MHC and MHICL Not Liable for Palace Hotel Worker's Dismissal

MHC AND MHICL vs.
NLRC et al
G.R. No. 120077
October 13, 2000
FACTS: private respondent Santos was an overseas worker employed as a
printer at the Mazoon Printing Press, Sultanate of Oman. Subsequently he was
directly hired by the Palace Hotel, Beijing, Peoples Republic of China and later
terminated due to retrenchment.
Petitioners are the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) and the Manila Hotel
International Company, Limited (MHICL).
When the case was filed in 1990, MHC was still a government-owned and
controlled corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. MHICL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
Hong Kong. MHC is an incorporator of MHICL, owning 50% of its capital stock.
By virtue of a management agreement with the Palace Hotel, MHICL trained
the personnel and staff of the Palace Hotel at Beijing, China.
Now the facts.
During his employment with the Mazoon Printing Press, respondent Santos
received a letter from Mr. Shmidt, General Manager, Palace Hotel, Beijing, China.
Mr. Schmidt informed respondent Santos that he was recommended by one
Buenio, a friend of his. Mr. Shmidt offered respondent Santos the same position
as printer, but with a higher monthly salary and increased benefits. Respondent
Santos wrote to Mr. Shmidt and signified his acceptance of the offer.
The Palace Hotel Manager, Mr. Henk mailed a ready to sign employment
contract to respondent Santos. Santos resigned from the Mazoon Printing Press.
Santos wrote the Palace Hotel and acknowledged Mr. Henks letter. The
employment contract stated that his employment would be for a period of two
years. He then started to work at the Palace Hotel.
Subsequently, respondent Santos signed an amended employment agreement

with the Palace Hotel. In the contract, Mr. Shmidt represented the Palace Hotel.
The Vice President (Operations and Development) of petitioner MHICL Cergueda
signed the employment agreement under the word noted.
After working in the Palace hotel for less than 1 year, the Palace Hotel informed
respondent Santos by letter signed by Mr. Shmidt that his employment at the
Palace Hotel print shop would be terminated due to business reverses brought
about by the political upheaval in China. The Palace Hotel terminated the
employment of Santos and paid all benefits due him, including his plane fare
back to the Philippines. Santos was repatriated to the Philippines.
Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Branch, NCR,
NLRC. He prayed for an award of AD, ED and AF for. The complaint named MHC,
MHICL, the Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt as respondents. The Palace Hotel and
Mr. Shmidt were not served with summons and neither participated in the
proceedings before the LA.
The LA decided the case against petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC,
arguing that the POEA, not the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case. The NLRC
promulgated a resolution, stating that the appealed Decision be declared null
and void for want of jurisdiction
Santos moved for reconsideration of the afore-quoted resolution. He argued that
the case was not cognizable by the POEA as he was not an overseas contract
worker. The NLRC granted the motion and reversed itself. The NLRC directed
another LA to hear the case on the question of whether private respondent was
retrenched or dismissed. The La found that Santos was illegally dismissed from
employment and recommended that he be paid actual damages equivalent to
his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract. The NLRC ruled in favor of
private respondent. Petitioners filed an MR arguing that the LAs
recommendation had no basis in law and in fact, however it was denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: Is the NLRC a proper forum to decide this case?
HELD: petition granted; the orders and resolutions of the NLRC are annulled.
NO
Forum Non-Conveniens
The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum.
We note that the main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions
and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines
has with the case is that Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL
are foreign corporations. Not all cases involving our citizens can be tried here.
The employment contract. Respondent Santos was hired directly by the
Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to the Sultanate
of Oman, where respondent Santos was then employed. He was hired without
the intervention of the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the
government.
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may
assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the
Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that
the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law
and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision. The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar.
Not Convenient. We fail to see how the NLRC is a convenient forum given that
all the incidents of the case from the time of recruitment, to employment to
dismissal occurred outside the Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by
the fact that the proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not
nationals of the Philippines. Neither .are they doing business in the Philippines.
Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the
Philippines.
No power to determine applicable law. Neither can an intelligent decision be
made as to the law governing the employment contract as such was perfected
in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci
contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made).
The employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines. Santos signified
his acceptance by writing a letter while he was in the Republic of Oman. This
letter was sent to the Palace Hotel in the Peoples Republic of China.
No power to determine the facts. Neither can the NLRC determine the facts
surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all acts complained of took place in
Beijing, Peoples Republic of China. The NLRC was not in a position to determine
whether the Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely affected operations of
the Palace Hotel as to justify Santos retrenchment.
Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision. Even assuming that a
proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such would not have any binding
effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation
incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served with summons.
Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired.
This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve
controversies involving foreign employers. Neither are we saying that we do not
have power over an employment contract executed in a foreign country. If
Santos were an overseas contract worker, a Philippine forum, specifically the
POEA, not the NLRC, would protect him. He is not an overseas contract worker
a fact which he admits with conviction.
__
Even assuming that the NLRC was the proper forum, even on the merits, the
NLRCs decision cannot be sustained.
II. MHC Not Liable
Even if we assume two things: (1) that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case,
and (2) that MHICL was liable for Santos retrenchment, still MHC, as a separate
and distinct juridical entity cannot be held liable.
True, MHC is an incorporator of MHICL and owns 50% of its capital stock.
However, this is not enough to pierce the veil of corporate fiction between
MHICL and MHC. In Traders Royal Bank v. CA, we held that the mere ownership
by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the
capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding
the fiction of separate corporate personalities.
It is basic that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those
composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be
related. Clear and convincing evidence is needed to pierce the veil of corporate
fiction. In this case, we find no evidence to show that MHICL and MHC are one
and the same entity.
III. MHICL not Liable
Santos predicates MHICLs liability on the fact that MHICL signed his
employment contract with the Palace Hotel. This fact fails to persuade us.
First, we note that the Vice President (Operations and Development) of MHICL,
Cergueda signed the employment contract as a mere witness. He merely signed
under the word noted.
When one notes a contract, one is not expressing his agreement or approval,
as a party would. In Sichangco v. Board of Commissioners of Immigration, the
Court recognized that the term noted means that the person so noting has
merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without
exercising a judicious deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter.
Second, and more importantly, there was no existing employer-employee
relationship between Santos and MHICL. In determining the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, the following elements are considered:
(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(2) the payment of wages;
(3) the power to dismiss; and
(4) the power to control employees conduct.
MHICL did not have and did not exercise any of the aforementioned powers. It
did not select respondent Santos as an employee for the Palace Hotel. He was
referred to the Palace Hotel by his friend, Buenio. MHICL did not engage
respondent Santos to work. The terms of employment were negotiated and
finalized through correspondence between Santos, Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Henk,
who were officers and representatives of the Palace Hotel and not MHICL.
Neither did Santos adduce any proof that MHICL had the power to control his
conduct. Finally, it was the Palace Hotel, through Mr. Schmidt and not MHICL that
terminated respondent Santos services.
Likewise, there is no evidence to show that the Palace Hotel and MHICL are one
and the same entity. The fact that the Palace Hotel is a member of the Manila
Hotel Group is not enough to pierce the corporate veil between MHICL and the
Palace Hotel.
Considering that the NLRC was forum non-conveniens and considering further
that no employer-employee relationship existed between MHICL, MHC and
Santos, the LA clearly had no jurisdiction over respondents claim in the NLRC
case. In all the cases under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the LA, an
employer-employee relationship is an indispensable jurisdictional requirement.
COMMUNICATION MATERIALS VS. CA

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT
COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC et al vs.CA et al.

G.R. No. 102223
August 22, 1996
FACTS: Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., (CMDI) and
ASPAC MULTI-TRADE INC., (ASPAC) are both domestic corporations.. Private
Respondents ITEC, INC. and/or ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC) are
corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Alabama, USA. There is no dispute that ITEC is a foreign corporation not licensed
to do business in the Philippines.
ITEC entered into a contract with ASPAC referred to as Representative
Agreement. Pursuant to the contract, ITEC engaged ASPAC as its exclusive
representative in the Philippines for the sale of ITECs products, in
consideration of which, ASPAC was paid a stipulated commission. Through a
License Agreement entered into by the same parties later on, ASPAC was able
to incorporate and use the name ITEC in its own name. Thus , ASPAC MultiTrade, Inc. became legally and publicly known as ASPAC-ITEC (Philippines).
One year into the second term of the parties Representative Agreement, ITEC
decided to terminate the same, because petitioner ASPAC allegedly violated its
contractual commitment as stipulated in their agreements. ITEC charges the
petitioners and another Philippine Corporation, DIGITAL BASE
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (DIGITAL), the President of which is likewise petitioner
Aguirre, of using knowledge and information of ITECs products specifications to
develop their own line of equipment and product support, which are similar, if
not identical to ITECs own, and offering them to ITECs former customer.
The complaint was filed with the RTC-Makati by ITEC, INC. Defendants filed a
MTD the complaint on the following grounds: (1) That plaintiff has no legal
capacity to sue as it is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines
without the required BOI authority and SEC license, and (2) that plaintiff is
simply engaged in forum shopping which justifies the application against it of
the principle of forum non conveniens. The MTD was denied.
Petitioners elevated the case to the respondent CA on a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised ROC. It was dismissed as well. MR
denied, hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
1. Did the Philippine court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner
corp, despite allegations of lack of capacity to sue because of non-registration?
2. Can the Philippine court give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the
principle of forum non convenience?
HELD: petition dismissed.
1. YES; We are persuaded to conclude that ITEC had been engaged in or
doing business in the Philippines for some time now. This is the inevitable
result after a scrutiny of the different contracts and agreements entered into by
ITEC with its various business contacts in the country. Its arrangements, with
these entities indicate convincingly that ITEC is actively engaging in business in
the country.
A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine
Courts although not authorized to do business here against a Philippine citizen
or entity who had contracted with and benefited by said corporation. To put it in
another way, a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation
after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the
doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as
to domestic corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin
as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity.
In Antam Consolidated Inc. vs. CA et al. we expressed our chagrin over this
commonly used scheme of defaulting local companies which are being sued by
unlicensed foreign companies not engaged in business in the Philippines to
invoke the lack of capacity to sue of such foreign companies. Obviously, the
same ploy is resorted to by ASPAC to prevent the injunctive action filed by ITEC
to enjoin petitioner from using knowledge possibly acquired in violation of
fiduciary arrangements between the parties.
2. YES; Petitioners insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the
application, or non application, of the private international law rule of forum non
conveniens defies well-settled rules of fair play. According to petitioner, the
Philippine Court has no venue to apply its discretion whether to give cognizance
or not to the present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having no personality to
sue before Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced because the court has
already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his filing
the original complaint. And as we have already observed, petitioner is not at
liberty to question plaintiffs standing to sue, having already acceded to the
same by virtue of its entry into the Representative Agreement referred to earlier.
Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on
the facts of the case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the
principle of forum non convenience. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to
assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the
court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that
the following requisites are met:
1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort
to;
2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts; and,
3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the courts
disposition to give due course to the questioned action, the matter of the
present forum not being the most convenient as a ground for the suits
dismissal, deserves scant consideration.
PHILSEC VS. CA
PHILSEC INVESTMENT et al vs.CA et al

G.R. No. 103493
June 19, 1997
FACTS: Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners
Ayala International Finance Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment Corp
(PHILSEC), secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.
In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc.,
through its president, private respondent Daic, assumed Ducats obligation
under an Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with
Vendors Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a
parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A., while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to
ATHONA as initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be paid by
means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc.
Subsequently, upon their receipt of the money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and
AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the
shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.
As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire amount covered
by the note became due and demandable. Accordingly, private respondent
1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for
payment of the balance and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud
allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of the
shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement.
While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a
complaint For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary
Attachment against private respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint
reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in the
Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that private
respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent
more than its true value.
Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1)
litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens,
and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.
The trial court granted Ducats MTD, stating that the evidentiary requirements
of the controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litis
pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum
non conveniens, even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the
principle of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic
on the ground of litis pendentia.
ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of the U.S.
court?
HELD: CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati
NO
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in
several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. This is
because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima
facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to
proof to the contrary. Rule 39, 50 provides:
Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity
to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata
or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial
court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even
furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence
presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then
being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such
that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata.
Second. Nor is the trial courts refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable
under the principle of forum non conveniens:
First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which does not
include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this
principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered
a matter of defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts

desistance.
HSBC VS. SHERMAN

HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION (HSBC) vs.

SHERMAN et al
G.R. No. 72494
August 11, 1989
FACTS: It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd.
(COMPANY), a company incorporated in Singapore applied with and was granted
by HSBC Singapore branch an overdraft facility in the maximum amount of
Singapore dollars 200,000 with interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate, payable
monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility.
As a security for the repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by HSBC to
it through the aforesaid overdraft facility, in 1982, both private respondents and
a certain Lowe, all of whom were directors of the COMPANY at such time,
executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of HSBC whereby private
respondents and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on demand all sums
owed by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the aforestated overdraft
facility.
The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:
This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall
be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with
the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of
Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee.
The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment and
inasmuch as the private respondents still failed to pay, HSBC filed A complaint
for collection of a sum of money against private respondents Sherman and Reloj
before RTC of Quezon City.
Private respondents filed an MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. The trial court denied the motion. They then filed before the
respondent IAC a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
prayer for a restraining order. The IAC rendered a decision enjoining the RTC
Quezon City from taking further cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same
for filing with the proper court of Singapore which is the proper forum. MR
denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Do Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit, vis-a-vis the
Guarantee stipulation regarding jurisdiction?
HELD: YES
One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State
does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for
exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam.
To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts
that will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in
Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much less
prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble,
damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner
BANK filed the action here just to harass private respondents.
**
In the case of Neville Y. Lamis Ents., et al. v. Lagamon, etc., where the stipulation
was [i]n case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of Davao
City. We held:
Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the venue, suffice it to
say that a stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing of suits in the
residence of plaintiff or defendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4, ROC, in the

absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement which would indicate
that the place named is the only venue agreed upon by the parties.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties did not thereby stipulate
that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction.
Neither did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of
jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a
State to exercise authority over persons and things within its boundaries subject
to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction over travelling
sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of other States, and
foreign military units stationed in or marching through State territory with the
permission of the latters authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the
concept of sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout the domain of the
State. A State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by
making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases
brought before them
NOTES:
The respondent IAC likewise ruled that:
In a conflict problem, a court will simply refuse to entertain the case if it is not
authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction. And even if it is so authorized, it may
still refuse to entertain the case by applying the principle of forum non
conveniens.
However, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the
principle of forum non conveniens depends largely upon the facts of the
particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus,
the IAC should not have relied on such principle.
AZNAR VS GARCIA
AZNAR vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963
FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by
Executioner Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given
to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter
LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar
as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having
been declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in
an earlier case.
As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California
when he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in
the Philippines, and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a
citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will he declared that
he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his
death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.
ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California
law?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the
case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as
the Philippine law on succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the

order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term national law is used therein.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that
under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will
in the form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article
946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the
law of his domicile.
It is argued on executors behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen
of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the
Kaufman case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensens will, such law being in force in the
State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith
and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the
decedents domicile, which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule,
while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession
and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its
own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should
apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its
citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid
down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with
foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the
person of the owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed
out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained
the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause if there is no
law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated in Sec. 946 of
the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article
16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not
be sustained.
As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned
in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil
Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question
to the law of the testators domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article
946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled
in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The
court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California;
such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case
will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict
of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime
for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the
parent recognizing them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California,
not by the internal law of California..
NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private
law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The
national law indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to
no other than the private law of the State of California.
INGENOHL VS OLSEN
INGENOHL vs. OLSEN AND COMPANY, INC

G.R. No. L-22288
January 12, 1925
FACTS: In 1919, the acting Alien Property Custodian of the United States, by
virtue of the Trading with the Enemy Act as amended, required and caused to be
conveyed to him the property and business then belonging to the company
known as Syndicat Oriente, formed under the laws of Belgium, of which the
plaintiff was the gestor, and an enemy as defined in said Act. The primary
purpose of the proceeding was to seize, sell and convey any and all of the
property owned and held by the company within the jurisdiction of the United
States, as a war measure, upon the ground that they were alien enemies of the
United States.
During the public sale, defendant corporation was the highest bidder. The said
Alien Property Custodian of the United States having thereafter accepted said
bid and received from the defendant corporation in cash the amount of said bid,
did execute in favor of the defendant corporation a deed of conveyance. The
defendant paid in good faith, and took over the property and assets of the
company, including its trade-marks and trade names and its business as a going
concern
After obtaining the proceeds from the sale, the plaintiff in violation of the
conveyance, wrongfully instituted an action in the Supreme Court of Hongkong
against the defendant in which the plaintiff claimed to be the sole owner of the
trade-marks for the exports of the business. The Supreme Court of Hongkong
ruled in favor of the plaintiff, allegedly through misrepresentation, ordering
defendant to pay the former for costs and AF. The Court ruled that the deed of
conveyance limited the sale of the business to the trademarks within the
Philippines, implying that the plaintiff is still entitled to the sell the cigars under
the same trademarks through exporting, which accounts to 95% of the total
sales of the company. (This means that the plaintiff paid the cash equivalent of
the whole of the business but only entitled to 5% of the such, the sales within
the Philippines)- UNFAIR TALAGA!
The CFI rendered judgment for the plaintiff for the full amount of his claim, with
interest, from which the defendant appeals. Defendant company alleges that
when he purchased the property and business, all trademarks are included; that
the subject of the sale is not only those trademarks for sales within the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Should the judgment rendered by the Hongkong court be enforced by
Philippine courts?
HELD: NO; we do not hesitate to say that the judgment rendered in the
Hongkong court was a clear mistake of both law and fact, and that it ought not
to be enforced in the Philippine Islands.
The business of the plaintiff is almost exclusively an export business, and that
the transfer of the goodwill thereof necessarily carried with it the transfer of said
export business and of the trade-marks and trade names which could not be
disconnected therefrom
- It is conceded that the Hongkong court had jurisdiction and that the
defendant appeared in the action and contested the case on its merits. Hence,
there was no collusion. Neither is it claimed that there was any fraud, but it is
vigorously contended that the Hongkong judgment was a clear mistake of both
law and fact. Exclusive of the provisions of section 311 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, it is very doubtful whether it could be sustained upon the ground of
comity or the Law of Nations. As between allied nations and under the law of
comity, their mutual policy should be to sustain and enforce the spirit and
intention with which the seizure and sale of any property of an alien enemy was
made rather than to minimize, destroy or defeat them.
We are construing a deed of conveyance from the United States to the
defendant. The primary purpose of the whole proceeding was to seize and
convey all of the property of the plaintiff or his company within the jurisdiction
of the United States, including trade names and trade-marks as those of an alien
enemy. To now give the defendant the use and benefit of only 5 per cent of such
trade names and trade-marks, and to permit the plaintiff to have and retain the
other 95 per cent to his own use and benefit after he has ratified and confirmed
the sale, would impugn the honor and good name of the United States in the
whole proceeding and defeat the very purpose for which it seized and sold the
property of an alien enemy, to wipe Ingenohl and his company out of existence
and put them out of business in so far as the United States had the power to do
so
Be that as it may, this court is bound be section 311 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. That law was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands, and
as to the Philippine Islands, it is the law of the land. In the absence of that
statute, no matter how wrongful the judgment of the Hongkong court may be,
there would be strong reasons for holding that it should be enforced by this
court.
PILAPIL VS IBAY-SOMERA
PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al

G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a
half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling
initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court,
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while
still married to said Geiling, Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia.
The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the
dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon
review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing
of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled PP
Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court presided by the
respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the
respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with
a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the
marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint
for adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ is SET
ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case is hereby made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since
been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is
a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute
the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. This is a logical consequence since the raison detre of said provision of
law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the
spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the
commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the
institution of the action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent
is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.
BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ

BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ

G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960
of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance
to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63
[(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
among other, rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces
of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his
service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA
2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons
Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In,
the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as
the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He
won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of
the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can
still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same
in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a naturalborn citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to,
or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said
oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as
the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows
him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO AND UPTON
VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON

G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985
FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They were married in
Hongkong in 1972 and begot two children. The parties were divorced in Nevada,
USA in 1982. Alice has then re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore
Van Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alices
business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred
by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no
community property as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is
now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines?
HELD: Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss
the Complaint
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the
property relations between Alice and Richard, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property,
or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of
the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction
over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the
case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the ground of
incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community
property nor community obligations.
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm
of KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer,
appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and
public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
GOVERNMENT VS. FRANK

THE GOVT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. FRANK

G. R. No. 2935
March 23, 1909
FACTS: In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered into a contract for a
period of 2 years with the Plaintiff, by which Frank was to receive a salary as a
stenographer in the service of the said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to
be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of
Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel.
Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the
part of Frank, he should become liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended
by the Government by way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to
Manila and the one-half salary paid during such period.
Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was paid half-salary
from the date until the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.
Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to make a further
compliance with the terms of the contract.
The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to recover from Frank the
sum of money, which amount the Plaintiff claimed had been paid to Frank as
expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half-salary for the
period consumed in travel.
It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80
and No. 224 should constitute a part of said contract.
The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his
special defense that
(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No.
224 and had thereby materially altered the said contract, and also that
(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore
not responsible under the law.
the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor of the Plaintiff
for the sum of 265. 90 dollars
ISSUE:
1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of the contract entered into
between Plaintiff and Defendant?
2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy?
HELD: the judgment of the lower court is affirmed
1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the legislative department of the
Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224
by Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of
the contract made between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The legislative
department of the Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of
Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the terms of a contract. The right
which the Defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not
been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws had been amended.
These acts, constituting the terms of the contract, still constituted a part of said
contract and were enforceable in favor of the Defendant.
2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and
therefore the contract could not be enforced against him. The record discloses
that, at the time the contract was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an
adult under the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. Frank
claims that, by reason of the fact that, under that laws of the Philippine Islands
at the time the contract was made, made persons in said Islands did not reach
their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable
under said contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed.
It is not disputed upon the contrary the fact is admitted that at the time
and place of the making of the contract in question the Defendant had full
capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters
bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are
determined b the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters
connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place
of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit,
admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the
place where the suit is brought.
Conflicts Of Laws Case Digest: Saudi Arabian Airlines

V. CA
G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998
Laws Applicable: Art 19 and 21 of Civil Code
Lessons Applicable: Conflict of Laws, factual situation, connecting factor, characterization, choice of
law, State of the most significant relationship
FACTS:
Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA), foreign airlines corporation doing business in the Philippines and may be
served summons in agent in Makati, hired Milagros P. Morada as a flight attendant for its airlines based in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

April 27, 1990: While on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, Morada went to a disco dance with fellow crew
members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. It was almost morning when they
returned to their hotels so they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. Shortly after Allah
left the room, Thamer attempted to rape Morada. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel
heard her cries for help and rescued her. Indonesian police arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the
latter as an accomplice.
When Morada returned to Jeddah, SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident and
requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA
Legal Officers negotiated with the police for the immediate release of the detained crew members but did not
succeed. Afraid that she might be tricked into something she did not want because of her inability to
understand the local dialect, Morado refused to cooperate and declined to sign a blank paper and a
document written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed Morada to return to Jeddah but barred
her from the Jakarta flights.

Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah and they were again put in service. While,
Morada was transferred to Manila.

January 14, 1992: Morada was asked to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia. He brought her to the police station where the police took her passport and questioned her
about the Jakarta incident. The police pressured her to drop the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until
she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of
Jeddah.
June 16, 1993: Morada, while in Riyadh Saudi Arabia, was not allowed to board the plane to Manila and
instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy. Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her
to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They told her that this was
necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah but it was actually a notice for her to appear before
the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
June 27, 1993: SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, assured Morada that the investigation was
routinary and that it posed no danger to her so she reported to Miniewy in Jeddah for further
investigation. She was brought to the Saudi court.

June 28, 1993: Saudi judge interrogated Morada through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident for an
hour and let her go. SAUDIA officers forbidden her to take flight. She was told to go the Inflight Service
Office where her passport was taken and they told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until
further orders.
July 3, 1993: She was brought to court again and to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision,
translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. The court tried
her, together with Thamer and Allah, and found her guilty of (1) adultery (2) going to a disco, dancing and
listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of
Islamic tradition.
Failing to seek the assistance of her employer, SAUDIA, she asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to
help her while her case is on appeal. She continued to workon the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer
and Allah continued to serve in the international flights.
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed
her to leave Saudi Arabia. Before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA,
without her being informed of the cause.

November 23, 1993: Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi, its
country manager.
January 19, 1994: SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss on following grounds: (1) that the Complaint
states no cause of action against SAUDIA (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest (3) that
the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished and
(4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case.
After opposition to the motion to dismiss by Morada and reply by SAUDIA, Morada filed an Amended
Complaint dropping Al-Balawi. SAUDIA filed its Manifestation, Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint,
subsequently motion for reconsideration which were all denied.

SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals. TRO was granted but Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was denied.

CA: Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of
damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further
held that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner
should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order:
o It is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the outset:

Morada's claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.
Morada: Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code which is a matter of domestic
law
ISSUE: W/N the RTC of Quezon City has jurisdiction over the case and it is the proper forum for
recovery of damages under Art. 21 of the Civil Code which should govern.
HELD: YES. petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. REMANDED to RTC of Quezon City, Branch 89
for further proceedings
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, the problem could
present a "conflicts" case

A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is
said to contain a "foreign element".
o Morada is a resident Philippine national

o SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation
o by virtue of the employment of Morada with the SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire
during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise
Forms of foreign element:
o Simple: one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between
nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State
o Complex
Violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal
forum. RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC
Quezon City assuming jurisdiction:
o private interest of the litigant

o enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained
o relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial
Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex", "harass", or "oppress" the defendant, e.g. by
inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. but unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines.
Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek
remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial
connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her. Moreover, by hearing the case in
the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties.
Trial court possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties
o By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntary
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court
o SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial court's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the
Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
As to the choice of applicable law, it seeks to answer 2 important questions:

o (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in
two or more states
o (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation
Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions of justice and
predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with the problem of deciding which of these
two important values should be stressed.

Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts
or rules fall
o "characterization" or the "doctrine of qualification

process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule
purpose: to enable the forum to select the proper law
Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of: (essential element of conflict rules)

o factual situation/relationship or operative fact (such as property right, contract claim); and
starting point of analysis
o test or connecting factor or point of contact (such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the
place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing) could be:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the
lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been
made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly
important in contracts and torts
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual
duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci
intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori the law of
the forum is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of "procedure" not
going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies
whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given
case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and
of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of
affreightment
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of
the applicable law.

Based on pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended Complaint:
o Morada was made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws
and tradition
o SAUDIA may have acted beyond its duties as employer by handing over the person of Morada to Jeddah
officials which contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation, misery
and suffering. It also took advantage of the trust, confidence and faith in the guise of authority as
employer.
o Conviction and imprisonment was wrongful but injury or harm was inflicted upon her person and
reputation which must be compensated or redress for the wrong doing
Complaint involving torts
"connecting factor" or "point of contact" - place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus
occurred = Philippines where SAUDIA deceived Morada, a Filipina residing and working here.
"State of the most significant relationship" applied
o taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue:
(a) the place where the injury occurred
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered
v private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working here
v a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage
Labels: 199
G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E.
BRAGANZA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,

Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy?
RULING:
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. Petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After
all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce
decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that
they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce
decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to
determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law
which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court
should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.
G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SENEN C. PEARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S.
GANDIONCO, respondents.
FACTS:
On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner filed civil case against petitioner for
legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. On
13 October 1986, private respondent also filed criminal case against petitioner for concubinage. On 14
November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision in the
action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation. The
respondent judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered The payment of support pendente
lite.
ISSUES:
1. Does conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal separation can
prosper or succeed?
2. Did the respondent judge gravely abuse his discretion on the alleged partiality in ordering the payment of
support to his wife pendente lite. ?
RULING:
1. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance
of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation,
based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage,
because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the
civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense.
2.
Divergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and
jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case, on the ground of
bias and manifest partiality. No proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in
ordering the same. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation,
and granted at the discretion of the judge. If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered
as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006

ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZCATINDIG, Respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968. The
marriage produced four children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems
that they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984,
Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil
Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce
action under its laws.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one
offspring.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the
Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not
recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine
law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Perez has a legal interest in the matter of litigation required of a would-be
intervenor in Tristans petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife?
RULING:
No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan
was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the
Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where a
citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to
his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a
Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad initiates a petition abroad to
obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute
divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce. Petitioners claim that
she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus,
petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is
based.
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
FACTS:
October 1986, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month.
Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November
16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
1.
2.
1.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married in Bacoor, Cavite. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending
money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times
but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not mere abandonment by the husband of his family and his insensitivity to them automatically
constitute psychological incapacity?
Whether or not requirements of psychological incapacity apply to mixed marriages?
RULING:
No. the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged
nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. We cannot presume psychological defect from the
mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. In Molina, it is
not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must
be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
2.
The husband being a Japanese national is immaterial in proving psychological incapacity, no distinction between an alien
spouse and a Filipino spouse. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
G.R. No. L-41427 June 10, 1988

CONSTANCIA C. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONSUELO DAVID, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner Constancia C. Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino, their
marriage having been celebrated on April 21, 1945 in Manila. The union produced three
children.
Respondent Consuelo David was legally married to Arturo Tolentino on February 8,
1931. Their marriage likewise produced children. The marriage was dissolved and
terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation on September 15, 1943
by a decree of absolute divorce on the ground of desertion and abandonment by the
wife. The trial court granted the divorce on its finding that Arturo Tolentino was
abandoned by Consuelo David for at least three (3) continuous years.
Thereafter, Arturo Tolentino married a certain Pilar Adorable, who however, died soon
after their marriage. Tolentino subsequently married Constancia on April 21, 1945.
Consuelo David, on the other hand, continued using the surname Tolentino after the
divorce and up to the time of the filing of this complaint.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioner's cause of action has already prescribed, and
2. Whether or not the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using
the surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced.
RULING:
1. The petitioner should have brought legal action immediately against the private
respondent after she gained knowledge of the use by the private respondent of the
surname of her former husband. As it is, action was brought only on November 23, 1971
with only verbal demands in between and an action to reconstitute the divorce case.
The petitioner should have filed her complaint at once when it became evident that the
private respondent would not accede to her demands instead of waiting for twenty (20)
years
As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, "where the plaintiff fails to go to the Court within
the prescriptive period, he loses his cause, but not because the defendant had acquired
ownership by adverse possession over his name but because the plaintiffs cause of
action had lapsed thru the statute of limitations."
2. Philippine law is understandably silent. We have no provisions for divorce in our laws
and consequently, the use of surnames by a divorced wife is not provided for. It is
significant to note that Senator Tolentino himself in his commentary on Art. 370 of the
Civil Code states that "the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband's
surname. She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others
from using it."
The petitioner, on the other hand, has failed to show that she would suffer any legal
injury or deprivation of legal rights inasmuch as she can use her husband's surname
and be fully protected in case the respondent uses the surname Tolentino for illegal
purposes.
In Silva, et al. v. Peralta (110 Phil. 57) cited by the petitioner, it was not the mere use of
the surname that was enjoined but the defendant's representation that she was the wife
of Saturnino Silva. There was, therefore, a usurpation of the wife's status which is
absent in the case at bar.

MHC and MHICL Not Liable for Palace Hotel Worker's Dismissal

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Conflicts Of Laws Case Digest: Saudi Arabian Airlines

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

her from the Jakarta flights.

Morada was transferred to Manila.

investigation. She was brought to the Saudi court.

without her being informed of the cause.

subsequently motion for reconsideration which were all denied.

Preliminary Injunction was denied.

o It is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the outset:

present a "conflicts" case

o Morada is a resident Philippine national

Forms of foreign element:

o private interest of the litigant

As to the choice of applicable law, it seeks to answer 2 important questions:

two important values should be stressed.

o "characterization" or the "doctrine of qualification

Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of: (essential element of conflict rules)

the applicable law.

Complaint involving torts

G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,

G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987

G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006

G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004

G.R. No. L-41427 June 10, 1988

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