Militarisation: Arms, Armed Actors and Camps

These notes summarise discussions held during the Protection Peer Group meeting in November 2012 and in
addition draw on two key documents: Conflict, Arms, and Militarization: The Dynamics of Darfurs IDP
Camps, (Kahn, C; 2008. Small Arms Survey, Switzerland) and UNHCRs Operational Guidelines on
maintaining the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Asylum (UNHCR; 2006)
Fleeing danger is the most common protection mechanism used by people at risk. In recognition of this,
the right to seek asylum forms the fundamental basis of Refugee Law. Although fleeing is self-protective,
most people would prefer to be able to live in their homes and on their land in peace and security.
Whether crossing national borders or displaced within their own country, the majority of displacement is
involuntary, coerced or forced.
People fleeing armed conflict, violence and abuse often find themselves living in formal or informal camps
and settlements that should be civilian spaces of refuge and safety. In armed conflict, retaining the
distinction between civilian and military objectives and between civilian populations and combatants1 is
one of the key principles of international humanitarian law.2 Under Refugee Law there is a clear duty on
host governments to ensure the civilian character of asylum and to separate combatants from refugee
populations, however this requirement should not interfere with the principle of non-refoulement (for
example, those seeking asylum must not be turned back at the border). Civilian populations in camps have
the right to access humanitarian assistance in order to ensure that their basic needs are met. Historically
Government response to risks of militarisation has often been inadequate due to lack of will or capacity or
both. UNHCR recommends a collaborative approach in recognition of limited state capacity and expertise
and, therefore, that simply lobbying Governments is not enough to bring about effective action. If the
capacity of the host government is weak or fragile, UN missions and UNHCR may support states on how to
ensure the provision of humanitarian space for civilians.
The civilian nature of refugee and IDP camps
Whilst refugee and IDP camps should be civilian and humanitarian spaces, inevitably in conflict situations
many are highly politicised, with camp populations often organising themselves around political beliefs,
affiliations and organisations. The right of civilians to freedom of expression, including to hold and express
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas to others, is enshrined under international
human rights law. Although the politicisation of a camp population may create a greater risk of
militarisation, this does not necessarily equate to a space being militarised and the distinction between
political activities within a civilian population and the militarisation of camps is complex. In highly
politicised situations, refugee and IDP camps often become strategic sites for political and economic
activity where, perceiving themselves under threat, the population has little choice but to engage in
complex allegiances and negotiations in order to achieve physical security and access to the political
process.3
Every camp has power and leadership, with formal and informal structures operating separately or in
parallel. Block leaders, gatekeepers and tribal and territorial division of camps are common features, all of
which affect humanitarian operations and are influenced or affected by both politicisation and
1

Combatant has a legal meaning under IHL restricted to members of a States armed forces, however in this discussion was used to
refer more generally to those directly participating in the hostilities including fighting, training, commanding etc.
2
Refugee Law also requires that refugee camps and settlements should be used only for accommodating civilian populations in
order to ensure the humanitarian nature of asylum (see UNHCR, page 9).

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militarisation. Minority groups may be particularly affected by these structures that can work in their
favour or, more commonly, exclude them. Women in are often excluded from leadership structures
although those related to male powerbrokers and leaders may have very influential and powerful positions,
and may effectively control food rations, access to services and aid, activities of other women (e.g.
firewood collection, participation in humanitarian activities, focus groups, etc) and even play an active
political or military role.
Unfortunately, many camps are also affected by criminality unrelated to armed actors as a result of the lack
of protection and control within camp environments. Civilian criminal activities take place in and around
most camps to varying degrees and may include petty theft, the presence and trade in small arms,
exploitation and/or trafficking of women and girls, or smuggling of goods. In response, civilians may set up
self-protection groups or local authorities may establish - and sometimes arm -and train self-defence
groups.
Whilst this paints an alarming picture of refugee and IDP camps as unsafe locations, it must be emphasised
that the majority of camp residents are people who are both very vulnerable due to their personal
circumstances and surrounding environment but also have a huge capacity and desire to ensure the
wellbeing and safety of their family and community. Camp inhabitants will often be trying to maintain a
difficult balance of ensuing the needs of their families are met with the various pressures and demands
made of them by actors with nefarious intentions.

What does militarised mean?

In these highly politicised and volatile contexts the presence of arms and armed actors alone does not
necessarily mean that a camp has become militarised, nor does a camp coming under effective military
control necessarily mean that all the inhabitants are militarised themselves. Arms and armed actors may
already be present within the society or host community (as is often the case in conflict environments) and
their level of presence may be no greater than external to the camp, or they may simply transit through as
a matter of logistical convenience. In this case, identifying a camp as militarised may be unhelpful and
may actually create greater risk for the inhabitants. However, the distinction between civilian and military
spaces can easily become blurred and it is vital to remember that the presence of armed actors will always
pose a potential risk to civilian safety including humanitarians.
Factors indicating militarisation may include:
The scale and continuity of presence of armed actors in camps
Use of camps as bases for training and/or armed attack, usually across borders
Recruitment (voluntary, coerced or forced) of men, women, boys and girls from among refugee and
IDP populations including non-combat roles eg. porters, housekeeping roles and as wives or sexual
slaves.
Use of camps as a source of revenue, through diversion of aid or taxation of civilians
Rest and recuperation of soldiers and their family members
Trafficking of small arms;
Political actions for the legitimacy of armed groups (e.g. campaigning and promotion)
Taxation and parallel structures (e.g. courts or detention facilities) set up by armed factions
Military actors or their proxies dominate or control civilian camp leadership structures

Refugees themselves are expected to abide by the laws of the host State and to refrain from activities that
are incompatible with the civilian character of asylum. The OAU Refugee Convention has an explicit
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prohibition against refugees engaging in subversive activities against any member state. It is also generally
accepted that a host State has a duty not to sponsor subversive conduct direct at the State of origin and to
exercise due diligence in preventing acts of violence.4
What are the implications of militarisation for the civilian population?
The presence of military actors and arms within camps can bring great risk to the civilian population and in
extremis can be a threat to national security and international peace and security. Potential problems
include the diversion of aid intended for civilians, increased risks of sexual exploitation and abuse,
manipulation of camp resources, the mobilisation and recruitment of civilians, including children, by armed
actors. Where armed actors are using humanitarian services such as water points provided by aid agencies,
this may result in inadequate provision for the civilian population, higher levels of risk for civilians using
those services (e.g. for women queuing alone at water points) and a perception that the aid effort is
supporting or allowing itself to be used to support one party to the conflict. In practical terms it may
sometimes be impossible to completely prevent this from happening, particularly where armed actors have
families within camps and visit them during periods of R&R. In this case, agencies should take every
measure to minimise the impact on the civilian population with limitations on service usage, segregation of
usage, agreements around behaviour and requiring that weapons are not brought into camps. These
arrangements should be only on a temporary basis whilst a more appropriate solution is identified.
The blurring of civilian and military spaces also risks that camps are perceived as having lost their protected
status as civilian objects and are thus vulnerable to military attack. A number of activities can be
undertaken in order to prevent this, including weapons amnesties or surrender processes; direct/indirect
negotiations with leaders of armed groups; initial screening of camp residents; effective camp management
and policing and security patrols. However, there have been a number of cases where national military
forces have been sent into camps to seize armed actors/arms which have resulted in threats and physical
violence towards civilians, and secondary displacement from camps With this in mind, lobbying for states
to ensure the civilian nature of camps can be fraught with difficulties and has a high risk of unintended
consequences. In addition care should be taken in negotiating with armed actors through intermediaries to
ensure that risk and security factors are taken into account and this risk is not simply transferred from the
agency to the intermediary.
Those with vested interests within and outside of camps - including political and armed actors - may
manipulate existing inter-tribal or factional tensions within camps for their own purposes. When camps are
located in strategic sites such as close to borders or near to military or internment camps, the risk of these
influences is much greater. Armed actors may use their temporary presence within camps or the
manipulation and control of camp populations as a tactic in order to leverage political gains or positioning,
by interfering with the right of the population to return or resettle by manipulating information about
return processes, eligibility, compensation, reparations, and the risks of return or resettlement elsewhere.
Forced , coerced or voluntary recruitment often takes place within camps. International Humanitarian Law
requires that refugee host states prevent recruitment on their territory. Not all arms-bearers in camps are
armed actors; frequently local civil protection or civil defence groups are created in insecure environments
either informally or sometimes with state support and provision of weapons. In some cases, very large
caches of weapons can be held by such groups. Young men in particular are most likely to join their ranks,
especially where they feel their families and communities are under threat and there are few other
alternatives such as paid employment available.
4

UNHCR, 2006 page 34

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Camp populations, in whole or part, may actively encourage and support the presence of armed actors,
who may be their own family members or friends or fighting in the name of a cause they support. In other
cases, the presence of armed groups unconnected to the population may be very threatening and
completely unacceptable to the populations.
What are the implications for humanitarian organisations?
Humanitarian organisations are civilian in their nature, staffed by civilians working to support a civilian
population. Some form of engagement must be maintained with military actors in order to secure access
and safety for their staff, operations and the populations they support. This engagement may be direct,
indirect, individual or collective. The primary impacts of militarisation on humanitarian organisations are
that it creates security risks that prevent access, puts the civilian population including national and
international aid workers at risk, and increases the possibility of aid diversion, taxation, extortion, etc. It
fundamentally affects the ability of humanitarian organisations to operate in line with humanitarian
principles and creates numerous practical challenges and risks. National staff, partner organisations and
community volunteers may be particularly at risk due to the politicisation of the aid environments and
attempts by armed actors to recruit or seek access to resources including those used by humanitarian
organisations, such as vehicles and communications equipment.
The presence of arms in a camp may increase the potential for violent escalation when disputes arise,
including incidents related to the provision of humanitarian assistance. For example, OCHA analysed 13
incidents that led to the suspension or interruption of humanitarian services in IDP camps in Darfur over a 3
month period in 2007 and found that the largest single cause of disputes which turned into security events
was aid distributions. (Kahn, 2008)

What action should be taken to ensure the civilian nature of IDP and refugee camps?
Advocacy with duty-bearers: Legally, the (host) state bears primary responsibility for taking action to
ensure the civilian nature of refugee and IDP camps. The relevant state should ensure the disarmament of
those entering its territory bearing weapons, identify and separate combatants from the refugee
population and intern them with due respect to their rights under national law, human rights law,
international humanitarian law and the rule of law, etc. However, in many cases states either lack the
capacity and skills to carry out these measures, may be unwilling to do so or may be acting as a participant
in the conflict.
In light of this, there are other ways in which humanitarian organisations and other non-state actors can
take steps to mitigate the effects of armed actors on civilian camps. Developed in the 1990s, UNHCRs
Ladder of Options outlines a range of soft and hard options, both preventative and responsive. They
include:
Ensuring camps are away from borders (min 50Km recommended) and away from conflict zones
and areas of endemic violence
Keeping camp sizes small at approximately 20k maximum
Ensuring appropriate security measures for camps and governance of camps (by-laws, awareness
of national law etc)
Working with national law enforcement authorities from the planning stage and building their
capacity (this requires national government cooperation and will not be possible in all cases)
Avoiding aid distribution through gatekeepers and leaders linked to armed groups or being coerced
or manipulated by them
Effective camp coordination, management and security
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Ongoing monitoring of armed presence and influence and negotiation through intermediaries or
collective advocacy
In cases where UNSC-mandated international military forces are present (e.g. as part of
peacekeeping operation or stabilisation mission) more robust methods may be utilised under a
Chapter VII mandate.
However this list is not exhaustive. Humanitarian agencies can take extra measures to ensure they are not
inadvertently strengthening or being seen to legitimise non-civilian actors by careful and ongoing analysis
of the context, recruitment, purchasing and logistics safeguards and measures and so on. Humanitarian
principles and what they mean operationally in a specific context should be prominently expressed,
ensuring that they do not strengthen the position of armed actors or their political and civilian
representatives (e.g. by taking them on as staff or volunteers in WASH committees etc, using them as
primary interlocutors or representatives of the camp population, etc). The use of state or non-state military
actors by humanitarian actors for security purposes should be avoided where possible5.
Labelling camps militarized on the grounds of the presence of armed actors or arms can have unintended
consequences and play into a political agenda resulting in violent disarmament or the legitimisation of a
camp as a military target. Humanitarian actors must exercise great caution in raising issues of militarisation
and make careful use of language in public and private advocacy to describe such situations, particularly
with local and national authorities. Weapons searches, for example, should ideally be carried out by civilian
law enforcement officers. Forced disarmament processes are highly risky and should be avoided, many
States prefer to use their military forces and to retain the element of surprise which limits potential to alert
camp residents in order to ensure their safety.
The success of NGOs in advocating for the non-militarisation of refugee and IDP camps will largely depend
on the commitment by authorities with the capacity to take necessary actions. In some cases the SRSG has
requested a review of a peacekeeping mandate to identify the potential for peacekeepers to support a
separation process (DRC, 2001) although this had limited effectiveness.
Humanitarian organisations including national actors will often have to interact and negotiate with
representatives of armed groups on issues such as taxation, extortion, security guarantees, aid diversion or
attempts to control logistics and employment practices of humanitarian actors. These interactions may be
more effective and less risky when done collectively, through a representative body with a common voice.
UN agencies, specifically UNHCR and OCHA or the Protection Cluster, may be the most appropriate
interlocutors and the Humanitarian Coordinator the most appropriate representative of the international
humanitarian effort. Advocacy for demilitarisation of camps inc. the voluntary surrender of weapons, and
promotion of humanitarian principles may all be elements of this negotiation and interaction. In some
cases it may be necessary to first carry out training and awareness-raising about humanitarian principles
amongst humanitarian actors themselves as part of the coordination and collective advocacy effort.
Camp governance is crucial to reducing the risks, and where necessary, impact of militarisation. This
requires significant investment in management and leadership structures, developing representatives of a
broad constituency of refugees, effective administration, security management and so forth. NGOs often
have relevant experience to develop and support such structures and in maintaining dialogue between
stakeholders.

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Washing and drying of military

uniforms

Armed actors in uniform with weapons transiting

through camps (although many armed actors may
not wear uniforms, not openly carry weapons and
may merge in with civilian population)

Armed actors diverting humanitarian aid (e.g. hijacking water trucks,

collecting up aid rations).

Armed actors in uniform regularly present in

camps

Armed actors use humanitarian services (e.g. water point)

Systematic taxing of aid recipients

Tents of young men who rotate on a regular basis

Impact on the civilian population

inc. humanitarian organisations

Security and safety risks violence

against women and girls, forced
recruitment etc

Men and boys restrict their movements or leave due to fears of forced
recruitment/forced labour or consequences of resisting (may affect women
and girls too esp. portering, catering and other support roles)

Reduced aid for civilians, esp. most

vulnerable; perception that
IDPs/refugees and/or
humanitarian orgs are supporting
one or other armed group &
possible reprisals,.

Known risks of sexual exploitation, abuse and sexual violence targeted at

women and girls (may affect men and boys too)

Take early preventative measures:

Increased criminality and harassment of civilian population in and around

camps
May undermine durable solutions for IDPs and refugees

Advocate for:
Camps away from borders (>50km)
Small camps <20k
Plan security with national
authorities
Effective camp management and
coordination, governance
structures
Early identification of potential risk
factors
Advocacy for maintenance of
civilian nature of camps, and for all
of the above

Understand who we are

working with
Apply due diligence approach
to recruitment, logistics,
purchasing & setting up
community-based structures
Analyse leadership structures
and who influences them /
power analysis

Reduced aid for civilians and

negative consequences for
those who resist taxation and
other coercive measures
Political manipulation and
large-scale systematic diversion
of aid

Military training taking

place in camps (drills,
exercises, weapon usage,
planning exercises etc)

State authorities may restrict freedom of

movement or attempt to disarm with
consequences for civilian population
May provoke cross-border attacks and/or
lead to camp being seen as a military
target

Negotiate through intermediaries, individually, collectively, through

Protection Cluster HC, HCT, Camp Management etc
Common agreement and understanding between humanitarian actors

Log and report security incidents relating

to military presence in camps

May jeopardise
international peace
and security trigger
an escalation of
conflict and threats to
national security &
international relations

Possible tensions between

refugees/IDPs and host
communities

Avoid aid distribution thru gatekeepers

Coordinate with other humanitarian
actors

Direct military actions

within or launched
from within camps

Technical vehicles,
weapons, armed actors
visible and openly residing
in camps

Systematic searches for deserters or open

recruitment (forced or voluntary)

Possible actions by humanitarian actors

Indication or signs of possible

militarisation
or armed presence

Combatants take R&R with

families in camps (out of uniform,
no weapons)

Active dialogue on humanitarian principles with a authorities and refugee /

IDP representatives

Negotiate and advocate

Carry out awareness campaigns within
camp on humanitarian principles

Actively monitor risks of

militarisation and unintended
negative consequences

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NGOs unlikely to still

be operational in
locations however
advocacy will be
scaled up significantly