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Creating a Geotechnical Baseline Report for Project Hobson,

Auckland
H Asche1, M Sheffield2 and M Sheffield3
ABSTRACT
Project Hobson involves the replacement of an existing 90-year-old
above-ground sewer that crosses Hobson Bay in Auckland, New Zealand,
and which is nearing the end of its economic life, with a 3 km long, 3.7 m
internal diameter segmentally-lined bored tunnel.
The $118 M project will offer several benefits to the owner, Watercare
Services Ltd, and the local community:
provide capacity to meet projected growth in the region,
virtually eliminate wastewater overflows into Hobson Bay and the
Waitemata Harbour, and
remove an obtrusive visual feature and open up the bay for
recreational purposes.
The geology in the region is a sedimentary formation, which has been
significantly influenced by volcanic activity; 49 volcanoes are present
within 20 km of the nearby city centre. The geology along the alignment
is dominated by two palaeovalleys which have been infilled with a
combination of marine alluvium and volcanic deposits.
Watercare Services Limited has elected to manage and share tunnelling
risk through, among other key measures, the implementation of a
geotechnical baseline report (GBR); one of the first uses of this type of
document in Australasia.
This paper describes the general principles behind the use of a GBR,
the development of the GBR used in Project Hobson and some lessons
learnt.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GEOTECHNICAL

BASELINE REPORT (GBR)
The following is intended to be no more than an introduction.
The key references are the ASCE Yellow and Gold Book
publications (Essex 1997 and 2007).

In non-tunnelling civil engineering work, the influence of the

ground conditions on total cost may well be limited. The
construction methods for the project as a whole will often be
relatively insensitive to the ground conditions. Foundation work,
which for example requires a pile to be founded at contract
level, will usually include a mechanism for additional payment
based on increases to the length of the piles.
Only when subsurface conditions differ substantially from
expected geotechnical conditions, necessitating different
construction machinery, etc will a latent conditions clause
become operative.
In tunnelling, however, many aspects associated with ground
conditions will have a major influence on time and cost and will
thus greatly impact the project. This is because time is an all
important component of tunnelling cost. Rather than the simple
issue of a suitable foundation level, we encounter issues of cut
ability, stand-up time, support and all phases of spoil handling.
Many of these issues are affected by subtle changes in the ground
composition and behaviour, as well as the skill and care
employed by the contractor. For example, not only does the clay
content make a big difference to the spoil handling but so does
careful or careless use of water at the face.
Prolonged and sometimes bitter disputes arise when the
tunnelling is slow, where the contractor blames the ground
conditions whilst the owner cites poor workmanship. Both cases
usually contain elements of truth, but the latent conditions clause
provides only limited guidance and little certainty of outcome.
There are three reasons for this:
1.

The owner usually presents the ground conditions in terms

that are not particularly relevant for the tunneller. For
example, boreholes are lavishly presented with photos, core
logs and core properties. However, predictions of ground
behaviour are not presented. Moreover, the geotechnical
information presented by the owner is often qualified as to
its extent and completeness.

2.

The clause itself does not provide clear trigger criteria.

Historically, a latent condition exists if the ground
conditions vary significantly from those that could have
been expected. However, how much difference is required
to trigger this mechanism is a valid and frequently asked
question, which is often not defined.

3.

The clause provides for the costing of a latent condition in

general terms only.

The latent condition clause

Originally many construction contracts were written such that
the contractor obtained no relief if the ground conditions were
different to those expected. Contractors were compelled to carry
contingencies in their bids for the risks of all conditions
encountered. This served to increase costs of construction but did
not reduce the potential for claims. In order to avoid the
inclusion of large contingencies for unforeseen conditions, the
latent condition clause was developed and has subsequently
been used in many construction contracts (known in the USA as
the differing site condition or DSC clause).
The GBR approach has arisen from a view, in particular within
the tunnelling industry, that the latent conditions clause and the
qualifications often accompanying the clause usually provide
no certainty as to what is foreseen or unforeseen. The
consequence can frequently be prolonged disputes, particularly
in tunnelling work.

The problem of the clarity of definition and certainty of

outcome can be illustrated by two examples:

Example 1. If a tunnel is excavated in a well-established city,

is a man-made obstruction (such as a pile or a tie-back
anchor) a latent condition?

Example 2. Suppose some property of the ground is

1.

Principal, Connell Wagner, Level 4, 139 Carlton Gore Street,

Newmarket, Auckland, New Zealand. Email: AscheH@conwag.com

2.

Project Manager, Watercare Services Ltd, 2 Nuffield Street,

Newmarket, Auckland, New Zealand.
Email: MSheffield@water.co.nz

3.

Associate, Connell Wagner, Level 2, 116 Military Road, Neutral Bay

NSW 2089. Email: SheffieldMG@conwag.com

13th Australian Tunnelling Conference

measured by sampling and a distribution is inferred. Note

that this process itself implies uncertainty. If the mean is
stated to be 100, with standard deviation ten, does a latent
condition arise if a prolonged stretch of ground has an
average of 108 or 118?

In both examples, the viewpoint of the contractors estimator

will be to predict conditions that are favourable enough to win
the job without unduly overburdening the bid with costs for risk,

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H ASCHE, M SHEFFIELD and M SHEFFIELD

knowing that the job will most likely be awarded to the lowest
bid. The estimator would therefore be tempted to assume no
man-made obstructions and an average property of 100.
The owners view would be different and will often be that the
discovery of a man-made obstruction should have been
reasonably anticipated by an experienced contractor. Hence the
tender estimate should have allowed for encountering an
obstruction. In the case of example 2, both 108 and 118 are
statistically within expected bounds for the ground property. As
for the comment that the owners always award to the low bid,
they will retort that there is no lucky conditions clause where
the contractor gives money back, if more favourable conditions
are encountered, therefore the owner is entitled to take the low
bid.
It is not hard to see why prolonged disputes have occurred in
tunnelling over latent conditions.
In the US, the GBR was developed as one of a number of
methods for dealing with this problem.

Contractual practices in the United States and

worldwide
As well as the GBR (described below), the United States (US)
tunnelling industry has developed a number of contractual
innovations not commonly used in Australasia. Two of these are
the dispute review board (DRB) and placement of tender
documents in escrow.
The DRB is a board, usually consisting of three experienced
independent practitioners in the tunnelling industry, which is
appointed to regularly inspect the tunnelling works and review
disputes as they arise during the progress of the project. Through
a variety of different means, the contractor and the owner agree
on three members, one of whom serves as the chair. The findings
of the DRB are usually not binding but are admissible as evidence
in court. However, as their attendance on site is contemporaneous
with the progress of the tunnelling, the findings of the DRB are
rarely overturned by arbitration or litigation.
US experience of DRBs is that they are very effective in
reducing frivolous or ambit claims. This is because the DRB
members usually collectively possess formidable experience in
tunnelling and contracting. The net effect is that contractors
usually only submit claims they expect the DRB will support.
Paradoxically, due to this effect, owners in the US often believe
that the DRB system favours contractors, as the ratio of claims
supported by the DRB is high.
The cost of a DRB is also an important consideration since it is
not insignificant, as three experienced practitioners must spend
some days every month on site throughout the duration of a
project.
The placement of documents in escrow is another innovation
which requires the contractor to provide the full workings of the
estimate on which the tender is based to an independent third
party. These documents can be made available to arbitration or to
a DRB under certain conditions. As with the DRB, this has the
effect of reducing ambit claims and reinforcing legitimate claims
on the basis that the conditions had not been expected at the time
of tender.
Worldwide, a number of significant tunnel failures have
caused concern to the insurance industry. The Association of
British Insurers and the British Tunnelling Society published the
Joint Code of Practice for Risk Management of Tunnel Works in
the UK (September 2003) as a standard for the management of
the risk associated with the anticipated subsurface conditions in a
contract prior to the bidding process. More recently (January
2006) the International Tunnelling Insurance Group has
published A Code of Practice for Risk Management of Tunnel
Works. Both these documents emphasise risk management and
cite the use of a GBR as a tool for this process.

388

The geotechnical baseline report (GBR)

The two examples of unclear latent conditions above
demonstrate the cause of the problem. In both cases, the risk
profile adopted by the contractor is at odds with the risk profile
which the owner had presumed would reasonably be included in
the price. The GBR is part of a risk management process that has
the aim of explicitly identifying and assigning the risks
associated with the ground conditions. This is a process which
requires collaboration between the owner and the designer aimed
at producing a clear communication to the contractor in terms
which are relevant to them.
The GBR is an integral part of the contract management
process, which describes and distributes risks. The GBR should
deal with elements of risks in three ways:
1.

risk that is to be explicitly included in the tender and the

conditions which the contractor is expected to include are
described;

2.

risk that is explicitly excluded from the tender, but passed

to a schedule of provisional items where it is priced; and

3.

risk that is explicitly excluded and hence handled as per the

latent condition clause.

The GBR describes the expected tunnelling operation and sets

out the baseline, ie the conditions on which the tender is to be
priced. The baseline does not need to be the expected conditions.
However, as will be demonstrated, the baseline cannot be too far
from the expected conditions.
Baselines for the examples described above might be:

Example 1. In the city, man-made obstructions can occur.

The baseline is to expect to encounter two steel piles in the
face of the excavation, and the tender price should allow for
the operation of stopping the drive and cutting out these piles
by hand. Other obstructions shall be paid for in the relevant
schedule of priced variations.

Example 2. The ground property has been calculated from

measurements taken in the boreholes. The average has been
found to be 100, with a standard deviation of ten. This
process involves errors and approximations in the sampling
and testing process. The baseline is that the ground will have
an average which will not exceed 115, and the tender price
should reflect this.
The wording should explain the risk profile and set the
baseline to be adopted for the purpose of pricing. The GBR
should also assure the owner that the tender price will include for
particular risks. Awareness and participation by the owner is
essential in the process since the owner must set the level of risk
off against the potential contract price.

Pitfalls and misconceptions

A potential pitfall in setting baselines is to set them too high.
Examples of this would be:

Example 1. The tender shall allow for a baseline condition

whereby many obstructions are encountered or the tender
shall allow for 50 obstructions to be encountered.

Example 2. The baseline ground property to be adopted is

200.
Why do these baselines fail? The reason is that the contractor
is unable to use these baselines as a basis for tendering, because
the likelihood of the baseline condition occurring is nearly zero.
In these cases, the contractor will revert to expected values, ie
zero, in order to maintain a competitive tender. Hence, disputes
associated with unrealistic baselines in the US have tended to be
in favour of the contractors and the baselines have been set aside.

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13th Australian Tunnelling Conference

CREATING A GEOTECHNICAL BASELINE REPORT FOR PROJECT HOBSON, AUCKLAND

In the case of material properties, beware of absolute measured

values (no rock will exceed 100 MPa UCS). Extreme values of
properties are very difficult to predict and such baselines provide
no useful information to the contractor, nor are they likely to
provide much transfer of risk from the Owner to the contractor.
It is therefore important to understand that a GBR is not a
geotechnical interpretive report which can be produced late
during the design phase of a project. The GBR is primarily a
contractual document in which conditions are described which
will differ from the expected conditions. As the GBR is an
integral part of the risk management process which distributes
risks contractually, development of the baselines must commence
early in the design, although the report cannot be finalised until
the end of the design process.

Baseline generation
The GBR must explicitly describe and consider the construction.
A description of the expected behaviour of the ground at each
shaft location and in each section of tunnel is required in terms
of cut ability, support, spoil handling behaviour, spoil sites, water
inflows, etc. To generate this information, it is beneficial if the
project is broken into sections with similar conditions.
It is also useful to include a section on past experience in
similar ground and include types of construction used and
difficulties experienced. Writing about previous problems does
seem to flush out key issues.
A geological settings report describing the historical processes
that have resulted in the present day geological conditions
(folding, fractures, etc), and is understandable to the tunnelling
engineer by avoiding geological jargon, may also provide a
useful indication of the key issues.
The baselines should be described in one of four ways:
1.

By exclusion eg the baseline is that no man-made

obstructions will be encountered.

2.

By defining a macro outcome eg the water inflow will

not exceed 10 L/s.

3.

By description eg previous tunnels have had difficulty

with the spoil becoming sticky if it gets wet. Expect to
minimise water addition and anticipate needing to treat the
spoil with conditioning agents.

4.

By defining properties eg the mean of a statistically

relevant sample will be within the following range. This is
best shown by use of a histogram of the test results to date
with the expected range superimposed.

To cover all of the important issues that the contractor must

consider, all of these are needed. Obviously, the more definitive
the baseline the better. However, inevitably some issues can only
be covered by description. Where the GBR describes material
properties, it should also define accepted methods for sampling
and measuring should a dispute arise.

Forward priced variations

A risk management process including a GBR will identify
specific risks which might be unlikely to occur but which are
readily definable in terms of cost. It is possible to then exclude
these risks from the baseline but pass them to a schedule of
forward priced variations. Examples of these can include:

management of water inflows above the baseline,

treatment of man-made obstructions,
treatment of boulders and cobbles,
installation of emergency intervention shafts, and
emergency fissure grouting.

13th Australian Tunnelling Conference

The GBR should refer to these items in the relevant sections,

eg the baseline is this should the baseline be exceeded, then
the item x in the schedule of forward priced variations will
apply.
The schedule may also provide for generalised provisional
items such as extra shotcrete, rock bolts, delays at the face, etc.

Incorporation of the geotechnical baseline report

(GBR) into the contract documents
For the GBR to function successfully, it needs to be incorporated
into the contract documents. This requires:

a revised latent condition clause which limits the

applicability of latent conditions to matters which are not
identified in the GBR, or other contract documents such as
the geotechnical data report;

the inclusion of conditions, which define whether issues

outside the baseline trigger additional payment or require the
contractor to demonstrate that additional costs were actually
incurred;

a revised variation assessment clause which defines the

procedures as to how issues identified in the GBR are to be
paid, giving priority to the schedule of forward priced
variations;

the schedule of forward priced variations, which will come

into play when the baselines are exceeded (unless the
conditions are such as to trigger the latent conditions clause);
and

requirements for the parties to gather, share and maintain

records of relevant data.

PROJECT HOBSON
Project overview
The project includes the construction of a new sewer tunnel
beneath Hobson Bay that will replace the 90 year old aboveground concrete sewer pipe that currently bisects the bay on
Aucklands waterfront adjacent to Tamaki Drive. The existing
pipeline is at the end of its economic life. Replacing it with a
larger capacity tunnel will meet projected growth in the area
(servicing a quarter of the Greater Auckland wastewater
conveyance requirements), provide sufficient storage in wet
weather (when stormwater also enters the system) to virtually
eliminate wastewater overflows into the bay and the Waitemata
Harbour and open up the bay for recreational purposes.
The new tunnel will receive flows from the Orakei Main Sewer
and branch sewers and convey the flows to a new pump station,
PS64, which will pump to the Eastern Interceptor. The bored
tunnel is approximately 3 km long and has an internal diameter
of 3.7 m and external diameter of 4.2 m. The tunnel will be
constructed using an earth pressure balance tunnel boring
machine capable of operating in open and closed modes. The
ground support will be provided by a single pass, precast
concrete, bolted and gasketted precast concrete segmental lining.
Two (8 m and 5 m diameter) inlet vortex drop shafts, together
with a new 22 m diameter pumping station, will also be
constructed as part of the project.
The existing sewer is located just above sea level in Hobson
Bay, and it falls east, towards the existing pump station PS16.
The new sewer is to be in tunnel, which involves the construction
of drop shafts at each of the junctions and a deep pump station.
The horizontal alignment commences on the west shoreline of
Hobson Bay adjacent to Logan Terrace (refer Figure 1). Logan
Terrace drop shaft provides the upstream connection to the
existing network. The tunnel crosses the western side of Hobson

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389

H ASCHE, M SHEFFIELD and M SHEFFIELD

FIG 1 - Scheme plan.

Bay to the Victoria Avenue Peninsula. The tunnel then passes

close to the existing foreshore, to connect with Victoria Avenue
drop shaft. The tunnel continues across the eastern side of
Hobson Bay, below the Orakei ridgeline to a new pump station
(PS64) within the Orakei Domain adjacent to PS16.
A key decision for the project was the depth of tunnel. The
tunnel traverses two palaeochannels within Hobson Bay, which
are infilled with sediments above the palaeosurface of East Coast
Bays Formation (ECBF); the ubiquitous bedrock of Auckland
City. To ensure the tunnel was wholly located within the ECBF
required a pump station with excessive depth and committed
Watercare to higher operating costs throughout the life of the
facility. The decision was made to lift the alignment as high as
possible whilst remaining below the most adverse ground
conditions a basalt flow from Little Rangitoto on the eastern
side of Hobson Bay.
The strength and consistency of the basalt flow is variable and
there is potential for the rock to be water charged. Therefore
the risks and TBM performance/configuration requirements
associated with tunnelling through the basalt were not considered
to be acceptable. A tunnel elevation was therefore established to
pass below the underside of the rock.

The Project Hobson geotechnical baseline report

(GBR)
Chapter headings for the Hobson GBR are shown in the Table 1.
Baselines for material properties (chapter 5) are set in terms of
the average of a statistically relevant sample. Histograms are
shown in Figures 2 and 3, showing the available data, as well as
bounds within which the properties are set.
For the driven tunnelling, the drive is broken into geographical
units of similar conditions (called reaches), as shown in Table 2.
Reach 1 was located adjacent to the TBM launch shaft and
comprised an area of level, undeveloped ground beneath some

390

TABLE 1
Geotechnical baseline report (GBR) layout.
No

Heading

Comments

Introduction

Project description

Sources of geological
and geotechnical
information

Describes context of geotechnical

investigations and includes section on
previous experiences in tunnelling in
similar ground

Project geological and

site setting

Describes geological and

hydrogeological processes

Relevant physical and

man-made conditions

Provides, for each geological unit,

baseline material properties

Shafts

Describes baseline extents of each

geological unit as well as baseline
material behaviour

Bored tunnels

Describes baseline extents of each

geological unit as well as baseline
material behaviour

Management and
disposal of spoil and
groundwater

Describes baselines for spoil and

groundwater inflows

Instrumentation and
monitoring

Describes data capture and management

10

Demolition of existing
Orakei main sewer

Describes baselines for access to

existing sewer

11

References

12

Abbreviations

Drawings

Drawings show reaches and distribution

of geological units

Figures

Figures show histograms of material

properties

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CREATING A GEOTECHNICAL BASELINE REPORT FOR PROJECT HOBSON, AUCKLAND

Baseline 15 - 30

Reach 2 was the longest section of tunnel where the tunnel

passed below the residential properties along the Orakei Ridge.
The ground cover was up to 70 m and ground conditions at the
tunnel horizon were expected to comprise ECBF. The contractor
was given the choice of operating the TBM in either open or
closed mode.
Within Reach 3, the tunnel passed through the East
Paleovalley which formed part of Hobson Bay. It was expected
that mixed face conditions would be present, comprising
weathered ECBF, volcanic deposits such ash and scoria and the
older (Pleistocene deposits) muds. It was specified that the TBM
should be operated in closed mode within this reach. A key
baseline was set in this reach, ie the basalt will not be
encountered within the tunnel horizon. Forward priced variations
were provided to address encountering the basalt.
One of the geological units expected to be encountered in
Reach 3 is known to contain volcanic ejecta (called bombs),
which can be made from hard material. A baseline was set to
limit the number and size of bombs to be priced. Forward priced
variations were included for encountering more than the baseline
number.
Reach 4 featured uniform tunnelling conditions, comprising a
full face of ECBF and cover in order of 20 m. As with Reach 2,
the contractor was given the option of operating the TBM in
open or closed mode.
Within Reach 5, the tunnel passed through West Paleovalley.
Mixed face conditions were expected; comprising weathered
ECBF and the recent alluvial muds, hence closed mode operation
was specified.
Reach 6 was expected to consist of entirely ECBF, and the
contractor was given the option of open or closed mode.

Class VI

Number of Tests

Mean 22

80-85

70-75

75-80

60-65

65-70

50-55

55-60

40-45

45-50

30-35

35-40

20-25

25-30

10-15

5-10

0-5

15-20

Plasticity Index (%)

FIG 2 - East Coast Bays Formation (ECBF) plasticity index.

14

Baseline Max 4.0

Class VI

12

Number of Tests

10
8
6
4

20-25

25-30

18-19

19-20

17-18

15-16

16-17

14-15

12-13

13-14

10-11

11-12

7-8

8-9

6-7

4-5

5-6

2-3

3-4

0-1

1-2

9-10

UCS (MPa)

Contractual framework
For this project, Watercare elected to have bespoke contractual
conditions written for the project. This allowed for the GBR and
forward priced variations to be interwoven into the conditions.
Watercare decided not to employ a dispute review board, but
did require the tender documents to be held in escrow by
Watercare, in locked boxes that could not be opened without
agreement of the parties. The escrow bid documents were
available to be scrutinised by either party in various
circumstances, not just in circumstances relating to the GBR.

FIG 3 - East Coast Bays Formation (ECBF) unconfined

compressive strength.

rugby pitches. It was limited in length by the distance between

the launch shaft and nearby residential properties. It was
therefore suited to TBM start-up and it was specified that trials of
the open and closed mode operations, together with probing,
should be performed within this reach since the risks of building
damage due to settlement were low.

TABLE 2
Outline description of reaches.
Orakei Domain

Reach
Chainage (m)
Length (m)

Orakei Ridgeline

1
2958

East Palaeovalley

2
2810

148

2810

Southern Section
(Victoria Avenue
Headland)

3
1700

1700

West Palaeovalley
(Central Section)

4
1300

1300

West Palaeovalley
(Central Section to
Drop Shaft)

5
410

410

6
240

240

1110

400

890

170

235

Feature
Land/marine

Land

Land

Marine

Marine

Marine

Marine

Cover

28

21 - 78

21

21

21

21

Recent alluvium

Older alluvium

Volcanic deposits

Basalt

Soft rock

Startup and trials

(closed, probing)

Option
(open/ closed)

Closed

Option
(open/ closed)

Closed

Option
(open/ closed)

TBM mode

13th Australian Tunnelling Conference

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391

H ASCHE, M SHEFFIELD and M SHEFFIELD

Previous mention has been made of the International

Tunnelling Insurance Groups (ITIG) Code of Practice for Risk
Management of Tunnel Works. Watercare did not incorporate
that document into the contract documents; however, in many
respects the guidelines set out in the ITIG code were closely
followed. It should be noted that incorporation of the ITIG code
is probably best achieved in an alliance type contract where risk
is primarily carried by the owner. It is also worth noting that
when seeking quotes for works insurance in early 2007 the
insurance industry was clearly pushing for the inclusion of the
ITIG code into the contract between the owner and the
contractor.
During tendering, Watercare operated an interactive tendering
process (ITP), where the tenderers were allowed to ask questions
and make suggestions. That process resulted in a number of
changes to the proposed contract documents.

In the GBR process it is essential that the owner understands

the risk and consequential implications they are accepting
through the content of the report, and it is also essential that the
designer understands the risk profile which the owner would like
to set. This understanding takes time to develop. Therefore, when
preparing a GBR it is recommended to allow for several major
revision cycles during the preparation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Connell Wagner authors wish to thank Watercare for the
kind permission to publish this paper and acknowledge the
foresight shown by Watercare in adopting a GBR based approach
to risk sharing on Project Hobson.
Randy Essex is also acknowledged for his thoughts and
valuable guidance in the production and preparation of the GBR
for Project Hobson.

LESSON LEARNED

REFERENCES

Project Hobson is now under construction and any lessons from

the use of the GBR during construction must wait for subsequent
reporting. However, a few comments can be made about the
writing of the GBR.
The use of a GBR increases the complexity of the task of
writing, reviewing and responding to the contract documents.
The contract documents become very interdependent. The
interactive tendering process helped in that aspects of the GBR
could be explained, clarified and adjusted.

Essex, R J (ed), 1997. Geotechnical Baseline Reports for Underground

Construction. Guidelines and Practices (American Society of Civil
Engineers: Reston).
Essex, R J (ed), 2007. Geotechnical Baseline Reports for Construction.
Suggested Guidelines (American Society of Civil Engineers: Reston).
The Association of British Insurers and the British Tunnelling Society,
2003. The Joint Code of Practice for Risk Management of Tunnel
Works in the UK.
The International Tunnelling Insurance Group, 2006. A Code of Practice
for Risk Management of Tunnel Works.

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13th Australian Tunnelling Conference