The Policy and Evolution of Non-Alignmen

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The policy and evolution of nonalignment: Past and

future
Christos A. Frangonikolopoulos
a b
Assistant Professor of Politics and International Relations , The American College of

Southeastern Europe
b
Associate of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

Published online: 06 Mar 2008.
To cite this article: Christos A. Frangonikolopoulos (1995) The policy and evolution of nonalignment: Past and future,
Paradigms, 9:1, 62-85, DOI: 10.1080/13600829508443078
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13600829508443078
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Paradigms, Vol.9 No.l Summer 1995
The Policy and Evolution of Non-Alignment:

Past and Future
Downloaded by [Aristotle University of Thessaloniki] at 03:58 02 July 2014
By Christos A. Frangonikolopoulos
Following their struggles for independence, and given the concepts of

justice, freedom and equality associated with this, newly independent
countries promoted a foreign policy that was universal in outlook and
based on communication and cooperation to solve major world problems.
The Belgrade Declaration of Non-Aligned countries in 1961 stated that
"countries represented at this conference do-not wish to form a bloc and
cannot be a new bloc. They sincerely desire to cooperate with any
government which seeks to contribute to the strengthening of confidence
and peace in the world." Non-alignment arose from the need for
identification by new states entering a complex and demanding system
and as a counter ideology to the pressures of the free world and the
socialist system, and in some cases as a result
of specific situations of
stress that some of these states were facing.1
Non-alignment may thus be described as a policy stemming from the
difficult international position of post-colonial states. In trying to resolve
their internal difficulties, these states were
forced to consider some the
problems of the international community.2 Non-alignment may also be
described as a distinctive ideology of global peace, peaceful co-existence,
elimination of colonialism, economic equality and universalism through
the United Nations.3
These are definitions that many scholars may not agree with. As a
policy of "enlightened self-interest", non-alignment served to consolidate
the cohesive role of the state against colonialism, to protect the integrity
and the continued existence of the new states from former metropoles,
and to provide a diversity of opportunities for external aid, thereby
reducing external influence.4 Non-alignment was "something of an
innovation", an expedient policy aimed at maximising political benefits
by playing both Cold War blocs against each other.5 It was the direct
result of the Cold War, an incidental
factor in the game of world politics,
and a sort of power-balance policy.6
The concept of non-alignment in general and membership in the NonAligned Movement (NAM) in particular, serves mainly to reconcile the
interests of weak Third World states with an international system that
is strategically and economically stratified. This is why, despite the
contradictions evident in the foreign policies of most non-aligned
countries, Third
World countries continue to value membership in the
movement.7 Non-alignment symbolises and to a certain degree
The Policy and Evolution of Non-Alignment
63
operationalises the "solidarity of the less powerful in global affairs". This

is evidenced in the growing institutionalisation of the NAM, as well as
in the promotion of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Thus,
non-alignment
may also be defined as a non-military, but anti-colonial
alliance.8
To understand these different interpretations requires an examination
of the evolution of non-alignment. This article distinguishes between
non-alignment as a policy and as a movement. In so doing, it will set the
analysis within
the context of what may be described as old and new nonalignment.9 The article asks: To what extent has the policy of nonalignment lost its validity with the creation of the NAM?
Old Non-Alignment
Non-alignment has experienced a transformation. Initially, it was a
policy of supporting moderation in East-West relations. It has become a
movement mainly committed to international economic reform. Old nonaligned policy involved military and political disengagement from Cold
War alliances and the attempt to promote peace between the two
superpowers. In the early years of decolonisation, the universal desire
for political and economic independence combined with the exigencies of
Cold War politics to produce several conferences. Six Pan-African
Conferences were held between 1900 and 1945. Asian countries also
staged conferences in which the problems of decolonisation, land reform
and industrialisation were discussed. The Conferences were the Asian
Relations Conference held in New Delhi in 101947, and the Conference of
Asian States held in the same city in 1949. The Bandung Conference
of the Afro-Asian countries, held in April 1955, publicly and forcefully
articulated 11
the desire for independent political and economic
development.
The search for political independence was also illustrated in the
individual efforts of some countries, a notable example being India. In
the era of Gandhi and Nehru, when the Indian National Congress began
its struggle for independence, one of the major preoccupations was to
resist the exploitation of Indian resources for British imperial purposes.
This became the main basis of Congress policy during the Second World
War and ultimately led it to adopt the famous 1942 "Quit India"
resolution asking for immediate British withdrawal from India and also
sanctioning the launching of a mass struggle to bring this about.
That struggle instilled a yearning for an active role in world affairs
in the interest of peace and freedom. Addressing a press conference on
64
26 September 1946, Nehru, as a member of the interim government in

charge of foreign affairs, noted that India proposed:
... as far as possible to keep away from the power politics of groups,
aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars
and which may again lead to disasters on an even larger scale. We
believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of
freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere, and lead to
conflict and war. We are particularly interested in the emancipation
of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the
recognition
in theory and practise of equal opportunities for all
races.12
The international system in which such independence was sought was
characterised by the advent of nuclear weapons and a bi-polar
configuration of power. In these conditions, the Cold War was a threat
to the independence of new countries in two principal ways: they were
pressed to join alliances, but, more important, if the Cold War became a
nuclear war, they could not hope to escape the military, political and
economic fall-out.
The desire for independence produced a bond with non-alignment, the
substance of which could be interpreted as the aspiration to achieve
universal rights, namely respect for equality and sovereignty. The
interrelationship of Cold War politics and the emergence of newly
independent countries further accelerated this option and eventually gave
rise to the universal
conception of the problems of international peace
and security.13 By operating from a stance of non-alignment, newly
independent states hoped to reduce political tension and improve the
prospects of peace in East-West relations, so that they could get on with
their own preoccupation of decolonisation and the betterment of the
economic, social, and political well-being of their peoples. That aspect of
non-alignment was clearly emphasised by President Sukarno:
Independence means putting an end for ever to the exploitation of
nation by nation... Abiding peace means not the mere absence of war;
it means removing the sources of conflict which threaten the world
and split it into camps.... The freedom to be free means the freedom
to determine our national policies.... to conduct our political, economic
and social efforts in line with our own national concepts.... to
cooperate with all nations, to be friends with all nations, the freedom
to oppose anything which harms the rightful and just interests of any
nation... From this point of view, non-alignment is not neutrality... It
is not the sanctimonious attitude of the man who holds himself aloof
65
- "a plague on both of your houses" ... Non-alignment is an active

devotion to peace, social justice and the freedom to be free.14
Non-aligned leaders therefore advocated a policy of peaceful coexistence,
cooperation, and communication. It was not a passive but an active
foreign policy which sought solutions to major world problems.
Non-alignment was something more than just a mere noninvolvement in the Cold War. It distinguished between neutrality as a
legal concept which assumes the legality of war and the political concept
of non-alignment which claims to be anti-war and which has as its object
the prevention of war between the two blocs.15 Non-aligned countries
sought to contribute to the improvement of relations between the
superpowers. They defined non-alignment as the willingness of small
and medium states to involve themselves actively in world politics,
pursuing an independent approach toward the parties of a given dispute
and, therefore, avoiding the consequences of power politics.
The aim of non-alignment was to introduce an element of global
flexibility and to provide a supportive and bridge-building third party
framework to help the superpowers manage their conflicts without the
need to negotiate formally or bargain for advantage. Explaining the
background to the Belgrade Conference in 1961, President Nasser
declared that behind it lay the feeling that the non-aligned states were
"capable by dint of their just and unbiased outlook on the problems facing
world peace, to play a positive role in the service of that peace."16
That the non-aligned could, by their objectivity, anticipate and
perhaps prevent the outbreak of a major war and promote international
peace and security in an atmosphere of cooperation and goodwill, found
expression in the activities of non-aligned countries regarding nuclear
disarmament and the role of the United Nations. Special attention was
devoted to the issue of disarmament at the Belgrade Summit of 1961.17
Delegates approved a separate Statement on the Danger of War and the
Appeal for Peace. This was at the suggestion of Nehru and was
specifically directed at the United States and the Soviet Union, proposing
that they might, in an age of nuclear weapons and the possibility of total
destruction, "immediately suspend their recent war approaches and
preparations, take no steps that would aggravate or contribute to further
deterioration in the situation, and resume negotiations for a peaceful
settlement of any outstanding differences between them with due regard
to the principles of the United Nations Charter and continue negotiating
until both they and
the rest of the world achieve total disarmament and
enduring peace."18
The Conference participants also decided to send identical messages
to President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, indicating the concern
66
of the non-aligned countries that continuing strained East-West19 relations

contributed to a general deterioration of the global situation. In fact,
following the Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade, two Heads of
Government and two Heads of State visited each of the superpowers.
Prime Minister Nehru of India and Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana
carried their message to Moscow. President Sukarno of Indonesia and
President Keita of Mali carried the same message to Washington.
In essence, non-aligned countries were asserting that big powers
alone could not determine the course of world events and that they had
the right as members of the international community, though former
colonies and developing countries, to participate in global politics. While
"the decisions leading to war or peace at present rest with these Great
Powers", the statement declared, "the consequences affect the entire
world. All nations and people have, therefore, an abiding concern and
interest that the approaches and actions of the Great Powers should be
such as to enable mankind to move
forward to peace and prosperity and
not to the doom of extinction."20
The first joint action of non-aligned countries was a memorandum
submitted to the Disarmament Committee of the United Nations on 16
April 1962, containing recommendations to the nuclear powers regarding
a nuclear test-ban. The memorandum was an appeal to the nuclear
powers to persist in their efforts to reach an agreement banning nuclear
tests. It proved helpful in prodding the nuclear powers to sign the Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and
Underwater on 5 August 1963. In the memorandum the non-aligned
countries stressed the need to establish a system for continuing
observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political
basis. The memorandum also recommended the establishment of an
international commission to police the agreement, consisting of a limited
number of qualified experts, possibly from non-aligned countries,
entrusted with processing data from observation posts. All parties would
agree to invite the commission to visit sites on their territory to check
suspicious events. The commission would report its assessment of the
event concerned to all parties of the treaty on the basis of the
commission's report.
The Soviet Union expressed its willingness to consider the proposals
contained in the memorandum as a basis for negotiations. The United
States-and the United Kingdom accepted the memorandum as one of the
bases for negotiations. At its seventeenth session, the General Assembly
on 6 November 1962 condemned all nuclear tests, and recommended that
if the parties concerned did not reach an agreement on the cessation of
all tests by January 1963, they should enter into an immediate
67
agreement prohibiting tests in the atmosphere, underwater and outer

space.
The quintessence of non-aligned ideology on disarmament also found
expression in the Belgrade proposal of 1961 for holding a Special Session
of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The proposal was
reiterated on numerous subsequent occasions, including the Fifth
Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries,
held in Colombo in 1976. Subsequently, at the initiative of the nonaligned countries, with the widespread support from other member
states, the General Assembly at its thirty-first session on 21 December
1976, adopted a vote resolution (31/189 B), which provided for a Special
Session devoted to disarmament in May and June of 1978.
During the Special Session the non-aligned countries called for a
number of specific measures aimed at the cessation of the nuclear arms
race, the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons, and the cessation of
production of such weapons. Innovations leading to qualitative
improvements in nuclear weapons, including delivery systems, should be
stopped forthwith. The non-aligned also demanded that the production
of fissionable material for nuclear weapons should cease, and that the
nuclear weapon states should renounce the threat or use of nuclear
weapons, as well as stop the testing of nuclear weapons.21
Regarding the political and military problems of the Cold War, the
non-aligned countries insisted that the United Nations should serve as
the main body for the resolution of conflict between the major powers.
The non-aligned sought to prevent the system from being directed by one
bloc. That would explain why leading spokesmen of the non-aligned
abstained on the so-called "Uniting for Peace" Resolution in the 1950s
which indirectly would have permitted the misuse of the United Nations
collective security system by the US-dominated General Assembly. The
United Nations, it was felt, should not be an instrument of power politics,
but rather an instrument
of conciliation for solving controversial
international questions.22
Within the UN the non-aligned have on various occasions helped to
deal with crisis situations caused by Cold War politics. During the
Korean War in the early fifties, non-aligned countries introduced two
resolutions aimed to prevent the war from escalating into a broader
conflict. One recommended the creation of a committee to seek a basis
for a cease-fire. The other suggested that a conference should be held for
the peaceful settlement of disputes in the Far East in accordance with
the principles of the United Nations Charter. During the Cuban missile
crisis in 1962, non-aligned members of the Security Council tabled23a joint
draft resolution to pave the way for the UN to act as a mediator.
68
Paradigms, Vol.9 No. 1 Summer 1995
The non-aligned also offered, and continue to support, procedures for

strengthening and facilitating the functioning of the Organisation. First,
the non-aligned fully endorsed the idea of UN authorised peace-keeping
operations to give the Organisation a role in the maintenance of peace
and security. In fact, non-aligned states have been supplying the
majority of
forces, thereby constituting the backbone of these
operations.24 Second, considering their numerical majority in the UN
since the 1960s, the non-aligned also provided the incentive for the
democratisation of the organisation. By changing the disposition of forces
within the organisation they have reduced the scope for great power and
bloc domination. Pressures from the non-aligned brought about the
expansion of the Security Council irom eleven to fifteen members,
together with the still open suggestion to enlarge it to twenty-one.25
Notable contributions have also been made in the establishment of
new subsidiary organs, primarily in the sphere of decolonisation
(Committee of 24, Council of Namibia, the Special Committee for
Struggle against Apartheid, and the Committee for Palestinian rights),
and international economic relations (UNCTAD, UNTOO, UNDP).
Similarly, non-aligned countries have been largely responsible for
supplementing Charter provisions, such as the Declaration on
Colonialism (1514QCV)), the Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States
(2625CKXV)), the Definition of Aggression (3314(XXEQ), the Declaration
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States
and the Protection of their Independence (2131(XX)), and the Declaration
and Action Programme for a New International Economic Order (3002(SIVI)).
This is not to claim that the non-aligned have always successfully and
sincerely enforced the letter and spirit of the philosophy outlined above.
The national interests of non-aligned states have sometimes been at
variance, creating division and seriously limiting the global influence of
the non-aligned. Moreover, the institutionalisation of the policy into a
movement has givSn the non-aligned a quasi-bloc character. Finally, the
Third World character of the movement has been emphasised by the
commitment to economic development.
The Lack of Identity in the Non-Aligned Movement
The NAM has normally operated in the space between its ideals and the
imperatives
of the narrowly conceived national interests of its
members.26 A recurring problem for the movement has been the need
to overcome the contradiction between national interests and the
69
requirements of group solidarity.27 The failure to project non-alignment

as a coherent international doctrine can only be understood and
explained through an examination of the factors which have created it.
These are the diverse nature of the NAM, the ambiguity of membership
criteria, and the movement's failure to resolve the security problems of
non-aligned countries.
The NAM has expanded to include countries from Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. In 1992 there were 108 members, as compared to 25 in
1961. This growth has resulted in varying perceptions and expectations
of member governments regarding the concept of non-alignment and the
functioning of the movement. The African numerical majority has given
the movement a strong antitimperialistic and regional character. In this
connection, the relatively delayed process of decolonisation
in Afiica (as
compared to Asia) proved an important factor.28 The intensification of
the Cold War in the 1950's, along with the creation of military blocs,
posed a threat to newly independent Asian states which spoke in favour
of peace and the dismantling of alliances. On the other hand, despite the
decolonisation of the African continent in the 1960's, the continuing
existence of racial and colonial problems meant that African states had
to promote different priorities.
These differences in priorities became clear at the Belgrade
Conference of 1961. Although the Conference recommended the
"immediate, unconditional, and total and final abolition of colonialism"
and resolved to "make a concerted effort to end all new types of
colonialism and imperialist domination in all its forms", members did
exhibit varying views as to where the efforts of new states should be
directed. Nkrumah saw continuing great power intervention in Africa as
the greatest obstacle to the liberation of African states and suggested
that emphasis should be given on the cause of decolonisation. Nehru, on
the other hand, viewed the Cold War and the emerging nuclear threat
as
the overriding issues that all non-aligned states should aim to face.29
The increasing interest among Latin American states towards NonAlignment in the 1970s had little to do with the convictions of the newly
emerging nations of Africa and Asia. The policy of Latin American states
could be described as no more than a pragmatic
approach formulated
essentially to meet national interests.30 The flexible and broader
outlook of non-alignment in the 1970s, which shifted the emphasis from
colonialism and Cold War politics to economic problems facing the Third
World, allowed Latin American countries to be accommodated by the
NAM. The economic crisis of 1973 impinged strongly upon Latin
American countries due to their dependence on the industrial world.
Therefore, it is not surprising that at the Algiers Summit of 1973, which
70
formally promoted the concept of a NIEO, seven Latin American states

were full members and ten attended as guests or observers.
Non-Alignment also allowed Latin American states to adjust to
changes in their political systems and situations. Given the frequent
changes in leadership, one cannot talk of non-aligned states in Latin
America, only of non-aligned governments.31 For example, Argentina
joined the movement in 1973 when military rule gave way to democracy.
However, given Argentina's military governments of 1976 to 1983, the
country observed non-aligned summits under guest status, while at the
same time it promoted closer ties with the United States regarding a
South Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
Despite these differences on the definition and functioning of the
movement, the NAM has not scrutinised the entrance of applicants that
wish to become members. States that are not non-aligned, it is felt,
should be allowed to link themselves with the movement, as they
manifest an aspiration to be independent in international relations. A
distinction has to be made between subjective factors, which indicate the
desire to strive for some form of non-alignment, and objective factors,
which point to the need of some states to associate themselves with a
major power.
This approach has maximised membership at the expense of
substance. To an increasing extent any state that claims to be
independent will become a member of the movement. The Philippines
became a member in 1979, on the assurance of intent to terminate the
presence of US bases in 1991. Rumania's relative freedom of manoeuvre
in foreign policy as a member of the Warsaw Pact also ensured its
membership in 1979. Pakistan's acceptance in 1979, given the
disintegration of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), is also a case
in point.
Apart from some indiscriminate admissions to the movement, the
ambiguity of the NAM's membership criteria has also allowed for
increasing political and military links with the major powers. Three of
the five criteria for membership were laid down at the first non-aligned
gathering at the Cairo Preparatory Meeting of Foreign Ministers in June
1961. These required that only states which were not members of a
multilateral military alliance concluded in the context
of great power
conflicts were eligible for invitation to the Summit.33 However, the
criteria failed to distinguish between military alliances and arrangements
made within the context of great power rivalry and those
forged for the
sake of individual security and reasons of self-defence.34 As a result,
India, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria concluded military aid agreements with one
of the superpowers. Cyprus, Ethiopia, and Libya also permitted the
installation of military facilities within their territory. Similarly,
71
Malaysia, when a member of the Multilateral Five Power Defence

Arrangement with Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore was
also deemed eligible for membership. On the whole, defensive treaties
should not cause much of a problem. However, any agreement, even if
defensive in nature, is likely to increase reliance on a major power. That
was most clearly witnessed in the Havana Summit of 1979, when Cuba
unsuccessfully tried to promote
the thesis that the Soviet Union was the
movement's natural ally.35
The diverse character of the non-aligned is also illustrated by the
increasing difficulty of the movement to achieve
consensus, the principle
on which decisions have been made.36 An increasing number of
reservations have been made, and the substance of the decisions taken
by consensus has been weak. For example, the debate over which
government should represent Kampuchea in the NAM following the
intervention of Vietnam, produced a consensus decision to keep the seat
vacant. Thirty speakers favoured the seating of the Peoples' Republic
and thirty-one the seating of Democratic Kampuchea.
Decisions such as these prevent the movement from offering solutions
to significant problems. This becomes clear in view of the failure of the
movement to resolve the security problems of member countries (Angola,
Afghanistan), as well as in the increasing conflict among non-aligned
countries (Vietnam-Kampuchea, Iran-Iraq, Iraq-Kuwait). The Gulf War
of 1991 is a good case in point. Following the outbreak of the war
against Iraq, the Yugoslavs convened a meeting in February in Belgrade
of sixteen Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned countries. It was more than
three weeks after the bombing started before the ministers met and it
was an ad hoc group rather than a meeting of the Bureau or the full
membership. The resulting efforts of a mission composed of the Foreign
Ministers of Cuba, India, Iran, and Yugoslavia to visit Baghdad and
initiate a peace process were aborted by the start of the war. While
during the period of sanctions and diplomatic pressure against Iraq, the
non-aligned had unambiguously asserted Kuwait's right to independence,
the Accra Conference of Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers in September
1991 avoided taking any explicit position on the war against Iraq. Unity
was maintained by asserting that had the "Security Council applied the
same standards of international legitimacy as they
did in the Gulf War,
the Palestine question could have been resolved."37
Throughout Africa and to a lesser extent in Asia, threats of secession
and strong claims to redraw frontiers have been of critical concern to the
NAM (Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya, India-Pakistan, Chad-Libya, GuineaVenezuela). Ethnic conflict, in many ways linked to the artificiality of
boundaries created by the major powers before and after the Second
World War, has led to demands for self-determination in the form of
72
regional autonomy (Sikh community in India) or even independent

statehood (Bangladesh, Tamils in Sri Lanka, and nationalities in
Yugoslavia).
. There have also been inter-state conflicts among non-aligned
countries to stabilise the distribution of local and regional power.38 An
example is India's intervention in Bangladesh in 1971 to redefine its
relationship with Pakistan. Cuba's presence in Angola and Vietnam's
occupation of Kampuchea also exemplify the functioning at regional or
global level
of a balance of power, sphere of influence, or regional alliance
system.39
The domestic dimension of security is also an important factor in
explaining conflict among non-aligned countries. Most non-aligned
countries are ruled by regimes which tend to be unjust in their political,
economic, and social policies. This is a source of considerable insecurity
within the movement, as conflict between the non-aligned countries has
a close correlation with domestic political instability. Non-aligned
countries have produced and purchased arms to a significant extent.40
They often also turn to the major powers for support; this undermines
their autonomy and allows for constant volatility in their relations with
the major powers. Alignment of some sort has given rise to regional
conflicts. Zaire's dependence on Western aid prompted the French and
Belgian intervention in the Zhaba province in 1978. Security assistance
offered by the major powers also creates a disincentive for Third World
countries to solve their conflicts via the instrumentality of the NAM.41
A case in point was when Kuwait was allowed to reflag its tankers with
United States flags in 1987.
Despite these problems, the movement has as yet no standing
machinery either to contain or to solve to conflicts among non-aligned
countries. At its inception, the movement engaged mainly in the struggle
for decolonisation and the promotion of world peace; it considered
conflicts among non-aligned countries to be secondary. It was only
stressed that disputes would be resolved exclusively by peaceful means;
this prevented the establishment of any collective organs for the
settlement or resolution of any intra-movement conflicts. Some have
advocated such machinery,42 but there is a lack of political will to
implement it. This indicates that the problem is not one of merely
setting up a conflict resolution mechanism, but of how to ensure political
commitment for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the need to
refrain from the threat or use of force.43
73
The growing mstitutionalisation and transitional character of

Non-Alignment
Considerable progress has been achieved in the establishment of various
institutional mechanisms
through which the movement has acquired a
more formal character.44 The principal organ of the NAM is the
Conference of Heads of State or Government, which has, since 1970,
convened at three year intervals. The leader of the country hosting the
Summit becomes the movement's President in Office and is entrusted
with coordinating its activities. The presiding country, in the absence of
a secretariat, also fulfils all necessary technical functions. Summit
Conferences are prepared and preceded by Conferences of Foreign
Ministers of Non-Aligned countries. They meet roughly midway between
Summit Conferences, reviewing prevailing trends in the international
system, making recommendations for the forthcoming Summit and
assessing the implementation of decisions or resolutions of the previous
summit.
The main executive organ of the movement is represented in the
activities of the Coordinating Bureau. Established in 1973, the Bureau
is entrusted with coordinating and implementing the joint activities of
the movement arising out of ministerial, Summit, and UN meetings. It
meets once a year at the level of Foreign Ministers, and on a continuing
basis at the level of permanent representatives of non-aligned countries
at the UN. A fourth institutional structure involves the Meetings of the
Group of Non-Aligned Countries in the United Nations. These meetings
are attended by Foreign Ministers and are devoted primarily to
preparations for the forthcoming General Assembly Session and the
elaboration of a joint approach of the non-aligned in that session.
Initially, non-alignment existed in an ad hoc and "individualistically
self-prescribed sense".45 India, Yugoslavia and Egypt played pioneering
roles in defining their own countries' foreign policies as that of nonalignment, which other countries were to regard as exemplary. After the
first Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade in 1961, the non-aligned
movement did not have a defined institutional structure. This was
illustrated in the irregularity of the first three summits: Belgrade in
1961, Cairo in 1964 and Lusaka in 1970. However, this flexibility and
informality could not be continued into the 1970s; disunity and conflict
among non-aligned countries in the 1960s could only be overcome by
some form of mstitutionalisation.
Divisions arose over whether to hold another Afro-Asian Conference
similar to that of Bandung in 1955. Proposed by Sukarno, it was opposed
by Tito, who did not wish to be excluded. India, considering its defeat in
the 1962 war with China, objected to Chinese participation. Indian
74
efforts to counterbalance or reduce Chinese influence obtained a

consensus that the Soviet Union should also be invited. The end result
was a decision not to go ahead with another Afro-Asian meeting.
Non-aligned countries were also beset by a series of internal and
external difficulties. The US landed marines in the Dominican Republic
in 1965 and intensified its efforts to defeat the Vietnamese with an air
war in 1966. Portugal became more repressive, stepping up its efforts to
retain its African colonies. In June 1967, in a surprise attack against
Egypt, Syria and Jordan, Israel occupied the Sinai, Gaza, Western
Jordan, Jerusalem, and Syrian border areas. Elsewhere, leading nonaligned leaders were toppled, notably Sukarno of Indonesia and Nkrumah
of Ghana - both forcibly displaced in .1966.
In this period of subdued activity, Yugoslavia took the initiative in
1969 and pressed for a Non-Aligned Conference in 1970. At the Lusaka
conference in 1970, participants pressed for some form of institutionalisation. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda noted that
a call for action is not enough unless there exists adequate machinery
to carry it out. Perhaps this is one factor to which not much
attention was given in the past.... It is for this reason that we
genuinely need the machinery for maintaining contact among us to
ensure continuity in the development of the non-aligned movement
and the implementation of our decisions.*6
It seems that institutionalisation is not a panacea to the problems
facing the non-aligned, but an unintended response to the increasing
membership of the movement and its lack of cohesion. While significant
strides have been made in institutionalisation, it also remains a
continuing process. At the Tenth Conference of the Heads of State or
Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Jakarta in September
1992, suggestions were put forward regarding the establishment of a
back-up committee and ad hoc groups for the Coordinating Bureau at the
United Nations, and of a Joint Coordinating Committee with appropriate
guidelines to facilitate
the exchange of views between the non-aligned
and the Group of 77.47
These suggestions indicate that the non-aligned countries seem to be
in a dilemma. If they continue to seek more effective cooperation among
themselves they will have to resort to increasing institutionalisation of
the movement. If, on the other hand, they let the present trends of
gradual and random institutionalisation continue they might end up
creating a third bloc of countries, the non-aligned bloc.
The movement has sought to bring a seemingly non-aligned approach
to bear upon the problems of particular concern only to some non-aligned
75
states, as, for example, the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a result nonalignment has lost its universal character. Moreover, due to the political
and ideological differences of non-aligned countries, the movement has
sought unity by emphasising a regional perspective as against a global
one in dealing with international problems. Regional sections are
included in Summit declarations. References are made to particular
countries. One only has to examine some radical views expressed in nonaligned declarations to understand the emphasis given to regional
perspectives. South Africa's behaviour towards Angola was seen as an
"act of aggression against the movement of non-aligned countries".
Regarding the Palestinian issue, the movement has stated that it
"condemned any agreement or treaty which violates or impinges the
rights of the Arab nations
and the Palestine people as recognised by the
non-aligned movement."48
This tendency encourages the institutionalisation and the promotion
of particular group interests within the movement. That this is a real
possibility was clearly demonstrated at the Havana Summit of 1979. On
that occasion, the majority of Arab states demanded the exclusion of
Egypt from the movement because it had signed the Camp David
Accords. The Accords were seen as a violation of non-aligned principles.
Evidently, these states assumed that the non-aligned movement was, or
that it should be, a rigid group in which there was no scope for individual
action.
The movement has also sought a common and collective strategy
through the promotion of a NIEO. The demand for a NIEO, it is felt, is
a logical extension of earlier demands for political self-determination.
The promotion of NIEO can also be explained as the result of certain
developments in the international system in the 1960s. With detente
between the superpowers and the emergence of China as an important
world power, it became increasingly difficult for the non-aligned to
exercise their facilitating role. This role was also undermined by conflict
between non-aligned countries (India-Pakistan, Egypt-Israel). In fact,
this situation served as an additional sign for the reorientation of their
line of action, as newly independent countries could no longer49only blame
the blocs or the Cold War for the insecurity of small states.
The Lusaka Summit provided the initial indications of the direction
that the movement was to take in the 1970s. The declaration on NonAlignment and Economic Progress was the first to insist that the "poverty
of the developing nations and their economic dependence ... constitute a
structural weakness in the present world economic system", and that the
"persistence of an inequitable world economic order inherited from the
colonial past...
poses insurmountable difficulties in breaking the bondage
of poverty."50 Following the Summit the movement expanded and
76
actively promoted the idea of self-reliance. In the framework of an Action

Programme for Economic Cooperation among developing countries, four
areas of activity that required more cooperation were identified: trade,
industry, and transport; technology and technical assistance; financial
and monetary cooperation; and international cooperation. The Algiers
Summit of 1973 authorised the establishment of an Information Centre
for Transnational Enterprises, the establishment of a Solidarity Fund,
and the promotion of a conference on raw materials and development.
In 1974, following the initiative of the then non-aligned President, the
Sixth Special Session of the UN was convened to discuss development
issues. The Declaration and Action Programme for a NIEO was agreed
It called for action to "correct inequalities, and redress existing injustices,
and make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the
developed and the developing countries".51 The NAM called for
negotiations between the North and the South to work towards greater
economic equality, the basic demands of which can be summarised as
follows: the creation of new commodity agreements to assure just prices,
indexation, sovereignty over natural resources, the transfer of technology,
and greater control over the two major types of international
private
organisations, the transnational corporations and banks.52
The NAM also embarked upon an ambitious programme of economic
cooperation involving the creation of an Information Centre and the
establishment of a Special Fund for the financing of buffer stocks of raw
materials and primary products exported by the developing countries. It
also considered the establishment of a Council of Associations of
Developing Countries, Producers, and Exporters of Raw Materials and
the creation of a non-aligned Solidarity Fund.
Such efforts to reorganise the international economic system involve
regular and practical coordination activities which reinforce
institutionalised cooperation among non-aligned countries. This is clear
at two levels: in the creation of the South Commission and the South
Centre, and in the decision to establish a Summit Level Group of
Developing Countries.
The South Commission adopted its terms of reference in 1988. In
brief, these consisted of: undertaking an analysis of national development
experiences in the South and elaborating an integrated perspective of the
future; evaluating the global environment to assess its implications for
the development prospects of the South; making an assessment of SouthSouth cooperation and encouraging collective self-reliance in order to
widen options for development strategies; carrying out an assessment of
South-North relations to determine how the voice of the South can be
strengthened and its role enhanced in the search for, and the
implementation of, greater equity in a new world order.
77
The Commission functioned as an independent body with its members

serving in their personal capacities. Its term was set for three years and
its work was financed by contributions from the developing countries. Its
Secretariat established in Geneva, the Commission held extensive
consultations with governments, international organisations, and
individuals. It established working groups to look into specific areas and
asked experts from both the South and the North to prepare papers for
its use. In different countries it held ten full meetings of Commission
members, at which the papers were considered.
In the course of its three years of operation, the Commission issued
separate statements on two pressing issues: external debt and the
Uruguay round of the GATT trade negotiations. In August 1990 it
released its report, "The Challenge to the South" in which it set out its
findings and recommendations. The report stressed how developing
countries could gain strength - and bargaining power - through mutual
cooperation. Describing how the world arrangements for trade, finance,
and technology handicap the South, it urged the South to act in solidarity
in the multitude of North-South negotiations.
Although the life of the Commission ended on 31 October 1990, the
members resolved to entrust their Chairman, Julius Nyerere, with the
task of guiding and energising the initial phases of this follow-up work.
This, it was felt, should consist of activities to disseminate the Report
and its principal messages, to mobilise support for the Report's
recommendations throughout the South, and to initiate specific activities
to implement or further elaborate different recommendations from the
Report.
To assist the Chairman and members in this task, the Commission
resolved to set up the South Centre. The Centre consists of offices in
Dar-es-Salaam and Geneva; both offices have small teams of professional
and support staff. In addition, it was also envisaged that an Advisory
Committee, composed of noted individuals from the South and including
some Commissioners, would be formed to assist the Chairman, and to
guide the work of the Centre.
The South Centre started its operations on 1 November, 1990. It is
engaged in efforts to ensure the wide and effective distribution of copies
of the Report, to encourage and assist other organisations to hold
national, regional, and interregional seminars to discuss the Report, to
build and expand contacts with non-governmental organisations, religious
groups, and other institutions, to promote programmes for South-South
student exchange, and to convene expert groups or commission papers on
such issues as the reform of the United Nations, the environment and
development, food security, or any other topics which might have a vital
bearing oi\ the development prospects of the South.53
78
The decision to establish a Summit Level Group of Developing

Countries was announced at the conclusion of the Non-Aligned Summit
Meeting in Belgrade, in September 1989. It was established in the belief
that there was (and is) considerable potential for greater and mutually
beneficial cooperation among developing countries with a view to
enlarging collective self-reliance in an increasingly interdependent world.
Furthermore, it was agreed that greater South-South cooperation would
supplement and complement domestic programmes for national
development and economic progress. It was also agreed that such
cooperation would lend greater cohesion and credibility to developing
countries in their efforts to pursue a more positive and productive NorthSouth dialogue.
'Membership of the Group, also referred to as the Group of Fifteen,
includes both non-aligned and other developing countries. The Group
held its first Heads of State Summit Level Meeting in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia from 1-3 June, 1990. The Second Summit Meeting was held in
Caracas, Venezuela from 27-29 November 1991. The Third Summit
Meeting was held in Dakar, Senegal in November 1992.
The activities of the Group include the implementation of several
bilateral payments arrangements for mutual trade and the first steps
towards a multilateral payments arrangement. Meeting in 1991, the
leaders of the Group also recommended the establishment of a South
Investment, Trade, and Technology Data Exchange Centre (SITTDEC)
which shall have the following purpose and functions: to provide
information services and make available relevant information on
technology, investment, and trade opportunities to member countries,
governments, educational and research institutes, private enterprises and
individuals; to evolve a set of standards and procedures for the
acquisition, processing and dissemination of information; to advise on the
establishment of their respective databases; to establish a central
information database and information networks; to provide negotiated
access to relevant database services of governments, non-governmental
organisations, and intergovernmental organisations of other countries; to
encourage the development and the use of information systems for
investment, trade and technology exchange between member countries
of SITTDEC; and to provide consultancy services to member countries.
On the invitation of the Venezuelan government, the first meeting of
businessmen of the Group took place in Caracas on 27 and 28 November
1991. The participants agreed to support the initiatives taken by the
Group. They also decided that an Economic Business Council, with
membership drawn from members of private and public sectors, should
be established in each Group country. These councils should promote
interaction among economic actors in the private and public sectors in
79
member countries. It was also agreed to establish a Group Business

Permanent Secretariat to coordinate activities, and implement decisions
taken at meetings of economic operators. The Business and Investment
Forum is to be established on a permanent basis. Meeting annually at
the time of the Summit, it will be preceded by a preparatory
meeting to
be convened by business organisations of the host country.54
Finally, it is important to note that the economic activities of the
NAM have not only increased the Third World character of the nonaligned institutionally, but politically as well. The commitment to the
reorganisation of the international economic system has reduced the
movement's prestige in the developed world. A US study by the Agency
for International Development in 1989 declared that after spending
billions of US 55
dollars, development aid to the Third World never achieved
its objectives. When considering the high level of political instability
in most non-aligned countries, scholars and practitioners of the developed
countries have viewed the promotion of a NIEO not as a call upon the
developed world to improve the position of underdeveloped countries, but
as an effort on the part of the South to reduce vulnerability and
weakness within their own systems. The South suffers from an
enormous gap in power capability at the international level and from
social rigidity and political instability at the domestic level.56 It is also
felt that the condition of poverty in the South is of its own making.57
Without the cooperation of all segments 58of the population South-South
cooperation is also not likely to increase.
The Non-Aligned in the "New World Order": The Need for a New
Strategy
With the end of the Cold War, there was no reason to suppose that the
non-aligned movement would disband. The Foreign Ministers' meeting
at Nicosia in September 1988 was attended by 93 out of the then 101
members of the movement. The Political Committee gave an unexpected
amount of time to considering proposals to adapt the movement to the
changed international climate. This new thinking was reflected in the
production of the short Nicosia Declaration covering the main issues
which was designed to make59 the Movement more understandable to
interested outside observers. At the Belgrade Summit of 1989, far
from seeing themselves as being out of business, the non-aligned saw the
new climate as a triumphant vindication of their ideology of peaceful
coexistence. They also hoped that the end of the Cold War in Europe
could be used to help the rest of the world, and declared that they were
ready to contribute actively and constructively to the ongoing efforts for
80
solving regional and global problems in accordance with the

principles of
the United Nations and the objectives of non-alignment.60
Yet the end of the Cold War created not only an opportunity, but also
a threatening situation. "We need to find our place in the international
order", Ghana's leader, Jerry Rawlings, stressed as he opened a major
political gathering of the non-aligned in Accra, at a Conference of Foreign
Ministers in September 1991.61 With the emerging tendency towards
a unipolar world and the focus on Europe, scenarios for the future range
from the marginalisation of the non-aligned in global affairs62 to the
view that the end of the East-West divide means that the world is now
fully bisected along North-South lines. Cooperation between the
superpowers may reduce the immediate fear'of a nuclear conflagration,
but it does nothing to alleviate the extreme poverty in much of the Third
World. Moreover, it is stressed that it is highly unlikely that money
which would have gone into building nuclear forces will now go into
official development assistance to Third World countries. It is more
likely that money will be used to bolster developed industrialised
economies which will then compete more actively with the Third
World.63 As a result, proposals to merge the non-aligned
with the
Group of 77, the forum for 128 developing countries64, or to change the
name to the "Movement of the Third World" have been discussed as
alternatives that might propel the membership towards new activities.65
The NAM, it is also felt, must become a lobby capable of promoting the
interests of the Third World. If the world is no longer polarised between
East 66and West, the polarisation between rich and poor is sharper than
ever.
This scenario could represent future developments. But it
underestimates the validity of non-alignment as a policy. Non-alignment
is not only limited to the historical context in which it was first pursued,
that is the Cold War and decolonisation. Issues previously overshadowed
by East-West confrontation are coming to the forefront of the global
agenda, which encompasses ethnic, economic, ecological, and
humanitarian security.
During the Tenth Conference in Jakarta, the leaders of the nonaligned pledged to play a leading role in the revitalisation, restructuring
and democratisation of the post-bipolar world. In a message entitled "A
call for collective action and the democratisation of international
relations", the non-aligned agreed that the collapse of the bipolar system
presented unprecedented possibilities as well as challenges for
cooperation among nations.
"Interdependence, integration and
globalisation of the world are among the new realities", they declared; the
new era in international relations, they stressed, has renewed hopes for
building a new and equitable international order, for stable peace and
81
common security.67 United Nations reform was one of the main issues
discussed. The non-aligned called for a review of the veto and the
extension of the Security Council membership as part of the
democratisation of the United Nations. They also underlined the need
for a balanced relationship between the General Assembly, Security
Council and the Secretary-General. With reference to disarmament the
non-aligned called for the consideration of regional confidence-building
measures and the establishment of a multilateral verification system
under UN auspices, suggesting as well that a non-aligned candidate
should chair the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Last,
but not least, they stressed that the lasting solution to global
environmental problems lay in sustainable development and called for a
new global partnership including the provision of new financial resources
to developing countries
and adequate access for them to environmentally
sound technology.68
These objectives should provide the test case for the future activities
of the non-aligned. Developments in global politics which followed the
end of the Cold War offer a unique opportunity to the non-aligned to
carve out a new strategy. Making effective progress in addressing global
problems highlights the relevance for new and flexible initiatives, as well
as the need for a non-aligned policy input and the creation of the
conditions necessary for developing joint strategies in dealing with global
issues.
Bearing that in mind, the policy of non-alignment should be separated
firom the NAM, particularly given the vicissitudes of the latter. The
experience of the movement has indicated that future non-aligned
initiatives on global problems should not be heterogenous. Rather, the
emphasis should be put on flexibility and commitment. To facilitate a
degree of coherence and responsibility among them, initiatives should not
include many Heads of State or Government and should not expand to
include the participation of other leaders. The leaders involved in the
initiatives should concentrate their energies and avoid concerning
themselves with other immediately related issues. Finally, the initiatives
should operate within informal and non-permanent mechanisms
established to ensure contact between the leaders involved and their
personal representatives, thus operating outside the frameworks of their
bureaucracies and the agencies of inter-governmental relationships.
Future initiatives of the non-aligned should be supportive and nondirective. This could find expression in the consistent and full support
for negotiations on the easing of ethnic tensions or nuclear disarmament.
In addition, by providing non-directive third party services such as the
means of communication (letters and messages) and good offices for
82 Paradigms, Vol.9 No.l Summer 1995

supervising agreements (verification and on-site inspection), the nonaligned could also be providing extra building blocks.
Future initiatives should also be based on the assumption that any
actor - whether it is a governmental or non-governmental organisation,
a group of experts, or parliamentarians - willing to work for the same
policy aims, should be accepted as an equal participant in a working
coalition that takes all political methods and international settings as its
field of operation. The non-aligned, if willing to operate within this
framework, will in many respects differ from the way states customarily
deal with global problems. They will clearly point to the differences of
the institutional and network approaches. States that have worked for
global problems have operated within institutions in which states are the
only accepted actors, such as the United Nations, the Conference of
Disarmament and the Non-Aligned Summits. Usually, it has not been
normal practice to cooperate formally with non-govemmental
organisations, scientists, or the mass media, or lobby in other political
settings. This will not only broaden and diversify the range of
participants, but will also provide a setting in which non-aligned
initiatives could try out new ideas and test policies outside the burdening
formalities of conventional state-centric institutions.
This is not a naive objective, but a logical attempt by which the
narrow perspective of state dialogue could be extended to include others
whose concern is no less demanding of recognition. Global problems are
a matter of common security. This is not a competing or opposing
approach. It implies that security and peace are compatible, mutually
supportive and interdependent. The need is to move away from the
process of confrontation and competition, to that of a supportive and
cooperative approach for facilitating solutions to global problems.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Peter Willets, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance,
(London: Francis Pinter, 1978), p. 29.
See Leo Mates, Non-Alignment: Theory and Current Policy, (Belgrade: Institute of
International and Economic Affairs, 1972), pp. 102-03.
Cecil V. Crabb and K. Babaa, "Non-Alignment as a Diplomatic and Ideological Credo",
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 362, 1965, pp.
6-17.
Lawrence W. Martin (ed.), Neutralism and Non-Alignment, (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1963), p. xii.
F. S. Good, "Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism", in Martin (ed), Neutralism,
note 4, p. 11.
6.
83
Robert L. Rothstein, "Alignment, Non-Alignment and Small Powers: 1945-1965",

International Organisation, vol. 20, no. 3, 1966. See also A. P. Rana, The Imperatives
of Non-Alignment, (New Delhi: The Macmillan Company of India, 1976).
7. Mohammed Ayoob, "The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or
Growing Pains ?", International Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 1, (1989), p. 74.
8. Willits, "The NAM ...", note 1., pp. 225-27.
9. Assibi H. Asobie, "Non-Alignment: The Problems of a Political Concept in a Changing
International System", Non-Aligned World, vol. 2, no. 4, 1984, pp. 493-519.
10. Bojina Tadic, "Non-Alignment: A Conceptual and Historical Survey", Paper presented
at the Conference on Non-Alignroent, Novisad, Yugoslavia, 16-18 January 1969, p. 14.
11. K. P. Kapunkaran, Outside the Contest, (New Delhi: Peoples' Publishing House, 1963),
pp. 48-49.
12. Quoted in Bimla Prassad, "The Evolution of Non-Alignment", India Quarterly, vol. 34,
no. 3, 1983, p. 300.
13. Vlado Benko, "Non-Alignment and the Problems of Peace on a General World Scale",
in Non-Alignment in the Eighties, (Belgrade: Institute of International Affairs and
Economics, 1982), p. 53.
14. Quoted in Non-Aligned: The Conference of Heads of State or Government of
Non-Aligned
Countries,
Belgrade,
September
1-6, 1961,
(Beograd:
Publicisticko-Izdavaski Zavod Jugoslavia, 1961), pp. 26-27.
15. Baghat Korany, Social Change, Charisma and International Behaviour: Towards a
Theory of Foreign Policy Making in the Third World, (Geneva: A. W. Sijthoff-Leiden,
Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1976), p. 19.
16. Quoted in Non-Aligned, note 13, pp. 43-44.
17. The superpower Summit of May 1960 had broken down because of the shooting down
of a US U-2 espionage aircraft by the Soviet Union. The crisis over the Congo had
developed into a Cold War issue, and Cuba had also become a bone of contention
between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the height of the Belgrade
Conference, the Soviet Union broke a tacit agreement by resuming weapons tests in the
atmosphere, which was followed some days later by a decision of the Kennedy
administration to resume underground testing. See Lars Nord, Non-Alignment and
Socialism: Yugoslav Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice, (Stockholm: Roben and
Sjognen, 1974), pp. 95-105.
18. Quoted in Non-Aligned, note 14, p. 252.
19. Ibid., pp. 264-265.
20. Quoted in ibid., p. 252.
21. K. P. Misra, "Ideological Bases of Non-Alignment", in Hans Kochler (ed.), The Principles
of Non-Alignment (Vienna: International Progress Organisation, 1982), p. 67.
22. Leo Mates, "Yugoslavia and the United Nations", A Report to the Second Institute on
the United Nations, August 1965, under the auspices of the Syracuse University, pp.
13-16.
23. See Miljan Komatina, "Policy and Movement of Non-Alignment in the United Nations",
in Non-Alignment in the Eighties, note 13, p. 109.
24. See M. S. Rajan, Studies on Non-Alignment and the Non-Aligned Movement (New Delhi:
ABC Publishing House, 1986).
25. See Richard L. Jackson, "The Role of the Non-Aligned States in the United Nations
Security Council", Non-Aligned World, vol. 1, no. 4, 1983, pp. 464-483.
26. See Satish S. Kumar, "Non-Alignment, International Goals and National Interests",
Asian Survey, vol. 23, no. 4, 1988, p. 460.
27. See Bassey Ate, "Dangers of Disunity in the Third World", Non-Aligned World, vol. 2,
no. 4, 1984, p. 427.
28. Anirudha Gupta, "Non-Aligned Africa", Non-Aligned World, vol. 1, no. 1, 1983, p. 178.
84
29. A. W. Singham and Shirley Hune, Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments (London: Zed
Books, 1986), pp. 81-86.
30. R. Narayan, "Non-Alignment and the Old States of Latin America", Non-Aligned World,
vol. 1, no. 2, 1983, p. 208.
31. L. D. Pedraza, "Latin America and the Caribbean Countries in the Non-Aligned
Movement", Non-Aligned World, vol. 2, no. 2, 1984, p. 200.
32. Ranko Petrovik, "Evolution of the Criteria of Non-Alignment", Review of International
Affairs, vol. 28, no. 658, 1977, pp. 37-40.
33. As laid down in 1961, the membership criteria of the NAM are as follows: that the state
should have an independent policy based on the notion of co-existence with other states
with different political and social systems and that it should be non-aligned in its
foreign policy or follow a trend in favour of such a non-aligned policy; that the state
should give consistent support to the movements of national independence; that the
state should not be a member of a military alliance which was functioning in the
context of Great Power conflicts; that if the state had a bilateral military alliance with
a Great Power, or was participating in a regional defence pact, it was not doing so in
the context of Great Power conflicts but for other reasons; and, that if the state leased
military bases to a Great Power it was not doing so in a Great Power context.
34. M. S. Rajan, "The NAM: Need for Revision of the Membership Criteria", Non-Aligned
World, vol. 1, no. 2, 1983, pp. 222-235.
35. See Peter Willets, The Non-Aligned in Havana (New York: St Martin's Press, 1981), pp.
9-14.
36. See Baghat Korany, "Coming of Age Against Global Odds: The Third World and its
Collective Decision-Making", in Baghat Korany (ed.), How Foreign Policy Decisions are
Made in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 35.
37. Peter Willets, "NAM: Alive and Well", African Events, September 1991, p. 28.
38. See Ashok Kapur, "The Militarisation of the Indian Ocean Littoral and Hinterland
Areas", Non-Aligned World, vol. 2, no. 1, 1984, p. 41.
39. Soedjatmoko, "The Patterns of Armed Conflict in the Third World", Alternatives, vol.
10, 1984-85, p. 483.
40. A. Bebler, "Defence and Security Cooperation in Non-Aligned States", Review of
International Affairs, vol. 41, no. 932, 1989.
41. S. D. Muni, "The Non-Aligned and Security", Non-Aligned World, vol. 2, no. 2, 1984.
42. B. Dabo, "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Conflict Between the Non-Aligned", and
V. D. Degan, "Resolution of Disputes and Conflicts within the NAM", in Non-Alignment
in the Eighties, note 13, pp. 372-379 and 398-411.
43. See Ernest Petric, "The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Among Non-Aligned
Countries", Non-Aligned World, vol. 1, no. 4, 1983, p. 460.
44. Stanto Nick, "Action Forms in the NAM and the advancement of Democratic Relations
within its Framework", in Non-Alignment in the Eighties, note 13, pp. 355-362.
45. Peter Lyon, "The Non-Aligned Movement: Performance and Prospects", in U. S. Bajpai
(ed.), Prospects and Perspectives of Non-Alignment, (New Delhi: Lanchares Publishers,
1983), p. 29.
46. Quoted in A. W. Singham and Shirley Hune, Non-alignment, note 29, pp. 107-108.
47. Report of Ministerial Committee on Methodology, Jakarta Summit, 1992.
48. Quoted in Rajan, "The NAM ...", note 34, pp. 150-151.
49. Leo Mates, "Non-Alignment and the Great Powers", Foreign Affairs, vol. 28, no. 3, 1970,
p. 259.
50. Quoted in Robert A. Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics
(New York: Praeger, 1980), p.31.
51. Quoted in ibid., p. 53.
52. Singham and Hune, Non-alignment, note 29, p. 24.
85
53. The South Centre, "The Follow-Up Office of the South Commission", Geneva, November
1990.
54. South Letter, No. 12, December 1991; Joint Communique, Second Meeting of the
Summit Level Group for South-South Consultation and Cooperation, November 1991;
The Summit Level Group of Developing Countries: Position Paper of the Group of
Fifteen on the New World Order, May 1992.
55. Regina Gaillard, "After Containment: International Changes through a
Non-Authoritarian Looking Glass", Paper presented for the BISA/ISA Conference,
London, March 29-April 2, 1989, p. 9.
56. Stephen D. Krasner, "Third World Vulnerability and Global Negotiations", Review of
International Studies, vol. 9, no. 4, 1983, pp. 235-248.
57. P. T. Bower and B. S. Yanney, "Against the New Economic Order", Commentary, vol.
63, 1977, pp. 25-31.
58. Jinoh Omo Fadara, "The Mirage of NIEO: Reflections of Third World Dystopia",
Alternatives, vol. 8, 1982-83, pp. 543-550.
59. Sally Morphet, "The Non-Aligned Movement and the Foreign Ministers' Meeting at
Nicosia", International Affairs, 1993, pp. 393-405.
60. The Belgrade Documents are contained in UN document A/44/551 of 29 September
1989.
61. Quoted in The Guardian, (UK) "Non-Aligned Countries Seek Survival Strategy", 5
September 1991.
62. The Report and Recommendations of the Non-Aligned Ministerial Committee on
Methodology for the Jakarta Summit of 1992 suggests in its introduction that the most
pressing new challenge confronting the movement is "the need to deal effectively with
the dangers of its marginalisation in global affairs". Anton Bebler in an article on "The
Neutral and Non-Aligned States in the New European Security Architecture", The
International Spectator, January-March 1992, suggests the disappearance of the
non-aligned group as relevant factor on the European scene, pp. 76-77. See also
Hans-Henrik Holm, "The End of the Third World", Journal of Peace Research, 1990 and
Yuri Vassilyev, "The Non-Aligned Movement Thirty Years One", International Affairs
(Russia), January 1992.
63. Bridget Green, The Non-Aligned Movement in Perspective, Sheffield Papers in
International Studies, No. 10., University of Sheffield 1992, p. 39.
64. See Karl P. Sauvant, "The Non-Aligned Movement and Group 77: Towards Joint
Cooperation", Non-Aligned World, vol. 1, no. 1, 1983, pp. 22-75.
65. "Non-Aligned Summit gives new direction to drifting movement", The Guardian, (UK)
7 September 1992, p. 8.
66. Olara Otunuu, "Emerging Trends in the New World Situation", The Round Table,
October 1992, pp. 407-408.
67. "Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Jakarta,
1-6 September, 1992", The Diplomatic World Bulletin, Special Report, vol. 23, no. 9,
1992.
68. Sally Morphet, "The Non-Aligned in the "New World Order": The Jakarta Summit,
September 1992", International Relations, 1993, pp. 350-380.

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This article was downloaded by: [Aristotle University of Thessaloniki]

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The policy and evolution of nonalignment: Past and

Assistant Professor of Politics and International Relations , The American College of

Associate of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

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Paradigms, Vol.9 No.l Summer 1995

The Policy and Evolution of Non-Alignment:

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Following their struggles for independence, and given the concepts of

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The Policy and Evolution of Non-Alignment

operationalises the "solidarity of the less powerful in global affairs". This

Paradigms, Vol.9 No.l Summer 1995

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26 September 1946, Nehru, as a member of the interim government in

The Policy and Evolution of Non-Alignment

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- "a plague on both of your houses" ... Non-alignment is an active

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Paradigms, Vol.9 No.l Summer 1995

of the non-aligned countries that continuing strained East-West19 relations

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The Policy and Evolution of Non-Alignment

agreement prohibiting tests in the atmosphere, underwater and outer

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Paradigms, Vol.9 No. 1 Summer 1995

The non-aligned also offered, and continue to support, procedures for

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The Policy and Evolution of Non-Alignment

requirements of group solidarity.27 The failure to project non-alignment

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Paradigms, Vol.9 No.l Summer 1995

formally promoted the concept of a NIEO, seven Latin American states

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The Policy and Evolution of Non-Alignment

Malaysia, when a member of the Multilateral Five Power Defence

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Paradigms, Vol.9 No.l Summer 1995

regional autonomy (Sikh community in India) or even independent

The Policy and Evolution of Non-Alignment

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The growing mstitutionalisation and transitional character of

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Paradigms, Vol.9 No. 1 Summer 1995

efforts to counterbalance or reduce Chinese influence obtained a

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The Policy and Evolution of Non-Alignment

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Paradigms, Vol.9 No.l Summer 1995

actively promoted the idea of self-reliance. In the framework of an Action

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The Policy and Evolution of Non-Alignment

The Commission functioned as an independent body with its members

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Paradigms, Vol.9 No. 1 Summer 1995

The decision to establish a Summit Level Group of Developing

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The Policy and Evolution of Non-Alignment

member countries. It was also agreed to establish a Group Business

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Paradigms, Vol.9 No.l Summer 1995

solving regional and global problems in accordance with the

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