Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28463 May 31, 1971
REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
Agrava & Agrava for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and
Solicitor Santiago M. Kapunan for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
It is a novel question that this petition for the review of a decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals
presents. Petitioner Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would have this Court construe the words "products of the
Philippines" found in Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code 1 as excluding bran (ipa) and pollard

(darak) on the ground that, coming as they do from wheat grain which is imported in the
Philippines, they are merely waste and not the products, which is the flour produced. 2 That way, it
would not be liable at all for the wharfage dues assessed under such section by respondent
Commission of Customs. It elevated the matter to respondent Court, as the construction it would
place on the aforesaid section appears too strained and far remote from the ordinary meaning of
the text, not to mention the policy of the Act. We affirm.
Hence, this petition for review. The sole error assigned by petitioner is that it should not, under its
construction of the Act, be liable for wharfage dues on its exportation of bran and pollard as they
are not "products of the Philippines", coming as they did from wheat grain which were imported
from abroad, and being "merely parts of the wheat grain milled by Petitioner to produce flour
which had become waste." 7 We find, to repeat, such contention unpersuasive and affirm the
decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals.
1. The language of Section 2802 appears to be quite explicit: "There shall be levied, collected and
paid on all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines ...
exported from the Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for
wharfage ...." One category refers to what is imported. The other mentions products of the
Philippines that are exported. Even without undue scrutiny, it does appear quite obvious that as
long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section.
Petitioner appeared to have entertained such a nation. In its petition for review before respondent
Court, it categorically asserted: "Petitioner is primarily engaged in the manufacture of flour from
wheat grain. In the process of milling the wheat grain into flour, petitioner also produces 'bran' and
'pollard' which it exports abroad." 8 It does take a certain amount of hair-splitting to exclude from
its operation what petitioner calls "waste" resulting from the production of flour processed from
the wheat grain in petitioner's flour mills in the Philippines. It is always timely to remember that, as
stressed by Justice Moreland: "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to
apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them." 9 Petitioner ought to have been aware that
deference to such a doctrine precludes an affirmative response to its contention. The law is clear;
it must be obeyed. It is as simple, as that. 10
2. There is need of confining familiar language of a statute to its usual signification. While
statutory construction involves the exercise of choice, the temptation to roam at will and rely on
one's predilections as to what policy should prevail is to be resisted. The search must be for a
reasonable interpretation. It is best to keep in mind the reminder from Holmes that "there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what obviously means." 11 To
paraphrase Frankfurter, interpolation must be eschewed but evisceration avoided. Certainly, the
utmost effort should be exerted lest the interpretation arrived at does violence to the statutory

language in its total context. It would be then to ignore what has been stressed time and time
again as to limits of judicial freedom in the construction of statutes to accept their view advanced
by petitioner.
3. Then, again, there is the fundamental postulate in statutory construction requiring fidelity to the
legislative purpose. What Congress intended is not to be frustrates. Its objective must be carried
out. Even if there be doubt as to the meaning of the language employed, the interpretation should
not be at war with the end sought to be attained. No undue reflection is needed to show that if
through an ingenious argument, the scope of a statute may be contracted, the probability that
other exceptions may be thought of is not remote. If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas
motivated by the same desire to be excluded from the operation of the Tariff and Customs Code
would likewise be entitled to sympathetic consideration. It is desirable then that the gates to such
efforts at undue restriction of the coverage of the Act be kept closed. Otherwise, the end result
would be not respect for, but defiance of, a clear legislative mandate. That kind of approach in
statutory construction has never recommended itself. It does not now. 12
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 27, 1967 is
affirmed. With costs against petitioner.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 74851. December 9, 1999]
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT AND BF HOMES, INC., respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
On September 14, 1992, the Court passed upon the case at bar and rendered its decision,
dismissing the petition of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), thereby
affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals which canceled the transfer certificate of
title issued in favor of RCBC, and reinstating that of respondent BF Homes.
This will now resolve petitioners motion for reconsideration which, although filed in
1992 was not deemed submitted for resolution until in late 1998. The delay was
occasioned by exchange of pleadings, the submission of supplemental papers, withdrawal
and change of lawyers, not to speak of the case having been passed from one departing to
another retiring justice. It was not until May 3, 1999, when the case was re-raffled to
herein ponente, but the record was given to him only sometime in the late October 1999.
By way of review, the pertinent facts as stated in our decision are reproduced herein, to
wit:
On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration
of Suspension of Payments (SEC Case No. 002693) with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).
One of the creditors listed in its inventory of creditors and liabilities was RCBC.
On October 26, 1984, RCBC requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to extra-judicially
foreclose its real estate mortgage on some properties of BF Homes. A notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale was issued by the Sheriff on October 29, 1984, scheduled on

November 29, 1984, copies furnished both BF Homes (mortgagor) and RCBC
(mortgagee).
On motion of BF Homes, the SEC issued on November 28, 1984 in SEC Case No.
002693 a temporary restraining order (TRO), effective for 20 days, enjoining RCBC and
the sheriff from proceeding with the public auction sale. The sale was rescheduled to
January 29, 1985.
On January 25, 1985, the SEC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
upon petitioners filing of a bond. However, petitioner did not file a bond until January 29,
1985, the very day of the auction sale, so no writ of preliminary injunction was issued by
the SEC. Presumably, unaware of the filing of the bond, the sheriffs proceeded with the
public auction sale on January 29, 1985, in which RCBC was the highest bidder for the
properties auctioned.
On February 5, 1985, BF Homes filed in the SEC a consolidated motion to annul the
auction sale and to cite RCBC and the sheriff for contempt. RCBC opposed the motion.
Because of the proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld the delivery to RCBC of a
certificate of sale covering the auctioned properties.
On February 13, 1985, the SEC in Case No. 002693 belatedly issued a writ of
preliminary injunction stopping the auction sale which had been conducted by the sheriff
two weeks earlier.
On March 13, 1985, despite SEC Case No. 002693, RCBC filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 140, Rizal (CC 10042) an action for mandamus against the provincial sheriff
of Rizal and his deputy to compel them to execute in its favor a certificate of sale of the
auctioned properties.
In answer, the sheriffs alleged that they proceeded with the auction sale on January 29,
1985 because no writ of preliminary injunction had been issued by SEC as of that date,
but they informed the SEC that they would suspend the issuance of a certificate of sale to
RCBC.
On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management Committee for BF Homes.
On RCBCs motion in the mandamus case, the trial court issued on May 8, 1985 a
judgment on the pleadings, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Judgment on the pleadings is granted and
judgement is hereby rendered ordering respondents to execute and deliver to petitioner
the Certificate of the Auction Sale of January 29, 1985, involving the properties sold
therein, more particularly those described in Annex C of their Answer. (p. 87, Rollo.)
On June 4, 1985, B.F. Homes filed an original complaint with the IAC pursuant to
Section 9 of B.P. 129 praying for the annulment of the judgment, premised on the
following:
x x x: (1) even before RCBC asked the sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose its mortgage
on petitioners properties, the SEC had already assumed exclusive jurisdiction over those
assets, and (2) that there was extrinsic fraud in procuring the judgment because the
petitioner was not impleaded as a party in the mandamus case, respondent court did not
acquire jurisdiction over it, and it was deprived of its right to be heard. (CA Decision, p.

88, Rollo).
On April 8, 1986, the IAC rendered a decision, setting aside the decision of the trial court,
dismissing the mandamus case and suspending issuance to RCBC of new land titles, until
the resolution of case by SEC in Case No. 002693, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment dated May 8, 1985 in Civil Case No. 10042 is hereby
annulled and set aside and the case is hereby dismissed. In view of the admission of
respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation that the sheriffs certificate of sale has
been registered on BF Homes TCTs . . . (here the TCTs were enumerated) the Register of
Deeds for Pasay City is hereby ordered to suspend the issuance to the mortgageepurchaser, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, of the owners copies of the new land
titles replacing them until the matter shall have been resolved by the Securities and
Exchange Commission in SEC Case No. 002693.
(p. 257-260, Rollo; also pp. 832-834, 213 SCRA 830[1992]; Emphasis in the original.)
On June 18, 1986, RCBC appealed the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
(now, back to its old revered name, the Court of Appeals) to this Court, arguing that:
1. Petitioner did not commit extrinsic fraud in excluding private respondent as party
defendant in Special Civil Case No. 10042 as private respondent was not indispensable
party thereto, its participation not being necessary for the full resolution of the issues
raised in said case.
2. SEC Case No. 2693 cannot be invoked to suspend Special Civil Case No. 10042, and
for that matter, the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage in petitioners
favor, as these do not constitute actions against private respondent contemplated under
Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A.
3. Even assuming arguendo that the extra-judicial sale constitute an action that may be
suspended under Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the basis for the
suspension thereof did not exist so as to adversely affect the validity and regularity
thereof.
4. The Regional Trial court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special Civil Case No.
10042.
5. The Regional Trial court had jurisdiction over Special Civil Case No. 10042.
(p. 5, Rollo.)
On November 12, 1986, the Court gave due course to the petition. During the pendency
of the case, RCBC brought to the attention of the Court an order issued by the SEC on
October 16, 1986 in Case No.002693, denying the consolidated Motion to Annul the
Auction Sale and to cite RCBC and the Sheriff for Contempt, and ruling as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petitioners Consolidated Motion to Cite Sheriff and Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation for Contempt and to Annul Proceedings and Sale,
dated February 5, 1985, should be as is, hereby DENIED.
While we cannot direct the Register of Deeds to allow the consolidation of the titles
subject of the Omnibus Motion dated September 18, 1986 filed by the Rizal Commercial
banking Corporation, and therefore, denies said Motion, neither can this Commission
restrain the said bank and the Register of Deeds from effecting the said consolidation.

SO ORDERED.
(p. 143, Rollo.)
By virtue of the aforesaid order, the Register of Deeds of Pasay City effected the transfer
of title over subject pieces of property to petitioner RCBC, and the issuance of new titles
in its name. Thereafter, RCBC presented a motion for the dismissal of the petition,
theorizing that the issuance of said new transfer certificates of title in its name rendered
the petition moot and academic.
In the decision sought to be reconsidered, a greatly divided Court (Justices Gutierrez,
Nocon, and Melo concurred with the ponente, Justice Medialdea; Chief Justice Narvasa,
Justices Bidin, Regalado, and Bellosillo concurred only in the result; while Justice
Feliciano dissented and was joined by Justice Padilla, then Justice, now Chief Justice
Davide, and Justice Romero; Justices Grio-Aquino and Campos took no part) denied
petitioners motion to dismiss, finding basis for nullifying and setting aside the TCTs in
the name of RCBC. Ruling on the merits, the Court upheld the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court which dismissed the mandamus case filed by RCBC and
suspended the issuance of new titles to RCBC. Setting aside RCBCs acquisition of title
and nullifying the TCTs issued to it, the Court held that:
. . . whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of
payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference, but . . . stand on
equal footing with other creditors. Foreclosure shall be disallowed so as not to prejudice
other creditors, or cause discrimination among them. If foreclosure is undertaken despite
the fact that a petition for rehabilitation has been filed, the certificate of sale shall not be
delivered pending rehabilitation. Likewise, if this has also been done, no transfer of title
shall be effected also, within the period of rehabilitation. The rationale behind PD 902-A,
as amended, is to effect a feasible and viable rehabilitation. This cannot be achieved if
one creditor is preferred over the others.
In this connection, the prohibition against foreclosure attaches as soon as a petition for
rehabilitation is filed. Were it otherwise, what is to prevent the petitioner from delaying
the creation of a Management Committee and in the meantime dissipate all its assets. The
sooner the SEC takes over and imposes a freeze on all the assets, the better for all
concerned.
(pp. 265-266, Rollo; also p. 838, 213 SCRA 830[1992].)
Then Justice Feliciano (joined by three other Justices), dissented and voted to grant the
petition. He opined that the SEC acted prematurely and without jurisdiction or legal
authority in enjoining RCBC and the sheriff from proceeding with the public auction sale.
The dissent maintain that Section 6 (c) of Presidential Decree 902-A is clear and
unequivocal that, claims against the corporations, partnerships, or associations shall be
suspended only upon the appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board or body. Thus, in the case under consideration, only upon the appointment
of the Management Committee for BF Homes on March 18, 1985, should the suspension
of actions for claims against BF Homes have taken effect and not earlier.
In support of its motion for reconsideration, RCBC contends:
The restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Securities and

Exchange Commission enjoining the foreclosure sale of the properties of respondent BF

Homes were issued without or in excess of its jurisdiction because it was violative of the
clear provision of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, and are therefore null and void; and
Petitioner, being a mortgage creditor, is entitled to rely solely on its security and to refrain
from joining the unsecured creditors in SEC Case No. 002693, the petition for
rehabilitation filed by private respondent.
We find the motion for reconsideration meritorious.
The issue of whether or not preferred creditors of distressed corporations stand on equal
footing with all other creditors gains relevance and materiality only upon the appointment
of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board, or body. Insofar as petitioner
RCBC is concerned, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 902-A are not yet
applicable and it may still be allowed to assert its preferred status because it foreclosed
on the mortgage prior to the appointment of the management committee on March 18,
1985. The Court, therefore, grants the motion for reconsideration on this score.
The law on the matter, Paragraph (c), Section 6 of Presidential Decree 902-A, provides:
Sec. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the
following powers:
c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real and personal, which is the
subject of the action pending before the Commission in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary to preserve the
rights of the parties-litigants to and/or protect the interest of the investing public and
creditors; Provided, however, that the Commission may, in appropriate cases, appoint a
rehabilitation receiver of corporations, partnerships or other associations not supervised
or regulated by other government agencies who shall have, in addition to the powers of a
regular receiver under the provisions of the Rules of Court, such functions and powers as
are provided for in the succeeding paragraph (d) hereof: Provided, finally, That upon
appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body,
pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or
associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal,
board or body shall be suspended accordingly. (As amended by PDs No. 1673, 1758 and
by PD No. 1799. Emphasis supplied.)
It is thus adequately clear that suspension of claims against a corporation under
rehabilitation is counted or figured up only upon the appointment of a management
committee or a rehabilitation receiver. The holding that suspension of actions for claims
against a corporation under rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the application or a
petition for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC may, to some, be more logical and wise
but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of the law. To insist on
such ruling, no matter how practical and noble, would be to encroach upon legislative
prerogative to define the wisdom of the law plainly judicial legislation.
It bears stressing that the first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law.
When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. As has been our consistent ruling, where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no occasion for interpretation; there is only room
for application (Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. Municipality of Naga, 24 SCRA 708

[1968]).
Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says
and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed (Chartered Bank
Employees Association vs. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 [1985]; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. De
Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 [1969]; Quijano vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 35
SCRA 270 [1970]).
Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or
construe its true intent. Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of
being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same
time. A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of two or more possible meanings, in
which case, the Court is called upon to exercise one of its judicial functions, which is to
interpret the law according to its true intent.
Furthermore, as relevantly pointed out in the dissenting opinion, a petition for
rehabilitation does not always result in the appointment of a receiver or the creation of a
management committee. The SEC has to initially determine whether such appointment is
appropriate and necessary under the circumstances. Under Paragraph (d), Section 6 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, certain situations must be shown to exist before a
management committee may be created or appointed, such as;
1. when there is imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of assets or
other properties; or
2. when there is paralization of business operations of such corporations or entities which
may be prejudicial to the interest of minority stockholders, parties-litigants or to the
general public.
On the other hand, receivers may be appointed whenever:
1. necessary in order to preserve the rights of the parties-litigants; and/or
2. protect the interest of the investing public and creditors. (Section 6 (c), P.D. 902-A.)
These situations are rather serious in nature, requiring the appointment of a management
committee or a receiver to preserve the existing assets and property of the corporation in
order to protect the interests of its investors and creditors. Thus, in such situations,
suspension of actions for claims against a corporation as provided in Paragraph (c) of
Section 6, of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is necessary, and here we borrow the words
of the late Justice Medialdea, so as not to render the SEC management Committee
irrelevant and inutile and to give it unhampered rescue efforts over the distressed firm
(Rollo, p. 265).
Otherwise, when such circumstances are not obtaining or when the SEC finds no such
imminent danger of losing the corporate assets, a management committee or
rehabilitation receiver need not be appointed and suspension of actions for claims may
not be ordered by the SEC. When the SEC does not deem it necessary to appoint a
receiver or to create a management committee, it may be assumed, that there are
sufficient assets to sustain the rehabilitation plan and, that the creditors and investors are
amply protected.
Petitioner additionally argues in its motion for reconsideration that, being a mortgage

creditor, it is entitled to rely on its security and that it need not join the unsecured
creditors in filing their claims before the SEC-appointed receiver. To support its position,
petitioner cites the Courts ruling in the case of Philippine Commercial International Bank
vs. Court of Appeals, (172 SCRA 436 [1989]) that an order of suspension of payments as
well as actions for claims applies only to claims of unsecured creditors and cannot extend
to creditors holding a mortgage, pledge, or any lien on the property.
Ordinarily, the Court would refrain from discussing additional matters such as that
presented in RCBCs second ground, and would rather limit itself only to the relevant
issues by which the controversy may be settled with finality.
In view, however, of the significance of such issue, and the conflicting decisions of this
Court on the matter, coupled with the fact that our decision of September 14, 1992, if not
clarified, might mislead the Bench and the Bar, the Court resolved to discuss further.
It may be recalled that in the herein en banc majority opinion (pp. 256-275, Rollo, also
published as RCBC vs. IAC, 213 SCRA 830 [1992]), we held that:
. . . whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of
payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference, but . . . stand on
equal footing with other creditors. Foreclosure shall be disallowed so as not to prejudice
other creditors, or cause discrimination among them. If foreclosure is undertaken despite
the fact that a petition for rehabilitation has been filed, the certificate of sale shall not be
delivered pending rehabilitation. Likewise, if this has also been done, no transfer of title
shall be effected also, within the period of rehabilitation. The rationale behind PD 902-A,
as amended, is to effect a feasible and viable rehabilitation. This cannot be achieved if
one creditor is preferred over the others.
In this connection, the prohibition against foreclosure attaches as soon as a petition for
rehabilitation is filed. Were it otherwise, what is to prevent the petitioner from delaying
the creation of a Management Committee and in the meantime dissipate all its assets. The
sooner the SEC takes over and imposes a freeze on all the assets, the better for all
concerned.
(pp. 265-266, Rollo; also p. 838, 213 SCRA 830[1992]. Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing majority opinion relied upon BF Homes, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (190
SCRA 262 [1990] per Cruz, J.: First Division) where it was held that when a corporation
threatened by bankruptcy is taken over by a receiver, all the creditors should stand on an
equal footing. Not anyone of them should be given preference by paying one or some of
them ahead of the others. This is precisely the reason for the suspension of all pending
claims against the corporation under receivership. Instead of creditors vexing the courts
with suits against the distressed firm, they are directed to file their claims with the
receiver who is a duly appointed officer of the SEC (pp. 269-270; emphasis in the
original). This ruling is a reiteration of Alemars Sibal & Sons, Inc. vs. Hon. Jesus M.
Elbinias (pp. 99-100;186 SCRA 94 [1990] per Fernan, C.J.: Third Division).
Taking the lead from Alemars Sibal & Sons, the Court also applied this same ruling in
Araneta vs. Court of Appeals (211 SCRA 390 [1992] per Nocon, J.: Second Division).
All the foregoing cases departed from the ruling of the Court in the much earlier case of
PCIB vs. Court of Appeals (172 SCRA 436 [1989] per Medialdea, J.: First Division)

where the Court categorically ruled that:

SECs order for suspension of payments of Philfinance as well as for all actions of claims
against Philfinance could only be applied to claims of unsecured creditors. Such order
can not extend to creditors holding a mortgage, pledge or any lien on the property unless
they give up the property, security or lien in favor of all the creditors of Philfinance. . .
(p. 440. Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in BPI vs. Court of Appeals (229 SCRA 223 [1994] per Bellosillo, J.: First
Division) the Court explicitly stated that . . . the doctrine in the PCIB Case has since been
abrogated. In Alemars Sibal & Sons v. Elbinias, BF Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
Araneta v. Court of Appeals and RCBC v. Court of Appeals, we already ruled that
whenever a distressed corporation asks SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of
payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference, but shall stand on
equal footing with other creditors. . . (pp. 227-228).
It may be stressed, however, that of all the cases cited by Justice Bellosillo in BPI, which
abandoned the Courts ruling in PCIB, only the present case satisfies the constitutional
requirement that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting
en banc (Sec 4, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). The rest were division decisions.
It behooves the Court, therefore, to settle the issue in this present resolution once and for
all, and for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, the following rules of thumb shall are
laid down:
1. All claims against corporations, partnerships, or associations that are pending before
any court, tribunal, or board, without distinction as to whether or not a creditor is secured
or unsecured, shall be suspended effective upon the appointment of a management
committee, rehabilitation receiver, board, or body in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A.
2. Secured creditors retain their preference over unsecured creditors, but enforcement of
such preference is equally suspended upon the appointment of a management committee,
rehabilitation receiver, board, or body. In the event that the assets of the corporation,
partnership, or association are finally liquidated, however, secured and preferred credits
under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code will definitely have preference over
unsecured ones.
In other words, once a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body is
appointed pursuant to P.D. 902-A, all actions for claims against a distressed corporation
pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly.
This suspension shall not prejudice or render ineffective the status of a secured creditor as
compared to a totally unsecured creditor. P.D. 902-A does not state anything to this effect.
What it merely provides is that all actions for claims against the corporation, partnership
or association shall be suspended. This should give the receiver a chance to rehabilitate
the corporation if there should still be a possibility for doing so. (This will be in
consonance with Alemars, BF Homes, Araneta, and RCBC insofar as enforcing liens by
preferred creditors are concerned.)
However, in the event that rehabilitation is no longer feasible and claims against the

distressed corporation would eventually have to be settled, the secured creditors shall
enjoy preference over the unsecured creditors (still maintaining PCIB ruling), subject
only to the provisions of the Civil Code on Concurrence and Preferences of Credit (our
ruling in State Investment House, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 277 SCRA 209 [1997]).
The majority ruling in our 1992 decision that preferred creditors of distressed
corporations shall, in a way, stand on equal footing with all other creditors, must be read
and understood in the light of the foregoing rulings. All claims of both a secured or
unsecured creditor, without distinction on this score, are suspended once a management
committee is appointed. Secured creditors, in the meantime, shall not be allowed to assert
such preference before the Securities and Exchange Commission. It may be stressed,
however, that this shall only take effect upon the appointment of a management
committee, rehabilitation receiver, board, or body, as opined in the dissent.
In fine, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration for the cogent reason that
suspension of actions for claims commences only from the time a management
committee or receiver is appointed by the SEC. Petitioner RCBC, therefore, could have
rightfully, as it did, move for the extrajudicial foreclosure of its mortgage on October 26,
1984 because a management committee was not appointed by the SEC until March 18,
1985.
WHEREFORE, petitioners motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The
decision dated September 14, 1992 is vacated, the decision of Intermediate Appellate
Court in AC-G.R. No. SP-06313 REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 140, in Civil Case No.
10042 REINSTATED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142261. June 29, 2000]
GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, FACT-FINDING INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (FFIB) of the Office
of the Ombudsman, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us are the Motions for Reconsideration filed by the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of the Interior and Local Government, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor-General, and the Office of the Ombudsman of our 5 April 2000
Resolution.[1] In this resolution, we ordered the immediate reinstatement of petitioner
Manuel Lapid to the position of Governor of Pampanga as the respondents failed to
establish the existence of a law mandating the immediate execution of a decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case where the penalty imposed is
suspension for one year.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On the basis of an unsigned letter dated July 20, 1998, allegedly originating from the
Mga Mamamayan ng Lalawigan ng Pampanga, addressed to the National Bureau of
Investigation, the latter initiated an open probe on the alleged illegal quarrying in
Pampanga & exaction of exorbitant fees purportedly perpetrated by unscrupulous
individuals with the connivance of high-ranking government officials. The NBI Report
was endorsed to the respondent Ombudsman and was docketed as OMB-1-98-2067.
On Oct. 26, 1998, a complaint was filed charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M. Lapid, ViceGovernor Clayton Olalia, Provincial Administrator Enrico Quiambao, Provincial
Treasurer Jovito Sabado, Mabalacat Municipal Mayor Marino Morales and Senior Police
Officer 4 Nestor Tadeo with alleged Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for allegedly having conspired between and
among themselves in demanding and collecting from various quarrying operators in
Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120.00 per truckload of sand,
gravel, or other quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing
the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for its collection. They were also
accused of giving unwarranted benefits to Nestor Tadeo, Rodrigo Rudy Fernandez &
Conrado Pangilinan who are neither officials/employees of the Provincial Government. of
Pampanga nor quarry operators by allowing them to collect the said amount which was
over and above the P40.00 prescribed under the present provincial ordinance and in
allowing Tadeo, Fernandez and Pangilinan to sell and deliver to various quarry operators
booklets of official receipts which were pre-stamped with SAND FEE P40.00.[2]
The Ombudsman issued an Order dated January 13, 1999 preventively suspending
petitioner Lapid, Olalia, Quiambao, Sabado, Morales and Tadeo for a period of six (6)
months without pay pursuant to Sec. 24 of RA 6770. On Jan. 19, 1999, the Department of
the Interior and Local Government (hereinafter the DILG) implemented the suspension of
petitioner Lapid[3].
On November 22, 1999 the Ombudsman rendered a decision[4] in the administrative case
finding the petitioner administratively liable for misconduct thus:
Wherefore, premises considered, respondent Manuel M. Lapid, Clayton A. Olalia, Jovito
S. Sabado and Nestor C. Tadeo are hereby found guilty of misconduct for which they are
meted out the penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay pursuant to section 25 (2) of
R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Respondent Marino P. Morales is hereby
exonerated from the same administrative charge for insufficiency of evidence. The
complaint against respondent Enrico P. Quiambao, who resigned effective June 30, 1998
was dismissed on March 12, 1999, without prejudice to the outcome of the criminal case.
[5]
The copy of the said decision was received by counsel for the petitioner on November 25,
1999 and a motion for reconsideration was filed on November 29, 1999. The Office of
the Ombudsman, in an Order[6] dated 12 January 2000, denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on January 18, 2000
praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the Ombudsman from
enforcing the questioned decision. The temporary restraining order was issued by the

appellate court on January 19, 2000.[7]

When the 60-day lifetime of the temporary restraining order lapsed on March 19, 2000
without the Court of Appeals resolving the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, a petition[8] for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed
with this Court on March 20, 2000. The petition asked for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the respondents from enforcing the assailed decision of the
Ombudsman and prayed that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered reversing and
setting aside the questioned decision (of the Ombudsman) dated November 22, 1999 and
the order dated January 12, 2000.[9]
On March 22, 2000 the Third Division of this Court issued a Resolution requiring the
respondents to comment on the petition. That same day, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution[10] denying the petitioners prayer for injunctive relief. The following day, or
on March 23, 2000, the DILG implemented the assailed decision of the Ombudsman and
the highest ranking Provincial Board Member of Pampanga, Edna David, took her oath of
office as O.I.C.- Governor of the Province of Pampanga.
On March 24, 2000 a Motion for Leave to File Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus[11] and the Supplement to the Petition[12] itself were filed in
view of the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying the petitioners prayer for
preliminary injunction. In addition to the arguments raised in the main petition, the
petitioner likewise raised in issue the apparent pre-judgment of the case on the merits by
the Court of Appeals in its resolution denying the prayer for preliminary injunction. In so
doing, petitioner argued that the respondent court exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction.
Proceeding from the premise that the decision of the Ombudsman had not yet become
final, the petitioner argued that the writs of prohibition and mandamus may be issued
against the respondent DILG for prematurely implementing the assailed decision. Finally,
the petitioner prayed for the setting aside of the resolution issued by the Court of Appeals
dated March 22, 2000 and for the issuance of a new one enjoining the respondents from
enforcing the said decision or, if it has already been implemented, to withdraw any action
already taken until the issue of whether or not the said decision of the Ombudsman is
immediately executory has been settled.
The Solicitor-General and the Office of the Ombudsman filed their respective
comments[13]to the petition praying for the dismissal thereof. Regarding the issue of the
immediate enforcement of the decision of the Ombudsman, the Solicitor-General
maintains that the said decision is governed by Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
and is therefore, immediately executory. For its part, the Office of the Ombudsman
maintains that the Ombudsman Law and its implementing rules are silent as to the
execution of decisions rendered by the Ombudsman considering that the portion of the
said law cited by petitioner pertains to the finality of the decision but not to its
enforcement pending appeal. The Office of the Ombudsman also stated that it has
uniformly adopted the provisions in the Local Government Code and Administrative
Code that decisions in administrative disciplinary cases are immediately executory.
The Solicitor-General filed an additional comment[14] alleging that the petitioner did not
question the executory character of the decision of the Ombudsman and that he is
presenting this argument for the first time before the Supreme Court. The appellate court
should be given an opportunity to review the case from this standpoint before asking the

Supreme Court to review the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. The petitioner filed a
consolidated Reply[15] to the Comments of the respondents.
After oral arguments before the Third Division of this Court on 5 April 2000, the
Resolution[16] subject of the instant Motions for Reconsideration was issued. The
Resolution provides as follows:
From the pleadings filed by the parties and after oral arguments held on April 5, 2000, the
petitioner represented by Atty. Augusto G. Panlilio, the respondent Ombudsman
represented by its Chief Legal Counsel, and the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of the Interior and Local Government represented by the Solicitor General,
and after due deliberation, the Court finds that the respondents failed to establish the
existence of a law mandating the immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman
in an administrative case where the penalty imposed is suspension for one year. The
immediate implementation of the decision of the Ombudsman against petitioner is thus
premature.
WHEREFORE, the respondents are ordered to reinstate effective immediately the
petitioner to the position of Governor of the Province of Pampanga. This case is hereby
remanded to the Court of Appeals for resolution of the appeal in CA-GR. SP No. 564744
on the merits. Said court is hereby directed to resolve the same with utmost deliberate
dispatch.
This is without prejudice to the promulgation of an extended decision.
From this 5 April 2000 Resolution, the Offices of the Solicitor-General and the
Ombudsman filed the instant motions for reconsideration.
The sole issue addressed by our 5 April 2000 Resolution is whether or not the decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman finding herein petitioner administratively liable for
misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay is
immediately executory pending appeal.
Petitioner was administratively charged for misconduct under the provisions of R.A.
6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Section 27 of the said Act provides as follows:
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. All provisionary orders of the Office of
the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be
entertained only on the following grounds:
XXX
Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one months salary shall be final and
unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari
within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision
or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman[17] likewise contain a similar
provision. Section 7, Rule III of the said Rules provides as follows:
Sec. 7. Finality of Decision where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be
final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the
expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for
reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in
Section 27 of R.A. 6770.
It is clear from the above provisions that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e.
suspension without pay for one year, is not among those listed as final and unappealable,
hence, immediately executory. Section 27 states that all provisionary orders of the Office
of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory; and that any order, directive
or decision of the said Office imposing the penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension
of not more than one months salary is final and unappealable. As such the legal maxim
inclusion unius est exclusio alterus finds application. The express mention of the things
included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken
together is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose
penalties that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and
immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case,
will stay the immediate implementation of the decision. This finds support in the Rules of
Procedure issued by the Ombudsman itself which states that (I)n all other cases, the
decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by
the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari (should now
be petition for review under Rule 43) shall have been filed by him as prescribed in
Section 27 of R.A. 6770.
The Office of the Solicitor General insists however that the case of Fabian vs.
Desierto[18] has voided Section 27 of R.A. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07. As such, the review of decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases is now governed by Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which mandates, under Section 12[19] thereof, the immediately executory character of
the decision or order appealed from.
The contention of the Solicitor General is not well-taken. Our ruling in the case of
Fabian vs. Desierto invalidated Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 7, Rule
III of Administrative Order No.07 and any other provision of law implementing the
aforesaid Act only insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases
from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The only provision affected by
the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters included in
said section 27, including the finality or non-finality of decisions, are not affected and
still stand.
Neither can respondents find support in Section 12, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides as follows:

Section 12. Effect of Appeal. The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon
such terms as it may deem just.
On this point, respondents contend that considering the silence of the Ombudsman Act on
the matter of execution pending appeal, the above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court,
which allegedly mandates the immediate execution of all decisions rendered by
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, should apply suppletorily to the provisions of
the Ombudsman Act. We do not agree.
A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law.[20] Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not
more than one months salary shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the
respondent therein has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days
from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision. In all these other
cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein will become final after the lapse of the
reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected[21] or, an appeal therefrom
having been taken, the judgment in the appellate tribunal becomes final. It is this final
judgment which is then correctly categorized as a final and executory judgment in respect
to which execution shall issue as a matter of right.[22] In other words, the fact that the
Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally
carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of
these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory.
The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory only
after it has become final and executory,[23] execution pending appeal being an exception
to this general rule. It is the contention of respondents however that with respect to
decisions of quasi-judicial agencies and administrative bodies, the opposite is true. It is
argued that the general rule with respect to quasi-judicial and administrative agencies is
that the decisions of such bodies are immediately executory even pending appeal.
The contention of respondents is misplaced. There is no general legal principle that
mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are immediately executory.
Decisions rendered by the Securities and Exchange Commission[24] and the Civil
Aeronautics Board,[25] for example, are not immediately executory and are stayed when
an appeal is filed before the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, the decisions of the
Civil Service Commission, under the Administrative Code[26], and the Office of the
President under the Local Government Code[27], which respondents cite, are
immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws under which the
decisions were rendered mandate them to be so. The provisions of the last two cited laws
expressly provide for the execution pending appeal of their final orders or decisions. The
Local Government Code, under Section 68 thereof provides as follows:
Section 68. Execution Pending Appeal. An appeal shall not prevent a decision from
becoming final and executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed
under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such
appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and
such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.

Similarly, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 6, Section 47, par. (4) of the Administrative
Code of 1987 provides:
(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is
suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.
Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial agency
is immediately final and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so provides.
Section 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal will
not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.
Petitioner was charged administratively before the Ombudsman and accordingly the
provisions of the Ombudsman Act should apply in his case. Section 68 of the Local
Government Code only applies to administrative decisions rendered by the Office of the
President or the appropriate Sanggunian against elective local government officials.
Similarly, the provision in the Administrative Code of 1987 mandating execution pending
review applies specifically to administrative decisions of the Civil Service Commission
involving members of the Civil Service.
There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the Administrative Code
of 1987 and the Local Government Code on execution pending review should be applied
suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the
Ombudsman Act which provides for such suppletory application. Courts may not, in the
guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not
provided or intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may
recommend the inclusion.[28]
And while in one respect, the Ombudsman Law, the Administrative Code of 1987 and the
Local Government Code are in pari materia insofar as the three laws relate or deal with
public officers, the similarity ends there. It is a principle in statutory construction that
where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially
designed for the said case must prevail over the other.[29] In the instant case, the acts
attributed to petitioner could have been the subject of administrative disciplinary
proceedings before the Office of the President under the Local Government Code or
before the Office of the Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act. Considering however,
that petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which should
govern his case.
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the ruling against
execution pending review of the Ombudsmans decision grants a one-sided protection to
the offender found guilty of misconduct in office and nothing at all to the government as
the aggrieved party. The offender, according to respondents, can just let the case drag on
until the expiration of his office or his reelection as by then, the case against him shall
become academic and his offense, obliterated. As such, respondents conclude, the
government is left without further remedy and is left helpless in its own fight against
graft and corruption.
We find this argument much too speculative to warrant serious consideration. If it
perceived that the fight against graft and corruption is hampered by the inadequacy of the

provisions of the Ombudsman Act, the remedy lies not with this Court but by legislative
amendment.
As regards the contention of the Office of the Ombudsman that under Sec. 13(8), Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered to (p)romulgate
its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties
as may be provided by law, suffice it to note that the Ombudsman rules of procedure,
Administrative Order No. 07, mandate that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month salary or fine equivalent to one month salary are still appealable
and hence, not final and executory. Under these rules, which were admittedly
promulgated by virtue of the rule-making power of the Office of the Ombudsman, the
decision imposing a penalty of one year suspension without pay on petitioner Lapid is not
immediately executory.
WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the Ombudsman are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I),
FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba,"
respondents.
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.
CASTRO, J.:p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion
Act, 1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive associations,"

and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with,
becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was
filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10
Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case
against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twiceamended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province
of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of
the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government
of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal

means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing
the government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an
instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New
People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating circumstances are
present, to wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing
the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was
had, an information was filed, which, as amended, reads:
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated by the
Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the
Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes
alias TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA,
MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN
DOES, whose identities are still unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700,
otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed as follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the
Province of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the
Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized,
joined and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG
MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in Republic Act No. 1700; that
BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly, willfully and
by over acts joined and/or remained as a member and became an officer and/or ranking
leader not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the New People's
Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines; and that all the abovenamed accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the aforestated subversive
organizations, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit subversive and/or seditious acts, by
inciting, instigating and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and
take up arms against the government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots
to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit,
subversion and/or other illegal means among which are the following:
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted meetings
and/or seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches instigating and inciting the
people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means; and toward
this end, the said accused organized, among others a chapter of the KABATAANG
MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or
promoting an armed revolution, subversive and/or seditious propaganda, conspiracies,
and/or riots and/or other illegal means to discredit and overthrow the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and to established in the Philippines a Communist regime.
2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA, together with
FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued the above subversive
and/or seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's
Army, and/or by instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite for the purpose
of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through armed
revolution, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means, and establishing in the
Philippines a Communist Government.

That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense: (a)
aid of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise
was employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that
(1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in
the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970,
declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and
overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government appealed.
We resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be
enacted." 2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. 3 Its essence

is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. 4 The constitutional ban
against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers 5 by confining
legislatures
to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. 7 History in
perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political
minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out
of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea
statute as a bill of attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of
attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing
menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave
danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress
usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of
the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial
court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and
voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a
presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What
it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the
outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for
definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines
but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is
not on individuals but on conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of
attainder and therefore unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:
(a) No person who
Party ... shall serve

is

or

has

been

member

of

the

Communist

(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing
body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than as an employee
performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organization.
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on its members.
Membership in the Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer

or a member of the governing body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the United
States pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses
power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from positions
affecting interstate commerce persons who may use of such positions to bring about
political strikes. In section 504, however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it
by the Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing
that any person who commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and
characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall
not hold union office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of deciding what persons
have committed the specified acts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it
designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics and
therefore cannot hold union office without incurring criminal liability members of the
Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S
CT 1357, lend a support to our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an order
by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a "Communist-action
organization," under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC
sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of "Communist-action organization" which the
Board is to apply is set forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially directed, dominated, or
controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world
Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and(ii) operates primarily to
advance the objectives of such world Communist movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec.
782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder,
reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon which the deprivations
setforth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. Although
the Board has determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist-action
organization," the Court found the statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that
the Party would always come within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its
conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtud of the activities in which it now engages,
comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at anytime choose to abandon
these activities, after it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate
means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge
Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment.
But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has
yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and
that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its
basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal
means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the
requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the
nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who
participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute were
construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful
goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically required that membership must be knowing or
active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4
means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired
"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful

goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15 This constitutes an element of "membership"
distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in
the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the
organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not
enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities
underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a
legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts
deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of attainder. 16
Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least
twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which fails
to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown
to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor unions
to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not
members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which
teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method,"
was upheld by this Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it
become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those who had
taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the United States during the Civil War from
holding office, 21 or from exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited the payment of further
compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engages in
subversive activities, 23 or which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve
as an officer or employee of a labor union, 24 have been invalidated as bills of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to
be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not
needed fairly to make such determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature passed a law requiring
every secret, oath-bound society with a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing
any person who joined or remained a member of such a society failing to register. While the
statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In
sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while
exempting other secret, oath-bound organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of
Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the nature and
activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and reached the
conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference between the two classes of
associations shown by experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in a manifest
tendency on the part of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purpose and
membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare,
and (b) in the absence of such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out
this difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal association in the
included class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that this organization functions
largely at night, its members disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated
to strike terror into the minds of the people;" and later said of the other class: "These
organizations and their purposes are well known, many of them having been in existence
for many years. Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no complaint
against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering with the rights of others."
Another of the courts said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the association or
organization of which the relator is concededly a member exercises activities tending to
the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not

confined to this society;" and later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a
recognized lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders
Law have already received legislative scrutiny and have been granted special privileges
so that the legislature may well consider them beneficial rather than harmful agencies."
The third court, after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret societies," and
observing that "the danger of certain organizations has been judicially demonstrated,"
meaning in that state, said: "Benevolent orders, labor unions and college fraternities
have existed for many years, and, while not immune from hostile criticism, have on the
whole justified their existence."
We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily available
including the published report of a hearing, before a committee of the House of
Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation, purposes and activities of
the Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised putting aside controverted evidence that the
order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with additional features
borrowed from the Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other periods; that its
memberships was limited to native-born, gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its
constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence
to the Constitution of the United States; in another exacted of its member an oath to
shield and preserve "white supremacy;" and in still another declared any person actively
opposing its principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our country and
an enemy to the weal of our national commonwealth;" that it was conducting a crusade
against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race
prejudices; that it was striving for political power and assuming a sort of guardianship
over the administration of local, state and national affairs; and that at times it was taking
into its own hands the punishment of what some of its members conceived to be crimes.
27

In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny
by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal
association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the
Philippine Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of
government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More recently, in Lansang vs.
Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of
Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the
emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said: "We
entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly
risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion
against the Government of the Philippines.
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the
ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply
retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of
attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of
attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features. This is the historic
explanation
for
uniting
the
two
mischiefs
in
one
clause 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a
bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that
establish that it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or employment in the
service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department thereof, either elective or
appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section advised,
advocated, or taught, or who may, after this section becomes effective, become a
member of or affiliated with any group, society, association, organization or party which
advises, advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5) years advised,

advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United
States of America or of the State of California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the petitioner
therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision insofar as it
purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date. We assume
that under the Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it
bars from the city's public service persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941,
advise, advocate, or reach the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or
become affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively
were a reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service by establishing an
employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners were
removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively
operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its
terms it prohibited any further payment of compensationto named individuals or
employees. Under these circumstances, viewed against the legislative background, the
statutewas held to have imposed penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby assumed judicial
magistracy, them it mustbe demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches
past conduct and that the penalties it imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court
observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the conduct
which it regulates is describedwith such particularity that, in probability, few
organizationswill come within the statutory terms. Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour
which they regard as harmful to the public welfare,whether that conduct is found to be
engaged in by manypersons or by one. So long as the incidence of legislation issuch that
the persons who engage in the regulated conduct, bethey many or few, can escape
regulation merely by altering thecourse of their own present activities, there can be no
complaintof an attainder. 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof
expressly statesthat the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the approval of
this Act." Only those who "knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or
remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its successors or of any
subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are punished. Those whowere members of the Party
or of any other subversive associationat the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the
opportunity of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and under oath their
membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciationshall operate to
exempt such persons from penalliability. 34 The penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot
inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of
the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment is inteded not to
provide the basis for a legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the
proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are
sofundamental that they are thought by some to occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of
constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe justified by the
existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting the statute in question
Congressconducted careful investigations and then stated itsfindings in the preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact
an organized conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversionand other illegal

means, for the purpose of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime subject to

alien dominationand control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of the Philippines
constitutes a clear, present andgrave danger to the security of the Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and persistentsubversion, national in scope
but international in direction,posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its
activities,there is urgent need for special legislation to cope withthis continuing menace to
the freedom and security of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of making these
findings in enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the trial courd
failed to takeproper account of the distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative fact.
Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thus:
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol
would raise a question of legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a reasonable
relationto public health, morals, and the enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of
intoxicating beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to require supplementation by rulemaking)would raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e., whether thisor that beverage is
intoxicating within the meaning of the statuteand the limits on governmental action
imposed by the Constitution. Of course what we mean by fact in each case is itselfan
ultimate conclusion founded on underlying facts and oncriteria of judgment for weighing
them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts those facts which are relevant to the
legislative judgment will not be canvassed save to determine whether there is a
rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while adjudicativefacts those which tie the
legislative enactment to the litigant are to be demonstrated and found according to the
ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38
is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio." The recital of legislative findings
implements this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities
Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action organizations" are controlledby the foreign
government controlling the worldCommunist movement and that they operate primarily
to"advance the objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court said:
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and reject
them....They are the productof extensive investigation by Committes of Congress over
morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We
certainly cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we accept
them, as we mustas a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich
Communist organizations pose not only to existing governmentin the United States, but
to the United States as asovereign, independent Nation. ...we must recognize that
thepower of Congress to regulate Communist organizations of thisnature is
extensive. 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings articulated in the AntiSubversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a proposition too plain to
require elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and
transcendes every other value, "forif a society cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal
attack, ...no subordinate value can be protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in

Dennis vs. United States: 41

Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion
against dictatorial governmentsis without force where the existing structure of
government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany principle of
governmental helplessness in the face of preparationfor revolution, which principle,
carried to its logical conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it isnot
within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the government by
force and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in sectin 4
thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even throughthe governmental purpose
be legitimate and substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 42 The
requirement of knowing membership,as distinguished from nominal membership, hasbeen held
as a sufficient basis for penalizing membershipin a subversive organization. 43 For, as has been
stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization; and
when membership is acceptedor retained with knowledge that the organization is
engaged inan unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membershipwith such
knowledge makes himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section 2 merely speaks of
"overthrow"of the Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful means, misconceives
the function of the phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a
legislative declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the different acts
prescribedare stated in section 4 which requires that membershipin the Communist Party of the
Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the
first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by
forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans." The absence of this
qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and other illegal means.
Only in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow ofgovernments, and certainly
the law does not speak in metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word
"overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the clearly delineated objective of
the "overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the
Government under thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What thisCourt once said in a
prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly imported
anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it should beinterpreted in the plain and obvious
sense in which it wasevidently intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow'could not have
been intended as referring to an ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise. The
useof the whip [which the accused exhorted his audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an
instrument designed toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild
interpretation which the appellant wouldhave us impute to the language." 45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by
force, violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speechand freedom of
association is infringed by the prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party
ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the
overriding considerationsof national security and the preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his
country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many respects to the
membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety, group, or assembly of
persons who teach, advocate, orencourage the overthrow or destruction of any such

governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliatedwith, any such

society, group or assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore than twenty years, or both,
and shall be ineligible for emplymentby the United States or any department or
agencythereof, for the five years next following his conviction.... 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United States: 47
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we arehere concerned is not
constitutionally protected speech, and itwas further established that a combination to
promote suchadvocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a politicalparty, is
not such association as is protected by the firstAmendment. We can discern no reason
why membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group
engagingin this same forbidden advocacy, should receive anygreater degree of protection
from the guarantees of that Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof accommodating the exigencies of
self-preservationand the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as inthe situation described
in the legislative findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,the
legislative judgment as to how that threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of
personal freedomsis not to be set aside merely because the judgment of judgeswould, in the first
instance, have chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains freedom
tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromisebetween the claims of the social order
and individual freedom,and when the legislative compromise in either case isbrought to the
judicial test the court stands one step removedfrom the conflict and its resolution through law." 49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the last proviso of section
4 which reads:
And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother person to overthrow the
Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of its political
subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means,for the purpose of
placing such Government or political subdivisionunder the control and domination of any
lien power, shallbe punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with allthe
accessory penalties provided therefor in the same code.
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in the Communist Party
of the Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any conspiracyby two persons to overthrow
the national or any local governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha
totalitarian regime, burt a democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under
an aliencommunist power, but under an alien democratic power likethe United States or England
or Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the Philippines and
SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther Purposes"), has a short title.
Section
1
providesthat
"This
Act
shall
be
known
as
the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the statuteunequivocally
indicates that the subject matter is subversionin general which has for its fundamental purpose
the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian regime in place of theexisting Government and not merely
subversion by Communistconspiracies..
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and need not recite the
details of the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature, scope, and
consequences of the proposed lawand its operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be
avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin order not to thwart the legislative
intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.

VI. Conclusion and Guidelines

In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we cannot
overemphasize the needfor prudence and circumspection in its enforcement, operatingas it does
in the sensitive area of freedom of expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic
guidelines to be observed in any prosecution under the Act.The Government, in addition to
proving such circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish the following elementsof the
crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of the Philippines, (a)
that thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow the presentGovernment of the Philippines and
to establish in thiscountry a totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that
the accused joined such organization;and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and byovert acts;
and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP continues to pursue the
objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organizedconspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government by illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under
thecontrol of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so willfully,
knowingly and byovert acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a member of the
Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any other subversive association: weleave this matter to
future determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two
cases are herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.
G.R. No. L-45081

July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C.
MAYOR, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance
of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents,
from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against
the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of
the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as
follows:

(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as
member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number
of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the
following resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES
NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere
presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean,
como por la presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara,
being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying,
among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly
for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of
which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este
dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in
the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest",
alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to
prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be
presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the
limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the

Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the
presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after
confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the
aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a
resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ
prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as
regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of
said election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the
Government or the National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose
exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for
decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can
regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so
regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected
and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and
paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United
States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the
Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein
raised because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the
respondent Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of
the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its
resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests
against the election of any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in
the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and
regulations essential to carry out the power and functions conferred upon the same by the
fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the
petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take

cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hence said
act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of
the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not
and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election
protests filed within the time that might be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or
corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on
March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9,
1935, there was no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of
members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last
day for the filing of protests against the election of members of the National Assembly, the
Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by
reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on
December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral
Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said
respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of
January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the
jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within
which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest
filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed
with quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal,
corporation, board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article
VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it
be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme
Court;

(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of
the united States) has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the
petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent
Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by
resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal
propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to
the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy.
However, the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading
the issue. Being a case prim impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty
to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing
justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of
jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example,
the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that
this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that
a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of
two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also
the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand,
the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through
its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the
law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of
social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as
much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system
of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would
be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no
express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power
of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of
our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of
the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function
is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it
ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is
not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing
must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to
pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis,
then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible

of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935,
confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral
Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for
the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as
aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the
effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after
December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere
surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral
Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National
Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed
said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral
Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government established in our
country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown
the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a
constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by
the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not
a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority
under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the
English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of our
constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given
effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American
example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from
exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what
otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume
what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly
provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV).
The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions
are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece,
Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established
to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy
shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between
two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the
controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and
undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the
long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them.
Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon
principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the
present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of
the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the

constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second
proposition and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the
petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly,
three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by
the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional
provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the people who adopted it so that we
may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5)
laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of
the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1)
modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House
of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the
Legislative over the particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion to
characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives,
respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar
[1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding
contested elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee
submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional
Security empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of executive officers for
whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment
proceedings against specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative
protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and
six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest corresponds, three members to
be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior
Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside. The
foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the
Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the
legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from
the two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from the
two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the
executive department in the persons of two representatives to be designated by the President.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to
the Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the
Legislative Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting
the election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as
to each House, by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number
of votes therein, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of
votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as
proposed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the
Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in
favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with
reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral
Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative
Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further changes in
phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The
draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all
cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission,
composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the
National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number
of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others,
proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the
following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of
the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:
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Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first
four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its
Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the
gentleman from Capiz whether the election and qualification of the member whose elections is
not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be
judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about
the election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there
is nothing to be determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also
the election of those whose election is not contested?

Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House
of Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the
assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has
been elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes
of the auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not
authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What
happens with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election?
The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims in this case the municipal
council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the
same case; there is no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a contest.
The first clause refers to the case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite where one person
tries to be elected in place of another who was declared elected. From example, in a case when
the residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the
man who has been elected is in question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain
maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is
to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the
elections, returns and qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to
be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from
Ilocos Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate
from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as
separate from the first part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are
already included in the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and
contested elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse
to confirm the elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?

THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to
the assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and
qualification of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if
two-thirds of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they
cannot remove him for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question
the eligibility of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral
Commission and make the question before the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested
or not contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power
and authority to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even
though that question has not been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship
Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons,
Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original draft and the
draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:

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Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada
por varios Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision
Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido
protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si
enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases contesting the election", de
modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya
habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon
the following interpellation also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la
minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar
el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa
forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la
Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el
partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los
de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.
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The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the
power to decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98)
against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by
reducing the representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral
Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The
Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus
maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.

As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by
the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of
said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly,
three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by
the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the
election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee,
through President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert
the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections",
which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan
tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57,
58), gives a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties
in the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are
partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of
proceeding prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership.
One of the standing committees appointed at the commencement of each session, was
denominated the committee of privileges and elections, whose functions was to hear and
investigate all questions of this description which might be referred to them, and to report their
proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election
petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses and other
evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the form
of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode
of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court was adopted, the
case was heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as by a committee.
The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee. The committee of
privileges and elections although a select committee was usually what is called an open one; that
is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named was required to
be present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote if
they pleased.

154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership
gradually assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770,
controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere party
questions, upon which the strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in
1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government, resigned his office in
consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial
of election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every principle of decency and justice
were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house were
insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious
matters, and in questions of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a
distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and,
on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to
regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in parliament." In his
speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing practice in
the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the principal
dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously notorious
that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly
self-elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of
our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this
house, who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist
themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the
very business, upon which they should determine with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which
met with the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770.
This was the celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell
declares, that it "was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the
security of the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable,
that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have led many of the
contemporaries of the measure to the information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in
by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent
experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the
common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James
Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an essential alteration of
the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most important rights and
jurisdictions of the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the nonpartisan settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to
two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance
with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become
imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as
amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2;
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws
Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In
the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the Committee of the
House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of
Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried
in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election of
members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court
(Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19)
and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to
decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the

purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919
(art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the
Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral
Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature
and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of
1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two
opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency,
Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37,
pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by the
Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme
Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of the
commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting separately. Although
there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this regard,
judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body on the part of the
Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate Power
under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25
et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their
majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the
history and political development of other countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it
wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the
exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own
experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The
creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers
of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of
the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a
vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the
creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the
people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to
transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much
the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the longfelt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the
people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the
Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and
minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was
created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of
the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the
legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the
Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very
indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of

the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express
prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S.D.,
260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that
said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the
commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the
commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with
the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National
Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this
authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the
resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of
the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to,
but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and
whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be
remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National
Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the
entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of
the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner
regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the
national Assembly as a coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its
acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in
the admission of protests against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out
hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be
filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is
also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence
of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests
before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission
may abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the
disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But
the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power
that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the
creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the
remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy.
All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We
believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much
confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as
they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the

agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and
each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be
deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for
which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional
agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of
human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however
illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may
exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are
considerations of equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the
intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on
November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in
section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on
November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara was approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The
pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does appear
that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a
resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protest. When, therefore, the
National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it
appear that said body had actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified
copies of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the
record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the
six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively
designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting
or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly
on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases had
already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to
organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its
exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been
contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of
members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3,
1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the
election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was
still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as
depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the
sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the
National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have been
filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the
protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not
required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of
fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a memberelect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No.
1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).

Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the
United States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his
seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such
return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office
(Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25,
26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is adverse to
the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is
certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such
certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the Journals, and to give
such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or
for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125,
sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house itself is
generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the return
(Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine
Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be
filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole
judge of the election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act
No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of
filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed
by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution
confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose election no protests had
been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further
protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall
[Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third
District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine
Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu],
Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate],
Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The
Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be
deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine
all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that
power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which authorized the National
Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of
contests against the election of its members. And what the National Assembly could not do
directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of
separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often
makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof,
the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism
devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers
and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than
to any of the other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each
house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its
members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and
complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules
and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object
would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and
regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law
making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387
empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against
the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or
bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential
before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the
National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no
protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election
of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent

Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution
of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing
protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a
constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the
present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is
an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.