Guy Non

As to Act of Acceptance or Repudiation
Guy v Ca
G.R. No. 165849, December 10, 2007
Facts:
Gilbert, petitioner, is the son of Francisco and Simny Guy. Respondents, Geraldine,
Gladys and Grace are his sisters. The family feud involves the ownership and control
of 20,160 shares of stock of Northern Islands Co., Inc. (Northern Islands). Northern
Islands is a family-owned corporation. In November 1986, they incorporated Lincoln
Continental as a holding company of the 50% shares of stock of Northern Islands in
trust for their daughters, respondents. In December 1986, upon instruction of
spouses Guy, Atty. Andres Gatmaitan, president of Lincoln Continental, indorsed in
blank Stock Certificate No. 132 (covering 8,400 shares) and Stock Certificate No.
133 (covering 11,760 shares) and delivered them to Simny. In 1984, spouses Guy
found that their son Gilbert has been disposing of the assets of their corporations
without authority. In order to protect the assets of Northern Islands, the 20,160
shares covered by the two Stock Certificates were then registered in the names of
respondent sisters, thus enabling them to assume an active role in the management
of Northern Islands. Thereafter, Simny was elected President; Grace as VicePresident for Finance; Geraldine as Corporate Treasurer; and Gladys as Corporate
Secretary. Gilbert retained his position as Executive Vice President. This
development started the warfare between Gilbert and his sisters. Lincoln Continental
filed a Complaint for Annulment of the Transfer of Shares of Stock against
respondents. The complaint basically alleges that Lincoln Continental owns 20,160
shares of stock of Northern Islands; and that respondents, in order to oust Gilbert
from the management of Northern Islands, falsely transferred the said shares of
stock in respondent sisters names. The trial court held that the complaint was
baseless and an unwarranted suit among family members. That based on the
evidence, Gilbert was only entrusted to hold the disputed shares of stock in his name
for the benefit of the other family members; and that it was only when Gilbert started
to dispose of the assets of the familys corporations without their knowledge that
respondent sisters caused the registration of the shares in their respective names.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Gilbert was merely trust for the Guy sisters.
Held:
There was no doubt that Lincoln Continental held the disputed shares of stock of
Northern Islands merely in trust for the Guy sisters as found by the trial court and
affirmed by the CA. In fact, the evidence proffered by Lincoln Continental itself
supports this conclusion. Article 1440 of the Civil Code provides that: A person who
establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed as
regards property for the benefit of another person is known as the trustee; and the
person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary.
In the early case of Gayondato v. Treasurer of the Philippine Island, this Court
defines trust, in its technical sense, as a right of property, real or personal, held by
one party for the benefit of another. Differently stated, a trust is a fiduciary
relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person holding the same to the
obligation of dealing with the property for the benefit of another person. Both Lincoln
Continental and Gilbert claim that the latter holds legal title to the shares in question.
However, there was no evidence to support their claim. Rather, the evidence on
record clearly indicates that the stock certificates representing the contested shares
are in respondents possession. Significantly, there is no proof to support his
allegation that the transfer of the shares of stock to respondent sisters is fraudulent.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals, fraud is never presumed but must be
established by clear and convincing evidence. Gilbert failed to discharge this burden.
We, agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent sisters own the shares of
stocks, Gilbert being their mere trustee.
Act of Acceptance or Repudiation

Republic v Guzman
G.R. No. 77368, October 5, 1993
Facts:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses
Simeon Guzman,3 a naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman, an
American citizen. In 1968 Simeon died leaving to his sole heirs Helen and David an
estate consisting of several parcels of land located in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-146837 (M), T-146839 (M), T-146840 (M), T146841 (M), T-146842 (M), T-120254 (M) and T-120257 (M).
On 29 December 1970 Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
of the Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the
property belonging to the estate of Simeon. The document of extrajudicial settlement
was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds on 8 December 1971. The
taxes due thereon were paid through their attorneys-in-fact, Attys. Juan L. Austria
and Lolita G. Abela, and the parcels of land were accordingly registered in the name
of Helen Meyers Guzman and David Rey Guzman in undivided equal shares.
Issue:
Whether or not David acquired the property by right of accretion and not by way of
donation, with the deeds of quitclaim merely declaring Helen's intention to renounce
her share in the property and not an intention to donate.
Held:
Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property are present in the
instant case. The transfer of the property by virtue of the Deed of Quitclaim executed
by Helen resulted in the reduction of her patrimony as donor and the consequent
increase in the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen's intention to perform
an act of liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently established. A perusal of the
two (2) deeds of quitclaim reveals that Helen intended to convey to her son David
certain parcels of land located in the Philippines, and to re-affirm the quitclaim she
executed in 1981 which likewise declared a waiver and renunciation of her rights
over the parcels of land. The language of the deed of quitclaim is clear that Helen
merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title and interest over the lands in favor
of David, and not a donation. That a donation was far from Helen's mind is further
supported by her deposition which indicated that she was aware that a donation of
the parcels of land was not possible since Philippine law does not allow such an
arrangement.
Executors and Administrators

Suntay v Suntay
G.R. No. 183053 June 16, 2010
Facts:
Cristina Suntay died leaving her husband and 5 grandchildren (3 legit, 2 illegit).
Before she died, she and her husband adopted the 2 illegit grandchildren, one of
whom was petitioner. Respondent (legit grandchild) filed a petition praying that
letters of administration be granted to her. Husband opposed invoking the order of
preference and thereafter nominating petitioner to act in his stead. SC ruled that the
order of preference is not absolute nor does it rule out the appointment of coadministrators. The appointment of an administrator depends on the sound
discretion of the trial court, taking into consideration the circumstances of each case.
1 facts of the case Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died, leaving as heirs her husband
Federico and her grandchildren (3 legitimate and 2 illegitimate). Prior to her death,
Cristina and Federico adopted their 2 illegitimate grandchildren, one of whom was
herein petitioner Emilio Suntay III). The spouses were estranged from their 3
legitimate grandchildren. Respondent Isabel Suntay (one of the legitimate
grandchildren) filed a petition for the issuance of letters administration in her favor.
Federico opposed on the ground that he should be the one appointed, considering
that he is the surviving spouse. Thereafter, Federico nominated petitioner Emilio III to
be administrator in his stead.
Issues:
Whether or not Emilio III should be appointed administrator.
Held:
Petitioner Emilio III and respondent Isabel Suntay should be co-administrators. ratio
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator of an estate. However, the order of preference is not
absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case. [1:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:(a) To the
surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next
of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;(b) If such
surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected
by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration
or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted
to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;(c) If there
is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.] Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant
facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration
by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother and Cristinas estate. In the
appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the
estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estates, a situation which obtains here.
Collation/Parification or Equalization among Forced Heirs (identity of heir and

beneficiary)
Lauro Vizconde v. CA
G.R. No. 118449, February 11, 1998
Facts:
Spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas have five children, namely: Estrellita NicolasVizconde (wife of herein petitioner LauroVizconde); Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas;
Teresita Nicolas de Leon; and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. On June 30, 1991,
Estrellita and her two daughters were killed. In an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate of Deceased Estrellita, Rafael and Salud, together with petitioner Vizconde,
inherited from Estrellitas estate.
Subsequently, when Rafael died in 1992, an intestate estate proceeding was
instituted by one of the heirs of Rafael. Private respondent Ramon, among other
things, averred that petitioner should be impleaded as one of Rafaels children by
right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter Estrellita.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, petitioner filed a Manifestation contending
that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no
interest to participate in the proceedings. The trial court granted Ramons motion.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the intestate estate proceeding
regarding Rafaels estate is proper.
Held:
No. The enumeration of compulsory heirs in Article 887 of the Civil Code is
exclusive, which negates the rulings of the RTC and CA that Lauro shall be included
in the proceeding as a compulsory heir for he is only a son-in-law of decedent
Rafael. Thus, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of decedent is
considered a third person or stranger. Petitioner may not be dragged into the
proceeding herein instituted; neither may he be permitted to intervene as he has no
personality or interest in the said proceeding. Thus, petition is granted.
Collation/Parification or Equalization among Forced Heirs (No

prohibition/inofficiousness)
Adan v Casili
C.A. No. 299
March 18, 1946
Facts:
The plaintiff Felix Adan commenced this action in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur against his sister Victoria Adan and the latter's husband, Agapito
Casili, to secure the judicial partition of the estate left by their deceased mother,
Simplicia Nepomuceno, alleged to consist of six parcels of land which are specifically
described in the complaint. Parcels 1 and 3, however, were subsequently discarded,
the first having been sold by the parties to the municipality of Libmanan, Camarines
Sur, and the second being admittedly the property of Maria Adan, a half sister of the
parties litigant. The remaining four parcels, referred to in the record as lots Nos. 2, 4,
5, and 6, are valued by both parties at P2,783.55.
Issue:
Whether or not the illegitimate children of a legitimate child can inherit by right of
representation from thechildren and relatives of such legitimate parent
Ruling:
No.First, Articles 902, 989 and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of
illegitimate children, which rights aretransmitted to their descendants upon death.
The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inheritby virtue of the right
of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate.Second, although Art 982 provides
that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right ofrepresentation",
the same is limited by Art 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit abintestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother
(who must be legitimate childrenthemselves).Third, it is true that while the NCC
granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles musthowever be
read in conjunction with Art 992, which prohibits the right of representation from
being exercisedwhere the person to be represented is a legitimate child. The
determining factor therefore is the legitimacy orillegitimacy of the person to be
"represented." It must be emphasized that illegitimate children have only thoserights
expressly garnted to them by law.Fourth, the term "relatives", in accordance with the
rules of statutory construction, must be understood to have ageneral and inclusive
scope inasmuch as the term is a general one. In fact, if the law wants to distinguish
itexpressly says so by adding qualifiers such as the word "collateral".From the
aforementioned, SC affirmed its earlier decision that the illegitimate grandchildren
are barred frominheriting ab intestato from Simona's estate..Art. 992 prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
childrenand relatives of the father or mother (who must be a legitimate child).
(However note that descendants, whetherlegitimate or illegitimate, can inherit by

right of representation if the person to be represented is an illegitimatechild.)

Carandang v Capuno
G.R. No. L-55373, July 25, 1983
Facts:
The late Josefa Capuno executed a deed of Donation Inter Vivos over four parcels of
real property in favor of petitioners, Gliceria Carandang-Collantes and Luz
Carandang. A complaint for annulment of was filed by private respondents, who are
nephews of the decedent. Private respondents alleged in their complaint that the
thumb mark in the deed of donation is not the decedents thumb mark. The RTC ruled
that the deed of donation is null and void, as affirmed by the court of appeaIs. The
SC however ruled that the donation is valid, and considering that the deed of
donation is a public instrument, it is entitled to the presumption of law that official
duty has been regularly performed. Private respondents have failed to prove the two
alleged grounds for the annulment of the donation by strong, complete and
conclusive evidence of its falsity or nullity.
Issue:
Is collation applicable in the present case?
Held:
No. The resolution of the issue is moot and academic since the Supreme Court have
ruled that the deed of donation was valid and may not be annulled. Assuming that in
Special Proceedings IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED JOSEFA CAPUNO, it was therein established that Josefa Capuno died
a widow, without any ascendant nor descendant, whether legitimate or otherwise and
that her only heirs are her niece, Lydia Capuno, and her nephews, Felix Capuno,
Simeon Capuno, Gerardo Capuno, and Aniceto Capuno, who are the plaintiffs, such
declaration of heirship cannot affect, prejudice nor reduce the donation since private
respondents admit that there are fifteen parcels of land left by the donor, Josefa
Capuno, at the time of her death which were not disposed of by virtue of a will or
testament. The records do not show the disposition of these fifteen parcels of land.
We can presume, however, that they constitute the intestate estate of the deceased,
Josefa Capuno, to which private respondents may legally succeed and inherit. The
deed of donation inter vivos must, however, be respected.

Mateo v Lagua
G.R. No. L-26270
October 30, 1969
Facts:
Cipriano Lagua was the original registered owner of 3 parcels of land situated in
Asingan, Pangasinan, referred to as Lot No. 998, with an area of 11,080 sq.m., more
or less and covered by O.C.T. No. 362; Lot No. 6541, with an area of 808 sq.m.,
more or less, covered by O.C.T. No. 6618; and Lot No. 5106, with an area of 3,303
sq.m., covered by O.C.T. No. 8137. Sometime in 1917, Lagua and his wife Alejandra
Dumlao, in a public instrument, donated Lots 998 and 6541 to their son Alejandro
Lagua, in consideration of the latter's marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage
was celebrated on 15 May 1917, and thereafter, the couple took possession of the
properties, but the Certificates of Title remained in the donor's name.
In 1923, the son, Alejandro, died. His widow, Bonifacia Mateo, and her infant
daughter lived with her father-in-law, Cipriano Lagua, who then undertook the
farming of the donated lots. It seems that at the start, Cipriano Lagua was giving to
Bonifacia the owner's share of the harvest from the land. In 1926, however, Cipriano
refused to deliver the said share, thus prompting Bonifacia to resort to the Justice of
the Peace Court of Asingan, Pangasinan, from where she obtained a judgment
awarding to her possession of the two lots plus damages.
Issues;
(1) the validity of the donation proper nuptias having been finally determined in Civil
Case No. T-339, any question in derogation of said validity is already barred;
(2) that the action to annul the donation, filed in 1958, or 41 years after its execution,
is abated by prescription;
(3) that a donation proper nuptias is revocable only for any of the grounds
enumerated in Article 132 of the new Civil Code, and inofficiousness is not one of
thorn;
and (4) that in determining the legitime of the Lagua brothers in the hereditary estate
of Cipriano Lagua, the Court of Appeals should have applied the provisions of the
Civil Code of 1889, and not Article 888 of the new Civil Code.
Held:
We are in accord with the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 442 is not one
exclusively for annulment or revocation of the entire donation, but of merely that
portion thereof allegedly trenching on the legitime of respondent Gervasio
Lagua;1 that the cause of action to enforce Gervasio's legitime, having accrued only
upon the death of his father on 12 November 1958, the dispute has to be governed
by the pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code; and that a donation proper
nuptias property may be reduced for being inofficious. Contrary to the views of
appellants (petitioners), donations proper nuptias (by reason of marriage) are without
onerous consideration, the marriage being merely the occasion or motive for the
donation, not its causa. Being liberalities, they remain subject to reduction for
inofficiousness upon the donor's death, if they should infringe the legitime of a forced
heir.
Partition and Distribution (Extrajudicial Partition by Testator during his Lifetime)

JLT Agro v Balansag
G.R. No. 141882. March 11, 2005
Facts:
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena
(Antonia), and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio). Don
Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa Teves Escao (Josefa) and
Emilio Teves (Emilio). He had also four (4) children with Milagros Donio, namely:
Maria Evelyn Donio Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose Catalino Donio Teves (Jose
Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves (Milagros Reyes) and Pedro Reyes Teves (Pedro).
[3]
The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering nine hundred and fiftyfour (954) square meters, known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre, which was
originally registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and
Antonia under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5203 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bais City. When Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in an
action for partition and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 entitled Josefa
Teves Escao v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al. Milagros Donio, the second wife
of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case

entered into a Compromise Agreement.
Issues:
(a) that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the
death of Don Julian;
(b) that Don Julian had no right to dispose of or assign Lot No. 63 to petitioner
because he reserved the same for his heirs from the second marriage pursuant to
the Compromise Agreement;
(c) that theSupplemental Deed was tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the
second marriage; and
(d) that TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner is spurious for not containing entries
on the Book No. and Page No
Held:
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant
to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally operative only
upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the
properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere
expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being
the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no
attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent
and might never exist. Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of
assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner
of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from
the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot,
Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right
cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had
already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.

Zaragoza v CA
G.R. No. 106401. September 29, 2000
Facts:
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at
the Municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Province of Iloilo. He
had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed
Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964, he died without a will and was survived by his four
children.
On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a
complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against Spouses Florentino and
Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots
943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She claims that she is a natural born
Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the late Flavio. She further alleged that her
father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his four
children. The shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in advance by
way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while her share, which consists
of lots no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred
that because of her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to
acquire lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no
formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these lots during her
father's lifetime.
Petitioners, in their Answer, admitted their affinity with private respondent and the
allegations on the properties of their father. They, however, denied knowledge of an
alleged distribution by way of deeds of sale to them by their father. They said that lot
871 is still registered in their father's name, while lot 943 was sold by him to them for
a valuable consideration. They denied knowledge of the alleged intention of
their father to convey the cited lots to Alberta, much more, the reason for his failure
to do so because she became an American citizen. They denied that there was
partitioning of the estate of their father during his lifetime.
Issue:
(1) whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his properties, which
include Lots 871 and 943, is valid; and
(2) whether the validity of the Deed of Sale and consequently, the Transfer
Certificate of Title over Lot 943 registered in the name of the petitioners, can be a
valid subject matter of the entire proceeding for the delivery of inheritance share.
Held:
On the first issue. It is the main contention of the petitioner that the adjudication of
Lots 943 and 871 in favor of private respondent, as her inheritance share, has no
legal basis since there is no will nor any document that will support the transfer. Both
the trial court and the public respondent found that during the lifetime of Flavio, he
already partitioned and distributed his properties among his three children, excepting
private respondent, through deeds of sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor
of private respondent because she had become an American citizen and the
Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioner admitted Lots 871 and 943 were
inheritance shares of the private respondent. These are factual determinations of the
Court of Appeals, based on documentary and testimonial evidence. As a rule, we are
bound by findings of facts of the Court of Appeal. Was the partition done during the
lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid? We think so. Private respondent, in
submitting her petition for the delivery of inheritance share, was in effect questioning
the validity of the deed of sale covering Lot 943 in favor of petitioner and
consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the latter's name. Although
the trial court, as an obiter, made a finding of validity of the conveyance of Lot 943 in
favor of petitioners, since according to it, private respondent did not question the
genuineness of the signature of the deceased, nevertheless, when the case was
elevated to the Court of Appeals, the latter declared the sale to be fictitious because
of finding of marked differences in the signature of Flavio in the Deed of Sale vis-vis signatures found in earlier documents. Could this be done? The petition is a
collateral attack. It is not allowed by Sec. 48 of the Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which provides:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It can not be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.

Chavez v IAC
GR No. L-68282, November 8, 1990
Facts:
Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in equal pro-diviso among
her 6 children, while possession of such property still remains with her. Three of her
children sold each their share to private respondent Concepcion, consolidating 4/6
portion thereof. Deeds of sale were therefor executed with the conformity of
Manuela. Despite such transfers, the latter sold the entire property to one of the
siblings, herein petitioner Raquel Chavez. Respondent sued for the annulment of the
later sale to Raquel which was denied by the trail court but which later decision
overturned by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, petitioner also contends that their
mother has left a last will and this will supercedes the earlier transfers.
Issue:
Is partition inter-vivos, and sale based on such partition valid? Does a last will
supercede that of the partition inter-vivos?
Held:
Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must
be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a
person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may
even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the
partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs. xxx The Deeds of Sale
are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance but a contract
perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed
the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the
property owner herself, is valid.
It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to
revoke the sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in
favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel
who had already profited from the sale she made of the property she had received in
the partition inter vivos.
Partition and Distribution (By co-heirs)

Heirs of Teves v CA
G.R. No. 109963. October 13, 1999
Facts:
Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine children, namely Teotimo, Felicia,
Pedro, Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano, Arcadia and Maria. Andres,
however, predeceased both his parents and died without issue. After Marcelina
Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died, intestate and without debts, in 1943 and 1953,
respectively, their children executed extrajudicial settlements purporting to adjudicate
unto themselves the ownership over two parcels of land belonging to their deceased
parents and to alienate their shares thereto in favor of their sister Asuncion
Teves. The validity of these settlements executed pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 of

the Rules of Court is the primary issue in the present case. Maria Teves Ochotorena
herself, denied having executed this Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale over her
share or interest in Lot 769 claiming that her signature in said document is a
forgery. She disowns her signature declaring that as a married woman she always
signs a document in her husbands family name. Further, she declared that on the
date she purportedly signed said document in Dumaguete City before the notary
public, she was in her home in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte.
Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves
and Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and binding.
Held:
With regards to the requisite of registration of extrajudicial settlements, it is noted
that the extrajudicial settlements covering Lot 769-A were never registered. However,
in the case of Vda. de Reyes vs. CA the Court, interpreting section 1 of Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court, upheld the validity of an oral partition of the decedents estate and
declared that the non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement does not affect its
intrinsic validity. It was held in this case that
The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for
its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the
heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no
creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are
involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law.
Thus, despite its non-registration, the extrajudicial settlements involving Lot 769-A
are legally effective and binding among the heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca since their
mother had no creditors at the time of her death.
Partition and Distribution (Judicial Partition)

Divinagracia v Parilla
G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015
Facts:
Conrado, Sr. owned a parcel of land in Iloilo City. He had 2 children with his first
wife,namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.; and 7 children with his second wife,
namely, Mateo, Sr,Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo and Cebeleo,
Sr. He also beot
! illeitimatechildren,
namely "duardo, #oelio
and #icardo. $oth

Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre%deceasedConrado, Sr. lea&in children, namely' (a)
for Mateo, Sr.' *elcon, +andelin, "usela, io&anni,Mateo, Jr., -ito, and aylord; and (b)
for Cebeleo, Sr.' Cebeleo, Jr. and eobel. Santiao,
whoalleedly
bouht
the shares of
ma/ority of the heirs of a property left by Conrado, Sr. He filed acomplaint for partition
but did not implead Mateo, Sr.0s children.#-C found that throuh
the sub/ect
document, Santiao
became a co%owner of the sub/ectland and, as such, has the riht
to demand the partition of the same. Howe&er, the #-C held thatSantiao
did not
&alidly ac1uire Mateo, Sr.0s share o&er the sub/ect land, considerin that
*elconadmitted the lac of authority to bind his siblins with reard
to Mateo, Sr.0s
share thereon.C3, on appeal, dismissed Santiao0s
complaint for /udicial partition.

It held the Mateo,Sr.0s children are indispensable parties to the /udicial partition
and thus, their non%inclusion asdefendants would necessarily result in its dismissal.
C3 denied the motion for reconsideration of the heirs of Santiao,
hence, the petition
for re&iew on certiorari.
Isssues:
Is the action for partition proper without impleadin Mateo, Sr.0s children4
Held:
No because the co%heirs are indispensable parties.-he aforementioned heirs 5
whether in their own capacity or in representation of their direct ascendant 5 ha&e
&ested rihts
o&er the sub/ect land and, as such, should be impleaded

asindispensable parties in an action for partition thereof. Howe&er, a readin of Santia
o0scomplaint shows that as reards
Mateo, Sr.0s interest, only *elcon was impleaded,

e6cludintherefrom
his siblins and co%representati&es. Similarly, with reard
to
Cebeleo, Sr.0s interesto&er the sub/ect land, the complaint impleaded his wife,
Maude, when pursuant to 3rticle 72 of the Ci&il Code, the proper representati&es
to his interest should ha&e been his children, Cebeleo,Jr. and eobel. 8erily,
Santiao0s
omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition

defecti&e.
Partition and Distribution (Judicial Partition)
Heirs of Velasquez v CA
G.R. No. 126996. February 15, 2000
Facts:
Sometime in 1989, the heirs of Anatalia de Guzman represented by Santiago,
Andres, Felicidad and Apolonio, all surnamed Meneses filed a complaint for
annulment, partition and damages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez (son of
Tranquilina de Guzman) for the latters refusal to partition the above-mentioned
conjugal properties of the Spouses Aquino. The complaint alleged that Leoncia de
Guzman, before her death, had a talk with the plaintiffs mother, Anatalia de Guzman,
with plaintiff Santiago Meneses and Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario
Velasquez in attendance; that in the conference Leoncia told Anatalia de Guzman,
Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario Velaquez that the documents of donation and
partition which she and her husband earlier executed were not signed by them as it
was not their intention to give away all the properties to Cesario Velasquez because
Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her sisters had several children to support;
Cesario Velasquez together with his mother allegedly promised to divide the
properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half (1/2) thereof; that they are
entitled to of each of all the properties in question being the children of Anatalia de
Guzman, full blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman. Plaintiffs further claim that after the
death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all the properties and
despite plaintiffs repeated demands for partition, defendants refused. Plaintiffs pray
for the nullity of any documents covering the properties in question since they do not
bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the partition of the
properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to order the
defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the land in question from the
time defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected.
Issue:
Whether or not partition is proper in the case
Held:
We are unable to sustain the findings of the respondent Court that it has been
adequately shown that the alleged transfers of properties to the petitioners
predecessor-in-interest made by the Aquino spouses were repudiated before
Leoncias death; thus private respondents are still entitled to share in the subject
properties. There is no preponderance of evidence to support the findings and
conclusions of both courts. The trial court declared the nullity of the donation inter
vivos in favor of petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez over the first parcel of
land described in the complaint, the deed of sale to Cesario Velasquez and Camila
de Guzman over the second parcel and the deed of donationpropter nuptias over the
third and sixth parcels and the sale to third parties of fourth and fifth parcels insofar
as the of these parcels of land are concerned which "legitimately belong to plaintiff."
It would appear that the trial court relied solely on the basis of Santiago Meneses
testimony "that in 1944 when his aunt Leoncia de Guzman was still alive, she called
a conference among them, the plaintiffs and their mother Anatalia, Cesario
Velasquez and his mother Tranquilina, telling them that all their properties which are
conjugal in nature shall be divided equally between Anatalia and Tranquilina and not
to believe the documents purportedly signed by her because she did not sign them".
Private respondent Santiago Meneses testimony is to the effect that Leoncia never
signed any deed of conveyance of the subject properties in favor of the petitioners.
However, Santiago Meneses testimony was never corroborated by any other
evidence despite his testimony that the alleged conference was also made in the
presence of third parties. Moreover, if the alleged conference really took place in
1944, a year before Leoncias death, Leoncia could have executed another set of
documents revoking or repudiating whatever dispositions she had earlier made to
show her alleged intention of giving her properties in equal shares to her sisters
Anatalia and Tranquilina de Guzman but there was none. The trial court found the
testimony of Santiago Meneses who is eighty years old to be credible, and this was
affirmed by the respondent court which stated that the matter of ascribing credibility
belongs to the trial court. However, the fact that a person has reached the "twilight of
his life" is not always a guaranty that he would tell the truth. It is also quite common
that advanced age makes a person mentally dull and completely hazy about things
which has appeared to him, and at times it weakens his resistance to outside
influence.
Partition and Distribution (When partition is Prohibited)

Figuracion v Vda de Figuracion
G.R. No. 151334
February 13, 2013
Facts:
The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died intestate in May
1958. Petitioner Carolina is the surviving spouse. The other petitioners Elena
Figuracion-Ancheta, Hilaria A. Figuracion (Hilaria), Felipa Figuracion-Manuel
(Felipa), Quintin Figuracion, and Mary Figuracion-Ginez and respondent Emilia
were Carolina and Leandros children. Subject of the dispute are two parcels of land
both situated in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which were acquired by Leandro during his
lifetime. These properties were: (1) Lot No. 2299 with a land area of 7,547 square
meters originally covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 4221-P and (2)
Lot No. 705 measuring 2,900 square meters and covered by TCT No. 4220-P. Both
lands were registered in the name of "Leandro Figuracion married to Carolina
Adviento". Leandro executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the above real properties in
favor of his six (6) children on August 23, 1955. Their shares, however, were not
delineated with particularity because spouses Leandro and Carolina reserved the
lots and its fruits for their expenses. Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 of
the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with an area of 3,164 square meters
originally owned by Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio), covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 15867 issued in his name on August 21, 1917. Eulalio begot Agripina
Adviento (Agripina) with his first wife Marcela Estioko (Marcela), whom Eulalio
survived. When he remarried, Eulalio had another daughter, herein petitioner
Carolina, with his second wife, Faustina Escabesa (Faustina).
Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Quitclaim should be considered an onerous donation
that requires no acceptance as it is governed by the rules on contracts and not by
the formalities for a simple donation.
Held:
The status of Agripina and Carolina as the legitimate heirs of Eulalio is an undisputed
fact. As such heirs, they became co-owners of Lot No. 707 upon the death of Eulalio
on July 20, 1930. Since Faustina was predeceased by Eulalio, she likewise became
a co-owner of the lot upon Eulalios death. Faustinas share, however, passed on to
her daughter Carolina when the former died on October 18, 1949. The Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication executed by Carolina did not prejudice the share of Agripina
because it is not legally possible for one to adjudicate unto himself an entire property
he was not the sole owner of. A co-owner cannot alienate the shares of her other coowners nemo dat qui non habet.
Partition and Distribution (Sale by co-heir of undivided interest)

De Jesus v Manglapus
G.R. No. L-353
August 31, 1946
Facts:
Among other things, it is alleged in the petition and admitted in the respondents'
answer that petitioners are some of the testamentary heirs of the late Gavino de
Jesus whose estate is the subject matter of the aforesaid special proceeding No.
3174; that respondent Justina S. Vda de Manglapus purchased from Sixto de Jesus
and Natalia Alfonga, co-heirs of the petitioners, the rights, interest, and participation
of the said Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga, in the said testate estate, particularly,
the two parcels of land above referred to, which parcels of land were assigned to the
said Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga as their shares in the same testate estate in
the project of partition which was already submitted to the probate court for approval
according to the respondent judge's order of March 11, 1946 (Appendix 1 of
respondents' answer) it had already been approved;-that on September 4, 1945,
when the project of partition was approved, respondent Justina S. Vda. de
Manglapus, presented within the special proceeding a petition for approval by the
probate court of said sale to her of the rights, interest, and participation of Sixto de
Jesus and Natalia Alfonga, particularly, of the said two parcels of land; that the
probate court approved said sale; that on September 9, 1945, "after learning of the
aforesaid sale on September 4, 1945," petitioners instituted an action in the Court of
First Instance of Batangas against respondent Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus for
legal redemption under article 1067 of the Civil Code, said action being civil case No.
3960 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in connection with this action for
legal redemption, respondents in paragraph 4 of their answer, after admitting the
institution of said action for legal redemption, allege that on March 11, 1946, the
Court of First Instance of Batangas issued an order dismissing the amended and
supplemental complaints in said civil case No. 3960 (they attach a copy of the order
of dismissal as Appendix 1 of their answer), but petitioners in their reply aver that
within the period prescribed by law they had perfected an appeal from said order of
dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge, presiding the probate court, had jurisdiction to
order the delivery of the possession of the aforesaid parcels of land to respondent
Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus
Held:
he sale to respondent Justina Vda. de Manglapus of the two parcels of land in
question by Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga took place after the project of
partition had been approved by the court (order of the probate court of March 11,
1946, in civil case No. 3960, the legal redemption case, Appendix 1 of respondents'
answer), on account of which article 1067 of the Civil Code cannot support
petitioners' claim, said article referring to a sale by any of the heirs of his hereditary
right to a stranger before partition. But even supposing that the approval of the
project of partition by the court was made after the sale to respondent Justina S.
Vda. de Manglapus of said two parcels of land by Sixto de Jesus and Natalia
Alfonga, still that approval related back to the date of the project of partition.

Verdad v Ca
G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996
Facts:
The petitioner, Zosima Verdad, is the purchaser of a 248-square meter residential lot
(identified to be Lot No. 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre, located along
Magallanes Street, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan City). Private respondent,
Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise a right of legal redemption over
the subject property and traces her title to the late Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law,
who died intestate on 08 March 1956. During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two
marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos and the second, following the latter's death,
with Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son
Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela
Lozada of the first marriage and her children of the second marriage, namely, David
Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales.
Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some time after
Macaria's death, died intestate without an issue.
Issue:
Whether or not Socorro C. Rosales is incapacitated to redeem the property, she
being merely the spouse of David Rosales, a son of Macaria, and not being a co-heir
herself in the intestate estate of Macaria
Held:
We rule that Socorro can. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that
matter, a mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-inlaw; however, Socorro's right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim
heirship in Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David
Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mother's inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When Macaria died on
08 March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David
Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales
himself later died, his own estate, which included his undivided interest over the
property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs
pursuant to the law on succession. All given, we find no error in the appellate court's
finding that private respondents are entitled to the redemption of the subject
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Garcia v Calimlam
G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989
Facts:
On February 11, 1946, one Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of
unregistered land about 372 sq. meters, situated in the Municipality of Tubungan,
Province of Iloilo (Exhibits, p. 19). On his death the property was inherited by his
nephews, nieces, grandnephews who are the descendants of his late brothers,
Pedro, Simeon, Buenaventura and Marcos.
On December 3, 1954, the heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin Garcia, Porfirio Garcia,
Dioscoro Garcia, Flora Garcia, Consolacion Garcia, Remedios Garcia, Trinidad
Garcia, Baltazar Garcia signed a document entitled, "Extra-judicial Partition and
Deed of Sale" (Exhibits, p. 19). On December 17, 1954 another group of heirs,
Rosario Garcia, Margarita Garcia, Dolores Rufino, Resurreccion Tagarao, Serafin
Tagarao, Buenaventura Tagarao, Fortunata Garcia and Simeon Garcia, all residents
of Isabela, Negros Occidental, also sold to the spouses Jose Calaliman and
Paciencia Trabadillo through their attorney-in-fact, Juanito Bertomo, their shares,
rights, interest and participation in the same parcel of land.
On May 7, 1955 the heirs Francisco Garcia, Paz Garcia, and Maria Garcia,
petitioners herein, filed against the spouses Jose Calaliman and Paciencia
Trabadillo, private respondents herein, Civil Case No. 3489 with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, for legal redemption of the 3/4 portion of the parcel of land inherited
by the heirs from the late Gelacio Garcia, which portion was sold by their co-heirs to
the defendants.
Issue:
The main issue is whether or not petitioners took all the necessary steps to
effectuate their exercise of the right of legal redemption within the period fixed by Art.
1088 of the Civil Code
Held:
It is not known whether the other heirs whose names appear in the document had
already signed the document at the time Paz Garcia was approached by Juanito
Bertomo. Paz Garcia, however, testified that she immediately informed her brother
Francisco that Juanita Bertomo wanted to sell the land to Jose Calaliman (TSN,
September 6,1957, p. 62). On December 26, 1954 he wrote respondents giving them
notice of his desire to exercise the right of legal redemption and that he will resort to
court action if denied the right (Exhibits, p. 8). The respondents received the letter on
January 13, 1955 but petitioner Francisco Garcia did not get any answer from them.
Neither did respondents show him a copy of the document of sale nor inform him
about the price they paid for the sale when he went home to Tubungan from Manila
sometime in March 1955 and went to see the respondent spouse about the matter
on March 24,1955. Petitioners fault the appellate court in not awarding them
damages, attorney's fees and costs. After finding in favor of respondent spouses and
against petitioners herein it is untenable for petitioners to expect that the appellate
court would award damages and attorney's fees and costs. However as already
discussed, petitioners have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a
written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun
to run. Petitioners clearly can claim attorney's fees for bad faith on the part of
respondents, first, for refusing redemption, and secondly for declaring the entire land
as theirs, although they knew some heirs had not sold their shares.
Partition and Distribution (effects of partition)

Maestrado v Ca
G.R. No. 133345
March 9, 2000
Facts:
These consolidated cases involve the status of Lot No. 5872 and the rights of the
contending parties thereto. The said lot which has an area of 57.601 square meters,
however, is still registered in the name of the deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario
Chaves. The spouses Ramon and Rosario died intestate in 1943 and 1944,
respectively. They were survived by the following heirs, namely: Carmen ChavesAbaya, Josefa Chaves-Maestrado, Angel Chaves, Amparo Chaves-Roa, Concepcion
Chaves-Sanvictores and Salvador Chaves.
To settle the estate of the said deceased spouses, Angel Chaves initiated intestate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila and was appointed
administrator of said estates in the process. An inventory of the estates was made
and thereafter, the heirs agreed on a project of partition. Thus, they filed an action for
partition before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. The court appointed
Hernando Roa, husband of Amparo Chaves-Roa, as receiver. On June 6, 1956, the
court rendered a decision approving the project of partition. However, the records of
said case are missing and although respondents claimed otherwise, they failed to
present a copy of said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not there was indeed an oral agreement of partition entered into by the
heirs/parties
Held:
We are convinced, however, that there was indeed an oral agreement of partition
entered into by the heirs/parties. This is the only way we can make sense out of the
actual partition of the properties of the estate despite claims that a court order
provided otherwise. Prior to the actual partition, petitioners were not in possession of
Lot. No. 5872 but for some reason or another, it was delivered to them. From 1956,
the year of the actual partition of the estate of the deceased Chaves spouses, until
1983, no one among the heirs questioned petitioners' possession of or ownership
over said Lot No. 5872. Hence, we are convinced that there was indeed an oral
agreement of partition among the said heirs and the distribution of the properties was
consistent with such oral agreement. In any event, the parties had plenty of time to
rectify the situation but no such move was done until 1983.
A possessor or real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the
adverse claimant establishes a better right. In the instant case it is the petitioners,
being the possessors of Lot No. 5872, who have established a superior right thereto
by virtue of the oral partition which was also confirmed by the notarized quitclaims of
the heirs.

Kilario v Ca
G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000
Facts:
Respondent Silverio Pada filed an ejectment case against sps. Kilario. The latter
occupies a portion of the intestate estate of Jacinto Pada, Grandfather of Silverio.
The Kilarios have been living therein since 1960 by sheer tolerance. When Jacinto
Pada dies, his heirs entered into extrajudicial partition of his estate in 1951. As a
result thereof, lot 5581 was allocated to Ananias and Marciano who became coowners of said lot.
Ananias died and his daughter succeeded in his right as co-owner. Eventually,
Juanita sold her right in the co-ownership to Engr. Paderes. Mariaon the other hand,
heir of Marciano, sold her share to her cousin respondent Silverio Pada. The latter
demanded sps. Kilario to vacate but the sps. refused.On June 1995, a complaint for
ejectment was filed against sps. Kilario. On July1995 a deed of donation in their
favor
was executed by heirs of Amador Pada.
Issue:
Whether or not the partition was valid

Held:
The extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in
1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires
partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. The
object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that
the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not
undermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditors to take into
consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the
rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other
formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property
need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the
heirs that participated therein. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto
Pada executed voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status.
When they discussed and agreed on the division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is
presumed that they did so in furtherance of their mutual interests. As such, their
division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there were debts existing
against the estate which had not been paid. No showing, however, has been made
of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason
why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of
Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four (44)
years of never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that
allocated the subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect.
The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for
they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of
Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as
prescription and laches have equally set in.Petitioners are estopped from impugning
the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly
admitting in their Answer that they had been occupying the subject property since
1960 without ever paying any rental as they only relied on the liberality and tolerance
of the Pada family. Their admissions are evidence of a high order and bind them
insofar as the character of their possession of the subject property is concerned.
Alejandrino v Ca
GR No. 114151, September 17, 1998
Facts:
The late spouses Alejandrino left their six children named Marcelino, Gregorio,
Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a lot in Cebu City. Upon the death of the
spouses, the property should have been divided among their children, however, the
estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in accordance with the procedures.
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased portion of the lots from
her brothers, Gregorio's, Ciriaco's and Abundio's share. It turned out, however, that a
third party named Nique, the private respondent in this case, also purchased
portions of the property from Laurencia, Abundio and Marcelino.
However, Laurencia (the alleged seller to Nique) later questioned the sale in an
action for quieting of title and damages. The trial court (Quieting of title case) ruled in
favor of Nique and declared him the owner of the lots. Laurencia appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals but later withdrew the same.
Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portion of the property that had been
declared by the trial court (Quieting of title case) as his own by virtue of purchase.
The trial court segregated the property on the basis of the Extra-Judicial Settlement
between Mauricia and Laurencia.
Issue:
Whether or not partition of the lot was validly made
Held: Yes.
1) Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long
as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to
exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right.
Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share. The
legality of Laurencia's alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino spouses
was upheld in the Quieting of title case which had become final and executory by
Laurencia's withdrawal of her appeal in the CA. When Nique filed a motion for the
segregation of the portions of the property that were adjudged in his favor, he was in
effect calling for the partition of the property. However, under the law, partition of the
estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially,
(2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration
proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by
the testator.
2) Extrajudicial settlement between Mauricia and Laurentia became the basis for the
segregation of the property in favor of Nique
However, evidence on the extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered before the
trial court and it became the basis for the order for segregation of the property sold to
Nique. Mauricia does not deny the fact of the execution of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of the estate. She only questions its validity on account of the absence of
notarization of the document and the non-publication thereof.
3) A partition is valid though not contained in a public instrument.
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate
reflected the intention of both Laurencia and Mauricia to physically divide the
property. Both of them had acquired the shares of their brothers and therefore it was
only the two of them that needed to settle the estate. The fact that the document was
not notarized is no hindrance to its effectivity as regards the two of them. The
partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document to be valid
between the parties.
Quizon v Castillo
G.R. No. L-7050
November 5, 1912
Facts:
The subject of this suit is a parcel of agricultural land, situated in the barrio of
Galamayano, municipality of San Jose, Province of Batangas, of an area such as is
usually required for sowing thirty gantas of seed-rice, and described and identified by
boundaries. It is taken for granted that this land belonged to Simona Madlangbayan,
who died seven years ago. At the present time it is in the exclusive possession of
one of the latter's children, Urbano Castillo, while there are other descendants of
hers who have the same right to wit: A daughter and some grandchildren of the
deceased brother of full blood of Urbano Castillo, named Pio Castillo; the daughter of
a sister of full blood of the same defendant, named Alfonsa, likewise deceased; and
a daughter of a half-brother of the said Urbano Castillo, named Estefano Libingting,
also deceased. The descendants of these three family branches claim to be entitled
to share with Urbano Castillo the ownership of the land in question, as being the only
property Simona Madlangbayan had left at her death. Hence, the demand for a
division, daughter figures as a defendant therein merely by default.
Issue:
Whether or not the instrument of gift was held to be false, and the gift null and void.
Held:
And even though the said instrument were not false, the trial court declared it to be
void and ineffective. The alleged gift was in fact null and void, according to the
provisions of articles 629 and 633 of the Civil Code, as its acceptance by the donee
was in no manner expressed in the instrument, nor was the pretended gift
consummated pursuant to the provision contained in article 623 of the same code.
The appellant argues that the acceptance in writing of the gift in question, was not
necessary, as it was made for a valuable consideration, and should be subject to the
legal provisions governing contracts. If this alleged gift was really made, it was one
of those mentioned in article 619 of the aforecited code, as being gift "which imposes
upon the donee a burden inferior to the value of the gift," for Simona Madlangbayan
apparently stated in the said instrument that she delivered the land to Urbano
Castillo in order that he defray the expenses of her subsistence and burial, "and if
perchance anything should remain from the price of the land, the surplus of the said
expenses (?) is granted to him by me." A gift this kind is not in fact a gift for valuable
consideration, but it remuneratory or compensatory, made for the purpose of
remunerating or compensating a charge, burden or condition imposed upon the
donee, inferior to the value of the gift which, therefore, may very properly to be
termed to be conditional, and article 622, invoked by the appellant himself, very
clearly prescribes that "gifts for valuable consideration shall be governed by the
provisions of this title with regard to the part exceeding the value of the charge
imposed," to say nothing of the finding of the trial court that the said instrument was
false as shown by the evidence and in accordance with which the defendant did not
fulfill the conditions mentioned, since he did not defray the expenses for the
subsistence and burial of Simona Madlangbayan.

Hernandez v Andal
G.R. No. L-273
March 29, 1947
Facts:
The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez,
and Pedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not parties here, are brother and sisters.
They acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel of land of which he
died seized and known as lot No. 120073 of the Batangas cadastral survey.
On January 23, 1944, the intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel, a
portion which is particularly described in the deed of conveyance Exhibit A, to
Zacarias Andal, the defendant, and Andal's wife in consideration of P860. This
portion purports to be the combined shares of the intervenors in the larger parcel,
allotted to them in a verbal partition alleged to have been made (time not stated)
among the five brother and sisters.
After the sale, on a date as to which the evidence is in disagreement but which is not
now important, the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. According
to her original complaint, dated February 3, 1944, she offered the purchasers P150
as price of repurchase, this being, according to that complaint, the amount Andal had
paid for Maria Hernandez's and Aquilina Hernandez's shares, but Andal, it is alleged,
refused to part with the property.
Issue:
Whether or not verbal partition is entirely void and cannot be validated by any acts of
the parties short of the execution of a public document and its registration
Held:
The civil law looks upon the role of public instruments in acts and contracts with
greater liberality with a view to better adaptation to human frailties and
idiosyncracies. In their blind faith in friends and relatives, in their lack of experience
and foresight, and their ignorance, men, in spite of laws, will make and continue to
make verbal contracts. The advantages of an air-tight policy concerning such
contracts fall far short of compensating for the resulting damage, injustice,
inconveniences and confusion. So even though articles 1278, 1279 and 1280 of the
Civil Code have made provisions for public instrument for all transactions and
contracts whose object is the creation, modification or extinction of real rights in
immovables, it has been recognized and held that verbal contracts may be effective
between the parties. A leading case on this subject is Thunga Chui vs. Que Bentec
(2 Phil., 561), Mr. Justice Williard writing the decision. It was said in that case that
when the essential requisites for the existence of a contract are present, the contract
is binding upon the parties, and, although required to be in writing by article 1280 of
the Civil Code, the plaintiff can maintain an action under article 1279 to compel the
execution of a written instrument. It says that "article 1279 does not impose an
obligation, but confers a privilege upon both contracting parties, and the fact that the
plaintiff has not made use of same does not bar his action." It further says that article
1279, far from making the enforceability of the contract dependent upon any special
intrinsic form, recognizes its enforceability by the mere act of granting the contracting
parties an adequate remedy whereby to compel the execution of public writing or any
other special form whenever such form is necessary in order that contract may
produce the effect which is desired according to whatever its object. This doctrine
was iterated and reiterated in a series of decisions perhaps longer than that on any
other legal topic. And it has been extended even to verbal contracts involving land
registered under the Torrens Act. Do the Rules of Court adhere to this salutary
principle? We can perceive no sufficient ground for the new Rules to depart from it.
No considerations of public policy enter into a partition of hereditary estate among
co-heirs greater than those involved in a contract between strangers which operates
to create, transmit, modify or extinguish property rights in land. If as between
strangers the creation, transmission, modification or extinction of real rights may be
lawfully effected by parol agreement notwithstanding the requirement that it be put in
writing, the new rule could not be more intransigent when the transaction is between
co-heirs and there is no change of ownership but simply designation and segregation
of that part which belongs to each heir

Dizon v Dizon
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
Facts:
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate
children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon
(herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate
granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon
Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven
compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositorsappellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the
Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named
compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo
Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson,
Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties
appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at
P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of
P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at
P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of partition inter vivos done by the testator is valid?
Held:
This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article
1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the
present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now
permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by
act inter vivos. This was intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine that for a
testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all
the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the
amendment but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of
partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity
and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other
codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by
the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositorsappellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made
by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere
devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and
apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven
compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution
by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil
Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code
that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him."

Favor v CFI
G.R. No. 126996
February 15, 2000
Facts:
On 18 February 1991 the heirs of Rosaida and Nicolasa Viloria filed an action for
partition with the Regional Trial Court of Balaoan, La Union, against their co-heir
Ruperto L. Viloria. The heirs alleged that during the lifetime of Nicolasa and Rosaida
they were co-owners in equal shares and pro-indiviso with Ruperto L. Viloria of a
commercial lot and an orchard. After Nicolasa and Rosaida died, their heirs
demanded from Ruperto L. Viloria, who was in possession of the properties, to
partition the same among them but he refused claiming that during their lifetime
Nicolasa and Rosaida sold and conveyed to him all their shares, interests and
participation over the properties in question. Ruperto alleged that Nicolasa and
Rosaida sold the commercial lot to him by virtue of a deed of sale executed on 10
August 1965 and duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of La Union,
while the heirs of Josefina V. Ancheta sold and relinguished to him all their claims
and ownership over the commercial lot. As regards the orchard, Ruperto further
alleged that it came to his possession when Nicolasa sold to him her share of the
land and the ancestral house standing thereon by virtue of a private agreement
written in Ilocano, referred to as "Catulagan," dated 10 June 1978, while Rosaida
sold to him her share of the property by virtue of a deed of sale dated 10 September
1987.
Issue:
Whether or not the ruling that the heirs are entitled to the property in question is
contrary to the law on succession.
Held:
The contention is without merit. The claim that the ruling of the appellate court is
contrary to the law on succession and jurisprudence proceeds from the assumption
that the deed of sale was a true conveyance. However, the Court finds that the 1965
deed of sale was in fact an express trust and hence no actual conveyance took
place. The owners Nicolasa and Rosaida did not relinquish their claim of ownership
over the commercial lot but continued to exercise acts of administration and
dominion over it, hence, it continued to form part of their estate and devolved upon
their demise on their heirs.
We disagree. Prescriptive period for an action of reconveyance of real property
based on implied or constructive trust which is counted from the date of registration
of property applies when the plaintiff is not in possession of the contested
property. Moreover, an action to compel the trustee to convey property registered in
his name for the benefit of the cestui que trust does not prescribe unless the trustee
repudiates the trust. Nicolasa and Rosaida were in possession of the land and were
exercising acts of ownership and administration over the property consistent with
their responsibility as co-owners. At no time did Ruperto openly repudiate the claims
of his co-owners but continued to assure them of their rights regarding the property.
Hence, prescriptive period did not commence to run against private respondents.
Partition and Distribution (Nullity and Rescission of Partition)

Feliciano v Canoza
G.R. No. 161746, September 1, 2010
Facts:
During his lifetime, Jacinto Feliciano applied for a free patent over the portion of land
he bought, declaring that the same was a public land, first occupied and cultivated by
Pedro Feliciano. Jacinto was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4) 012293 on November
28, 1977. and the same was forwarded to the Register of Deeds of Malolos,
Bulacan, but unfortunately, it was burned on March 7, 1987. Pedro Canoza, for his
part, also applied for a free patent over the portion of land which he bought, claiming
that the same was public land, first occupied and cultivated by Leona and Maria
Feliciano. He was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4) 012292, now covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-364 on February 23, 1979. On October 18, 1993,
Eugenio Feliciano and Angelina Feliciano-de Leon, surviving heirs of the
late Esteban Feliciano, and Trinidad Feliciano-Valiente and Basilia FelicianoTrinidad, surviving children of the late Doroteo Feliciano, filed a complaint against
Salina Feliciano, Felisa Feliciano, Pedro Canoza and the heirs of the late Jacinto
Feliciano, namely Delia, Rosauro, Elsa, Nardo and Ponciano, all surnamed
Feliciano, for the Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title, Recovery of Real
Property and Damages. They alleged that the settlement of the estate and sale were
done without their participation and consent as heirs of Esteban and
Doroteo. Likewise, they averred that the ancestral home of the Felicianos is erected
on the subject property and that they have occupied the same since birth. Canoza
and Jacinto falsely declared that the property was not occupied, so their titles to the
property should be declared null and void on the ground that they have made false
statements in their respective applications for free patent.
Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement was proper?
Held:
Evidently, the applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to annul the deed
of extrajudicial settlement was four (4) years counted from the discovery of fraud as
held in the case of Gerona v. De Guzma. However, the records show that petitioners
complaint was filed only on October 18, 1993, or almost sixteen (16) years after
Jacinto Feliciano was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4) 012293 on November 28, 1977,
and almost fourteen (14) years from the time Pedro Canoza was issued OCT No. P364 on November 28, 1979. As petitioners are deemed to have obtained
constructive notice of the fraud upon the registration of the Free Patent, they clearly
failed to institute the present civil action within the allowable period. The same result
obtains even if their complaint is treated as one (1) essentially for reconveyance as
more than ten (10) years have passed since petitioners cause of action accrued. The
CA committed no error in dismissing their complaint.

Balus v Balus
G.R. No. 168970
January 15, 2010
Facts:
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and
Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July
6, 1984.
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as security for
a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank). The said
property was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-439(788) and
more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land with all the improvements thereon, containing an area of 3.0740
hectares, more or less, situated in the Barrio of Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City,
and bounded as follows: Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 5122, Csd-292;
along line 2-12, by Dodiongan River; along line 12-13 by Lot 4649, Csd-292; and
along line 12-1, by Lot 4661, Csd-292. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the
mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the
sole bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a
Certificate of Sale3was executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property
was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the
auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale4 in the
Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank.
Issue:
Whether co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject property persisted
even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its
name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the
Bank
Held:
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds a necessity for a complete
determination of the issues raised in the instant case to look into petitioner's
argument that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an independent contract which gives
him the right to enforce his right to claim a portion of the disputed lot bought by
respondents.1avvphi1
It is true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, contracts are
perfected by mere consent; and from that moment, the parties are bound not only to
the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences
which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
Article 1306 of the same Code also provides that the contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy.

Non v Ca
G.R. No. 137287 February 15, 2000
Facts:
Petitioners contended that the late Nilo employed forgery and undue influence to
coerce Julian to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca averred that her
brother Nilo employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial
settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the
extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its
annulment.
Issue:
Was preterition present that would warrant annulment
Held:
When Virginia died intestate, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property
included, was transmitted to her heirs her husband Julian and their children. The
inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent, remained
under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition. Petitioners are vague
on how and in what manner fraud, forgery and undue influence occurred. The
exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of
extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition,
however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral
attack on the TCT issued. The relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to
the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the
partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the
share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering
the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the
Isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.

Guy Non

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As to Act of Acceptance or Repudiation

Act of Acceptance or Repudiation

Executors and Administrators

Collation/Parification or Equalization among Forced Heirs (identity of heir and

Collation/Parification or Equalization among Forced Heirs (No

March 18, 1946

(However note that descendants, whetherlegitimate or illegitimate, can inherit by

Collation/Parification or Equalization among Forced Heirs (No

Collation/Parification or Equalization among Forced Heirs (No

October 30, 1969

Partition and Distribution (Extrajudicial Partition by Testator during his Lifetime)

of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case

Partition and Distribution (Extrajudicial Partition by Testator during his Lifetime)

Partition and Distribution (Extrajudicial Partition by Testator during his Lifetime)

Partition and Distribution (By co-heirs)

Teves. The validity of these settlements executed pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 of

Partition and Distribution (Judicial Partition)

namely "duardo, #oelio

and #icardo. $oth

complaint for /udicial partition.

o&er the sub/ect land and, as such, should be impleaded

Mateo, Sr.0s interest, only *elcon was impleaded,

his siblins and co%representati&es. Similarly, with reard

omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition

Partition and Distribution (Judicial Partition)

Partition and Distribution (When partition is Prohibited)

February 13, 2013

Partition and Distribution (Sale by co-heir of undivided interest)

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Partition and Distribution (Sale by co-heir of undivided interest)

Partition and Distribution (Sale by co-heir of undivided interest)

Partition and Distribution (effects of partition)

Partition and Distribution (effects of partition)

Whether or not the partition was valid

Partition and Distribution (effects of partition)

Partition and Distribution (effects of partition)

March 29, 1947

Partition and Distribution (effects of partition)

Partition and Distribution (effects of partition)

February 15, 2000

Partition and Distribution (Nullity and Rescission of Partition)

Partition and Distribution (Nullity and Rescission of Partition)

January 15, 2010

Partition and Distribution (Nullity and Rescission of Partition)

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