Research on Speedy Disposition

SPEEDY DISPOSITION:
A Constitutionally Guaranteed Right

According to the Supreme Court in

Coscolluela v. Sanbiganbayan (First
Division) and People of the Philippines1:

Speedy disposition, broader concept than

the speedy trial.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases
encompasses the broader purview of the
entire proceedings of which trial proper is
but a stage. As held in Dansal v. Fernandez,
Sr.:4

A persons right to the speedy disposition of

his case is guaranteed under Section 16,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:

Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV

of the 1973 Constitution, the constitutional
provision o[on speedy disposition of cases]
is one of three provisions mandating
speedier dispensation of justice. 5 It
guarantees the right of all persons to a
speedy disposition of their case; includes
within its contemplation the periods
before, during and after trial, and affords
broader protection than Section 14(2),6
which guarantees just the right to a
speedy trial. It is more embracing than the
protection under Article VII, Section 15,
which covers only the period after the
submission of the case. 7
The present
constitutional provision applies to civil,
criminal
and
administrative
cases. 8
(emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations in original)

SEC. 16. All persons shall have

the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.
This constitutional right is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends
to all parties in all cases, be it civil or
administrative in nature, as well as all
proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial.
In this accord, any party to a case may
demand expeditious action to all officials
who are tasked with the administration of
justice.2

Speedy Disposition: Not a Mathematical

Concept
The right to speedy disposition of cases
should be understood to be a relative or
flexible concept such that a mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved
would not be sufficient.3

It is, in criminal cases however where

the need to a speedy disposition of their
cases is more pronounced. It is so,
because in criminal cases, it is not only
the honor and reputation but even the

4
5
6

Rafael L. Coscolluela v. Sanbiganbayan (First

Division) and People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
191411, 15 July 2013.
Citing Roquero v. Chancellor of UP-Manila, G.R. No.
181851, 09 March 2010 (614 SCRA 723, 732);
citations omitted.
Coscolluela, citing Enriquez v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 174902-06, 15 February 2008
(545 SCRA 618, 626).

7
8

G.R. No. 126814, 02 March 2000 (383 Phil. 897, 905).

Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, 1996, p. 489.
Art. III, Sec 14 (2). " In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
(underscoring supplied)
Bernas, id., citing Talabon vs. Iloilo Provincial Warden,
78 Phil 599.
Bernas, id.

liberty of the accused (even life itself before

9
10
the enactment of R.A. 9346 ) is at stake.
What is the objective of the right to speedy
disposition of cases?
The right to speedy disposition of cases is
not merely hinged towards the objective of
spurring dispatch in the administration of
justice but also to prevent the oppression of
the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time.
Akin to the right to speedy trial, its salutary
objective is to assure that an innocent
person may be free from the anxiety and
expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of
having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation
and
consideration
of
whatsoever legitimate defense he may
interpose.11 This looming unrest as well as
the tactical disadvantages carried by the
passage of time should be weighed against
the State and in favor of the individual.

WHEN is the right to speedy disposition

VIOLATED?
Jurisprudence dictates that the right to
speedy disposition is deemed violated only
when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements
of the trial are asked for and secured; or
even without cause or justifiable motive, a
long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.12

9
10

11
12

An Act Prohibiting The Imposition Of Death Penalty In

The Philippines
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Criminal Case
No. SB-08-CRM-0266, quoted in People of the
Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, First Division, et
al., G.R. No. 188165, 11 December 2013.
Mari v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 187728, September 12,
2011, 657 SCRA 414, 423.
Roquero v. Chancellor of UP-Manila, supra.

What are the factors which must be

considered in assessing whether the right
to speedy disposition is violated?
In the determination of whether the
defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy disposition of a case, the following
factors may be considered and balanced:
1. the length of delay;
2. the reasons for the delay;
3. the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused; and
4. the prejudice caused by the delay.13
Preparation of the Resolution, not
considered as end of Preliminary
Investigation, for purposes of assessing
violation/non-violation of the right to
speedy disposition of cases.
In Cosculluela, the Supreme Court did not
lend credence to the Sandiganbayans
position that the conduct of preliminary
investigation was terminated as early as
March 27, 2003, or the time when Graft
Investigation Officer Butch E. Caares
prepared the Resolution recommending the
filing of the Information.
According to the High Court, such position
is belied by Section 4, Rule II of the
Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10,
1990, otherwise known as the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
which provides:
SEC. 4. Procedure The preliminary
investigation of cases falling under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in
the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the
following provisions:
xxx

xxx

xxx

No information may be filed and no

complaint may be dismissed without the
written authority or approval of the
13

Id., at 733.

ODESSA GRACE E. GONZAGA | Last Updated on 09 December 2016.

Ombudsman in cases falling within the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of the
proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other
cases. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The above-cited provision readily reveals

that there is no complete resolution of a case
under preliminary investigation until the
Ombudsman approves the investigating
officers recommendation to either file an
Information with the SB or to dismiss the
complaint. Therefore, the preliminary
investigation
proceedings
were
not
terminated upon Caares preparation of the
Resolution and Information on 27 March
2003 but rather, only at the time Acting
Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro finally
approved the same for filing with the SB. In
this regard, the proceedings were terminated
only on 21 May 2009, or almost eight (8)
years after the filing of the complaint.
Finally, the Office of the Ombudsman
should create a system of accountability in
order to ensure that cases before it are
resolved with reasonable dispatch and to
equally expose those who are responsible for
its delays, as it ought to determine in this
case.
Can the Sandiganbayan use the excuse the
delay
in
preliminary
investigation
proceedings of the Ombudsman by the
fact that the case had to undergo careful
review and revision through the different
levels therein, in addition to the steady
stream of cases which the Ombudsman
had to resolve?
NO. The Office of the Ombudsman was
created under the mantle of the Constitution,
mandated to be the protector of the people
and as such, required to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner
against officers and employees of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, in order to

promote efficient service.14 This great

responsibility cannot be simply brushed
aside by ineptitude.
Precisely, the Office of the Ombudsman has
the inherent duty not only to carefully go
through the particulars of case but also to
resolve the same within the proper length of
time. Its dutiful performance should not
only be gauged by the quality of the
assessment but also by the reasonable
promptness of its dispensation. Thus,
barring any extraordinary complication,
such as the degree of difficulty of the
questions involved in the case or any event
external thereto that effectively stymied its
normal work activity any of which have
not been adequately proven by the
prosecution in the case at bar there appears
to be no justifiable basis as to why the
Office of the Ombudsman could not have
earlier resolved the preliminary investigation
proceedings.15
Notice of the on-going investigation or
termination
thereof,
necessary
in
determining assertion or non-assertion by
the accused of its right to speedy
disposition.
In the Cosculluela case, the Supreme Court
found that the accused cannot be faulted for
their alleged failure to assert their right to
speedy disposition of cases.
Records show that accused could not have
urged the speedy resolution of their case
because they were unaware that the
investigation against them was still ongoing. They were only informed of the 27
March 2003 Resolution and Information
against them only after the lapse of six (6)
long years, or when they received a copy of

14
15

Enriquez v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos.

174902-06, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 627-630.
Rafael L. Coscolluela v. Sanbiganbayan (First
Division) and People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
191411, 15 July 2013.

ODESSA GRACE E. GONZAGA | Last Updated on 09 December 2016.

the latter after its filing with the SB on 19

June 2009.
In this regard, they could have reasonably
assumed that the proceedings against them
have already been terminated. This serves
as a plausible reason as to why accused
never followed-up on the case altogether.
Instructive on this point is the Courts
observation in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,16
to wit:
Petitioners in this case, however, could
not have urged the speedy resolution of
their case because they were completely
unaware that the investigation against
them was still on-going. Peculiar to this
case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners
were merely asked to comment, and not file
counter-affidavits which is the proper
procedure to follow in a preliminary
investigation.
After
giving
their
explanation and after four long years of
being in the dark, petitioners, naturally,
had reason to assume that the charges
against them had already been dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the
Ombudsman failed to present any plausible,
special or even novel reason which could
justify the four-year delay in terminating its
investigation. Its excuse for the delay the
many layers of review that the case had to
undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had
to entail has lost its novelty and is no
longer appealing, as was the invocation in
the Tatad case. The incident before us does
not involve complicated factual and legal
issues, specially (sic) in view of the fact that
the subject computerization contract had
been mutually cancelled by the parties
thereto even before the Anti-Graft League
filed its complaint. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Being the respondents in the preliminary

investigation proceedings, it was not the
accuseds duty to follow up on the
prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsmans
responsibility to expedite the same within
the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view

of its mandate to promptly act on all

complaints lodged before it. As pronounced
in the case of Barker v. Wingo:17
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to
trial; the State has that duty as well as the
duty of insuring that the trial is consistent
with due process.

Reckless
Reasoning:
Ombudsmans
authority is vested by law, hence,
Ombudsman cannot be divested thereof
by mere claim of delay.
The argument that the authority of the
Ombudsman is not divested by the claimed
delay in filing the information as this
authority is vested by law is a reckless
reasoning that only shows that while
admitting there was undue delay in the
disposition of the case, it could still proceed
with its information to charge the accused.
In People v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, First
Division,18 the Supreme Court quoted the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) 19, when
the latter said:
The prosecution need not be reminded of the
uniform ruling of the Honorable Supreme
Court dismissing the cases of Tatad,
Angchangco, Duterte and other cases for
transgressing the constitutional rights of the
accused to a speedy disposition of cases. To
argue that the authority of the Ombudsman
is not divested by the claimed delay in filing
the information xxx is to limit the power of
the Court to act on blatant transgression of
the constitution.

It must be remembered that delay in

instituting prosecutions is not only
productive of expense to the State, but
of peril to public justice in the
attenuation and distortion, even by mere
natural lapse of memory, of testimony.
It is the policy of the law that
17
18

16

G.R. No. 130191, 27 April 1998 (352 Phil. 557, 582583).

19

407 U.S. 514 (1972).

People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, First
Division, et al., G.R. No. 188165, 11 December 2013.
In Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266.

ODESSA GRACE E. GONZAGA | Last Updated on 09 December 2016.

prosecutions should be prompt, and that

statutes, enforcing such promptitude
should be vigorously maintained. They
are not merely acts of grace, but checks
imposed by the State upon itself, to
exact vigilant activity from its
subalterns, and to secure for criminal
trials the best evidence that can be
obtained. 20
In determining violation of the right to
speedy disposition, a Fact-Finding
Investigation
conducted
by
an
Ombudsman Field Investigation Office
(FIO) should not deemed separate from
the preliminary investigation conducted
the Office of the Ombudsman.
The guarantee of the speedy disposition of
cases under Section 16 of Article III of the
Constitution applies to all cases pending
before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies.
Thus, the factfinding investigation should not be deemed
separate from the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
if the aggregate time spent for both
constitutes inordinate and oppressive delay
in the disposition of any case. 21
It is baseless to capitalize on what the
Ombudsman supposedly did in the process
of the fact-finding stance; and then
reasoning out as if clutching on straws that
the sequences of events should excuse it
from lately filing the information. But it
took the Ombudsman six (6) years to
conduct the said fact-finding investigation,
and then unabashedly it argues that is not
part of the preliminary investigation.
Determining probable cause should usually
take no more than ninety (90) days precisely
20

21

Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Criminal Case

No. SB-08-CRM-0266, quoted in People of the
Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, First Division, et
al., G.R. No. 188165, 11 December 2013.
People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, First
Division, et al., G.R. No. 188165, 11 December 2013.

because it only involves finding out whether

there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the persons charged could be held for trial or
not. It does not require sifting through and
meticulously examining every piece of
evidence to ascertain that they are enough to
convict the persons involved beyond
reasonable doubt. That is already the
function of the Courts.
The conclusion thus, that the long waiting of
six (6) years for the Office of the
Ombudsman to resolve the simple case of
Robbery is clearly an inordinate delay,
blatantly intolerable, and grossly prejudicial
to the constitutional right of speedy
disposition of cases, easily commands
assent. Nonetheless, it must be made clear,
that issuing this ruling is not making nor
indulging in mere mathematical reckoning
of the time involved. 22
What test should be applied in assessing
the prejudice caused by the delay?

22

Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Criminal Case

No. SB-08-CRM-0266, quoted in People of the
Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, First Division, et
al., G.R. No. 188165, 11 December 2013.
In the same case, the Supreme Court, on the issue of
inordinate delay, held that:
There was really no sufficient justification
tendered by the State for the long delay of
more than five years in bringing the charges
against the respondents before the proper
court. On the charge of robbery under
Article 293 in relation to Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code, the preliminary
investigation would not require more
than five years to ascertain the relevant
factual and legal matters. The basic
elements of the offense, that is, the
intimidation or pressure allegedly exerted
on Cong. Jimenez, the manner by which
the money extorted had been delivered,
and the respondents had been identified as
the perpetrators, had been adequately
bared before the Office of the Ombudsman.
x x x.

ODESSA GRACE E. GONZAGA | Last Updated on 09 December 2016.

Closely related to the length of delay is the

reason or justification of the State for such
delay. Different weights should be assigned
to different reasons or justifications invoked
by the State. For instance, a deliberate
attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper
or prejudice the defense should be weighted
heavily against the State. Also, it is
improper for the prosecutor to intentionally
delay to gain some tactical advantage over
the defendant or to harass or prejudice him.
On the other hand, the heavy case load of
the prosecution or a missing witness should
be weighted less heavily against the State. x
x x (emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

The test that should be applied in assessing

the prejudice caused by the delay is the
balancing test.
In the context of the right to a speedy trial,
the Court in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan23
illumined:
A balancing test of applying societal
interests and the rights of the accused
necessarily compels the court to approach
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the
light of the interest of the defendant that the
speedy trial was designed to protect,
namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and
concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit
the possibility that his defense will be
impaired. Of these, the most serious is the
last, because the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system. There is also
prejudice if the defense witnesses are
unable to recall accurately the events of
the distant past. Even if the accused is not
imprisoned prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty
and by living under a cloud of anxiety,
suspicion and often, hostility. His
financial resources may be drained, his
association is curtailed, and he is
subjected to public obloquy.

Unreasonable delay of more than ten (10)

years, violative of the right to speedy
disposition; Reorganization not a valid
excuse; speedy disposition applies also
when the case is already submitted for
decision.
In Licaros v. the Sandiganbayan,24 the
Supreme Court held:
The unreasonable delay of more than ten
(10) years to resolve a criminal case, without
fault on the part of the accused and despite
his earnest effort to have his case decided,
violates the constitutional right to the speedy
disposition of a case. Unlike the right to a
speedy trial, this constitutional privilege
applies not only during the trial stage, but
also when the case has already been
submitted for decision.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the

government that bears the burden of proving
its case beyond reasonable doubt. The
passage of time may make it difficult or
impossible for the government to carry its
burden. The Constitution and the Rules do
not require impossibilities or extraordinary
efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or
the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such
right shall deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals.
As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the
accused despite a delay, it must show two
things: (a) that the accused suffered no
serious prejudice beyond that which ensued
from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and
(b) that there was no more delay than is
reasonably attributable to the ordinary
processes of justice.

xxx

Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 899, 917-919

(2004)

xxx

The failure of the Sandiganbayan to decide

the case even after the lapse of more than
ten years after it was submitted for decision
involves more than just a mere
procrastination in the proceedings. From the
explanation given by the Sandiganbayan, it
appears that the case was kept in idle
slumber, allegedly due to reorganizations in
the divisions and the lack of logistics and
facilities for case records. Had it not been
for the filing of this Petition for Mandamus,
petitioner would not have seen any
development in his case, much less the
eventual disposition thereof. The case
24

23

xxx

Abelardo B. Licaros v. The Sandiganbayan and The

Special Prosecutor, G.R. No. 145851, 22 November
2001.

ODESSA GRACE E. GONZAGA | Last Updated on 09 December 2016.

remains unresolved up to now, with only

respondent courts assurance that at this time
work is being done on the case for the
preparation and finalization of the decision

complaint by stating that no political

motivation appears to have tainted the
prosecution of the case.
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

In sum, we hold that the dismissal of the

criminal case against petitioner for violation
of his right to a speedy disposition of his
case is justified by the following
circumstances: (1) the 10-year delay in the
resolution of the case is inordinately long;
(2) petitioner has suffered vexation and
oppression by reason of this long delay; (3)
he did not sleep on his right and has in fact
consistently asserted it, (4) he has not
contributed in any manner to the long delay
in the resolution of his case, (5) he did not
employ any procedural dilatory strategies
during the trial or raised on appeal or
certiorari any issue to delay the case, (6) the
Sandiganbayan did not give any valid reason
to justify the inordinate delay and even
admitted that the case was one of those that
got buried during its reorganization, and (7)
petitioner was merely charged as an
accessory after the fact.

We cannot accept the Special Prosecutors

ratiocination. It is the duty of the prosecutor
to speedily resolve the complaint, as
mandated by the Constitution, regardless of
whether the petitioner did not object to the
delay or that the delay was with his
acquiescence provided that it was not due to
causes directly attributable to him.
Consequently,
we
rule
that
the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in not quashing the information for violation
of petitioners Constitutional right to the
speedy disposition of the case in the level of
the Special Prosecutor, Office of the
Ombudsman.

For too long, petitioner has suffered in

agonizing anticipation while awaiting the
ultimate resolution of his case. The
inordinate and unreasonable delay is
completely
attributable
to
the
Sandiganbayan. No fault whatsoever can be
ascribed to petitioner or his lawyer. It is now
time to enforce his constitutional right to
speedy disposition and to grant him speedy
justice.

May the fact that no political motivation

attended the prosecution be validly raised
against an alleged violation of the right to
speedy disposition?
No. In Cervantes v. The Sandiganbayan
(First Division), et al.,25 the Supreme Court
held that there was violation of the right to
speedy disposition of cases, after finding
that:
The Special Prosecutor try to justify the
inordinate delay in the resolution of the
25

Elpidio C. Cervantes v. The Sandiganbayan (First

Division), The Special Prosecutor, and Pedro
Almendras, G.R. No. 108595, 18 May 1999.

ODESSA GRACE E. GONZAGA | Last Updated on 09 December 2016.