Sin vs Sin

Sin vs. Sin

GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001
FACTS:
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen
in January 1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties
presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In
June 1995, trial court dismissed Florences petition and throughout its
trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal
Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994
stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not
actively participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain
hearings, nothing more was heard of him.
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with
the absence of the participation of the State in the proceedings.
HELD:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court
should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification
briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case
may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the
State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is
remanded for proper trial.

De Ocampo vs Florenciano
De Ocampo vs. Florenciano
107 Phil 35
FACTS:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They
begot several children who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951,
latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his
trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found
out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture
where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife
was going out with several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952,
when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they
had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act
of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention
of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested
conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal
action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in
1955.
ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the
confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code.
HELD:
Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed
adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other than such
confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48
of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a
confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is
evidence of the adultery independent of the defendants statement
agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be
granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the
evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a
judgment based exclusively on defendants confession. The petition

should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet
prescribed.

Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio
Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21,
1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as
husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when
her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their
marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with
a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for
the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others,
would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his
share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with
Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective
evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent
already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a
vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of
her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation
on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond
the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that
the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her
father, Macario Lapuz.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an

action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the
action involved property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff,
even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of
decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If
death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation;
and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic
and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her
demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any
property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a
proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the
appellant.

Gandiongco vs Penaranda
Gandionco vs Penaranda
GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987
FACTS:
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against
herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground
of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint
of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application
for the provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was
approved and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to
suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent
thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal
case for concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil
action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action
thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be
suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed
pending the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.
HELD:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were
incorrect. A civil action for legal separation on the ground of
concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal
action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce
the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and
criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such
civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with
the legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and
disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of
legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of
evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of
in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the
judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente
lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or
reduce the same.

Bugayong vs Ginez
Bugayong vs. Ginez
GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with
Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave.
Immediately after the marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong
in said municipality before he went back to duty. The couple came to
an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who later moved

in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-inlaw and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to
Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan
to study in a local college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco,
(plaintiffs sister-in-law) and some from anonymous writers, which were
not produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity
of his wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a
certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications, prompted him in
October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him
to consult with the navy legal department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife.
They met in the house of the defendants godmother. They proceeded
to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1
day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept
together in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on
the information he received but instead of answering, she merely
packed up and left which he took as a confirmation of the acts of
infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez
that may serve as a ground for dismissal of the action.
HELD:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a
ground for legal separation. A single voluntary act of marital
intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is
presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation
may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been
no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.

Pacete vs Carriaga
Pacete vs Carriaga
231 SCRA 321
FACTS:

Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband
Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal
separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of
property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete
on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete
subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August
1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he
evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an
extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly
granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set
by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the
defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court
received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15,
20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor
of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file their answer, in
declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March
17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and
held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
HELD:
The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between
parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the
plaintiff is not fabricated.
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state
attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and
of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that
marriage is more than a mere contract.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,
obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is
further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for
annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties
exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to
see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

Macadangdang vs CA
Macadangdang vs CA
GR No. 38287, October 23, 1981
FACTS:
Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio
Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for
two years and had 6 children. They started a buy and sell business
and sari-sari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune,
their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking,
transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate
etc. Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in
extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they
separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good.
When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of
her estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action. In
April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of
legal separation has effect on the legal separation.
HELD:
The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no
effect on the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued, the
finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to
appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the
liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor
terminated.
The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation
on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and
distribution conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law
on intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever
remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse.

Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the

final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family
Code provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These
legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable
incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of
determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.