G.R. No.

L-1988
February 24, 1948
JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner, vs.
COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND,
UNITED STATES ARMY, respondents.

concerning military bases, and Article XIII thereof is as

follows:

Lorenzo Sumulong and Esteban P. Garcia for petitioner.

J. A. Wolfson for respondent.

JURISDICTION

MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jesus
Miquiabas against the Commanding General PhilippineRyukyus Command, United States Army, who is alleged to
have petitioner under custody and to have appointed a
General Court-Martial to try petitioner in connection with an
offense over which the said court has no jurisdiction.
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the
United States Army in the Philippines, who has been charged
with disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging
to the United States Army, in violation of the 94th Article of
War of the United States. He has been arrested for that
reason and a General Court-Martial appointed by respondent
tried and found him guilty and sentenced him to 15 years
imprisonment. This sentence, however, is not yet final for it is
still subject to review.
It may be stated as a rule that the Philippines, being a
sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses committed
within its territory, but it may, by treaty or by agreement,
consent that the United States or any other foreign nation,
shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed
within certain portions of said territory. On March 11, 1947,
the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the
United States of America, entered into an agreement

1. The Philippines consents that the United States shall have

the right to exercise jurisdiction over the following offenses:
(a) Any offense committed by any person within any base
except where the offender and offended parties are both
Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the
United States on active duty) or the offense is against the
security of the Philippines;
(b) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member
of the armed forces of the United States in which the
offended party is also a member of the armed forces of the
United States; and
(c) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member
of the armed forces of the United States against the security
of the United States.
2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction
over all other offenses committed outside the bases by any
member of the armed forces of the United States.
3. Whenever for special reasons the United States may desire
not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraphs 1
and 6 of this Article, the officer holding the offender in
custody shall so notify the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the
city or province in which the offense has been committed
within ten days after his arrest, and in such case the
Philippines shall exercise jurisdiction.

4. Whenever for special reasons the Philippines may desire

not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraph 2
of this Article, the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or
province where the offense has been committed shall so
notify the officer holding the offender in custody within ten
days after his arrest, and in such a case the United States
shall be free to exercise jurisdiction. If any offense falling
under paragraph 2 of this article is committed by any
member of the armed forces of the United States.
(a) While engaged in the actual performance of a specific
military duty, or
(b) during a period of national emergency declared by either
Government and the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) so finds
from the evidence, he shall immediately notify the officer
holding the offender in custody that the United States is free
to exercise jurisdiction. In the event the fiscal (prosecuting
attorney) finds that the offense was not committed in the
actual performance of a specific military duty, the offender's
commanding officer shall have the right to appeal from such
finding to the Secretary of Justice within ten days from the
receipt of the decision of the fiscal and the decision of the
Secretary of Justice shall be final.
5. In all cases over which the Philippines exercises jurisdiction
the custody of the accused, pending trial and final judgment,
shall be entrusted without delay to the commanding officer of
the nearest base, who shall acknowledge in writing that such
accused has been delivered to him for custody pending trial
in a competent court of the Philippines and that he will be
held ready to appear and will be produced before said court
when required by it. The commanding officer shall be
furnished by the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) with a copy of

the information against the accused upon the filing of the

original in the competent court.
6. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, it is naturally
agreed that in time of war the United States shall have the
right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any offenses
which may be committed by members of the armed forces of
the United States in the Philippines.
7. The United States agrees that it will not grant asylum in
any of the bases to any person fleeing from the lawful
jurisdiction of the Philippines. Should such person be found in
any base, he will be surrendered on demand to the
competent authorities of the Philippines.
8. In every case in which jurisdiction over an offense is
exercised by the United States, the offended party may
institute a separate civil action against the offender in the
proper court of the Philippines to enforce the civil liability
which under the laws of the Philippines may arise from the
offense.
Under paragraph 1 (a), the General Court-Martial would have
jurisdiction over the criminal case against petitioner if the
offense had been committed within a base. Under paragraph
1 (b), if the offense had been committed outside a base, still
the General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction if the
offense had been committed by a "member of the armed
forces of the United States" there being no question that the
offended party in this case is the United States. It is not
necessary therefore, to consider whether the offense is
against "the security of the United States" under paragraph 1
(c), or whether petitioner committed it in "the actual
performance of a specific military duty" or in time of a
declared "national emergency" under paragraph 4, or
whether we are still in a state of war under paragraph 6, for

in all these instances the military jurisdiction depends also

upon whether the offender is a member of the armed forces
of the United States. We shall then determine in this case (1)
whether the offense has been committed within or without a
base, and, in the second instance, (2) whether the offender is
or is not a member of the armed forces of the United States.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding

paragraph, the Port of Manila reservation with boundaries as
of 1941 will be available for use to the United States armed
forces until such time as other arrangements can be made
for the supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two
Governments.

As to the first question, Article XXVI of the Agreement

provides that "bases are those area named in Annex A and
Annex B and such additional areas as may be acquired for
military purposes pursuant to the terms of this Agreement."
Among the areas specified in Annexes A and B, there is none
that has reference to the Port Area of Manila where the
offense has allegedly been committed. On the contrary, it
appears in Annex A that "army communications system" is
included, but with "the deletion of all stations in the Port of
Manila Area."

3. The terms of this agreement pertaining to bases shall be

applicable to temporary quarters and installations referred to
in paragraph 1 of this article while they are so occupied by
the armed forces of the United States; provided, that
offenses committed within the temporary quarters and
installations located within the present limits of the City of
Manila shall not be considered as offenses within the bases
but shall be governed by the provisions of Article XIII,
paragraphs 2 and 4, except that the election not to exercise
the jurisdiction reserved to the Philippines shall be made by
the Secretary of Justice. It is agreed that the United States
shall have full use and full control of all these quarters and
installations while they are occupied by the armed forces of
the United States, including the exercise of such measures as
may be necessary to police said quarters for the security of
the personnel and property therein.

Paragraph 2 of Article XXI is invoked by respondent. The

whole article is as follows:
TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall retain the
right to occupy temporary quarters and installations now
existing outside the bases mentioned in Annex A and Annex
B, for such reasonable time, not exceeding two years, as may
be necessary to develop adequate facilities within the bases
for the United States armed forces. If circumstances require
an extension of time, such a period will be fixed by mutual
agreement of the two Governments; but such extension shall
not apply to the existing temporary quarters and installations
within the limits of the City of Manila and shall in no case
exceed a period of three years.

The subject matter of this article, as indicated by its heading,

is "Temporary Installations." Paragraph 1 refers to temporary
quarters and installations existing outside the bases specified
in Annex A and Annex B, which may be retained by the
United States armed forces for such reasonable time as may
be necessary not exceeding two years in duration, extendible
fro not more than three years, the extension not being
applicable to existing temporary quarters and installations
within the limits of the City of Manila.
Paragraph 2, of Article XXI, refers to the Port of Manila
Reservation, which will be available for use to the United

States armed forces, also as a temporary quarters and

installations, its temporariness not being for a definite period
of time, but "until such time as other arrangements can be
made for supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the
two Governments." There is in paragraph 2 absolutely
nothing that may be construed as placing the Port of Manila
Reservation in the category of a permanent base.
Paragraph 3, of Article XXI, provides "that offenses
committed within the temporary quarters and installations
located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall
not be considered as offenses within the bases but shall be
governed by the provisions of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and
4." Therefore, the offense at bar cannot be considered as
committed within, but without, a base, since it has been
committed in the Port of Manila Area, which is not one of the
bases mentioned in Annexes A and B to the Agreement, and
is merely temporary quarters located within the present
limits of the City of Manila.
The next inquiry is whether or not the offender may be
considered as a member of the armed forces of the United
States under Article XIII, paragraph 1 (b). As above stated,
petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the
United States Army in the Philippines. Under the terms of the
Agreement, a civilian employee cannot be considered as a
member of the armed forces of the United States. Articles XI,
XVI and XVIII of the Agreement make mention of civilian
employees separately from members of the armed forces of
the United States, which is a conclusive indication that under
said Agreement armed forces do not include civilian
employees.
Respondent invokes Articles II of the Articles of War of the
United States, which enumerates, among the persons subject
to military law, persons accompanying or serving with the

armies of the United States. But this case should be decided

not under the Articles of War, but under the terms of the
Base Agreement between the United States and the
Philippines. And not because a person is subject to military
law under the Articles of War does he become, for that
reason alone, a member of the armed forces under the Base
Agreement. And even under the Articles of War, the mere
fact that a civilian employee is in the service of the United
States Army does not make him a member of the armed
forces of the United States. Otherwise, it would have been
necessary for said Article to enumerate civilian employees
separately from members of the armed forces of the United
States.
Respondent maintains that petitioner has no cause of action
because the Secretary of Justice had not notified the officer
holding the petitioner in custody whether or not the
Philippines desired to retain jurisdiction under Article XXI,
paragraph 3, of the Military Base Agreement. It is sufficient to
state in this connection that in cases like the present where
the offender is a civilian employee and not a member of the
Unites States armed forces, no waiver can be made either by
the prosecuting attorney of by the Secretary of Justice, under
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article XIII in connection with
paragraph 3 of Article XXI, of the Agreement.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the
General Court-Martial appointed by respondent has no
jurisdiction to try petitioner for the offense allegedly
committed by him and, consequently, the judgment rendered
by said court sentencing the petitioner to 15 years'
imprisonment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by
respondent without prejudice to any criminal action which
may be instituted in the proper court of the Philippines.

Let a copy of this decision be sent immediately to the

Honorable, Secretary of Justice.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and
Tuason, JJ, concur.

G.R. No. L-32485

October 22, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF

THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF
R.A. No. 6132.

The petitioner should therefore be accordingly guided by the

pronouncements in the cases of Imbong and Gonzales. 2
The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision
constitutes an ex post facto law is likewise untenable.

KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner.

An ex post facto law is one which:.
MAKASIAR, J.:.
This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas
Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized and existing nonstock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of
the land, and praying for a determination of the validity of
Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights
and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition,
petitioner avers that it has printed materials designed to
propagate its ideology and program of government, which
materials include Annex B; and that in paragraph 11 of said
petition, petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by
supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention who
will propagate its ideology.
Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns
because it quoted, only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on
the ground that it violates the due process clause, right of
association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex
post facto law.
The first three grounds were overruled by this Court when it
held that the questioned provision is a valid limitation on the
due process, freedom of expression, freedom of association,
freedom of assembly and equal protection clauses; for the
same is designed to prevent the clear and present danger of
the twin substantive evils, namely, the prostitution of
electoral process and denial of the equal protection of the
laws. Moreover, under the balancing-of-interests test, the
cleansing of the electoral process, the guarantee of equal
change for all candidates, and the independence of the
delegates who must be "beholden to no one but to God,
country and conscience," are interests that should be
accorded primacy.1

(1)
makes criminal an act done before the passage of the
law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such
an act;
(2)
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed;
(3)
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;
(4)
alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense;
(5)
assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in
effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something
which when done was lawful; and
(6)
deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.3
From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex
post facto laws, the constitutional inhibition refers only to
criminal laws which are given retroactive effect.4
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any
provision of R.A. No. 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the
penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval
of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is
nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that Secs. 8(a)

and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall apply to acts

carried out prior to its approval. On the contrary, See. 23
directs that the entire law shall be effective upon its
approval. It was approved on August 24, 1970.
WHEREFORE, the prayer of the petition is hereby denied and
paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not
unconstitutional. Without costs.

GEORGE V. BENEDICTO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 157604

Present:

- versus -

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G.

CHUA,
Respondents.

Davide, Jr., C.J.,

(Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 19, 2005

x------------------------------------------- - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition seeks to
annul the Resolution,[1] dated March 21, 2003, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73919 for grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
Petitioner George V. Benedicto is the owner of a parcel of
land with an area of 736 square meters located in Carlos Hilado
Highway, Bacolod City. He entered into a contract of lease with
private respondent Romeo G. Chua on October 15, 2000. Under the
contract, the lease was to start on November 15, 2000. The
contract also stipulated that the rent would be P7,000 monthly.
Chua immediately started constructing a hollow-block fence,
conformably with paragraph 6 of their contract, to wit:
6.
the
Lessee
may
introduce
any
improvements and additions on the land, and at the
termination of the lease, he may remove the same,
except the fence surrounding and enclosing the
property, the cost of which shall be equally divided

into twenty-four (24) months and the amount thereof

be deducted from the rent until the same shall have
been completely set-off.[2]
On November 13, 2000, Chua paid Benedicto P28,000
representing deposit for one month and advance rent for three
months. Thereafter, Chua failed to pay the rent prompting
Benedicto to send a demand letter after a fruitless amicable
settlement at the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa.
Chua did not pay. Hence, Benedicto filed a case against
Chua for unlawful detainer and damages, docketed as Civil Case
No. 26881, with the Municipal Trial Court in Bacolod City, Branch 3.
In turn, Chua filed with the same court a petition for consignation
docketed as Civil Case No. 26911.
The MTCC dismissed the consignation case for lack of
jurisdiction as the said case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The MTCC found merit in the complaint for unlawful detainer and
damages. It ordered Romeo G. Chua and all persons acting for and
under him or on his behalf, (1) to immediately vacate or surrender
possession of the leased premises to therein plaintiff; (2) to pay
plaintiff P19,500, covering the period from March 15, 2001 to
August 14, 2001, and thereafter, the additional or further amount
of P4,500 only per month until said premises was vacated and until
the P2,500 monthly credit in favor of the defendant was exhausted
reckoned from February 15, 2001 to January 14, 2003 whichever
comes first; and (3) to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000 as
attorneys fee and P5,000 for costs and other expenses.[3]
Chua appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City,
Branch 43. In its Decision,[4] dated August 30, 2002, the RTC
modified the MTCC judgment. It dismissed the case for
consignation, for lack of tender of payment and prior notice;
ordered Chua to immediately vacate or peacefully surrender
possession to Benedicto; ordered the Clerk of Court of the Municipal
Trial Court in the City of Bacolod to turn over to Benedicto P46,500
and P18,000 upon presentation of the original receipts; ordered
Benedicto to pay Chua P6,136.39 representing the remaining value
of the improvement constructed by the former, which is the
perimeter hollow block fence, and deliver to Chua P4,672.64
deposited by the latter with the aforementioned judicial authorities
in the excess of the rental of the property as computed by the
Court; and ordered Chua to pay Benedicto the P10,000, attorneys

fees and P5,000 for cost and other expenses. The RTC also denied
all other claims and counterclaims of the parties.[5]
On November 19, 2002, Chua filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for review with prayer for temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction.
Meanwhile, on November 22, 2002, in Civil Case No. 0211643, the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 43 issued a Writ of
Execution.[6]
However, in view of the aforesaid petition for review, the
Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order on December
23, 2002, enjoining the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 43, from
enforcing its Decision in Civil Case No. 02-11643.
Upon receipt of the said TRO, Presiding Judge Philadelfa B.
Pagapong-Agraviador replied in a letter dated January 2, 2003 as
follows:
Pertinent to your telegram dated December
23, 2002 received by the undersigned on the same
date, please be informed that returns were made by
Mr. Leoncio Yongque, Jr., Deputy Sheriff of this
branch, on the partial execution of the Courts
Decision
dated
August
30,
2002
in
the
aforementioned case. Attached for your ready
reference are the following annexes:
A Sheriffs return dated December 5, 2002;
B Sheriffs return dated December 16, 2002;
C Sheriffs return dated December 23, 2002.
Also
attached
is
the
undersigneds
Memorandum to the branch sheriff enjoining him
from fully implementing the Writ of Execution dated
November 22, 2002.
[Concomitant] to your resolution granting
defendants application for a Temporary Restraining
Order, there being no complete execution of the
assailed decision, undersigned undertakes that no
further execution shall be implemented until further
order from your court.[7]

On April 4, 2003, Benedicto filed with the Court of Appeals

an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Dissolve/Quash Temporary
Restraining Order[8] on the ground that the TRO had already
become moot and academic.
In his Comment[9] to the said Manifestation and Motion,
Chua replied that the writ of execution issued by the RTC had not
been fully implemented because his properties and the
improvements were still within the subject premises.
The Court of Appeals ruled on the said Manifestation and
Motion, in its assailed Resolution of March 21, 2003, as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, let the writ
of preliminary injunction be issued in this case upon
the posting of a P100,000.00 injunction bond
restraining the respondents from prohibiting the
petitioner from entering the subject premises and/or
from conducting business thereon just like before the
controversy between the parties had arisen. For this
purpose, respondent is hereby ordered to remove
anything that was placed to block the display room of
the petitioner and to remove the padlock and to open
the gate so that petitioner may resume his usual
business in the premises, all pending resolution of
the instant petition for review.
...
SO ORDERED.[10]
Clearly, the sole issue in this case is: Did the Court of
Appeals commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned writ of preliminary
injunction, despite the immediately executory character of RTC
judgments in ejectment cases?
Herein petitioner Benedicto contends that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a
preliminary injunction even if it was not prayed for.
Granting arguendo that said provisional remedy was prayed for,
Benedicto insists preliminary injunction does not lie as judgments
of the RTC against the defendant in ejectment suits are
immediately executory even pending appeal. Benedicto also argues
that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, in effect,
disposed of the main case without trial. Benedicto further points

out that the act sought to be enjoined by the preliminary injunction

was already fait accompli.
For his part, Chua counters that the present petition cannot
be resorted to without a prior motion for reconsideration to allow
public respondent Court of Appeals to correct the error imputed to
it. He also maintains that there was only partial delivery of
possession to Benedicto; hence, the acts sought to be enjoined had
not yet become fait accompli. Finally, Chua stresses that despite
the executory character of the RTC judgment against the defendant
in ejectment cases, injunctive relief may still be granted.
We find petitioners arguments without sufficient basis.
First, a preliminary injunction may be granted even if not
prayed for as long as the requisites therefor are present. More so if
it is prayed for. Second, contrary to petitioners contention, the
questioned writ of preliminary injunction did not dispose of the
main case without trial. The writ merely suspended the execution of
the RTC judgment pending appeal. It bears stressing that the main
case, subject of the petition for review, is still yet to be resolved by
the Court of Appeals. Lastly, it is evident from Judge PagapongAgraviadors letter[11] that the impugned judgment is not yet fully
executed. Thus, the acts sought to be enjoined by the assailed writ
of preliminary injunction are not yet fait accompli.
Rule 70, Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Court on Forcible
Entry and Unlawful Detainer states:
Immediate execution on appeal to Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court. The judgment of the
Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be
immediately executory, without prejudice to a further
appeal that may be taken therefrom.
This section presupposes that the defendant in a forcible
entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court and decides to appeal to a superior court. It
authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution without
prejudice to the appeal taking its due course. [12] It is our opinion
that on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ should
circumstances so require.
In the case of Amagan v. Marayag,[13] we reiterated our
pronouncement in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao [14] that the
proceedings in an ejectment case may be suspended in whatever

stage it may be found. We further drew a fine line between forcible

entry and unlawful detainer, thus:
Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer,
as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the
right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is
seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial
proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less
productive of confusion and disturbance of physical
possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience
and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of
legal possession, whether involving ownership or not,
is brought to restrain, should a petition for
preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of
any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in
order to await the final judgment in the more
substantive case involving legal possession or
ownership. It is only where there has been forcible
entry that as a matter of public policy the right to
physical possession should be immediately set at
rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the
fact that the other party might ultimately be found to
have superior claim to the premises involved thereby
to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru
force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the
courts.[15]
Patently, even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases
are immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be
granted. There need only be clear showing that there exists a right
to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be
directed violate said right.[16]
In this case, we note that the petition for review filed with
the Court of Appeals raises substantial issues meriting serious
consideration. Chuas putative right to continued possession of the
premises stands to be violated if the adverse judgment of the RTC
were to be fully executed. Hence, the complete execution of the
RTC judgment could be held in abeyance, through a writ of
preliminary injunction, until final resolution of the main controversy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The assailed Resolution, dated March 21, 2003, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73919 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING