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EUROTECH INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v.

CUIZON
G.R. No. 167552; April 23, 2007
Ponente: J. Chico-Nazario
FACTS:
From January to April 1995, petitioner sold to Impact Systems various products allegedly amounting to P91,338.00
pesos. Subsequently, respondents sought to buy from petitioner one unit of sludge pump valued at P250,000.00 with
respondents making a down payment of P50,000.00. When the sludge pump arrived from the United Kingdom,
petitioner refused to deliver the same to respondents without their having fully settled their indebtedness to petitioner.
Thus, on 28 June 1995, respondent EDWIN and Alberto de Jesus, general manager of petitioner, executed a Deed of
Assignment of receivables in favor of petitioner. Impact systems is owed by ERWIN Cuizon.
Despite the existence of the Deed of Assignment, respondents proceeded to collect from Toledo Power Company the
amount of P365,135.29. Alarmed by this development, petitioner made several demands upon respondents to pay
their obligations. As a result, respondents were able to make partial payments to petitioner. On 7 October 1996,
petitioner's counsel sent respondents a final demand letter wherein it was stated that as of 11 June 1996,
respondents' total obligations stood at P295,000.00 excluding interests and attorney's fees. Because of respondents'
failure to abide by said final demand letter, petitioner instituted a complaint for sum of money, damages, with
application for preliminary attachment against herein respondents
By way of special and affirmative defenses, respondent EDWIN alleged that he is not a real party in interest in this
case. According to him, he was acting as mere agent of his principal, which was the Impact Systems, in his
transaction with petitioner and the latter was very much aware of this fact.
ISSUE:
Whether the act of Edwin in signing the Deed of Assignment binds his principal Impact Systems
HELD:
Yes, the act of Edwin in signing the Deed of Assignment binds Impact Systems
The Supreme Court held that in a contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do
something in representation or on behalf of another with the latter's consent. Its purpose is to extend the personality
of the principal or the party for whom another acts and from whom he or she derives the authority to act. It is said that
the basis of agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on matters within the
scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally executed by the principal.
In this case at hand, the parties do not dispute the existence of the agency relationship between respondents
ERWIN as principal and EDWIN as agent.

Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Edwin Cuizon and Erwin Cuizon


G.R. No. 167552 April 23, 2007

FACTS:
Eurotech is engaged in the business of importation and distribution of various European industrial
equipment. It has as one of its customers Impact Systems Sales which is a sole proprietorship owned by Erwin
Cuizon. Petitioner sold to Impact Systems various products allegedly amounting to P91,338.00. Cuizons sought to
buy from Eurotech 1 unit of sludge pump valued at P250,000.00 with Cuizons making adown payment of P50,000.00.
When the sludge pump arrived from the United Kingdom, Eurotechrefused to deliver the same to Cuizons without

their having fully settled their indebtedness toEurotech. Thus, Edwin Cuizon and Alberto de Jesus, general manager
of Eurotech, executed a Deedof Assignment of receivables in favor of Eurotech.

Respondents, despite the existence of the Deed of Assignment, proceeded to collect from Toledo Power
Company the amount of P365,135.29. upon learning this,Eurotech made several demands upon Cuizons to pay their
obligations. As a result, Cuizons were able to make partial payments to Eurotech. Cuizons total obligations stood at
P295,000.00 excluding interests and attorneys fees.

Edwin Cuizon alleged that he is not a real party in interest in this case. According to him, he was acting as
mere agent of his principal, which was the Impact Systems, in his transaction with Eurotech and the latter was very
much aware of this fact.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Edwin exceeded his authority when he signed the Deed of Assignment thereby binding himself
personally to pay the obligations to Eurotech.

RULING:
No.
Edwin insists that he was a mere agent of Impact Systems which is owned by Erwin and that his status as
such is known even to Eurotech as it is alleged in the Complaint that he is being sued in his capacity as the sales
manager of the said business venture. Likewise, Edwin points to the Deed of Assignment which clearly states that he
was acting as a representative of Impact Systems in said transaction.

In a contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or
on behalf of another with the latters consent. Its purpose is to extend the personality of the principal or the party for
whom another acts and from whom he or she derives the authority to act. The basis of agency is representation, that
is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the
same legal effect as if they were personally executed by the principal.

An agent, who acts as such, is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts. There are 2 instances
when an agent becomes personally liable to a third person. The first is when he expressly binds himself to the
obligation and the second is when he exceeds his authority. In the last instance, the agent can be held liable if he
does not give the third party sufficient notice of his powers. Edwin does not fall within any of the exceptions contained
in Art. 1897.

In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a managing agent may enter into any contracts that he deems
reasonably necessary or requisite for the protection of the interests of his principal entrusted to his management.

Edwin Cuizon acted well-within his authority when he signed the Deed of Assignment. Eurotech refused to deliver the
1 unit of sludge pump unless it received, in full, the payment for Impact Systems indebtedness. Impact Systems
desperately needed the sludge pump for its business since after it paid the amount of P50,000.00 as down payment it
still persisted in negotiating with Eurotech which culminated in the execution of the Deed of Assignment of its
receivables from Toledo Power Company. The significant amount of time spent on the negotiation for the sale of the
sludge pump underscores Impact Systems perseverance to get hold of the said equipment. Edwins participation in
the Deed of Assignment was reasonably necessary or was required in order for him to protect the business of his
principal

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC.vs.PEDRO L. LINSANGAN


FACTS:
Florencia Baluyot offered Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan a lot called Garden State at the Holy Cross Memorial Park owned
by petitioner (MMPCI). According to Baluyot, a former owner of a memorial lot under Contract No. 25012 was no
longer interested in acquiring the lot and had opted to sell his rights subject to reimbursement of the amounts he
already paid. The contract was for P95,000.00. Baluyot reassured Atty. Linsangan that once reimbursement is made
to the former buyer, the contract would be transferred to him.
Atty. Linsangan agreed and gave Baluyot P35,295.00 representing the amount to be reimbursed to the original buyer
and to complete the down payment to MMPCI. Baluyot issued handwritten and typewritten receipts for these
payments. Contract No. 28660 has a listed price of P132,250.00. Atty. Linsangan objected to the new contract price,
as the same was not the amount previously agreed upon. To convince Atty. Linsangan, Baluyot executed a
document confirming that while the contract price is P132,250.00, Atty. Linsangan would pay only the original price of
P95,000.00.
Later on, Baluyot verbally advised Atty. Linsangan that Contract No. 28660 was cancelled for reasons the latter could
not explain. For the alleged failure of MMPCI and Baluyot to conform to their agreement, Atty. Linsangan filed a
Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against the former.
MMPCI alleged that Contract No. 28660 was cancelled conformably with the terms of the contract because of nonpayment of arrearages. MMPCI stated that Baluyot was not an agent but an independent contractor, and as such was
not authorized to represent MMPCI or to use its name except as to the extent expressly stated in the Agency
Manager Agreement. Moreover, MMPCI was not aware of the arrangements entered into by Atty. Linsangan and
Baluyot, as it in fact received a down payment and monthly installments as indicated in the contract.
The trial court held MMPCI and Baluyot jointly and severally liable. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a contract of agency between Baluyot and MMPCI?
2. Whether or not MMPCI should be liable for Baluyots act?
HELD:
First Issue. Yes. By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. As properly found both by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, Baluyot was authorized to solicit and remit to MMPCI offers to purchase interment

spaces obtained on forms provided by MMPCI. The terms of the offer to purchase, therefore, are contained in such
forms and, when signed by the buyer and an authorized officer of MMPCI, becomes binding on both parties.
Second Issue. No. While there is no more question as to the agency relationship between Baluyot and MMPCI, there
is no indication that MMPCI let the public, or specifically, Atty. Linsangan to believe that Baluyot had the authority to
alter the standard contracts of the company. Neither is there any showing that prior to signing Contract No. 28660,
MMPCI had any knowledge of Baluyot's commitment to Atty. Linsangan. Even assuming that Atty. Linsangan was
misled by MMPCI's actuations, he still cannot invoke the principle of estoppel, as he was clearly negligent in his
dealings with Baluyot, and could have easily determined, had he only been cautious and prudent, whether said agent
was clothed with the authority to change the terms of the principal's written contract.
To repeat, the acts of the agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal unless the latter ratifies the
same. It also bears emphasis that when the third person knows that the agent was acting beyond his power or
authority, the principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third person was aware of such limits
of authority, he is to blame and is not entitled to recover damages from the agent, unless the latter undertook to
secure the principal's ratification.

Uy v. CA
Facts:
Petitioners William Uy and Rodel Roxas are agents authorized to sell 8 parcels of land. Petitioners offered to sell the
land to NHA for a housing project. On February 14, 1989, NHA passed a resolution approving the acquisition of said
lands, and pursuant to this the parties executed Deeds of Absolute Sale. However, only 5 out of 8 lands were paid for
by NHA because of a report from DENR that the remaining area is located at an active landslide area and are
therefore not conducive for housing. On November 22, 1991, NHA issued a resolution canceling the sale of the
remaining lands and offered P1.225 million to the landowners as daos perjuicios. On March 9, 1992, petitioners filed
a complaint for damages against NHA and its general manager Robert Balao. The RTC declared the cancellation to
be justified, but awarded the amount offered by NHA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, but deleted the
award.
Issues:
(1) Whether the petitioners are real parties in interest
(2) Whether the cancellation is justified
Held:
(1) Petitioners claim that they lodged the complaint not in behalf of their principals but in their own name as agents
directly damaged by the termination of the contract. Petitioners in this case purportedly brought the action for
damages in their own name and in their own behalf. An action shall be prosecuted in the name of the party who, by
the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced. Petitioners are not parties to the contract of sale between
their principals and NHA. They are mere agents of the owners of the land subject of the sale. As agents, they only
render some service or do something in representation or on behalf of their principals. The rendering of such service
did not make them parties to the contracts of sale executed in behalf of the latter. Since a contract may be violated
only by the parties thereto as against each other, the real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or defendant, in an
action upon that contract must, generally, either be parties to said contract. Petitioners have not shown that they are
assignees of their principals to the subject contracts. While they alleged that they made advances and that they
suffered loss of commissions, they have not established any agreement granting them "the right to receive payment
and out of the proceeds to reimburse [themselves] for advances and commissions before turning the balance over to
the principal[s]."
(2) The cancellation was not a rescission under Article 1191. Rather, the cancellation was based on the negation of
the cause arising from the realization that the lands, which were the object of the sale, were not suitable for housing.
Cause is the essential reason which moves the contracting parties to enter into it. In other words, the cause is the
immediate, direct and proximate reason which justifies the creation of an obligation through the will of the contracting
parties. Cause, which is the essential reason for the contract, should be distinguished from motive, which is the
particular reason of a contracting party which does not affect the other party. Ordinarily, a party's motives for entering
into the contract do not affect the contract. However, when the motive predetermines the cause, the motive may be
regarded as the cause. In this case, it is clear, and petitioners do not dispute, that NHA would not have entered into

the contract were the lands not suitable for housing. In other words, the quality of the land was an implied condition
for the NHA to enter into the contract. On the part of the NHA, therefore, the motive was the cause for its being a
party to the sale. We hold that the NHA was justified in canceling the contract. The realization of the mistake as
regards the quality of the land resulted in the negation of the motive/cause thus rendering the contract inexistent.

Soriamont is a corporation providing services as a receiving agent for line load contractor vessels.
o Ronas is its general manager
Sprint is a corporation engaged in transport services.
o Its co-respondent Ricardo Papa (Papa) is engaged in the trucking business under the business
name Papa
)
SPRINT files COMPLAINT
Sprint filed with the RTC a complaint against Soriamont and Ronas. Sprint alleged:
a) Soriamont rented from Sprint some chassis units for the transport of container vans;
b) With authorization by Ronas, PTS and another trucker, Rebson Trucking, were able to withdraw
from the container yard of Sprint, two chassis units
c) Soriamont and Ronas failed to pay rental f ees for the subject
d) Sprint was informed by Ronas of the purported loss of the equipment
e) Despite demands, Soriamont and Ronas failed to pay the rental and to replace or return the
equipment.
Sprint wants from Soriamont:
o Some amount (about P53k) as interes t and penalties
o Actual damages (unpaid rentals + replacement of lost equipment)
o Some amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount claimed for (why 25%? Case didnt say)
o Atty fees
o Costs of the suit
SORIAMONT files COUNTERCLAIM
Admitted to the lease agreement but only on certain dates ( Oct 1993 to Jan 1994) and not anymore on
some dates (Dec
1993) as alleged in Sprints complaint
Soriamont is not a party in interest since it was PTS and Rebson Trucking that withdrew the equipment
from the container yard
SORIAMONT files THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT against PTS
rd
Filed a 3 party complaint because PTS and Rebson were the ones who withdrew the equipment
RTC:

Papa failed to answer so it was declared in default


Soriamont liable for claim of Sprint
Ronas and Papa both have no liability
Reason: Soriamont authorized PTS to withdraw the equipment

RTC awards to Sprint:


Value of the 2 chasis equipment with INTEREST at the legal rate from filing of the complaint
The unpaid rentals with INTEREST at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint
Atty fees
Rate of INTEREST increased to 12% per annum once decision becomes final and executor
CA:

Affirmed with MODIFICATION:

Rate of legal INTEREST per annum on both the value of the two chassis equipment, and on the unpaid
rentals, is 6% to be increased to 12% from finality of decision (sorry, I dont get how that modified the RTC
decision they both said 12%)

Issue: Is Soriamont liable??


Held: Yes

Ratio:
Re: Interest
Adjustment of the applicable rate of legal interest on the value of the equipment, and on the un paid
rentals is proper and with legal basis.
Under NCC 2209 when an obligation not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is breached, then
an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate
of 6% p er annum.
The monetary judgment in favor of Sprint does not involve a loan or forbearance of money; hence, the
proper imposable rate of interest is 6% percent
As in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA, the interim period from the finality of the judgment awarding a
monetary claim until payment, is deemed to be equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
Rules as explained by the Eastern Shipping case:
When an obligation is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages .
With regard to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of
interest, as well as the accrual, is imposed, as follows:

When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money:
I.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing.
The interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded.
In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default,
i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of NCC 1169 of the Civil
Code.
When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money:
An interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at
the rate of 6% per annum.
No interest on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established.
Where the demand is established, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is
made judicially or extrajudicially (NCC 1169)
BUT when such certainty cannot be reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made
The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executor:
Rate of legal interest shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
Interim period being deemed to be an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
---- Consistent with the jurisprudence, and affirmed in more recent cases, when the judgment awarding
a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest shall be 12% per annum
from such finality until its satisfaction,
o Interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent of a forbearance of credit.
o From the time the judgment becomes final until its full satisfaction, the applicable rate of legal
interest shall be 12%
Re: Evidence
Soriamont anchors its defense on its denial that it authorized PTS to withdraw the equipment from the
container yard of
Sprint
Soriamont admits that the authorization letter dated was under its letterhead, however, letter was
actually meant for and sent to Harman Foods as shipper. And Harman was the one who tasked PTS to
withdraw
SC says:
Soriamont is essentially challenging the sufficiency of the evidence that PTS withdrew the subject

equipment. In effect, it is raising questions of fact.


Only questions of law blah blah..
But given that Soriamont is precisely that the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record, SC accommodatea Soriamont by going over
the same evidence considered by the CA and RTC
The burden is on Soriamont to prove its allegation that PTS acted in any manner in excess of its
authority as agent, thus, resulting in the loss of the equipment.
BUT as the CA and the RTC found Soriamont did not adduce any evidence to prove that allegation.
The only thing proven was that Soriamont, through PTS, withdrew the two chassis units from Sprint, and
that these have never been returned to Sprint.
Petition denied.

DOMINGO v. DOMINGO42 SCRA 131


FACTS:
In a document, Vicente M. Domingo granted Gregorio Domingo, a real estate broker, the exclusive
agency to sell his lot No. 883 of Piedad Estate with an area of about 88,477 square meters at the
rate of P2.00 per square meter(or for P176,954.00) with a commission of 5% on the total price, if the
property is sold by Vicente or by anyone else during the 30-day duration of the agency or if the
property is sold by Vicente within three months from the termination of the agency to a
purchaser to whom it was submitted by Gregorio during the continuance of the agency with notice to
Vicente.
The said agency contract was in triplicate, one copy was given to Vicente, while the original and
another copywere retained by Gregorio. On June 3, 1956, Gregorio authorized the intervenor Teofilo
P.Purisima to look for a buyer, promising him one-half of the5%
commission. Thereafter, Teofilo Purisima introduced Oscar de Leon to Gregorio as a prospective
buyer.After several conferences between Gregorio and Oscar de Leon, the latter raised his offer to
P109,000.00 on June 20, 1956 , to which Vicente agreed by signing.
Upon demand of Vicente, Oscar de Leon issued to him a check in the
amount of P1,000.00 as earnest money, after which Vicente advanced to Gregorio the sum of
P300.00. Oscar deLeon confirmed his former offer to pay for the property
atP1.20 per square meter in another letter. Subsequently,Vicente asked for an additional amount
of P1,000.00 as earnest money, which Oscar de Leon promised to deliver to him.
Pursuant to his promise to Gregorio, Oscar gave him asa gift or propina the sum of One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00)for succeeding in persuading Vicente to sell his lot at P1.20per square meter or a
total in round figure of One HundredNine Thousand Pesos (P109,000.00). This gift of One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00) was not disclosed by Gregorio to Vicente. Neithera did Oscar pay Vicente the
additional amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) by way of earnest money. In the deed of sale
was not executed on August 1, 1956 as stipulated in Exhibit "C" nor on August 15,1956 as extended
by Vicente, Oscar told Gregorio that he didnot receive his money from his brother in the United
States, for which reason he was giving up the negotiation including the amount of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) given a searnest money to Vicente and the
One Thousand Pesos(P1,000.00) given to Gregorio as propina or gift.
When Oscardid not see him after several weeks, Gregorio sensedsomething fishy. So, he went to
Vicente and read a portion of Exhibit "A" marked habit "A-1" to the effect that Vicente was still

committed to pay him 5% commission, if the sale is consummated within three months after the
expiration of the 30-day period of the exclusive agency in his favor from
theexecution of the agency contract on June 2, 1956 to apurchaser brought by Gregorio to Vicente
during the said 30-day period.
Vicente grabbed the original of Exhibit "A" and tore it to pieces. Gregorio held his peace, not wanting
to antagonize Vicente further, because he had still duplicate
of Exhibit "A". From his meeting with Vicente, Gregorio proceeded to the office of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, where he discovered Exhibit "G' deed of sale executed on September 17,
1956 by Amparo Diaz, wife of Oscar deLeon, over their house and lot No. 40 Denver Street,
Cubao,Quezon City, in favor Vicente as down payment by Oscar deLeon on the purchase price of
Vicente's lot No. 883 of PiedadEstate.
Upon thus learning that Vicente sold his property to the same buyer, Oscar de Leon and his wife, he
demanded in writting payment of his commission on the sale price of One Hundred Nine Thousand
Pesos (P109,000.00), Exhibit "H". He also conferred with Oscar de Leon, who told him that Vicente
went to him and asked him to eliminate Gregorio in the transaction and that he would sell
his property to him for One Hundred Four Thousand Pesos (P104,000.0 In Vicente's replyto
Gregorio's letter, Exhibit "H", Vicente stated that Gregoriois not entitled to the 5% commission
because he sold the property not to Gregorio's buyer, Oscar de Leon, but toanother buyer, Amparo
Diaz, wife of Oscar de Leon.
The Court of Appeals found from the evidence that Exhibit "A", the exclusive agency contract, is
genuine; that Amparo Diaz, the vendee, being the wife of Oscar de Leonthe sale by Vicente of his
property is practically a sale toOscar de Leon since husband and wife have common
oridentical interests; that Gregorio and intervenor TeofiloPurisima were the efficient cause in the
consummation of the sale in favor of the spouses Oscar de Leon and Amparo Diaz;that Oscar de
Leon paid Gregorio the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as "propina" or gift and not as
additional earnest money to be given to the plaintiff, because Exhibit"66", Vicente's letter
addressed to Oscar de Leon withrespect to the additional earnest money, does not appear tohave
been answered by Oscar de Leon and therefore there isno writing or document supporting Oscar de
Leon's testimony that he paid an additional earnest money of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) to
Gregorio for delivery to Vicente, unlike the first amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) paid
byOscar de Leon to Vicente as earnest money, evidenced bythe letter Exhibit "4"; and that Vicente
did not even mentionsuch additional earnest money in his two replies Exhibits "I"and "J" to
Gregorio's letter of demand of the 5% commission.
ISSUE:(1) whether the failure on the part of Gregorio to disclose to Vicente the payment to him by
Oscar de Leon of the amountof One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as gift or "propina" forhaving
persuaded Vicente to reduce the purchase price fromP2.00 to P1.20 per square meter, so
constitutes fraud as tocause a forfeiture of his commission on the sale price.
HELD:In the case at bar, defendant-appellee GregorioDomingo as the broker, received a gift or
propina in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) from theprospective buyer Oscar de
Leon, without the knowledge andconsent of his principal, herein petitioner-appellant Vicente
Domingo. His acceptance of said substantial monetary gift corrupted his duty to serve the interests
only of his principal and undermined his loyalty to his principal, who gave himpartial advance
of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) on his commission. As a consequence, instead of exerting his
bestto persuade his prospective buyer to purchase the property on the most advantageous terms

desired by his principal, the broker, herein defendant-appellee Gregorio Domingo, succeeded in
persuading his principal to accept the counter-offer of the prospective buyer to purchase the property
at P1.20 per square meter or One Hundred Nine Thousand Pesos (P109,000.00) in round figure for
the lot of 88,477 square meters, which is very much lower the the price
of P2.00 per square meter or One Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-Four Pesos
(P176,954.00) forsaid lot originally offered by his principal. The duty embodied in Article 1891 of the
New Civil Code will not apply if the agent or broker acted only as a middle manwith the task of
merely bringing together the vendor and vendee, who themselves thereafter will negotiate on the
terms and conditions of the transaction. Neither would therule apply if the agent or broker had
informed the principal of the gift or bonus or profit he received from the purchaser
andhis principal did not object therto.
11

Herein defendant-appellee Gregorio Domingo was not merely a middleman of the petitionerappellant Vicente Domingo and the buyerOscar de Leon. He was the broker and agent of saidpetitio
ner-appellant only. And therein petitioner-appellant wasnot aware of the gift of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00)received by Gregorio Domingo from the prospective buyer;much less did he consent to
his agent's accepting such a gift. The fact that the buyer appearing in the deed of
saleis Amparo Diaz, the wife of Oscar de Leon, does notmaterially alter the situation; because the
transaction, to bevalid, must necessarily be with the consent of the husbandOscar de Leon, who is
the administrator of their conjugalassets including their house and lot at No. 40 Denver
Street,Cubao, Quezon City, which were given as part of andconstituted the
down payment on, the purchase price of herein petitioner-appellant's lot No. 883 of Piedad Estate.H
ence, both in law and in fact, it was still Oscar de Leon whowas the buyer.As a necessary
consequence of such breach of trust,defendant-appellee Gregorio Domingo must forfeit his
rightto the commission and must return the part of thecommission he received from his
principal. Teofilo Purisima, the sub-agent of Gregorio Domingo,can only recover from Gregorio
Domingo his one-half share of whatever amounts Gregorio Domingo received by virtue of the
transaction as his sub-agency contract was with GregorioDomingo alone and not with Vicente
Domingo, who was noteven aware of such sub-agency. Since
Gregorio Domingoreceived from Vicente Domingo and Oscar de Leonrespectively the amounts of
Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00)and One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) or a total of One Thousand
Three Hundred Pesos (P1,300.00), one-half of thesame, which is Six Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P650.00), should bepaid by Gregorio Domingo to Teofilo
Purisima.Because Gregorio Domingo's clearly unfoundedcomplaint caused Vicente Domingo mental
anguish andserious anxiety as well as wounded feelings, petitioner-appellant Vicente Domingo shoul
d be awarded moraldamages in the reasonable amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00)
attorney's fees in the reasonableamount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), considering thatthis
case has been pending for the last fifteen (15) yearsfrom its filing on October 3, 1956.WHEREFORE,
the judgment is hereby rendered, reversing thedecision of the Court of Appeals and directing
defendant-appellee Gregorio Domingo: (1) to pay to the heirs of VicenteDomingo the sum of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) asmoral damages and One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) asattorney's
fees; (2) to pay Teofilo Purisima the sum of SixHundred Fifty Pesos (P650.00); and (3) to pay the
costs.

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