the One and enfolds to the One, so does the composition unfold and enfold itself like nesting circles, moving away from and yet
turning toward their center. This circularity originates from Plotinus understanding of the nature of discursive thought itself, which he compares to
many lines which proceed from one center in order to lead to a notion of
the multiplicity which has come to be. 65 The composition of VI.6 also conveys iconically the self-turning attention of Plotinus train of thought, as
if the subject (skemma) of his thought produced the scheme (schma), Greek
pun intended, of the universe it contemplates.66
Contrary to Brisson, who views the central chapters of the treatise as a
long digression that answers the questions posed in the rst three chapters,67
I think the concept of number is so well ingrained in the composition of the
treatise that its rationale naturally follows the narrative of the treatise. In
fact, Charles-Saget reproduces the commentary on VI.6 edited by Bertier
et al. as an equally analytical part of her study of mathematics in Plotinus
and Proclus.68 My own interest, pursued elsewhere, in how the literary form
of philosophy provides the framework for understanding the philosophical concepts it presents has led me to study the composition of VI.6 in the
64. Metaph. 1083b361084a1.
65. VI.5.5.13. See Rappe (2000: 124125).
66. VP 8.813: He worked out his train of thought from beginning to an
end in his own mind, and then, when he wrote it down, since he had set it all in
order in his mind, he wrote continuously as if copying from a book. Even if he
was talking to someone, engaged in continuous conversation, he kept to his train
of thought.
67. Brisson (2006: 286).
68. Charles-Saget 1982.

INTRODUCTION

21

Ch. 1

Chs. 23

Chs. 48

Ch. 9

Chs. 1016

Ch. 17

Ch. 18

FIGURE 1. Concentric composition of Ennead VI.6 by chapter.

context of Plotinus concept of number.69 One of the noteworthy discoveries
I have made in working on the treatise is that the concept and the exegesis
of VI.6 are in a surprisingly conuent relationship. This exegesis displays
the elegance of Plotinus thought, despite the accusation, often deserved, of
obscurity and disparity. The concentric composition of VI.6 conveys nondiscursively the higher ontological presence of number in the intelligible realm
and iconically sketches the spherical gure of the universe. It also illustrates
perfectly Brhiers statement that the image, in Plotinus, is not an external
ornament but an integral element of the thought. 70 The relationship between
VI.6 and the concept of number reveals a less intimidating and more attractive side of Plotinus style and demonstrates how rewarding it is to examine
the interplay between form and content in the Enneads.
I have taken advantage of this rare example of symbiosis between literary form and philosophical content and have followed the progression of the
treatise to construe Plotinus concept of number, instead of straightening the
course of his argument in favor of our modern analytical taste. As a result,
this book does not offer a commentary on VI.6, but rather an analysis of
Plotinus composition of the universe according to number as presented in
VI.6 and all the Enneads.
69. Slaveva-Grifn (2003a, 2003b, 2005).
70. Brhier (1958: 30).

22

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

A Note on Terminology, Translation, and Citation

The complexity of Plotinus thought is reected in the intricacy of his vocabulary and compressed style. Oftentimes a term has a number of different
meanings depending on its context. I have followed the convention of capitalizing the One, Intellect, and Soul, when they denote the underlying principles of existence, the hypostases. When they are not capitalized, they refer
to an individual one, being, intellect, and soul. I have also capitalized Monad,
Indenite Dyad, and Complete Living Being when Plotinus uses them as
proper names. Like everyone who has faced the challenge of Plotinian living
thought, I have tried to grasp the precise semantic nuance of a particular
usage, but I must admit that I cannot claim with absolute condence that I
have always been successful.
Finally, as often is the case with any term in Plotinus, kosmos has a number of different meanings depending on the specic context. It can refer to:
(1) the universe as a whole as acted upon by the principle of order; (2) the
universal order determining the individual place of everything in the grand
scale of things; or (3) the two conceptual planes that distinguish collectively
all intelligible beings from their material copies. In order to minimize as
much as possible the polysemous complexity of the term, I have used universe when I have referred to Plotinus idea of the entire cosmos (1 above),
which includes both the intelligible realm (kosmos notos) and physical reality
(kosmos aisthtos). When I have discussed either of the two planes separately
(3 above), I have used respectively intelligible realm and physical reality.
I have kept Plotinus original term kosmos only when I have had in mind the
principle of universal order (2 above).
Following the denition of multiplicity (plthos) in VI.6, I have called it
multiplicity to express Plotinus use of the term as a collective noun, conceptualizing the ordered existence of everything other than the One, as opposed
to his use of polla as many, which denotes a multitude of particular units
without an explicit notion of order.
Translating the Enneads is an equally Herculean task. But this time we
can claim that it has been accomplished with greater success. Armstrongs
translation of the complete text of the treatises in seven volumes in the Loeb
series (19661988) has withstood the test of many a mind and has deservedly
won its authoritative place. Thus I have used his translations as the basis of the
quotations in the text, with appropriate and sometimes substantial modications. The readership of the Enneads is expanding with the new series Plotin:
Traits, edited by Luc Brisson and Jean-Franois Pradeau. I believe the appearance of VI.6 in print in this series is another testament to the timeliness and
importance of the subject of this book. The Greek text is according to P. Henry
and H.-R. Schwyzer, Plotini Opera, 3 vols. (Clarendon Press 19641983) and it
is used without transliteration only in the footnotes to quote the original text

INTRODUCTION

23

of a translation or to illustrate a point that has already been made in the main
body of text.
A few words are in order about the way in which the Enneads are cited.
In general, there are two conventions of referring to a specic treatise. The
rst identies the number of the Ennead and the number of the treatise in
this Ennead. For example, the treatise On Numbers is cited as VI.6, which
means Ennead VI, treatise six. The other contains the above information but
adds in brackets the number of the treatise according to the chronological
order given by Porphyry in VP 46. Thus, Enn. VI.6 [34] indicates that
this is the sixth treatise in the sixth Ennead and that the treatise is number
thirty-four on Porphyrys chronological list. There is no specic distinction
of when one way is preferred to the other, but the common trend recently
favors the former and I have observed it throughout this book.
Plotinus on Number is intended to serve experienced as well as developing scholars pursuing research in Neoplatonism, ancient philosophy, or the
history of mathematics in general. It is hoped that the book will be of interest to those who study the development of ancient cosmology and the history
of the concepts of One and Many in late antiquity.

1
Platonic Cosmology on Plotinian Terms
Ennead VI.6 and the Timaeus
Plotinus cosmology begins where Platos cosmogony ends. In the Timaeus,
Plato explains how the Demiurge brings together that which is visible and
in disorderly motion into universal order (tou kosmou systasis, Ti. 32c.56).
In VI.6, Plotinus expounds that the universe is a separation from the One
(apostasis tou henos, VI.6.1), which organizes everything into a nite cosmos.
The Timaeus presents, in an ascending order, the composition (systasis) of
the primordial matter by the Demiurge into an image as close as possible
to a perfect intelligible model, whereas VI.6 constructs, in a descending
order, the universe as dianoetically successive separation (apostasis) of Being,
Intellect, the Complete Living Being, and Soul from a suprametaphysical
starting point.1 Both works explicate the construction of the universe, but
from opposite ends.
While it is obvious that the antinomy of the terms composition (systasis) and separation (apostasis) does not stem from a conceptual opposition
between Plato and Plotinus,2 I would argue that Plotinus view of multiplicity
itself demands reversing the order of the cosmological account in VI.6. Since
the One, as the ultimate source of existence, is beyond being, the universe
can exist only as a result of the emanating power of the One.3 Everything
must descend from and depend upon the One.4 Thus, if VI.6 is going to
deal with the construction of the universe, it must employ the top-down
approach.
In an article on the revival of Neoplatonic studies at the end of the last
century, Gerson concludes that Plotinus consistently top-down approach
provides a most provocative alternative to the bottom-up approach, precisely
1. This cosmogonical act is atemporal and aspatial. Our inability to
comprehend it nondiscursively forces us to talk about it dianoetically as
separating, unfolding, descending from the One (IV.3.30, V.1.11, V.8.9) or to
represent it guratively as a center and its circle (V.1.11).
2. In VI.2.2, the intelligible realm is presented as systasis of all primary kinds.
3. VI.2.17.2223: t pkeina to ntow; VI.9.11.42: pkeina osaw.
Cf. I.7.1.19; V.1.8.7; V.3.17.13; V.4.2.38; V.6.6.30; VI.8.16.34. Also Plato, R. 509b9.
4. III.8.10.1: dnamiw tn pntvn.
24

PLATONIC COSMOLOGY ON PLOTINIAN TERMS

25

owing to its uncompromising radical character.5 The two approaches, as he

points out, rely upon simplication and inversion respectively.6 In the case
of VI.6, I would add, it is the difference between saying that multiplicity is
nothing but otherness from the One and multiplicity is an inferior ontological
expression of its source. Plato and Plotinus share the same goal, but the difference in their approach lies in whether they see the glass as half empty or half
full. In the Timaeus, Plato does not observe what is in the glass but rather vacuum, because the primordial elements are in disorder, while in VI.6 Plotinus
explains what is actually in the glass because every postcosmic element is in
its ordered ontological place. The rst approach has difculty explaining the
interactions between the glass contents, while the second approach elucidates
the derivation of the elements lling the glass. In V.8.7, Plotinus dismisses the
bottom-up approach because he nds the preconception of the nite universe
impossible.7 Arguing from an ontological, not epistemological, standpoint, he
claims that one cannot think up the universe with all its elements together,
unless one perceives that all things exist in something else from which they
derive. The nesting explanation of the derivation of the universe lays the
foundation of the top-down approach.
This chapter therefore examines how the top-down approach converts
the systasis of the Timaeus into the apostasis in VI.6 in particular and Platos
cosmogony into Plotinus cosmology in general. Subsequently, this analysis
searches for the roots of Plotinus understanding of the origin of the universe
as a separation from the One in Platos cosmogony in the Timaeus and in the
Neopythagorean notion of the First God as stasis.
Enn. VI.6 is not usually associated with Plotinus cosmology as II.1 is,
for example, because it does not deal with the standard cast of ancient cosmology: the four primary elements, the heavens, the physical reality, and the
soul.8 Instead, it postulates that the universe is a result of the separation of
multiplicity from the One and that this separation is conducted according to
intelligible number. While II.1 strictly follows the traditional Platonic explanation of the universe, VI.6 conates Platonic cosmogony and Neopythagorean
numeric theory to produce a truly Plotinian account focusing on the derivation of that which exists from that which is beyond existence.9 Naturally,
5. Gerson (1997: 299).
6. For an example of simplication, Gerson (1997: 299) gives the mind
is nothing but electrical and chemical activities in the brain; for an example
of inversion, he gives the mind can only be understood as an imperfect
representation of its paradigm.
7. V.8.7.89: ote pnoia dunat.
8. Wilberding (2006).
9. An extension of Platos equation of the One and the Good as beyond
being in R. 509b9.

26

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

this account relates the composition of the universe by using general terms,
such as multiplicity and innity, rather than by examining any specic elements. Thematically, II.1 presents Plotinus exegesis of the orthodox Platonic
cosmology, whereas VI.6 focuses exclusively on the post-Platonic view of the
universe as a derivation and other from the One.10
Discussing Plotinus cosmological exegesis in VI.6, both Charles-Saget
and Nikulin neglect to recognize the conceptual communication of the treatise with the Timaeus.11 Most recently, however, in his preface to the translation of VI.6, Brisson calls Plotinus un disciple dle du Platon du Time,12 a
statement that deserves, I think, a serious consideration. The treatise conveys
Plotinus understanding of the structure of the universe, namely, the architecture of the intelligible realm according to number. The strong cosmological
tones of VI.6 demand that we turn our attention to the Timaeus rst.13
We often forget that the cosmogony in the Timaeus begins on a less perfect note. It starts from the primeval material chaos, which brings a thematic
culmination to the catastrophic end of Atlantis, and ends with the creation
of cosmic order, discernible even in the organization of the human body.14
Scholars tend to use the original-and-copy analogy in presenting Platos view
of the physical world as a phenomenological expression of the Forms. While
this method suits his ontology well, it obfuscates the fact that the cosmogony
of the Timaeus is an upward progression from the image to its original, from
sensible matter to the Forms. Platos cosmogony begins with the Demiurges
perception of the disorderly state of everything that is corporeal and visible.15
Through his inherent goodness, the Demiurge brings the precosmic matter
10. II.1 is the fortieth treatise in Porphyrys chronological order (VP 5) and
thus succeeds VI.6, which is number thirty-four. Both treatises belong to the
middle period of Plotinus writing, characterized by Porphyry as the acme of
Plotinus ability (VP 6.33).
11. While Charles-Saget (1980: 917) examines the place of the treatise in
the Neopythagorean tradition, Nikulin (2002) is interested in the post-Plotinian
development of the concept.
12. Brisson (2006: 289).
13. Aside from Phillips, who analyzes (1997: 173197) the Neoplatonists
answers to the question of the eternity of the cosmos in the Timaeus, the
relationship between Plotinus view of the origin of the universe, especially as
presented in VI.6, and the Timaeus has not been yet examined.
14. Respectively Ti. 25c6d6 and 69a681e.
15. Ti. 30a.35: pn son n ratn paralabn ox suxan
gon ll kinomenon plhmmelw ka tktvw. Plutarch interprets the
disorderly precosmic state as animated by the World Soul and as an aspect of the
Indenite Dyad, De Generatione Animae in Timaeo 1014b, as John Dillon pointed
out to me.

PLATONIC COSMOLOGY ON PLOTINIAN TERMS

27

into order by putting intelligence into soul, and soul in body (Ti. 30b45)
so that he creates an imperfect image of the perfect intelligible paradigms
he contemplates. The bottom-up approach explains the physical reality as a
copy of the Forms by putting it together as if lling the empty half of the
glass with order and identity.
Plato builds the systasis of the universe upon motion, which is at the
basis of the existential polarity between the Forms and their material copies.
To recall the famous denitions of being (to on) and becoming (to gignomenon), the Forms are ontologically perfect constants (that which always is
and has no becoming), while their copies are materially imperfect variables
(that which becomes and never is).16 The Forms are eternal, perfect, atemporal, motionless, and therefore not subject to change, whereas the physical
world is originated, imperfect, temporal, constantly in motion, and therefore
subject to change.17
In the Timaeus, motion characterizes the universe in its precosmic and
postcosmic stages. First, there is the discordant and disorderly motion of the
precosmic elements, which the Demiurge brings into order.18 Second, in creating the model of the Complete Living Thing (to zon noton), the Demiurge
makes motion inherent in the nature of the World Soul. In the composition of the World Soul, he uses the Same, which is indivisible and always
changeless, the Different, which is divisible and comes to be in the material
world, and the Mixture of the Same and the Different (Ti. 35a). The rst
two parts are completely opposite to each other, while the third, containing elements of both, acts as their intermediary. Because, in this sense, the
nature of the World Soul is heterogeneous, the difference in the nature of its
elements creates motion and therefore change. For this reason, the Demiurge
regulates and orders the motion of the World Soul in strict numerical proportions as he shapes it in the perfect form of a sphere (Ti. 36a37d). Third, the
Demiurges nal touch in the creation of the ordered universe is the creation
of time as a quantiable physical image of eternity (Ti. 37d). He channels the
disorderly motion of primordial mass into the orderly existence of a nite universe by giving it a distinct conguration by means of shapes and numbers
16. Ti. 27d628a1. Cf. Parmenides, fr. 8.36 and 2538 and fr. 8.3941,
respectively.
17. Plato contradicts himself in Sph. 248e249b by arguing that the Forms
do not lack intelligence, change, movement, and life. Scholars have a hard time
resolving Platos inconsistency. Cornford (1935: 244247) suggests that Plato has
both intelligible and physical reality in mind. But I do not think we have seen
the end of the debate. Motion is one of the principal characteristics of Intellect,
see the discussion of substantial number and Intellect in chapter 5.
18. Respectively, Ti. 30a45, kinomenon plhmmelw ka tktvw and
Ti. 30a5, ew tjin at gagen k tw tajaw.

28

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

(Ti. 53b45).19 As a result, the Demiurges induction of proportions and numbers converts Platos cosmogony into cosmology.20
While for Plato, in the Timaeus, the universe is a composition (systasis)
of the primordial mass in an order, for Plotinus, in VI.6, the universe is a
separation (apostasis) of everything from the One into order. The universe is
a one-in-many unity of different degrees of ontological stability that derive
by emanation in a successive order from the One, beyond Being, to Intellect,
comprising all intelligible beings, to Soul, the lower part of which brings
life to physical reality. At rst glance, the opening chapter of the treatise
has a strong cosmogonical sense, underlining the stark difference between
the beginning of the Timaeus account and Plotinus conception of the origin
of the universe. Paradoxically, it seems that Plato and Plotinus attribute the
structure of the universe to opposite processes. There is no primordial disorder in Plotinus construction of the universe. Instead, there is only an ontological orderly procession of everything that exists from the One.21 While
Platos account is about putting the universe together as an image of the
perfect intelligible paradigms, Plotinus account is about unfolding the universe from the absolute Good and the One.22 It seems that Plotinus begins
his account of the composition of the universe from the point at which Plato
leaves it off.

Origin of Multiplicity in Plotinus

Before dealing with any specic cosmological details as in II.1, Plotinus must
work out the most important point of any cosmogonical theory, the beginning of existence. Now is the time to clarify that this beginning is only a
dianoetic expression conveying the relationship between the One and the

19. Cornfords translation (1935: 198). The reference to Platos account of

the creation of time and numbers (Ti. 37d39e and 47a) suggests that Plotinus
has the Timaeus in mind in VI.6.
20. In Cornfords words (1935: 31), the cosmology is cast in the form
of cosmogony, a story of events spread out in time. This idea is overall
underplayed by Wilberding (2006: 621) in his discussion of Platos cosmology.
21. OMeara (1993: 6079) refers to it as derivation, arguing that this
term is less specic when applied to the explanation of the constitution of
intelligible beings by the One as opposed to terms like emanation, creation,
or making. Although I see, with OMeara, the need for a less specic term to
express such a general idea, I think unfolding captures best Plotinus idea of
the composition of the universe, as is discussed in chapter 5. Rists efuence
(1962a: 99107) is another successful rendering.
22. Regulated by number, as explained later in VI.6.9.

PLATONIC COSMOLOGY ON PLOTINIAN TERMS

29

intelligible realm. The nondiscursiveness of the One itself obscures both the
primal separation from the One and Plotinus account of it.
The aporia of explaining precisely how the interaction between a higher
and a lower metaphysical principle occurs does not originate with Plotinus but
can be traced back to the Timaeus itself. In his discussion of the nature of the
Receptacle in Ti. 50bc, Plato explains that, in it, the Forms mold their ontological patterns onto the primary elements in an unexplainable and wondrous
fashion. 23 The nondiscursiveness of the cosmogonical act that originates physical reality stems from the intelligible nature of the Forms and the dianoetic
difculties surrounding the Receptacle itself. The Receptacle is not in a particular point in time and space, but its nature is to be available for anything
to make its impression upon, and it is modied, shaped, and reshaped by the
things that enter in it. 24 Plato views the systasis of the disorderly matter of the
Receptacle to be beyond the human ability to conceive or to describe.
Ancient and modern scholars alike have cast many nets to comprehend the nature of Platos Receptacle. Aristotle associates matter with the
Indenite Dyad and the Receptacle, the disorderly state of which is the
source of evil. This view, however, raises the problem, unthinkable for Plato
and Plotinus, that the Forms, which come from the Indenite Dyad, possess evil.25 Plotinus attempts to solve the problem by distinguishing two
types of matter: sensible and intelligible.26 I think Cornfords point that the
Receptacle is not that out of which (ex hou) things are made; it is that
in which (en hi) qualities appear best describes the difference between
the two types of matter.27 Plotinus concept of intelligible matter has caused
embarrassment among Neoplatonic scholars. The terms intelligible and
matter crown the opposite ends of the ontological hierarchy and seem to
be mutually exclusive. Rist solves the problem by suggesting that the contemplation of the One by Now [sic] in the form of Intelligible Matter is the
cause of the very existence of the Second Hypostasis. 28
Similarly to the mysterious way in which the Forms imprint their
characteristics onto the Receptacle in the Timaeus, Plotinus views the origin of the universe as a thaumastic act.29 While Plato makes the Receptacle
23. Ti. 50c6: trpon tin dsfraston ka yaumastn. Also Simpl.
In Phys., p. 320.
24. Ti. 50c23, Zeyls translation. The evasive nature of the Receptacle is
perhaps best understood in Derridas (1993: 87127) deconstructive reading of
kho-ra. On Derridas interpretation of the Receptacle, see Gersh (2006: 1516).
25. Metaph. 988a714; Ph. 192a15, 203a916, 209b33210a2.
26. II.4.3.
27. Cornford (1935: 181).
28. Rist (1962a: 102).
29. Contrary to Gerson (1994: 46), who remarks that the second rx
[sic] does not arise magically or mysteriously from the rst. It is coeternal with

30

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

a medium between the Forms and the physical reality in his bottom-up
approach, Plotinus dematerializes the cosmogonical process and conceptualizes it as a separation and otherness from the One in his top-down approach.
In the treatise on contemplation, III.8, he inspiredly pronounces that the
very rst separation from the One is a wonder (thauma) beyond discursive
thought:
Oh, yes, it is a wonder (thauma) how the multiplicity of life came
from what is not multiplicity, and the multiplicity would not have
existed, if what was not multiplicity had not existed before the multiplicity. For the origin is not divided up into the All, for if it were
divided up it would destroy the All too; and the All could not any
more come into being if the origin did not remain by itself, different
from it. (III.8.10.1419) 30
The passage describes one of Plotinus postulates about the rst hypostasis,
that is, the One is simple. Although our analytically trained minds cannot be
satised by the spiritual and maybe even religious connotations of Plotinus
use of thauma, a close examination reveals that the passage lists the reasons
for the ontogenetic wonder of the universe not by establishing what the One
is but by negating what multiplicity is.31 In doing so, he chooses the top-down
approach and looks at the glass as half full, that is, negating that which is,
instead of establishing that which is not. Since the One cannot be reasoned
(VI.8.14.30), does not have predication (V.5.6.24, VI.8.8.6), and is truly ineffable
(V.3.13.1),32 we haphazardly understand why Plotinus perceives the separation
as a thauma. But if we contextualize Plotinus description of the origin of multiplicity in Platos presentation of the cosmogonical act in the Receptacle in an
unexplainable and wondrous fashion (tropon tina dysphraston kai thaumaston,
Ti. 50c6), we can truly understand that Plotinus transposes the cosmogonical
mystery from the Receptacle at the brink between the intelligible and physical

the rst but subordinate. It is only as a heuristic device that multiplicity can be
said to arise from the One. From the modern epistemological point of view,
Gerson is right. The textual evidence, however, shows that Plotinus still views
the origin of multiplicity as thauma, despite his logical explanation of it.
30. Cf. VI.9.5.30: yama to n, m n stin.
31. Mortley (1975: 365366 and 1982: 429439) examines the relation of
Plotinus via negativa with the mystery cults and early Christian theology. He
also (1975: 367) argues lucidly that for Plotinus language is a way of coping with
multiplicity of intellection. I return later to this point, pp. 105106.
32. Mortley (1975: 376) connects rrhtow with t rrhta referring to
the unspeakable content of the mysteries.

PLATONIC COSMOLOGY ON PLOTINIAN TERMS

31

reality in the Timaeus to the origin of the entire universe. Both Platos systasis
and Plotinus apostasis contain thauma.

Plotinus Apostasis and Numenius Stasis

The relationship between the Timaeus and Plotinus cosmology cannot be
understood without considering the intermediary of Neopythagoreanism.
The directional polarity with which Plato and Plotinus conceive the beginning of the universe is also a result of the conceptual innovation of Platonic
thought in the Neopythagorean generation before Plotinus and specically
by Numenius, who indirectly inuenced him, most likely through Ammonias
Saccas, whose lectures Plotinus attended personally during his Alexandrian
period (VP 3).33 I will discuss at greater length the complex relationship
between Plotinus and his teachers and contemporaries in the beginning of
chapter 2, which is devoted to the Neopythagorean inuence on his concepts
of multiplicity and number. Since our current subject is the Platonic context
of Plotinus cosmology, here I examine Numenius views only as an attempt
to discover the missing link between the cosmologies of Plato and Plotinus.
With the concepts of the One and multiplicity, Plotinus rewrites the
Timaeus infused with post-Platonic and more specically Neopythagorean
ideas. According to Numenius, Three Gods order the universe: the Father
(patr), the Maker (poits), and the Creation (poima).34 In this triad, scholars have rightly seen the precursor of Plotinus three hypostases, with the
notable exception that the rst hypostasis in Plotinus is beyond the other
two.35 The fragment below explains the relationship between the First
and the Second God from a point of view which, I think, is crucial for
Plotinus understanding of apostasis. In the place of the motion, which is
characteristic to the Second [God], I say that the stability, which is characteristic of the First [God], is an innate motion, from which the order of
the universe is and its eternal unity and preservation is poured toward all
things (fr. 15).36 Numenius concept of the First God as both at rest and
in innate motion completes reasonably well, in my judgment, the conceptual shift between Platos view of the universe as a composition (tou kosmou
33. A younger contemporary of Nicomachus whose oruit was ca. 150,
according to Dillon (1996: 362). On Numenius, see pp. 8 and 4243.
34. Fr. 21 (des Places) in Proclus, In Ti. I 303.27304.7 9.
35. Festugire (1954: IV, 275276) and Krmer (1964: 8183).
36. Ant gr tw prososhw t deutr kinsevw tn
prososan t prt stsin fhm enai knhsin smfuton, f' w
te tjiw to ksmou ka mon diow ka svthra naxetai ew
t la.

32

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

systasis) and Plotinus denition of multiplicity as a separation from the

One (apostasis tou henos). The First God is not Platos Demiurge,37 but his
concept of the absolute Good, which Plotinus later renes, with the help of
Moderatus, as the One.38 The Second God is the Demiurge, later elicited in
Plotinus Intellect. If we consider what OMeara calls Plotinus Principle of
Prior Simplicity,39 we can conclude that, in Numenius, since the First God
is transcendent, it possesses, in an absolute form, the qualities of the Second
God. Consequently, since motion is the characteristic of the Second God,
the First God must possess innate motion (kinsis symphytos). Numenius
describes the First God to be in stasis, which is not static but dynamic and
possesses an innate motion that orders the cosmos (taxis tou kosmou).40 So
how are we to understand the conceptual paradox of Numenius First God
as innately moving stability?
The inuence of the Timaeus on Numenius views is rather detectable.
Of most interest to us is that Numenius combines Platos idea that being is
always according to itself (Ti. 28a8) with the primary kinds of Being, Rest,
and Motion (Sophista 254d).41 In order to render the cosmogonical motion
in the Timaeus, we may suppose that Numenius conates Platos primary
kinds of Being, Rest, and Motion in his First God and perceives of it as
stability (stasis) in innate motion (kinsis symphytos). Although Numenius
conceptual adaptation of the Timaeus seems paradoxical, it is not out of line
with his Three Gods. On the contrary, this kind of paradox is ingrained in
his system. For example, the Second God unies matter, but is split by
it (fr. 11), creates both his own idea and the cosmos (fr. 16), and the
Second and the Third Gods are one (fr. 11). Dodds nds the answer to
these paradoxes in Proclus interpretation of Numenius system in the context of Ti. 39e69.42 According to Proclus, Numenius equates the First God
with the living creature that truly is,43 and says that he thinks (noei) by calling in the help of the Second God (en proschrsei tou deuterou); he equates
his Second God with Nous, and says that Nous creates by calling the help
37. As misunderstood by Proclus, In Ti. I 303.27ff; Dillon (1996: 366).
38. See chapter 2.
39. OMeara (1993: 62) and sketched in III.8.10.
40. Dodds (1957: 1213); Dillon (1996: 368).
41. Respectively, t kat tat xon . . . e (Ti. 28a67) and t n at
ka stsiw ka knhsiw (Sph. 254d). Dillon (1996: 369) takes it as a reference to
Sph. 248e and the predicates of the Completely Existent: motion, life, soul, and
knowledge. I think the analogy with Sph. 254d is more accurate since Numenius
talks about exactly the same things as Plato: being, rest, and motion.
42. In Ti. 3.103.
43. Proclus has t stin zon corresponding to t stin zon in
Ti. 39e8.

PLATONIC COSMOLOGY ON PLOTINIAN TERMS

33

of the Third (en proschrsei tou tritou). 44 Dodds accepts Proclus interpretation of help (proschrsis) to solve the above paradoxes by associating the
three gods with three different mental processes.45 Since the Second God
has the ability to think and be self-reexive, the First God borrows or inherits the ability to think from the Second God.46 Since the Third God possesses dianoia, the Second God, when relating to the Third God, abandons
his nosis and takes on dianoia. Thus there is an implicit interdependence
among the three gods.
Dodds does not extend his interpretation to solve the paradox of stasis and kinsis symphytos in the First God. But I see no reason why not. If
motion (kinsis) is the characteristic of the Second God and if the First God,
as the highest grade of reality (autoon),47 is in stasis, then the First God must
borrow the motion of the Second God and make it innate motion (kinsis
symphytos). While being proper negates the idea of motion and the First
God is in stasis proper,48 the First God must possess innate motion in order
to account for the motion of the Second God. Although this argument may
seem circular, the circularity is not generated by our analysis but stems from
the interdependent elements of Numenius system itself.
In VI.6, Plotinus solves, I would argue, the difculty of Numenius
stasis-kinsis paradox by expressing only implicitly the idea of motion in the
term apostasis, literally meaning away from the stasis. That Plotinus is
aware of Numenius denition is clear in III.9.79, which explicitly discusses
the characteristics of Numenius First and Second Gods.49 While explaining
the relationship between Intellect and the Forms, based on the same passage from Ti. 39e used by Proclus,50 Plotinus postulates that the One is
the power of motion and rest, so that is beyond them; but the Second is at
rest and also in motion around the First.51 Plotinus completely removes the
One from the ontological equation (perhaps a distant relative of Numenius

44. Dodds translation (1957: 13).

45. Although I nd Dodds explanation of the nosis of the First God shady,
his discussion of the dianoia of the Second God is compellingly lucid.
46. In stark opposition to Plotinus view in III.9.9.1: o noe t prton
pkeina ntow.
47. Fr. 17 (des Places): aton.
48. Fr. 6 (des Places): d ata to ntow nmatw sti t
m gegonnai mhd fyarsesyai mhd' llhn mte knhsin mhdeman
ndxesyai mte metaboln krettv falhn.
49. This is perhaps the most unusual treatise in the Enneads containing
sporadic notes.
50. In Ti. 3.103, discussed p. 32.
51. III.9.7.13. An allusion to Platos famous passage in the Epistulae II 312e3.

34

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

autoon) and makes it the absolute source of stasis and kinsis, while Intellect
becomes the embodiment of kinsis symphytos.52
Numenius claim that the innate motion propels or creates not the
kosmos itself but rather the order of the cosmos (taxis tou kosmou) is important. It implies that, according to him, the origin of the universe is not a
cosmogonical act as it is for Plato in the Timaeus, but a cosmological act
that arranges the cosmos of the universe. Plotinus, it seems, shares the same
view in VI.6 and develops Numenius idea in two ways. First, by focusing
on the state of existence of multiplicity in VI.6.1, he reinforces Numenius
understanding that the coming-to-be of the universe is a cosmological rather
than cosmogonical act.53 Second, he coins the term apostasis to signify the
former.54 Thus, it is through Numenius that, as we said in the beginning of
the chapter, Plotinus cosmology begins where Platos cosmogony ends.
Numenius concept of stasis of the One is the foundation of Plotinus
understanding of apostasis. Explaining the transcendent nature of the One in
VI.5.3, Plotinus asserts axiomatically that the One does not separate from itself
(existatai);55 it does not come into being; it is not in any physical place, but
is always with itself; it does not stand away from itself (m diestanai), so that
nothing comes from it (mde proienai ti ap autou); and it does not separate
from anything (mdenos apostatein). The language of this description emphasizes that the One does not participate in the separation of multiplicity from
itself. Because the One is beyond being and nondianoetic, it can be conceived
only as an opposite to that which originates from it. As a result, the One is
described by negating the ontogenetic separation of multiplicity from the One.
If we remove the prexes denoting separation from the verbs listed above
(ex-istatai, die-stanai, pro-ienai, apo-statein),56 we are left purely with the
52. V.1.4 and VI.9.3.4245: The One is not in movement or at rest, not in
place, not in time, but itself by itself of single form, or rather formless, being
before all form, before movement and before rest; for these pertain to being and
are what make it many. This description systematically denies that the One
participates in Aristotles categories, see pp. 9599.
53. Plotinus repeatedly emphasizes that the extending of the universe from
the One does not occur in time but presents only dianoetically the structure of
the universe.
54. The term does not occur in any metaphysical context before Plotinus
but is prevalent in the post-Plotinian Neoplatonists: Simplicius, In Cael., vol. 7,
p. 255.9, In Ph., vol. 9, p. 798.14, In de An. vol. 11, p. 6.7; Iamblichus, Comm.
Math. 33.29; Syrianus, In Metaph. 137.11.
55. Ti. 50b78: k gr tw autw t parpan ok jstatai
dunmevw.
56. See the discussion of substantial number and the One in chapter 5.

PLATONIC COSMOLOGY ON PLOTINIAN TERMS

35

denition of multiplicity in VI.6: since multiplicity pours forth (chetai), and

extends (ekteintai) from the One, it is a separation (apostasis) from the One.
If we ignore, for a moment, the nondiscursiveness of the One, we can
perceive that the apostasis of multiplicity is a direct result of the stasis of the
One. We may even suppose dianoetically that the One is in stasis because
the One is not divided, does not pour forth, remains in itself, is always
with itself, is one and the same in number, and exists as a whole. All these
characteristics of the One negate the characteristics of multiplicity found
in VI.6.1. When we restore the nondiscursiveness and absoluteness of the
One at the end of this hypothetical exercise, we can understand that the
One does not possess stasis or kinsis but only emanates them: [the One]
does not move nor does it stand still, 57 and yet, something generated by
the One leaves it and comes into the other things in many ways.58 In this
vein, the immediate separation from the One is a result of the transcendent
nature of the One.
A much-discussed passage in V.3.11 offers a good starting point for examining the very rst separation. It explains that Intellect, as the Second Hypostasis,
turns itself toward the One in a contemplative act in which Intellect sees the
One as multiplicity. When Intellect turns itself toward the One in a desire to
attain to the One in its simplicity, it perceives something else, which is many
in itself (plthynomenon, V.3.11.34). Here Plotinus enigmatically explains that
Intellect does not act as Intellect in this process but as sight which has not
yet seen (opsis oup idousa, V.3.11.5). We get a better idea of what he is talking
about when he elaborates that Intellect perceives the multiplicity reected from
the One as an imagination (phantasma) and gains sight and knowledge of the
One only after understanding in a contemplative act that many come from the
One.59 Itself thinking and the object of thought, Intellect comes into existence

57. V.5.10.1617: o gr kinetai od' sthken. Plotinus reverses the

order of Platos quote ote sthken ote kinetai at Sph. 250c7, Prm. 139b3,
and Lg. 893c2.
58. VI.5.3.2324: llo d ti p' ato gegonw kataleloipw at
kein ew t lla pollax. This interpretation of multiplicity follows the same
line of reasoning as V.5.5.3, where Plotinus claries that in the case of numbers, the
one remains unchanged, but another one makes number (poiontow d llou).
59. Rist (1962a: 101) argues that the passage explains how the Indenite
Dyad experiences the rst act of separation. Even if this is what Plotinus has in
mind implicitly, I do not think we have enough hard evidence for it in the text.
He is usually very specic when he talks about the ristow daw and wants
us to distinguish it from Intellect. But throughout this passage, he refers to the
entity he is talking about only as now.

36

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

simultaneously at the very moment when Intellect understands that the One
is many. In the coming-to-be of Intellect, the One reveals itself as multiplicity
because Intellect sees itself as multiplicity.
The emanation of Intellect as multiplicity from the One in Plotinus represents both the stasis and the kinsis symphytos in Numenius First God.
He further straties Numenius concept by separating the stasis of the First
God from the kinsis symphytos in which the One is absolute and beyond
being, while the Indenite Dyad, as will be discussed later, conceptualizes
the principles of innate motion, duality, and creation of the Second God.60
Although, in Plotinus, the One does not participate in the act of manyness
and remains in absolute stasis, it reveals itself through the innate motion in
the Indenite Dyad.61 Contemplating the One, Intellect sees the multiplicity
of the Indenite Dyad as a reection of the One. Only then can Intellect,
lled with the multiplicity that emanates from the One (plrtheis), stand
still (stas) and contemplate the One.62
The opening chapter of VI.6 offers an informative example of what
Gerson calls the uncompromising radical character of Plotinus thought.63
Since Plotinus gives an account of the structure of the universe through multiplicity, he must vest the cosmogony in the Timaeus in garments suited to the
post-Platonic taste of his time. His top-down approach sketches the ontological ladder of the universe in which the One and Innity are respectively at the
top and the bottom of its hierarchy, while multiplicity is their intermediary.64
In cosmological terms, the apo-stasis from the One con-stitutes the existence
of the universe, pun intended.
My main point is not that there is an intertextual echo of systasis/stasis/
apostasis respectively in Plato/Numenius/Plotinus, but that the different
points from which Plato, Numenius, and Plotinus develop their cosmogonical accounts (bottom, middle, and top) build the same structure of the universe, which, in its turn, demands the above intertextual echo. This echo
highlights both the conceptual differences and the conceptual similarities
among the three cosmologies.

60. See the discussion of substantial number and Intellect in chapter 5.

61. The multiplicity of the Indenite Dyad is not in conict with the
Absolute One (VI.4.4).
62. V.5.8.913.
63. Gerson (1997: 299); see also pp. 2425.
64. His view of multiplicity in the beginning of VI.6 casts a positive light
on the participation of multiplicity in the structure of the universe and stands
in direct opposition to the theme of the last treatise in the GroschriftII.9, On
the Evil, number 33 in the chronological order of the Enneads and immediately
preceding VI.6.

PLATONIC COSMOLOGY ON PLOTINIAN TERMS

37

The Universe as Degrees of Separation from the One

The term apostasis does not occur in philosophical texts before Plotinus. It
appears strictly in mathematical works to signify physical distance.65 The
term is used without any ontological connotations even by Theon of Smyrna
in his treatise The Mathematics Useful for the Understanding of Plato, where
it is only used to measure the radius of a circle.66 Considering Numenius
meaning of stasis as kinsis symphytos and Plotinus via negativa description
of the One, it is reasonable, I think, to conclude that Plotinus coined the
term to denote the cosmological process in which the universe exists as different from and dependent upon the One.67 He separates the stasis from the
kinsis symphytos in Numenius and delegates them respectively to the One
and Intellect. Although the One does not possess any particular qualities, it
possesses them in absolute form. If the One is the absolute stasis from which
the universe unfolds, the term apostasis literally negates the meaning of stasis. The One is in stasis in the sense that it is the absolute starting point of
the universe, while Intellect, through the emanation from the One, receives
the stasis and kinsis in actuality. Since separation from the One leads to
existence, apostasis denotes ontological becoming and thus being.68
Based on the denition of multiplicity in VI.6.1, we may expect that
Plotinus would present the underlying principles of the universe as a degree
of separation from the One. In other words, multiplicity (plthos) would
measure the universe from the Being to the embodied soul. We do not need
to search far in the Enneads to nd out that, indeed, he employs the idea
of separation, although at some embryonic stage, as a measurement of the
distance from the One to the second and to the third hypostases.
Let us examine VI.2.5 closely. Explaining that multiplicity comes from
a plurality that is one and yet different from the absolute One, Plotinus
65. Theon, In Ptol., p. 337, 1.24; p. 521, 1.7; p. 620, 1.19, among many
others. The term is not even found in Euclid.
66. Theon, De util. math. 191, 15. Themistius denes the circle as gr
p totou pantaxyen sh pstasiw kklow, In Ph. vol. 5.2, p. 233, 2.
Cf. Simpl., In Cael., vol. 7, p. 181, 29.
67. Aristotle uses apostasis only once in the denition of time, which is not
in a cosmological or metaphysical context. Ph. 223a.58: prteron gr ka
steron lgomen kat tn prw t nn pstasin ... n gr t
nn, ka to nn pstasiw.
68. The later commentators pick up on Plotinus use of apostasis to mean
existence. Discussing the actual activities (energeiai) of Intellect, Damascius
explains that the energeia of Intellect is directed toward the One and not toward
separation from being, that is, nonexistence (pstasiw p to enai, De
Principiis vol. 1, p. 133.7).

38

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

remarks that the extent of the separation from being is as great as that of
the departure from unity. 69 Contextually, apostasis here means measurement
of a degree of beingness and unity. As already determined in V.3.11,70 the rst
separation from the One is a contemplative act in which Intellect sees the
One in its multiplicity (plthynomenon). This multiplicity is unied because
it is an image of the absolute One. The absolute One cannot participate itself
in this multiplicity because it is beyond being and does not become multiplicity but reveals itself to Intellect as multiplicity, unied by one. VI.2.5
claries the explanation of the rst separation in V.3.11 by highlighting the
differences between the absolute One and the one containing multiplicity.
The former is beyond being; the latter is unied being.71 The former is absolute unity; the latter is the unied multiplicity, emanated by the former. The
latter represents the originative principle of the Indenite Dyad, which is
best reected in the double nature of Intellect, able to think itself and to
think all the beings in itself.72
But nowhere in the Enneads does Plotinus specically call the Indenite
Dyad or even Intellect apostasis.73 In the passages describing Intellects contemplation of the One in which Intellect becomes aware of its existence, the
idea of separation is represented by the differences between the Absolute
One and Intellect.74 I should note that he prefers to characterize Intellect
by its closeness to rather than remoteness from the One. The reason, I suggest, for his interest in emphasizing the distance from the One at the end
rather than at the top of the ontological spectrum lies in Plotinus view that
Intellect is closer to the One and thus it is obvious that is related to the One,
whereas it is more difcult to grasp the relation of the innumerable physical
reality to the One. Although Soul is most ontologically distant from the One,
it is still related to it:
But since Soul depends on Intellect and Intellect on the Good,
so all things depend on him through intermediaries, some close
69. VI.2.5.67: s gr prw n pstasiw, ts ka prw
n. Later echoed by Proclus in s gr plevn pstasiw, tosot
t xein mudrteron, In Ti. 1.306.9 and by Syrianus in poll plon a
cuxika tn noern, s plevn pstasiw, In Metaph. 137.11.
70. See pp. 3536.
71. On Plotinus unied being as arithmos hnmenos (VI.6.9), see the
discussion of substantial number and Absolute Being in chapter 5.
72. Against Rists assertion (1962a: 100) that Plotinus does not speak of the
Indenite Dyad as multiplicity (plthos).
73. It is not until the Theol. Ar. 10.26, where the Indenite Dyad is called
the rst separation (prt apostasis).
74. V.3.11.

PLATONIC COSMOLOGY ON PLOTINIAN TERMS

39

to him, some neighbours of those close to him, and the things

of sense dependent on Soul at the ultimate distance from him.
(VI.7.42.2124) 75
I quote this passage not only to demonstrate the ontological succession of
the underlying principles in the structure of the universe but also to prove
that Plotinus perceives the ontological succession in terms of separation.
His view of physical reality as ontologically the farthest separation from the
One measures the dependence of sense-perceptible reality upon the underlying principle of Soul conceived as the furthest separation (pleist apostasis, V.1.1.78).76 All references to apostasis as ontological distance pertain
to Soul and physical reality or, put differently, to the end of the ontological
spectrum.77 At the bottom of this chain of separation stands innity as a
complete separation from the One (pantels apostasis, VI.6.1.2).
In I.8.7,78 Plotinus further denes the meaning of apostasis in VI.6 by
recognizing the different ontological motions in the separation: the moving away (ekbasis),79 which results in the Otherness from the One, and the
moving down (hypobasis), which traces the ontological hierarchy from the
intelligible to the sensible world. The two terms clarify that apostasis in
VI.6 means falling away,80 separating, expanding, and going down from the
One, which produces the universe as extended multiplicity (diestkos plthos,
VI.2.5.9). The moving away and moving down represent the innate motion
of multiplicity as ontologically dependent on the One, while apostasis denotes
the state in which multiplicity abides as Otherness from the One.
The separation from the One is an ontologically deteriorating act in
which a thing is multiple when, unable to tend to itself, it pours out and
is extended in scattering; and when it is utterly deprived of the one in its
75. VI.7.42.2124: nhrthmnhw d cuxw ew non ka no ew
tgayn, otv pnta ew kenon di msvn, tn mn plhson, tn
d tow plhson geitonontvn, sxthn d' pstasin tn asyhtn
xntvn ew cuxn nhrthmnvn.
76. V.1.1.59: Since [the souls] were clearly delighted with their own
independence, and made great use of self-movement, running the opposite
course and getting as far away as possible (pleistn apostasin), they were ignorant
even that they themselves came from that world [the intelligible].
77. V.1.1.8; VI.2.5.7; VI.7.42.24; VI.9.4.4. Damascius also talks about
apostasis exclusively at the level of Soul. Cf. De Principiis vol. 1, p. 169.10: to
trtou pstasiw p to prtou.
78. One of Plotinus latest treatises, number 51 in Porphyrys chronological
order (VP 6).
79. Cf. ekbebkos, VI.6.3.78.
80. Armstrong (1988: vol. 7, 11).

40

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

outpouring it becomes multiplicity (VI.6.1.46). If we compare the fragmented nature of multiplicity to the absolute unity of the One, multiplicity is everything other than the One. In fact, multiplicity is the universe.
But, breaking the Pythagorean tradition that views multiplicity as complete
evil,81 Plotinus ameliorates multiplicitys lack of absolute ontological unity
by explaining that the universe does not expand searching for anything else
but itself (VI.6.1.1014).82 As a result, this desire turns multiplicity inward,83
connects it, albeit faintly,84 with the One, and thus preserves it from complete separation from the One (pantels apostasis, VI.6.1.2), meaning innity
and nonexistence. This inward desire induces order and correspondence in
multiplicity because what needed ordered beauty was many 85 and creates
kosmos. From the intelligible beings to their material images, order arranges
multiplicity into a one-in-many universe.
The discussion of the ontological distance of apostasis draws together
the concepts of the One and multiplicity as a Plotinian pair of opposites (hen
plthos). I characterize this pair of opposites as Plotinian not to distinguish
it from the Pythagorean and Platonic pair of One and Many but to highlight
Plotinus understanding of Multiplicity as a collective plthos in VI.6, and not
as the individualized plurality conveyed by the standard ta polla. Plotinus
introduces the concept of multiplicity as a measurement of ontological distance from the One, creating the orderly structure of the universe.
Let us recapitulate our ndings. Plotinus denes the beginning of the
universe as a separation (apostasis) from the One that results in the ontologically hierarchical existence of everything. The rst hypostasis is both absolute stability and absolute motion and therefore the absolute starting point
of the separation that results in the existence of the universe. Possessing
ontological stability inherent in being, Intellect is a separation that is closest
to the One because rst Intellect perceives itself as the multiplicity of the
Indenite Dyad and only then realizes that this multiplicity comes from the
One. Finally, Soul, as the ontologically weakest form of existence, oscillating
between the intelligible and the material world, represents the farthest separation from the One.86
81. This is the main point of Losevs commentary on VI.6.1 (1928: 1214).
82. For the outward and inward stages of separation, see Charles-Saget
(1980: 32).
83. VI.6.1.16: t d prw at t ndon n.
84. VI.6.18.24: mudrw.
85. VI.6.1.2728: pol t demenon ksmou.
86. V.1.1.78 and VI.7.42.23: pleist and eschat apostasis, respectively.
In V.8.7.2223, Plotinus view that matter is a sort of ultimate form (eidos ti
eschaton) corresponds to the ultimate stage of the separation of Soul (eschat
apostasis). Soul, enmattered in physical reality, is the farthest separation from

PLATONIC COSMOLOGY ON PLOTINIAN TERMS

41

The top-down cosmological order in VI.6 is determined by Plotinus

ontological system and therefore necessitates its representation as opposite to the bottom-up cosmogonical order in the Timaeus. This reversal in
the understanding of the universe from Platos systasis to Plotinus apostasis
most likely reects the Neopythagorean development of the concept of the
First God as an innate stability and mobility in Numenius. The description of multiplicity in VI.6.1.1 proceeds like a mathematical progression, and
the Plotinian terms of Platos cosmology suggest strong Neopythagorean
inuence.

the One (pleist apostasis in V.1 and eschat apostasis in VI.7), matter is the most
distant and ontologically pejorative. On the same note, Proclus calls the distance
between the human and divine matters pantels apostasis (In Ti., vol. 3, p. 165.7).

2
Multiplicity as Number
Surfacing from the Neopythagorean Underground
This chapter aims at excavating the Neopythagorean layer in Plotinus
concepts of multiplicity and number. Among the Enneads, VI.6 is the best
candidate for this work as it follows the long Neopythagorean tradition of
philosophizing about numbers.1 The heading above reects the strong and
yet subtle Neopythagorean movement in the rst and second centuries, wittily called the Neopythagorean underground, 2 and the tangible presence of
Neopythagorean elements in Plotinus concept of multiplicity.
In VP 14, Porphyry reports the names of Severus, Cronius, Numenius,
Gaius, and Atticus among the philosophers whose works Plotinus used in
his lectures. Among them, Numenius is distinguished in that Plotinus was
accused of appropriating his ideas and later absolved from the charges in a
letter written by Longinus (VP 1721). The letter also attests, as reported
by Porphyry, that Plotinus deliberately propounded Pythagorean views,
and the works of Numenius and Cronius and Moderatus and Thrasyllus
come nowhere near the accuracy of Plotinuss treatises on the same subjects
(VP 21.59). Even if we ignore the encomiastic tone of Porphyrys biography, it is clear that Plotinus was highly esteemed in Neopythagorean circles,
and his use of Neopythagorean material should surface, in its turn, from the
scholarly underground for serious consideration.
In VP 3, Porphyry also documents that Plotinus was a student of
Ammonius Saccas, a mysterious gure who swore his students to secrecy
about his doctrines. Most likely his secrecy is not the sole reason for our lack
of written evidence from him. But since both Numenius and Ammonius are
thought to have introduced Plotinus to Neopythagoreanism,3 the paucity of
Numenius extant fragments and the lack of Ammonius writings present a
serious obstacle for directly studying the Neopythagorean roots of Plotinus
understanding of multiplicity and number. We can, however, perform a
kind of conceptual archaeology to search and uncover the Neopythagorean
remains scattered throughout the Enneads. Although scholars have generally
1. Charles-Saget (1980: 917) surveys this tradition.
2. Dillon (1996: 381).
3. Dodds (1957); Schroeder (1987); Narbonne (1994).
42

MULTIPLICITY AS NUMBER

43

acknowledged the Neopythagorean inuence on Plotinus, there is little concrete discussion of any particulars, aside from the Neopythagorean elements
in Plotinus concept of the One, as discussed later.4
The opening statement of VI.6 introduces the question of multiplicity
precisely in its Neopythagorean context. In the previous chapter, we examined the inuence of Numenius concept of the First God as stability (stasis) and innate motion on Plotinus idea that the universe is a separation
(apostasis) from the One. In its turn, Numenius idea of stasis contains elements that characterize the denition of number found in the fragments of
his not-so-distant contemporary Moderatus.5 According to him, number is a
system of monads (systma monadn), which is a progression of multiplicity
(propodismos plthous) beginning from the monad and a regression (anapodismos plthous) stopping at the monad.6 This reasoning makes the rst monad
both the beginning of the ascending sequence of numbers and the end of the
descending sequence of numbers. The monad is the actual limit of quantity
because there is no number smaller than it. When multiplicity is decreased
by subtraction of all numbers, the naked monad (stertheisa), Moderatus concludes, receives onlyness (mon) and stability (stasis). Since the monad is
both the starting point and the nishing end for numbers, the monad lacks
motion and thus represents stability. If all numbers start with and return to
the monad, the monad must be unmoved, xed, and stable. This stability
makes the monad the limit of quantity.7
Reworking Platonic ideas and Neopythagorean mathematics,8 Moderatus
further distinguishes between the monad and the number one. The monad is

4. Dodds (1928); Rist (1962b); Jackson (1967); Whittaker (1969); Dillon

(1996: 347). See also pp. 4546.
5. See p. 8.
6. Theon, Expos. rer. math., p. 18, 38: riymw sti ssthma mondvn,
propodismw plyouw p mondow rxmenow ka napodismw
ew monda katalgvn. monw d sti peranousa posthw [rx
ka stoixeon tn riymn], tiw meioumnou to plyouw kat
tn faresin to pantw riymo sterhyesa monn te ka stsin
lambnei. Cf. Stobaeus, Anth., vol. 1, p. 21, discussed by Dillon (1996: 350).
As Bulmer-Thomas notes (1983: 384), Iamblichus (In Nic. 10.9) attributes
the denition of the monad to Thales. But while Iamblichus, probably following
Nicomachus (Ar. 1,7,1.2), calls it monadn systma, Theon of Smyrna, perhaps
following Moderatus, calls it systma monadn. This reversal is most likely
incidental, but it may also indicate two different traditions.
7. Theon, Expos. rer. math., p. 18, 5. I accept Useners emendation of
mondew d peranousi posthw into mondaw d peranousa posthw.
8. According to Moderatus avid Neopythagoreanism, Plato and his
successors are mere followers of Pythagoras. Cf. Dillon (1996: 346).

44

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

the rst principle of numbers (tn arithmn arch), whereas the arithmetical
number one is the principle of enumerated things (tn arithmtn arch).9 In
this distinction, the monad as the rst principle of numbers acquires, albeit
faintly, some ontological signicance since it generates the numbers themselves as systems of monads. This generating principle is different from the
numerical expression of individual things. If we view the monad as a principle of numbers (tn arithmn arch), for example, the number ve represents
ve monads that are brought together to form one unity, like our ve-digit
hand. When we think of a normal hand, we do not think of the ve ngers
individually but of the ve ngers that all together make one hand. But, from
the point of the one as the principle of enumerated things (tn arithmtn
arch), the number ve enumerates ve individual things, like ve chocolate
bonbons.10 The difference between the intelligible principle of number and
the mathematical principle of number in Moderatus anticipates Plotinus distinction between intelligible and arithmetical number.
This distinction brings us to the question of the rst One in Moderatus.
It is not clear from the extant fragments exactly how Moderatus explains
the difference between the monad as the rst principle of number and the
One as the rst underlying principle of existence. A controversial passage in
Simplicius (In Phys. A 7, 230.34), which I interpret, with Dodds, Jackson,
and Rist, as representing Moderatus views,11 lists three separate Ones as
underlying principles of existence: the rst One, which is above Being and
all essence; the second One, which is truly existent and an object of intellection; and the third One, which is the soul-realm which participates
in the previous two. 12 Unfortunately, it is unclear who the author of the
doctrine is. The text states that, according to Moderatus report, rst the
Pythagoreans, followed by Plato, form an opinion about matter (hyl).13 In
9. Stobaeus, Anth., vol. 1, p. 21. It is not absolutely clear from the text
that Moderatus shares this opinion, but it is quite reasonable to assume so.
Otherwise, the text would have somehow indicated a divergence.
10. It is unlikely that this distinction leads Moderatus to the conclusion
that number is quantity in the intelligible realm (to en notois poson), as
reported by Theon (Expos. rer. math., p. 19, 15) and as later rejected by Plotinus
(VI.6.4). The phrase is in a sentence that connects almost verbatim Moderatus
two fragments quoted in Stobaeus. Contrary to Dodds (1928: 138, n. 2), who
attributes the phrase to Moderatus, I think it is safer to suspect, for the lack of
textual evidence, Theons addition.
11. Dodds (1928); Jackson (1967); and Rist (1962b).
12. Respectively, pr t enai ka psan osan, per st t
ntvw n ka nohtn, and per st t cuxikn, metxein to nw ka
tn edn. Dillons translation (1996: 347).
13. Tathn d per tw lhw tn pnoian okasin sxhknai
prtoi mn tn Ellnvn o Puyagreioi, met d' kenouw

MULTIPLICITY AS NUMBER

45

his discussion of the passage, although admitting that the text most likely
expresses Moderatus views, Dillon takes the subject of the sentence (houtos)
to refer to Plato and not Moderatus, thus reading that Plato, following the
Pythagoreans, declares that the rst One is above Being and essence.14 It
seems to me that the text contains an elliptical connection between Plato
and Moderatus. Relating Moderatus account, Simplicius makes a syllogistic
jump from the names of the Pythagoreans and Plato to Moderatus views.
In his mind, all three of them represent the same doctrines, and he lists
them accordingly. The idea of the three Ones is certainly Middle Platonic
and most likely Neopythagorean, and the author, even if not Moderatus, is
Neopythagorean.15 But even if Moderatus did not come up with the system
of the three Ones, which is unlikely as I will discuss presently, this text
proves that he at least knew of this view, and we should expect him to incorporate it in his own ideas.
The Neopythagorean origin of the concept of the One has been at the
center of a long and heated scholarly debate. Dodds, followed by Jackson,
discovers an earlier Neopythagorean doctrine within Moderatus three
Ones in the Parmenides, while Rist purports that the doctrine is original to
Moderatus.16 I think Moderatus denition of number can bring us closer to
answering this question:
1. He postulates that both number and the numbered things have
founding principles, respectively as the rst principle of numbers (tn
arithmn arch) and as a principle of enumerated things (tn arithmtn
arch).
2. He distinguishes between numbers representing unities and numbers
enumerating individual things, such as the difference between the
monad and the number one.
If we consider Moderatus characteristics of number in the context of our
earliest evidence of the Neopythagorean cosmological views, reported in
Alexander Polyhistor, we discover that Moderatus view of the monad as the
rst principle of numbers is concurrent with the Neopythagorean view that
the monad is the originative principle of everything.17 The same fragment
(fr. 140) also documents that the Indenite Dyad derives from the monad

Pltvn, w ka Modratow store. Otow gr kat tow

Puyagoreouw . . . Dodds (1928: 137140); Dillon (1996: 347).
14. In Phys. A 7, 230.3637: otow gr kat tow Puyagoreouw t
mn prton n pr t enai ka psan osan pofanetai.
15. Cf. Numenius idea of the Three Gods, discussed pp. 3136.
16. Dodd (1928); Jackson (1967); Rist (1962b).
17. Fr. 140, 31: rx mn pntvn monw.

46

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

as matter underlying the monad being its cause.18 By relating Alexanders

account to the system of the Three Ones, one may see that Moderatus treats
the monad as a joint principle of existence with the Indenite Dyad, which,
in its turn, relates to the second One as a principle of propagation in the
intelligible realm, while the third One corresponds to the Soul, which acts
according to the enumerating principle of number. Rist has argued that
Alexanders testimony demonstrates that the monad has two functions: the
rst, which treats the monad as the Supreme Principle, is a prototype of the
Neoplatonic One, and the second, which treats the monad as a productive
principle, is a precursor of the Neoplatonic Intellect. Polyhistors text, however, does not separately account for the third One, which relates to physical
reality but combines it with the Second One by stating that the Indenite
Dyad is at the foundation of the material principle. If we take into account
Moderatus distinction between unifying number and enumerating number,
I think we can modify Rists classication of the dual function of the monad
to account for Moderatus three Ones.19 The rst One, as a supreme principle of everything, derives from Moderatus view that the Monad is arch
in the sense of absolute stability and an absolute starting point. The second One, as a principle of creation, derives from the monad representing all
numbers as absolute unities. The third One, as a principle of the material
reality, derives from the number one as enumerating individual things. This
reclassication elucidates the inuence of Moderatus denition of number
on his cosmological views. Such conceptual symbiosis between mathematics
and the universe is a genuine Neopythagorean characteristic.

Outward and Inward Direction of Multiplicity in Ennead VI.6

Plotinus understanding of multiplicity synthesizes the ideas of Numenius
and Moderatus.20 The denition of multiplicity as a separation from the One
in VI.6.1 conates Moderatus concept of number moving in progression
from or regression to the monad as stasis and Numenius concept of the First
God as stability that contains innate motion.21 He conceptualizes the motion
of multiplicity (plthos) by using Moderatus idea of number as motion of
progression or regression of multiplicity (propodismos plthous kai anapodismos). Instead of using Moderatus terms, however, Plotinus invents his own
18. Fr. 140, 31: k d tw mondow riston duda w n lhn t
mondi at nti postnai.
19. Rist (1962b: 393).
20. Charles-Saget (1980: 52) observes the relation between Moderatus and
Plotinus.
21. And Platos primary kinds in Sph. 254d, as discussed in chapter 5.

MULTIPLICITY AS NUMBER

47

term, apostasis, which specically encapsulates Numenius idea of stasis and

innate motion (symphytos kinsis), combined with the Neopythagorean distinction between ontological and arithmetical number.22
While discussing the nature of arithmetical quantity (to poson) in
VI.3.810, Plotinus himself is aware of the arithmetical denition of number
as he claries that one must call the many many as a multiplicity in number (plthos en arithmi) . . . but this is the same as saying an expansion of
number (epektasis arithmou) and the opposite contraction (systol). 23 The
text suggests that Plotinus uses analogically the arithmetical understanding of number for the bidirectional state of multiplicity to the extent that
Plotinus pair of One and multiplicity, which we dened in chapter 1,24 is
better suited to the title of One and number.
Like Platos cosmology in the Timaeus, Moderatus denition of number
has motion at its foundation: all of number unfolds and enfolds to the monad
as a starting and an ending point. Moderatus bidirectional motion of number
is woven into Plotinus understanding of the two directions of multiplicity.25
In the beginning of VI.6.1, Plotinus explains that multiplicity extends in
two opposite directions: rst, as an outward motion (ex poreia) from the
One (VI.6.1.48);26 and second, as an inward motion (pros hauto neneukos)
from the exterior toward the One (VI.6.1.1114).27 While the former explains
how multiplicity derives from the One, the latter illustrates how multiplicity
retains its connection with the One. This bidirectional composition establishes, rst, that the outward motion brings multiplicity to exist as many and
large in a journey foolish and compulsory, which induces an ontological
weakening;28 and second, that the inward motion directs multiplicity toward
22. This may be a good example of the clarity for which Longinus allegedly
praised Plotinus, as Porphyry reports in VP 21.
23. The two terms are not attested in the extant mathematical texts.
24. See the end of the chapter.
25. Charles-Saget does not note this parallel. She (1980: 32) denes the
bidirectional procession of Multiplicity as dispersion (de lun au multiple, il y a
dispersion, cart progressif lgard de soi-mme et du principe, donc mouvement
vers linnit, linconsistance, le mal) and concentration (du multiple vers lun,
dans le recueillement et linclination vers soi, se produit au contraire le resserrement
de ltre, le progrs vers lexistence et la possession de soi).
26. Further represented in I.8.7.1720 as a bidirectional process including
ekbasis and hypobasis, as discussed on p. 39.
27. On the concept of procession in Plotinus, see Trouillard (1955). On the
relationship between the two directions as proodos and epistroph, see Corrigan
(2005: 2830).
28. VI.6.1.1113: d' jv porea mtaiow . . . tan gnhtai pol
mga.

48

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

TABLE 2.1. Correlation of the Characteristics of Multiplicity Unfolding and

Enfolding
Outward Direction
(ex poreia, VI.6.1.48)

Inward Direction
(pros hauto neneukos, VI.6.1.1114)

Unable to tend to itself

(adynaton eis hauto neuein)

Desires to tend to itself

(heautou desti pros hauto neneukos)

Pours forth and expands

(chetai kai ekteintai skidnamenon)

Seeks itself inward

(hauto ztei)

Becomes multiplicity
(plthos ginesthai)

Each thing exists more in belonging to

itself
(mallon de estin hekaston . . . hotan
heautou i)

Becomes magnitude
(megethos ginetai)

Does not possess quantity and size

(ouch hotan gentai poly mega)

Abides always expanded

(aei cheomenon menon)

Exists turned inwardly

(estin . . . hotan heautou i)

itself and, by seeking its original source, partially compensates the ontological
loss accrued during its outward expansion.29 If the outward motion is based
on the inability of multiplicity to tend to itself, then the inward motion is
based on the ability of multiplicity to seek itself.30 The characteristics of the
inward direction bring multiplicity closer to the One and thus are antithetical
to the nature of the outward direction, as demonstrated in table 2.1.
Like Moderatus progression of number, multiplicity ows from the
One through the ontogenic interaction between the Monad and the Indenite
Dyad, and ends with everything that exists. As a result of this action, multiplicity comes to be and abides in its expanded state. The inward direction, like Moderatus regression of number, turns itself toward its starting
point and loses its quantity and size. The inward turning of multiplicity
provides an ontological damage control of the outward direction. Although
plthos is unable to tend to itself originally and, pouring out of itself, scatters
to become multiplicity, it retains its desire to tend to itself and thus seeks
itself inward.31 If we consider the inward motion of multiplicity within the
context of Intellects perception of the One as many (plthynomenon), the
29. VI.6.1.1213: mllon d stin kaston . . . tan auto .
30. Respectively, VI.6.1.4: dunaton ew at neein and VI.6.1.11:
at zhte.
31. VI.6.1.16: t d prw at t ndon n. Cf. VI.9.12.

MULTIPLICITY AS NUMBER

49

self-turning direction of multiplicity reects the self-turning direction of the

One (V.1.6.1819).32 When plthos is turned inwardly, it looks away from its
manyness and size in an attempt to restore its ontological unity with the
One. Corresponding to Moderatus denition of the monad as the absolute
limit of number, Plotinus characterizes the Monad in the Indenite Dyad
as the limit of multiplicity. Similarly, since Moderatus perceives no number
outside of the monad, Plotinus nds nothing outside of the nite universe.33
Just as, according to Moderatus, all numbers progress from and regress
to the monad, multiplicity, according to Plotinus, dynamically constructs the
universe by unfolding from and enfolding to the One. Plotinus conceptualizes the two directions of multiplicity in terms of the properties of number
to increase and to decrease.

Multiplicity as Efuence and Unity

So far we have discovered traces of both Moderatus and Numenius in Plotinus
concept of multiplicity, and the omission of Nicomachus, from whom we actually have a complete extant work, is becoming rather conspicuous.34 Now is
the time to address this. In different treatises of the Enneads, Plotinus refers
rather explicitly to Nicomachus threefold denition of number.35 The view
that multiplicity is limited in VI.6.1 points to Nicomachus understanding of
number as limited multiplicity (plthos hrismenon). The reference to mathematical number as multiplicity of henads (plthos henadn) in VI.6.5.6 points
to Nicomachus denition of number as a combination of units (monadn
systma). But, above all, Nicomachus denition of number as a ow of quantity made up of units (posottos chyma ek monadn sygkeimenon) is most likely
behind one of the most vivid images of the transcendent nature of the One in
the Enneads:
If one enquires, therefore, where the living beings come from, one
is enquiring where the sky there comes from; and this is to enquire
32. There is a tempting parallel between the self-tending ability of the One
(prw at neneukw, VI.6.1.1314) and Porphyrys description of Plotinus
self-turned attention (tn ge prw autn prosoxn, VP 8.20).
33. VI.5.9.3437.
34. Nicomachus lived in the rst half of the second century and was
slightly older than Numenius. Dillon (1996: 352353, 361362).
35. Ar. I.7.1. Following Euclid, Elementa VII. Def. 2. Aristotles denition is
similar, Metaph. 1020a13: plyow . . . t peperasmnon riymw. See DOoge
(1926: 190). On Plotinus use, see OMeara (1993: 6061).

50

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

where the [universal] living being comes from, and this is the same
as where life comes from, and the universal life and universal Soul
and universal Intellect, when there is no poverty or lack of resource
there, but all things are lled full of life, and, we may say, boiling
with life. They all ow, in a way, from a single spring (h hoion rho
ek mias pgs), not like one particular breath or one warmth, but as
if there was one quality which held and kept intact all the qualities
in itself. . . . (VI.7.12.1926) 36
In light of Nicomachus denition of number as a ow (chyma), the passage does not simply offer a literary metaphor of the efuence of the One
but presents a literal explanation of the ontological productive power of the
One.37 The transcendent nature of the One itself elicits the metaphor of owing. Since, for Plotinus, multiplicity is number, the owing of the One
must also be number. Since the Ones productive power is omnipresent and
multiplicity is the numbered expression of the One, the universe, while being
regulated by number, ows out of the One.38 Such ow, in turn, denes existence and the spring (rho) in the text is not a metaphor, but a conceptual
synonym for number. I will return to the relationship between the One and
number, but here I should note that the dependence of the universe on both
the One and number juxtaposes the two concepts and raises the question of
whether the One itself is number.39
The efuence of the One according to number best illustrates the unity
of Plotinus universe. Dependent on the One, the universe as multiplicity
extends outward and contracts inward, akin to the behavior of number in the
denitions of Moderatus and Nicomachus.40 Plotinus summarizes:
Now [multiplicity there is not Evil] because the multiplicity is unied (hntai to plthos) and not allowed to be altogether multiplicity,
36. The treatise immediately succeeds VI.6 in Porphyrys arrangement.
Armstrong (1988: vol. 7, 126127) points out the connection of this passage with
Aristotles De Anima 405b2629, which distinguishes the etymologies of the
Presocratic ideas of to live (zn) and to boil (zen).
37. On metaphor as Platonic ontological concept, see Gerson (1997:
298299).
38. Other vivid ow metaphors in Plotinus include the procession of the
unlimited (II.4.11.31), the fountain-like multiplicity (IV.7.4.32), the suns energy
(IV.5.7.5), and Souls presence (VI.7.11.59).
39. See the discussion of substantial number and the One in chapter 5.
40. Charles-Saget (1980: 37) recognizes the remedial force of Plotinus
argument here: Au pralable (3, 2, 9), une correction simpose: la multiplicit
nest un mal comme le premier chapitre voulait le suggrer.

MULTIPLICITY AS NUMBER

51

being a one-multiple (hen on plthos). And because of this it is less

than the One, because it has multiplicity (hoti plthos echei), and in
so far as it is compared with the One, it is worse; and since it does
not have the nature of that One, but has gone out from it, it has
been diminished, but it keeps its majesty by the one in it, and it
turned back its multiplicity to one and there it stayed. (VI.6.3.49)
The above passage concerns multiplicity in the intelligible. The unity of
multiplicity, albeit inferior to the unity of the One, carries with it the notion
of the absolute unity of the One. Having gone out of the One (ekbebkos),41
the unity of multiplicity is inferior (elattoutai, VI.6.3.6) to the absolute unity
of the One and always remains a degree away from the perfect unity of its
source.42 But, as far as tending to itself and its source, the One, multiplicity
gains its ontological value. Through inward contemplation, unity brings the
multiplicity of all beings closer to the One and farther away from physical reality.43 The centripetal orientation of every level of the architecture of
Plotinus universe serves a cosmological purpose. It is the counterpoint to
the cosmogonical nature of the outward direction of multiplicitys separation
from the One and gathers the multiplicity of all intelligible beings and their
sensible representations in a bondlike unity.44
The preeminence of the concept of unity in the organization of the universe also claries the distinction Plotinus makes between multiplicity (to plthos) and many (ta polla) that I introduced at the end of chapter 1.45 The former
refers collectively to every thing as a whole. The latter refers to multiplicity as
consisting of individual things. For example, Plotinus uses the terms monad,
triad, and myriad to denote something that exists as one unity, while, when
he refers to numbers as composite from individual things, he uses the numbers one, three, and ten thousand.46 If we relate this distinction to the cosmological standpoint of multiplicity as a separation from the One, then we nd
another reason to talk not about the traditional pair of One (hen) and Many
(polla),47 as Plato does, but rather about the One (to hen) and Multiplicity
(plthos), as Plotinus does. The predominant use of plthos throughout VI.6
suggests that the focus of the treatise is upon the unity of multiplicity relating
to Moderatus monad as the rst principle of numbers (tn arithmn arch),
41. Referring to ekbasis (I.8.7.18), discussed p. 39.
42. VI.6.3.45: keklutai pnth plyow enai n n plyow.
43. VI.6.3.3: n tow osin ntvw plyow.
44. VI.9.2.20: poll mrh ka sundetai n t poll tata.
45. See p. 40.
46. VI.6.10.
47. The rst reason is the ontological distance of multiplicity from the One,
discussed pp. 3840.

52

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

and not upon the segmented multiplicity relating to Moderatus one as the
principle of enumerated things (tn arithmthn arch).
Now is the time to address the question of why I think Moderatus and
not Nicomachus is the primary source of inuence on Plotinus formulation
of the concepts of multiplicity and number, even though Moderatus thought
is documented only in scraps of fragments, and Nicomachus work is better represented in its extant form. It is interesting that Porphyry mentions
Moderatus twice among the philosophers whom Plotinus used extensively
in his lectures,48 while he explicitly omits Nicomachus. That Porphyry is
familiar with Nicomachus work is obvious from the references to his teachings in the Life of Pythagoras.49 Why does he leave out Nicomachus in the
Life of Plotinus? I do not think the question can be answered with the current evidence. Nicomachus famous denition of number as a ow of number
composed of monads50 is undoubtedly at the foundation of Plotinus favorite
imagery of the efuence of the One.51 But Nicomachus does not address, at
least in his extant works, two very important elements that are present in
Moderatus and Plotinus: rst, the understanding of number as a motion from
and to the monad; and second, the conceptual difference between the monad
(monas) and the One (hen) and between numbers (arithmoi) and numerable
things (arithmta). Nicomachus, although distinguishing between paradigmatic numbers that preexist in the divine realm and arithmetical numbers,52
does not offer an extensive cosmological account explaining the difference
between intelligible and scientic number.53 The latter is the sole object
of his Introduction to Arithmetic, while the former is briey referenced in
chapter I.6 and expanded in his section in the Theology of Arithmetic.54 Above
all, Nicomachus does not even talk about the above as two separate kinds of
number, nor does he elaborate on their relationship. On the other hand, as
demonstrated in the previous section, we nd the answers to all these questions in what little text is attributed to Moderatus. Thus I rest my case.
The denition of multiplicity as apostasis in VI.6 infuses the motion,
inherent in the cosmogony in the Timaeus, with Neopythagorean content.
48. VP 20.75 and 21.7.
49. VPyth. 20.3 and 59.1.
50. Ar. I.7.1: posthtow xma k mondvn sugkemenon.
51. II.4.11.31, IV.7.4.32, IV.5.7.5, VI.7.11.59.
52. Ar. I.6.1.
53. Nicomachus terminology is not completely dened. He calls scientic
number epistmonikos (Ar. I.6.4.2) but talks about intelligible number in a
roundabout way without referring to it with a specic term. I think the closest
term to his meaning would be intelligible (notos) number, which DOoge (1926:
9899) translates divine.
54. DOoge (1926: 99).

MULTIPLICITY AS NUMBER

53

Plotinus view weaves together Moderatus concept of number, Numenius

concept of the First God as stability and innate motion, and Nicomachus
concept of number as a ow. As a result, Plotinus cosmology is based specifically on the Neopythagorean denitions of number. Just as the monad is the
limiting principle of quality in Moderatus, Plotinus concept of multiplicity
denotes multiplicity limited by numbers. For Plotinus, multiplicity is nite,
not innite, and number belongs to the intelligible realm, not to the theoretical world of mathematics. This conceptual parallel suggests that number
may have a more signicant role in the organization of the intelligible realm
than scholars have recognized and that Plotinus brings the Neopythagorean
underground to the Platonic foreground.

3
The Number of Innity
In the study of Plotinus concept of number, Aristotle should come when
Plotinus himself introduces him. Otherwise, the long history of the debate
between Aristotle and Platos successors on the concept of number may overshadow Plotinus position on the issue.1 If we want to investigate the latter,
we need to see the debate through Plotinus eyes.
The difculty with Platos concept of number begins with his unwritten doctrines, in which he talked about the Good, Limit, and Unlimited
as primary principles and allegedly equated numbers with the Forms.2 The
latter conceptually denes the ontological role of numbers by implying that
numbers have a metaphysical property, different from their enumerating or
arithmetical property. Aristotle, following his scientic method of examination, attempts to understand Platos ontological view of numbers by investigating their arithmetical nature because it is more objective. First Aristotle
probes Platos understanding of innite number in Prm. 142b145a, which
contains the Second Hypothesis that the one partaking in being is both limited and unlimited. While this passage has attracted much scrutiny, Plotinus
treatment of it in VI.6.23 has received minimal scholarly attention for three
main reasons. The topic of the number of innity is seemingly outside of
the principal relationship among the three hypostases; it is in a treatise
that, too, is outside of the main Neoplatonic interest; and not least, within
VI.6, the topic itself has an outside position, hidden between the discussions
of multiplicity in VI.6.1 and the primary subject of the treatisethe role of
number in the intelligible, in VI.6.414. In addition, Plotinus treatment of
the number of innity, as he calls it, is usually considered extraneous to the
denition of number proper. Charles-Saget identies the main purpose of
VI.6.23 to be the discussion of number and innity from both a quantitative and an ontological perspective, with emphasis on the latter.3 A detailed
examination, however, suggests that the primary focus of the chapters is
the origin of number from the Indenite Dyad. Since the rst chapter of
VI.6 deals with the general explanation of the origin and characteristics of
1. See pp. 38.
2. Refer to Ross (1951: 142153) and Krmer (1990: 6971, 93113).
3. Charles-Saget (1980: 3435).
54

THE NUMBER OF INFINITY

55

multiplicity as number, the next two chapters must address specically the
origin of number at the metaphysical level, that is, the generation of number
from the Indenite Dyad.
It seems that Plotinus wishes to do more than simply set out Platos
views. His concept of the three hypostases needs clarication, rst from a
cosmogonical and then from an ontological viewpoint, about how exactly
number is generated and precisely what it does in the intelligible. While
Rist has made much sense of the role of the Indenite Dyad in the intelligible and Nikulin has dealt with the ontological aspect of the concept of number, Plotinus contribution to Aristotles debate on Platonic number remains
unexamined.4 In this chapter, I argue that Plotinus introduces the subject of
the number of innity after the discussion of multiplicity in VI.6 not only to
illustrate Aristotles misconception of Platonic numbers but also to explain
the relationship between multiplicity as number and the Indenite Dyad as
the principle from which numbers originate. The notion that multiplicity is
number, established in VI.6.1, propels Plotinus to expand on his understanding of the Ideal Numbers before his explanation of the role of number in the
intelligible realm in the central chapters of the treatise (VI.6.414).
The question about the number of innity is raised in the beginning of
the second chapter of VI.6.5 At rst glance, the question seems sudden and
without an apparent relation to the discussion of the separation of multiplicity from the One in chapter 1. At second glance, however, if we consider
the nding of chapter 2 that multiplicity is number, the context of the question emerges. Because Plotinus understands multiplicity as a collective term
denoting the cosmological role of number in the universe, it is logical for him
next to ask if multiplicity, that is, number proper, is nite or innite. Initially
he formulates the question as what, then, about what is called the number
of the innite (VI.6.2.1), which he immediately rephrases into how it is
a number, if it is innite (VI.6.2.2). The latter echoes directly Aristotles
famous conclusion at the end of Metaph. 1083b that number must be either
innite or nite.6 This strong conceptual resonance suggests that Plotinus
intends his discussion to regard not Platos but Aristotles position.
Plotinus discussion of the problem of the number of innity marks his
entry into the greater debate Aristotle wages against the Platonic doctrine
4. Rist (1962a, 1962b); Nikulin (1998a, 2002). Ross (1951: 185) does not put
Plotinus, Iamblichus, or Proclus on his list of later philosophers who have dealt
with the Indenite Dyad. Maybe his goal is to trace the concept in Aristotles
commentators from Theophrastus to Asclepius.
5. VI.6.2.1: t on p to legomnou riymo tw peiraw; VI.6.2.2:
pw riymw, e peirow.
6. Metaph. 1083b3637: ti ngkh toi peiron tn riymn enai
peperasmnon. Cf. Metaph. 1020a13.

56

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

that the Forms are numbers. Plotinus uses the concept of the number of
innity to begin his defense of Plato and the Platonists because it allows him
to explain the relationship between number and the Indenite Dyad and the
role of number in the intelligible realm. This discussion further enables him
to move, in VI.6, from the subject of multiplicity in general to the examination of the role of number proper in the intelligible. The denition of separation of multiplicity from the One in VI.6.1 sketches the big cosmological
picture. Next he needs to provide the details of how multiplicity, as number,
unfolds into the universe. Since for Plotinus, as for all Platonists, numbers
originate from the Indenite Dyad, he must rst address Aristotles misconception of Platos reference to the Indenite Dyad and innite number.

Platos Position
Surprisingly for his Platonic attitude, Plotinus does not begin the analysis of
Aristotles position with a discussion of Platos original text on the Second
Hypothesis (Prm. 142b145a), which introduces the terms of innite multiplicity (apeiron plthos) and innite number (apeiros arithmos), but with
Aristotles interpretation of Platos ontological as well as mathematical explanation of the generation of numbers (Metaph. 1083b). Plotinus goes directly to
the crux of the problem that Aristotle does not distinguish between the ontological and mathematical side of number. Aristotles disagreement with Plato,
however, goes further back to the beginning of Metaphysics (987b2934),
where he criticizes Plato because, unlike the Pythagoreans, Plato considers
unity (to hen) and numbers to be different from the material things, introduces
the Forms, postulates a dyad to be a nature different from unity, and makes
this dyad generate all numbers excluding the primes. 7 This line of criticism
reveals that Aristotle dismisses the ontological interpretation of Platos argument, although Platos line of reasoning is completely based on it.
For example, in Prm. 142d9143a, Plato proves that, in order for one
to exist, it must contain two parts (existence and oneness). In turn, each of
these two parts contains two others (existence and oneness), and so on and so
forth. From this, it follows that, as Sayre notes, the one in H2 [the Second
Hypothesis] might be indenitely multitudinous . . . and to hen, because of its
unstable constituency (its parts always becoming two), is capable of yielding

7. Earlier in Metaph. 986a1617, Aristotle explains that, according to

Plato, number is an underlying principle of existence (archn einai) and acts
like a matter for beings (hs hyln tois ousi). Perhaps in direct opposition to this
passage, Plotinus concludes in V.1.5.9 that number is as substance (hs ousia),
discussed pp. 6870.

THE NUMBER OF INFINITY

57

an apeiron plthos, not that it will do so willy-nilly. 8 Sayre rightly argues

against Cornfords analysis of the passage as a deduction of the existence
of the unlimited series of numbers 9 by pointing out that Platos text never
suggests that the innite multiplicity (apeiron plthos) should be arranged in
innite series. Instead, we should interpret the innite multiplicity only as
indenitely multitudinous and thus different from the innite number (apeiros
arithmos) in Prm. 144a6. Parmenides makes the transition from indenite
multiplicity to innite number by xing the initial indenite multiplicity into
a set of distinct entitiestwo, three, twice two etc. 10 If there is the pair
of one-being, then there is a number. If there is a number, then there is an
innite number (1 + 1 = 2; 2 + 1 = 3; etc.),11 meaning that a set of numbers
is innitely numerous (apeiros arithmos). Therefore, Plato summarizes, one,
itself cut up by being, is many, indeed, unlimited in multitude. . . . Thus, not
only is being one many, but also one itself, divided up by being, is necessarily
many (Prm. 144e39). The summary concludes the deduction that one and
being are equinumerous in the sense that each part of being is one part (oneness) and each oneness is such a part (existence). By saying that number and
being are innitely numerous, Plato means that there is no nite number of
single things that exist and yet one, as a part, is limited to the wholeness of
that which it is a part (Prm. 144e9145a2).12 At the end, Plato concludes that
the one that is (to hen . . . on) . . . is both one and many, is a whole and has
parts, and is limited as well as innitely numerous. 13 In other words, Plato
explains that as far as being is concerned, number is limited to being; as far
as number proper is concerned, number is innite. This symbiotic duality
between being and number, however, Aristotle does not recognize.
Considering the straightforwardness of Platos reasoning, it is surprising
that Aristotle rejects the proposition that there can be both innitely many
numbers and no specic number representing innity, in spite of his promotion of the same line of thinking in Ph. 207a33b15. Consequently, he insistently argues that, if the Forms are numbers, then it is impossible for innite
8. Sayres quotation marks and italics (1996: 166, 167).
9. Cornford likely draws his conclusion from Metaph. 1083b1084a. Sayre
(1996: 171).
10. Turnbull (1998: 7482) refers to it as the two machine and the three
machine of number. Also referred to in VI.6.2; see pp. 6566.
11. Turnbull (1998: 7578) points out that the phrase et cetera in the
above series conveys exactly the notion of the innity of number in a vast
mathematical combinatorics. For the relationship of Platos arithmetical exercise
and Greek mathematics, see Turnbulls discussion of Euclids view of numbers as
multitudes of units (1998: 7475).
12. Sayre (1996: 174175).
13. Prm. 145a2.

58

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

number to exist either intelligibly or as an object of sense perception because

if it had intelligible existence, it would be represented phenomenologically by
a nite magnitude.14 So why is Aristotle on the wrong track here?
Aristotle misinterprets Prm. 143144 as demonstrating Platos account of
the actual generation of numbers as if numbers did not exist prior to this
exercise in the Parmenides, as Sayre quips.15 In fact, Parmenides only proves
that number is unity and that all number exists, although it comprises an innitely numerous set. Aristotle, however, interprets this passage as describing
the generation of number itself and concludes in Metaph. 1083b361084a4
that there cannot be innite number because the generation of numbers is
always of an odd number or an even one. 16 In this statement, he conates
Platos use of innite multiplicity (apeiron plthos) and innite number
(apeiros arithmos) in the Second Hypothesis in Parmenides. He considers the
latter as a reference to innite sets of numbers and the former as a representation of Platos deduction that all number, including innite number, exists.17
Such combining of the ontological and mathematical aspects of Platos innite number only conrms Aristotles skepticism that number has a separate
ontological existence, but does not prove the fallacy of Platos position.

Aristotles Criticism of Plato and the Platonists

The section of the Metaphysics that contains Aristotles criticism of Platos
innite number 18 is described by Annas as an unconnected string of arguments beginning and ending abruptly and with no connecting topic.19 This
evaluation points out the abrupt transitions in the ow of Aristotles argument from disproving Platos view to rejecting the Platonic theories of number (both of which occupy about two-thirds of the chapter), and nally to
ending the section with a short and unsatisfactory exposition of his own
view.
Metaph. 1083a1084a concludes Aristotles criticism of Platos alleged
view that the Forms are numbers.20 The debate about the relationship between
Forms and numbers originates from Aristotles representation of Platos
position according to his unwritten doctrines rather than from an explicit
14. Ph. 206a21206b33. For a defense of Platos views from Aristotle, see
Kouremenos (1995: 6271).
15. Sayre (1996: 171).
16. Trans. Annas (1976: 108).
17. For a detailed analysis, Sayre (1983: 9899).
18. Metaph. 1083a1084a.
19. Annas (1976: 176).
20. Metaph. 987b1429; 1028b1832; 1081a; 1085b.341086a.18; 1088b34.

THE NUMBER OF INFINITY

59

discussion in the dialogues.21 Throughout the dialogues, we nd pieces that

may form the foundation of Aristotles presentation of Platos late doctrine
of Form-numbers. In R. 525cd, Tht. 195d196b, and Epin. 990c6,22 Plato
speculates that numbers participate in our intelligence and exist separately
from the things that they enumerate. In the Sph. 238a1011, the Eleatic
Stranger generalizes that at any rate, we consider all number to be among
the things that exist. 23 Based upon Platos works and especially the unwritten doctrines, Aristotle synthesizes that Plato considers the mathematicals
as intermediaries between the Forms and their material copies. For example, the idea of a triangle is the same regardless of whether it is drawn on
sand, molded on a piece of wood, or construed in our minds. As Merlan
puts it, mathematicals mediate between ideas and sensibles in that they
share changelessness with the former, multiplicity with the latter. 24 They
are ontologically superior to the physical world and yet, despite representing unchangeable concepts, they are ontologically inferior to the Forms. If
the Forms are numbers, then, the Form-numbers must differ both from
numbers representing mathematical objects and from numbers enumerating
physical multiplicity.
Aristotle begins the discussion in Metaph. 1083a by asking whether there
is a difference between number, representing quantity, and monad, representing quality.25 If there is a difference, he speculates, the former would
represent quantity (poson), the latter quality (poion).26 In other words, the
Ideal Numbers should be distinguished not according to quantity (kata to
poson) but according to quality (kata to poion).27 Nevertheless, the distinction
21. Merlan (1967: 15); Annas (1976: 1 and especially 41): Platos theories
about the foundations of mathematics, the derivation of numbers and (later) of
geometrical objects do not gure in the dialogues. They have to be recovered
from indirect sources.
22. Regarding the Epinomis, I follow the scholarship on the subject, which
traditionally leaves aside the problem of Platos authorship.
23. Sph. 238a10: riymn d tn smpanta tn ntvn tyemen.
24. Merlan (1967: 16).
25. He distinguishes better the ontological kind of number by calling
it eidtikos arithmos in Metaph. 1086a25: o mn gr t mayhmatik
mnon poiontew par t asyht, rntew tn per t edh
dusxreian ka plsin, psthsan p to edhtiko riymo ka
tn mayhmatikn pohsan. On Plotinus preference of ousids over eidtikos
arithmos, see pp. 7576.
26. Metaph. 1083a13: pntvn d prton kalw xei diorsasyai
tw riymo diafor, ka mondow, e stin. ngkh d' kat t
posn kat t poin diafrein.
27. Metaph. 1083a23.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

between the two is impossible, he argues, rst because the qualitative

differences28 among numbers (such as compositeness, primeness, and dimension) are ultimately based on their discrete quantities and second because it
is irrational to claim that numbers are sui generis.29 Aristotle deems the latter sufcient to end the discussion outright.
Aristotles distinction between mathematical and ideal number is not
analytical but hypothetical. His chief complaint lies in the origin of numbers, which he believes must be quantitative, not qualitative. The monad,
without quality of its own, cannot produce qualitatively different numbers,
whereas the indenite dyad can produce the numbers only quantitatively (ou
poion h de posopoion).30 At any rate, it seems that Aristotle wants to promote
the position that, if numbers are separate ontological entities, they must have
separate quality, not quantity. Thus he looks for a distinction based upon
ontological difference. Such a distinction, however, is impossible, according to him, because it supposes that they are primary substances. From the
Categories and the Metaphysics, we know that he considered substance prior
to the categories of quality, quantity, and rest.31 Therefore neither quality
nor quantity could produce the primary ontological difference in numbers,
because each one of them includes the denition of substance in their being,
whereas the denition of substance does not include any of them. I will later
return to discuss the implications of Aristotles view on quantity as a category
for Plotinus concept of number.32 For now it should sufce to say that, in the
discussion of quantity and quality in Metaph. 1083a, Aristotle concludes that
quantity, and not quality, is the differentiating element in number.
Next this conclusion leads to Aristotles refutation of the theories of
Platos immediate successors, Speusippus and Xenocrates.33 First, he rejects
Speusippus claim that the mathematical numbers alone are the primary principles of existence. He argues that Speusippus claim is irrational34 because,
28. Metaph. 1020b3.
29. Metaph. 1083a414.
30. Metaph. 1083a1112: ti ot' n p to nw tot' ataw
gnoito ot' n p tw dudow. Aristotles description of the indenite
dyad as posopoion is a hapax legomenon, according to Ross (1924: 441). He refers
to it elsewhere as dyopoion (1082a15, 1083b36).
31. Cat. 5, Metaph. 1028a31b2. For a detailed discussion of Aristotles view
on the priority of substantial being, see Witt (1989: 4762).
32. See pp. 110112.
33. See pp. 68.
34. For a defense of Speusippus position, see Dancy (1991: 7798) and
Dillon (2003: 4064). On Aristotles position, see Annas (1976: 188) and Cleary
(1995: 356357). Cf. Iamblichus, Comm. Math. 4 and Pseudo-Iamblichus, Theol.
Ar. 82, 1085, 3.

THE NUMBER OF INFINITY

61

if the mathematical numbers alone exist, every number must have its own
unique originating number, and all numbers would derive from the One.35
Second, Aristotle moves to Xenocrates, only to give him the shortest and
most acerbic treatment. In one sentence, he judges Xenocrates theory to be
the worst because it supposes that the Form-numbers and the mathematical
numbers are the same.36 After dismissing these theories, he states somewhat
approvingly that the Pythagoreans view is more sound because it does not
separate numbers from things but instead postulates that physical things are
numbers. Subsequently, he refutes this view, too, by explaining that, since
things have magnitudes and magnitudes are divisible,37 whereas mathematical number represents abstract units and therefore is indivisible, things cannot be made of numbers because there are no indivisible magnitudes.
If we consider these criticisms in the context of his distinction between
mathematical number and ideal number in Metaph. 1083a, discussed earlier,
it becomes clear that Aristotle is uncomfortable with the subject because
he does not offer an explanation of his own after he lists his objections. In
Metaph. 1083a120, he insists that the difference between the two numbers
is quantitative and not qualitative, since quantity implies that units comprise
number, while quality, pertaining to an objects nature without regard to
quantity or size, implies indivisibility. In Metaph. 1083b817, however, he
switches the argument from quantitative numbers to magnitudes to show
that the quantitative numbers are also indivisible when compared to magnitudes because they represent abstract units. Thus, he concludes, the arithmetic number is monadic.38
The question of the origin of number permeates Aristotles discussion
and forms the core of his disagreement with Plato. The question of whether
the Ideal Numbers derive from the monad or from the dyad rst appears
in Metaph. 1083a1112 and is modied in Metaph. 1083b2325 as to how all
numbers derive from the great and the small. 39 If they do, he speculates,
they can either originate from the great and the small or separately come
from the great and the small. On the one hand, it is impossible to come
from the latter because some numbers would come only from the great and
others only from the small. Thus, the monads would be characterized as
35. Metaph. 1083a2427. Aristotles reference to Plato here should be taken
more as a sarcastic note than as a genuine installment in his argument.
36. Metaph. 1083b13, 1086a511. Annas (1976: 175); Cleary (1995: 356357);
Dillon (2003: 98111).
37. De Generatione et Corruptione 315b25317a18.
38. O g' riymhtikw riymw monadikw stin. This conclusion is
very important for Plotinus own denition of monadikos arithmos; see p. 93.
39. Metaph. 1083b2325: pteron ksth monw k to meglou ka
mikro sasyntvn stn, mn k to mikro d' k to meglou.

62

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

either great or small. On the other hand, numbers cannot come from the
former, because numbers, as separate entities, would be indistinguishable
from one another, if they come from the equalized principles of the great
and the small. But above all, the problem is that the monad is prior to the
dyad and it acts like a form of a Form. But what does the monad come
from, if the Indenite Dyad produces two, and not the monad? Aristotles
questioning and the famous remark about the Indenite Dyad (aoristos dyas)
as two-maker (dyopoios) in Metaph. 1083b36 demonstrate the contradiction
within his mathematical approach of explaining the Ideal Numbers. When
he points out that the monad is prior to the dyad, he is as close as he can get
to making the jump from a mathematical to an ontological perspective. But
he cannot make this jump because, for him, number is not a being (to on),
nor even substance (ousia). Instead, he escapes his ontological stalemate by
calling the Indenite Dyad innite number. 40
In Metaph. 1084a79, Aristotle questions how there can be a Form of
innite number, if the innite number cannot be limited by a Form or a sensible body.41 Annas suggests that Aristotles criticism stems from the interpretation that the Platonists view innity as actual and not potential.42 His
own understanding from Ph. 207a33b15 is that the innite cannot exist in
actuality because (1) it cannot be gone through, as in the case of voice, which
is invisible and (2) it cannot be traversed because that which admits of
being traversed has no end (Ph. 204a14).43 He deduces that, since innity
is unlimited, innity is potentiality:
That the innite does not exist in actuality has been already stated,
but it exists by division; . . . Accordingly, we are left with the alternative that the innite exists potentially. (Ph. 206a1618) 44
Rist, in his seminal article The Indenite Dyad and Intelligible Matter in
Plotinus, cogently argues that Aristotle mistakenly takes the Indenite Dyad
as two separate things, as we saw above in his use of the great and the small,
rather than the potentiality of plurality, which leads to his own mistaken
view of the Platonic generation of Ideal Numbers. 45 Even before Annas and
Rist, Ross shows exhaustively that Aristotle misses the mark in understanding

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Metaph. 1083b3637.
Ross (1924: 446447); Annas (1976: 178179).
Annas (1976: 178).
Apostles translation (1969).
Annas (1976: 178); Cleary (1995: 8284).
Rist (1962a: 100) in support of Ross (1951: 204).

THE NUMBER OF INFINITY

63

the relation between Platos Ideal Numbers and the arithmetical numbers.46
Aristotles rejection of the propositions that numbers, as Forms, are causes of
other things and that numbers are separate from the things they enumerate
drives the split between Aristotle and Plato and the Platonic tradition on numbers.47 Faced with this conceptual impasse, he directs his investigation solely
into the nature of mathematical numbers. In other words, Aristotle chooses to
examine the wrong patient with the wrong tools, and consequently comes up
with the wrong diagnosis. By treating the Indenite Dyad as innite number,
he examines the Ideal Numbers from the perspective of the arithmetical numbers and concludes that the former are nonsensical.48
Aristotles criticism in Metaph. 1083ab, therefore, crystallizes the conceptual differences between the two camps and puts Aristotles mathematical
approach in opposition to the Platonic ontological approach. All later philosophers, especially in the Platonic tradition, have had to grapple with the
issue. Plotinus is no exception to this rule.

Plotinus Answer
Given Platos ambiguous expression of innite number in Prm. 144a6 and
Aristotles reference to it in Metaph. 1083b3637, it is not surprising that
Plotinus himself, after dening multiplicity, tackles the question of the socalled number of innity.49 The use of the participle so-called (legomenos)
in VI.6.2.150 resonates with both Platos expression and Aristotles refutation
of it and reveals Plotinus awareness of the issue.51 While Aristotle seeks to
decipher Platos innite number through mathematical logic,52 Plotinus nds
the answer in Platos ontology. But, while Aristotle understands the origin of
46. Cf. R. 525cd, Tht. 195d196b, Epin. 990c6. Ross (1924: vol. 1, 157177);
Annas (1976: 4); Cleary (1995: 346389).
47. Most eloquently expressed in Metaph. 987b11988a15.
48. Aristotles purpose in studying ontology and mathematics, in fact,
is not very different from the Neopythagoreans efforts. But while the
Neopythagoreans accept the fusion of mathematics and ontology and bring it
to a different conceptual level, Aristotle, although abrogating the fusion, uses
mathematics for the study of ontology.
49. VI.6.2.1: t on p to legomnou riymo tw peiraw; Cf. De
Cael. 272a2; Ph. 203a206b.
50. Perhaps this is a subtle jibe at Aristotles use of so-called (legomenos)
in distinguishing epistemological truth from linguistic expression. Cat. 2. See
Apostle (1980: 53).
51. Repeated later in VI.6.17.34: di t on lgomen peirow riymw.
52. Ph. 204b513.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

number in abstract mathematical operations, Plotinus looks for the origin of

number in relation to the Indenite Dyad and in the intelligible realm.53
For Plotinus, Aristotles rejection of the proposition that the numbers
derive from the Indenite Dyad is most objectionable. Before explaining
the role of number in the intelligible (VI.6.418), he sets out in VI.6.23
to correct Aristotles mistake in Metaph. 1083b in equating the principle of
the Indenite Dyad with the mathematical meaning of innite number
in Metaph. 1083a3537. Aristotle disproves, in Metaph. 1083b361084a17, the
claim that number is either nite or innite.54 First, he dismisses the premise that number is nite by stating that, if the original numbers run up
to ten only,55 then the Forms would quickly run out of numbers to represent the original things. For example, if the number three is inherent in the
Form of man, there will be no numbers for the Form of horse or the Form
of anything else. Also, were three to be the Form of man, it follows that
all other threes will represent Ideas of man, which, in turn, will lead to an
innite number of men (apeiroi esontai anthrpoi).56 Once again, Aristotle
contradictorily examines the Ideal Numbers on the basis of the properties of
mathematical numbers. By forcing the former to behave mathematically, he
shows the impossibility of the Ideal Number Three.
Aristotles refutation of the proposition that number is innite, however, is of greater interest to us because Plotinus responds to it in VI.6.2.
In Metaph. 1084a110, he explains that number cannot be innite for mathematical and ontological reasons. Mathematically, when generated, number must be either odd or even. Ontologically, if Forms are numbers, there
must be a Form of the innite too. The latter, Aristotle argues, is denitely
wrong, because the Platonists conceive the Forms as denite, not indenite.57
Ironically, he gets the ontological reasoning right only quickly to disregard it.
But his mathematical rationale is surprisingly skewed. He refuses to accept
the possibility that there could be a series of innitely many numbers (n)
without determining a nite quantity for n. His refusal is particularly striking since he accepts the same proposition in Ph. 207a33b15.
53. II.4.35; III.8.11; V.3.11.
54. Actually, Aristotle rst says innite (apeiros [arithmos]) and then
nite (peperasmenos), but I have reversed the order because his reasoning on
the innite number leads to the next major point in my analysis.
55. A reference to the Pythagorean view, also held by Plato (Metaph.
1088b10) and Speusippus (Metaph. 1028b2124), that the numbers from one to
ten are the Ideal Numbers that participate in the construction of the universe
through the tetractys (Metaph. 986a89). Cf. Philolaus, fr. 11.
56. Metaph. 1084a1021.
57. Metaph. 1084a79. This rationale shows Aristotles rare acknowledgment
of the Platonic view.

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65

Charles-Saget considers Aristotles discussion of innite number and

mathematical operations in Ph. 203208 to be the main target of Plotinus
critique in VI.6.2,58 since there are certain thematic correspondences between
the two texts: the impossibility that the number of sensibles is innite in
VI.6.2.24 and Ph. 205a; and the assertion that, when we multiply numbers in our mind, we only perform abstract mathematical operations that
do not affect the physical number of things in VI.6.2.47, VI.6.2.1015, and
Ph. 208a1520. In fact, the two thematic correspondences in VI.6.2 and
Ph. 203208 offer a quick summary of Aristotles reasoning on the mathematical innity of number, as they highlight the beginning and end of the
section on innite number in the Physics. I disagree, however, that Plotinus
summarizes this section in response to Aristotles mathematical discussion
of innite number in the Physics. Instead, I think that Plotinus uses the
passage in the Physics to highlight Aristotles tendentious discussion in
Metaph. 1084a. In VI.6.2, Plotinus uses Aristotles view in the Physics only
to refute Aristotles analysis of the Indenite Dyad in the Metaphysics.
That Aristotle equates the Indenite Dyad with innite number in
Metaph. 1083b3537 has great signicance for the bigger picture of Plotinus
argument in VI.6. While the second chapter of VI.6 rejects Aristotles interpretation of the Indenite Dyad as innite number, the third chapter
presents the Indenite Dyad as the principle of limit and unlimited in the
intelligible realm.59 The juxtaposition of the two chapters heightens their
conceptual opposition. It also strongly suggests that Plotinus had Aristotles
original opposition of the two concepts in Metaph. 1083b3537 in mind.
Additionally, the juxtaposition of chapters 2 and 3 bluntly exposes Aristotles
confusion.
The arithmetical behavior of number is certainly a minor concern for
Plotinus. Because Aristotle treats innite number as a mathematical number, Plotinus rst refutes the proposition that number proper originates in
physical reality or in mathematical theory. With his reference to Aristotles
use of abstract manipulation in Ph. 208a1520,60 Plotinus also echoes Platos
so-called two and three machine in Prm. 143d8e7,61 which demonstrates
58. Charles-Saget (1980: 149150).
59. Referred to as one-many (hen polla, V.1.8.26). Cf. Jackson (1967: 322).
Dodds (1928: 132133) does not mark the beginning of the Second Hypothesis in
the Parmenides until 144b, although he considers 142a to be the end of the First
Hypothesis. Regrettably, he does not nd the summary in 142a144b, leading to
the discussion of the number of innity in 144c6, valuable either.
60. VI.6.2.47: But, even if [the one who numbers] makes them twice or
many times as many, he limits them, and even if he takes into account the past
or the future or both at once, he limits them.
61. Turnbull, n. 10.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

that the existence of numbers follows from the existence of the unity at
hand. 62 Plotinus, however, conceives of this unity as the key element relating
number to being. According to him, number proper exists separately from
mathematical number:
No, the generation of number is not in the power of the one who
counts, but it is already limited and stands fast (hristai kai hestken).
Or, in the intelligible, just as the real beings are limited so is the
number limited to as many as the real beings (arithmos hrismenos
hosos ta onta). (VI.6.2.810)
For him, the true nature of number is ontological, not quantitative, and the
origin of number is in the intelligible realm and not a result of mans intellectual mathematical operations. The passage has crucial importance for
Plotinus understanding of the origin of number in the intelligible because
it introduces number as possessing the characteristics of being:63 it is limited (hristai) and therefore exists (hestken). This compatibility makes number and being commensurate in the same way that Plato makes number and
being equinumerous in Prm. 144d1145a.64 For Plotinus, the unity of being
and number stems from the unity of the existence and the oneness of
Platos second hypothesis.
Plotinus reasons toward the existence of the Indenite Dyad in the
intelligible by considering two ways in which innity can exist.65 The rst
supposes that innity exists in the intelligible by suggesting the absurd proposition that innity is an intelligible being.66 The second presumes that innity exists not in the intelligible realm but only in sensible reality.
Naturally, Plotinus focuses on the rst hypothesis. Because innity
is unlimited, it both needs to be limited and shies away from the idea of
limit.67 And yet, when innity is caught by limit,68 place comes into existence (hypest topos, VI.6.3.18). But this is not place in the sense of location
but rather place in the sense of ontological instantiation. The running away
62. Sayre (1996: 171).
63. Paraphrased later in VI.6.3.2 as for what really exists and is, is already
determined by number ( gr fsthke ka stin, riym katelhptai
dh).
64. See the discussion of Platos position in the beginning of the chapter.
65. In his explanation, the focus on the intelligible realm makes the use of
peira independent from the negative connotations associated with physical
matter.
66. Recalling Aristotles second proposition in Metaph. 1084a79.
67. VI.6.3.13: o gr t praw, ll t peiron rzetai;
VI.6.3.1516: t peiron fegei mn at tn to pratow dan.
68. VI.6.3.16: lsketai d perilhfyn jvyen.

THE NUMBER OF INFINITY

67

of innity is movement, not in the sense of spatial movement, since place

occurs only after innity has been caught by limit (VI.6.3.1921), but in the
sense that innity does not stay still (m menei, VI.6.3.2325) in the way in
which number does (hristai kai hestken, VI.6.2.9):
One will conceive it as the opposites and at the same time not the
opposites: for one will conceive it as great and small (mega kai
smikron)for it becomes bothand at rest and moving (hests kai
kinoumenon)for it does really become these. (VI.6.3.2830)
The passage explains the principal difference between Aristotle and Plotinus
and elucidates why Aristotles explanation of the Indenite Dyad is wrong
from the Platonic point of view.69 Aristotle considers the Indenite Dyad
as two things, which he rst calls quantity-maker (posopoios) in Metaph.
1083a13 and later redenes as two-maker (dyopoios) in Metaph. 1083b36.
The former represents the Indenite Dyad as a mechanism that generates
quantity in general, which Aristotle quickly rejects as impossible.70 This
rejection forces him to interpret the Indenite Dyad as some sort of mathematical doubling mechanism that does not create multiplicity in general but
only twos.71 For Plotinus, on the other hand, the great and the small do not
produce quantity, but represent the pair of the principles of rest and motion
(hests kai kinoumenon), possessing the characteristics of stability (stasis) and
innate motion (symphytos kinsis) inherent in Numenius First God.
It is not until Syrianus commentary on Aristotles treatment of number that Aristotles confusion is resolved. Proclus teacher explicitly talks
about the Indenite Dyad qua principle, which is the author for all things
of generative power and procession (proodos) and multiplicity (plthos) and
multiplication. 72 According to him, the Indenite Dyad lls every level of
reality (divine, intelligible, psychic, natural, and sensible) with the numbers
proper to it. Syrianus articulates the concept of the Indenite Dyad as a primary originative principle of the numbers that govern every level of reality.
But Plotinus cannot speak with such clarity on the subject because he needs
rst and foremost to establish that number has ontological meaning and to
distinguish intelligible from arithmetical number. Most likely he has in mind
Syrianus conceptual goal, but what we nd in VI.6.3 and elsewhere in the
69. Rist (1962a: 100) and Sayre (1983: 98), accusing Cornford (1939: 144)
and Taylor (1927: 22) of following Aristotles false lead.
70. Metaph. 1083a1113: ti ot' n p to nw tot' ataw
gnoito ot' n p tw dudow: t mn gr o poin d
posopoin. Discussed pp. 5960.
71. Metaph. 1083b3536: gr ristow duw duopoiw n. Discussed
pp. 5960.
72. In Metaph. 112.35ff. Trans. Dillon and OMeara (2006: 6).

68

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

Enneads are the labor pains of a work in progress, which later allows philosophers like Syrianus to achieve such conceptual clarity.73
Therefore we need to look elsewhere in the Enneads to acquire a complete understanding of Plotinus concept of the Indenite Dyad. The discussion in VI.6.3 is not intended to depict the full picture, but only to reject
Aristotles quantitative interpretation of the Dyad. VI.6.3 ends with the notion
that the Indenite Dyad is a principle pertinent to the intelligible realm. He
further elucidates this position by explaining that what is called number in
the intelligible world and the dyad are rational principles (logoi) and Intellect
(nous) in V.1.5.1314. The equation of number and the Indenite Dyad with
rational principles suggests that they originate from the rst separation of
multiplicity from the One and organize the intelligible realm.
In chapter 1, we discussed the rst separation, in which Intellect contemplates itself as an image of the One in multiplicity.74 The thaumastic
nature of this paradox stems from the two activities of the One. The internal
activity, which the One directs toward itself, prevents it from losing any part
of itself in its productivity. The external activity, directed toward the Second
Hypostasis, reveals itself to Intellect as its own multiplicity.75 Through selfcontemplation, Intellect instantiates itself as many (ho nous houtos ho polys)
and perceives the One as multiplicity.76 Thus, the thinking of Intellect is the
actual activity of the Indenite Dyad, which produces multiplicity.77
So, what is the role of the intelligible numbers and the Indenite
Dyad in this rst act of separation? Although Plotinus introduces them in
the above order in V.1.5, in our examination, we need to reverse this order
because the Indenite Dyad belongs to the efuence from the One when
it rst appears, before it has returned in contemplation upon its source and
become informed, 78 whereas the intelligible numbers pertain to the informed
Intellect seeing its manyness. In V.1.5, we nd that this is the actual order of
separation from the One:
For number is not primary: the One is prior to the dyad, but the
dyad is secondary, and originating from the One, has it as dener,
but is itself of its own nature indenite; but when it is dened, it is
73. This process took about two centuries.
74. See pp. 3536.
75. Here I am happy to use Emilssons lucid analysis of the double activity
of the One (2007: 2230). I regret, however, that his work appeared in print too
late for me to peruse it thoroughly in my book.
76. V.3.11.34: . . . pl jeisin llo e lambnvn n at
plhyunmenon.
77. Rist (1962a: 102).
78. Rist (1962a: 99).

THE NUMBER OF INFINITY

69

already a number, but a number as substance (hs ousia); and soul

too is a number. (V.1.5.69)
The passage not only contributes to the standard postulate in Plotinian metaphysics that the One is metaphysically prior and thus superior to the Indenite
Dyad and the intelligible numbers, but also claries the relationship between
the Indenite Dyad and the intelligible numbers. Note that he only says that
the One is prior to the Indenite Dyad. He does not say that the Indenite
Dyad is prior to the intelligible numbers. The Indenite Dyad and the intelligible numbers are at an equal metaphysical level. The former is the indefinite (aoristos, V.1.5.8), shapeless (amorphos, II.4.4.20) productive efuence
from the One resulting in movement and otherness from the One (kinsis kai
heterots).79 He also compares it to darkness (aphtistos, II.4.5.35) or unformed
sight (atyptos opsis, V.3.11.12). The latter is a result of Intellects contemplation of itself and the unity of the One as many, dened by intelligible number.80
Thus, Plotinus carefully distinguishes between the Indenite Dyad and intelligible number as pertinent to the pre-Intellect and post-Intellect respectively.
Because intelligible number denes the indenite nature of the Dyad, in contrast to Speusippus, Plotinus does not talk about the Indenite Dyad as multiplicity (plthos), because, for him, the intelligible number itself is multiplicity.
The passage in V.1.5 also answers the pressing question of whether the
One itself is number.81 The One is not number internally, but it externally
manifests itself as number, when Intellect contemplates the One. This distinction enables Plotinus to specify that the One is not counted at all: for
it is a measure and not measured, and it is not equal to the other units
so as to be of their company.82 This conclusion has major signicance for
understanding the structure of the intelligible realm. First, it preserves the
suprametaphysical state of the One. Second, it explains that the Indenite
Dyad is not number either. Third, it suggests that intelligible number is an
expression of the external activity of the One. Fourth, it denes the indenite nature of the Dyad only when Intellect contemplates itself and its source.
Fifth, it shows that the Indenite Dyad is the underlying substrate83 upon
79. II.4.5.3133: riston d ka knhsiw ka terthw p to
prtou, kkenou prw t risynai demena.
80. This is slightly different from Rist (1962a: 104), who describes them as
dened by the Forms.
81. I am grateful to Tony Long for stimulating me to pursue this question
by suspecting that the One is number, despite the fact that I reached the
opposite conclusion.
82. V.5.4.1315. On the negative description of the One and negative
theology, see Mortley (1975: 373).
83. V.1.5.1417.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

which the intelligible number acts like a Form,84 as if Intellect was shaped
by the numbers owing through the external activity of the One. The undened nature of the Dyad carries the potentiality of existence85 and intelligible
matter,86 while the dened nature of intelligible number presents the actuality of existence in VI.6.9.28.87 Consequently, intelligible number becomes
being and substance (arithmos de hs ousia, V.1.5.9).88 The explication of the
last result, of course, deserves its own chapter, following next.
Let us combine this discussion about the Indenite Dyad and intelligible
number with the analysis of the previous two chapters. In chapter 1, we examined the origin of Plotinus presentation of multiplicity, although in reversed
order, from the Timaeus. We pointed out the thaumastic element in Platos
conception of the Forms imprinting themselves onto matter in the Receptacle
and in Plotinus denition of multiplicity as separation from the One. While
Plato describes the Demiurges work ordering the primordial chaos of the
primary elements in numerical proportions (Ti. 36a37d), Plotinus makes
intelligible number, as an agent of the external activity of the One, dene
and order the unlimited nature of the Dyad into being and substance. In the
rst separation from the One, the One gives what it does not itself possess:
multiplicity.89 Therefore, Plotinus treatment of the relationship between the
Indenite Dyad and intelligible number conrms the nding of chapter 2 that
multiplicity is number. Multiplicity exists in the intelligible only as Number.90
The Indenite Dyad and intelligible number also relate to the two directions
in multiplicity. At the intelligible level, the outward direction represents the
indenite, preinformed nature of the Dyad, while its inward direction represents the dened and informed nature of intelligible number.
The discussions of the number of innity in VI.6.2 and the Indenite
Dyad in VI.6.3 expose Aristotles misinterpretation of the Indenite Dyad
and place the origin of number in the intelligible realm. As Plotinus says,
quantitative number is only an image (eidlon arithmou, VI.6.2.13) of the true
existence of number in the intelligible and should not be the subject of investigation. VI.6.23 establishes that number and being are inseparable.
84. III.8.11.
85. V.3.11.
86. II.4.5, III.8.11. On the intelligible matter in Aristotle in connection with
Plotinus, see Rist (1962a: 106).
87. See the discussion of substantial number in chapter 4.
88. The relationship between the One, the Indenite Dyad, and intelligible
number is a Plotinian echo of Platos Limit, Unlimited, and Mixture in Phlb.
16d7e1, 27b7c1. Merlan (1967: 21).
89. VI.7.15. Rist (1962a: 103).
90. V.4.2.78 explicitly states from the Indenite Dyad and the One derive
the forms and numbers.

4
Number and Substance
Plotinus Three Hypotheses about Number
in the Intelligible Realm
Plotinus view of the Indenite Dyad, as a principle of potentiality that
the One denes through intelligible number, raises many questions. How
does the Indenite Dyad relate to substance (ousia) and to the hypostases
of Intellect and Soul? How does intelligible number impose limit on the
unlimited? Exactly what is the nature of intelligible number?
Let us follow Plotinus train of thought that examines each of these
questions in the central chapter of VI.6. The refutation of Aristotles view
of the number of innity in VI.6.23 not only defends the Platonic true
numbers, but also univocally denies place for mathematical number in the
intelligible realm. The discussion of the Indenite Dyads relation to intelligible number places number at the level of the rst Monad and Being. This
view requires much consideration as it is at the heart of Plotinus ontology
and represents a new step in the theoretical debate between Aristotle and the
Platonic concept of number.
In his anti-Aristotelian argument, Plotinus does not distinguish intelligible number and mathematical number terminologically; instead, he expects
the reader to understand which one he is referring to by the context of the
argument. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to number in the intelligible realm as intelligible number, adopting Plotinus single use of notos
arithmos in V.9.11.13. As Charles-Saget notes the term is ambiguous because
it implies both the existence of number in the intelligible realm and the
plurality of Forms themselves,1 but again, it is usually possible to discern
from the context which one is meant. Since, at this point of VI.6, Plotinus
completely enters into the discussion of number as part of the intelligible,
the term intelligible number best captures the main focus in the rest of the
treatise. As the argument progresses, he specically uses arithmos to mean
1. Charles-Saget (1980: 42): Cette incertitude o nous demeurons lgard
du sens du nombre intelligible (cest--dire du nombre qui est dans lintelligible,
car intelligible jusquici ne qualie pas le nombre, ne lclaire pas, il le situe
simplement) nest pas leve par une indication quelconque sur le sense de la pluralit
dans les ides elles-mmes.
71

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

intelligible number, even after he denes it as substantial number (ousids

arithmos) in VI.6.9.34.2
In VI.6.23, the two kinds of number are introduced indirectly by
explaining their major difference. He repeatedly states that the generation
of number is not in the power of the one who counts, but it is already limited
and stands fast, that in the intelligible, just as the real beings are limited
so is the number limited to the real beings, and that what really exists and
is, is already determined by number. 3 These statements repeatedly establish
that intelligible number originates in and pertains to the intelligible realm.
Mathematical number, on the other hand, is mentioned only once as an
image of intelligible number.4 As a result, even without proper and explicit
terminology, the two types are characterized by the standard Platonic division of an intelligible paradigm and its physical copy.
After alluding to the distinction between intelligible and mathematical
number in VI.6.2, Plotinus abandons the latter and focuses on the former, since
that which exists and is, has been already determined by number. 5 In the discussion of the order of separation from the One in V.1.5.9, examined earlier,6
Plotinus explains that the One is prior to the Indenite Dyad and denes
the Dyad by number which is as substance (hs ousia). The comparison
of number with substance elucidates the relationship between the Indenite
Dyad and intelligible number, but more important it establishes an ontological relationship between intelligible number and substance. Ontologically the
use of hs in the sense of as in the phrase arithmos hs ousia does not simply compare but equates number with substance within the Indenite Dyad.
Since number denes the unlimited nature of the principle of potentiality,
number induces limit and stability in the intelligible. Furthermore, since limit
and stability imply being, it follows that number must be being. This reasoning leads Plotinus to conceive of number as substance.
This brings us to the subject of the origin of Limit, Being, and the
absolute Monad.7 In V.1.5, Plotinus explains that the One is prior to the
Dyad and denes the Dyad by number. In V.5.5, he further claries that
the dening activity of the One is the rst Monad, which is the principle of
Limit and gives beings substantial existence.8 Nikulin has pointed out that
the intelligible numbers come from the Monad and the Indenite Dyad.9 His
2. Discussed in the last section of this chapter.
3. In order, VI.6.2.89; VI.6.2.910; and VI.6.3.2.
4. VI.6.2.13.
5. VI.6.3.2.
6. See pp. 6869.
7. Peculiarly absent from Rists discussion (1962b).
8. V.5.5.13: tn osan atow pestsato. On the Monad and Being,
see the discussion of substantial number and the Absolute Being in chapter 5.
9. Nikulin (2002: 8185).

NUMBER AND SUBSTANCE

73

conclusion, however, requires further clarication. If the absolute Monad is

the principle of the absolute Being and denes the Indenite Dyad in the
creation of the intelligible realm, then the Monad and the Indenite Dyad
produce not the intelligible numbers, but the multiplicity of beings as intelligible numbers.
The Monad as the rst principle of being underlies the existence of
intelligible numbers. V.5.4 claries that the One does not participate in number but when the dyad comes to be, the monad before the dyad exists. 10
The monad in number participates in the rst Monad as the principle of
existence that represents both unity and individuality. For example, the
two units in the dyad and the wholeness of the dyad both participate in the
monad but in different ways. The dyad is one as a unity and the two units
in the dyad are each an individual unit, which is one as a unity. As Plotinus
says, an army and a house are one in a different way.11 A house is one in
virtue of its continuous structure, while an army is one as a discrete unity.
Like a house, the dyad is one in virtue of its continuity, while the number
two is one as a discrete unity.
The Aristotelian origin of the distinction between continuous and discrete will be discussed later, in the examination of the primary kinds in
VI.23.12 Here it is important to understand Plotinus point that, while both
a house and an army participate in the monad, the monad itself does not
participate in them, but beings acquire their unity and individuality by participation in the monad.13 The monad represents one as the unity and the
limit in being.14
The discussion of the relationship between being and number raises the
question of how intelligible number relates to the Forms. Plotinus considers
three possible ways:15
1. The posterior hypothesis (H1): if each Form is numbered after
it comes into existence, then number is posterior to the Forms
(epiginomenos, VI.6.4.36).

10. V.5.4.24.
11. V.5.4.3133.
12. See chapter 5.
13. V.5.4.2930.
14. VI.6.4.34: since being is of such a kind as to be itself the rst, we
conceived it as monad Nikulin (2002: 77).
15. Nikulin (2002: 7480) analytically construes Plotinus concept of number
without discussing the concept within the structure of the argument in VI.6. His
interpretation is rather concise and does not examine every detail of Plotinus
argument, such as the disproof of H1 and H2 or the discussion that intelligible
number is not incidental.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

2. The simultaneous hypothesis (H2): number is created along with each

Form (synegennth, VI.6.4.67).
3. The anterior hypothesis (H3): number is conceived in and of itself
(autos eph heautou ho arithmos enoth, VI.6.4.10).16
In order to understand the hypotheses correctly, we must remind ourselves
that the temporal distinctions used in expressing relations in the intelligible
realm are actually atemporal.17 The notion of time in the intelligible is only
a coping mechanism of our dianoetic thinking in conveying the relations
of metaphysical superiority and dependency. The above hypotheses, thus,
investigate whether number is, respectively, metaphysically inferior, equal,
or superior to the Forms.
Recalling Platos distinction between numbers enumerating senseperceptible things and numbers representing higher mathematical concepts, Plotinus attempts to answer the above hypotheses through Plato.18 In
VI.6.4.2025, he paraphrases the explanation in Ti. 39bc that men came to
the idea of number by the alternation of day and night. 19 The reference illustrates the fact that numbers simply measure the differences between things.20
He further expounds that, according to Plato, soul enumerates things when
they enter into soul by perceiving them as different. This view supports the
posterior hypothesis (H1) that numbers are inferior to the things they count
and, in the context of the intelligible realm, below the Forms.21
On the other hand, in VI.6.4.2025, he recalls Platos R. 529d24, which
explains that true astronomy is concerned with motions that are really fast
or slow as measured in true number (en ti althini arithmi), delineate true
16. Nikulin (2002: 7475) counts four hypotheses: the number may be either
after, together with, or independent of the Forms and subdivides the last one into
number being independent either before or after the Forms. The last bifurcation,
although important to the nature of intelligible number, does not need to be counted
as two separate hypotheses as it refers to the single premise that number is prior to
the Forms. Therefore, with Charles-Saget (1980: 4142), I count three hypotheses.
17. I should also add space. But, since the three above hypotheses do not
include spatial reference, I have left it out from the main text.
18. Charles-Saget (1980: 42).
19. Continued in Ti. 47a. On Plotinus mind most likely are also the
creation of time as an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity
remaining in unity (Ti. 37d57) and the alternating motions of the sun and the
moon (Ti. 38a78).
20. III.7.12.3133: . . . The god made day and night by means of which, in
virtue of their difference, it was possible to grasp the idea of two, and from this
[Plato] says, came the concept of number.
21. A remote reference perhaps to the future role of Soul as translator of
the intelligible numbers into mathematical numbers; see pp. 114118.

NUMBER AND SUBSTANCE

75

geometrical gures (pasi tois althesi schmasi), and are all in relation to one
another. This passage comes from the much-discussed section on Platos
propaedeutics describing the curriculum designed to train the guardians
minds to grasp arithmetic, geometry, stereometry, astronomy, and harmonics
by reason and thought, not by sight. 22 The order of the disciplines proceeds
from the particular to the abstract. Regarding astronomy, Plato completely
dismisses the knowledge acquired by the senses and argues that real astronomers, that is, the ones with a strong philosophical bent, do not study the
visible appearance of the heavenly bodies movements, but their intellectual
counterparts. The incorporeal mathematical abstractions occupy an intermediate position between the Forms and their physical copies, although they are
closer to the former than to the latter.23 By true numbers and true gures,
Plato means abstract numbers, which lead us closer to the understanding of
the colorless, shapeless, and invisible being, as described in the Phaedrus.24
Thus, Platos true numbers are closer to H2 and H3 rather than H1.
In mentioning Platos true numbers, Plotinus goal is apparently to place
number in the intelligible realm. He achieves this in a peculiar, convoluted,
yet still important manner:
But then when Plato says in the true number (en ti althini arithmi), and speaks of the number in substance (ton arithmon en ousiai),
he will, on the other hand, be saying that number has an existence from
itself (hypostasin tina an aph heautou tou arithmou) and does not have
its existence in the numbering soul (ouk en ti arithmousi hyphistasthai
psychi) but the soul stirs up in itself from the difference in sensible
things the idea of number (ennoian tou arithmou). (VI.6.4.2025)
Plotinus introduces Platos true numbers as the alternative to the posterior
hypothesis (H1). In addition, he explains that Plato speaks of them as numbers in substance and as existence from itself. But Plato does not associate
the true numbers with substance (ousia) in the passage Plotinus refers to in
the Republic. Plotinus skips Platos view that the mathematical number is an
intermediary between the Forms and the physical copies and links the true
numbers directly with being. In his interpretation of Plato, Plotinus fuses the
22. R. 529d45: lg mn ka diano& lhpt, cei d' o.
23. In general, Plato considers geometry as a more advanced discipline than
arithmetic because it works with abstract construction of geometrical gures.
Adam (1965: 129, 166167).
24. Phdr. 247c67: xrmatw te ka sxhmtistow ka nafw
osa. Parallel drawn by Adam (1965: 129). In this particular passage, I
translate ousia as being to be faithful to Platos original use and not to let
Aristotles term substance, which I use throughout, overpower it.

76

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

true numbers in the Republic with Platos description of ousia in the Phaedrus
in order to conceptualize his own idea of the intelligible number as substantial (ousids arithmos) in VI.6.9.34.25 Aristotle does not use Platos true number (althinos arithmos) at all. Indeed, he coins his own term, such as Formal
number (eidtikos arithmos), to signify Platos Form-numbers. Plotinus, on
the other hand, specically quotes Platos true number to show his reception
of Platos view, while he does not even once use Aristotles Formal number.
Plotinus interpretation of Platos true numbers, in VI.6, has three important ideas with programmatic signicance for the concept of the substantial
number. First, according to him, by true numbers, Plato means number
in substance (ton arithmon en ousiai).26 This interpretation entirely shifts
the true number from the realm of mathematicals, as intermediaries between
the Forms and the physical reality, to the intelligible realm. Second, the
explanation that number is in substance leads to the major conclusion that
number has an existence from itself and does not have its existence in the
numbering soul, 27 which places substantial number in Intellect. Third, the
above point allows Plotinus to specify that the soul enumerates by stirring
up in itself the idea of number, which in turn suggests that number belongs
to a higher ontological level than the individual soul.28
Plotinus interpretation of Platos true numbers, then, points to H2 and
H3 in VI.6.4: that number is either simultaneous and equal to the Forms
(H2) or prior and superior to the Forms (H3).

Is Substantial Number Discrete and Incidental?

VI.6.5 begins the analysis of the hypotheses by modifying the main question
about the relationship between number and substance to a question about the
nature of number itself:
What, then, is the nature of number? Is it an accompaniment (parakolouthma) of each substance and something observed in it (epitheroumenon hekasti ousiai)man and one man (anthrpos kai heis
25. In his late period, Plato himself might have distinguished between
true numbers and mathematical numbers as reported by Aristotle, Metaph.
1080b1114, 1083b12, and Syrianus, In Metaph. 186.3036. Annas (1976: 6972);
Nikulin (2002: 73).
26. VI.6.4.21. Plotinus substantial number denotes both Platos being
and Aristotles substance, as discussed in the rest of the chapter.
27. VI.6.4.2123.
28. I believe Plotinus is speaking about the individual soul here as his
point is to deny the sense-perceptible origin of number, although he would have
expressed a similar thought about the universal Soul, too.

NUMBER AND SUBSTANCE

77

anthrpos), for instance, and being and one being (on kai hen on),
and so with all the individual intelligibles and the whole of number
(ta panta hekasta ta nota kai pas ho arithmos)? But how is there a
dyad and a triad, and how are all unied, and how could such and
such number be brought together into one? (VI.6.5.15)
The nal questions seem to retract the conclusion that was reached at
the end of VI.6.4 and reexamine H1. If number is metaphysically inferior to substance, number would accompany substance as it distinguishes
particulars from universals: a man from man, one being from being, the
whole number of beings from all beings.29 But such reasoning follows the
rules of mathematical number, which counts things discretely. It does not,
however, relate to substantial number, because the nature of substantial number possesses internal unity,30 which must not be discrete but indiscrete.31
This reasoning supports the text of V.5.4.2835, discussed earlier,32 that
the monad has substantial unity (kata to hs einai hen), which is different
from the unity of the things that are predicates of it. Take the dyad, for
example, Plotinus insists. What is the inseparable unity of the dyad?33
Obviously, it is not two powers brought together, as if composed into
one, 34 because, if it were, the substantial number would be simply multiplicity of units (plthos henadn).35 Substantial number then would be like
mathematical number, composite and without inherent unity, except in
the case of the monad, which is simple one (to haploun hen) inherently
possessing unity.36
Plotinus argument revisits Aristotles question about the difference
between number and monad (unit) in Metaph. 1083a.37 Aristotle thought
29. Cf. Metaph. 1003b.2230. Armstrong (1988: 20).
30. VI.6.5.45: pw duw ka triw ka pw t pnta kay' n.
This one is the monad as unity, not the absolute One, which does not relate to
anything, o kat' llo (V.5.4.7).
31. The topic of the substantial unity leads to the discussion of Intellect
as one nature in VI.6.7. Cf. the unity of Intellect as always inseparable and
indivisible (e dikritow ka o meristw) in IV.1.1.7.
32. See p. 73.
33. The Indenite Dyad is not strictly speaking a substantial number, but
an ideal principle possessing two powers, potentiality and actuality. Nikulin
(2002: 81).
34. VI.6.5.9: do xei dunmeiw suneilhmmnaw oon snyeton ew n.
35. VI.6.5.6.
36. VI.6.5.67, for one cannot be predicated to itself; thus it cannot make
two. The simple one (t plon n) is perhaps an image of the bare one
(t n ciln, VI.6.11.19) and the pure one (t kayarw n, V.5.4.6).
37. Discussed pp. 5962.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

that, in order for them to be different, they must differ not by quantity (kata
to poson) but by quality (kata to poion). Since he perceives the difference
between number and monad to be only quantitative and not qualitative, he
dismisses the qualitative distinction between them as nonsensical (alogon).38
Plotinus also looks, although not as explicitly as Aristotle, for the same distinction. Just as Aristotle uses mathematical concepts to deny the ontological
meaning of number, Plotinus uses mathematical language to deny the arithmetical characteristics of substantial number. First, he compares substantial number to multiplicity of henads, recalling the mathematical denition
of number proper.39 Second, he explains the dyad as a composite number
(synthetos arithmos).40 Neither attempt, however, satises him as demonstrating the internal and inseparable unity of substantial numbers. This series of
failed attempts reinforces the invalidity of Aristotles conclusion about the
quantitative nature of number and points at Plotinus ontological interpretation of substantial number. In this light, once again H1 proves to be false.
For him, number does not count substance in the intelligible realm.
Next, Plotinus turns to the Pythagorean analogical understanding of
numbers (arithmoi ek tou analogon) in order to exemplify what kind of unity
substantial number has.41 For example, the Pythagoreans speak of the tetrad as absolute justice (VI.6.5.1012).42 The inherent unity of the tetrad is
conveyed by the indivisibility of the abstract concept of justice. By giving a
38. Metaph. 1083a8.
39. Moderatus denes number as systema monadn (see pp. 4344)
whereas Euclid denes it as multiplicity composed of units (t k mondvn
sugkemenon plyow, El. bk. 7, def. 2, bk. 9, def. 22), which is used by both
mathematicians and philosophers later. Plotinus choice of henads in the place of
monads is peculiar, but we cannot make much of it for now since he is usually
inexact in his quotations. Xenocrates, however, speaks of multiplicity from
absolute henads (plyow j ndvn lhyinn) and explains that we do not
use henads in regard to individual bodies (fr. 260, Isnardi Parente). Damascius
is able to distinguish between the two: number is composed of many units
whereas multiplicity is composed of henads (k mondvn gr polln
riymw, t d plyow j ndvn sumplhrotai, De Principiis 129.19).
40. Euclid, El. 7, def. 14; Aristotle, Metaph. 1020b4.
41. VI.6.5.11.
42. Most likely, according to Armstrong (1988: 21), Plotinus refers to
Aristotles treatment of the Pythagorean doctrines in Metaph. 985b23986b8
rather than to their original sources. On the Pythagorean tetrad, see Theol.
Ar. 29: Anatolius reports that it is called justice, since the square (i.e., the
area) which is based on it is equal to the perimeter (trans. Watereld). For
the mathematical details of the concept in Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, see
Ausland (2006: 107123).

NUMBER AND SUBSTANCE

79

certain abstract meaning to the individual numbers, the Pythagoreans denote

the nonquantitative nature of number. Following the Pythagorean method, we
may suppose that the unity of the dyad does not come from the quantitative
addition of two units but is inseparable from the absolute idea of the dyad.
The analogy suggests that the dyad, the triad, and the tetrad in the intelligible are not different from the Form of whiteness, man, or anything else.
The discussion of number as substance invites the question of whether
number is incidental to the Forms (symbebkos), and thus referring to H2.43
Charles-Saget acknowledges the Aristotelian tone of the section only in
passing.44 Her cursory note, however, stems from the expository style of Plotinus
text itself. Plotinus begins by explaining that number is not incidental to the
Forms, just as absolute movement is essential and not incidental. To distinguish essential (kata to ti estin) and incidental movement (symbebkos), he
refers to the discussion of time and movement in III.7.12, which claries
that time measures the movement of the universe, and not movement per se.
Movement per se is a being and thus essential, while movement observed in
a thing is incidental. He concludes that substantial number is not altogether
incidental (oude symbebkos hols), since even incidentals must be something
before they incidentally occur.45 This conclusion is exemplied in VI.3.6
where he explains that the white per se is being (to leukon on) independently from the things to which it is incidental, such as white Socrates
or white thing. 46 Therefore there must be a real existence of whiteness,
although the color white is only observed in things.47 Even if number, like
the color white, is inseparable from the things it is predicated of, number
also must precede man and being, and every thing of which it is predicate.48
Thus, the simultaneous hypothesis (H2) is invalid:
And [Number] is prior to being (pro tou ontos) so that being itself
may succeed in being one (auto tou hen einai); but I mean not that
One which we say is beyond being (epekeina tou ontos) but this
43. His discussion of the second hypothesis is the briefest of the three.
Nikulin (2002: 7480) lists it among his four hypotheses but omits it from his
discussion. Charles-Saget (1980: 43) spends a paragraph on it.
44. Charles-Saget (1980: 43) does not give specic references to Aristotle.
The subject pervades his works. A few most essential references are A. Pr. 90a11;
De An. 406a18; Metaph. 1003a30, 1015b2935.
45. VI.6.5.2627: t gr sumbebhkw de ti enai pr to
sumbebhknai. Cf. VI.6.10.2839.
46. Most likely Plotinus homage to Aristotles frequent use of the color
white in discussing incidentals, Cat. 5a39; Metaph. 1007a32b12.
47. VI.6.5.1820.
48. VI.6.5.2835.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

other one which is predicated of each individual Form (touto to hen

ho katgoreitai tn eidn hekastou). (VI.6.5.3538)
The passage brings to fruition Plotinus protracted labor on the subject.
Substantial number is superior to being because it determines being as one.
The immediate clarication in the passage, that is, that he does not mean the
One beyond being, is not absolutely necessary since the beyondness of the
One is not threatened here. The mention of the One beyond being is useful,
though, because it claries that Number, prior to being, is the monad that
is predicated of each form.49 A decad should not be perceived as composed
of ten separate units but, like a house, as a single unity that has ten powers
brought together in one. The absolute unity of ten (autodekas) must preexist
the Forms,50 as absolute justice preexists just acts. The absolute decad is to
the Forms as the Forms are to sense-perceptible objects.
The major question, then, is that, if the one itself and the decad itself
exist in the intelligible prior to applying to the Forms, what is their absolute nature? Plotinus answer is that we make [intelligible beings] come into
being in thought. 51 To illustrate his point, he quotes Aristotles De Anima,
that in immaterial things the knowledge and the thing are the same. 52 For
Aristotle, the denition of what it is is the same as what it is. 53 In other
words, absolute Justice and the concept of justice are the same. For Plotinus,
however, the denition or the concept of something does not constitute the
thing itself (VI.6.6.1926),54 but the thing itself is nothing else but intellect and knowledge (VI.6.6.2629). Once again, Plotinus comes back to the
major point of disagreement with Aristotle on the number of innity, that
the Forms are absolute beings in the intelligible realm and have separate
existence both from their material copies and from dianoetic thought: true
knowledge is not an image of the thing but the thing itself.55 The absolute
nature of substantial number is in Intellect.

49. Also called riymw at in VI.6.8.5.

50. VI.6.5.3951.
51. VI.6.6.45: lg d de nomzein tn gnesin atn poiesyai.
Also V.1.8. Cf. Parmenides, D-K B 3, 4, and 8. Socrates, too, wants to construct
a city, lg, R. 369c9.
52. VI.6.6.1920: e d tiw lgoi, w p tn neu lhw t at
stin pistmh t prgmati, noted by Armstrong (1988: 27). Cf. De An.
3.5.430a23 and 3.7.431a12.
53. Metaph. 1028a1318. Witt (1989: 54).
54. Armstrong (1988: 26): A clear statement that a Platonic Form is
something very different from a hypostasized Aristotelian universal.
55. VI.6.6.2930: toto d' stn ok ekna to prgmatow, ll
t prgma at.

NUMBER AND SUBSTANCE

81

Thus, the nal stop in Plotinus search for the nature of substantial number is the second hypostasis. The investigation has made a full circle starting
from the relationship between the Indenite Dyad and number in the intelligible and returning to the unity of knowledge and being in Intellect. From
our vantage point, it seems that Plotinus should have addressed this question
immediately after his discussion of the Indenite Dyad, because the question
of how number is Intellect was pressing when he made the equation between
Intellect and multiplicity in V.3.11 and III.8.8.56 Yet, he could not explicate
the relationship between number and Intellect without rst determining that
number precedes the Forms.
Plotinus nds the nal proof that number precedes the Forms in the
nature of Intellect, in which knowledge of the Forms and Forms themselves
are in inseparable unity.57 Absolute motion (autokinsis) of Intellect brings
the thoughts of the Forms (nosis) not as an image of the Forms but as the
Forms themselves (VI.6.6.3134) because motion in Intellect is not incidental but real and the active actuality (energeia) of what is moved, which exists
in actuality. 58 The unity of knowledge and Form suggests once again that
the absolute number (arithmos auto), as Plotinus later denes it in VI.6.8,
precedes the Forms and thus supports the anterior hypothesis (H3).

The Whole Number of Beings

The one-in-many nature of Intellect invites Plotinus to search next for the
unity of substantial number in the second hypostasis in VI.6.78.59 As I
discussed earlier, Intellect contemplates the One by cognizing its own
multiplicity.60 Thus, Intellect, as Gerson formulates it, is the eternal product of the One and is cognitively identical with all intelligibles. 61 In VI.6.7,
56. Discussed pp. 3536 and p. 104.
57. The unity is an intellectual statue, as if standing out from itself and
manifesting in itself, or rather existing in itself (VI.6.6.4042). This is a triple
reference to Socrates comparison of the wholeness of the perfect state to the
overall completeness of a statue in R. 420cd, to Socrates request to view the
intelligible idea of the perfect state coming alive in Ti. 19bc, and to Aristotles
popular example of a bronze statue in Metaph. 984a2425, 1013a25, and Ph. 190a26,
207a28, among many others.
58. VI.6.6.3536: [knhsiw] ntvw, ti m sumbbhken ll, ll
to kinoumnou nrgeia ntow nerge&. This description clearly relates
Numenius concept of the innate motion of the First God to the level of Intellect
in Plotinus.
59. Charles-Saget (1980: 47).
60. See pp. 3536.
61. Gerson (1994: 46).

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

Plotinus repetitively describes this unity of Intellect and intelligibles as one

nature (mia physis),62 rst by quoting Anaxagoras famous expression all
in one together (homou en heni panta), and second, by rephrasing it ontologically as all beings together (homou pantn ontn).63 His paraphrase,
however, underlines the presence of multiplicity in Intellect.64 The apparent reason is that Intellect, as one nature, contains all intelligible beings as
thinking contains all thoughts of Intellect.65 Thus Intellect and beings share
the same intelligible nature. Closely echoing Anaxagoras, Plotinus explains
in IV.1.58 that the whole Intellect one together (homou men nous pas)
is always inseparable and indivisible (aei adiakritos kai ou meristos).66 Since
substantial number is Intellect, as explained in V.1.5.1214,67 then substantial
number must be also inseparable and indivisible from being.68
So what is the content of the one nature of Intellect? In the earlier discussion of V.3.11, we found the rst separation of multiplicity from the One
in the contemplative act of Intellect, in which Intellect sees and knows the
One by seeing and knowing itself as many (nous polys and plthynomenos).69
Intellect, as self-reexive thinking, knows itself as the external activity of the
One by seeing the multiplicity of beings. Copying the internal and external
activities of the One, Intellect, as thinking, turns itself internally to contemplate itself and, in the same act, turns externally to cognize its multiplicity
(VI.6.7.810). So both Intellect and the beings it contemplates share the one
nature of the second hypostasis.70
The explanation of the one nature of Intellect in VI.6.7 elucidates the
bidirectional structure of multiplicity in the intelligible realm, which was
62. One nature is mentioned emphatically twice in VI.6.7.12.
63. VI.6.7.4 and 7; Cf. DK 59B 1.
64. Explaining the one nature of Intellect, Plotinus masterfully refers to
Anaxagoras quote three times without repeating himselfa good illustration of
Corrigans (2005: 4) assessment that Plotinus never says exactly the same thing
twice.
65. VI.6.7.2: man fsin pnta xousan ka oon perilabosan.
66. The context of this statement is the participation of the unembodied
soul in the intelligible realm and the divisibility of its nature, which allows
embodiment.
67. See pp. 6870.
68. The conclusion complements Gersons distinction (1994: 178179)
between discursive divided intellect and undivided Intellect, which makes
discursive thinking possible. Substantial number falls in with the latter.
69. See p. 35.
70. V.9.8.1617: ma mn on fsiw t te n te now, in contrast to
the complete lack of quality in matter (mhdema fsiw) in I.8.10.4.

NUMBER AND SUBSTANCE

83

introduced in VI.6.1. The outward direction represents Intellect thinking all

beings, which are already separated in Intellect forever (VI.6.7.10), whereas
the inward direction constitutes Intellect knowing all beings together in one.
The desire of multiplicity, after its separation from the One, to return to the
One (VI.6.1.16), in fact, begins with the rst act of separation from the One,
which is marked by Intellects contemplation of itself as many. As Intellect
embraces the Forms as one nature (VI.6.7), so is multiplicity circumscribed
by one and retained into unity (VI.6.1.24).
In VI.6.8, the multiplicity of Intellect introduces the concept of the
Complete Living Being (to panteles zion and autozion), which encompasses
in itself all living beings and being one as large as all things. 71 The Complete
Living Being contains the multiplicity of all beings in the intelligible.72 The
whole number of beings has been an undercurrent in Plotinus discussion
of unity since VI.6.4.4, because it expresses the idea that the number of all
beings is nite. The Complete Living Being encompasses the whole number of all living beings (arithmos sympas), and therefore is the absolute living
being (zion prts).73 The intermediary position of the whole number in the
following equation demonstrates that number unies the intelligible realm.74
Equation of the Number of the Complete Living
All Living Beings
ta panta zia

Whole Number = Complete Living Being

[of Living Beings]
= sympas arithmos = to autozion

As Intellect embraces the Forms into the Complete Living Being, so

does the whole number of all beings embrace the multiplicity of all beings
that exist individually. The embracing, however, is not external, as if from
one thing to another, but internal and self-identifying for both Intellect and
71. Respectively VI.6.7.1619 and 8.2. Cf. Platos universal living being (to
zion) in the Ti. 30c31b. Charles-Saget (1980: 47) interprets the one-in-many
nature of Intellect and the Complete Living Being as different aspects of the
intelligible.
72. Hadot (1957: 118119) concludes that Sph. 248e supports Ti. 39e in the
description of the plurality of being in VI.6.8. Charles-Saget (1980: 50), however,
nds Plotinus remarks less convincing.
73. VI.6.8.14.
74. Later Plotinus denes the whole number (sympas arithmos) itself as
encompassing number (periechn arithmos) in the discussion of the presence
of number in the intelligible realm in VI.6.9.31; see the section on substantial
number and the Complete Living Being in chapter 5.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

the beings.75 The division between thinking and beings is articial and is a
result of our discursive thought. In Intellect, the activity of thinking (nosis)
is simultaneous with its own objects (ta onta).76
Where does absolute existence, such as the absolute man (autoanthrpos)
or the absolute number (arithmos auto), come from, then?77 Stripped of the
burden of predication, the absolute substance (althin ousia), according to
Plotinus, is a power that comes from itself and is the most living and intelligent of all:78
If then one should take being rst, since it exists rst, then, intellect, and then the living being (for it is already established that this
contains all things)but intellect comes second, for it is the active
actuality of substance (energeia gar ts ousias); then number would
not be on the level of the living being (out an kata to zion ho
arithmos ei)for even before it one and two existednor on the
level of intellect (oute kata ton noun)for substance was before it,
which was already one and many (pro gar autou h ousia hen ousa
kai polla n). (VI.6.8.1722)
As Charles-Saget notes, the passage recapitulates the ndings that Plotinus
has made thus far in his examination: that Being comes rst in the separation
from the One, followed in due order by Intellect and the Complete Living
Being.79 This summary, however, does not explain the place of number in the
triad of Being-Intellect-Complete Living Being. Substantial number is not
at the level of the Complete Living Being since the Forms already existed
individually,80 nor is it at the level of Intellect, since Intellect is already second in respect to Being, which, in turn, is also one and many. This conclusion dismisses once again the rst two hypotheses introduced earlier at
VI.6.5, that number is either posterior to or simultaneous with the Forms,
and conrms the third hypothesis, that number precedes the Forms and is
at the level of Being.
75. In III.9.1.114, Plotinus claries Platos statement that Intellect sees the
Ideas existing in the real living creature (Ti. 39e79) by explaining that there
is nothing in the statement against both being one, but distinguished by thought,
though only in the sense that one is intelligible object, the other intelligent
subject.
76. V.6.2.1112: Intellect does not have thinking without the object of
thought. Corrigan (2005: 36).
77. VI.6.8.46.
78. VI.6.8.1012.
79. Charles-Saget (1980: 48).
80. As suggested previously in VI.6.4.

NUMBER AND SUBSTANCE

85

Substantial and Monadic Number

The placement of number at the same metaphysical level as absolute substance returns the discussion to the original question, in VI.6.4, about the
relationship between number and substance:
It remains then to consider whether substance generated number by
dividing itself (h ousia ton arithmon egennse ti hauts merismi), or
number divided substance (ho arithmos emerise tn ousian); for certainly either substance and movement and rest and same and other
generated number or number generated them (h ousia kai kinsis kai stasis kai tauton kai heteron auta ton arithmon ho arithmos
tauta). (VI.6.9.15) 81
The idea of division (merismos) of being according to number adds an ontological layer to its primary mathematical meaning.82 The passage examines
the ontogenetic role of substantial number and suggests that this number
is above all intelligibles and among the Platonic primary kinds (being, rest,
motion, same, and other).83 VI.6.6.4142 has already explained that the absolute existence of all intelligibles stands out from itself and manifests in itself,
or rather exists in itself. How does number relate to absolute substance? Is
it a result of our thought and cleverness, or does it exist in the intelligible
realm?84
In order to answer these questions, Plotinus goes back to H3 and further subdivides it into two propositions: rst, if number exists by itself in the
intelligible, number must preexist the Forms; 85 or second, if number exists
by itself, it comes after the Forms. The latter he has already rejected in H1.
Here he points to the apparent paradox, that if being precedes number, then
how it is that being is one being and two beings are two beings. His reasoning claries the second hypothesis in the Parmenides by asserting that the
idea of number is already in us when we count one man and a second man
after him and a succession of other men one after the other.86 So number
81. Losev (1928: 50) labels VI.6.9 as the most difcult text in the history of
Greek philosophy.
82. Heron, Den. 21.1.6; Theon, In Ptol. 457.10, 458.12; Claudius
Ptolemaeus, Syntaxis Math. 1.1.32.6; Diophantus, Arithm. 14.2; Iamblichus,
Comm. Math. 5.39; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 1.159.1.
83. Armstrong (1988: 32). Platos mgista tn genn in Sph. 254255a.
84. VI.6.9.1314: t pino& ka t pibol ka t postsei.
85. VI.6.9.811.
86. VI.6.9.1524. Plotinus uses the same argument against mathematical
number in VI.6.2.

86

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

precedes being in order to count the number of beings and the rst proposition in VI.6.9.2227 turns out to be true:
1. Certainly the beings were not numbered at the time when they came
to be.
2. But it was [already clear] how many there had to be.
3. The whole number, therefore, existed before the beings themselves.87
4. But, if numbers were before beings, numbers are not beings.
5. Number, therefore, was in being, not as the number of beingfor
being was still one.
6. But number was in being as the power of number which, having come
to exist (h tou arithmou dynamis hypostasa), divided being (emerise
to on) 88 and made it, so to speak, in labor to give birth to multiplicity
(hoion dinein epoisen auton to plthos).
The conclusion that the power of number divides being further suggests that
number is a productive power that is either the substance of being (h ousia
autou) or the activity of being (h energeia ho arithmos estai).89 The former
associates it with the intelligible realm in general, the latter with Intellect.90
I discuss the conceptual ramications of this denition in the following
chapter. Now it is important to note that power (dynamis) here signies
actuality and not potentiality as in Aristotle. Plotinus associates number
with substance and ontological productivity. The Indenite Dyad represents
the element of potentiality in the intelligible. His distinction between the
Indenite Dyad and substantial number in V.1.5 clearly suggests that the latter
acts differently from the former.91 If the former is potentiality, then the different act of the latter must be actuality.92 In addition, Plotinus associates
dynamis with productive power and actuality when he describes the productive power of the One. As Armstrong notes, the meaning of dynamis in relation to the One connotes something that is supremely active, not passive; 93
87. Nikulin (2002: 75) makes the following successful comparison: If we
stage a thought experiment in which we create something, we have to know
precisely beforehand how many things are to be produced. In this way, number
has to precede things.
88. Merismos and synthesis are the mathematical terms for division and
multiplication; Heron, Def. 21.1.6; Proclus, In Euc. p. 5, 5.
89. VI.6.9.2728.
90. Brisson and Pradeau (2006: 339).
91. See pp. 6870.
92. Contrary to Losev (1928: 6970), who interprets number to contain
potentiality of being.
93. Noted by Armstrong (1967: vol. 3, 394395).

NUMBER AND SUBSTANCE

87

that is, the One is the productive power of all things and the rst power.94
But, while the One is a formlessness that is productive of Forms, substantial
number, as a result of the interaction between the Indenite Dyad and the
Monad, imposes limit itself onto being and thus creates the Forms themselves. Substantial number is the mold into which the Forms slip to exist.
Thus, it is both substance and primary activity of being.
At this point, Plotinus argument is both most anti-Aristotelian and
most Aristotelian. Fusing what Plato calls true numbers in the Republic with
the description of ousia as being in Phdr. 247c68,95 Plotinus equates number with substance, power, and activity of being. It is perhaps ironic, from
a Platonic point of view, that Plotinus solution offers the most Aristotelian
defense of Platos view of number. On the one hand, the denition of number
as substance succinctly contains the characteristics of Aristotles denition
of primary substance,96 that it is concrete (tode ti) and separable (christos).97
On the other hand, Plotinus completely adapts Platos true number (althinos arithmos) to t the ontological hierarchy of the intelligible realm. As a
principle of actuality, number imposes limit onto the Indenite Dyad, as
a principle of potentiality. By explaining that number is substance (ousia),
power (dynamis), and actuality (energeia), Plotinus makes number the building block of the intelligible, as presented in VI.6.9.2931. Table 4.1 displays
TABLE 4.1. The Aspects of Number in the Intelligible Realm
in Plotinus
Being
(to on)

Unied number
(arithmos hnmenos)

Intellect
(Nous)

Number moving in itself

(arithmos en heauti kinoumenos)

Complete Living Being

(to zion)

Encompassing number
(arithmos periechn)

Beings
(ta onta)

Number unfolded outward

(arithmos exelligmenos)

94. III.8.10.1: dnamiw tn pntvn. V.4.1.2325: e tlen sti t

prton ka pntvn teletaton ka dnamiw prth. Gerson
(1994: 17).
95. See pp. 7576. This parallel is further strengthened by the description
of soul as source and principle of motion (pg kai arch kinses) in Phdr.
245c9, as remarked by Brisson and Pradeau (2006: 339, note 144).
96. By primary substance, I refer to what Aristotle describes as the
substance rst in every way (pants h ousia proton, Metaph. 1028a32).
97. Respectively, Metaph. 1028a3 and 1028a34. Witt (1989: 3839, 4758).

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

the denition-like synthesis of the ontological role of substantial number in

VI.6.9.2932. It is remarkable that Plotinus embeds what could arguably be
considered the essence of the argument of the entire treatise in a rhetorical
question. For him, it seems that there is nothing left to explain or to prove
about the constitutive role of substantial number in the intelligible, except
spelling out its terms and different aspects.
Brisson and Pradeau rightfully compare the aspects of substantial number that participate in the production of the intelligible in VI.6.9 to the role
of the mathematicals in the creation of the sensible world in the Timaeus.98
According to Plotinus, substantial number has its own infrastructure including four terms corresponding to the ontological nature of every element in
the tetrad of Being-Intellect-Complete Living Beingbeings that he discussed earlier in VI.6.78.99 Each term explicates the innermost nature of
every component in the tetrad. At the level of Being, Number is unied
with Being (arithmos hnmenos).
In all beings, number has unfolded outward (arithmos exelligmenos).
This centrifugal movement is ontogenic and guratively represents the outward direction of multiplicity, described in the rst chapter of the treatise.100
Substantial number then divides Being, which is unied number, according
to the whole number of beings that is already predetermined.
The Complete Living Being is encompassing number (arithmos
periechn) that circumscribes the number of beings which has unfolded
(arithmos exelligmenos) from the unied number of Being (arithmos
hnmenos). The detnition of the encompassing number claries Plotinus
earlier statement that the Complete Living Being embraces all beings that
already exist individually.101
The unfolded number of all beings and the encompassing number of the
Complete Living Being involve motion away from the unied number of Being.
In other words, the substantial number in beings and the Complete Living
Being separate from the unied number of Being just as multiplicity separates
from the One.102 The denitions of substantial number reinforce the initial
denition of multiplicity as separation from the One in VI.6.1. The foundation
of existence, then, is motion, which is inherent in Intellect, dened by Plotinus
as number moving in itself (nous de arithmos en heauti kinoumenos).103
98. Brisson and Pradeau (2006: 339, n. 146).
99. Charles-Saget (1980: 5358); Nikulin (2002: 80).
100. As discussed in chapter 1.
101. Cf. VI.6.7.1619.
102. Corrigan (2005: 37).
103. Krmer (1964: 304) concludes Intellect to be nothing else but the
substantial number moving, in the sense of thinking, itself. Nikulin (2002: 76).
See the discussion of substantial number and Intellect in chapter 5.

NUMBER AND SUBSTANCE

89

The detailed explanation of the role of number in the intelligible realm

introduces the two types of number in Plotinus: substantial number (ousids
arithmos) and monadic number (monadikos arithmos).104 The former is the
ontogenetic nonquantitative paradigm of existence in the intelligible realm;
the latter is its quantitative image.
Substantial number is absolute number, which, together with Being,
divides substance to create all beings that come after Being in separation
from the One. It is also the rational principle (logos), described in V.1.5.13,
which orders substance (ousia) and constitutes being (to on).105 Substantial
number participates in Being as an activity (energeia) of Being and as such
it emanates its power of numbering to all beings. Unied number unfolds
itself into all beings, makes the number of multiplicity nite, and abides in
Intellects constant motion:106 But the Substantial number is that contemplated in the Forms (ousids ho men epitheroumenos tois eidesi) and sharing
in their generation (syggennn auta), and, primarily, the number in Being
and with Being and before the beings (prts de ho en ti onti kai meta tou
ontos kai pro tn ontn) (VI.6.9.3537). The passage synthesizes Plotinus
Platonic answer to Aristotle, toward which he has been moving since the
beginning of his examination of the three hypotheses in VI.6.4.107 The explanation that substantial number is contemplated in the Forms implies that
number is metaphysically superior to all intelligible entities and underlies
their existence. When substantial number is a power and active actuality
of Being, it is present in Being as unied number (arithmos hnmenos). As
such, substantial number is for all beings what the One is for Being. As
the One is the principle of Being (ti onti to hen arch) and the existence of
Being rests upon the One (epi toutou estin on, VI.6.9.3940), so is substantial
number the source, root, and principle of beings.108 Since number is actuality of substance (energeia ts ousias), number must be at the level of the
Indenite Dyad and Being. As Being is absolute substance (althin ousia)
and number is active actuality of the absolute substance, so is absolute number actuality of substance (energeia ts ousias).
Plato alludes to the idea that the Forms are numbers without coining a
particular term for them. Following Platos lead and the contemporary disputes on the Platonic theories of number in the Old Academy, Aristotle refers
104. Nikulin (2002: 7376).
105. Nikulin (2002: 70).
106. Krmer (1964: 305ff); Szlezk (1979: 90104); Cleary (1995: 346365);
Annas (1976: 6273); and Nikulin (2002: 73).
107. VI.6.5.12: ra parakouloyhma ka oon piyevromenon
kst os&.
108. VI.6.9.3839: bsin d xei t nta n at ka phgn ka
=zan ka rxn.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

to the Form-numbers as Formal number (eidtikos arithmos).109 But Plotinus

has a more ambitious program than his predecessors. Since he develops a
new philosophical system, he must adapt the Platonic and Neopythagorean
concept of number to suit his system. Thus, he has to explain how number
is at the origin of the intelligible realm en tout and at every intelligible entity
separately. To accomplish this, he needs more than a loan of old terminology.
He needs to invent a new term for the name of the intelligible number that
will capture precisely the symbiotic relationship between intelligible number
and substance. As a result, he coins the term substantial number (ousids
arithmos) in VI.6.9.34 to denote the paradigmatic kind of number abiding in
the intelligible.
Plotinus conclusion that substantial number constitutes the intelligible realm continues the traditional dispute on Platonic number between the
Aristotelian and Platonic schools. Therefore, to articulate his position better,
in VI.6.1011 he reviews the main points of the argument. The summary is
important for the structure of the treatise as it is the centerpiece that marks
the end of the investigation of the three hypotheses of the nature of number
in the intelligible, and the start of the descending exegesis, which will trace
the newfound understanding of the ontological role of number consecutively
in Being, Intellect, the Complete Living Being, and all beings.110 The summary not only recapitulates the original top-down approach in presenting
Plotinus cosmology in VI.6.1, but also explains its conceptual reasons. Since
substantial number is the pattern that constitutes intelligible existence from
the unied number of Being to the encompassing number of the Complete
Living Being, the only conceptually sound way for representing the composition of the universe is to follow the pattern of substantial number unfolding
the universe from Being to beings.
In this vein, the beginning of VI.6.10 reexamines the denition of multiplicity as separation from the One (apostasis tou henos) in consideration
of the relationship between Being and substantial number. That number
is being standing in multiplicity111 rewrites the original denition of multiplicity to mean that number instantiates the existence of multiplicity. It
supports, in Plotinian terms, the second hypothesis of the Parmenides:112 as
number stands rm in being, so does being stand rm in number. The two
are ontologically equal and inseparable.
109. The term is especially characteristic of Xenocrates (fr. 99.28, 110.3,
111.2, 112.6, 115, 260.11). It appears only once in Speusippus (fr. 35.4).
110. Charles-Saget (1980: 5859) recognizes two themes in the chapter:
lines 120 support the conclusions of chapter 8 that number preexists being;
lines 2051 discuss number as a predicate to being.
111. VI.6.10.1: stw on t n n plyei riymw.
112. Discussed in chapter 3. Also Nikulin (2002: 74).

NUMBER AND SUBSTANCE

91

Based on this ontological union between number and being, Plotinus

summarizes that substantial number is a preliminary sketch for beings (protypsis). It is like unities (henades) keeping a place for beings which are
going to be founded on them (hidrythsomenois).113 It is not incidental (kata
syntychian), but inherent to beings (kata prothesin) so that number preexists beings.114 Finally, it is the cause that determines how many the beings
are.115 If we consider the aspect of substantial number at the level of Being,
it becomes clear that the origin of henads as unities or sketches of beings
derives from the unied number of Being:
Each [being] is one, if the one in them is many all together (homou
polla n to hen to ep autois), [116] as the triad is one, and all the beings
are one, not like the one of the number one (ouch hs to hen to kata
tn monada), but as the ten thousand or any other number is one
(hs hen h myrias allos tis arithmos). (VI.6.10.1720)
Without being yoked to a particular thing,117 the henads in beings represent
individually the inseparable unity of the unied number in and with Being.
If the decad, for example, consists of ten units and each unit is one, Plotinus
argues, this one is common to the ten individual units. But, if this one is
common to the ten individual units, why could it not be common to the
unity of the decad itself? It is obvious that there is one nature predicated of
many, which we said must exist in itself before being observed in many. 118
The common nature of the henad (henas) is the inseparable ontological unity
imparted both on the single unit in the decad and on the decad per se. This
inseparable unity is not incidental but an individualized ontological expression of the unied number of Being (hnmenos arithmos). The henads have
existence of themselves and are not a result of agglutination or combination. This conclusion rejects Aristotles proposition in Metaph. 1083a that the
units in numbers are combinable.119

113. VI.6.10.24, further explained at VI.6.10.2029.

114. VI.6.10.1112 and VI.6.10.2739. He refers back to the discussion of
whether number is accidental to being in VI.6.5.
115. VI.6.10.1416 and 10.4151.
116. Echoing mo n n pnta in VI.6.7.4 and mo . . . now pw in
IV.1.1.5; above, pp. 8183.
117. VI.6.11.45: o gr d sunezexyai de n.
118. VI.6.11.79: toto d fsiw ma kat polln kathgoroumnh,
n lgomen ka pr to n pollow yevresyai den kay' atn
prxein.
119. See chapter 3.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

If the units in numbers are noncombinable, there is not only one unit
that exists, but there must be a multiplicity of units.120 This multiplicity of
units (plthos henadn) introduces the problem of the homonymy between
the One, as the rst hypostasis, and the one present in being.121 Plotinus
distinguishes them by deducing that, if the rst unit is that which exists in
the highest way, it follows that the other units are units only by the common
name of units because, in fact, they have a different nature (VI.6.11.1417).
But, it is not possible for the rst unit to be coupled with that which is one
in the highest degree, since that which is one in the highest degree does not
need to be predicated of any thing (VI.6.11.1819). Therefore, he concludes,
there must be a one which is nothing else but bare one (to hen psylon), isolated in its essential nature, before each individual one is spoken and thought
(VI.6.11.1921). This bare one is different from the One and is the henad of
each being. The henad is the ontological matrix for each particular being so
that no being could exist without being predicated to number.122 Otherwise,
it would become innumerate and irrational (anarithmon kai alogon),123 echoing Aristotles conclusion in Metaph. 1083a8 that the distinctions between
number and unit are nonsensical (aloga). The decisiveness of this conclusion
is perhaps surprising. Plotinus brings the niteness of the universe down to
the henads and their inseparable unity with beings. The henads, as images
of the unied number of Being (hnmenos arithmos), limit beings.
Plotinus, however, is not yet ready to articulate the fusion between substance and number as clearly as it is later found in Syrianus: And indeed,
if one imagines unitary numbers (monadikoi arithmoi) as coming into being,
one will observe the Form that confers quality as coming later to shape the
quantity underlying it. 124 For Syrianus, the monads are merely the matter
or substratum of number, on which we have to impose, as form, the triad,
pentad, heptad, ennead, etc., that we carry in our souls. 125
In Plotinus, the clear conceptual distinction between monads and henads
is at a formative stage. Nikulin remarks that Plotinus uses monads (monades) and henads (henades) rather loosely and interchangeably throughout
the Enneads.126 And yet, in the discussion of the unity of substantial number in VI.6.45, Plotinus seems to relate the monad to substantial number

120. VI.6.5.6, VI.6.11.12: ka otvw plyow stai ndvn.

121. Charles-Saget (1980: 63).
122. Corrigan (2005: 181).
123. VI.6.11.3233, also alluded to in VI.6.6.1718.
124. In Metaph. 139, 1.2025; trans. Dillon and OMeara (2006).
125. Dillon and OMeara (2006: 3). Authors italics. This is similar to
Aristotle, who considers the henads to be matter of number, Metaph. 1084b56.
126. Nikulin (2002: 77 and n. 41).

NUMBER AND SUBSTANCE

93

and the henad to quantitative number. He calls the rst being monad,127
and distinguishes the substantial unity from the quantitative unity of numbers in the phrase multiplicity of henads (plthos henadn).128 Previously,
in V.5.4.3335, he discusses the relationship between monads and henads in
the question of whether the monads in the number ve and the monads in
the number ten are different, but the one in the number ve and the one
in the number ten are the same. The question distinguishes between the
intact unity of substantial numbers and the discrete units of quantitative
numbers. It is not immediately answered in V.5 and is only ambiguously
answered in VI.6.45.129 While it seems that the monads are associated with
substantial number in V.5, over all both monads and henads are used in reference to substantial number in VI.6.45. In the most important part of the
argument, which leads to the denition of substantial number in VI.6.9.33,
Plotinus states that they call the Forms henads and numbers. With Dodds,
I take they to refer to the Neopythagoreans.130
The evidence of Plotinus use of monads and henads in VI.6 is inconclusive. Nevertheless, if we consider that the henads individually represent
the substantial number as unied number in every being, we have a good
reason to suppose that toward the end of the explanation of substantial
number in VI.6, he associates the henads with substantial number, although
he calls this kind of number substantial, not henadic. While coining a new
name for Platos ontological numbers, Plotinus calls the quantitative number monadic after Aristotles term for mathematical number.131 Perhaps
Plotinus chooses Aristotles monadic number over Moderatus henadic number in order to emphasize that Aristotle understands correctly quantitative
number but misunderstands Platos true numbers.
Plotinus inconsistent use of monads and henads is a symptom not so
much of his conceptual ambiguity as of the uncertain terminology of his
times. Moderatus, as we saw earlier, distinguished between monads and
henads in his denition of number as between unities of numbers and
127. VI.6.4.4: oon prton at enai, nosamen monda.
128. VI.6.5.67: otv gr stai plyow mn ndvn, ew n d
odew par t plon n. Thesleff (1965: 237.1719); Nikulin (2002: 77).
129. This reference is the formal precursor of VI.6 in the Enneads.
130. Dodds (Proclus. The Elements of Theology, 1963: 258). Theon
(Expos. rer. math. 21, 14) reports that the Neopythagoreans even consider the
henads to correspond to the One, but, according to the Anonymous Photii, the
Pythagoreans attribute the monad to the intelligible numbers and the henad to
quantitative numbers.
131. Metaph. 1083b1617: ll mn g' riymhtikw riymw
monadikw stin. Nicomachus calls this kind of number scientic
(pisthmonikw, Ar. I.6.),

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

units of numbers.132 Along the same lines, Plotinus rst distinguishes, in

VI.6.5, between monad as substantial unity and henad as quantitative unit.
Reecting the divergent Neopythagorean terminology, Plotinus, perhaps
unwittingly, slips from one into the other during his discussion because
his main goal is to show that the unity of number and being is inseparable
regardless of its terminology. In fact, this slip attempts to unite the different
views and prepares the ground for the elaboration of the theory of henads
in the later Neoplatonists.133 It has been argued that Iamblichus, with his
strong Neopythagorean bent, is the rst one who starts to work on a theory
of henads, which Proclus later completes with the elaborated doctrine that
gods are henads, ontologically prior to Being and Intellect.134
In the company of the stars of Neoplatonic numeric theology, Plotinus
contribution to the development of the concept of the henad has been overlooked. His view of substantial numbers as henads, I argue, deserves more
attention and credit. His merit is in planting the idea that the henads are
molds for the Forms and in explaining the two kinds of number as an intelligible paradigm and its quantitative, that is, sense-perceptible, copy. Monadic
number is a copy of substantial number because, by separating the beings
individually, it imitates the ontogenic role of substantial number.
The denitions of substantial and monadic number are the nal step of
Plotinus solution to Aristotles criticism of Platos complicated understanding of number. This solution is successful for Plotinus cosmology because
it establishes a Platonically informed relationship between the two kinds
substantial number is the ontological supersedent and the intelligible paradigm of monadic number. It is turned inwardly toward itself; its existence is
unied with Being and, in this sense, is an absolute number. Monadic number is the quantitative representation of substantial number and is turned
outwardly to enumerate physical reality.
Plotinus engages Plato and Aristotle in an imaginary dialogue about
the nature of number. If we ask ourselves who the winner in this scholastic
debate is, the fact that the central section of VI.6 opens with criticism of
Aristotle and closes with a new interpretation of Plato speaks for itself.

132. See pp. 4346.

133. As Dodds summarizes (1963: 257), the doctrine of divine henads
is the most striking of the modications introduced by later Neoplatonism
into the Plotinian world. But even Syrianus, who lived almost a century after
Iamblichus, uses them interchangeably, In Metaph. 139.1.2025, 183.1.2425.
134. Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 59.160.2; Proclus, El. Theol. prop. 64 and
113167. Dillon (1972, 1993); OMeara (1989: 8283, 204207).

5
Number and the Universe
The aspects of substantial number require a reevaluation of the structure of
the intelligible realm.1 The list of unied number, moving-in-itself number,
unfolded number, and encompassing number in VI.6.9 is unusually systematic
and complete for Plotinus. Charles-Saget discusses its general implications
for the intelligible2 and Nikulin refers to it only in a sentence to exemplify
the process of thinking and thought.3 Plotinus list, however, deserves more
attention and a closer examination. The view that number is an activity of
primary substance4 with specic properties warrants an investigation of the
relationship between substantial number and the general properties of substance, also known as Platos greatest kinds of being, rest, motion, same, and
other.5 In a strictly Platonic context, the properties of substantial number
act as agents of the primary kinds in the construction of the intelligible and
reveal the exact ontogenetic details of how multiplicity separates from the
One. This chapter examines each of the aspects in an attempt to construe
the architecture of the universe according to them.

Substantial Number and the One

The anterior hypothesis that substantial number precedes beings, presented
in VI.6.4, places number at the heart of ontogenesis.6 Later, in VI.6.9,
Plotinus highlights the ontological importance of number by dening substantial number as activity of substance (energeia ts ousias). In order to
understand the importance of this denition, we need to recall the distinction Gerson has made between activity of substance (energeia ts ousias) and
activity from substance (energeia ek ts ousias).7 The former refers to the
activity which is the thing itself, while the latter refers to the activity
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Presented in table 4.1.

Charles-Saget (1980: 5657).
Nikulin (2002: 80).
Dened in VI.6.8.1722 and VI.6.9.2728.
Plato, Sph. 244b245c, 254d257a. Gerson (1994: 23).
See chapter 4.
Gerson (1994: 23). V.4.2.24, II.9.8.23, V.9.8.1315, VI.2.22.2426, to list a few.
95

96

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

which comes from the thing.8 Also, the former must be considered as primary activity, the latter as secondary activity. Since substantial number is
primary activity of substance (energeia ts ousias), it follows that substantial number is substance itself and must possess the primary properties of
substance: being, rest, motion, sameness, and otherness.9 The denition
of number as a primary activity of substance, in fact, fullls the premise
of the third hypothesis that substantial number is prior to beings, has a
separate existence from beings, and participates in the creation of beings.
The ontogenetic power of substantial number continually gives existence
by dividing Being, as unied number (hnmenos arithmos), into multiplicity of beings.10 The idea that substantial number is primary activity
of substance itself implies that Being does not exist without being unied
in and with substantial number. This understanding poses the question of
whether substantial number per se can exist without the union with being.
Certainly, the statement in VI.6.10.23 that the henads are molds (paraskeu
and protypsis) 11 for beings suggests this, if not at the level of Being, at least
at the level of beings.
In our discussion of the relationship between the Indenite Dyad and
substantial number in chapter 2, we examined Plotinus argument in V.1.5
that number is not rst, but the One is prior to the Dyad; the One limits
the Dyad; and, when it does this, substantial number is already in place.12
In the argument, however, the logical transition from the One that limits
the Indenite Dyad to the predetermined existence of substantial number is
abrupt. It is not clear what exactly predetermines the substantial numbers,
unless we understand that the Monad, as an image of the One, is implied.
Yet Plotinus does not proceed to say that this kind of number is as being
(hs on), but as substance (hs ousia). This comparison is also ambiguous,
however. Does it mean that substance is inseparable from number or that
substance is the ordered result of the Ones power to limit the Dyad? V.1.5
does not offer an answer but makes one thing clear: substantial number is
different from the One. At the end of our analysis of V.1.5,13 we reached the
same conclusion, just on more general terms; namely, that the One is not
8. Gerson (1994: 23).
9. VI.6.9.2729.
10. V.5.4.18: osidhw mn t enai e parxvn; VI.6.9.2627:
to riymo dnamiw postsa mrise t n ka oon dnein
pohsen atn t plyow.
11. The meaning of protypsis as mold and holding place for beings
suggestively echoes the use of archetypos to describe the One as the original of
existence, VI.4.10.18.
12. V.1.5.79.
13. See pp. 6870.

NUMBER AND THE UNIVERSE

97

number internally,14 but it externally manifests itself as number in Intellects

contemplation of the One. How, then, is substantial number an ontological
expression of the One?
As determined earlier, the view of substantial number as power of substance (dynamis ts ousias) depends on the understanding that the One,
although it does not divide itself into all, is the productive power of all (dynamis tn pantn).15 In its internal activity, the One remains unchanged because
it is simple, perfect, and self-sufcient.16 In its external activity, the One is
omnipresent and the most powerful source of all life.17 This external productive activity, however, entails the existence of another one that can participate in being. This other one is the substantial number that continually
gives existence (ousids men ho to einai aei parechn).18 Substantial number,
therefore, is the ontological expression of the One, because it executes in
actuality the dividing and ordering of substance and induces existence.
In V.5.45, Plotinus analogically illustrates the difference between the
One and substantial number by distinguishing between substantial and
monadic number. Monadic number, he says, gives quantity, both when it
is in series with other numbers and when it measures things.19 This is the
rst time mathematical number is mentioned in the Enneads and it is not
introduced as monadic, but as quantitative number. Obviously, the primary
goal of Plotinus analogy is to show that the One and substantial number
do not participate in quantity, and thus do not have anything to do with
quantitative number. He further explains that quantitative number imparts
quantity by imitating the relationship between substantial number and the
One. Monadic number does not expand or divide the unity of substantial
number, but when a dyad comes to be, the monad before the dyad exists,
neither each of the two units in the dyad nor one of them is the monad in the
dyad. 20 Substantial number remains unchanged because it is not quantity
but a pattern or a holding place for being.21 Therefore it is not expandable
nor divisible, but only ontological.

14. VI.5.3.1920: the One is one and the same, undivided by number.
15. Respectively, VI.6.9.26 and III.8.10.1, discussed in chapter 4.
16. Gerson (1994: 1618).
17. I.8.2.47.
18. V.5.4.18.
19. In the latter, he really says when number is not with other number,
which I interpret to mean when number is not part of arithmetical operations
but measures physical objects.
20. V.5.4.2425.
21. See chapter 4.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

The difculty of understanding what substance (ousia) is lies in its nonphenomenological nature.22 In a way, substantial number epitomizes this
difculty because it is most closely related terminologically to its senseperceptible counterpart. While ousia, as intelligible substance, and hyl, as
sense-perceptible matter, are to a large extent terminologically separated,23
the word number (arithmos) makes both substantial number (ousids
arithmos) and monadic number (monadikos arithmos) appear only as its subgenera. Therefore, it takes Plotinus a lot more explanation to elicit the differences between the two. He often uses an analogy with One to illustrate the
difference between substantial and monadic number. In V.5.45, for example,
he compares the relationship between the two kinds of number specically
to the relationship between substantial number and the One. Compared to
monadic number, substantial number is nondiscursive in the sense that it is
nonquantitative. In regards to nondiscursiveness, substantial number is to
monadic number what the One is to substantial number.24 But he also explicates the nonnumerical nature of the One by dening and comparing the
two kinds of number. Substantial number is closer to the One than any other
intelligible being, including the Complete Living Being and Intellect, and yet
is not the One, as the One would not have made a discrete plurality. 25
Plotinus uses the analogy of substantial number and the One to explain
the relationship between the two kinds of number. The analogy places substantial number in the intermediate position between the One and monadic
number and thus metaphorically shortens the distance between the One, as
the principle (arch) of all, and number which enumerates physical reality.
He again nds monadic number useful in the description of the absolute
One:
Now we long to see, if it is in any way possible, what is the pure,
real One (to kathars hen), unrelated to anything else. At this point,
then, you must rush to one, and not any longer add anything to it,
but stand absolutely still in fear of departing from it (stnai pantels dediota autou apostatsai), and not progress the least little way
towards two. (V.5.4.610)
22. VI.5.2.16. OMeara (1993: 2426) deservedly calls it a category
mistake leading to the major difculty in understanding the intelligible per se.
23. I refer to substance and matter in their most general meaning, apart
from hyl not. On the distinction between substance and matter, see Nikulin
(2002: 3).
24. V.5.5.211 clearly distinguishes between the One, as the supreme
principle of existence, one as a substantial number, and one as a quantitative
number.
25. VI.2.5.89: o gr n diesthkw plyow poei.

NUMBER AND THE UNIVERSE

99

Earlier, I discussed the importance of the passage for the denition of multiplicity as separation (apostasis) from the One.26 The One is described by
negating any motion and otherness from it. Nikulin cites the same lines to
illustrate the closest proximity of the Monad to the One.27 The passage is
most interesting, however, in that it uses quantitative concepts to convey the
nonquantitative and absolute nature of both the One and the Monad:
1. To rush to the One;
2. Not to add anything to the One;
3. To stand absolutely still in fear of departing from the One;
4. Not to progress even a little toward two.
The series of negations establishes the One and the Monad as not countable
and beyond monadic number. If we reverse the above negative propositions
and replace the One with one in the sense of unit, we can construe the
denitions of number and multiplicity proper:28
1. To move away from one;
2. To add something to one;
3. To separate from one;
4. To progress toward two.
The two lists of propositions emphasize the polarity between the One and
the mathematical one and prove that the One is beyond number. As stated
in V.5.4.1215, the One is not included in the count with another one, or
another number of any size; it will not be counted at all: for it is a measure
and not measured, and it is not equal to the other units so as to be one of
their company. This conclusion, although intended to distinguish the One
from monadic number, also highlights the differences between substantial
and monadic number itself. Substantial number, as an expression of the One,
is a measure for being as it continually gives existence, while, in itself, it is
unmeasured, because it is nonquantitative but ontological.29 Since quantitative number imitates substantial number as its ontological paradigm, so does
substantial number,30 in turn, imitate its own supersedent, the One, which is
the measure of all and itself unmeasured.31
26. See the origin of multiplicity in Plotinus in chapter 1.
27. Nikulin (2002: 78).
28. Cf. VI.6.1; discussed in chapter 1.
29. V.5.4.18.
30. VI.6.9.3435: monadikw legmenow edvlon totou.
31. I.8.2.5: mtron pntvn ka praw; VI.7.32.2123: t te ew e ka
ew pnta o mtron at ddvsin od' a metran.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

Substantial Number and Absolute Being

Plotinus concept of number as activity of being relates substantial number
to all the aspects of the intelligible realm.32 The list in VI.6.9.29 begins
with the denition that, at the level of absolute Being, substantial number
is unied number (hnmenos arithmos). As the henads are molds for beings
to be limited and shaped,33 so does the unied number limit and shape
Being. This means that number has priority even over Being and if number
is prior to Being, then the unied substantial number is the closest to the
source of all.
At the level of Being, substantial number is unied with Being, forming
the archetype of all beings. Nevertheless, this archetype should not be confused with the Monad. The Monad is the very rst to come from the productive power of the One and, together with the Indenite Dyad, generates
every number as a form or a henad.34 As such, the Monad represents absolute stability and unity with itself. In V.5.5, Plotinus analogically elucidates
that as there in the case of numbers, the form of the rst, the monad, was
in all numbers primarily and secondarily, and each of the numbers which
come after the monad did not participate in it equally, so here too each of
the beings which come after the First has in itself a kind of form of it.35
Substantial numbers and beings participate only to a different degree in the
absoluteness of the Monad. The Monad, as an image of the One, and the
Indenite Dyad give substantial existence to being so that being is a trace,
albeit imperfect, of the One.36 The Monad, as the generating principle of
existence, is not a substantial number, however. Plotinus emphasizes the difference between the rst Monad and the absolute Being, by dening Being
as unied number, not as unied monad.37
The meaning of the term unied number (hnmenos arithmos) denotes
limit and rest. Both of them are permanent characteristics of existence and
relate to the One as their source. To illustrate the absoluteness of the One,
Plotinus recalls Platos explanation of the First Hypothesis in the Parmenides,

32. V.3.7.2526: stin mn now n at nrgeia.

33. VI.6.10, discussed in chapter 4.
34. Opposite to Aristotle (Metaph. 1084b56), who considers the henads
as matter of number. As Nikulin (2002: 82) summarizes, the matter of the
essential number is rather a multiplicity of the dyad, bounded by the form of the
monad.
35. V.5.5.711.
36. V.5.5.1114.
37. Syrianus (In Metaph. 112.31) explicitly distinguishes between the Monad
and the Dyad as ontogenetic principles and the substantial monad and dyad.

NUMBER AND THE UNIVERSE

101

that the one does not move, nor does it stand still. 38 The One, as the rst
principle of all, is both the power which causes motion and rest and beyond
motion and rest.39 Since the One is simple and rst, it is not itself in motion
and rest, but produces them in its external activity.40 As a result, motion and
number are among the primary properties of substance. Consequently, in
the ontological procession from the One, Being denotes rest, while Intellect
denotes motion. When the external productive activity of the One comes into
being, it turns back to the One, lls itself with multiplicity, and becomes
Intellect by contemplating the One. This stopping and introverted turning,
Plotinus explains, is being, whereas the retrospective gaze upon the One is
Intellect.41 In other words, Being, as unied number, is Intellects rest in
relation to the One.42 Thinking stops in Being. Plotinus, therefore, denes
the primary kind of stability (stasis) as the limit of Intellect.43
In V.1.7, Plotinus refers to being (to on) as not uctuating-in-the-indenite
and as xed by limit and stability. This description is based on the role of
substantial number in the relationship between the One and the Indenite
Dyad. Since the Indenite Dyad is the principle of potentiality, which, undened, is in constant motion, the One, as the source of stability, denes the
indeniteness of the Dyad with limit and shape through substantial number.
As a result, substance is characterized as that which is already dened by
number, while limit and shape in substance instantiate being and produce
stability in the intelligible realm.44
If we compare the denition of being as stability of existence by limit
and shape, to the denition of substantial number in V.5.4, as number that
continually gives existence, we can deduce that substantial number, as an
ontological expression of the One, is the source of limit and shape for being.
As quantitative number measures generation in physical reality, so does substantial number dene, albeit nonquantitatively and non-sense-perceptibly,
the generation of being in the intelligible.

38. Prm. 139b.23: t n ra, w oiken, ote sthken ote kinetai.

Cf. Sph. 254d5.
39. III.9.7.12: t mn prton dnamw sti kinsevw ka stsevw,
ste pkeina totvn.
40. V.5.10.1517: p' ato knhsiw prtho gr n at
p' ato stsiw, ti atw m deto: o gr kinetai od' sthken.
41. V.2.1.1921.
42. Corrigan (2005: 37) reaches the same conclusion, although without the
emphasis on the role of the unied number in Being.
43. VI.2.8.2224.
44. V.1.7.2526: stsiw d tow nohtow rismw ka morf, ow ka
tn pstasin lambnei.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

Describing substantial numbers role to dene the Indenite Dyad in

V.1.5,45 Plotinus explains that number is as substance (hs ousia), not as
being (hs to on).46 This distinction associates number with substance and
thus with the primary kinds (prta gen) 47 of rest/stability (stasis), motion
(kinsis), otherness (heterots), and sameness (tautots).48 Just like substance,
number, as activity of substance itself, possesses them all.
In VI.6.9.29, the denition of Being as unied substantial number suggests that Being and substantial number are at rest (stasis). As unied substantial number, Being is an image of the One as the source of stasis. Because
stasis itself signies stability and thus existence, Plotinus almost hints that
the primary kind of stasis has precedence over the primary kind of motion
(kinsis), although he introduces the latter rst in his discussion of the primary kinds. He admits that, if someone does not consider stasis among the
primary kinds, he is completely out of line (atopteros):49 rst, because rest
is easier to relate to being than movement, and second, because rest simply
means existing in the same state and in the same way. 50 Although existence
is separation from the One and thus denotes movement, being is rst associated with limit and consequently rest. The lack of movement implies permanency and stability. The unied substantial number simply denes Being
as stasis.
In the beginning of VI.6.10, Plotinus summarizes that Being stands
rm in multiplicity, when it woke as many, and was a kind of preparation for
the beings and a preliminary sketch. 51 We have already discussed this passage in relation to the henads.52 The true context of the passage, however, is
the unity of one and many in Being. The henads represent the multiplicity
of beings that retain a trace of the unied number of Being in themselves to
impart onto their beings. Thus, each henad, as a holding place for being, is
an individual version of the unied number of Being.
The unied number of Being and stasis are ontological representations
of the perfect unity of the One. Since Being came into existence from the
One and the One is absolute by nature, then, in number, Being inherits the
unity of the One (to hen) as unied number (hnmenos arithmos).53 That
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Discussed pp. 6870.

On the distinction between being and substance, II.6.1.
I.3.4.14, VI.2.8.43, 9.1, 13.1. Plotinus term for Platos megista gene.
VI.2.7.
VI.2.7.2628.
VI.2.7.30: t gr kat tat ka satvw. Cf. Sph. 248a12.
VI.6.10.13: stw on t n n plyei riymw.
See pp. 9094.
In reversed order, VI.6.9.29 and 39.

NUMBER AND THE UNIVERSE

103

Being is unied number represents the closest degree of unity to the perfect
noncompositeness of the One.54 The unied number of Being is the ontological replica of the One because Being is a result of Intellects contemplation
of the One.55 Being cannot exist without unied substantial number.

Substantial Number and Intellect

In the Timaeus, the Demiurge orders the motion of the primeval elements
into a nite universe, revolving according to number. In the Sophist, Plato
considers movement one of the primary kinds. With the concept of the
Unmoved Mover, Aristotle places motion in the foundation of the universe.
Moderatus sees motion in the progression and regression of number to and
from one.56 Numenius First God possesses both rest and innate motion.57
Plotinus makes movement the basis of all life in the intelligible.58 For him,
the source of movement is the One itself.59 Movement both underlies the
separation of multiplicity from the One and denes the relationship between
the Indenite Dyad and the Monad in the production of the Forms and
numbers.
Plotinus denition that Intellect is substantial number which moves in
itself 60 reects upon the many facets of the concept in its long tradition and
lays the foundation of the second hypostasis. In its nature, intelligible movement is atemporal and aspatial, for it is only a logical sequence articulating
the ontological succession and dependence among beings. As an ontological
expression of the One,61 substantial number is also an expression of intelligible movement since the One is the source of both rest and movement.62
In our earlier discussion of the relationship between the Indenite Dyad
and substantial number, we established that Plotinus considers number and
54. VI.6.9.3233: de at otvw riymn enai.
55. The One beyond Being is not predicated to anything and the one in
the one-being exists only as one in Being because, there, it is not divided into
parts (VI.2.9). Narbonne (2001: 7577) perceptively calls substantial number
engenderment of beings, after Charles-Saget (1980: 53).
56. See chapter 2.
57. See chapter 1.
58. VI.2.7.67.
59. V.5.10.15.
60. VI.6.9.3031: now d riymw n aut kinomenow.
61. As established in the previous section.
62. Nikulin (2002: 85): all the numbers are already there, already having
been moved.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

the Dyad to be rational principles and Intellect.63 He explicitly mentions the

Forms in relation to number by explaining that every number which comes
from the Dyad and the One is a form (eidos), as if Intellect was shaped
(morphthentos) by the numbers which came to exist in it. 64 In fact, the rst
time substantial number is mentioned in the Enneads is exactly to equate it
with Intellect. In III.89, while elaborating on the theory of contemplation,
Plotinus explains that number belongs to the intelligible realm since Intellect
is number.65 When Intellect contemplates the One, it does not contemplate
it as the simple one, but it unknowingly becomes many: as if heavy [with
drunken sleep], it unfolded itself because it wanted to possess everything. 66
I leave the discussion of the unfolded aspect of Intellect for the next section. Here let us focus on Intellects desire to possess everything. If Intellect
desires to possess everything, it follows that Intellect is decient in some
way and that thinking expresses Intellects deciency.67 The nature of this
deciency derives from the complexity caused by the one-in-many nature
of Intellect.68 Since Intellect is not simple as the One is, Intellect is not selfsufcient as the One is. By thinking itself, Intellect comprehends all intelligibles in itself, in order to replenish its deciency. The desire for fulllment
originates the introverted motion of Intellect, which results in the unied
number of Being.
The concept that Intellect is number moving in itself also portrays the
self-contained nature of Intellect. As previously discussed,69 Intellect knows
and sees itself by contemplating the One.70 This self-knowledge is introspective. By turning inward, Intellect realizes its multiplicity, but, in doing so,
Intellect still retains its self-directed orientation.71 As Plotinus describes it,
the Being of Intellect is activity, and there is nothing to which the activity
is directed; so it is self-turned. 72 The self-turned activity represents the
moving-in-itself number that allows Intellect to be self-contained.73

63. V.1.5.1314: on ke legmenow riymw ka duw lgoi ka

now. Discussed in chapter 3.
64. V.1.5.1517.
65. III.8.9.34: riymw d o
tow.
66. III.8.8.34: jelijen atn pnta xein ylvn.
67. V.3.13.1215, discussed in Gerson (1994: 53).
68. Gerson (1994: 54).
69. V.3.7. See pp. 4849.
70. Emilsson (2007: passim) refers to the prethinking stage of Intellect as
inchoate, which captures very well the notion of inceptive motion in it.
71. Gerson (1994: 54).
72. V.3.7.1819.
73. V.3.7.2526: stin mn now n at nrgeia.

NUMBER AND THE UNIVERSE

105

The characteristics of Intellects movement derive from the characteristics

of the primary kind of movement (kinsis), described in VI.2. Plotinus points
at its prominent position among the other primary kinds by introducing ousia
and kinsis as the rst two primary kinds. In this order, kinsis is mentioned
even before stasis, as if rest can occur only after motion occurs. As we determined above, motion is in the foundation of thinking and thus existence.74
Without the motion of thinking, Intellect cannot realize itself, and the existence of Being, in its state of rest as unied number, would be impossible.
The primary kind of movement is an activity of being that is ontologically
inseparable from being, except in our dianoetic thought. Movement does not
change the nature of being, but rather is in being as if making it perfect. 75
Intellects number, which moves in itself, then perfects Intellects decient
nature that desires to possess everything. Intellects thinking is centripetal,
internalized motion that results in both Intellects separation from the One
and Intellects realization that it is separated from the One. Intellect becomes
Intellect through the contemplation of its separation from the One:
Thinking, which sees the intelligible and turns towards it and is, in a
way, being perfected by it, is itself indenite like seeing (aoristos men
aut hsper opsis), but is dened by the intelligible (horizomen de
hypo tou notou). This is why it is said: from the Indenite Dyad and
the One derive the Forms and Numbers (ek ts aoristou dyados kai
tou henos ta eid kai hoi arithmoi): that is Intellect (touto gar ho nous).
For this reason Intellect is not simple but many (dio ouch haplous,
alla polla); it manifests a composition, of course an intelligible one,
and already sees many things. It is, certainly, also itself an intelligible,
but it thinks as well: so it is already two (dio dyo d). (V.4.2.411)
By thinking, Intellect is Intellect, that is, many, intelligible, intelligent, in
motion, and everything else appropriate to it.76 Thus Intellect is a movement,
for one must include movement if there is thought, and rest that it may
think the same (V.1.4.3637).77 Both the One and Intellect are thinking, but,
74. In VI.2.7.1620, Plotinus states that motion is not under nor over, but
with being, as, in VI.6.9, he determines that number is with and in substance.
75. VI.2.7.2426: kinsevw d per t n faneshw ok jistshw
tn kenou fsin, mllon d' n t enai oon tleion poioshw.
76. VI.7.39.1416: nosaw d atw polw gnetai, nohtw, non,
kinomenow ka sa lla proskei n.
77. An idea already alluded to in VI.6.6.3033: So the thought of
movement has not made absolute movement, but absolute movement has made
the thought of it, so that it has made itself as movement and thought; for
movement there is also the thought of that thing itself.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

while the One itself is thinking of itself, Intellect is thinking of itself as well
as contemplating that from which it comes (V.4.2.1326).78
In the intelligible, motion is thinking. The churning motion of number
in Intellect is the waking power in VI.6.10.12, which substantiates Intellect
itself, and divides being in labor to give birth to multiplicity. 79 Intellect is
shaped by substantial number.80 There is nothing unmeasured (ametron)
in Intellect, for it moves itself according to substantial number, which is
an ontological expression of the One.81 Number ontologically, not quantitatively, measures the separation of being from the One. In Being, motion
has stopped in the unied substantial number. The beginning of the internal
motion of number in Intellect is thinking, which makes its rst stop at the
unied number of Being, unfolds into the ministops of beings, and contains
itself in the Complete Living Being.

Substantial Number and Beings

Plotinus understanding that Intellect is number moving in itself can be represented dynamically by a circle which, possessing all beings, unfolds itself.82
This understanding of Intellect predetermines the denition of beings as
substantial number that has been unfolded.83 The unfolded number of beings
is the result of the unfolding thought of Intellect itself:
But immediately after Intellect comes being, and number is in this,
and with its help it produces the real beings when moving according to number (meth hou ta onta gennai kinoumenon kat arithmon),
setting the numbers before their existence (prostsamenon tous arithmous ts hypostases autn) as the One stands before its own, joining
being itself to the rst. (VI.6.15.2427)
The passage describes the productive power of the One in labor to give
birth to multiplicity. 84 As explained, being cannot by its own means become
78. The textual problems of the text are discussed in Merlan (1964: 4547).
Armstrong (1984: vol. 5, 146) points out that this passage clearly articulates the
idea that the One thinks.
79. VI.6.9.26: to riymo dnamiw postsa mrise t n.
80. V.1.5.1219.
81. III.8.11.31.
82. III.8.8.34: jelijen atn pnta xein.
83. VI.6.9.2930: t d nta jelhligmnow riymw.
84. VI.6.9.2627: to riymo dnamiw postsa mrise t n
ka oon dnein pohsen atn t plyow.

NUMBER AND THE UNIVERSE

107

many, unless somebody cuts it up like a magnitude.85 The number moving

in itself substantiates the individual existence of all beings and creates the
notion of otherness (heterots). As it thinks itself, Intellect thinks beings into
existence.86 In regard to the primary kinds, beings are a particular being, a
particular rest, and a particular motion. These particular properties bring
together in themselves the different aspects of the substantial number underlying the corresponding primary kinds. The results of this conation are
the henads of the Forms. Each henad expresses a particular unity of the
particular kinds. Beings express most clearly the primary kind of otherness.
The difference between the beings (diestsen en heterotti) produces discrete
multiplicity (diestkos plthos).87
The general properties of substance are recognized by separating them
from one another according to their difference.88 We examined the differences among Being, Intellect, and beings as represented by the different
aspects of substantial number. If we consider the primary kinds in relation to
the different aspects of substantial number, it becomes apparent that Plotinus
connects the differences among the primary kinds to the different aspects of
substantial number. The primary kind of otherness underlies the unfolded
number of beings. As each of them has a particular being, a particular rest,
and a particular motion, then each being possesses a particular ontological
identity that characterizes the differences in beings.

Substantial Number and the Complete Living Being

The Complete Living Being is encompassing number (arithmos periechn,
VI.6.9.31). It contains what Plotinus refers to both as the whole number
of beings (sympas arithmos) in the introduction of the Complete Living
Being in VI.6.8.3 and as the whole number (pas arithmos) in the explanation that the whole number of being is predetermined before the existence
of beings in VI.6.9.2324. Both references stress that number participates
in the Complete Living Being with its unifying power. VI.6.78 presents
the encompassing number of the Complete Living Being as an activity of
Intellect to think itself and in itself. Intellects thinking completely grasps
85. VI.2.2.3940: o gr aut poll, e m tiw w mgeyow
kermatzei.
86. Thought is both manifold and movement: nhsiw, eper nhsiw
stai, poiklon ti de enai, t d plon ka t at pn oon
knhma, VI.7.39.1719.
87. Respectively, VI.2.8.3435 and VI.2.5.9, while the One would not have
made a discrete plurality (VI.2.5.89).
88. VI.2.8.3136.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

all beings at once. Each being, on the other hand, is not passively contained
by Intellect as a part in Intellect. As Corrigan puts it, each part is not
only in the whole but is the whole, so to speak, just by being itself. 89 This
all-in-one (homou en heni panta) Intellect is the Complete Living Being.90
The totality of the unied number of Being is matched by the whole number of the Complete Living Being. If Intellect were only sameness, it could
not think itself because it could not relate itself to something different from
itself.91 When Being thinks, it relates Intellect to itself as an otherness to the
One. Since Intellect is not self-sufcient, it thinks both itself and the beings
inside itself and, by this, possesses both otherness and sameness.92
It may seem that Plotinus should have had the unied number of Being
represent the primary kind of sameness (tautots).93 He does not, however,
dene sameness as noncompositeness or simplicity. On the contrary, he
introduces the primary kind of sameness, as bringing beings back together
to unity and seeing beings as unity. 94 In other words, the general property of sameness can be recognized only after beings have been perceived
as different. Sameness comes to exist as a mirror reection of otherness.
Plotinus describes the bringing of beings together as collecting them into
sameness. 95 His denition of the primary kind of sameness does not imply
an ontological stop, as in the unied number of Being, but an all-inclusive
revolving ontological motion. Intellect moves along in the same way and on
one same and identical course, but still is not the same one partial thing,
but all things. 96 Therefore, there is otherness and sameness where there is
Intellect and Substance (VI.7.39.45).
It turns out that the assertion Plotinus made in the beginning of VI.6
that multiplicity is limited contains ontological truth. Every aspect of multiplicity corresponds to a certain role of number in the intelligible: that multiplicity is separation from the One (apostasis tou henos, VI.6.1.1) represents
the moving number of Intellect (nous de arithmos en heauti kinoumenos,
VI.6.9.3031), and the outward and inward directions of multiplicity exhibit
89. Corrigan (2005: 34).
90. VI.6.7.
91. VI.7.39.110.
92. VI.7.39.56: de gr tn non e terthta ka tatthta
lambnein, eper nosei.
93. As interpreted by Nikulin (2002: 78).
94. VI.2.8.3637: plin d tata ew n ka n n ka pnta n.
95. VI.2.8.3738: ew tatn a sungvn ka blpvn tatthta
ede genomnhn ka osan.
96. VI.7.13.46: now te kinomenow kinetai mn satvw ka kat
tat ka moia e, o mntoi tatn ka n ti n mrei, ll
pnta.

NUMBER AND THE UNIVERSE

109

the self-contained motion of Intellect; that multiplicity is circumscribed

by one (VI.6.1.24) anticipates the encompassing number of the Complete
Living Being (VI.6.9.31); that what really exists and is, is already determined by number (VI.6.3.3) 97 foreshadows the unied number of Being
(VI.6.9.29). Number, then, is the rational principle that orders the intelligible realm.98 The absolute unied number in Being, when contemplated by
Intellect (the number moving in itself), divides substance and becomes the
unfolded number of beings, enclosed by the nite number of the Complete
Living Being.99
The examination of the properties of substantial number reveals that
they represent, in a concentrated form, the primary kinds of substance. I
say concentrated because all primary kinds determine the existence of every
being and, as Plotinus says, the primary kinds appear to us at rst as mixed
and indistinguishable. It is only after our dianoetic examination that we perceive them individually.100 From this it follows that the different properties of
substantial number simultaneously underlie the structure of the intelligible,
and only when we examine them individually do they appear in their most
concentrated form in each of the elements in the second hypostasis.
The particular activities of substantial number in Being, Intellect, beings,
and the Complete Living Being, as dened in VI.6.9, correspond to Platos
ve primary kinds: the unied number of Being (hnmenos arithmos) corresponds to stability (stasis); the number moving in itself in Intellect (arithmos
en heauti kinoumenos) corresponds to motion (kinsis); the unfolded number
in beings (arithmos exelligmenos) corresponds to otherness (heterots); and
the encompassing number in the Complete Living Being (arithmos periechn)
corresponds to sameness (tautots). Each activity, just like each category,
characterizes a different aspect of the intelligible realm. When put together,
all activities of substantial number bring together the different aspects of the
same whole.101 This same whole, in turn, corresponds to the fth primary
kind of being. In this sense, substantial number constructs the intelligible.
Substantial number has priority over all aspects of the intelligible, including
Being. Plotinus calls number in the intelligible realm substantial (ousids)
and not ontological (ontikos), presumably because it, like substance, provides
97. VI.6.3.2: gr fsthke ka stin, riym katelhptai dh.
98. VI.9.5.
99. V.1.5.1517: As if Intellect was shaped by the numbers which came to
exist in it.
100. VI.2.8.
101. Armstrong (1988: vol. 6, 7) cites Brhiers evaluation of VI.2 as a
reective analysis which brings to light different aspects of the same whole.
This evaluation holds true beyond the pages of the treatise, especially regarding
the activities of substantial number.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

all intelligible existence. Number substantiates separation from the One,

which enables Being to stand rm in multiplicity.102 In his own summary,
the rst and true number is the principle and spring of existence for the
real beings. 103
Considering Plotinus principal disagreement with Aristotles categories,104
the correlation between the Platonic primary kinds and the properties of substantial number in Plotinus provides another conceptual defense of Platonic
number. He uses the parallel to argue once again for the existence of substantial number against Aristotles mathematical interpretation, discussed
earlier.105
Aristotle places quantity second on the list of his ten categories, following substance itself.106 Most often, he refers to it as poson and occasionally as
posots,107 but never as number (arithmos). This fact is important because it
proves that Aristotle views quantity to be the primary genus, of which number is simply a species. Consequently, this view leads to the fundamental
rift between Aristotle and Plotinus on the subject of number. In VI.1.4 and
VI.2.13, Plotinus argues against Aristotles placement of quantity among what
Plotinus considers to be the primary kinds.108 According to Plotinus, quantity
is posterior both to the primary kinds (being, rest, motion, otherness, and
sameness) and to itself.109
Further, Aristotle divides quantity into two species: discrete (diaireton)
and continuous (syneches).110 Among the former he places number, because
the units in arithmetical number do not have a common boundary; among
the latter, he places magnitude, for example, a line, because all the points
on a line are in relation to one another and have a common boundary.111
102. VI.6.10.1.
103. VI.6.15.3435: rx on ka phg postsevw tow osin
riymw prtow ka lhyw.
104. Plotinus views Aristotles categories entirely from the point of Platos
primary kinds and consequently nds them completely inapplicable for the
understanding of being in VI.1.124. For the most recent summary of the
scholarship on Plotinus criticism of Aristotles categories, see De Haas (2001).
105. See chapter 3.
106. Metaph. 1028a; Cat. 3b10ff.
107. For the former, Metaph. 1083a4, among many; for the latter, Metaph.
1028a19.
108. VI.2.13.12: t posn ok n tow gnesi tow prtoiw, ka a
t poin.
109. VI.2.13.7: sterw te kenvn ka auto.
110. Cat. 6 and Metaph. 1020a. Porphyry, In Cat. 101, 1; Simplicius, In Cat.
120; Dexippus, In Cat. 3, 1.
111. Cat. 6.

NUMBER AND THE UNIVERSE

111

Plotinus main objection to taking number as discrete quantity is that the

one is not the same in discrete and in continuous things but, more important, that the one is not the same in perceptible and in intelligible things.112
The one, as the unit of number, is denitely not a genus113 and the nature
of quantity signies a denite quantity and measures how much each thing
is and is itself a so much. 114 Plotinus specically rejects Aristotles view that
number is a genus including continuous magnitude, place, and time.115 If the
continuous is quantity, then the discontinuous would not be quantity. For
how would they both relate to one common quantity, unless the quantity in
the continuous is considered to be incidental? But if the continuous things
are quantity only incidentally, that does not explain what their nature is in
virtue of which they are considered quantity. 116 In order for quantity to be a
primary kind, it must be simultaneous with being, like Platos primary kinds
described above.117 Plotinus argues that quantity is posterior to these primary kinds, because it includes movement when number increases and rest
when number stops to make a unit.118 Quantity is a mixture of movement
and rest, and thus composite and not inherent to substance. Quantity is only
a form.119 He species that, in order to understand the nature of number as
a Platonist, one should investigate how numbers in and by themselves are
substances. No matter what the substantial nature of number is, in any case,
such numbers have nothing in common with quantitative numbers except
the name alone.120
The primary kinds of being, motion, rest, otherness, and sameness
conate into the concept of substantial number. By considering substantial
number as activity of substance (energeia ts ousias), Plotinus relates number
to the essence of substance itself and to Aristotles primary substance that
explains what a thing is. Thus substantial number, like being, is a whole in
112. Apostle (1980: 71) notes that the name discrete, although the
antonym of continuous, is not a synonym of noncontinuous.
113. VI.2.11.4243: n tow riymow koinn t n d svw toto ka
o gnow; VI.1.4.5051: stai tonun ox n ti gnow, ll' riymw
mnow.
114. VI.2.13.2021: metre t son kstou at te son ti.
115. VI.1.4.12.
116. VI.1.4.910: katoi toto t lgesyai posow prxei, opv
d, tw fsiw kay lgetai, dhlotai.
117. VI.2.13.23: posn mn o prton met tn llvn, ti
kena mn ma met to ntow.
118. VI.2.13.2326.
119. II.4.9.67: edow posthw.
120. VI.1.4.5455: ok n koinn ti xoien prw totouw kenoi,
ll' noma mnon.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

many things. It exists independently in the intelligible, and yet the things
participate in it.121

Soul and Number

Plotinus omission of soul from the list of the activities of substantial number is rather conspicuous by now. This notion is sharpened by the long prePlotinian tradition of understanding soul as number, including the Pythagoreans,
Platos Demiurge, who uses arithmetical ratios and geometrical patterns to
make the cosmic soul, and Xenocrates concept of the soul as self-moving
number.122 Before Plotinus, Soul is one element of the intelligible that has
been clearly associated with number. Yet he does not discuss the soul until
the end of the exegesis on the concept of number, in VI.6.16. Furthermore,
on the list in VI.6.9, he does not assign a specic activity of substantial number to Soul. He does not even mention Soul in the discussion of substantial
number in the intelligible in VI.6.610. The rst time he introduces soul in
the treatise is through Platos explanation that the notion of number arises in
the transition of soul as it goes from one thing to another, as if it numbers
them.123 This is also the last time Plotinus refers to soul until the antepenultimate chapter of the treatise. Why is soul missing from the central and most
essential chapters dealing with the concept of number in VI.6?
The reason for this, I argue, lies in the concept of substantial number
itself. In V.3.5 and III.8.9, Plotinus introduces Intellect as number. In the
central chapters of VI.6, and especially in the list of activities of substantial
number in VI.6.9, he elaborates every detail of numbers construction of the
second hypostasis, and thereby conates the properties of substantial number with the primary kinds of existence. This conation seals the ontogenetic
productive power of substantial number exclusively in the intelligible realm.
At the level of Soul, as the third hypostasis, which mediates between the
intelligible and the sensible, things are more complicated. Substantial number
generates Being, Intellect, beings, and the Complete Living Being, because
they are pure intelligible entities. Soul, however, contains the complex duality
of having a part of itself undescended in the intelligible realm and a part of
itself descended in the corporeal world. Substantial number therefore cannot
have an exclusive property with Soul, unless all of Soul is undescended and
disembodied. In order to distinguish the higher transcendent part from the
lower embodied part of the soul, in VI.6.1516, Plotinus returns to the discussion of the difference between monadic and substantial number. Here he
121. VI.2.12.
122. Ti. 3537; Xenocrates, fr. 190.
123. VI.6.4.918.

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113

examines the relationship between the two kinds from a new perspective. He
explains that substantial numbers, which are the rst numbers in the generation of the intelligible realm, are numbered numbers (prtoi arithmoi, hs
arithmtoi).124 They are numbered in the sense that they possess the number,
which they represent, inherently as their substance, and they do not measure
or count things quantitatively.125 The henads, dened as molds for beings in
VI.6.10.12, then represent the numbered numbers. Since substantial numbers are numbered numbers and paradigms of monadic numbers, it follows
that monadic numbers are numbering numbers that measure and count
the countable things (arithmountes tous arithmous kai ta arithmta).126 This
conceptual and etymological play, however, is perplexing.127 Plotinus admits
that his audience nds this distinction most difcult and would ask for more
explanation. As a reply, he summarizes the crucial points of his explanation
so far in the rest of the treatise. This little vignette on the audiences reaction
provides a rare glimpse of the live atmosphere of his lectures and structurally
marks the inception of the concluding chapters. Plotinus construes his explanation in the form of an imaginary dialogue with his audience.
The difculty lies in how to distinguish substantial numbers (the numbered numbers) from monadic numbers (the numbering numbers).128 He
begins with monadic number in physical reality. For example, Plotinus says,
when you count one dog and one man to be two or even two men, you should
not consider this two to be substance in the intelligible (arithmos houtos ouk
ousia), nor even a kind of substance that is in the perceptible things (oud
hs en aisthtois), but purely quantitative measurement (kathars poson).129 If
you split this two, you make the two new ones as the quantitative principle of
number two.130 But this quantitative principle, he insists, does not represent
the unity of two underlying intelligible realities. If these two underlying realities are activities of substance and they form a unity, this two is a substantial
two, different from a monadic two.131
124. VI.6.15.3738.
125. Nikulin does not discuss this part of Plotinus exegesis. Charles-Saget
(1980: 7376).
126. VI.6.15.4041. Proclus, In Tim. I, 16.26; Dexippus, In Cat. 69.15.
Similarly, Amado (1953: 423425) interprets the terms along the lines of
Spinozas natura naturata and natura naturans.
127. VI.6.16.89: xei gr polln poran. This difculty is also noted
by Brhier in his translation (1963: 14); see Amado (1953: 423425).
128. VI.6.16.68: w prtvn ntvn oto esin o riymo, llouw
te a riymow par' kenouw enai lgete riymontaw.
129. VI.6.16.1518.
130. VI.6.16.1920: t na rxn poiew ka tyesai poso.
131. VI.6.16.2426; VI.2.9.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

Proceeding to the substantial two, Plotinus argues that, since substantial

numbers exist in the intelligible and underlie the Forms, it is correct to think
that a dog in itself or a man in himself have a particular substantial number.
Let us say a dyad, for example. Each one of them is a dyad, not by counting them quantitatively as two ones,132 but by grasping them as the unity
(henots) of two underlying principles. This dyad is a substantial dyad,133 as
the substance of the thing (a man or a dog) holds its nature together.134 As
a result, we do not make a man or a dog two by counting. The substantial
dyad of a man or a dog has its own existence in the intelligible and does not
come together when we number. The summary of the difference between
the two kinds of number reinforces one last time Plotinus principal disagreement with Aristotles view of quantity as a primary kind and number
as its species.
Naturally, the rejection of Aristotles view that number is multiplicity
of units raises the question of exactly how substantial number is imitated
by monadic number in enumerating physical reality. Plotinus answer is that
the monadic number externally assigns a certain quantity to a thing, while
the substantial number internally shapes the substantial unity of the Form
of this thing. The substantial number, he claries, is latent in us when we
do not count.135 When we count, we convert the internal nonquantitative
number into an external quantitative expression, just as when we walk, we
externalize or actualize the primary kind of movement.136 Since number is
substance and thus in the substance that makes us and not in body or magnitude, he argues, it follows that soul is number.
Plotinus precise words are that soul is number, if it is a substance.137
The modality of the statement comes from the souls duality in its undescended intelligible part and descended corporeal part. The number of body
is substance in the way that is proper for body, he claries, while the number
of soul is substance in the way that is proper for soul. He gives an example
with a triad in the intelligible: if a triad is represented in a living being in
the intelligible, it is a substantial triad (trias ousids); and if this triad is not
in a particular living being but is generally in real being (hols trias en ti

132. A subtle jibe at Aristotles understanding of the Indenite Dyad as

dyopoios in Metaph. 1083b36.
133. A good example that the Indenite Dyad is not a substantial number.
Nikulin (2002: 81).
134. VI.6.16.2728: t n t os& ka sunxon tn to prgmatow
fsin.
135. VI.6.16.3738.
136. A reference to Metaph. 1028a2029.
137. VI.6.16.45: riymw ra cux, eper osa.

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115

onti), it is a principle of substance.138 The latter is the numbered number of

the substantial triad.
The discussion of numbered numbers and numbering numbers, albeit
enigmatic and not elaborated by later Neoplatonists, elucidates Plotinus
interpretation of Platos true number at the onset of Plotinus investigation
of the three hypotheses on the relationship between number and substance
in VI.6.4.2125. As the numbering number only actualizes the numbered
numbers, the numbering soul does not produce number but only arouses in
itself the idea of number from the difference in sensible things.139 In counting, Plotinus vividly says that you generate the quantitative number in yourself and actualize the quantity and the dyad.140 When you say that the form
of virtue is a tetrad, you actualize the quantity of the substantial tetrad and
attribute to virtue the substantial tetrad that is in you.141
The activities of substantial number suggest that Soul is number. As
discussed in V.1.5,142 the One is prior to the Indenite Dyad and, when the
Indenite Dyad is dened by the One, it becomes Intellect and substantial number (arithmos hs ousia). The different activities of substantial number have their own ontological hierarchy: substantial number, as the unied
number of Being, is an image of the One; the unfolded number of beings
represents the principle of otherness in the intelligible realm; the encompassing number of the Complete Living Being represents the principle of sameness in the intelligible; monadic number is an image of substantial number;
Intellect, as number moving in itself, is an image of the Indenite Dyad; and
Soul is an image of Intellect.143 Since Intellect is number moving in itself,144
Soul, as an image of Intellect, must also resemble number moving in itself.145
If substantial number instantiates Intellect and Soul is an image of Intellect,
then Soul also contains an image of substantial number. The above activities
of substantial number relate to the intelligible as a whole, and likewise, Soul
imitates them all. Plotinus has already hinted at the mimetic nature of Soul
in the comparison that Soul holds all things together in itself, just as Intellect
embraces all beings together in the intelligible realm.146 The difference
138. VI.6.16.4754.
139. Discussed in chapter 4.
140. VI.6.16.5152: s d gennw riymn n so ka nergew posn
ka duda.
141. A correlative to his example of justice as a tetrad in VI.6.5.1012.
142. See pp. 6870.
143. V.1.3.7: ekn tw sti no.
144. VI.6.9.3031; VI.7.13.45.
145. Although Plotinus does not describe Soul as self-moving
(autokintos) but as always moving (aeikintos) in V.1.12.5.
146. VI.6.7.5: cux otv mimetai ka legomnh fsiw.

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in wholeness between Soul and Intellect is that Intellect holds all beings
in their actuality, whereas Soul comprises them in their potentiality.147 As
images of beings, material things represent beings only potentially as one
being is copied in a great number of sensible things. Since Soul is an image
of Intellect, Soul cannot possess an individual aspect of substantial number, but actualizes all aspects in its activity. Soul moves, unfolds, embraces,
stops in the creation of the sensible reality as image of the intelligible. In
these activities, Soul deciphers the ontological code in substantial number
into corporeal and quantitative multiplicity.
As the image of Intellect, Soul also inherits Intellects one-in-many
nature. In VI.2.4, the multiplicity of Soul is explained by a comparison to
the body. The body, being many and one, is divisible into many innumerable
parts. Soul, which also is a unity of many and one, is not divisible because
its parts are not spatially separated.148 It is many not as a compound from
many, but as one nature, which is many.149 With its one-in-many nature,
Soul creates the plurality of bodies, animals, and plants in physical reality
and preserves them from innumerable innity by encompassing them in its
one nature. Soul comprises all sensible things in one as Intellect and the
Complete Living Being embrace the whole number of beings in one.
Regarding knowledge, Soul, like Intellect, cognizes itself as multiplicity
separated from the One. Souls knowledge of the One is different from Souls
knowledge of itself, just as Intellects seeing of the One in Being is different
from Intellects seeing of itself in beings.150 Because of the basic nondiscursiveness of the One, Soul does not reason the One, but understands the One
by a presence superior to knowledge. 151 But to acquire knowledge of itself,
Soul thinks discursively.
The language with which Plotinus explains the dianoetic reasoning of
Soul is also important. Discursive thought is dened as separation (apostasis) from the One 152 as Soul goes past the One and falls into number and
147. VI.6.15.2123. That Soul and Intellect are number is an original
Pythagorean doctrine (Metaph. 985b), adopted later by Xenocrates, for whom
Soul is a self-moving number (autokinton; Iamblichus, De Anima 4.8).
148. VI.2.4.2122: e d tiw lboi cxhn man distaton megyh
plostaton.
149. VI.2.4.3132: o snyeton n k polln, ll ma fsiw
poll. In V.1.2, Soul itself exists forever not departing from itself (m
polepein autn), quoting Phdr. 245c8.
150. Discussed pp. 3536.
151. VI.9.4.13: kat parosan pistmhw krettona.
152. VI.9.4.35: Soul experiences its falling away from being one and is not
altogether one (psxei d cux to n enai tn pstasin ka o
pnth stn n). Cf. V.1.1.59.

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117

multiplicity. 153 Discursive thinking unfolds as many (logos gar h epistm,

polla de ho logos, VI.9.4.56) as if adding layers of sense-perceptible propositions to conceal the ontological truth of its single source.154 The explanation of
Souls discursive thought interprets epistemologically the original denition
of multiplicity in VI.6.1. Separation from the One is knowledge that unfolds
into many characteristics and accumulates propositions. This interpretation
is important, because rst, it explains Souls dianoetic connection with number and multiplicity, and second, it reinforces the notion that any reasoned
account and denition are attempts at peeling away the layers of propositional thinking to uncover the underlying truth beyond. Like Intellect, Soul,
when it knows itself, becomes number and many;155 while contemplating the
One, Soul regains its unity and nondiscursiveness.156
In Soul, the dichotomy between One and multiplicity is most striking.
It involves the intelligible and the corporeal, the immortal and the mortal,
the continuous and the discrete, substantial number and monadic number.
Since it includes a multiplicity of complete opposites, the unity of Soul has
been consistently an object of philosophers interests. In his commentary on
the Timaeus, Proclus summarizes the prevalent theories on the representation of the soul:
Before those who earlier than we have attempted to explain the
nature of the soul arithmetically (mathmatikn poiountes tn ousian
ts psychs) [157] as some medium between the physical and the metaphysical, it is asserted by those who call the soul a number that it
consists of unity, as something indivisible (hoi men arithmon autn
eipontes ek monados poiousin hs ameristou), and of the Indenite
Dyad as something divisible (ek tou aoristou dyados hs merists).
Others, however, who conceive of the soul as of a geometrical gure (gemetrikn hypostasin), insist that it consists of a point and
distance (ousan ek smeiou kai diastases); of which the rst is indivisible, and the second divisible. Of the rst opinion are the people

153. VI.9.4.67: parrxetai on t n ew riymn ka plyow

pesosa.
154. The reverse process of abstraction retracts multiplicity and knowledge
back to the One, as lucidly explained by Mortley (1982: 436437).
155. VI.6.16.45: riymw ra cux.
156. VI.9.6.35: In contemplating the One, Soul loses its multiplicity and
number.
157. Based on the ensuing distinction between the two types of
representations of the soul, pace K. Guthrie (1987: 48), I translate mathmatikn
as referring specically to arithmetic, not to mathematics in general.

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around Aristander, Numenius, and the majority of the other commentators; of the second opinion is Severus.158
The passage relates the Neopythagorean arithmetical and geometrical representations of the soul.159 We do not know much about the divide between
the two schools, and the gure of Aristander is unknown,160 but it is obvious
that, for Plotinus, both views are equally important and complement each
other in his concept of Soul. On the one hand, Plotinus distinction between
substantial and quantitative number falls along the lines of Numenius understanding of number as that which is indivisible, corresponding to substantial number, and that which is divisible, corresponding to monadic number.
On the other hand, the geometrical construction of the soul as a point and
dimensionality represents guratively the relationship between the higher
and the lower part of Soul, between the universal Soul and the individual
soul, and between the One and multiplicity.161 We have discussed the former
thoroughly, and the latter requires our present attention.

The Ungured Figure of Souls Dance

The context in which Plotinus reaches the conclusion that Soul is number is
also signicant for the understanding of the role of Soul in the structure of
the universe. Alluding to Platos elaborate explanation of the mathematically
harmonious making of the world-soul in Ti. 36a637a1, Plotinus explains in
VI.6.16.4344 that soul is number and melody, since intelligible substance
itself is number and melody. In the Ennead explicating the nature of the
intelligible realm (V.9), Plotinus states: indeed all music, since the ideas
which it has are concerned with rhythm and melody, would be of the same
kind as the art which is concerned with intelligible number. 162 He compares
the art of music to the art of intelligible number ([techn] peri ton noton arithmon echousa), in order to explain that not all imitative arts produce
158. Proclus, In Tim. II, 153.1725; Numenius, fr. 39 (des Places), fr. 46
(Guthrie). Guthries translation with modications.
159. A better explanation of the geometrical relationship between the point
and the three-dimensional separation from it can be found in Platos description
that the soul is interwoven with the body from the center on out in every
direction to the outermost limit of the heavens and covers it all on the outside
(Ti. 36e15).
160. des Places 1973: 89, n. 3.
161. Guthries translation. Cf. Iamblichus, De Anima 4. On number and
time in the separation of the Soul, see Blandin (2000: 3360).
162. V.9.11.1013.

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119

copies of sensible, or more precisely not intelligible, objects, but that there
are some which possess a closer connection with the intelligible. His statement recalls a series of memorable images of dancing, dancers, and dances
throughout the Enneads. For example, the cosmic dance of the heavenly bodies in IV.4.3334, the hypostatic dance of Soul around Intellect in I.8.2, and
the divine dance of the individual soul, free from its corporeal imprisonment
and reunited with its intelligible source in VI.9.910. All these images pertain to the intelligible and visually convey the order and the harmony at the
cosmic stage of the universe. But how do music and dancing relate to the role
of number in the intelligible realm?
Plotinus use of metaphors is one of the most captivating features of his
style and has long been an object of scholarly attention. Gerson has suggested
that usually there is a deeper ontological meaning in these metaphors.163 In
support of his view, I think that the dancing scenes in the Enneads are literary metaphors of the harmonious universe, but, at a deeper level, there is a
certain literalness to them that conceptually reveals the inherent ontological
roles of substantial number in the structure of the intelligible. This ontological movement of number, which organizes the kosmos notos, originates and
directs the circular cosmic dances of Intellect and Soul.
First, let us go back to the passage cited in the beginning of this
section, and ask what Plotinus means by the art of intelligible number. In
VI.3.16.1824, he explains that some arts, such as lyre playing, contain senseperceived activities (energeiai aisthtai), while others, such as the works of
the soul (tas de auts ts psychs pragmateias), relate to the intelligible realm.
On Platos authority, he also distinguishes other arts, such as geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music, that occupy an intermediate position between
sensible reality and the realm of the Forms. As he states, geometry is concerned with intelligibles and it must be placed there [in the intelligible]. 164
Geometry theorizes in gures the concepts of relation, proportion, and
measurement. This kind of conceptualization uses the monadic numbers as
measures of magnitudes, however.
All these arts use number as their medium and work with quantiable
proportions in space and time.165 Plotinus, too, thinks that the arts relate
closely to something that is beyond sense perception. While Plato uses conventional mathematics to demonstrate their higher noetic quality, Plotinus
emphasizes the nonquantitative nature of substantial number and geometrical gures. His attention is exclusively on their role in the intelligible, where
163. Gerson (1997: 298299).
164. V.9.11.2426: gevmetra d nohtn osa takta ke. On Platos
intelligible number, see R. 525b11526c12: the soul is turned toward the Good by
studying geometry.
165. On rhythm and harmony, see R. 398d2, Symp. 187e5, Leg. 655a5.

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space and time do not exist, or in other words, where measurable quantity
does not exist. Thus, the art of intelligible number in Plotinus comparison
between music and number refers to the ontological, not sense-perceptible,
activities of substantial number in the intelligible.
In VI.6.17.57, Plotinus borrows the geometrical gure of the line as an
example from Aristotles explanation of continuous quantity 166 to explain that
a line, in the intelligible, is unlimited, not because there is an intelligible line
that is unlimited, but because we can always think of a longer line:
1. It is impossible to attach a mental image to the things which really
exist in the intelligible realm.
2. Hence the line in the intelligible is unlimited in the sense that it is not
of denite numbered length.
3. Since a line is what proceeds from one point and over one distance, it
is posterior to number because the one is observed in it.
4. Limit is not thought to be included in the absolute line, since the line
in the intelligible cannot be measured quantitatively.
How is it possible for the absolute line to start from a point and yet be
unlimited? For Plotinus, the line is both an intellectual thing (noeron) and
somehow a real thing (ps to pragma). All gures in the intelligible (point,
line, plane, and solid) do not have quantity or quality but exist as ungured gures (aschmatista schmata) before they are extended into bodies
(VI.6.17.2526):
Figure, then, is always one in real being (schma hen en ti onti),
but it has distinctions in it either in the living being (en ti zii)
or before the living being (pro tou ziou). But I mean has distinctions not in the sense that it has acquired size (ouch hoti emegethynth), but because it has been divided (hoti hekaston emeristh pros
hekaston), each part of it in correspondence to each being, and given
to the bodies there in the intelligible. (VI.6.17.2831)
As substantial numbers are the paradigms of monadic numbers and the
henads are molds for beings, so too, in the intelligible, ungured gures are
the antecedents of gures, and, in this sense, are unlimited. If intelligible
gures are unlimited, then what kind of division does Plotinus have in mind?
The answer is that the division of being by substantial number generates the
beings in Intellect.167

166. Cat. 6.5a114.

167. VI.6.9.26: to riymo dnamiw postsa mrise t n.

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121

The concept of ungured gures, introduced at the end of VI.6, conrms

the ontological solution to the problem of the number of innity, examined
in the beginning of the treatise.168 On the one hand, number and gures, just
like beings, are limited in the intelligible (arithmos ekei hristai), because it
is not possible to think of more beings than the ones Intellect thinks.169 On
the other hand, they are unlimited, in the sense that they are not measured
quantitatively in the intelligible:170
But what it is it all is, being one and all together and, certainly, a
whole, and not bounded by any limit but by its own agency being
what it is; for in general none of the real beings is in a limit (tn
gar ontn hols ouden en perati), but what is limited and measured
is what is prevented from running on into indeniteness and needs
a measure (esti to peperasmenon kai memetrmenon to eis apeirian
klythen dramein kai metrou deomenon); but those real beings are
all measures (ekeina de panta metra), and therefore are all beautiful.
(VI.6.18.612)
The existence of being is a measureitself a result of the division of Being
by and according to substantial number. In VI.2.22.1920, we also learn that,
before Intellect sees all beings, they are unlimited (apeira), but as soon as
it comprehends them (ti de heni perilphthenta), they arrive at number (eis
arithmon erchetai). Intellect also holds Soul, which comes after it, so that
Soul is in number. Only the lowest part of the soul, the one that is responsible for grasping and shaping matter, is altogether innite (to de eschaton
auts d apeiron pantapasi, VI.2.22.2223).171 That number is unlimited in
the intelligible realm means that beings exist there without measure.172 But
as soon as Intellect sees them in the Complete Living Being, they show their
number, magnitude, and quality.173
The ontogenetic activities of substantial number in Being, Intellect,
beings, and the Complete Living Being construct the ungured gure of
the intelligible. It is in the form of a circle, but this circle is also ungured,
as it does not have any quantitative dimensions or measures. Since this circle does not have any quantitative dimensions, the best dianoetic description
of it is to conceive it as the cosmic dance of Soul around Intellect and of
168. VI.6.2; see chapter 3.
169. VI.6.18.14.
170. VI.6.18.56: eh d' n kke peirow, ti ok sti memetrhmnow.
171. Recalling apostasis eschat in VI.7.42.2124; see chapter 1, note 86.
172. VI.6.18. Cf. VI.6.7.710: all beings exist individually before Intellect
sees them.
173. VI.2.21.1226.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

Intellect around Soul. Dance is a most suitable analogy because, although it

is based on measurements of space and rhythm, it conveys them implicitly.
When one observes dance, one is not made aware of the actual measurements but of their effect. The ungured gure of the intelligible, although
not measured quantitatively, also implicitly conveys its effect in the circular
dance of Soul.174
Plotinus idea of the circle that equally encompasses the plurality of its
parts follows the long tradition of geometrical representation of the composition of the universe, documented in Alexander of Aphrodisias commentary
on Aristotles metaphysics:
Plato and the Pythagoreans thought that the numbers were the cause
of being, for they took the rst and non-composite as cause, surfaces
being rst in relation to bodies, being more simple and independent
in their being of body, lines being rst in relation to surfaces, and
points are rst in relation to lines, being totally non-composite and
having nothing prior to them. (In Metaph. 55.2026) 175
This is the Peripatetic report of how Plato views the generation of the universe as a geometrical progression from a discrete point to a line to a plane to
a solid.176 OMeara represents it as shown in gure 5.1.177 I will not digress into
the mathematical history of this representation since it is outside of Plotinus
interest itself. I will point out, however, that he uses a similar geometrical
progression to explain the productive power of number that constructs the
intelligible realm. But his understanding of the constitutive role of number literally rounds out the corners of OMearas gurative representation
of Platos cosmology. The gure of the circle conveys the transcendence of
the One, not in every corner of the cube but in every segment of circle of
the kosmos notos and the kosmos aisthtos. The One is the single point from
which Intellect unrolls outward, and the universe explodes into multiplicity,
although it is still unied by the limit of the circles circumference.178 The
fact that all elements of the circle are listed in the passage above emphasizes
174. I am thankful to the anonymous reviewer for the reference to
Olympiodorus treatment of Platos interpretation of circular dance as an
imitation of the heavens, In Grg. 5.5 and of souls circularity in 30.12.
175. OMeara (1993: 47). Dooleys translation (1992: 84).
176. Cf. Metaph. 1080b; Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos VII 99;
Theon, Exp. rer. math. 27.
177. OMeara (1993: 47).
178. I.7.1.24: So the One must stay still, and all things turn back to it, as a
circle does to the center from which all the radii come (sper kklon prw
kntron f' o psai gramma). Cf. VI.2.12.810.

NUMBER AND THE UNIVERSE

123

FIGURE 5.1. Geometrical representation of Platos cosmology (OMeara 1993).

that they are absent in the single point of the One. Plotinus, too, cautions
us that comparing the One to the single point (smeion) is only a result of our
desire and necessity to indicate the One to each other; otherwise the absolute
One beyond Being is not a point (smeion) or a unit (monas),179 although the
unied number of Being is.
The list of the properties of substantial number in VI.6.9.2931 constructs
the intelligible realm in a strictly mathematical progression.180 Substantial
number does not arrange the multiplicity of intelligible beings into a kosmos
notos, for they have never been in chaos or disorder, but, by dividing Being,
the substantial number itself creates a kosmos notos. To visualize Plotinus
description, we can mark Being as a point representing the unied number
of Being, the Intellect as a concentric circle representing the number moving in itself, all beings as lines unfolding from Being to the circle of the
Intellect, and nally the Complete Living Being as a sphere encompassing
all the above. Plotinus himself explains that substantial number constructs
the intelligible realm as an intelligible sphere (sphaira not) embracing the
form imposed upon the universe. 181 Because substantial number does not
measure quantitatively beings and the intelligible realm, this image is not
spatial or temporal and yet is a literal and iconic representation of the architecture of the intelligible according to the ontogenetic activities of substantial
number. The best parallel to the metaphysical qualities of Plotinus image is
perhaps Parmenides own description of being as completed, / from every
direction like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere, / everywhere from the centre equally matched. 182
Plotinus vision of the circular motion of the universe, which is rooted
in a center that is beyond it, closely relates to the circular heavenly models

179. VI.9.5.42.
180. Similarly, Gerson (1994: 45) characterizes Plotinus description of the
efuence of the One in V.2.1.711.
181. II.9.17.5.
182. DK B8.4244: tetelesmnon st, / pntoyen ekklou
sfarhw nalgkion gk, / messyen sopalw pnt. (Gallops text
and trans.) I thank the anonymous reviewer for reminding me of this parallel.

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

constructed by Hipparchus of Samos, Eudoxus, Heracleides, and Ptolemy.183

Euclid denes the circle as a plane gure contained by one line upon
which all the straight lines fall from one point and are equal to one another.
The point from which the equidistant lines derive is called the center of the
circle.184 Proclus acknowledges the particular metaphysical usefulness of the
gure of the circle as such:
The rst and simplest and most perfect of the gures is the circle. It is superior to all solid gures because its being is of simpler
order, and it surpasses other plane gures by reason of its homogeneity and self-identity. It corresponds to the Limit, the number
one, and all the things in the column of the better. . . . If you divide
the universe into the heavens and the world of generation, you will
assign the circular form to the heavens and the straight line to the
world of generation; for insofar as the circular form is found in the
changes and gures of the world of generation, it is divided from
above, from the heavenly order. It is because of the circular revolution of the heavens that generation returns in a circle upon itself
and brings its unstable mutability into a denite cycle. If you divide
bodiless things into soul and Intellect, you will say that the circle
has the character of Intellect, the straight line that of soul. This is
why the soul, as she reverts to Intellect, is said to move in a circle.
(In Euc. 147.819) 185
I cite this passage at length because it presents the synthesized nal result
of what Plotinus has set out to do in the Enneads. Proclus commentary on
Euclids denition of the circle demonstrates the path of Plotinus complete
philosophical exegesis. The suitability of the circle to express the simplicity
of a starting point from which multiplicity expands outward until it is contained inward by a circumscribing line is beyond doubt. This becomes clear
when we relate the hypostases to the elements of the circle.
Proclus conceptualizes a clear geometrical distinction between the circular shape of the heavens and Intellect and the linear sense-perceptible progression of soul. Based on Plotinus distinction of number, we can equate
the former with the nonquantitative substantial numbers and the ungured
intelligible gure of the circle, and the latter with soul as the linear quantitative enumerating principle in physical reality.
Examining Proclus concept of the circular movement and the beyondness of the hypostases in his Elements of Theology, prop. 20, Kutash
183. Except Ptolemy, all mentioned in Kutash (1994: 105).
184. Euclid, El., def. XV and XVI. Kutash (1994: 109).
185. Morrows translation (1970) with modications.

NUMBER AND THE UNIVERSE

125

recognizes, in passing, the inuence of geometrical and astronomical theories of Plato and Plotinus on Proclus.186 A closer look, however, reveals that
Proclus commentary on Euclids denition of the circle, cited above and also
by Kutash,187 does not bear such direct resemblance to Proclus explanation
of the motion of Soul and Intellect in prop. 20 as it does to Plotinus explanation of the circular form in the intelligible in the Enneads.188 In IV.2.1,
Plotinus discusses the indivisibility of Intellect and the indivisibility of the
part of soul that always remains in the intelligible, and the divisibility of the
part of soul that descends into the sensible. To illustrate what he means, he
describes that soul is composed of the part which is above and that which
is attached to that higher world but has owed out as far as these parts, like
a line from a center (hoion gramms ek kentrou).189
For Plotinus, Being produces the real beings when moving according
to number.190 The motion of number begins with Intellect, which exists by
thinking itself and thinking all the individual intellects in itself. Thinking
for Intellect is moving within itself. This motion is introverted, self-reexive,
all-inclusive, and without direction, except for the dianoetic conception of
inward and outward. Therefore, the motion is circular, though not in the sense
of circular direction, but rather that a circle circumscribes the movement.191
The unied number of Being is the point of Intellects gaze upon the One
before it realizes its multiplicity. By the moving-in-itself number of Intellect,
the individual forms come into existence as a number that unfolds itself from
the unied number of Being. The individual beings do not continue their
unfolding motion ad innitum. They are encompassed by the number of the
Complete Living Being. Thus, the intelligible world moves circularly, folding out and folding in, resembling the breathing in and out of an ensouled
organism. Plotinus perceives guratively the course of this ontological progression as follows: [Intellect] became like a circle unfolding itself, shape
and surface and circumference and center and radii, some parts above and
some below. 192 The unfolding of the circle of Intellect (exelixas) results in
186. Kutash (1994: 105, 112).
187. Kutash (1994: 109110).
188. Among Proclus predecessors, Plotinus must have had the most sway
in the formulation of Proclus view, since all the elements of his commentary on
Euclids denition of a circle are found in Plotinus.
189. IV.1.1.1617.
190. VI.6.15.25: t nta genn kinomenon kat' riymn.
191. I.8.2.1517: Intellect has all things and is all things, and is with them
when it is with itself and has all things without having them.
192. III.8.8.3638: oon gr kklow jeljaw atn ggone ka
sxma ka ppedon ka perifreia ka kntron ka gramma ka t
mn nv, t d ktv.

126

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

Being = Unified Number

Beings = Unfolded Number

Intellect = Number Moving in Itself

Complete Living Being = Encompassing Number

FIGURE 5.2. Geometrical representation of the aspects of substantial number

in the intelligible realm in Ennead VI.6.

the unfolded number of all intelligible beings (arithmos exelligmenos). In

VI.6.17.4143, we read that Intellect, as thinking itself, is a bare sphere (h
nosis de psilon echei sphairan), which is represented geometrically by the planar surface, but the living being is the sphere of the living being (to de zion
ziou sphairan), represented by the solid (gure 5.2).193
Plotinus presents Intellect as a circle in III.8.8.36, and as number moving
within itself in VI.6.9.3031.194 Since the inner revolution of number creates
193. In VI.5.5.13, Plotinus describes dianoetic thought as many lines
proceeding from one center which leads to a notion of the multiplicity which has
come to be.
194. Themistius, De An. 5.3.3.2: kinosi t zon p' riymo,
kayper ka Dhmkritou famen p to riymo tn sfairn.

NUMBER AND THE UNIVERSE

127

the notion of a sphere, it follows that Intellect, which has not seen all beings
in itself, resembles an empty sphere. But when Intellect sees, and thus thinks
all intellects or all beings in itself, it holds them and surrounds them in the
Complete Living Being as encompassing number (VI.6.31), which resembles
a full sphere.195 The sphere of the living being is, then, the gure of the universe (to te tou pantos schma) to which Plotinus refers in the beginning of his
discussion of the gures in the intelligible (VI.6.17.2324).196
The nal product of this progression is the encompassing number of
the Complete Living Being. IV.4.32 sheds more light on Plotinus view of
the Complete Living Being by quoting Ti. 30d131a1 that the universe (to
pan) is a single living being which encompasses all the living beings that
are within it; it has one soul which extends to all its parts, in so far as
each individual thing is a part of it (IV.4.32.47). Plotinus interprets Platos
denition in terms of his own ontological classication to mean that this
one universe is all bound together in shared experience and it is like one
living creature (IV.4.32.1314). This Complete Living Being consists of all
individual things that exist, or as he says, persist (menein) by moving.
Its movement can be observed by sympathy (sympatheia) in the heavenly
circuit.197 It is not casual but according to the rational principle of its
living organism, possessing harmony of action, experience, and order which
arranges things together, bringing them in due relation to each other . . . as
if they were performing a single ballet (mian orchsin) in a rich variety of
dance-movements (en poikili choreiai, IV.4.33.17). The rational principle
which orchestrates this cosmic dance is the substantial number. It creates
harmonious movements between all individual beings, Intellect, and Being.
Plotinus dancing metaphor illustrates the structure of the universe not in
situ, but contemplatively in action; not static and devoid of life, but dynamic
and boiling with life. He further extends the simile by comparing the
orderly and yet different movements of the limbs of the dancers body to
the image of the whole universe, which actively lives its own complete life,
moving its great parts within itself, and continually rearranging them.198
This motion is not in space or in time; rather, it is contemplative, possessing the knowledge of the intelligible realm. Motion in the intelligible means
the ontological progression of beings according to the rhythm provided by

195. As in the self-reection of Intellect, according to Rappe (2000:

124128).
196. The Complete Living Being holds all beings full of life, and, we may
say, boiling with life (pntvn zvw peplhrvmnvn ka oon zentvn,
VI.7.12.2223). After Aristotle, De Anima 405b2628. Armstrong (1988: 126).
197. Kutash (1994: 105).
198. IV.4.33.2729.

128

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

FIGURE 5.3. Geometrical representation of Being as a center and unied

number, Intellect as number moving in itself around its center, and Soul as
dancing around Intellect in Ennead VI.6.
substantial number. Quoting Platos Second Letter (312e14), Plotinus explains
the chain of ontological command:
That Intellect is the rst act of the Good and the rst substance
(prt energeia and prt ousia); the Good stays still in himself; but
Intellect moves about him in its activity, as also it lives around him.
And soul dances around intellect outside (h de exthen peri touton
choreuousa psych), and looks to it, and in contemplating its interior
sees God through it. (I.8.2.2125) 199
Soul is like a circle too, tting itself around its center, the rst expansion after
the center, an unextended extension (diastma adiastaton).200 All intelligible realities are unextended extensions (IV.4.16.2324), because they are ungured gures
(VI.6.17.2526). Once more, Plotinus visualizes the One as a point, Intellect and
the Complete Living Being as an unmoved circle, and Soul as a circle that moves
by its desire.201 As a result, the sphere of all (tou pantos sphaira), since it possesses
199. The passage continues with a reference to the journey of the gods in
Phdr. 247a248a.
200. IV.4.16.22.
201. IV.4.16.2325. For the dance of the Soul around Intellect, see
I.8.2.2324; For the unmoved and unchanged Intellect and the moving Soul

NUMBER AND THE UNIVERSE

129

FIGURE 5.4. Geometrical representation of the outward and inward motion

of multiplicity in Plotinus.
the soul which desires in that way, moves by its natural desire.202 In VI.9.810, he
explains that the natural movement of Soul is not in a straight line but in a circle
around a center that is not on the outside but within itself (see gure 5.3).
If we further consider the hypostatic dance of Soul in the intelligible
realm in the context of Plotinus understanding of the origin of multiplicity
as a separation from the One in VI.6, we discover that the motions of Soul
coincide with the two directions in which multiplicity exists. The rst is a
motion away from the One, which gives existence to all beings and Soul, as
different from the One. This direction is represented by the external dance
of Soul around Intellect. The second motion of multiplicity is introspective
and toward the One, which preserves multiplicity from dissipation into innity. This direction is represented by the inward dance of Soul around its center in an attempt to see its intelligible source. While Soul dances externally
outside Intellect, it is turned internally toward Intellect and the One.
The ontological composition in this explanation can be represented geometrically as in gure 5.4.
generating sense-perceptible reality, see III.4.1. For Soul as an unfolding seed,
see III.7.11.2324.
202. IV.4.16.2729. Cf. the motion of heaven is circular because it imitates
Intellect (II.2.1.1), and the universe, too, imitating Intellect, both moves in a
circle and is at rest (II.2.3.2022).

130

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

The three primary hypostases represent a center with two concentric

circles in which the center is the rst hypostasis, the One beyond being; the
inner circle circumscribes the second hypostasis, Intellect moving in itself
around it; and the outer circle circumscribes the third hypostasis, Soul moving around Intellect. But how is it possible for the One to be a point in
this ontological representation, when the One is beyond being? We cannot
solve the problem unless we consider the ontological activities of substantial number. Being, as unied number that has not divided being yet, is the
homeostatic center of the two circles. As a static image of the One, Being
is a holding place for the One in the noetic architecture of the universe.203
The One is the single source from which Intellect unrolls and the universe
expands in multiplicity, unied by the encompassing line of the circles
circumference.204 Plotinus cautions us that comparing the One to the single
point (smeion) is only a dianoetic result of our desire and need to indicate
the One to each other. So, the absolute One beyond Being is not a point
(smeion) or a unit (monas),205 but the unied number of Being is. The cosmic dance of Intellect and Soul, then, is circular because it follows the ontological activities of substantial number in the intelligible realm.
The closing chapters of the very last treatise of the Enneads in Porphyrys
arrangement (VI.9.811) describe the cosmic dance of the enlightened individual soul that has achieved its complete union with the One. In fact, this
is the last image that the Enneads leave in our minds eye. These dancing
scenes not only metaphorically convey the complete harmony of the universe,
but also reveal the ontological truth of the intelligible. Plotinus perceives the
universe, like a sphere full of life, which derives from the One and returns
to the One according to the concentric numbered dance of Soul around
Intellect, and of Intellect around the One.206 Intellect and Soul perform their
cosmic dance on the stage of the universal poetic creation207 to the rhythm
of substantial number.

203. Similarly, Corrigan (2005: 28) describes Plotinus circle analogy as a

circle unfolding itself into radii and circumference but still rooted in its centre,
which is itself rooted in the centre of all centres beyond it.
204. I.7.1.2324; see n. 178 above. Cf. VI.2.12.810.
205. VI.9.5.4142.
206. I.8.2.2325, VI.9.811.
207. III.2.17.4950: t pn pohma.

6
Unity of Thought and Writing
In VP 24.1114, Porphyrys statement, So I, as I had fty-four treatises of
Plotinus, divided them into six sets of nine (Enneads)it gave me pleasure
to nd the perfection of the number six along with the nines, has garnered
many slighting remarks in the pages of Neoplatonic scholarship. Armstrong
criticizes Porphyry for taking a most unfortunate liberty in creating an
extremely unsystematic presentation of a systematic philosophy;1 Gerson
nds the arrangement to be a seriously disruptive division; 2 and OMeara
dismisses it as wholly articial and sometimes misleading. 3 Consequently,
scholars suggest two alternative organizations of the Enneads. The rst reconstructs the conceptual unity of certain treatises, such as the Groschrift (III.8;
V.8; V.5; II.9), which Porphyry disperses throughout the collection.4 The second reads the treatises in Porphyrys chronological order (listed in VP 46)
in an attempt to show the development of Plotinus philosophy itself.5
While the communis opinio of Porphyrys arrangement stems from our
analytically trained perception of how philosophical writing should be organized, I think we must also try to understand his work within the context
of both Plotinus thought and the Neopythagorean fashion of the time.
Porphyrys arrangement does not simply embellish Plotinus corpus like
the Muses ennead, crowning the nine books of Herodotus Histories:6 as
a student of Plotinus and a former member of the Neopythagorean school,
Porphyry would have understood his task to be editing and arranging his
masters works in an order complying with the tenets of the presented philosophy. This chapter, therefore, examines Porphyrys arrangement of the
1. Armstrong (1967: 217) and (1966: vol. 1, viii), respectively.
2. Gerson (1994: xiv).
3. OMeara (1993: 10).
4. Argued by Armstrong (1967: 217); OMeara (1993: 810); Gerson (1994:
xiv); Dillon (1992: 189204, esp. 191). Roloff (1970) disregards Porphyrys
arrangement and writes a commentary on the treatises as a whole. Also followed
by Cilento (1971).
5. OMeara (1993: 910). For the opposite antidevelopmentalist position,
see Armstrong (1967: 218), followed by Gerson (1994: xvii).
6. Plutarch, Moralia 744b, however, sees a deeper signicance in the Muses
number.
131

132

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

Enneads in relation to Plotinus concepts of multiplicity and number and the

late Neopythagorean thought of the Theology of Arithmetic.7

Porphyry and the Enneads

Porphyrys interest in collecting Plotinus treatises continues the Hellenistic
and Roman tradition whereby the works of Plato and Aristotle were organized by their successorsAlbinus, Dercyllides, Thrasyllus, Theon of
Smyrna, and Andronicus, to name a few.8 While all of them made their collections at least a century after the deaths of Plato and Aristotle, Porphyry
knew Plotinus personally. He not only collected and edited his masters treatises but, unlike his predecessors, encouraged him to write them. Regardless
of Porphyrys motives, his close association with Plotinus suggests that we
should give more credit to his editorial work than we have done.9
In the beginning of VP, Porphyry declares Plotinus approval of his
editorial role: I myself, Porphyry of Tyre, was one of Plotinuss closest
friends, and he entrusted to me the editing of his writings (VP 7.4951).10
Considering Porphyrys aspirations to be regarded as Plotinus intellectual
heir,11 we should suspect that he would use more than sheer numerical elegance in his task, especially as his agship role as the editor of the Enneads
was the key to his self-promotion. Toward the end of VP, Porphyry again
justies his editorial authority:
He [Plotinus] himself entrusted me with the arrangement and editing of his books (tn diataxin kai tn diorthsin tn biblin poieisthai
7. Aristotles silence upon the hexad and the ennead in Met. A and M also
grants the arrangement a programmatic signicance for Neopythagorean number
symbolism. The omission is more apparent on Burkerts list (1972: 4667), which
is based on Aristotle and Alexanders commentary on Aristotles text.
8. On the Platonists, see Tarrant (1993: 1103); Mansfeld (1994: 5884). On
Andronicus, see Barnes (1997: 169); Pfeiffer (1968: 264, 273).
9. According to VP 46, Plotinus, at a more advanced age, began to write
the tractates in September 253 and stopped only at his death in 270. On the
chronology of Plotinus writing, see Dillon (1992: 191). On Porphyrys edition,
see Goulet-Caz (1982: vol. 1, 2807 and 294307).
10. Gerson (1994: xiv): We should note rst of all that probably owing
to Plotinus foresight in choosing an editor, especially one as able as Porphyry,
we possess everything that Plotinus wrote. . . . Among the ancient Greek
philosophers, the only other one we can say this about is Plato.
11. Porphyry most likely intentionally omits the names of Plotinus wellknown pupils, Amelius and Eustochius, here. Eunapius does not mention
Porphyrys edition in his Lives of Philosophers and Sophists. Penella (1990: 40).

UNITY OF THOUGHT AND WRITING

133

hmin epetrepsen), and I promised him in his lifetime and gave

undertakings to our other friends that I would carry out this task.
So rst of all I did not think it right to leave the books in confusion in order of time as they were issued (prton men ta biblia
ou kata chronous easai phyrdn ekdedomena edikaisa). I followed
the example of Apollodorus of Athens, who collected the works of
Epicharmus the comedian into ten volumes, and Andronicus the
Peripatetic, who classied the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus
according to subject, bringing together the discussions of related
topics. (VP 24.211) 12
Taken at face value, this statement conrms Porphyrys motivation and ambition. He perceives his work on the Enneads as a natural continuation of the
Hellenistic and Roman publishing trend. The collections of Platos dialogues
were constantly reorganized after Platos death. But the corpus Aristotelicum
had a less fortunate fate. After many vagaries, a number of Aristotles texts
fell into the possession of Andronicus, who unied them thematically. The
references to Andronicus and Apollodorus help us understand better how
Porphyry himself perceived his work, in what state he received the treatises,
and what exactly he did to them. Porphyry organized the tractates thematically in Andronicus fashion and divided them into a signicant number of
volumes qua Apollodorus.13 In his mind, he did not compare his work to the
standard work of Platos editors, who edited already established collections,
but to the work of the editors who made collections from scratch.
Since Plotinus writings grew naturally but sporadically from his lectures over a period of seventeen years, the treatises obviously needed editing
and organization. The phrase in confusion in order of time (kata chronous . . . phyrdn, VP 24.56) denotes not only the disorderly condition in
which Porphyry received the treatises but also the condition that prompted
Plotinus to ask his disciple to publish them in arrangement (diataxis) and
editing (diorthsis) (VP 24.2). Armstrong, remarking that diorthsis need
imply no more than the correction of the spelling and supply of punctuation, does not comment on the connotation of diataxis, despite the word
order, in which the latter immediately precedes the former.14 The combined
12. Both Barnes and Blumenthal note the importance of Porphyrys remark
recognizing Andronicus contribution to the collection of Aristotles works, later
overshadowed by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Barnes (1997: 379); Blumenthal
(1996: 8, n, 6). Pfeiffer (1968: 264, 273) also documents the two scholars
editorship with Porphyrys testimony in VP.
13. Barnes (1997: 3738).
14. According to Armstrong (1967: 217), there is no reason to suppose that
Porphyry did not do his work as editor conscientiously and accurately. But he

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

use of the two terms and the orthographic meaning of diorthsis suggest that
we should interpret diataxis to mean, specically, arranging the treatises.15
At rst glance, Porphyrys organization of the treatises from the easiest
to the most difcult topics does not directly reect the division of philosophy
into ethics, physics, and logic, which governs Platos collections. Albinus
organization adapts this tripartite division and further divides Platos works
into ve subtypes of peirastic, maieutic, hyphegetic, logical, and anatreptic
dialogues. Thrasyllus division, followed later by Theon of Smyrna, groups
the dialogues into tetralogies following the pattern of three tragedies and
a satyr play.16 Edwards recognizes that Porphyrys arrangement moves in a
similar direction but sees stronger kinship with the division of body, soul,
and spirit, found in Origens De Principiis (4.2.4).17 As we will see later, his
conjecture is all the more convincing in that it captures the anagogical path
on which the treatises unfold the essence of Plotinus universe, because
Porphyry believes that his editorship is central to the teaching, promotion,
and preservation of Plotinus philosophy.18

Ennead VI.6
Why should we look next into Plotinus concepts of multiplicity and number
for a possible answer to Porphyrys arrangement? Because, as we have determined in this book, the two concepts lay the foundation of Plotinus understanding of the composition of the universe. If we are to concern ourselves
with studying the ordering of a multitude of treatises into a whole, then
focusing on Plotinus signature view of the universe as one-in-many seems
to be suitable and logical.
From Porphyrys editorial standpoint, if the Enneads are going to present
Plotinus view of the universe, regardless of whether Plotinus cares or not,
they can do so only if they are published as a multitude of treatises, organized
in a way that demonstrates their unity. For Porphyry, to induce kosmos in the
presentation of the treatises is to arrange them in a way that inwardly,
through introspection, reveals to the reader the essence of Plotinus universe.

also judges that Porphyry did no more than correct the spelling, etc., of his
masters carelessly written and unrevised manuscripts.
15. Leopardi translates them as ordo and emendatio in Moreschini (1982).
16. Tarrant (1993: 41, 89107).
17. Edwards (2000: 51, n. 309).
18. Eustochius (c. 270) published another edition of the Enneads, quoted by
Eusebius in Praeparatio Evangelica. But all extant manuscripts of the Enneads
transmit the treatises according to Porphyrys edition. Cf. Henry (1935); GouletCaz (1982: 287294); for a concordance of the two editions, see Henry (1938).

UNITY OF THOUGHT AND WRITING

135

If we consider each Ennead as a whole, we nd that the rst Ennead includes

works on the spiritual nature of man; the second Ennead deals with physical
matter; the third explains how the physical world relates to the intelligible
realm; the fourth discusses the sensible and intelligible nature of soul; the
fth espouses Intellect as an intermediary between Soul and the One; and
the sixth Ennead culminates in the discussion of the most difcult concepts
pertinent to the intelligible realm, including those of number and the One
itself.19 This thematic arrangement moves inward from the sense-perceptible
multiplicity through the hypostases of Soul and Intellect to culminate in the
subject of the One.20 It turns the multiplicity of the Enneads inward toward
their most central topic.
Given Plotinus understanding of the ontogenic role of substantial number in the intelligible world, detailed in the preceding chapters, the meaning
of Porphyrys arrangement of the Enneads emerges as a multiplicity ordered
by number. Just as substantial number organizes the intelligible realm as
many-in-one, so does its material image, monadic number, arrange the multiplicity of the treatises into kosmos, which is turned inward toward its intelligible essence. If the treatises were going to present Plotinus complete view
of how the universe was organized, then they could do so only if they recreated its organization. By ordering them into six Enneads, the monadic
number, like all material things, conveys, yet faintly, 21 the organization of
Plotinus universe.

Six Along with the Nines

Recent scholarship on the nondiscursive nature of Neoplatonic thinking
has demonstrated that the language of Neoplatonism is the language of
symbols. 22 While the relation between text and symbol is more apparent in
the later Neoplatonic tradition, Porphyrys contribution to this tradition will
remain inevitably opaque due to the paucity of evidence in his extant works.
Nevertheless, being a Plotinian Platonist, 23 Porphyry is intimately familiar
19. This progression does not follow the tripartite division of the Platonic
corpus. The part dealing with logic is replaced by metaphysics and spirituality.
See pp. 133134. OMeara (1993: 9) describes it as a path for the ascent of the
soul of the reader, going from the rst steps to the ultimate goal of Plotinian
philosophy.
20. Cf. Brhier (1958: 30): The style of Plotinus is one of the most
beautiful we have because it always expresses the movement of a living thought.
21. VI.6.18.24: mudrw.
22. Rappe (2000: 117).
23. Barnes (2003: xii).

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PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

with the works of his contemporary Neopythagoreans. In his lengthy quotation of Longinus letter in VP 2021, he mentions not a few, but all the
names of the Neopythagorean underground 24Cronius, Moderatus,
Thrasyllus, Numenius, and Ammonius Saccas, the teacher of Plotinus
himself (VP 3).25 With this entourage in mind, the question of Porphyrys
arrangement of Plotinus works must be related to traditional Pythagorean
and Neopythagorean numeric symbolism.26
The later Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean tradition elucidates what
Porphyry might have implied by his notorious perfect ratio of six and nine.
Despite the scarcity of original Pythagorean writings, the development of
the Pythagorean numerical canon from Philolaus to Proclus is still traceable. In this continuous span, Aristotle, of course, rst attempts to systematize the circulating Pythagorean views on the metamathematical and
metaphysical correspondence between numbers and the universe. Although
Aristotles work on the Pythagoreans is lost, he discusses Pythagorean
numerical symbolism at considerable length throughout Metaphysics books
A and M. With the help of Alexanders commentary on Aristotles text,
Burkert reconstructs Aristotles list in which the monad is nous and ousia;
the dyad is doxa; the triad symbolizes a whole with a beginning, middle,
and end; the tetrad is justice; the pentad is marriage; the hebdomad is
opportunity; and the decad is the perfect number.27 The symbolism of each
number on this list is not our concern now; I mention the entire list to
point out that there are three obvious omissions, two of which are a primary concern for us. Aristotle not only omits the hexad, the ogdoad, and
the ennead from the list but does not even mention them anywhere in
his works, not even in the Metaphysics.28 No matter what the actual reasons for Aristotles conspicuous lacuna, we have no reason to think that
Aristotle omits them intentionally. Most likely the three numbers were not
a part of mainstream Pythagorean numerology yet. This is conrmed by
Theol. Ar. 74.10, which forcefully and unreasonably attributes to Philolaus

24. See pp. 4243.

25. Brisson (1982: vol. 1, 561113).
26. Burkert (1972: 465482) argues that the mystical notion of numbers as
holding some transcendent truths about the universe does not originate with, but
is articulated most eloquently by, Orpheus and Pythagoras.
27. In his commentary on the Metaphysics, Alexander claries Aristotles
text by matching the Pythagorean numbers to Aristotles descriptions. For a
complete discussion, see Burkert (1972: 466467).
28. With the exception of the hexad, mentioned twice as a payment of six
drachmas in Oec. 1347a34 and 1353a18.

UNITY OF THOUGHT AND WRITING

137

the derivative sequence of numbers and the idea that the hexad represents
ensoulment (empsychsis, D-K A 12.3).29
In fact, ever since Plato crafted the cosmogonical role of soul in the
Timaeus, the concept constantly gained popularity in Middle Platonic and
Neopythagorean circles. While Philo places the hexad in the foundation
of universal order, Moderatus calls it a marriage and Aphrodite.30 The
Theology of Arithmetic explains these allegories better by dening the hexad
as the rst perfect number (Theol. Ar. 33.2), which arises out of the rst
even and rst odd numbers, male and female (Theol. Ar. 33.56), and by
which the universe is ensouled and harmonized.31 The hexad is the rst
perfect number, because it is a result of the sum or multiplication of the
rst three numbers (1 + 2 + 3 or 1 2 3) and symbolizes the harmonious unity of the primary opposites of male and female.32 It also ascribes to
soul the animation of the universe brought together as wholeness of limbs
(Theol. Ar. 36.31).33 The hexad is kosmos because the universe, like 6, is
often seen as composed of opposites in harmony, and the summation of the
word universe is 600.34 As a perfect number, the hexad symbolizes order
of multiplicity and harmony of opposites.
If we view Porphyrys arrangement of the treatises according to the
Neopythagorean hexad, the organization of the Enneads by the number six
overtly corresponds to the organizing role Soul plays in the composition of
the physical world. Plotinus does not mention the hexad anywhere in the
Enneads. Nevertheless, this is in accord with his view, discussed earlier, that
29. Ti. 43b.25; Huffman (1993: 356359).
30. De Op. Mundi 89.1: smpaw ksmow teleiyh kat tn
jdow riymo teleou fsin; Moderatus, fr. 3.5: pvnmazen . . . tn
jda Gmon ka Afrodthn.
31. Theol. Ar. 33.2223: kat atn mcuxsyai ka kayhrmsyai
tn ksmon. Waterelds translation (1988); Greek according to de Falco (1975).
On perfect numbers, Theol. Ar. 17.13; Aristotle, Cael. A1.268a9; Euclid, Elementa
7.22; Theon, Expos. rer. math. 45.9; Nicomachus, Ar. 1.16, 39, 447; Iamblichus,
De vita Pyth. 152.
32. Theol. Ar. 34.1415: Tw mn prtaw at t jdi a b g;
Theol. Ar. 36.2327: Prth gr jw puymenikvtth perisxen
riymhtikn mesthta: . . . tn prvtsthn dxoito mfasin ka tn
ato to riymo edopohsin.
33. Later in the same text, we nd the etymology of the hexad from jiw
zvtik, meaning the living condition or ensoulment (Theol. Ar. 64.3).
34. Theol. Ar. 37.812: ka gr ksmow, sper ka w, j
nantvn pollkiw fyh sunestw kay rmonan, ka sunarymhsiw
to ksmou nmatow jaksi stin.

138

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

Soul does not have a specic corresponding ontological role as substantial

number.35 But, since soul is substance, soul is number in general36 as the primary underlying principle that comprises the multiplicity of the intelligible
and sensible world both. Souls role is to embody the ontological content of
substantial numbers into monadic numbers counting the visible multiplicity
of the universe.
For Plotinus, as for Moderatus earlier, Soul is also Aphrodite
(psyche . . . Aphrodit men esti, III.5.9.33). Since a part of Soul remains in
the intelligible realm and a part of it descends into the sensible world, Soul
unites the material world with its intelligible paradigm by bringing order
and correspondence to the universe, and because of this, Plotinus concludes
that every soul is Aphrodite (esti pasa psyche Aphrodit, VI.9.9.31).37 For him,
as for the Neopythagoreans, Soul is order, number, and the intermediary
between the visible and invisible realms. But he does not compile a list of the
Pythagorean numerical canon in the Enneads as this is neither in accord with
his interests nor with his style. His primary goal is to explain the ontogenic
role of substantial number in the intelligible realm, regardless of its nominal value (which does not have any ontological meaning), and not the role
of its material monadic image. Thus, we should not expect that he would
refer explicitly to Soul as the hexad in VI.6 or elsewhere. In fact, through
the Enneads and especially in VI.6, Plotinus sticks to the most popular nominal values of number as monad, dyad, triad, tetrad, pentad, and decad.38
Perhaps the reason for this is that they have the most important ontological
meaning. He uses the monad and the dyad to distinguish them from the
Monad and the Indenite Dyad. The triad is the rst odd number, which
represents actual extension from the Monad and the Dyad;39 the tetrad represents the natural progression of everything in the universe; 40 the pentad
35. See pp. 112113.
36. VI.6.16.45: riymw ra cux, eper osa. Xenocrates, fr. 183
(Parente): Jenokrthw d lgvn tn cuxn riymn autn kinonta
atoknhton atn legen; also reported by Aristotle, Metaph. 985b30.
Plotinus on the number of the soul, V.1.5.9, VI.2.22.21, VI.5.9.14, and VI.6.16.45.
Cf. Theol. Ar. 33.2223.
37. Explicating Platos myth of the birth of Eros and Aphrodite (Symp.
203b), he distinguishes two types of Aphrodite: the heavenly Aphrodite
(Aphrodit ourania) as the Soul, always remaining in the intelligible realm, and
the vulgar Aphrodite (Aphrodit pandmos) as the soul, descending into the
material world (VI.9.9.2930).
38. Nikulin (2002: 8588) is of the same mind. He does not even list all
numbers to which Plotinus refers in the Enneads.
39. VI.3.13, VI.6.6.
40. Theol. Ar. 20.

UNITY OF THOUGHT AND WRITING

139

is the rst number to encompass the specic identity of all number, since
it encompasses 2, the rst even number, and 3, the rst odd number; 41 and
the decad represents the Pythagorean tetractys, symbolizing the wholeness
of the universe.42
For Porphyry, things are different. He not only comes from a strong
Neopythagorean background, like Plotinus, but also responds to the
revival of Pythagorean numerical symbolism in later Neoplatonism and
Neopythagoreanism. Porphyrys arrangement of the treatises into six groups
nondiscursively embodies Plotinus understanding that Soul also arranges
that which has separated from the One into a one-in-many universe. He
animates, to use Neopythagorean language, the multiplicity of the treatises
to re-create the organic wholeness of Plotinus universe.
The numerical symbolism of the ennead is Neopythagorean too. Later
Neoplatonists call the ennead the greatest of numbers within the decad and
an unsurpassable limit. 43 The limiting characteristic of the ennead is most
suitable for enclosing the number of the individual treatises within itself.
While the hexad represents the formation of number and order (tn autou tou
arithmou eidopoisin, Theol. Ar. 36.27), the ennead marks the end of the formation of specic identities (horizei goun tn eidopoisin, Theol. Ar. 56.25).
As the hexad, like Soul, organizes the groups of the treatises in the body
of the collection, the ennead, like the comprising number of the Complete
Living Being, limits the number of treatises within each group to the last
original number.44 As the ennead brings numbers together and makes them
play in concert (Theol. Ar. 57.214), so does the ennead bring together the
multiplicity of the treatises and turns them inward to its source.45 While the
hexad inscribes the cosmogonical role of soul on the Enneads, the ennead
symbolizes the completion of the universe. This is why the treatises are not
organized in nine groups of six but in six groups of nine. The enneads of the
41. Theol. Ar. 3031.
42. Theol. Ar. 79.
43. Theol. Ar. 56.2425.
44. Theol. Ar. 57.78: There is a natural progression up to it, but after
it there is repetition (mxri mn gr atw fusik prbasiw, met d
atn palimpetw).
45. Porphyry embeds the etymology of the ennead as if it were the henad
of everything within it, by derivation from the one (nnaw mn kklhtai
oone nw pnta ntw atw kat parvnuman to n, Theol.
Ar. 57.45) by placing the treatise, devoted to the One (to hen), last in his
arrangement. As pointed out by one of the anonymous reviewers, Iamblichus
etymologizes the ennead as new one (hen neon, In Tim. fr. 53), which also
suits the idea of completing the universe as an image, albeit different, of the One
and in this sense new one.

140

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

treatises, circumscribed and thus animated by the hexad of the soul, enclose
everything on the subject of the universe from beginning to end, from henad
to ennead.46 There is nothing more to be said about it outside of Plotinus
philosophy and outside of the number of the Enneads, homonymy intended.
Therefore, in the arrangement of the Enneads, Porphyry reects the growing
importance of the hexad and the ennead before their formal canonization in
the Theology of Arithmetic.47
Porphyry fuses Plotinus philosophy with Neopythagorean numerical symbolism to reveal the central organizing theme of Plotinus universe.
His arrangement of the treatises encrypts numerically the perfect unity of
Plotinus universe, for which VI.6 provides the conceptual blueprint. The
teachers concept of kosmos as multiplicity ordered by number is the reason
that his student enjoys the perfection of the mathematical ratio of 6 9. The
Enneads, like the universe, unfold outward into multiplicity, while Porphyrys
arrangement, in turn, enfolds the treatises inward to create an image of the
universe according to Plotinus. Porphyrys arrangement of the Enneads in six
groups of nine, therefore, is not arbitrary but mandatory for understanding
the universe of Plotinus thought.48

46. In Armstrongs words (1988: vol. 7, 6), VI.6 explains how all reality
proceeds in due order from its source, the One or Good, and how the human
spirit may nd its way back to that source.
47. With the exception of Plutarch, Moralia 744b, the philosophical
meaning of the ennead is not discussed until Syrianus, In Metaph. 134.14; and
especially Proclus, In R. vol. 2, 237.19, In Cra. 176.62, In Ti., vol. 2, 127.4.
48. In relation to Thrasyllus nine Platonic tetralogies and Porphyrys six
Plotinian enneads, Mansfeld (1994: 65) notes that such numbers and relations
between numbers according to Platonist and Pythagorean thought are not just an
expression of order, but a cause of order in the rst place. The two sets are a
sort of micro-cosmoi.
This chapter was previously published as Unity of Thought and
Writing: Enn. 6.6 and Porphyrys Arrangement of the Enneads in Classical
Quarterly 58.1 (2008): 277285. I have truncated the original section (pp. 280281)
that introduces VI.6 and the concepts of multiplicity and number in order to
avoid repetition.

Conclusion: In Defense of Plato

In true Plotinian fashion, let us start from the beginning one last time.
The trouble with numbers starts with the Pythagoreans, who postulate that
numbers are the building blocks of the universe. Plato adapts this view to
Parmenides doctrine that real existence is beyond what the senses perceive,
in the realm of thought and speech. The dialectic between One and Many,
Limit and Unlimited in the Philebus delineates the future framework of
the question about the relationship between the Forms and numbers. For
Aristotle, however, number is not substance but only an arithmetical category used by man to manipulate speculatively quantity and size. The trouble
with number then passes down to the Old Academy. Speusippus replaces
the Forms as paradigms of existence with mathematical numbers that derive
from the two primary principles of the One and multiplicity. Xenocrates, in
turn, modies Speusippus principles into the Monad and the Dyad. The
Neopythagoreans mix together the ontological and mathematical meaning
of number.
In this tradition, Plotinus continues the Platonic and Neopythagorean
dialogue on the dialectic between One and Many as he weaves the boundlike nature of the universe, which, like a fabric and the details of its texture,
consists of unity and diversity. However, through the concept of number, he
distinguishes many (ta polla), as innumerable diversity, from multiplicity (to
plthos), as multiplicity that is ordered according to number as if number
agglutinates the different degrees of separation from the One into the nite
and bondlike unity of the imaginary cosmic sphere.
VI.6 addresses two core questions for the understanding of the composition of the universe: What is number? What is the relationship between number and multiplicity? The importance of the questions is emphasized by the
concluding argument of the treatise espousing the position that number underlies the existence of every aspect of the intelligible. As explained in VI.6.9,
number supersedes the hypostases of Soul and Intellect. The ontologically
paradigmatic role of number in the intelligible realm is imitated by the quantitative monadic number that enumerates physical reality. As a result, Plotinus
concept of number explains the universe as unambiguously nite.1
1. To use Lewis precise expression (1964: 98).
141

142

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

Ennead VI.6 is at the heart of Plotinian cosmology. The treatise begins

with a discussion of multiplicity in place of number, because multiplicity is
ontological expression of number as activity of substance in the kosmos notos.
This ontological separation (apostasis) successively instantiates the separation
of Intellect, the descent of Soul from Intellect that enmatters physical reality.
Once multiplicity reaches complete separation from the One, it turns inward
and, by seeking itself, seeks its origin. Like the progression and regression of
number in Moderatus denition, the two directions of multiplicity construct
a dynamic universe, centered on the principles of the outward cosmogonical
unfolding of multiplicity to the phenomenal world and the inward cosmological enfolding of all elements to the One. Everything exists as a certain degree
of separation from the One substantiated by number. Thus the question of
whether multiplicity is a separation from the One contains Plotinus denition of number itself. Multiplicity is the phenomenal expression of number
in the composition of the universe. Without multiplicity there is no number;
without number there is no multiplicity. In order to explicate the nature of
number, Plotinus has to explain rst what multiplicity is.
The beginning of VI.6 depicts the bidirectional state in which multiplicity exists. The initial centrifugal movement of separation from the One
reverses itself into a centripetal introspection of that which has separated
from the One. In the intelligible realm, this movement is conducted according to the ontogenic participation of substantial number in the existence of
Being, Intellect, and all beings. In physical reality, the separation from the
One of the intelligible beings is copied by monadic number, which quantitatively enumerates individual things. Monadic numbers and their mathematical application conceal their intelligible source. As with any intelligible
entity, the existence of substantial numbers is not apparent to the untrained
mind but is a subject of contemplation only.
The main argument of VI.6 is that existence in the intelligible realm
is not only a degree of ontogenetic separation from the One, mediated by
number, but depends on and is a result of the constitutive ontological role
of number. More specically, substantial number provides a representation
of the general properties of substance. With Being, substantial number is
unied and thus closest to the One. With Intellect, substantial number is
moving in itself reenacting the dichotomy of the Indenite Dyad itself, and
becomes ontologically separated further from the One than Being. With
beings, substantial number exists in the multiplicity of beings that, facilitated by the moving-in-itself number of Intellect, have unfolded into the
individual existence of beings, and constitutes the next more distant separation from the One in the intelligible. Deciphering and enacting all the
properties of substantial number in its cosmic dance, soul enmatters them
into quantitative monadic numbers.

CONCLUSION

143

The concept of separation from the One ascribes to number and multiplicity a primary role in constructing the architecture of the intelligible
realm, in which number performs the function of limit, and multiplicity
enacts the Platonic and Pythagorean concept of the Unlimited. Number is
the likeness of the One in the sense that it constrains multiplicity to a certain limit and preserves it from slipping away into innity. It imitates, albeit
in an ontologically deteriorated way, the self-sufciency and completeness of
the One.
Wallis concludes that existence in Plotinus hierarchy means a fragmentation of the unity of the One. 2 Others have also established that number fullls an ontological purpose in Plotinus hierarchy.3 Wallis claim that
Plotinus never considers multiplicity as a valuable addition to an initial
unity should be revised in light of VI.6. The treatise elucidates that which
has been left unwritten in the Platonic view of numberthat number is an
active actuality of Being and a power of substance that builds the architecture of the universe according to its ontological role.4 In other words, substantial number actualizes Wallis fragmentation of the unity of the One
by determining every form of intelligible existence.
The current study also warrants the revision of Brhiers view that the
discussion of multiplicity in the opening chapter of the treatise does not relate
to Platos concept of number because it does not have a xed number.5 The
denition of multiplicity as an apostasis from the One explains that multiplicity originates from number, regardless of what the exact nite number is. As
soon as even the slightest separation or moving away from the One occurs,
number and substance act together to procure the unfolding of multiplicity
from the One in due ontological order. Existence, then, is Otherness from the
One, actualized by the intelligible number. Multiplicity is separation from the
One according to the ontological exigency of substantial number.
2. Wallis (1972: 57) explains that Plotinus conception of the One can
best be understood if we recall that in his view multiplicity is never a valuable
addition to an initial unity, but connotes rather a fragmentation of that unity
(VI.6.1; VI.7.8.1922). Hence at each stage of his universe the descent into
greater multiplicity imposes fresh limits and restrictions, disperses and weakens
the power of previous stages, and creates fresh needs requiring the development
of new faculties previously unnecessary.
3. Krmer (1964: 300304); Charles-Saget (1982: 124127); and Nikulin
(1998: 8589).
4. Scholars traditionally study the central chapters (69) dealing with
number in the intelligible: Krmer (1964: 292311); Alexandrakis (1998); Nikulin
(1998); with the exception of Ppin (1979) and Horn (1995b: 149169).
5. Brhier (1963: vol. 6, 7).

144

PLOTINUS ON NUMBER

The seeming paradox of coexistence of Limit and Unlimited in the

nature of multiplicity and number implies that, if things can be numbered,
then they are not innite. For number determines the boundaries of multiplicity, consequently the universe, by preserving it from complete separation (pantels apostasis). For the one who numbers perceives objects as
innite because numbers in physical reality can always admit another number. The true existence of number, however, is not quantitative or a subject
of mathematical speculation but is an active actuality of substance (energeia
ts ousias). Moving in itself, substantial number provides the ability of the
Intellect to think itself and thus recognize all Forms as number, which has
unfolded itself in the encompassing and thus nite number of the Complete
Living Being. Substantial number conducts the separation of all beings from
the One at every level of the intelligible by constructing and lling up the
cosmic sphere with existence.6 The universe is nite because even monadic
number is an image of the substantial number that constitutes the outermost layer of the cosmic sphere. The universe, like a sphere, is nite, with
the only difference that it is alive in the sense that the ordered multiplicity
expands in and out.
The concentric composition of VI.6 underlines introspectively the central theme of the treatise that number has an ontological and constitutive role
in the composition of the intelligible realm. Number substantiates both the
downward ontogenetic and upward ontological direction of multiplicity. The
universe, as a breathing sphere, unfolds and enfolds according to number.
The inward and outward properties of number in the intelligible determine
the inward and outward directions of multiplicity. Number is the principle
and the measure of beings and matter. In this sense, substantial number is
perfect and the active actuality of Being that divides substance to create all
beings. As a result, number is the building block of Plotinus cosmos and the
underlying principle for multiplicity to exist in the intelligible realm and in
physical reality.
The study of this book demonstrates that the subject of number should
be considered among the most important concepts for understanding
Plotinus philosophy and therefore deserves greater scholarly attention than
it has received. Plotinus adopts and adapts Platonic and Neopythagorean
cosmology to place number in the foundation of the intelligible realm and
the construction of the universe. He is the rst philosopher who fuses the
Platonic true numbers and the quantitative mathematical numbers in a conceptually informed relationship, as between an intelligible paradigm and its
sense-perceptible image. Throughout the Enneads and especially in Ennead
VI.6, he systematically peels off the layers of mathematical and quantitative
perception from the concept of number to reveal that real number is the
6. VI.7.12.2330.

CONCLUSION

145

primary activity of substance, which orders the unfolding of the universe

from its absolute source into a nite multiplicity.
The concept of number is the troublemaker in the history of Platonism.
It separated the followers of Plato and Aristotle into two camps for generations. For Plotinus, however, the concept becomes the peacemaker that
reconciles the camps. The importance of this reconciliation is central to
Plotinus philosophical system because it not only uses Aristotle to defend
Plato from Aristotle himself but brings to light Plotinus major proof that
the universe is nite. For him, as for his Platonic and Neopythagorean predecessors, the universe has meaning, enciphered by number. In this light,
Plotinus concept of number is the fundamental link between the number
theories of the Neopythagoreans and the later Neoplatonists.

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B I B L I O G R A P H Y

The following bibliography includes items to which I have referred in the

text and items that I have found useful for understanding the subject but that
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Dexippus. On Aristotles Categories: In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium. In
Commentaria Aristotelem Graeca IV.2. Ed. A. Busse. Berlin: G. Reimer,
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I N D E X

O F

N A M E S

A N D

S U B J E C T S

This index includes references to names and subjects throughout the book. Modern
scholars are mentioned only if their views are discussed in the main body of text or in
a note that does not provide only a reference to them. For a complete list of secondary
sources, see the Bibliography. For a complete list of primary sources, see the Index
Locorum.
on quantity and quality, 59
on substance, 60, 111
arithmetic, 9, 119
Armstrong, A. H., 131, 133
astronomy, 7475, 119

activity/actuality (energeia), 111

of the Indenite Dyad, 68 (see also
Indenite Dyad and number)
of substance and number, 15, 8687,
9596, 100, 144
Albinus, 134
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 122, 136
Alexander Polyhistor, 45
Amelius, 18
Ammonius Saccas, 8, 13, 42, 136
Anaxagoras, 82
Andronicus, 133
Annas, J., 62
Apollodorus, 133
arch
and number, 89n.108
as primary originative substance, 4
Aristotle, 103, 136
categories of, 110
and criticism of Platonic numbers, 4,
7, 54, 55, 5760, 6263, 94
and criticism of Speusippus and
Xenocrates, 6061
on the Indenite Dyad, 14, 29, 62,
65, 67
and monadic number, 93

Being (to on), 73, 84, 100103, 108109,

115, 125, 127
and number, 71, 88, 121
and the One, 130
origin of, 72
and rest, 101
as unied number (arithmos
hnmenos), 15, 88, 91, 96, 100,
102103, 106, 109, 115, 125, 130
being(s) (to on and ta onta), 86, 91, 109,
115, 121, 123, 127
and Intellect, 107, 127
and multiplicity, 102
and ousia, 7576
as unfolded number (arithmos
exelligmenos), 15, 88, 106,
109, 115, 123, 126
See also henads as molds for beings,
henads and monads
Brhier, ., 143
161

162

INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS

Brisson, L., 20, 26, 88

Burkert, W., 136
Charles-Saget, A., 11, 19, 20, 26, 54, 65,
71, 79, 84
circle, 106, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128129
and the composition of
Ennead VI.6, 19
Complete Living Being (to panteles zion
and autozion), 83, 107109, 115,
116, 121, 123, 125, 139
as circle or sphere, 123, 126128
as encompassing number (arithmos
periechn), 15, 88, 106, 107, 109,
115, 127
See also Intellect, whole number of
beings
contemplation (theria), 9, 82, 97, 104
as wonder (thauma), 30
Cornford, F. M., 57
Corrigan, K., 108
cosmology, 12, 13, 25, 53, 90, 94, 142
and the Timaeus, 28
DAncona Costa, C., 17
Dillon, J. M., 6, 45
Dodds, E. R., 33, 44
dyad
as a rst principle. See Indenite Dyad
as a number, 114
Ennead VI.6, 10, 142
composition of, 1921, 144
and the Groschrift, 19 (see also
Groschrift)
ennead, 16, 136, 140
Enneades, 10, 1719, 135, 140 (see also
Porphyry and the arrangement/
organization of the Enneades)
ensoulment (empsychsis), 137
Euclid, 124
geometry and geometrical gures, 9, 119
Gerson, L. 24, 36, 81, 95, 119, 131
Groschrift, 10, 1819, 131
Heinemann, F., 15
henad(s), 91
as molds for beings, 91, 9394, 113

and monads, 9294

and multiplicity, 92, 93, 102
and quantitative unity, 94
and substantial number, 78, 100
Heracleides, 124
hexad, 16, 136, 137138, 139, 140
Hipparchus of Samos, 124
Horn, C., 11, 15
imagination (phantasma), 35
Indenite Dyad (aoristos dyas), 67, 55,
66, 68
and Aristotle, 14, 29
as the great and the small, 61
and innite number. See innite
number, number of innity
and Monad, 4546, 49, 73, 87, 138
and multiplicity, 38 n.72, 69
and number, 15, 54, 64, 70, 81, 100
See also Intellect and Indenite
Dyad, One and Indenite Dyad,
potentiality
Intellect, 6, 106, 108, 109, 121122, 123,
125, 127
as circle, 128, 130
and Indenite Dyad, 115
as number moving in itself (arithmos
en heauti kinoumenos), 15, 104105,
108109, 115, 123, 125
as one nature, 82, 116
as the second hypostasis, 8, 35, 81
as separation from the One, 68, 70,
84, 105
and Soul, 119 (see also Soul)
and substantial number, 15, 80, 103106
and wonder (thauma), 30
See also motion and movement,
multiplicity, thinking, whole
number of beings
intelligible realm. See kosmos and
number in the intelligible realm
Jackson, B. D., 44
Justice, 80
Kirchner, K. H., 11
kosmos, 22, 119, 122, 123, 134, 140, 142
Krmer, H. J., 11, 19
Kutash, E., 124125

INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS

Limit (peras), 5, 54, 72, 144

line(s) and linear, 120, 123, 124
Losev, A. F., 10, 11n.35
magnitude(s), 61
many. See multiplicity
mathematics, 15, 63n.48
Merlan, P., 6, 59
metaphor, 119, 127
Moderatus, 8, 32, 43, 44, 52, 136, 137
and denition of number, 47
and the rst principle of number, 51
on mathematical number, 13, 43
motion in, 103
See also Plato
Monad, 49, 73
as a rst principle, 7, 46
and number, 15, 71, 73
and the One, 96, 99
origin of, 72, 100
See also Indenite Dyad and Monad
monad(s), 46, 62
in Aristotle, 5962, 93
different from number, 77
henads and, 9293
in Moderatus, 14, 4344, 51
as one and unity, 73
and substantial unity, 77, 94
See also Aristotle on quantity and
quality, one
monadic number (monadikos arithmos),
15, 61n.38, 89, 93, 9798, 113, 114,
135, 142, 144
and substantial number, 94, 99, 115
motion/movement (kinsis), 79, 81, 101
and Intellect, 109
as number, 46
in Numenius, 33, 103
as a primary kind, 103, 105, 109
in Timaeus, 27
See also Moderatus, thinking
multiplicity (plthos), 4, 24, 43, 53,
90, 124
and beings, 102
as owing, 48
innite (apeiron plthos), 5758
and Intellect, 35, 38, 40, 48, 68, 125
and many (polla), 22, 40, 141
as measurement, 37

163

and number, 14, 16, 18, 50, 55, 135,

142, 143
outward and inward direction, 14, 40,
4748, 108, 144
and the universe, 40, 43, 140
in Xenocrates, 7
See also henads, Indenite Dyad, One,
separation of multiplicity from the
One, whole number of beings
Neopythagorean
distinction between ontological and
arithmetical number, 47, 94
doctrines and thought, 132, 139
numerical theory, 16, 42, 118, 140
roots of Plotinus concept of number, 13
Nicomachus of Gerasa, 8, 52
and number, 49
and scientic number (epistmonikos
arithmos), 52n.53
Nikulin, D., 11, 26, 55, 72, 74n.16, 92
nine. See ennead
number (arithmos), 4, 9, 55, 66, 75,
98, 144
arithmetical, 44, 67
and Being. See Being and number
and beings, 89 (see also beings as
unfolded number)
as ow, 4950
Formal (eidtikos arithmos), 76, 90
and Forms, 27n.17, 5859, 64, 73, 79,
80, 89, 104, 114, 144
Ideal, 6062, 64
innite (apeiros arithmos), 5758
of innity, 20, 54, 55, 63, 121
intelligible (notos arithmos), 67,
6970, 7172, 90
in the intelligible realm, 15, 87, 89, 95,
109, 119, 126, 141
mathematical, 49, 61, 65, 7172, 97
and multiplicity, 16, 18, 50, 55
in Nicomachus, 49
as preliminary sketch/mold for beings
(protypsis), 91, 94, 113
Pythagorean, 45, 7879
and quality, 6061, 78
quantitative, 14, 97, 111
scientic (epistmonikos), 52n.53
true (althinos arithmos), 76, 87, 93

164

INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS

number (arithmos) (continued)

See also activity/actuality of substance
and number, Indenite Dyad,
Moderatus, Monad and number,
motion/movement, monadic
number, One and number, power,
quantity, rational principle,
substance and number, substantial
number
Numenius, 8, 13, 31, 41, 42, 118, 136
and the concept of the Three Gods,
13, 31, 32
and innate motion (symphytos kinsis),
13, 33, 47, 103
Proclus interpretation of, 3233
OMeara, D. J., 11, 15, 18, 19, 28n.21, 32,
122123, 131
One (to hen), 30, 67, 87, 102103,
122123, 130
activities, 68, 80
as the rst hypostasis, 8, 40
as the rst principle, 6, 98, 100
and Indenite Dyad, 69, 96, 115
in Moderatus, 44
and Monad, 96, 99
and multiplicity, 40, 51, 117, 118
and number, 69, 80, 98, 143
in Numenius, 37
as a point, 128
as a property of substantial number, 16
See also one, separation, Intellect
one (to hen)
different from a monad, 43, 45
and One, 92, 99
as a principle of enumerated things in
Moderatus, 14, 46
one and many, 56, 102
One and Many as a Platonic pair, 40, 141
ontological stability (stasis), 13
in Parmenides, 57
See also rest
Origen, 134
otherness (heterots), 107, 109, 115
Parmenides, 123
Parmenides, 45
rst hypothesis of, 5, 100
second hypothesis of, 6, 58, 85, 90

Phaedrus, 7576, 87
Philebus, 5
Philo, 137
Plato, 45, 122
being (to on) and becoming (to
gignomenon), 27
and Moderatus, 45
on number, 56, 74 (see also Ideal
Number and true number)
unwritten doctrines (agrapha dogmata)
of, 6, 54
See also Parmenides
Plotinus, 8
and his defense of Platonic number,
14, 64, 94, 110
and his refutation of Aristotles
criticism of Platonic number, 14, 56,
80, 114
writing style of, 20, 133134
point, 122123, 130 (see also One as a
point)
Porphyry, 18, 132
and the arrangement/organization of
the Enneades, 12, 16, 131, 133134,
137, 139, 140
and Vita Plotini, 42
potentiality, 62, 86
and Indenite Dyad, 71, 101
power (dynamis),
of being and number, 15, 8687
of substance, 97
Pradeau, J.-F., 88
Presocratics, 4
Primary Kinds (megista gen and
prta gene), 15, 32, 95, 102,
105, 109111, 112
as properties of substantial number,
16, 85 (see also aspects of substantial
number)
See also motion, otherness, sameness,
and rest
Proclus, 117, 124, 125, 136
and his interpretation of Numenius.
See Numenius
Ptolemy, 124
quality (poion), 59 (see also Aristotle on
quantity and quality, number and
quality)

INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS

quantity (posots and poson), 15, 47, 61,

97, 110111, 114
and number, 5960, 78
See also Aristotle on quantity and quality
rational principle (logos), 89, 109
Republic, 76
rest/stability (stasis), 101102, 109
as a primary kind, 102
in Numenius, 3334, 103
Rist, J. M., 29, 44, 46, 55, 62
Ross, D., 62
sameness (tautots), 108109, 115
Sayre, K. 5657
separation (apostasis), 31, 34, 37, 39, 41,
47, 52, 142
and Being, 84
as measurement, 38
of multiplicity from the One (apostasis
tou henos), 13, 15, 25, 28, 35, 43, 46, 88,
90, 99, 108, 110, 116117, 129, 142, 143
in Numenius, 13
See also Intellect as separation from
the One
Six. See hexad
Soul, 112, 116, 118, 121, 139
as circle, 128
dance of, 118119, 122, 127, 129130
and hexad, 16
as an image of intellect, 16, 115
as the most ontological distance from
the One, 38, 40, 40n.86
and number, 16, 112, 115, 138
as physical reality, 116, 137138
as the third hypostasis, 9
as World Soul, 16, 118
soul
enumerating things, 74, 76, 124
individual, 16, 114, 118, 130
Speusippus, 6, 7, 60, 69
sphere and the Complete Living Being,
123, 126, 127
substance (ousia), 4, 15, 109
and number, 72, 7577, 8687, 89,
9697, 98, 101102, 115
See also Aristotle on substance,
substantial number

165

substantial number (ousids arithmos),

14, 76, 78, 80, 8485, 8791, 93,
9899, 101102, 110, 112, 114, 120,
123, 124, 127, 128, 130, 135, 142
aspects/properties of, 95, 107, 109,
116, 126
and being(s), 97
and Intellect, 103104, 112, 144
and Soul, 112, 116
See also activity/actuality, monadic
number, intelligible, number, power
Syrianus, 67, 92
Szlezk, T. A., 11
Timaeus, 5, 12, 24, 32, 88, 117
composition (systasis) of the universe
in, 13, 24, 2729, 3132, 41
cosmogony in, 13, 25, 26, 41
Demiurge in, 26, 27
disorder of the primordial elements
in, 25
Receptacle in, 29
Theology of Arithmetic, 140
Theon of Smyrna, 37, 134
thinking, 68, 83, 84, 104106, 117, 125
in Numenius, 33
Thrasyllus, 134, 136
Two. See dyad
universe, 36, 130, 134, 144
as one-in-many, 9, 139
origin/generation of, 34, 122
as unity, 4, 19, 5051, 140, 141
See also multiplicity
ungured gure (aschmatista
schemata), 9, 120121, 122, 124
Unlimited (apeiria), 120, 121, 144
in Plato, 5, 54
in Xenocrates, 7
Vita Plotini. See Porphyry and
Vita Plotini
Wallis, R. T., 143
whole number of beings (arithmos
sympas), 83, 107 (see also Intellect)
Xenocrates 6, 7, 6061, 112

This page intentionally left blank

I N D E X

L O C O R U M

985b30: 138n.36
986a89: 64n.55
986a1617: 56n.7
987a29ff.: 4n.6
987b11988a15: 63n.47
987b1429: 58n.20
987b2934: 56
988a714: 29n.25
1003a30: 79n.44
1003b2230: 77n.29
1007a32b12: 79n.46
1013a25: 81n.57
1015b2935: 79n.44
1020a: 110n.110
1020a13: 49n.35, 55n.6
1020b3: 60n.28
1020b4: 78n.40
1028a: 110n.106
1028a3: 87n.97
1028a1318: 80n.53
1028a19: 110n.107
1028a2029: 114n.136
1028a31b2: 60n.31
1028a32: 87n.96
1028a34: 87n.97
1028b1832: 58n.20
1028b2124: 64n.55
1076a1922: 7n.21
1080b: 122n.176
1080b1114: 76n.25
1081a: 58n.20
1083a: 5960, 61, 77, 91

Alexander of Aphrodisias
In Aristotelis Metaphysica
Commentaria (In Metaph.)
55.2026: 122
Anaxagoras
59B 1: 82n.63
Aristotle
Analytica Priora (A. Pr.)
90a11: 79n.44
Categories (Cat.)
2: 63n.50
3b10ff.: 110n.106
5: 60n.31
5a39: 79n.46
6: 110n.110111
6.5a114: 120n.166
De Anima (De An.)
405b2629: 50n.36, 127n.196
406a18: 79n.44
430a23: 80n.52
431a12: 80n.52
De Caelo (De Cael.)
268a9: 137n.31
272a2: 63n.49
De Generatione et Corruptione
315b25317a18: 61n.37
Metaphysics (Metaph.)
984a2425 81n.57
985b: 116n.147
985b23986b8: 78n.42
167

168

INDEX LOCORUM

Aristotle (continued)
1083a13: 59n.26
1083a4: 110n.107
1083a413: 60n.29
1083a8: 78n.38, 92
1083a1113: 61, 67n.70
1083a13: 67
1083a2427: 61n.35
1083a3537: 64
1083b: 55, 56, 64
1083b13: 61n.36, 76n.25
1083b1617: 93n.131
1083b2325: 61
1083b3537: 65, 67n.71
1083b36: 67, 114n.132
1083b361084a: 20n.64, 57n.9, 58, 64
1083b3637: 55n.6, 62, 63
1084a: 65
1084a110: 64
1084a79: 62, 64n.57
1084a1021: 64n.56
1084b56: 92n.125, 100n.34
1085b: 7n.18
1085b341086a18: 58n.20
1086a25: 59n.25
1086a511: 61n.36
1088b10: 64n.55
1088b34: 58n.20
Oeconomica (Oec.)
1347a34: 136n.28
1353a18: 136n.28
Physics (Ph.)
190a26: 81n.57
192a15: 29n.25
203a206b: 63n.49
203a916: 29n.25
204a14: 62
204b513: 63n.52
205a: 65
206a1618: 62
206a21b33: 58n.14
207a28: 81n.57
207a33b15: 57, 62, 64
208a1520: 65
209b33210a2: 29n.25
223a58: 37n.67
Cicero
De Finibus
5.87.49: 4n.5

Claudius Ptolemaeus
Syntaxis Mathematica (Syntaxis
Math.)
1.1.32.6: 85n.82
Damascius
De Principiis
vol. 1, p. 129.19: 78n.39
vol. 1, p. 133.7: 37n.68
vol. 1, p. 169.10: 39n.77
Dexippus
In Aristotelis Categorias
Commentarium (In Cat.)
3.1: 110n.110
69.15: 113n.126
Diophantus
Arithmetica (Arithm.)
14.2: 85n.82
Euclid
Elementa (El.)
VII, Def. 2: 49n.35, 78n.39
VII, Def. 14: 78n.40
VII, Def. 22: 137n.31
XI, Def. 22: 78n.39
XV: 124n.184
XVI: 124n.184
Eusebius
Praeparatio Evangelica
15.37.6.1: 4n.5
Heron
Denitiones (Den.)
21.1.6: 85n.82, 86n.88
Iamblichus
De Anima
4: 118n.161
4.8: 116n.147
De Communi Mathematica Scientia
(Comm. Math.)
4: 60n.34
5.39: 85n.82
33.29: 34n.54
De Mysteriis
59.160.2: 94n.134

INDEX LOCORUM

In Nicomachi Arithmeticam
Introductionem (In Nic.)
10.9: 43n.6
In Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum
Fragmenta: In Timaeum (In Tim.)
fr. 53: 139n.45
De Vita Pythagorica (De vita Pyth.)
152: 137n.31
Moderatus
Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum
fr. 3.5: 137n.30
fr. 140: 45, 46n.18
Nicomachus of Gerasa
Arithmetica Introductio (Ar.)
1.6: 93n.131
1.16: 137n.31
6.1: 52n.52
6.4.2: 52n.53
7.1: 52n.50
7.1.2: 43n.6, 49n.35
33.2: 16n.51
39.447: 137n.31
57.45: 16n.52
Numenius of Apamea [des Places]
fr. 6: 33n.48
fr. 11: 32
fr. 15: 31
fr. 16: 32
fr. 17: 33n.47
fr. 21: 31n.34
fr. 39: 118n.158
Olympiodorus
In Platonis Gorgiam Commentaria (In Grg.)
5.5: 122n.174
30.12: 122n.174
Origen
De Principiis
4.2.4: 134
Parmenides [DK and Gallop]
B 3: 80n.51
B 4: 80n.51
B 8: 80n.51
B 8.36: 27n.16

B 8.2538: 27n.16
B 8.3941: 27n.16
B 8.4244: 123n.182
Philo
De Opicio Mundi (De Op. Mundi)
89.1: 137n.30
Philolaus [DK]
fr. 11: 64n.55
fr. 12.3: 137
Plato
Epinomis
990c6: 59, 63n.46
Epistulae
II.312e14: 128
II.312e3: 33n.51
Leges (Lg.)
893c2: 35n.57
Parmenides (Prm.)
137c4142a8: 5
139b23: 101n.38
139b3: 35n.57
142b145a: 54, 56
142b1151e2: 6
142d9143a: 56
143d8e7: 65
144a6: 57, 63
144b: 65n.59
144d1145a: 66
144e9145a2: 57
Phaedrus (Phdr.)
245c8: 116n.149
245c9: 87n.95
247a248a: 128n.199
247c67: 75n.24, 87
Philebus (Phlb.)
16c510: 5
16d7e1: 70n.88
27b7c1: 70n.88
Respublica (R.)
369c9: 80n.51
398d2: 119n.165
420cd: 81n.57
509b9: 24n.3, 25n.9
525b11526c12: 119n.164
525cd: 59, 63n.46
529d24: 74

169

170
Plato (continued)
529d45: 75n.22
Sophista (Sph.)
238a1011: 59
244b245c: 95n.5
248e: 32n.41, 83n.72
248e249b: 27n.17
250c7: 35n.57
254255a: 85n.83
254d: 32, 46n.21
254d257a: 95n.5
Symposium (Symp.)
187e5: 119n.165
203b: 138n.37
Theaetetus (Tht.)
195d196b: 59, 63n.46
Timaeus (Ti.)
19bc: 81n.57
25c6d6: 26n.14
27d628a1: 27n.16
28a67: 32n.41
28a8: 32
30a.35: 26n.15, 27n.18
30b45: 27
30c31b: 83n.71
30d131a1: 127
32c56: 13n.40
34b1036d7: 5
3537: 112n.122
35a: 27
36a37d: 27, 70
36a637a1: 118
37c639e2: 5
37d39e: 28n.19
37d57: 74n.19
38a78: 74n.19
39bc: 74
39e: 33, 83n.72
39e69: 32, 84n.75
47a: 28n.19, 74n.19
50bc: 29
50c23: 29n.24
50c6: 29n.23, 30
53a255c6: 5
53b45: 28
69a681e: 26n.14
Plotinus
Enneades (Enn.)

INDEX LOCORUM

I.3.4.14: 102n.47
I.7.1.19: 24n.3
I.7.1.2324: 130n.204
I.7.1.24: 122n.178
I.8.2: 119
I.8.2.47: 97n.17
I.8.2.5: 99n.31
I.8.2.1517: 125n.191
I.8.2.2125: 128
I.8.2.2324: 128n.201, 130n.206
I.8.7.1720: 47n.26
I.8.7.18: 51n.41
I.8.10.4: 82n.70
II.2.1.1: 129n.202
II.2.3.2022: 129n.202
II.4.3: 29n.26
II.4.35: 64n.53
II.4.4.20: 69
II.4.5: 70n.86
II.4.5.3133: 69n.79
II.4.5.35: 69
II.4.9.67: 111n.119
II.4.11.31: 50n.38, 52n.51
II.6.1: 102n.46
II.9.8.23: 95n.7
II.9.17.5: 123n.181
III.2.17.4950: 130n.207
III.4.1: 129n.201
III.5.9.33: 138
III.7.11.2324: 129n.201
III.7.12: 79
III.7.12.3133: 74n.20
III.8.4.710: 9n.25
III.8.6.3638: 19n.60
III.8.8.34: 104n.66, 106n.82
III.8.8.36: 126
III.8.8.3638: 125n.192
III.8.9: 112
III.8.9.34: 104n.65
III.8.10: 32n.39
III.8.10.1: 24n.4, 87n.94, 97n.15
III.8.10.1419: 30
III.8.11: 64n.53, 70n.84,n.86
III.8.11.31: 106n.81
III.9.1.114: 84n.75
III.9.79: 33
III.9.7.13: 33n.51, 101n.39
III.9.9.1: 33n.46
IV.1.1.5: 91n.116

INDEX LOCORUM

IV.1.1.7: 77n.31
IV.1.1.1617: 125n.189
IV.1.58: 82
IV.21: 125
IV.3.30: 24n.1
IV.4.16.22: 128n.200
IV.4.16.2325: 128,n.201
IV.4.16.2729: 129n.202
IV.4.32: 127
IV.4.3334: 119
IV.4.33.17: 127
IV.4.33.2729: 127n.198
IV.5.7.5: 50n.38, 52n.51
IV.7.4.32: 50n.38, 52n.51
V.1.1.59: 39n.76, 116n.152
V.1.1.78: 39, 40n.86
V.1.2: 116n.149
V.1.3.7: 115n.143
V.1.4: 34n.52
V.1.4.3637: 105
V.1.5: 96, 102, 115
V.1.5.69: 6869
V.1.5.79: 96n.12
V.1.5.8: 69
V.1.5.9: 56n.7, 70, 72, 138n.36
V.1.5.1219: 106n.80
V.1.5.1314: 68, 89, 104n.63
V.1.5.1417: 69n.83
V.1.5.1517: 104n.64, 109n.99
V.1.6.1819: 49
V.1.7: 101
V.1.7.2526: 101n.44
V.1.8: 80n.51
V.1.8.7: 24n.3
V.1.8.26: 65n.59
V.1.11: 24n.1
V.1.12.5: 115n.145
V.2.1.711: 123n.180
V.2.1.1921: 101n.41
V.3.5: 112
V.3.7: 104n.69
V.3.7.1819: 104n.72
V.3.7.2526: 100n.32, 104n.73
V.3.11: 35, 38, 64n.53, 70n.85, 82
V.3.11.34: 35, 68n.76
V.3.11.5: 35
V.3.11.12: 69
V.3.13.1215: 104n.67
V.4.1.2325: 87n.94

V.4.2.411: 105
V.4.2.78: 70n.90
V.4.2.1326: 106
V.4.2.24: 95n.7
V.4.2.38: 24n.3
V.5.4: 73, 97, 98, 101
V.5.4.6: 77n.36
V.5.4.610: 98
V.5.4.7: 77n.30
V.5.4.1215: 99
V.5.4.1315: 69n.82
V.5.4.18: 96n.10, 97n.18, 99n.29
V.5.4.24: 73n.10
V.5.4.2425: 97n.20
V.5.4.2835: 77
V.5.4.2930: 73n.13
V.5.4.3133: 73n.11
V.5.4.3335: 93
V.5.4.38: 10
V.5.46: 19
V.5.5: 72, 97, 98, 100
V.5.5.211: 98n.24
V.5.5.3: 35n.58
V.5.5.1114: 100n.36
V.5.5.13: 72n.8
V.5.6.24: 30
V.5.8.913: 36n.62
V.5.10.15: 103n.59
V.5.10.1517: 35n.57, 101n.40
V.6.2.1112: 84n.76
V.6.6.30: 24n.3
V.8.56: 19
V.8.7.89: 25n.7
V.8.7.2223: 40n.86
V.8.9: 24n.1
V.9.8.1315: 95n.7
V.9.8.1617: 82n.70
V.9.11.1013: 118n.162
V.9.11.13: 71
V.9.11.2426: 119n.164
VI.1.124: 110n.104
VI.1.1.1617: 125n.189
VI.1.4: 110
VI.1.4.12: 111n.115
VI.1.4.910: 111n.116
VI.1.4.5051: 111n.113
VI.1.4.5455: 111n.120
VI.2.2: 24n.2
VI.2.2.1011: 10n.29

171

172

INDEX LOCORUM

Plotinus (continued)
VI.2.4: 116
VI.2.4.2122: 116n.148
VI.2.4.3132: 116n.149
VI.2.5: 37, 38
VI.2.5.67: 38n.69, 39n.77
VI.2.5.89: 98n.25
VI.2.5.9: 39, 107n.87
VI.2.7: 102n.48
VI.2.7.67: 103n.58
VI.2.7.1620: 105n.74
VI.2.7.2426: 105n.75
VI.2.7.2628: 102n.49
VI.2.7.30: 102n.50
VI.2.8: 109n.100
VI.2.8.2224: 101n.43
VI.2.8.3136: 107n.88
VI.2.8.3637: 108n.94
VI.2.8.3738: 108n.95
VI.2.8.43: 102n.47
VI.2.9: 103n.55, 113n.131
VI.2.9.1: 102n.47
VI.2.11.4243: 111n.113
VI.2.12: 112n.121
VI.2.12.810: 122n.178, 130n.204
VI.2.13: 110
VI.2.13.1: 102n.47
VI.2.13.12: 110n.108
VI.2.13.23: 111n.117
VI.2.13.7: 110n.109
VI.2.13.2021: 111n.114
VI.2.13.2326: 111n.118
VI.2.13.31: 10
VI.2.17.2223: 24n.3
VI.2.21.1226: 121n.173
VI.2.22.1920: 121
VI.2.22.21: 138n.36
VI.2.22.2223: 121
VI.2.22.2426: 95n.7
VI.3.6: 79
VI.3.810: 47
VI.3.13: 138n.39
VI.3.1624: 119
VI.4.4: 36n.61
VI.4.10.18: 96n.11
VI.5.2.16: 98n.22
VI.5.3.1920: 97n.14
VI.5.3.2324: 35n.58

VI.5.5.13: 20n.65, 126n.193

VI.5.9.14: 138n.36
VI.5.9.3437: 49n.33
VI.6.1: 35, 37, 40n.81, 46, 47, 5456,
83, 88, 90, 99n.28, 117, 143n.2
VI.6.1.1: 41, 108
VI.6.1.2: 39, 40
VI.6.1.4: 48n.30
VI.6.1.46: 40
VI.6.1.48: 47, 48
VI.6.1.1014: 40, 47
VI.6.1.11: 48n.30
VI.6.1.1114: 47n.28, 48
VI.6.1.1213: 48n.29
VI.6.1.1314: 49n.32
VI.6.1.16: 40n.83, 48n.31, 83
VI.6.1.24: 83, 109
VI.6.1.2728: 40n.85
VI.6.2: 121n.168
VI.6.23: 54, 64, 70, 71, 72
VI.6.2.1: 55, 63
VI.6.2.2: 55
VI.6.2.24: 65
VI.6.2.47: 65
VI.6.2.810: 66, 72n.3
VI.6.2.9: 67
VI.6.2.1015: 65
VI.6.2.13: 72n.4
VI.6.2.3940: 107n.85
VI.6.3: 67, 68
VI.6.3.2: 66n.63, 72n.3, 109n.97
VI.6.3.3: 51n.43, 109
VI.6.3.45: 51n.42
VI.6.3.49: 5051
VI.6.3.6: 51
VI.6.3.78: 39n.79
VI.6.3.13: 66n.67
VI.6.3.1516: 66n.67
VI.6.3.18: 66
VI.6.3.1921: 67
VI.6.3.2325: 67
VI.6.3.2830: 67
VI.6.4: 44n.10, 76, 77, 84n.80, 89, 92, 93, 95
VI.6.4.36: 73
VI.6.4.4: 83, 93n.127
VI.6.4.67: 74
VI.6.4.918: 112n.123
VI.6.4.10: 15n.44, 74

INDEX LOCORUM

VI.6.414: 5455
VI.6.4.2025: 74, 75, 115
VI.6.4.21: 76n.26
VI.6.4.2123: 76n.27
VI.6.5: 91n.114, 92, 93, 94
VI.6.5.12: 89n.107
VI.6.5.15: 7677
VI.6.5.45: 77n.30
VI.6.5.6: 49, 77n.35, 92n.120
VI.6.5.67: 77n.36, 93n.128
VI.6.5.9: 77n.34
VI.6.5.1012: 78, 115n.141
VI.6.5.11: 78n.41
VI.6.5.1820: 79n.47
VI.6.5.2627: 79n.45
VI.6.5.2835: 79n.48
VI.6.5.3538: 7980
VI.6.5.3951: 80n.50
VI.6.6: 138n.39
VI.6.610: 112
VI.6.6.45: 80n.51
VI.6.6.1718: 92n.123
VI.6.6.1920: 80n.52
VI.6.6.1926: 80
VI.6.6.2629: 80
VI.6.6.2930: 80n.55
VI.6.6.3033: 105n.77
VI.6.6.3134: 81
VI.6.6.3536: 81n.58
VI.6.6.4042: 81n.57, 85
VI.6.7: 77n.31, 81, 83, 88, 107, 108n.90
VI.6.7.12: 82n.62,n.65
VI.6.7.4: 82n.63, 91n.116
VI.6.7.5: 115n.146
VI.6.7.810: 82, 121n.172
VI.6.7.10: 83
VI.6.7.1619: 83n.71, 88n.101
VI.6.8: 81, 83, 88, 107
VI.6.8.14: 83n.73
VI.6.8.2: 83n.71
VI.6.8.3: 107
VI.6.8.46: 84n.77
VI.6.8.5: 80n.49
VI.6.8.1012: 84n.78
VI.6.8.1722: 84, 95n.4
VI.6.8.3435: 107n.87
VI.6.9: 28n.22, 85n.81, 95, 105n.74, 109,
112, 141

173

VI.6.9.15: 85
VI.6.9.811: 85n.85
VI.6.9.1314: 85n.84
VI.6.9.1524: 85n.86
VI.6.9.2227: 86
VI.6.9.26: 15n.44, 97n.15, 106n.79,
120n.167
VI.6.9.2627: 96n.10, 106n.84
VI.6.9.2728: 86n.89, 95n.4
VI.6.9.28: 15n.44, 70
VI.6.9.29: 100, 102, 109
VI.6.9.2931: 15n.46, 87, 88, 106n.83, 123
VI.6.9.3031: 103n.60, 108, 115n.144, 126
VI.6.9.30: 107
VI.6.9.31: 109
VI.6.9.31: 83n.74
VI.6.9.3233: 103n.54
VI.6.9.33: 93
VI.6.9.34: 72, 76, 90
VI.6.9.3435: 99n.30
VI.6.9.3537: 89
VI.6.9.3839: 89n.108
VI.6.9.3940: 89
VI.6.10: 100n.33, 102
VI.6.1011: 90
VI.6.10.1: 90n.111, 110n.102
VI.6.10.12: 106, 113
VI.6.10.24: 91n.113, 96
VI.6.10.1112: 91n.114
VI.6.10.1416: 91n.115
VI.6.10.1720: 91
VI.6.10.2029: 91n.113
VI.6.10.2839: 79n.45, 91n.114
VI.6.10.4151: 91n.115
VI.6.11.45: 91n.117
VI.6.11.79: 91n.118
VI.6.11.12: 92n.120
VI.6.11.1417: 92
VI.6.11.1819: 92
VI.6.11.1921: 92
VI.6.11.3233: 92n.123
VI.6.1516: 112
VI.6.15.2123: 116n.147
VI.6.15.2427: 106
VI.6.15.25: 125n.190
VI.6.15.3435: 110n.103
VI.6.15.3738: 113n.124
VI.6.15.4041: 113n.126

174

INDEX LOCORUM

Plotinus (continued)
VI.6.16: 112
VI.6.16.68: 113n.128
VI.6.16.89: 113n.127
VI.6.16.1518: 113n.129
VI.6.16.1920: 113n.130
VI.6.16.2426: 113n.131
VI.6.16.2728: 114n.134
VI.6.16.3738: 114n.135
VI.6.16.4344: 118
VI.6.16.45: 114n.137, 117n.155,
138n.36
VI.6.16.4754: 115n.138
VI.6.16.5152: 115n.140
VI.6.17.34: 63n.51
VI.6.17.57: 120
VI.6.17.2324: 127
VI.6.17.2526: 9n.28, 120, 128
VI.6.17.2831: 120
VI.6.17.4143: 126
VI.6.18: 121n.172
VI.6.18.14: 121n.169
VI.6.18.56: 121n.170
VI.6.18.612: 121
VI.6.18.24: 40n.84, 135n.21
VI.7.8.1922: 143n.2
VI.7.11.59: 50n.38, 52n.51
VI.7.12.1926: 4950
VI.7.12.2223: 127n.196
VI.7.12.2330: 144n.6
VI.7.13.46: 108n.96, 115n.144
VI.7.15: 70n.89
VI.7.32.2123: 99n.31
VI.7.39.110: 108n.91
VI.7.39.45: 108
VI.7.39.1416: 105n.76
VI.7.39.1719: 107n.86
VI.7.42.2124: 3839, 40n.86, 121n.171
VI.8.8.6: 30
VI.8.14.30: 30
VI.8.16.34: 24n.3
VI.9.12: 48n.31
VI.9.2.20: 51n.44
VI.9.3.4245: 34n.52
VI.9.4.13: 116n.151
VI.9.4.35: 116n.152
VI.9.4.4: 39n.77
VI.9.4.56: 117
VI.9.4.67: 117n.153

VI.9.5: 109n.98
VI.9.5.30: 30n.30
VI.9.5.4142: 130n.205
VI.9.5.42: 123n.179
VI.9.6.35: 117n.156
VI.9.811: 130,n.206
VI.9.910: 119, 129
VI.9.9.2930: 138n.37
VI.9.9.31: 138
VI.9.11.42: 24n.3
Plutarch
De Defectu Oraculorum
409e: 7n.19
De Generatione Animae in Timaeo
1014b: 26n.15
De Procreatione Animae
1012d1013b: 7n.19
Moralia
744b: 131n.6, 140n.47
Porphyry
In Aristotelis Categorias
Commentarium (In Cat.)
101.1: 110n.110
Vita Plotini (VP)
3: 13n.41, 31, 42, 136
45: 18n.59
46: 131, 132n.9
5: 10n.30, 18, 26n.10
5.35: 18
5.5964: 17n.53
6: 23, 39n.78
6.33: 26n.10
7.4951: 132
8.813: 20n.66
8.20: 49n.32
14: 13n.41, 42
1721: 8n.23, 13n.41, 42
2021: 136
20.75: 52n.48
21: 47n.22
21.59: 42
21.7: 52n.48
24: 16
24.2: 133
24.211: 132133
24.56: 133
24.1114: 131

INDEX LOCORUM

Vita Pythagorica (VPyth.)

20.3: 52n.49
59.1: 52n.49
Proclus
Institutio Theologica (El. Theol.)
prop. 20: 124, 125
prop. 64: 94n.134
prop. 113167: 94n.134
In Primum Euclidis Elementorum
Librum Commentarii (In Euc.)
5.5: 86n.88
147.819: 124
In Platonis Cratylum Commentaria
(In Cra.)
176.62: 140n.47
In Platonis Rempublicam Commentarii
(In R.)
2.237.19: 140n.47
In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria
(In Ti.)
1.16.26: 113n.126
1.303.27304.7: 31n.34, 32n.37
1.306.9: 38n.69
2.127.4: 140n.47
3.103: 32n.42, 33n.50
Pseudo-Plutarch
Placita Philosophorum
887c4: 4n.5
Pythagoreans [DK]
44B.2: 4n.4
Sextus Empiricus
Adversus Mathematicos (Adv. Math.)
1.159.1: 85n.82
7.99: 122n.176
Simplicius
In Aristotelis Categorias
Commentarium (In Cat.)
120: 110n.110
In Aristotelis de Anima Commentaria
(In de An.)
6.7: 34n.54
In Aristotelis de Caelo Commentaria
(In Cael.)
181.29: 37n.66

175

255.9: 34n.54
In Aristotelis Metaphysica
Commentaria (In Metaph.)
187a: 6n.16
In Aristotelis Physica Commentaria
(In Phys.)
230.34: 44
230.3637: 45n.14
320: 29n.23
798.14: 34n.54
Stobaeus
Anthologia
1, 2122: 14n.42, 44n.9
1, 21: 43n.6
Syrianus
In Metaphysica Commentaria (In Metaph.)
112.31: 100n.37
112.35ff.: 67n.72
134.14: 140n.47
137.11: 34n.54, 38n.69
139.1.2025: 92n.124, 94n.133
183.1.2425: 94n.133
186.3036: 76n.25
Themistius
De Anima
5.3.3.2: 126n.194
In Aristotelis Physica Paraphrasis (In Ph.)
5.2, p. 233.2: 37n.66
Theologoumena Arithmeticae
(Theol. Ar.)
10.26: 38n.73
17.13: 137n.31
20: 138n.40
29: 78n.42
3031: 139n.41
33.2: 137
33.56: 137
33.2223: 137n.31, 138n.36
34.1415: 137n.32
36.2327: 137n.32
36.27: 139
36.31: 137
37.812: 137n.34
56.2425: 139n.43
56.25: 139

176

INDEX LOCORUM

Theologoumena Arithmeticae
(Theol. Ar.) (continued)
57.45: 139n.45
57.78: 139n.44
57.2124: 139
64.3: 137n.33
79: 139n.42
82.10: 60n.34
85.3: 60n.34
Theon of Smyrna
Commentaria in Ptolemaei Syntaxin
Mathematicam (In Ptol.)
377.1.24: 37n.65
457.10: 85n.82
458.12: 85n.82
521.1.7: 37n.65
620.1.19: 37n.65

Philosophi Platonici Expositio

Rerum Mathematicarum ad
Legendum Platonem Utilium
(Expos. rer. math.)
18, 38: 43n.6
18, 5: 43n.7
19, 15: 44n.10
21, 14: 93n.130
27: 122n.176
Xenocrates [Isnardi Parente]
fr. 99.28: 90n.109
fr. 110.3: 90n.109
fr. 111.2: 90n.109
fr. 112.6: 90n.109
fr. 115: 90n.109
fr. 190: 112n.122
fr. 260.11: 90n.109