x6. MAGBANUA VS. UY- ART.

6
FACTS:
As a consequence of the final and executory decision of the Supreme Court in Rizalino
Uy vs NLRC,et.al, the NLRC conducted hearings to determine the amount of wage differentials
due to the 8 complainants (now petitioners).
On February 13, 1997, the petitioner filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution.
Rizalino Uy filed a Manifestation requesting that the cases be terminated and closed,
stating that the judgement award as computed has been complied with to the satisfaction of the
petitioners. Said Manifestation was also signed by the 8 petitioners. Together with the
manifestation was a Joint Affidavit dated May 5, 1997, attesting the receipt of payment from
respondent and waiving all other benefits due them in connection with the complaint.
On October 20, 1997, 6 out of 8 petitioners filed a Manifestation requesting that the
cases be considered closed and terminated as they were already satisfied of what they have
received. They also attested that they have no more collectible amount from respondent and if
there is any, they are abandoning and waiving the same.
The LA issued an order denying the Writ of Execution and considered the cases closed
and terminated. The NLRC reversed the decision holding that a final and executory judgement
can no longer be altered and that quit claims and releases are normally frowned upon as
contrary to public policy. The CA ruled that compromise agreements may be entered into even
after the final judgement.
ISSUES: 1. W/N the final and executory judgement of SC could be subject to compromise
agreements.
2. W/N the petitioners affidavit waiving their awards in the labor case executed
without the assistance of their counsel and labor arbiter is valid.
HELD:
1. There is no justification to disallow a compromise agreement, solely because it was entered
into after final judgment. The validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the
requisites and principles of contracts, not by when it was entered into. Petitioners voluntarily
entered into the compromise agreement. Circumstances also reveal that respondent has already
complied with its obligation pursuant to the compromise agreement. Having already benefited
from the agreement, estoppel bars petitioners from challenging it.
2. The presence or the absence of counsel when a waiver is executed does not determine its
validity. There is no law requiring the presence of a counsel to validate a waiver. The test is
whether it was executed voluntarily, freely and intelligently; and whether the consideration for it
was credible and reasonable. Where there is clear proof that a waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or a gullible person, the law must step in to annul s uch transaction. In the present
case, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that their consent had been vitiated.

7. FF CRUZ INC VS. HR CONSTRUCTION- ART. 6

Facts:
In 2004, FFCCI entered into a contract with the Department of Public Works and Highways for
the construction of the Lower Agusan Development Project. On August 9, 2004, FFCCI, in turn,
entered into a Subcontract Agreement with HR Construction Corporation (HRCC) for the supply
of materials, labor, equipment, tools and supervision for the construction of a portion of the said
project called the East Bank Levee and Cut-Off Channel in accordance with the specifications of
the main contract. In the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly
progress billing which the latter would then pay, subject to stipulated deductions, within 30 days
from receipt thereof. The parties agreed that the requests of HRCC for payment should include
progress accomplishment of its completed works as approved by FFCCI. They agreed to conduct
a joint measurement of the completed works of HRCC together with the representative of
DPWH and consultants to arrive at a common quantity. HRCC commenced the construction of
the works pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. However, before the project was completed,
HRCC pursuant to the arbitration clause in the subcontract agreement filed with the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission a complaint praying that FFCI pay the overdue
application plus legal interests they have not paid. FFCCI maintained that HRCC failed to
comply with the condition stated under the Subcontract Agreement for the payment of the
latters progress billings.
Issue:
Whether or not FFCCI is already barred from contesting HRCCs valuation of the completed
works having waived its right to demand the joint measurement requirement.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that FFCCI had waived its right to demand for a joint measurement of
HRCCs completed works under the Subcontract Agreement. On account of its failure to
demand the joint measurement of HRCCs completed works, had effectively waived its right to
ask for the conduct of the same as a condition sine qua non to HRCCs submission of its monthly
progress billings. Basically, the instant issue calls for a determination as to which of the parties
respective valuation of accomplished works should be given credence. FFCCI claims that its
valuation should be upheld since the same was the result of a measurement of the completed
works conducted by it and the DPWH. On the other hand, HRCC maintains that its valuation
should be upheld on account of FFCCIs failure to observe the joint measurement requirement
in ascertaining the extent of its completed works. FFCCI admits that in all three instances where
it paid HRCC for its progress billings, it never required compliance with the afore quoted
contractual provision of a prior joint quantification. Such repeated omission may reasonably be
construed as a waiver by FFCCI of its contractual right to require compliance of said condition
and it is now too late in the day to so impose it. Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides that
rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals
or good customs. The tribunal cannot see any such violation in this case.

8. BERNABE VS. ALEJO- ART 4 ( ART. 6 SABI NI SIR WALANG CONNECT)

BERNABE VS ALEJO

Facts:
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo and
was named Adrian Bernabe who was born on September 18, 1981. After Ernesto Bernabe and
Rosalina, his legal wife died, the only heir left is Erestina. Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed a
complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe
and be given a share of his fathers estate.

ISSUE:
W/NAdrian Bernabe can petition for compulsory recognition now that his alleged father is dead.

HELD:
Yes, Adrian Bernabe can petition for compulsory recognition even when his alleged father is
already dead.

RATIONALE:
The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, Adrian was only 7 years old then and he was
only 12 years old when his father died.The Supreme Courtruled that Adrians right to an action
for recognition which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, hadalready vested prior to
the enactment of the Family Code.Article 255 of the Civil Code states:This codeshall have
retroactiveeffect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Article285 of the Civil Code states:
The action for recognition of the natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of thepresumed parents except in the following cases: (1) If the
father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case thelatter may file the action
before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; (2) If after the death of
the fatheror of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in
which either or both parents recognize thechild. In this case, the action must be commenced
within four years from the finding of the document.The petition for compulsory recognition was
filed by Carolina on behalf of Adrian on May 16, 1994, when Adrian was still a minor or13 years
old. This is well before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority.

9. METRO INVESTMENT VS. ESTE DEL SOL- ART. 7

Facts:

First Metro Investment Corporation granted Este Del Sol a loan amounting to P7,385,500.00 to
finance a sports/resort complex. The said loan shall be released on staggered basis bearing 16%
interest per annum payable in 36 equal and consecutive monthly amortization. In case of
default, acceleration clause was provided and amount due shall be subject to 20% one time
penalty on the amount still due bearing interest at the highest rate permitted by law until full
payment plus liquidated damages at the rate of 2% per month compounded quarterly with
attorneys fee equivalent to 25% of the sum sought to be recovered which shall not be lawyer
than P20,000.00

In connection with the loan agreement, Este del Sol executed several documents as security for
payment a Real Estate Mortgage over 2 parcels of land being utilized as the site of its
development project and individual Continuing Suretyship agreements by co-respondents , to
guarantee the payment of all the obligations of respondent Este del Sol up to the aggregate sum
of P7,500,000 00. An underwriting Agreement was also executed for annunderwriting fee of
P200,000 payable to FMIC with supervision fee of P200,000.00 and a consultancy fee of
P332,500 both per annum for a period of 4 years.

Upon default of payment, the REM was foreclosed atba oublic auction where petitioner was the
highest bidder. Petitioner diled to collect for alleged deficiency balance against respondents
since it failed to collect from sureties plus the 20% interest per annum. Respondents appealed to
the CA which held that fees provided in the Underwriting and Consultancy Agreement
camouflaged the execessively usurious interest charged. The Ca further ordered the to
reimburse what is due the petitioner and the respondent.
Issue: W/N the Central Bank Circular No. 905 repeal the Usury Law thus allowing the rates provided for
in the contracts
Held:

There is no merit to petitioner FMICs contention that Central Bank Circular No. 905 which took
effect on January 1, 1983 and removed the ceiling on interest rates for secured and unsecured
loans, regardless of maturity, should be applied retroactively to a contract executed on January
31, 1978, as in the case at bar, that is, while the Usury Law was in full force and effect. It is an
elementary rule of contracts that the laws, in force at the time the contract was made and
entered into, govern it. More significantly, Central Bank Circular No. 905 did not repeal nor in
any way amend the Usury Law but simply suspended the latters effectivity. The illegality of
usury is wholly the creature of legislation. A Central Bank Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a
law can repeal another law. Thus, retroactive application of a Central Bank Circular cannot, and
should not, be presumed
4

10. SAMSON VS. DAWAY

FACTS:
The petitioner and owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes Manufacturing Corporation allegedly
sold for offers the sale of garment products using the trademark CATERPILLAR to the
prejudice of the Caterpillar Incorporated. The respondent filed a case before the RTC. The
petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense. He contended that
under Section 170 of RA 8293, the penalty of imprisonment for unfair competition does not
exceed 6 years hence the offense is cognizable by the MTC and not by the RTC. RA. No 7691, a
prior law, provides that the offense is triable and cognizable before the RTC.
ISSUES: W/N the RA 8293 will prevail over RA 7691.
HELD:
The court ruled that in Section 163 of RA 8293, actions for unfair competitions shall be brought
before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. The law
contemplated in Section 163 of RA 8293 is the RA 166 otherwise known as the Trademark Law.
Section 27 of the Trademark Law provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of
registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and description/representation
is lodged before the Court of First Instance (now RTC). Since RA 7691 is a general law and
RA 8293 in relation to the Trademark Law is a special law, the latter prevails.
Henceforth, the unfair competition case should therefore be filed before the RTC.

NOTE:
RA 8293- Intellectual Property Law
RA 7691- Judiciary Reorganization Act
In RA 7691, cases of unfair competition with penalty not exceeding 6 year are under MTC. If it
exceeds that amount, RTC.

11. AND 18. CIR VS PRIMETOWN

5

FACTS:
On March 11, 1999, the Vice Chair of Prime town Property Group Gilbert Yap applied for
the refund or credit of income tax the respondent paid in 1997. He said that the respondent
incurred losses of Php. 71, 879,228 in 1997 and therefore not liable for income taxes. On April
14, 2000, it filed a petition before the CTA which the latter dismissed because it is beyond the 2
year prescriptive period as provided by NIRC. The CTA found the respondent filed its final
adjusted return on April 14, 1998 hence the right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that
date. The CA reversed the decision of the CTA and ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not
extinguish between a regular year and a leap year. The MR of the petitioners was denied.
Aggrieved, the petitioners brought the case to SC.
ISSUES: 1. W/N the petition was filed within the 2 year prescriptive period.
2. W/N the Administrative Code will prevail over the Civil Code.
HELD:
1. Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be
12 calendar months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the
calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain. The court held that
Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are
irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year
reglementary period.
2. Administrative Code prevails. A law may be repealed expressly or impliedly. Implied
repealed however are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and
unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is whether or not the subsequent law
encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and cannot be logically and
reasonably reconciled.
Both the Civil Code and Administrative Code deal with same subject matter which is the
computation of legal periods. Under the Administrative Code, the number of days is
irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal
periods. The court therefore held that the Administrative Code, being the most recent
law, governs the computation of legal periods.

12. LLEDO VS. LLEDO

Facts:
Cesar, branch clerk of RTC Branch 94 in Quezon City was dismissed from the service pursuant
to a complaint filed by Carmelita for immorality, abandonment, and conduct unbecoming a
public official. The decision carried with it forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual
disqualification from employment in government service. Cesars forfeiture of leave credits was
given to Carmelita by virtue of her letter begging release of the same for use in paying off their
house which was due to be foreclosed by the GSIS. In 2002, Cesar Jr., Cesars son, asked the
court for a refund of his fathers GSIS payment because the latter had been bedridden and
abandoned by his mistress, and is now under the care of Cesar Jr. The money according to him
will be used to defray his hospitalization expenses. When sought for comment, the GSIS Board
opined that Cesar is not entitled to a refund of his GSIS premiums, because it is the policy of
the GSIS not to refund GSIS premiums to those separated or dismissed from the service, unless
the dismissal provides otherwise.
The applicable law was Sec. 9 of CA No. 186, the effect of dismissal or separation from service.
Under this law, the benefits under his membership policy shall automatically forfeited to the
system except one-half of the cash or surrender value and shall be paid to members in case of
death to his beneficiary. President Marcos also issued PD No. 146 an act amending, expanding,
increasing and integrating the social security benefits of government employees and facilitating
the payment under CA no. 186.
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 9 of CA no. 186 should repeal.
Held:
No. As a general rule, repeals by implication are not favored. When statutes are in pari materia,
they should be constructed together. A law cannot be deemed repealed unless it is clearly
manifested that legislature so intended it.
The court held that PD No. 1146 did not expressly repeal CA no. 186. Under the first instance of
implied repeal, they are guided with the principle that in order to effect a repeal by implication,
the latter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent with and repugnant to the existing law that
they cannot be reconciled and made stand together. The clearest case of inconsistency must be
made before the interference of implied repeal can be drawn, for inconsistency is never
presumed.

13. BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO

7

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as
then Executive Secretary.
On December 28, 2000, the RP signed the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, with the
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No.
0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender
bilateral agreement between the USA and the RP.Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037
dated May 13, 2003, the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted
the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the
Agreement with the US government. The Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines
as persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought
against them in international tribunals.

ISSUE:
W/N the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting obligations
that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of
international law.
HELD:
The court ruled that Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute
can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or
the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both
countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement contextually
prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC,
without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its
existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of
international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction
pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both
Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.

14. TING VS. TING

Facts

Benjamin Ting and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates
in medical school. They were married on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was
already pregnant with their first child. The couple begot six children throughout their marriage.
Petitioner is an anesthesiologist while respondent is the treasurer at the hospital owned by
latters family.

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner respondent filed a
verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code claiming that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however,
only became manifest thereat.

Respondent's allegation of psychological incapacity was based on petitioners alcoholism which

affected his family relationship and profession, his compulsive gambling habit, violent nature
brought about by regular drinking and his irresponsibility and immaturity as evident in his
failure to financially support his family.

In support of her claims, she presented Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a psychiatrist who concludes
that petitioner suffer from a personality disorder as evident in his behaviors mentioned above.
The petitioner on the other hand

The lower court rendered its Decision[36] declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oates findings and the admissions
made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA then reversed the trial courts ruling stating
there was no proof of psychological incapacity as Dr. Oates conclusion was based merely on
theories and not on established facts contrary to guidelines set in Santos v. Court of Appeals and
in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.

Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the Molina ruling could not be
made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis. Such was
denied for being filed out of time. She then filed a petition for certiorari with this Court which
granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmen's motion for reconsideration. On
review, the CA reversed its first ruling and sustained the trial court's decision.

A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the
CA. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
1. W/N the CA violated the rule on stare decis
2. W/N petitioner is psychologically incapacitated
Held:
1. No. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of
law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.[49] Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,[50] necessary for
two simple reasons: economy and stability. Respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines
prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the
principle of stare decisis is no longer new. We have explained in Pesca v Pesca and in Anotnio v
Reyes that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of
the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance
therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
Key Points:
a. The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand by the thing and do not disturb
the calm.
b. Limits to Application:
it would not be followed if it were plainly unreasonable;
where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions;
the binding force of the decision was the actual principle or principles necessary for the
decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.
c. Two strains or stare decisis

vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher
courts to cases involving the same facts.
horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents
1. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution - flexible because
the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said
about it. (Justice Frankfurter)
2. statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. - inflexible because after a statute
has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal
judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had
been drafted by the Congress itself. This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the
need to preserve the courts' limited resources. (Justice Stevens)
d. 4-pronged test to determine whether court should follow
.
stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations
10

determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability;
consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to
the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation;
determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no
more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine;
find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old
rule of significant application or justification.
2. The Court reversed the trial courts and the appellate court's rulings declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio. It was held that totality of evidence
adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge
the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.The law intends to
confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened
respondents allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically
contradicting psychological evaluations. There appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion
because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamins deposition similar to what Dr. Oate
did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by
another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr.
Obras) personal interview with Benjamins brothers. Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in
favor of Dr. Obras findings.It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of
the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio

15. SORIANO VS. PEOPLE

FACTS
Hilario Soriano, then President of Rural bank of San Miguel (RBSM) was charged for estafa
through falsification of commercial documents for allegedly securing a loan of 48 million in the
name of two (2) persons, when in fact these individuals did not make any loan in the bank, nor
did the bank's officers approved or had any information about the said loan. The state
prosecutor conducted a Preliminary Investigation on the basis of letters sent by the officers of
Special Investigation of BSP together with 5 affidavits and filed two (2) separate information
against Soriano: the first Information was for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the RPC, in relation to Article 172 of the RPC
and PD 1689; and the other Information was for violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended
by PD 1795, which refers to the prohibition against the so-called DOSRI loans.
11

Petitioner argued that the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the complaint
and hence was defective for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 3(a),
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such as the statement of address of petitioner and oath and
subscription. Moreover, petitioner argued that the officers of OSI, who were the signatories to
the letter-complaint, were not authorized by the BSP Governor, much less by the Monetary
Board, to file the complaint. According to petitioner, this alleged fatal oversight violated Section
18, pars. (c) and (d) of the New Central Bank Act (RA 7653).
The trial court ruled against Soriano. Soriano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, and the
CA denied Petitioners prayer.
ISSUE/S
Whether the complaint complied with the mandatory requirements provided under Section 3(a),
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653.
HELD
In Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, the Court held that the affidavits attached to the BSP transmittal
letter complied with the mandatory requirements under the Rules of Court.
The SC held in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, after a close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the
BSP to the DOJ, that these were not intended to be the complaint, as envisioned under the
Rules. They did not contain averments of personal knowledge of the events and transactions
constitutive of any offense. The letters merely transmitted for preliminary investigation the
affidavits of people who had personal knowledge of the acts of petitioner. We ruled that these
affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, initiated the preliminary investigation. Since these
affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary
public, then there was substantial compliance with Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
The BSP letters involved in Soriano v. Hon. Casanov are not the same as the BSP letter involved
in the instant case. However, the BSP letters in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova and the BSP
letter subject of this case are similar in the sense that they are all signed by the OSI
officers of the BSP, they were not sworn to by the said officers, they all contained summaries of
their attached affidavits, and they all requested the conduct of a preliminary investigation and
the filing of corresponding criminal charges against petitioner Soriano. Thus, the principle
of stare decisis dictates that the ruling in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova be applied in
the instant case once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should
be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

16. LAND BANK VS. PAGAYATAN

FACTS:
Suntay Estate was subjected to an Operation Land Transfer. A portion of it was also subjected to
CARP. However, even after the release of Certificates of Land Ownership Award to the farmer12

beneficiaries under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), the owner of the land
remained unpaid. Thus, Lubrica, as assignee of the owner, filed a petition for determination of
just compensation with Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). The latter issued a
judgment ordering Land Bank to immediately pay the amount it stated. Land Bank posits that
the amount of just compensation to be paid is not the value given by PARAD but that of
Department
of
Agrarian
Reform
(DAR).
ISSUE:
W/N the valuation determined by the PARAD/Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) or the preliminary valuation as determined by the DAR is the proper amount to
be
deposited
under
Section
16
of
Republic
Act
No.
6657
HELD:
It is the purchase price offered by the DAR in its notice of acquisition of the land that must be
deposited in an accessible bank in the name of the landowner before taking possession of the
land not the valuation of the PARAD. Moreover, it is only after DAR has made its final
determination of the initial valuation of the land that the landowner may resort to the judicial
determination of the just compensation for the land and RA 6557 only allows the release of the
initial valuation of DAR and the Land Bank to the landowner prior to the determination by the
courts of the final just compensation due. Clearly, it is the initial valuation made by the DAR and
LBP that is contained in the letter-offer to the landowner under Section 16(a), said valuation of
which must be deposited and released to the landowner prior to taking possession of the
property

17. ABKD PARTYLIST VS. PURISIMA

Facts: RA 9335 provides a system rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and
Incentives Fund and Revenue Evaluation Board for All of the Employees of BIR and BOC. The
fund is sourced from the collection of BIR and BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year
as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC, and Civil Service Commission were tasked to promulgate and
issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, to be approved by a joint
Congressional Oversight Committee.
As taxpayers, petitioners contented that the system will transform the officials and employees of
the BIR and BOC into mercanaries and bounty hunters as they will do their best only in

13

consideration of such rewards. They also argue that the system violates the equal protection
clause, undue delegation of powers and separation of powers.
Under the Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of
power between the legislative and the executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a
way to delegate vast power to the executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining
the option to cancel particular exercise of such power without having to pass new legislation or
to repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability
as it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies.
Issue: W/N legislative veto is just.
Held: Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which,
by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or
disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a
congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to
attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to
which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or
structure of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in
enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws

19. REGINO VS PANGASINAN COLLEGES

Facts: In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and Dance
Revolution," for the construction of the school's tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was
required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each, recompensing students who purchased
tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay shall not take the final
examinations.
Petitioner, a first year computer science student at Respondent PCST, reared in a poor family and
enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Gamurot and Baladad, allegedly
disallowed her from taking the tests as compliance with PCST's policy.
petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative

14

remedies. RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action and CHED, not the courts, had
jurisdiction over the controversy. Petitioner filed the present Petition on pure questions of law.
Issues: 1. w/n the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable
2. w/n the Complaint stated sufficient cause(s) of action.
HELD:
1.

NO. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the present
case.
First, petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she
demanding it to allow her to take her final examinations; she was already enrolled in another
educational institution. A reversal of the acts complained of would not adequately redress her
grievances; under the circumstances, the consequences of respondents' acts could no longer
be undone or rectified.
Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is
competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained
of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor
are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to award
damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission.
Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the
issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner's action for
damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a
function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.

2. As a rule, every complaint must sufficiently allege a cause of action; failure to do so warrants
its dismissal. A complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what
appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.
The foregoing allegations show two causes of action; first, breach of contract; and second,
liability for tort.
Therefore, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Orders REVERSED. The trial court
is DIRECTED to reinstate the Complaint and, with all deliberate speed, to continue the proceedings
in Civil Case No. U-7541.

20.EQUITABLE BANK VS CALDERON

FACTS
In April 1986, Jose Calderon, a reputable businessman engaged in several business activities
here and abroad, and a seasoned traveller, together with some reputable business friends and
associates went to Hong Kong for business and pleasure trip. On 30 April 1986, Calderon with
friend, went to Gucci Dept Store located at the basement of the Peninsula Hotel HK. Calderon
purchased several Gucci items, with total cost thereof amounting to HK$4,030.00 (US$523.00).
He then presented and gave his credit card to the saleslady who promptly referred it to the store
cashier for verification. Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of his friend and other
15

shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon
sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter refused
to honor it, and even threatened to cut it into pieces with a pair of scissors. Deeply embarrassed
and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods
and items that he bought.
Upon his return to RP, and claiming that he suffered much torment and embarrassment on
account of EBCs wrongful act of blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card while at the Gucci,
HK, Calderon filed with the RTC at Makati City a complaint for damages against EBC. EBC
alleged that the latters credit card privileges for dollar transactions were earlier placed under
suspension on account of Calderons prior use of the same card in excess of his credit limit,
adding that Calderon failed to settle said prior credit purchase on due date, thereby causing his
obligation to become past due. EBC further asserts that Calderon also failed to maintain the
required minimum deposit of $3,000.00.
RTC ruled in favour of Calderon. EBC raised it to the CA, which affirmed RTCs decision in
favour of Calderon, only insofar as moral damages the amount of which was even reduced, and
the costs of suits are concerned are concerned. Unwilling to accept a judgment short of complete
exemption from any liability to Calderon, EBC elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE/S
WON Calderon can indemnify Equitable Banking Corp for damages
HELD
Unquestionably, respondent suffered damages as a result of the dishonor of his card. There
is, however, a material distinction between damages and injury. To quote from our decision
in BPI Express Card Corporation vs. Court of Appeals:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results
from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for
damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to
the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an
individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of
some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded;
and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.
In the situation in which respondent finds himself, his is a case of damnum absque injuria.
SC granted EBCs petition; and reversed and set aside the CAs decision.

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21. NIKKO HOTEL VS REYES

FACTS:
While drinking coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, respondent Roberto Reyes was
allegedly invited by Dr. Violeta Filart, his friend, to join her in the birthday party of the hotels
manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsurouka. During the party and when Reyes was lined up at the buffet
table, the latter was allegedly stopped by Ruby Reyes who claimed to be the Executive Secretary
of the hotel. Reyes alleged that in a loud voice, Lim asked him to leave the party. He further
stated that he tried to explain that she was invited by Dr. Filart but not long after, he was
escorted by a policeman out of the party.
17

Ruby Lim admitted he asked Reyes to leave but not under the ignominious
circumstances painted by the latter. Dr. Filart said she never invited Reyes.
Reyes claimed for damages amounting to 1 Million actual damages, 1 Million moral
damages and/or Php. 200,000 Attorneys fees.
The RTC dismissed the case and gave more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim. The
CA however, reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: W/N Nikko Hotel violated Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
The court held that the petitioner did not violate the Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Even if
respondent assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners under Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code were under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to
unnecessary ridicule nd shame.
Reyes failed to establish any proof of ill motive on the part of Lim who did all necessary
precautions to ensure that Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave. Considering
almost 20 years of service in the hotel industry, Ms Lim is experienced enough to know how to
handle such matters.
Furthermore, Reyes version of story was unsupported by failing to present a witness to back his
statement

Note: Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as
injury) refers to inflicted injury or to the consent to injury precludes recovery of damages by the
one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger even if he is not negligent in
doing so.

22. FAR EAST BANK VS PACILAN JR

Facts:
Pacilan maintains a current account with petitioner bank. He issued several postdated checks,
the last one being check no. 2434886 amounting to P680. The said check was presented to
petitioner bank for payment on April 4, 1988 but was dishonored. It appeared that the account
of Pacilan has been closed on the evening of April 4 on the ground that it was 'improperly
handled'. It appeared that the plaintiff issued four checks from March 30 - April 4, 1988
amounting in total to P7,410, on one hand, his funds in the bank only amounted to P6,981.43,
thus an overdraft of P 428.57 resulted therefrom. Then, the last check was dishonored despite
the fact that plaintiff deposited the amount the following day.Pacilan wrote a complaint to the
18

bank but after the bank did not reply, he filed an action for damages against it and the employee,
Villadelgado who closed the account. The plaintiff alleged that the immediate closure of his
account was malicious and intended to embarrass him.
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded actual damages and exemplary
damages. The bank appealed, but the CA affirmed the lower court's decision with modifications
and held that the closure of the bank of plaintiff's account despite its rules and regulation
allowing a re-clearing of a check returned for insufficiency of funds , is patently malicious and
unjustifiable. The petitioner contended that in closing the account, it acted in good faith and in
accordance with the pertinent banking rules and regulations governing the operations of a
regular demand deposit, allowing it to close an account if the depositor frequently draws checks
against insufficient funds or uncollected deposits.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages
Held: NO. The award of damages under Art. 19 of the Civil Code is unjustifiable. The petitioner
has the right to close the account of plaintiff based on the rules and regulations on regular
demand deposits. The facts do not show that the petitioner abused its rights in the exercise of its
duties. The evidence negates the existence of bad faith and malice on the part of the petitioner
bank, which are the second and third elements necessary to prove an abuse of right in violation
of Art. 19. The records also showed that indeed plaintiff has mishandled his account by issuing
checks previously against insufficient funds not just once, but more than a hundred times. The
acceptance by the bank of the deposit the day after the closure of the account cannot be
considered as bad faith nor done with malice but a mere simple negligence of its personnel. As a
result, whatever damage the plaintiff has suffered (by virtue of the subsequent dishonor of the
other checks he issued) should be borne by him alone as these was the result of his own act in
irregularly handling his account.

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23. REYES VS MAURICIO

Facts:
Eugenio owns a parcel of land in Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement
among the heirs following the death of his parents. Librada F. Mauricio and her daughter filed a
complaint before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan alleging that theyre the legal heirs of
Godofredo Mauricio who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his
predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that from 1936 until his death in May
1994,Godofredo had been working on the subject land and introduced improvements consisting
of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other permanent improvements;
that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation
of a document denominated a Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to eject respondents from
the subject property.

ISSUE:
W/N the Kasunduan is Valid and Enforceable.

HELD:
NO. Adhering to the principle that that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one
of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, mental
weakness or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection (Art. 24, New Civil
Code), In the case at bar, Plaintiff-Appellee is already eighty-one (81) years old who can neither
read nor write, thus, she just simply signs her name with her thumbmark. The Kasunduan is
Void.

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24. CANCIO VS ISIP

FACTS:
Respondent Emerencia Isip was charged with 3 counts of violation of BP 22 and another
3 counts of estafa. One of the cases involving BP 22 was dismissed because it was deposited
before 90 days from the date written in the check. Two other cases were filed to the RTC of
Pampanga and were later dismissed due to the failure of the prosecution.
The 3 counts of estafa were also filed before the RTC Pampanga which was later
dismissed. The prosecution reserved its right to file a separate civil action. Hence, the criminal
cases were dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a civil action.
On December 15, 1997, the petitioner filed the instant case for the collection of the sum
of money, seeking to recover the amount of checks which were the subject of the Estafa cases.
The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint arguing that petitioners action is barred
by the Doctrine of Res Judicata.
ISSUES: W/N even if the Estafa cases were dismissed, the petitioner could still file a
separate civil action.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the civil action could prosper. The reservation for civil action was made by the
prosecution on time. According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; civil
liability is deemed instituted with criminal case unless there is a reservation to file a separate
civil action.
On the case at bar, the complainant clearly based on culpa contractual, an independent civil
action. The cause of action was breach of the contractual obligation. Hence, it is distinct and
independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the
result of the criminal proceedings.

NOTE:
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA- also known as claim preclusion, is the Latin term for "a
matter [already] judged", and refers to either of two concepts: in both civil law and common law
legal systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject to appeal;
and the legal doctrine meant to bar (or preclude) continued litigation of a case on same issues
between the same parties

21

25. LG FOODS CORP VS. HON. FILADELFO

FACTS:
Respondent Emerencia Isip was charged with 3 counts of violation of BP 22 and another
3 counts of estafa. One of the cases involving BP 22 was dismissed because it was deposited
before 90 days from the date written in the check. Two other cases were filed to the RTC of
Pampanga and were later dismissed due to the failure of the prosecution.
The 3 counts of estafa were also filed before the RTC Pampanga which was later
dismissed. The prosecution reserved its right to file a separate civil action. Hence, the criminal
cases were dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a civil action.
On December 15, 1997, the petitioner filed the instant case for the collection of the sum
of money, seeking to recover the amount of checks which were the subject of the Estafa cases.
The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint arguing that petitioners action is barred
by the Doctrine of Res Judicata.
ISSUES: W/N even if the Estafa cases were dismissed, the petitioner could still file a
separate civil action.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the civil action could prosper. The reservation for civil action was made by the
prosecution on time. According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; civil
liability is deemed instituted with criminal case unless there is a reservation to file a separate
civil action.
On the case at bar, the complainant clearly based on culpa contractual, an independent civil
action. The cause of action was breach of the contractual obligation. Hence, it is distinct and
independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the
result of the criminal proceedings.

NOTE:
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA- also known as claim preclusion, is the Latin term for "a
matter [already] judged", and refers to either of two concepts: in both civil law and common law
legal systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject to appeal;
and the legal doctrine meant to bar (or preclude) continued litigation of a case on same issues
between the same parties

22

26. HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMEON VS. CHAN

FACTS:
The late Eduardo Simon was charged with violation of BP 22. More than 3 years later,
respondent Elvin Chan commenced with MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for collection of the
principal amount of Php. 336,000 with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment. On
August 17, 2000, Simon filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss. He argued that a civil action is
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action or he
reserves his right for separate civil action.
The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of litis pendencia. The CA however overturned
the decision. The CA said civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 are changed based on the the SCs ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Association vs Velez
where it ruled that recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 may be
prosecuted separately.
ISSUE: W/N a separate civil action could prosper
HELD:
The court reversed the CAs decision and granted the petition. It ruled that there is no civil
action to recover the value of a bouncing check. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court effective
December 1, 2000 states that in a criminal action institutes, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
UNLESS a. the offended party waives the civil action or b. the offended party waives the civil
action or he reserves his right for separate civil action.
The court ruled that criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed.
Even if the said rule is not yet in effect when Chan commenced the Civil action on August
30,2000, it could still be applied. AS A GENERAL RULE, NO VESTED RIGHT MAY
ATTACH TO ARISE FROM PROCEDURAL LAWS.
The court agreed with the CAs ruling that upon the filing of the criminal cases for BP 22, the
civil action for the recovery of the amount of the check was also impliedly instituted under
Section 1 (b) of Rule 111 of 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

23

27. LIM VS PONCE DE LEON

FACTS: On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Taha sold to Timbangcaya a motor launch M/L
"SAN RAFAEL". After a year, Timbangcaya filed a complaint alleging that Taha forcibly took
away the motor launch from him.
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan,filed with the Court of First
Instance of Palawan a case of Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Taha;
and requested Maddela to seize and impound the motor launch from plaintiff-appellant Lim
who subsequently bought the motor from Taha.
Plaintiffs-appellants pleaded to return the motor launch but the defendants-appellees refused
to.Thus they filed a complaint for damages against defendants-appellees alleging that Maddela
entered the premises of Lim without a search warrant and then and took away the hull of the
motor launch without his consent upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who was not vested with
authority to order the seizure of a private property.
Defendants-appellees denied the allegations, claiming that the motor launch was sold by Taha to
Timbangcaya and Maddela claimed that he merely obeyed the orders of his superior officer to
impound said launch.
RTC, upholding the validity of the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that "the authority
to impound evidences or exhibits orcorpus delicti in a case pending investigation is inherent in
the Provincial Fiscal who controls the prosecution,dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: 1. W/N defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of
the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was
admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime.
2. W/N defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages
allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.

HELD:
1. NONE. Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution states that a reasonable search and seizure
must be effected by means of a valid search warrant which is issued upon probable cause
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person, the judge
must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized.
2.

YES. Under Art. 32 of the New Civil Code a person whose constitutional rights have
been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer
24

or employee responsible. Hence, defendant-appellees without warrant violated plaintiffappellants constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and therefore
civilly liable.However Maddela is exculpated from liability as he was led to believe that
there was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch due to the letter and order of
his superior officer Faced with a possible disciplinary action from his Commander,
Maddela was left with no alternative but to seize the vessel

Therefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, and ordering Ponce de Leon to pay to
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim actual and moral damages

28. COJUANGCO JR VS CA

FACTS: Petitioner, a businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses having won the race,
sent letters of demand to private respondents for the collection of the prizes due him which are
being withheld on advice of Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz of the PCGG. On January 30, 1991,
this case was filed before the RTC of Manila. But before receipt of the summons, PCGG advi[s]ed
defendants that it poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize winnings Immediately,
this was communicated to Atty. Estelito Mendoza.Petitioners counsel, refused to accept the
prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court. RTC ruled that
Respondent PCSO and its then chairman Carrascoso had no authority to withhold winnings of
petitioner, since no writ of sequestration had been issued by the PCGG.Carrascoso had acted in
bad faith amounting to the persecution and harassment of petitioner and his family. [6] It thus
ordered the PCSO and Carrascoso to pay in solidum petitioners claimed winnings plus
interests. RTC issued an Order[7] for the issuance of a writ of execution. PCSO delivered the
amount to petitioner. On appeal, CA reversed and set aside RTC ruling. CA held that the former
PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG in regard to the prize
winnings of petitioner. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N CA erred in reversing RTC finding that respondent acted in bad faith.

HELD: NO. CA did not err in reversing RTC finding that respondent acted in bad faith.

25

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known
duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
Carrascosos decision to withhold petitioners winnings could not be characterized as arbitrary or
whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice but evidences shows his good faith. He acted
upon the PCGGs order and instruction but the moment he received the go signal he
immediately informed the latter with no objection and paid off all the winnings due the
plaintiff.
Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the RTC that Respondent Carrascoso
may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides that public officer or
employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in
any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages.
[(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law.]
It is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is
enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of ones duties.
In this case, petitioners right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. The
withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order
clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.

Therefore, the petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with
theMODIFICATION that Carrascoso Jr. is ORDERED TO PAY petitioner nominal damages.

26

29. CHATO VS FORTUNE TOBACCO

FACTS: On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654 which provides that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, shall be charged
an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos
(P5.00) per pack. Prior to its effectivity, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion,"
"Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the
55% ad valorem tax.Respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against
petitioner in her private capacity under Art. 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of
RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process
of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
contending that respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in
the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority, the complaint
states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and the certification
against forum shopping was signed by respondents counsel in violation of the rule that it is the
plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same.RTC denied motion to dismiss thus
elevating the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari but same was dismissed on
the ground that under Art. 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not
act with malice or bad faith. Thus, this appeal.
ISSUE: (1)W/N a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in
connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office?
(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code should govern in determining whether the instant complaint states
a cause of action?
HELD:
1. YES. A public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in
connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office. As general rule is that a
public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just
performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. However,
under Art. 32 of the Civil Code, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the
constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages even if his acts were
not so tainted with malice or bad faith.Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public
officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the
performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with
malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional
right of the plaintiff.
2. SC ruled that the decisive provision is Art. 32, being a special law, shall prevail opver the
general law (Administrative Code). The complaint in the instant case was brought under
Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an
action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will
not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The lower courts correctly denied the
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough
that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
27

Therefore, the petition is DENIED. CA decision is AFFIRMED.

28