Leg Pro Cases

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant,
vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.
AQUINO, J.:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D.
Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her.
Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical
technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos
College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in
January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They renewed their relationship.
After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding
house since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked
Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said that she
was in love with another man and that she had a child with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that
be the case, he did not mind because he loved her very much.
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and
Magdalena were secretly married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his law studies in Davao
City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and Segundino went to her hometown,
Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not really so. Segundino
convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations.
He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for the baby in
Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar
examinations. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu
Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25, 1975. Several days after his oathtaking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was
something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could
not get married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had married
Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife,
Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical
treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael.
He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of
Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an
illegitimate child before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the
complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is required to produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral
character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be
terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar.
The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a
married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was
justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not
subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly
scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually
arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances.
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed, observed that "the legislator
well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not
well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An
occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt
a saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases:
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of
marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in
consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged
her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she
did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento
vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in
the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera
vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).
(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women who had borne him
a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs.
Peralta, 101 Phil. 313).
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her
to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage,
marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to
demand money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken
relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar
(Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon
by him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse
because, anyway, they were going to get married. She used to give Puno money upon his request. After she
became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case
No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise of
marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina
and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. I will
bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in
death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586).
(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a
married woman separated from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and
begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is similar to the case of Soberano
vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano
before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and
1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels.
On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them
unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant and the
respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity.
According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. In
1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva.
This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to
warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382;
Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322;
Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for disbarment against the
respondent is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, (Chairman) Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos and de Castro, JJ., are on leave.
Fernandez and Guerrero JJ., were designated to sit in the Second Division.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 3405. June 29, 1998]
JULIETA
B.
NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY.
NARAG, respondent.
DOMINADOR
M.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus,
when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw
his or her privilege to practice law.
On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint [1] for disbarment
against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and
6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. [2]
The complainant narrated:
The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty. Dominador M.
Narag in the early seventies as a full-time college instructor in the College of Arts
and Sciences and as a professor in the Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita,
17 years old and a first year college student, enrolled in subjects handled by Atty.
Narag. Exerting his influence as her teacher, and as a prominent member of the
legal profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao, Atty.
Narag courted Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her resistance until the student
acceded to his wishes.
They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the
community, but which they managed to keep from me. It therefore came as a terrible
embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief and pain when my husband
abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous
circumstances.
It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause the employment of Ms. Espita at
the Department of Trade and Industry Central Office at Makati, Metro Manila. Out of
gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms. Espita agreed to live with Atty. Narag, her
sense of right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a member of the Bar.
It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador M. Narag has
abandoned us, his family, to live with a 22-year-old woman, who was his former
student in the tertiary level[.][3]
This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [4]
On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan received from complainant
another letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint. She alleged therein that (1) she
fabricated the allegations in her complaint to humiliate and spite her husband; (2) all the love letters
between the respondent and Gina Espita were forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from emotional
confusion arising from extreme jealousy. The truth, she stated, was that her husband had remained a
faithful and responsible family man. She further asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous
relationship with one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family.[5] Supporting her letter were an Affidavit of
Desistance[6] and a Motion to Dismiss,[7]attached as Annexes A and B, which she filed before the IBP
commission on bar discipline.[8] In a Decision dated October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of
Governors [9] dismissed the complaint of Mrs. Narag for failure to prosecute. [10]
The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this Court [11] received another
letter[12] from the complainant, with her seven children [13] as co-signatories, again appealing for the
disbarment of her husband. She explained that she had earlier dropped the case against him
because of his continuous threats against her.[14]
In his Comment on the complainants letter of November 11, 1991, filed in compliance with this
Courts Resolution issued on July 6, 1992, [15] respondent prayed that the decision of the Board of
Governors be affirmed. Denying that he had threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife, he alleged
that she had voluntarily executed her Affidavit of Desistance [16] and Motion to Dismiss,[17] even
appearing before the investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under oath that she
prepared the Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on her own free will and affirmed the
contents thereof.
In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied abandoning his family
to live with his paramour. However, he described his wife as a person emotionally disturbed, viz.:
What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably jealous and
possessive woman, and every time the streak of jealousy rears its head, she fires
off letters or complaints against her husband in every conceivable forum, all without
basis, and purely on impulse, just to satisfy the consuming demands of her loving
jealousy. Then, as is her nature, a few hours afterwards, when her jealousy cools
off, she repents and feels sorry for her acts against the Respondent. Thus, when
she wrote the Letter of November 11, 1991, she was then in the grips of one of her
bouts of jealousy.[18]
On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the Comment of respondent
to the IBP.[19] In the hearing before IBP Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose, respondent alleged the
following:[20]
2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him not even a
square meter of land, but gave him the best legacy in life: a purposeful and
meaningful education.Complainant comes from what she claims to be very rich
parents who value material possession more than education and the higher and
nobler aspirations in life. Complainant abhors the poor.
3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle ways of love,
forgiveness, humility, and concern for the poor. Complainant was reared and raised
in an entirely different environment. Her value system is the very opposite.
4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he could in thirtyeight (38) years of marriage to protect and preserve his family. He gave his family
sustenance, a comfortable home, love, education, companionship, and most of all,
a good and respected name. He was always gentle and compassionate to his wife
and children. Even in the most trying times, he remained calm and never inflicted
violence on them. His children are all now full-fledged professionals, mature, and
gainfully employed. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social institution.
On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy, Complainant has
been systematically and unceasingly destroying the very foundations of their
marriage and their family. Their marriage has become a torture chamber in which
Your Respondent has been incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED,
TORTURED, ABUSED, and HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and emotionally, by
the Complainant, in public and at home. Their marriage has become a nightmare.
For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the pain of his
misfortune with dignity and with almost infinite patience, if only to preserve their
family and their marriage. But this is not to be. The Complainant never mellowed
and never became gentl[e], loving, and understanding. In fact, she became more
fierce and predatory.
Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent does not
seem in sight. The darkness continues to shroud the marital and familial landscape.
Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from
enslavement. Paraphrasing Dorfman in Death and the Maiden, can the torturer and
the tortured co-exist and live together?
Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and uncompromising mind
whose only obsession now is to destroy, destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent,
with perpetual regret and with great sorrow, filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. x x x.
5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending. But your
Respondent never revealed these destructive qualities to other people. He
preserved the good name and dignity of his wife. This is in compliance with the
marital vow to love, honor or obey your spouse, for better or for worse, in sickness
and in health. . . Even in this case, Your Respondent never revealed anything
derogatory to his wife. It is only now that he is constrained to reveal all these things
to defend himself.
On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage, Complainant tells
everyone, everywhere, that her husband is worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and
immoral. She goes to colleges and universities, professional organizations,
religious societies, and all other sectors of the community to tell them how evil, bad
and immoral her husband is. She tells them not to hire him as professor, as
Counsel, or any other capacity because her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is
this love? Since when did love become an instrument to destroy a mans dearest
possession in life - his good name, reputation and dignity?
Because of Complainants virulent disinformation campaign against her husband,
employing every unethical and immoral means to attain his ends, Your Respondent
has been irreparably and irreversibly disgraced, shamed, and humiliated. Your
Respondent is not a scandalous man. It is he who has been mercilessly
scandalized and crucified by the Complainant.[21]
To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent presented as
evidence the following list of the complaints she had filed against him and Gina Espita:
3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty x x x

3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No. P-5-90. x x
x
3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutors Office of Cagayan. I.S
No. 89-114. x x x
3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and concubinage.
OMBUDSMAN Case No. 1-92-0083. x x x
3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No.
4061. DISMISSED.
3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutors Office of Cagayan. I.S.
No. 92-109. DISMISSED. (x x x). Complainant filed Motion for
Reconsideration. DENIED. (x x x).
3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (x x x) with S[upreme] C[ourt]. Withdrawn (x x
x). DISMISSED by IBP Board of Governors (x x x). Re-instituted (x x x).
3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (x x x). Adm. Case No. 3405. Pending.
3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (x x x). Third MCTC, Tumauini,
Isabela. Pending. x x x[22]
In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:
I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (x x x), picture (x x x) are
inadmissible in evidence as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Cecilia Zulueta
vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996. (x x x).
xxxxxxxxx
II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never courted Gina
Espita in the Saint Louis College of Tuguegarao. He never caused the
employment of said woman in the DTI. He never had or is having any illicit
relationship with her anywhere, at any time. He never lived with her as husband
and wife anywhere at any time, be it in Centro Tumauini or any of its barangays,
or in any other place. He never begot a child or children with her. Finally,
respondent submits that all the other allegations of Mrs. Narag are false and
fabricated, x x x
xxxxxxxxx
III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her two sons
forcibly drove respondent Narag out of the conjugal home. After that, Atty.
Narag tried to return to the conjugal home many times with the help of mutual
friends to save the marriage and the family from collapse. He tried several times
to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. In fact, in one of the hearings of the disbarment
case, he offered to return home and to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. But Mrs.
Narag refused all these efforts of respondent Narag. x x x
IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent, vindictive,
scandalous, virulent and merciless wife since the beginning of the marriage,
who incessantly beat, battered, brutalized, tortured, abuse[d], scandalized, and
humiliated respondent Atty. Narag, physically, mentally, emotionally, and
psychologically, x x x.
V. Complainant Julieta Narags claim in her counter-manifestation dated March
28, 1996, to the effect that the affidavit of Dominador B. Narag, Jr., dated
February 27, 1996 was obtained through force and intimidation, is not
true. Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit freely, voluntarily, and absolutely
without force or intimidation, as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes of
the testimonies of Respondent Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge
Dominador Garcia during the trial of Criminal Case No. 12439, People vs.
Dominador M. Narag, et. al., before the Tuguegarao MTC on May 3, 1996. x x
x.
xxxxxxxxx
VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man - a senior citizen of 63 years sickly, abandoned, disgraced, weakened and debilitated by progressively
degenerative gout and arthritis, and hardly able to earn his own keep. His very
physical, medical, psychological, and economic conditions render him unfit and
unable to do the things attributed to him by the complainant. Please see the
attached medical certificates, x x x, among many other similar certificates
touching on the same ailments. Respondent is also suffering from hypertension.
[23]
On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report, [24] recommending the indefinite
suspension of Atty. Narag from the practice of law. The material portions of said report read as
follows:
Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by

the contending parties, two (2) issues are relevant for the disposition of the case,
namely:
a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged abandonment of
respondents own family and [whether he was] living with his paramour,
Gina Espita;
b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children with Gina
Espita (Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) as appearing on
paragraph 1(g) of respondents Comment vis-a-vis his handwritten love
letters, the due execution and contents of which, although he objected
to their admissibility for being allegedly forgeries, were never denied by
him on the witness stand much less presented and offered proof to
support otherwise.
Except for the testimonies of respondents witnesses whose testimonies tend to
depict the complaining wife, Mrs. Narag, as an incurably jealous wife and
possessive woman suffering everytime with streaks of jealousy, respondent did not
present himself on the witness stand to testify and be cross-examined on his sworn
comment; much less did he present his alleged paramour, Gina Espita, to disprove
the adulterous relationship between him and their having begotten their illegitimate
children, namely: Aurelle Dominic N. Espita and Kyle Dominador N. Espita. Worse,
respondents denial that he is the father of the two is a ground for disciplinary
sanction (Morcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467).
Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent subject to
disciplinary action as a member of the legal profession.[25]
In its Resolution[26] issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and approved the investigating
commissioners recommendation for the indefinite suspension of the respondent. [27]Subsequently, the
complainant sought the disbarment of her husband in a Manifestation/Comment she filed on October
20, 1997. The IBP granted this stiffer penalty and, in its Resolution dated November 30, 1997, denied
respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence presented by the
parties, we find that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the penalty of disbarment.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent [28] to the practice of law, but
a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross
immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. [29]
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to
show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. [30] Furthermore,
such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree [31] or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.[32]
We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol[33] that, as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact
be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the
Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping
of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards.
Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order to live with
Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its
disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. [34]
Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself, [35] were: Charlie Espita,[36] Magdalena
Bautista,[37] Bienvenido Eugenio,[38] Alice Carag,[39] Dr. Jervis B. Narag,[40]Dominador Narag, Jr.,[41] and
Nieves F. Reyes.[42]
Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated complainants charge
against respondent in these categorical statements he gave to the investigating officer:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag?
A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita.
Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him?
A Yes, sir.
(Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag)
Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?
ATTY. NARAG:
Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner.
CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT
A Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living together as husband and wife
and that they already have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador.
x x x x x x x x x [43]
During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie Espita repeated his
account that his sister Gina was living with the respondent, with whom she had two children:
Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as husband and wife. You claim that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you say that?
A Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you have already two children and I
know that that is really an immoral act which you cannot just allow me to follow since my moral values
dont allow me that my sister is living with a married man like you.
Q How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them in the house?
A Yes, si[r].
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador, is
it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag?
A Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your family.[44]
In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs. Narag the love letters
respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag tried to dissuade him from appearing at the
disbarment proceedings.[45]
Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in this wise:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?
A I know him very well, sir.
Q Could you please tell us why do you know him?
A Because he was always going to the house of my son-in-law by the name of Charlie Espita.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M. Narag?
A At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir.
Q And this is located where?
A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.
Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the residence of Atty. Narag?
A Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living as husband and wife, is it
not?
A Yes, sir.[46]
Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple, testified that she learned
from the Narag children -- Randy, Bong and Rowena -- that their father left his family, that she and her
husband prodded the complainant to accept the respondent back, that the Narag couple again
separated when the respondent went back to his woman, and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his
wife.[47]
On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to establish that
respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman. Absent any evidence showing that
these witnesses had an ill motive to testify falsely against the respondent, their testimonies are
deemed worthy of belief.
Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent had sent to
Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina and her two children, whom he
acknowledged as his own. In addition, complainant also submitted as evidence the cards that she
herself had received from him. Guided by the rule that handwriting may be proved through a
comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or treated by the respondent as genuine, we
affirm that the two sets of evidence were written by one and the same person. [48] Besides, respondent
did not present any evidence to prove that the love letters were not really written by him; he merely
denied that he wrote them.
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself
but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not
suffice. Thus, when his moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his
cherished profession is imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the
satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll
of Attorneys.[49] This he failed to do.
Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina Espita. At the same time,
he depicts his wife as a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending, and as an insanely and
pathologically jealous woman, whose only obsession was to destroy, destroy and destroy him as
shown by her filing of a series of allegedly unfounded charges against him (and Gina Espita). To
prove his allegation, he presented ninety-eight (98) pieces of documentary evidence [50] and ten (10)
witnesses.[51]
We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not establish the fact
that he maintained that moral integrity required by the profession that would render him fit to continue
practicing law. Neither did their testimonies destroy the fact, as proven by the complainant, that he
had abandoned his family and lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had two children. Some of them
testified on matters which they had no actual knowledge of, but merely relied on information from
either respondent himself or other people, while others were presented to impeach the good
character of his wife.
Respondent may have provided well for his family -- they enjoyed a comfortable life and his
children finished their education. He may have also established himself as a successful lawyer and a
seasoned politician. But these accomplishments are not sufficient to show his moral fitness to
continue being a member of the noble profession of law.
We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties e.g., to support, educate
and instruct their children according to right precepts and good example; and to give them love,
companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. [52] As a husband, he is
also obliged to live with his wife; to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and
support.[53]
Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away from home. But the
evidence shows that he was away not only because of his work; instead, he abandoned his family to
live with his paramour, who bore him two children. It would appear, then, that he was hardly in a
position to be a good husband or a good father. His children, who grew up mostly under the care of
their mother, must have scarcely felt the warmth of their fathers love.
Respondents son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his fathers moral frailties in
his testimony:
Q My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven, is there a fault that is so
serious that it is incapable of forgiveness?
A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the emotional part of myself, I suppose
I cannot forgive a person although I am a God-fearing person, but I h[av]e to give the person a lesson
in order for him or her to at least realize his mistakes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
COMR. JOSE:
I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that your father is the worst, hardened
criminal on earth, would you send him to jail and have him disbarred? That is the question.
CONTINUATION.
A With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to be given a lesson. At this point in
time, I might just forgive him if he will have to experience all the pains that we have also suffered for
quite sometime.
Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his flesh is your flesh, his bones are
your bones and you now disown him because he is the worst man on earth, is that what you are
saying.
A Sort of, sir.
Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father has sinned, you have no more
father, am I correct?
A Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kid because my father is not
always staying with us at home. So, how can you say that? Yes, he gave me life, why not? But for sure,
sir, you did not give me love.[54]
Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating officer the trauma he went
through:
Q In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the fact that your father is maintaining a
paramour, could you please tell this Honorable Commission the effect on you?
A This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters, especially my married life,
sir. And it also affected my children so much, that I and my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts to say that I
and my wife parted ways. This is one reason that affected us.
Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways?
A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she could not face the people,
our community, especially because my wife belongs to a well-known family in our community.
Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are those.
A Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows so well that my mother
suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my mother.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Why did your wife leave you?
A The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family, Your Honor.
Q In your wifes family?
A In our family, sir.
Q And what do you mean by that?
A What I meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father went to the extent of
scolding my wife and calling my wife a puta in provincial government, which my mother-in-law hated
him so much for this, which really affected us. And then my wife knew for a fact that my father has an
illicit relationship with Gina Espita, whom he bore two children by the name of Aurelle Dominic and Kyle
Dominador, which I could prove and I stand firm to this, Your Honor.[55]
Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts prove
otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather, he is a partner who
has solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova[56] The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of
a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.
In Toledo vs. Toledo,[57] the respondent was disbarred from the practice of law, when he
abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[58] the respondent was disbarred after the complainant proved
that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This
Court declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar.
In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that
respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law
profession. As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting,[59] a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be in the personal record of
Respondent Narag; and furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
[1]
See records, Vol. I, pp. 1-2. Attached therein are photocopies of the marriage contract of the couple and of two love
letters written by the respondent to his paramour.
[2]
Code of Professional Responsibility.
[3]
Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-2.
[4]
Records, Vol. I, p. 11.

Records, Vol. II, pp. 13-14.
[6]
[7]
[5]
[8]
The Court noted the letter in its Resolution, dated July 30, 1990, and referred the same to the IBP. See records, Vol. II,
p. 19.
[9]
Signatories therein are Numeriano G. Tanopo, Jr., president; Ernesto S. Salunat, Jose Aguila Grapilon, Beda G. Fajardo,
Baldomero C. Estenzo, Rene C. Villa and Teodoro D. Nano, Jr., governors of Northern Luzon Region, Southern Luzon
Region, Bicolandia Region, Eastern Visayas Region, Western Visayas Region and Eastern Mindanao Region,
respectively; Mervyn G. Encanto, executive vice president; and Romeo T. Capulong and Didagen P. Dilangalen, governors
of Central Luzon Region and Western Mindanao Region, respectively.
[10]
Records, Vol. III, pp. 34-37.
[11]
Through the office of then Chief Justice Fernan.
[12]
Dated November 11, 1991.
[13]
The children are Genevieve Narag Bautista, Dominador B. Narag Jr., Randolph B. Narag, Jervis B. Narag, Rowena
Narag Addun, Cheryl Rita B. Narag and Christiana B. Narag.
[14]
Records, Vol. III, p. 23. The letter was forwarded to the Office of the Bar Confidant on December 2, 1991.
[15]
Records, Vol. III, pp. 40-42.
[16]

Ibid., pp. 17-18.
[18]
Ibid., pp. 40-41.
[19]
Records, Vol. III, p. 44.
[17]
[20]
Compiled Answer/Comment and Counter-Affidavits, records, Vol. II, pp. 1-11.
[21]
Ibid., pp. 1-3.
[22]
Ibid., pp. 8-9.
[23]
Memorandum for the Respondent, pp. 1-6; records, Vol. IV, pp. 299-304.
[24]
Records, Vol. I, pp. 17-59.
[25]
Report by Comm. Plaridel C. Jose, pp. 42-43; records, Vol I, pp. 58-59.
[26]
Ibid., pp. 15-16.
[27]
Notice of Resolution from the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Board of Governors, Pasig City, signed by National
Secretary Roland B. Inting. A copy of said notice was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant on September 16,
1997. Records, Vol. I, pp. 15-16.
[28]
2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be x x x of good
moral character; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)
[29]
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
7 C.J.S., 14, p. 826; Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 751 citing In re Monaghan, 126 VT, 53m 222 A.2d 665, 674;
and Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., p. 447, citing Arciga vs. Maniwang, 106 SCRA 594, 594, August 14, 1981.
[30]
[31]
Reyes vs. Wong, 63 SCRA 667, 673, January 29, 1975.
[32]
Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859, 869-870, April 30, 1963.
[33]
218 SCRA 30, 40, January 29, 1993, per curiam, citing Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26, March 8, 1989, per
Feliciano, J.
[34]
Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293, 297-298, October 27, 1983; Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622, 627, August 22,
1989; Adarne vs. Aldaba, 83 SCRA 734, 739, June 27, 1978; Arboleda vs. Gatchalian, 58 SCRA 64, 67, July 23, 1974;
and Go vs. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439, 442, October 23, 1967.
[35]
TSN, September 22, 1993, pp. 15-46.
[36]
Ibid., pp. 28-134.
[37]
TSN, November 3, 1993, pp. 16-41.
[38]
Ibid., pp. 42-55.
[39]
Ibid., pp. 58-71.
[40]
TSN, November 4, 1993, pp. 5-34.
[41]
Ibid., pp. 35-64.
[42]
TSN, January 17, 1994, pp. 3-14.
[43]
TSN, September 22, 1993, pp. 31-32.
[44]
Ibid., pp. 85-89.

Ibid., pp. 39 and 75.
[45]
[46]
TSN, November 3, 1993, pp. 43-44, 47-48 and 51
[47]
TSN, January 17, 1994, pp. 6-8 and 11.
[48]
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
[49]
Delos Reyes vs. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653, 658, November 28, 1989.
[50]
See Records, Vol. III, pp. 1-234.
[51]
Jude Sales (TSN, April 19, 1994, pp. 3-6); Atty. Virgilio A. Sevandal (TSN, April 19, 1994, pp. 6-16); Juanito H. Comia
(TSN, April 19, 1994, pp. 17-24); Alfonso Tumamao (TSN, April 19, 1994, pp. 25-51); Ofelio Pablo (TSN, April 20, 1994,
pp. 2-36); Judge Rolando L. Salacup (TSN, May 16, 1994, pp. 2-37); Romeo Calabaquib (TSN, May 17, 1994, pp. 2-21);
Remigio Magundayao (TSN, June 7, 1994, pp. 2-6); Fr. Benjamin T. Lasan (TSN, June 7, 1994, pp. 7-19); and Alfonso C.
Gorospe (TSN, June 7, 1994, pp. 19-27).
[52]
Art. 220, Family Code. See also Art. 356 of the Civil Code and Art. 3 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (or PD 603).
[53]
Art. 68, Family Code.
[54]
TSN, November 4, 1993, pp. 28-30.
[55]
TSN, November 4, 1993, pp. 38-39 and 45-46.
[56]
179 SCRA 680, 683, November 29, 1989,
[57]
7 SCRA 757, April 27, 1963.
[58]
128 SCRA 485, April 2, 1984.
[59]
AC No. 4539, May 14, 1997, pp. 5-6, per curiam.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O. Perez (Dr. Perez) with the Office of the
Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo)
(respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960s when they were both
students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty.
Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez. 2
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married the latter on
May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of
Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez because he got her
pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which
could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law School.4
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to
Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty.
Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured
her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage. 5
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of America (USA). Their
union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic. 6
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was obtained
from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty.
Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son. 7
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to nullify his
marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to the said petition. 8
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter 9 in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindigs
scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter 10 written and signed by Atty.
Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to
marry her once his impediment is removed. Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty.
Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13,
2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez. 11
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo
Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.12
In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their respective comments, which they
separately did on November 25, 2002.14
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that immediately
after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious
intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children, their relationship simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty. Wilhelmina
Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven
suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of property. She likewise advised the couple to
obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide them. 16
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a Judge of the
First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its
laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic court on June
12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984. 17
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by the Dominican
Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig
and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July
1984 in the USA.18
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to Gomez was still
subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He
merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship.19
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in October 2001 to
prevent any acrimony from developing.20
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall
apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that while he was
attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned
from his firm in January 2001.21
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig began courting her
while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindigs romantic overtures; she told him that she could
not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said that despite being turned down,
Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned from his law firm. 22
On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation within 90 days from notice.23
On June 2, 2003, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order 24 setting the mandatory conference of the
administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the conference, the parties manifested
that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD
directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and
Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17, 2003 25 and October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position
paper27 on October 24, 2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and
Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon
7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindigs
act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral
and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner further opined
that:
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig established a pattern of
grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it
was reprehensible to the highest degree.
chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and personal conduct, must display
exemplary behavior. Respondents bigamous marriage and his proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely caused
damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head up high and expect his students, his peers and the
community to look up to him as a model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a
second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a
mockery of an otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of the
community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be dismissed for
dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged affair between the
respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, 30 which adopted and approved the recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, claiming that
the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perezs uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under
Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of persons having
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the
absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez testimony.
He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never concealed the status of his
marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindigs motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with
the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but
it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral
character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant
thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation,
his life, his all.34 (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the
practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor.35 Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency. The Court makes these
distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.36
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Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindigs own admission, indeed
establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high
degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968, which was then
followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously,
15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then already falling
apart due to Gomez serious intimacy problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal partnership of
gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same
year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and earth just so he could marry her
right away a marriage that has at least a semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic
was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still
validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise,
his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances
seriously taint Atty. Catindigs sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws
on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that Atty.
Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the
USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine
jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindigs claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a
nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a faade of validity to his
otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest
degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in order to give their
union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to properly
seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with the much younger Atty.
Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a
grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be
misunderstood, the Courts finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindigs desertion of Dr. Perez, but on
his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages
the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage.37 In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons
his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a child. 38
Atty. Catindigs subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of
the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission,
Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He
exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty
of disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case
of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of
the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never
be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it
appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
Atty. Catindigs claim that Dr. Perezs allegations against him are not credible since they are uncorroborated and not
supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty.
Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage with Gomez
still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove the claimed
amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was
mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported
love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The
evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. 39
The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed received a letter
informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of the allegations therein.
Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for
her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross
immorality and of violating the Lawyers Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby DISBARREDfrom the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar Confidant and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.
The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Jardeleza, J., no part respondent ca finding was collegue in faculty.
Endnotes:
Rollo, pp. 1-23.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 43.
10
Id. at 44.
11
Id. at 16-18.
12
Id. at 18.
13
Id. at 62.
14
Id. at 75-83; 86-99.
15
Id. at 75-83.
16
Id. at 76.
17
Id. at 76-77.
18
Id. at 77-78.
19
Id. at 78.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 78-79.
22
Id. at 90.
23
Id. at 116-117.
24
Id. at 176-177.
25
Id. at 454-468.
26
Id. at 469-479.
27
Id. at 480-500.
28
Id. at 571-593.
29
Id. at 587-588.
30
Id. at 569-570.
31
Id. at 594-610.
32
Id. at 627.
33
590 Phil. 270 (2008).
34
Id. at 276. See also Cordon v. Balicanta, 439 Phil. 95, 115-116 (2002).
35
Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Sr., 468 Phil. 329, 335 (2004).
36
See Garrido v. Attys. Garrido and Valencia, 625 Phil. 347, 358 (2010).
37
See Cordova v. Cordova, 259 Phil. 278 (1989).
See Tucay v. Atty. Tucay, 376 Phil. 336 (1999); Narag v. Atty. Narag, 353 Phil. 643, 663 (1998); Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,
213 Phil. 437, 440 (1984).
38
39
See Aba v. De Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7649, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 361, 372.
EN BANC
FOODSPHERE, INC.,
Complainant,
A.C. No. 7199

[Formerly CBD 04-1386]
Present:
- versus -
ATTY.
MELANIO
MAURICIO, JR.,
Respondent.
L.
PUNO, C.J.
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 22, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing
and manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name
CDO, filed a Verified Complaint[1] for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr.,
popularly known as Batas Mauricio (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids
including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!,and a host of a television
program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double BBATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyers
oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery
in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as
Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to
be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can.
Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration
(BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD
conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero
demanded P150,000 as damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand,
however, as being in contravention of company policy and, in any event, outrageous.
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by
the Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the
Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the
meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page of
the would-be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No.
12[2] which complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and
defects to it and its products. Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless complainant
gave in to the P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counteroffer earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to
the Corderos and P35,000 to his BATAS Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to
place paid advertisements in the tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN[3] seeking the withdrawal of their
complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint.[4] Respondent, who
affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns
in a tabloid that he prepared the document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract [5] asking
complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues
at P15,000 per issue or a total amount of P360,000, and a Program Profile[6] of the television
program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with
the following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC
at P7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for P130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the
tabloid amounting to P45,000 at P15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC
in the television program at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on complainants offer,
respondent relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and
threatened to proceed with the publication of the articles/columns.[7]
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- BATAS NG BAYAN at
radio station DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program,
which announcement was transcribed as follows:
OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas
Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa
telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito
muna ang contest, o, aling liver spread ang may uod? Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman
ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at
anong companya ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po
an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang
inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? [8] (Emphasis and
italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad
light. Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an
article captioned KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD! In another article, he wrote IBA PANG
PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN![9] which appeared in the same publication in its September 713, 2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote
another article entitled DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO.[10]
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA published
in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles:[11] (a) Uod sa liver spread,
Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276); [12] (b) Uod, itinanggi ng CDO, Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.277);[13] (c) Pagpapatigil sa CDO, Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278);[14] (d) Uod sa liver
spread kumpirmado, Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279);[15] (e) Salaysay ng nakakain ng
uod, Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280);[16] (f) Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy, Setyembre 11, 2004
(Taon 7, Blg.281);[17] (g) Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards, Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon
7, Blg.284);[18] (h) Brutalidad ng CDO guards, Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285);
[19]
(i) CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP, Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287);[20] (j) May
uod na CDO liver spread sa Puregold binili, Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288);
[21]
(k) Desperado na ang CDO, Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290);[22] (l) Atty. Rufus
Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO, Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);[23] (m) Kasunduan ng
CDO at Pamilya Cordero, Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292); [24] (n) Bakit nagbayad ng P50
libo ang CDO, Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293).[25]
In his September 8, 2004 column Anggulo ng Batas published in Hataw!, respondent wrote an
article Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread.[26]
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi Mo
ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be the same
baseless and malicious allegations/issues against it.[27]
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and
Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending
at he time of the filing of the present administrative complaint.[28]
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City,
docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly
Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice,[29] alleging:
xxxx
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
xxxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for miracles to
happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would ever act on his
complaint?
xxxx
8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an
investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can
Respondents expect justice to be meted to them?
9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would elude them in
this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of their cause,
but, more importantly, because of the injustice of the system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela City had been
the willing recipient of too many generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also with
reports that a top official of the City had campaigned for his much coveted position in the past
distributing products of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even by mere
staff and underlings of this Office to people who dare complain against the Complainant in their
respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate and ask their associates
and relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the
Complainant, and they would surely be given the same rough and insulting treatment that
Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge here;[30]
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction [31] which respondent filed, as
counsel for his therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
xxxx
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside their
thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this
action.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and
several others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04, [33] before the Regional Trial Court,
Valenzuela City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding,
respondent continued to publish articles against complainant[34] and to malign complainant
through his television shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his October 5,
2005 Report and Recommendation:[35]
I.
xxxx
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio, et al.,
the Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge
Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads:
Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order included in the instant plaintiffs motion, this Court, inasmuch as the
defendants failed to appear in court or file an opposition thereto, is constrained to
GRANT the said plaintiffs prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to maintain
STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents, representatives or any
person acting for and in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from further
publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in
the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on
plaintiff and its products.
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by the
Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order
dated 10 December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive therein
addressed to him to desists [sic] from further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any
matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices
and/or defects on plaintiff and its products, respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out
with articles on the prohibited subject matter in his column Atty. Batas, 2004 in the December 16
and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid Balitang Bayan Toro (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the Complaint).
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of
Professional Responsibility which reads: A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
II.
xxxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Valenzuela City, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate
These Cases To the Department of Justice. In said pleading, respondent made the following
statements:
xxxx
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the
integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office.
Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed
before it and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations.
The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve
and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd
[s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers.
III.
The Kasunduan entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex C of the
Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent.
xxxx
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the said
Kasunduan was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy, and this
accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.
However, even after the execution of the Kasunduan and the consequent dismissal of the
complaint of his clients against herein complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a media
offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are the
numerous articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17
December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to come out
with these articles against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary restraining
order issued against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny that he
indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication in the tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose the
defects of complainants products to the consuming public. Complainant claims that there is a
baser motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for
complainants failure to give in to respondents request that complainant advertise in the tabloids
and television programs of respondent. Complainants explanation is more credible. Nevertheless,
whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles against complainant does not
detract from the fact that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind the Kasunduan which
he himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was less
than forthright when he prepared said Kasunduan and then turned around and proceeded to
lambaste complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said agreement. Complainant
would have been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as it could have defended itself
against the charges of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless against the attacks of
respondent, a media personality. The actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least,
deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[36](Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006,
adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend
respondent from the practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to
act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession,[37] which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter
alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for
his BATAS Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his
television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending
to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the
complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its
products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes. For he defied said status quo order, despite his
(respondents) oath as a member of the legal profession to obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities.
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandate, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper,
by using intemperate language.

Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:[38]
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to
use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.[39]
(Underscoring supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal
profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
directs a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession.[40]
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be
underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,[41] the therein complainant engaged therein-herein
respondents services as she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of
respondent, a media personality,[42] only to later find out that after he demanded and the therein
complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by
him. Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the
radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain
extent, have affected the sales of complainant.
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondents motion for
reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when he
filed falsification charges against the therein complainant.[43]
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the
premises, sufficient.
of
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyers oath and breach
ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon his receipt
of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO

Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
NTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
[1]
Rollo (Vol. I of the CBD rollo), pp. 1-21.

Annex B of the complaint, id. at 23.
[3]
Annexes C and C-1, id. at 24-25.
[4]
Annex F, id at 29. The Order reads:
Before us is a Kasunduan dated 10 August 2004 duly signed by the parties praying that the above-entitled case be dismissed with
prejudice on the ground that they have agreed to settle their differences amicably.
The Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1 s. 1993, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the provisions of Chapter
III[,] Title V of RA 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines provides for the encouragement of both parties
to settle the case amicably. (Rule III, Section 1, C.1)
The agreement of the parties is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy.
PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the above-captioned case is hereby DISMISSED.
xxxx
[5]
Annex D, id. at 26.
[6]
Annexes E and E-1, id. at 27-28.
[7]
Id. at 7.
[8]
Id. at 8.
[9]
Annex G-1, id. at 32-33.
[10]
Annex G-2, id. at 34-35.
[11]
Attached to the complaint as Annexes H-series.
[12]
Rollo (Vol. I of the CBD rollo), p. 37.
[13]
Id. at 38.
[14]
Inadvertently not attached to the Annexes H-series.
[15]
Rollo (Vol. I of the CBD rollo), at 39.
[16]
Id. at 40.
[17]
Id. at 41.
[2]
[18]
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
[20]
Id. at 44.
[21]
Id. at 45.
[22]
Id. at 46.
[23]
Id. at 47.
[24]
Id. at 48.
[25]
Not attached but is supposedly included in the Annexes H-series of the complaint.
[26]
Rollo (Vol. I of the CBD rollo), p. 49.
[27]
Id. at 10. The copies of the complaint-affidavits are attached as Annexes J, J-1, and J-2.
[28]
Ibid.
[29]
Id. at 121-125.
[30]
Id. at 122-124.
[31]
Id. at 126-128.
[32]
Id. at 126.
[33]
The complaint was for libel but a reading of the complaint shows that it was a complaint for damages. Annex L, id. at 129-164.
[34]
Respondent wrote and publicized: Buwelta sa CDO (October 2004); Child Abuse Kontra CDO (November 2-8, 2004).
[35]
Rollo (Vol. III of CBD rollo), pp. 37-41.
[36]
Id. at 45-48.
[37]
Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA 209, 221.
[38]
A.C. No. 6567, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 359.
[39]
Id. at 368.
[40]
Vide Catu v. Rellosa, supra note 37 at 220.
[41]
A.C. No. 5655, April 22, 2005, 456 SCRA 508.
[42]
Id. at 509.
[43]
A.C. No. 5655, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 307, 318.
[19]

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 100643 December 12, 1995

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br. 79, Morong
Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY, and AGUEDO EUGENIO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a material fact in a
decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari, thereby altering the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment.
Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law. 1
On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer Evidence Re Charge of
Unauthorized Intercalation in a Judicial Record dated 18 November 1992. He claimed that the inserted words were
written by his client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the petition to be filed before the Supreme
Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the latter formalized the petition. He manifested that he
would not risk committing the act for which he was found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial
and Bar Council to the President for appointment as regional trial judge. 2 But the Court on 3 December 1992 denied
the motion for want of a compelling reason to justify a reversal of the questioned resolution. 3
On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already 62 years old,
has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and in all candor promised that if
given another chance he would live up to the exacting demands of the legal profession. He appended to his motion
certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish of St. Michael Archangel,
Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM,
Chairperson, Center for Housing and Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College of
Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge
Teodoro P. Regino, RTC-Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon City; and Judge
Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon City. 4 However, on 11 August 1994 the Court denied the motion. 5
On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging among others that he had
been deprived of his means to life; he had pursued civic, religious and community work, especially for the poor and
the underprivileged short of extending legal assistance because of his incapacity; he had admitted "with profound
regret and with utmost humility his commission of an unpardonable mistake and ask(ed) that he be given another
chance;" and, he was "remorseful for what he has done and comes to this Honorable Court with a contrite heart." 6
His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1 December 1994 saying that while she did not condone
what her husband had done, it had been her fervent wish that the Court took a second look into its decision
disbarring her husband as her entire family had been traumatized by his disbarment. 7
On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court
reiterating his Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment of 1 December 1994. Thus
I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed and admit full responsibility for it. I realize it
was dishonest and unfair to pass the blame to my secretary who was merely following my
instructions. The intercalation was my own act and I am justly punished for it.
Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only beg for your mercy. I have a wife and children
to support but my only means of livelihood has been withdrawn from me. I am destitute and
desperate and can only turn to you for relief . . . .
Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even thought of blackening the law profession, to
which I owe so much. Please let me redeem myself by admitting me back to its precincts, where I
swear to live strictly according to its canons . . . . 8
On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of movant Dacanay.
On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement
It has been 33 long months since my disbarment, during which time I have been struggling to make
both ends meet to provide for my wife and three children. Please give me the chance to prove that I
am a reformed offender who will henceforth do nothing whatsoever to dishonor the legal profession. 9
On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent's 4 August 1995 letter. 10
On 17 November, 1995 movant once more wrote the Court
I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a grievous offense for which I was justly punished at
the time with the extreme sanction of disbarment.
I have been suffering much since my disbarment more than 36 months ago, but it is my wife and
children who have suffered more for my transgression. Although innocent, they bear with me the
stigma and burden of my punishment. 11
The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him sufficient time
and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is
worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His admission of guilt and
repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards
the legal profession demands from its practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M.
Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned that
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules
of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the
bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal
profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is
not only a right, but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is
demanded of its members . . . 12
WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED and he is therefore
allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the required legal fees. This resolution is effective
immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 101-111.
2 Id., pp. 135-144.
3 Id., pp. 171-172.
4 Id., pp. 173-185.
5 Id., pp. 186-187.
6 Id., pp. 189-192.
7 Id., p. 193.
8 Id., p. 196.
9 Id., p. 198.
10 Id., p. 199.
11 Id., p. 200.
12 Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 132.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988
filed by counsel for respondent Raul M. Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated October
7, 1988. We have reviewed once more the Court's extended per curiam Resolution, in the light of the argument
adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but must conclude that we find no sufficient basis for modifying the
conclusions and rulings embodied in that Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious quotations
and references to foreign texts which, however, whatever else they may depict, do not reflect the law in this
jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the conclusions reached in the per
curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some of the "Ten (10) Legal Points for Reconsideration," made in the
Motion for Reconsideration.
1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this Court "to charge respondent [with]
indirect contempt and convict him of direct contempt."
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of
court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the bar." The Court did not
use the phrase "in facie curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct contempt," though we are aware that courts in
the United States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of "direct contempts' as "contempts in the face of
the courts." Rather, the court sought to convey that it regarded the contumacious acts or statements (which were
made both in a pleading filed before the Court and in statements given to the media) and the misconduct of
respondent Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a frontal assault upon the
integrity of the Court and, through the Court, the entire judicial system. What the Court would stress is that it
required respondent, in its Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to explain "why he should not be punished for contempt of
court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions" and in respect of which, respondent was heard and given the
most ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and evidence that he wanted to present for the
consideration of this Court. The Court did not summarily impose punishment upon the respondent which it could
have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider respondent's acts as
constituting "direct contempt."
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error for this Court to charge respondent
under Rule 139 (b) and not 139 of the Revised Rules of Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court pointing out that:
[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the
Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court such reference to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of
Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before
the Supreme Court.
The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion for referral of this case either to
the Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines under Rule 139 (b). Otherwise, there would have
been no need to refer to Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point out that under the old rule, Rule 139, referral
to the Solicitor General was similarly not an exclusive procedure and was not the only course of action open to the
Supreme Court. It is well to recall that under Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint") of Rule 139, "Proceedings for
the removal or suspension of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court, (1) on its own motion, or (2) upon the
complaint under oath of another in writing" (Parentheses supplied). The procedure described in Sections 2 et seq. of
Rule 139 is the procedure provided for suspension or disbarment proceedings initiated upon sworn complaint of
another person, rather than a procedure required for proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court on its own motion.
It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would initiate motu proprioproceedings for which it did not find probable
cause to proceed against an attorney. Thus, there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor General, which referral
is made "for investigation to determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of the
respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated against the respondent. The Court may, of
course, refer a case to the Solicitor General if it feels that, in a particular case, further factual investigation is
needed. In the present case, as pointed out in the per curiamResolution of the Court (page 18), there was "no need
for further investigation of facts in the present case for it [was] not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez
that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him" and that "in any case, respondent has had the amplest
opportunity to present his defense: his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that
those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The
issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other
agency, is compelled to resolve such issues."
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for Reconsideration is from a dissentingopinion
of Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United State. 1 It may be pointed out that the majority in Green v. United States, through
Mr. Justice Harlan, held, among other things, that: Federal courts do not lack power to impose sentences in excess of one
year for criminal contempt; that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right; nor does
the (US) Constitution require that contempt subject to prison terms of more than one year be based on grand jury
indictments.
In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or less dubious manuscripts of the
Fourteenth Century, what is indisputable is that from the foundation of the United States the
constitutionality of the power to punish for contempt without the intervention of a jury has not been
doubted. The First Judiciary Act conferred such a power on the federal courts in the very act of their
establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of the Judiciary Committee of eight that reported the bill to the
Senate, five member including the chairman, Senator, later to be Chief Justice, Ellsworth, had been
delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Oliver Ellsworth, Chairman, William Paterson, Caleb
Strong, Ricard Basett, William Few. 1 Annals of Cong 17). In the First Congress itself no less than
nineteen member including Madison who contemporaneously introduced the Bill of Rights, had been
delegates to the Convention. And when an abuse under this power manifested itself, and led
Congress to define more explicitly the summary power vested in the courts, it did not remotely deny
the existence of the power but merely defined the conditions for its exercise more clearly, in an Act
"declaratory of the law concerning contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat 487.
xxxxxxxxx
Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this Court throughout its existence . In at
least two score cases in this Court, not to mention the vast mass of decisions in the lower federal
courts, the power to punish summarily has been accepted without question. ... 2
To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is simplistic at best. The judge who finds
himself compelled to exercise the power to punish for contempt does so not really to avenge a wrong inflicted upon
his own person; rather he upholds and vindicates the authority, dignity and integrity of the judicial institution and its
claim to respectful behaviour on the part of all persons who appears before it, and most especially from those who
are officers of the court.
3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible
tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was, more modestly, simply
paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious
conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice."
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves
all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and
which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending
apocalypse. The clear and present danger" doctrine has been an accepted method for marking out the appropriate
limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been
recognized and applied by courts. In Logunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 3 this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice
Melencio-Herrera said:
...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil
liberties" (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It is not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
"From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that
press for recognition."
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion
for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the
mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test" (Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The principle "requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or
type of situation (Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, supra, p. 899). (Emphasis Supplied) 4
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," we believe that the statements
here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such
circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per
curiam Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive evil" which the Supreme Court
has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence
or similar disruptions of public order. 5 What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and
prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the
avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of
professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts. The "substantive evil" here involved, in
other words, is not as palpable as a threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far
reaching in its implications for society.
4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to hold that intent is
irrelevant in charges of misconduct." What the Court actually said on this point was:
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the
respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He
will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. It is,
upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that the respondent offered no apology in his two (2)
explanations and exhibited no repentance (Resolution, p. 7; footnotes omitted).
The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such subjectivities (understood as pyschological
phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by the processes of this Court. Human intent can only be shown
derivatively and implied from an examination of acts and statements. Thus, what the Court was saying was that
respondent's disclaimer of an intent to attack and denigrate the Court, cannot prevail over the plain import of what
he did say and do. Respondent cannot negate the clear import of his acts and statements by simply pleading a
secret intent or state of mind incompatible with those acts or statements. It is scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one
accused of homicide cannot successfully deny his criminal intent by simply asserting that while he may have
inserted a knife between the victim's ribs, he actually acted from high motives and kind feelings for the latter.
5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to punish respondent for
contempt of court for out of court publications."
Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged modern trends in the United Kingdom
and in the United States concerning the law of contempt. We are, however, unable to regard the texts that he cites
as binding or persuasive in our jurisdiction. The Court went to some length to document the state of our case law on
this matter in its per curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the circumstances of this case that would suggest to this
Court that that case law, which has been followed for at least half a century or so, ought to be reversed.
6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition of indefinite suspension from the
practice of law constitutes "cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment". The Court finds it difficult to
consider this a substantial constitutional argument. The indefiniteness of the respondent's
suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the effect of placing, as it were,
the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has
the effect of giving respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and
misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and
demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly
demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The denial is FINAL.
The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion, dated October 25, 1988 and the Supplemental
Manifestation, dated October 27, 1988, filed by respondent
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 356 US 165, 2 L Ed 2d 672 (1958).
2 2 L ed 2d at 691-692; Emphasis supplied.
3 92 SCRA 476 (1979).
4 92 SCRA at 488.
5 See the separate opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections,
27 SCRA 835, 888 at 897-898 (1969).
THIRD DIVISION
JONAR SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 6252
Complainant,
Present:
Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and
Carpio Morales,* JJ
Promulgated:
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN,
Respondent. October 5, 2004
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
N
otaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the
performance of their duties, which are impressed with public
interest. They
are
enjoined
to
comply
faithfully
with
the
solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will
not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who

violate it or neglect observance thereof.
__________________
*
On leave.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Complaint[1] filed by Jonar Santiago, an
employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP),
for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was
filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It
charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138[2] of the Rules
of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03 [3], Canon 5[4],
and
Canons
12.07[5] and
12.08
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R.

Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the complainant in
this wise:
x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that
Respondent in notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or
refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax
certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the
notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and
IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in

favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was
actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain
date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after
the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and
thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats.[6]
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of

the CBD,[7] Atty.
affiants
whose
Rafanan filed his verified Answer.[8] He admitted having administered the oath to the
Affidavits
were
attached
to
the
verified
Complaint. He
believed,
however,
that
the
non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.
He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied

only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not
mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts
and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter,
the
affidavits,
which
were
sworn
to
before
government
prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of

the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants
residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have
entries in their notarial register for these documents.
As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification
required by Section 3 of Rule 112[9] of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent
explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the
Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of the
prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR,

respondent argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of their
clients on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is
essential to the ends of justice. Complainant charged respondents
clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since
they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, his
testimony is very essential to the ends of justice.
Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had
threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of their case
by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent
requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the
following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled
hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears
of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted
Certifications[10] from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit[11] of the two police officers
who had assisted them.
Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no

other purpose than to harass him, because he was the counsel of
Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter
before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.
After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through
Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on
June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the afternoon. Notices[12] of
the hearing
were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant
appeared.Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.
[13] The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two oclock in the afternoon.
On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his

Reply[14] to the verified Answer of respondent. The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13,
2001.[15] It also received complainants Letter-Request[16] to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted
that request in its Order[17] dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed
the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the
case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.
The CBD received complainants Memorandum[18] on
September
26,
2001. Respondent did not file any.
The IBPs Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVI-2003-172[19] approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioners
Report that respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification,
the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The
IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the
recommendation[20] of the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to P3,000 with a warning that any
repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty.
The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the

Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the
CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondents Administrative Liability

Violation of the Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of

notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to
every document acknowledged before them has presented the
proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence
tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of
such certification.[21] They are also required to maintain and keep
a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by
them; and to give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one
in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of
[their] register, on which the same is recorded. [22] Failure to
perform these duties would result in the revocation of their

commission as notaries public.[23]
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply

neglected, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary
weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering
into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these
elementary requirements.
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained the value

and meaning of notarization as follows:
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be
overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document thus making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and
the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a
notary public and appended to a private instrument.
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted
the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in
their
performance
of
the
notarial
act
are
never
to
be
countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the
performance of their duties,[25] which are dictated by public policy

and are impressed with public interest.
It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has

readily admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to
enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as
well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.
Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with

those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative to
cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He
points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His
belief that the requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently
irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire,
the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is
appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of
notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being
swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable
justification for breaking the law.
We note further that the documents attached to the verified
Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondents clients
Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses
Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted

murder, filed by complainants brother against the aforementioned
clients. These documents became the basis of the present
Complaint.
As
correctly
pointed
out
by
the
investigating
commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the
absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer the oath -- to certify that he has
personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. Respondent
failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and CounterAffidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was
not required to comply with the certification requirement.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to

obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes.[26] They are expected to be in the forefront in the
observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries
with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and
to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and
jurisprudence.[27] It is imperative that they be conversant with

basic legal principles.Unless they faithfully comply with such
duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and
diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they
may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is

placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the
laws.[28] No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse
or justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the
law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his
clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to
disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar
must be exercised with great caution.[29] Disbarment will be
imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser
penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be
decreed.[30] Considering the nature of the infraction and the
absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the
penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a
sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.
Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before
Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the
defense of alibi proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in
violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: A lawyer shall avoid testifying
in behalf of his client.
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client,
except:
a)
on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or
custody of an instrument and the like;
b)
on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is
essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must, during his
testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified

from being a witness,[31] except only in certain cases pertaining to
privileged
communication
arising
from
an
attorney-client
relationship.[32]
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon

lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to their clients as
witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell
the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are

partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of
others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of
a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question
is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who
testify for their clients.
Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer

and witness for the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave
many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because
they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will
have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are
against the lawyers client, they will have an opportunity, not
likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified
it with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes
doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful.[33]
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being
witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the
preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses,
unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to
withdraw from active management of the case.[34]
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit

executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily
make him administratively liable for the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every
remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of
the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latters life
and liberty are at stake.[35] It is the fundamental right of the
accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges
against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable
doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to
ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to
law.
Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent,

as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save
his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to present -by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating
circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients
would not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due
process of law.[36]
The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary

for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on
the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his
residence and could not have possibly committed the crime

charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does
not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of
its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation

in which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this
instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary
investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial. [37] Not
being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation
has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting
them from open and public accusations of crime and from the
trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and
protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions.
The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to
[38]
be followed by the trial proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind

respondent to refrain from accepting employment in any matter
in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an
essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in
future cases in which his testimony may become essential to
serve the ends of justice, the canons of the profession require him
to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.
No Proof of Harassment
The charge that respondent harassed complainant and
uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not supported by
evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare
charge cannot be equated with liability.[39] It is not the self-serving
claim of complainant but the version of respondent that is more
credible, considering that the latters allegations are corroborated
by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the
Cabanatuan City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating

the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that
similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
W E C O N C U R:
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice
Records, pp. 1-4.

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
[3]
CANON 1 x x x
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any
suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause.
[4]
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in
continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high
standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students
and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.
[5]
CANON 12 x x x
Rule 12.07 A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly
inconvenience him.
[6]
Annex A, Notice of Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors; Report, pp. 1-2.
[7]
Records, p. 13.
[1]
[2]
[8]
[9]
Id., pp. 14-18.

Sec. 3. Procedure. x x x
(a) x x x. The affidavits shall be sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized
to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of
whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
xxxxxxxxx
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits
and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his
witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counteraffidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of
this section x x x.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
Records, pp. 54-55.

Joint Affidavit of PO3 Ronaldo S. Gamboa and PO2 Nicasio A. Yambot; records,
p. 68.
Records, p. 57.
See Registry Return Receipt attached to Notice of Hearing.
Records, pp. 59-63.
Id., pp. 65-67.
Id., p. 74.
Id., p. 88.
Id., pp. 92-100.
See Notice of Resolution; records, p. 103.
The
investigating
commissioner
recommended that
respondent
be
reprimanded and fined P1,500.00 for violating Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
251 of the Revised Administrative Code.
246 of the Revised Administrative Code.
249 of the Revised Administrative Code; Protacio v. Mendoza, 395 SCRA 10,
17, January 13, 2003.
383 SCRA 498, 504, July 2, 2002, per Bellosillo, J.
Vda. de Bernardo v. Restauro, 404 SCRA 599, 603, June 25, 2003; Maligsa v.
Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408, 414, May 14, 1997; Arrieta v. Llosa, 282 SCRA
248, 253, November 28, 1997.
Canon 1 of the CPR.
Canon 5 of the CPR.
Alitagtag v. Garcia, 403 SCRA 335, 341, June 10, 2003.
Ibid.
Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos, supra.
Per 20 of the Rules of Court.
Per 24 of the Rules of Court.
Vicente J. Francisco, Legal Ethics (1949), p. 203 (citing Williams, Legal Ethics,
p. 53; and Warvelle, Legal Ethics, p. 119).
Philippine National Bank v. Uy Teng Piao, 57 Phil. 337, October 21, 1932.
Canon 5 of the Canons of Professional Ethics; 20 (i) of Rule 138, Rules of
Court.
Lames v. Lascieras, 89 SCRA 186, 189, March 30, 1979.
Manuel R. Pamaran, Rules on Criminal Procedure Annotated (1998), p. 161
(citing Tandoc v. Resultan, 175 SCRA 37, July 5, 1989).
[38]
[39]
Ibid.
Manubay v. Garcia, 386 Phil. 440, 443, April 12, 2000.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6155
March 14, 2006
MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint 1 on 15 August 2003 against Atty. Jaime Juanito P.
Portugal (respondent) for violation of the Lawyers Oath, gross misconduct, and gross negligence. Complainants are
related to petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23 entitled SPO1 Ernest C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3
Rolando M. Joaquin v. People of the Philippines, in whose behalf respondent filed the Petition for Review on
Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) in the case.
The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged mishandling of the above-mentioned petition which
eventually led to its denial with finality by this Court to the prejudice of petitioners therein.
The facts are as follows:
On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin (eventually
petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the accused) were involved in a shooting
incident which resulted in the death of two individuals and the serious injury of another. As a result, Informations
were filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty
and trial ensued. After due trial, the Sandiganbayan2 found the accused guilty of two counts of homicide and one
count of attempted homicide.
At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the accused. Respondent then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001.
Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with
the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration.3 Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed
with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002.
Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent telephone calls they made to his
office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went to respondents last known address
only to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding address.
More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to personally verify the status of the ad
cautelam petition as they had neither news from respondent about the case nor knowledge of his whereabouts.
They were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a Resolution 4 dated 3 July 2002, denying the
petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees.
Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest 5 had already been
issued against the accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent
the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing.
In his Comment,6 respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes that he was not the original
counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting
the accused of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the
original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan
decision.
Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere
effort and in true spirit of the Lawyers Oath did he file the Motion for Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly
irregular character, respondent also made informal but urgent and personal representation with the members of the
Division of the Sandiganbayan who promulgated the decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts
he put into the case of the accused, his other professional obligations were neglected and that all these were done
without proper and adequate remuneration.
As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He stresses that the last day of filing
of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review,7 seeking an additional thirty (30) days to file the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he
filed the petition by registered mail and paid the corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed
within the reglementary period.
Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the "herculean" efforts he made in assisting the accused for almost a year
after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He considered the fact that it was a case he had just
inherited from the original counsel; the effect of his handling the case on his other equally important professional
obligations; the lack of adequate financial consideration for handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United
States to explore further professional opportunities. He then decided to formally withdraw as counsel for the
accused. He wrote a letter to PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person between
respondent and complainants, explaining his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to
Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter through
registered mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for the letter.
Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case and endorsed the Notice of
Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court. Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was
keenly aware that it would be difficult to find a new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as respondent.
Respondent suggests this might have been the reason for the several calls complainants made to his office.
On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
1awph!l.net
The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) who sent
notices of hearing to the parties but of the three complainants, only complainant Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in
the mandatory conference held, the other two complainants were declared as having waived their rights to further
participate in the IBP proceedings.8
The parties were directed to file their respective position papers and on 27 May 2005, Commissioner Villadolid
submitted his Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility9 and recommended the imposition of penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension of six (6)
months. 10 On 12 November 2005, the Board of Directors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve Commissioner
Villadolids recommendation to find respondent guilty and specifically to recommend his suspension for six (6)
months as penalty.
1awph!l.net
The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the facts presented, whether respondent
committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No. 152621-23, which eventually led to the ad
cautelam petitions dismissal with finality.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds the suspension recommended by the IBP
proper.
In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent has a higher duty to be
circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the property of the accused which stands to be lost but more
importantly, their right to their life and liberty. As held in Regala v. Sandiganbayan: 11
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it,
among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a
very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest x x x .
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other profession in
society. x x x12
At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam petition was actually filed out of time. Though respondent
filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration with the
attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, he should have known that a second motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading13 and it rests on the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the
motion did not toll the reglementary period to appeal. Having failed to do so, the accused had already lost their right
to appeal long before respondent filed his motion for extension. Therefore, respondent cannot now say he filed
the ad cautelam petition on time. Also important to note is the allegation of complainants that the Sandiganbayan
denied the second motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated 7 February 2002. This respondent does not
dispute.
As to respondents conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely fell short of the high
standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his clients. As aptly observed by
Commissioner Villadolid, respondent had not been quite candid in his dealings with the accused or complainants.
The Court notes that though respondent represented to the accused that he had changed his office address, still,
from the examination of the pleadings14 he filed, it can be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the same mailing
address as that known to complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondents office would have received the
Courts Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that situation was to at least inform
the client of the adverse resolution since they had constantly called respondents office to check the status of the
case. Even when he knew that complainants had been calling his office, he opted not to return their calls.
Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of complainants may have been about the letter he
sent PO3 Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as counsel of the case. However, though aware of such
likelihood, respondent still did not return their calls. Had he done so, he and complainants could have threshed out
all unresolved matters between them.
Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is presumably
steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself instead of the
accused. At the very least, he should have informed this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he had
already given instructions to his clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as
suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the accused.
Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the
accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave them instructions on how to go about
respondents withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the
appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it
for him if such was truly the case. Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which
confirms the receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend
credence to respondents naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in their stand that they
did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed the ad cautelam petition. He could relieve himself of his
responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written conformity of the accused and filing it with the court
pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.15
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime
with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is,
however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it
without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the
clients written consent or from a good cause.16
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition was primarily due to the gross
negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed in Aromin v. Boncavil17 that:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and
champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion
to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of the
his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much
is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the
bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 18
Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated without adequate or proper
remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently disputed such claim when they attached in their position
paper filed before the IBP a machine validated deposit slip in the amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings
account of one Jaime Portugal with account number 7186509273. 19 Respondent has neither admitted nor denied
having claimed the deposited amount.
The Court also rejects respondents claim that there was no formal engagement between the parties and that he
made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper consideration. In the words of then Justice
Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta: 20
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client
never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of
public service, not money, is the primary consideration. 21
Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:
A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or
implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received
in any matter pertinent to his profession. x x x 22
Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in
the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of
fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of
remuneration.
Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the shooting incident that the
accused was engaged in. He described the incident, thus: "the accused police officers who had been convicted of
[h]omicide for the salvage of Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C.
Macato."23 Rule 14.0124 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients
as to their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually branded his own clients
as being the culprits that "salvaged" the victims. Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is unprofessional
to be labeling an event as such when even the Sandiganbayan had not done so.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of respondent for six (6) months, the most severe
penalty recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not explain why such penalty was justified. In a fairly
recent case where the lawyer failed to file an appeal brief which resulted to the dismissal of the appeal of his client
in the Court of Appeals, the Court imposed upon the erring lawyer the penalty of three (3) months suspension. 25The
Court finds it fit to impose the same in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months. Let a copy of the Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Asscociate Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 1-13.
In a decision dated 30 April 2001, penned by Associate Justice Nicodemo T. Ferrer and concurred in by
Associate Justices Narciso S. Nario and Rodolfo G. Palattao. Id. at 26-54.
2
Dated 11 September 2001, id. at 80-87.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 124-126
Id. at 132-137.
Id. at 138-141.
Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 12-14.
Particularly:
Canon 17A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
10
Report and Recommendation, p. 11.
11
330 Phil. 678 (1996).
12
Id. at 699.
The Rules of Court, which suppletorily applies to the rules of procedure of the Sandiganbayan, prohibits
the filing of a second motion for reconsideration as embodied in Section 2 of Rule 52 which states:
13
"Sec. 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment
or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained."
Motion for Reconsideration, rollo, pp. 56-74, Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for
Reconsideration and the Second Motion for Reconsideration, id. at 80-87, Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review, supra note 7, Petition for Review on Certiorari Ad Cautelam, rollo, pp. 103-122.
14
Sec. 26. Change of attorneys.An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding,
by the written consent of his client filed in court. x x x
15
16
Orcino v. Gaspar, 344 Phil. 792, 798 (1997).
17
373 Phil. 612 (1999).
18
Id. at 618, citing Santiago v. Fojas, 248 SCRA 68, 73-74.
19
Annex "J" of complainants Position Paper, rollo, vol. 2, p. 110.
20
432 Phil. 840 (2002).
21
432 Phil. 840, 843 (2002).
Spouses Rabanal v. Atty. Tugade, 432 Phil. 1064, 1068 (2002), citing Dee v. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA
651 (1989).
22
23
Rollo, p. 136 and Vol. 2, id. at 120.
Rule 14.01A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the latters race, sex,
creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.
24
25
Edquibal v. Ferrer, A.C. No. 5687, 3 February 2005, 450 SCRA 406.
SECOND DIVISION
LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO,
A.C. No. 6174
Complainant,
Present:
CARPIO,
Chairperson,
- versus -
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
ATTY. RODOLFO T. GALING,
Respondent.
November 16, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us for consideration is Resolution No. XVIII-2007-196 [1] of the Board of

Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the
complaint[2] for disbarment filed by Lydia Castro-Justo against Atty. Rodolfo
T. Galing.
Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the
services of respondent Atty. Galing in connection with dishonored checks
issued by Manila City Councilor Arlene W. Koa (Ms. Koa). After she paid his
professional fees, the respondent drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa
demanding payment of the checks.[3] Respondent advised complainant to
wait for the lapse of the period indicated in the demand letter before filing
her complaint.
On 10 July 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for
estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila.[4]
On 27 July 2003, she received a copy of a Motion for Consolidation [5] filed by
respondent for and on behalf of Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases,
and the latters daughter Karen Torralba (Ms. Torralba). Further, on 8 August
2003, respondent appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa before the prosecutor of
Manila.
Complainant submits that by representing conflicting interests, respondent

violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In his Comment,[6] respondent denied the allegations against him. He

admitted that he drafted a demand letter for complainant but argued that it
was made only in deference to their long standing friendship and not by
reason of a professional engagement as professed by complainant. He
denied receiving any professional fee for the services he rendered.It was
allegedly their understanding that complainant would have to retain the
services of another lawyer. He alleged that complainant, based on that
agreement, engaged the services of Atty. Manuel A. Ao.
To bolster this claim, respondent pointed out that the complaint filed by
complainant against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was
based not on the demand letter he drafted but on the demand letter
prepared by Atty. Manuel A. Ao.
Respondent contended that he is a close friend of the opposing parties in

the criminal cases. He further contended that complainant Justo and Ms. Koa
are likewise long time friends, as in fact, they are comares for more than 30
years since complainant is the godmother of Ms. Torralba. [7] Respondent
claimed that it is in this light that he accommodated Ms. Koa and her
daughters request that they be represented by him in the cases filed
against them by complainant and complainants daughter. He maintained
that the filing of the Motion for Consolidation which is a non-adversarial
pleading does not evidence the existence of a lawyer-client relationship
between him and Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba. Likewise, his appearance in the
joint proceedings should only be construed as an effort on his part to
assume the role of a moderator or arbiter of the parties.
He insisted that his actions were merely motivated by an intention to help

the parties achieve an out of court settlement and possible
reconciliation. He reported that his efforts proved fruitful insofar as he had
caused Ms. Koa to pay complainant the amount of P50,000.00 in settlement
of one of the two checks subject of I.S. No. 03G-19484-86.
Respondent averred that the failure of Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba to make
good the other checks caused a lot of consternation on the part of
complainant. This allegedly led her to vent her ire on respondent and file
the instant administrative case for conflict of interest.
In a resolution dated 19 October 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP

adopted and approved with modification the findings of its Investigating
Commissioner. They found respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by representing conflicting
interests and for his daring audacity and for the pronounced malignancy of
his act. It was recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law
for one (1) year with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.[8]
We agree with the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner,[9] as adopted by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
It was established that in April 2003, respondent was approached by

complainant regarding the dishonored checks issued by Manila City
Councilor Koa.
It was also established that on 25 July 2003, a Motion for Consolidation was
filed by respondent in I.S. No. 03G-19484-86 entitled Lydia Justo vs. Arlene
Koa and I.S. No. 03G-19582-84 entitled Lani C. Justo vs. Karen
Torralba. Respondent stated that the movants in these cases are mother
and daughter while complainants are likewise mother and daughter and that
these cases arose out from the same transaction. Thus, movants and
complainants will be adducing the same sets of evidence and witnesses.
Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him

and complainant because there was no professional fee paid for the services
he rendered. Moreover, he argued that he drafted the demand letter only as
a personal favor to complainant who is a close friend.
We are not persuaded. A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding

the close friendship between complainant and respondent. The relationship
was established the moment complainant sought legal advice from
respondent regarding the dishonored checks. By drafting the demand letter
respondent further affirmed such relationship. The fact that the demand
letter was not utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that respondent
was not eventually engaged by complainant to represent her in the criminal
cases is of no moment. As observed by the Investigating Commissioner, by
referring to complainant Justo as my client in the demand letter sent to the
defaulting debtor[10], respondent admitted the existence of the lawyer-client
relationship. Such admission effectively estopped him from claiming
otherwise.
Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate respondent
from liability. Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers
from complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting
interests. The prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client

relationship is established and extends beyond the duration of the
professional relationship.[11] We held in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta[12] that it is not
necessary that any retainer be paid, promised or charged; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for
which his service had been sought.[13]
Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [a]

lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Respondent was
therefore bound to refrain from representing parties with conflicting
interests in a controversy. By doing so, without showing any proof that he
had obtained the written consent of the conflicting parties, respondent
should be sanctioned.
The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on

principles of public policy and good taste. [14] In the course of the lawyerclient relationship, the lawyer learns of the facts connected with the clients
case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of the
relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
[15]
It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which
is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. [16]
The case of Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat[17] is instructive on this concept, thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or

more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client. [18] This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. [19] Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and
also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection. [20] Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.[21]
The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Ao who
was eventually engaged by complainant will not exonerate him from the
clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
take- over of a clients cause of action by another lawyer does not give the
former lawyer the right to represent the opposing party. It is not only
malpractice but also constitutes a violation of the confidence resulting from
the attorney-client relationship.
Considering that this is respondents first infraction, the disbarment sought

in the complaint is deemed to be too severe. As recommended by the Board
of Governors of the IBP, the suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year is warranted.
Accordingly, the Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing from

the practice of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty. Let copies of
this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The
Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a copy of this Decision to
respondents record as member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
[1]
Rollo, p. 45.
[2]
Id. at 1-2.
[3]
Id. at 3-4.
[4]
Id. at 5-6.
[5]
Id. at 10-11.
[6]
Id. at 14-22.
[7]
Id. at 16.
[8]
Id. at 45.
[9]
Id. at 46-53.
[10]
Id. at 48.
[11]
Buted v. Hernando, A.C. No. 1359, 17 October 1991, 203 SCRA 1, 8.
[12]
432 Phil. 840 (2002).
[13]
Id. at 848.
[14]
Hilado v. David, 84 Phil 569, 578 (1949).
[15]
Maturan v. Gonzales, A.C. No. 2597, 12 March 1998, 287 SCRA 443, 446.
[16]
Supra note 14 at 579.
[17]
453 Phil. 108 (2003).
[18]
Id. at 111 citing PINEDA, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 199 [1999 ed.].
[19]
Id. citing Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569[1949]; Nombrado v. Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13 [1968]; Bautista v. Barrios, 9 SCRA 695
[1963].
[20]
Id. at 111-112 citing PINEDA, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p.199, citing Pierce v. Palmer, 31 R.I. 432.
[21]
Id. at 112 citing AGPALO, Legal Ethics, p. 220, citing in Re De la Rosa, 27 Phil. 258[1914]; Grievance Committee v. Rottner, 152
Conn. 59, 20
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4566. December 10, 2004]
UNITY FISHING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, complainant, vs. ATTY. DANILO

G. MACALINO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is this petition by way of a complaint for disbarment filed by Unity Fishing
Development Corporation against Atty. Danilo Macalino for having violated Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In its resolution of June 26, 1996, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint
within ten (10) days from notice.
[1]
On July 26, 1996, respondent filed a motion for extension of thirty (30) days within which to file
comment, which motion was granted by the Court in its resolution of August 21, 1996.
[2]
[3]
On August 26, 1996, respondent filed another motion for extension, this time for an additional
period of fifteen (15) days. The motion was similarly granted by the Court in its resolution of October
7, 1996.
[4]
[5]
[6]
Still, on September 19, 1996, respondent filed a third and last extension of time to file comment.
Again, this was granted by the Court via its resolution of November 27, 1996.
[7]
Unfortunately, no comment was ever filed by respondent.

Hence, and taking note of complainants Motion to Conduct Further Proceedings, filed on March
23, 1998, the Court, in its resolution of April 27, 1998, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
[8]
[9]
Acting on the referral, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline designated Atty. Cesar R. Dulay as
investigating commissioner.
It appears, however, that even while the case was already under formal investigation, respondent
displayed the same attitude of lack of concern. As reported by Atty. Dulay:
The Commission issued a notice setting the case for hearing on October 8, 1998, at which hearing
complainant represented by its legal counsel and respondent appeared. Again, respondent asked for
fifteen days from October 8, 1998 to file his Answer. Complainant also asked the same period
within which to file his reply.
On November 5, 1998, respondent filed an urgent motion for extension of time to file answer.
On November 9, 1998, respondent again filed an urgent motion for last extension of time or a
period of fifteen (15) days from November 15, 1998 to file answer, which was granted by the
Commission.
Since the respondent has not filed his answer as required by the Honorable Supreme Court and the
Commission, the case was again set for hearing on November 9, 1999.
On said date, only the counsel for complainant appeared. Respondent was absent. However, records
show the notice sent to him was returned unserved with the annotation Moved. Records also show
that respondent has not filed his answer and again he was given a last chance to file his answer
within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order dated November 9, 1999 and the hearing of the case
was reset to December 9, 1999.
On December 9, 1999, only counsel for complainant appeared and moved that respondents right to
file answer be deemed waived and that complainant be allowed to file Memorandum after which,
the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 14, 1999, respondent again filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of fifteen (15) days
from December 4, 1999 within which to file his answer.
On January 7, 2000, the complainant filed a Memorandum, a copy of which was furnished to
respondent and which was not controverted by respondent.
All told, respondent filed six (6) motions for extension of time to file Answer and up to this time,
which is almost seven (7) years from the time the Honorable Supreme Court required respondent to
file his answer to the complaint, respondent has not filed any answer,
[10]
on account of which the investigating commissioner considered the case as now ready for resolution.
[11]
Thereafter, the investigating commissioner submitted his Report. Dated January 20, 2003, the
Report recites the factual background of the case and the commissioners discussion and findings
thereon, thus:
[12]
Frabal Fishing and Ice Plant Corporation (hereinafter, Frabal) was the owner of a parcel of land
located along Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard, Sta. Mesa, Manila which was leased to Wheels
Distributors, Inc. (hereinafter, Wheels), an authorized dealer of cars and motor vehicles of various
make;
A dispute arose between Frabal and Wheels regarding the terms and conditions of the lease
contract. The dispute eventually led to a lawsuit. Frabal hired the services of respondent Atty.
Danilo G. Macalino as counsel for the purpose of representing its interest in the said lawsuit;
Frabal merged and was absorbed by Petitioner corporation on February 12, 1991, with the former
conveying, assigning and transferring all its business assets and liabilities to the latter, including all
judicial and extra-judicial claims. Hence, Petitioner was substituted in lieu of Frabal in the formers
lawsuit with Wheels;
As Petitioners legal counsel, Respondent advised Petitioner to severe all contractual relationship
with Wheels as a step towards eventually evicting the latter from the property they were occupying;
Hence, upon advice of Respondent, the contract of lease between Frabal and Wheels was
terminated. Respondent likewise advised Petitioner to return the guarantee deposit equivalent to
two (2) months rental or the amount of P50,000.00 to Wheels;
On March 2, 1988, Petitioner prepared Metrobank Check No. MB350288 dated March 8, 1988 for
the amount of P50,000.00. The check was crossed and made payable to the Wheels Distributors,
Inc. (Annex A).
Respondent volunteered to bring the check to the office of Wheels himself and to make them accept
it. Hence, on March 3, 1988, Respondent sent his representative to Petitioners office to get the said
check;
Respondents representative duly received the said check from Petitioner, as proof of which he
signed Check Voucher No. 3-012 (Annex B);
Thereafter, Respondent represented to Petitioner that he was able to deliver the check to Wheels
Distributors, Inc.;
The suit between Petitioner and Wheels continued for several years. In the meantime, Petitioner
changed counsels, replacing Respondent with someone else;
Finally, sometime in May 1994, the suit ended in amicable settlement. In the process of negotiating
the terms and conditions of the settlement, Wheels informed Petitioner that it never received
therefund (sic) guarantee deposit in the amount of P50,000.00;
Petitioner was shocked to learn this piece of information from Wheels Distributors as all along
Respondent had represented to Petitioner that Wheels has already received the guarantee deposit
of P50,000.00;
Petitioner searched its files for the subject check. After locating the check, Petitioner noted that at
the back of the check was a rubber stamp marking indicating that it was deposited with the United
Savings Bank Head Office on May 13, 1988 to Account No. CA-483-3. United Savings Bank has
since been acquired by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and is now known as UCPB
Savings Bank;
Petitioner checked with Wheels Distributors from whom it later learned that the latter never
maintained an account with the United Savings Bank, now the UCPB Savings Bank;
Petitioner wrote to Respondent on May 19, 1994 to explain why the check in issue never reached
Wheels Distributors and how it was endorsed and encashed despite the fact that it was a crossed
check (Copy of said letter is Annex C);
Despite receipt of said letter, however, Respondent never responded nor attempted to explain his
side to what strongly appears to be a gross misappropriation of the money for his own personal use;
Hence, Petitioner was constrained to institute an action for damages against Respondent Danilo G.
Macalino as well as UCPB Savings Bank with the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 72
where the same is now docketed as Civil Case No. 2382-MN;
That Respondent misappropriated the amount of P50,000.00 for his own personal use cannot be
denied. An employee of UCPB in the person of Eduardo Estremadura testified in the aforestated
case for damages that Respondent Atty. Danilo G. Macalino was the one maintaining Account No.
CA-483-37 at UCPB, to which the crossed check payable to Wheels was deposited (TSN, p. 8,
Aug. 24, 1995, copy of the TSN is Annex D);
The Metrobank Check No. MB350288 dated March 8, 1988 for the amount of P50,000.00 was
deposited to Respondents account is further shown in United Savings Bank Current Account
Deposit Slip accomplished by Respondent when he deposited said check with United Savings Bank
on May 13, 1988 (Copy of said deposit slip is Annex E).
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS:
Respondent Atty. Danilo G. Macalino was given all the opportunity to answer and present his
defenses to the complaint. Regrettably, the records show that despite the orders of the Supreme
Court and this Commission respondent has not taken any step to verify and inquire as to the status
of the complaint against him. Almost three years since the submission of the complainants
memorandum, respondent has not reacted nor made any move to protect himself and answer the
complaint. Due process consists in being given the opportunity to be heard and we believe that in
this case respondent has been given all the opportunity to be heard.
On the basis of the above, the investigating commissioner concluded his Report with the following
-
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for two (2) years and be ordered to account to complainant the amount of P50,000.00.
Respondent should be warned that a similar offense will merit a more severe penalty.
[13]
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2003-341, adopting
and approving the report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner with a modification
as to the penalty, to wit:
[14]
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED, the Report and

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification as to the penalty to
conform to the evidence, and considering respondents failure to account for the funds received by
him in trust from complainant in gross violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as for respondents lax, remiss and untroubled attitude in this case, Atty.
Danilo G. Macalino is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and Ordered
to account to complainant the amount of P50,000.00 with a Warning that a similar offense will
merit a more severe penalty.
This resolution is now before us for confirmation.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of
fidelity and good faith. It is designed to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of that
kind from being done for the protection of the client. So it is that the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
[15]
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF

HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
The Canon of Professional Ethics is even more explicit when it states:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or
takes advantages of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of
the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circumstances
be commingled with his own or be used by him. (par. 11)
Here, we are in full accord with the findings, conclusion and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors that respondent misappropriated the money entrusted to him and which he failed to
account for to his client despite demand therefor.
Respondents failure to rebut complainants evidence clearly reveals his failure to live up to his
duties as a lawyer in consonance with the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
His repeated failure without any valid reason to comply with the orders of the Court requiring him to
comment on the complaint lends credence to the allegations thereof and manifests his tacit admission
of the same. As aptly found by Commissioner Dulay, the following uncontroverted facts as supported
by the annexes of the complaint had been established:
1. that Metrobank Check No. MB350288 in the amount of P50,000.00 payable to Wheels
Distributors (Annex A of Petition) was prepared by Frabal Fishing & Ice Plant Corporation (Annex
B Petition) and released to respondents representative;
2. that the said Metrobank Check No. [MB350288] was deposited to Account No. 0110004833
under Account Name Danilo G. Macalino at the United Savings Bank (Annex E of Petition);
3. that on 19 May 1994 complainant wrote a letter to respondent (Annex C of Petition) advising the
latter that the Metrobank Check intended for Wheel Distributors, Inc. was not received by them
(Wheels Distributors) yet it was endorsed and encashed. Respondent was therefore requested to
explain how the particular check was encashed. Respondent received the letter on May 23, 1994
(Annex C-3 of Petition) and the records do not show that respondent replied to the latter requiring
him to explain; and
4. that complainant filed a civil case against UCPB Savings Bank, and Danilo Macalino before the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 2382-MN (Annex D of
Petition) and at the hearing of said case on August 24, 1995, witness Eduardo Estremadura, a
bookeeper of UCPB Bank positively testified that Danilo G. Macalino was the maintainer of
Account No. CA-483-3 of the UCPB Savings Bank, Legaspi Branch (page 8 & 9 Annex D, TSN of
hearing of Civil Case No. 2382-MN) and that Check No. 350288 was deposited to the Account of
Danilo G. Macalino under CA-483-3 on May 13, 1988 (page 9 of Annex D, TSN of hearing); and
was credited to the account of Danilo G. Macalino (page 12 of Annex D, TSN of hearing of Civil
Case No. 2382-MN) ,
[16]
from which established facts, the investigating commissioner made the following conclusions:
1. that Metrobank Check No. 350288 in the amount of P50,000.00 which was intended for Wheels
Distributors, Inc. was deposited and the amount credited to Account No. 483-3 of respondent
Danilo G. Macalino with the UCPB Savings Bank.
2. that respondent when required by the complainant to explain and account for the amount of
P50,000.00 caused by Metrobank Check No. 350288 which was not intended for him failed to reply
and give any accounting of such funds to complainant.
[17]
Respondents wanton failure to make an accounting and to return to his client the amount
entrusted to him upon demand give rise to the presumption that he misappropriated it, in violation of
the trust and confidence reposed on him. His act of holding on to complainants money without its
acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. A lawyer, under his oath,
pledges himself not to delay any man for money and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity
to his client.
[18]
[19]
It is clear, therefore, that respondent, by depositing the check in his own account and
subsequently deceiving his client into believing that he delivered the same to Wheels is undoubtedly
guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not
merely to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the
respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays
their trust and confidence. Like judges, lawyers must not only be clean; they must also appear
clean. This way, the peoples faith in the justice system remains undisturbed.
[20]
[21]
What is more, respondents repeated failures to comply with the orders of the Court requiring him
to comment on the complaint indicate a high degree of irresponsibility on his part.
We have no hesitance, then, in confirming the resolution passed by the IBP Board of Governors
suspending respondent from the practice of law for one (1) year. We could have taken a more drastic
action against respondent, but considering that he has no prior administrative record, it is our
sentiment that the recommended penalty serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the public
and the legal profession. After all, in Espiritu vs. Cabredo, we imposed the same penalty on an
attorney who similarly failed to account the money received from his client and to restitute it without
any reason.
[22]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo G. Macalino is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, for his failure to immediately return and deliver the funds of his
former client upon demand, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year effective immediately, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely. He is likewise ordered to return the sum of P50,000 to complainant
within ten (10) hereof.
Let copies of the Resolution be entered into respondents record as an attorney and be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and all the courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
[1]
Rollo, p. 27.
[2]
Id., at pp. 28-29.
[3]
Id., at p. 32.
[4]
Id., at pp. 33-34.
[5]
Id., at p. 37.
[6]
Id., at pp. 38-39.
[7]
Id., at p. 43.
[8]
Id., at pp. 44-45.
[9]
Id., at p. 47.
[10]
Id., at pp. 45-47.
[11]
Id., at p. 47.
[12]
Id., at pp. 42, et seq.
[13]
Id., at, p. 50
[14]
Id., at p. 41.
[15]
Espiritu vs. Cabredo, IV, Adm. Case No. 5831, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 19.
[16]
Rollo, pp. 47-48.
[17]
Id., at pp. 48-49.
[18]
Aldovino, et al. vs. Pujalte, Jr., A.C. No. 5082, 17 February 2004.
[19]
Ong vs. Grizaldo, A.C. No. 4724, 30 April 2003, 402 SCRA 1 [2003].
[20]
Busios vs. Ricafort, 347 Phils. 687 [1997].
[21]
Judge Angeles vs. Atty. Uy, Jr., 386 Phil. 221 [2000].
[22]
See note 16, Supra.

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
SPOUSES VIRGILIO
ANGELINA ARANDA,
and
Petitioners,
A.C. No. 7907
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus -
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
ATTY.
EMMANUEL
ELAYDA,
Respondent.
F.
Promulgated:
December 15, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The instant case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by

the spouses Virgilio and Angelina Aranda (spouses Aranda) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline,
charging their former counsel, Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda (Atty. Elayda), with
gross negligence or gross misconduct in handling their case. The spouses
Aranda were the defendants in Civil Case No. 232-0-01, entitled Martin V.
Guballa v. Spouses Angelina and Virgilio Aranda, filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 72.
In the Complaint dated August 11, 2006, [1] the spouses Aranda alleged that
Atty. Elaydas handling of their case was sorely inadequate, as shown by his
failure to follow elementary norms of civil procedure and evidence, [2] to wit:
4. That on February 14, 2006 hearing of the said case, the case was ordered
submitted for decision [the spouses Aranda] and [Atty. Elayda] did not appear;
certified copy of the order is attached as Annex C;
5. That the order setting this case for hearing on February 14, 2006 was sent
only to [Atty. Elayda] and no notice was sent to [the spouses Aranda] that is they
were unaware of said hearing and [Atty. Elayda] never informed them of the setting;
6. That despite receipt of the order dated February 14, 2006, [Atty. Elayda]
never informed them of such order notwithstanding the follow-up they made of their
case to him;
7. That [Atty. Elayda] did not lift any single finger to have the order dated
February 14, 2006 reconsidered and/or set aside as is normally expected of a
counsel devoted to the cause of his client;
8. That in view of the inaction of [Atty. Elayda] the court naturally rendered a
judgment dated March 17, 2006 adverse to [the spouses Aranda] which copy
thereof was sent only to [Atty. Elayda] and [the spouses Aranda] did not receive any
copy thereof, certified xerox copy of the decision is attached as Annex D;
9. That they were totally unaware of said judgment as [Atty. Elayda] had not
again lifted any single finger to inform them of such adverse judgment and that
there is a need to take a remedial recourse thereto;
10. That [Atty. Elayda] did not even bother to file a notice of appeal hence the
judgment became final and executory hence a writ of execution was issued upon
motion of the plaintiff [Martin Guballa] in the said case;
11. That on July 18, 2006 Sheriff IV Leandro R. Madarag implemented the writ
of execution and it was only at this time that [the spouses Aranda] became aware of
the judgment of the Court, certified xerox copy of the writ of execution is attached
as Annex E;
12. That on July 19, 2006, they wasted no time in verifying the status of their
case before Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Olongapo City and to their utter shock,
dismay and disbelief, they found out that they have already lost their case and
worst the decision had already become final and executory;
13. That despite their plea for a reasonable period to take a remedial
recourse of the situation (the Sheriff initially gave them fifteen (15) days), Sheriff
Madarag forcibly took possession and custody of their Mitsubishi Pajero with Plate
No. 529;
14. That they were deprived of their right to present their evidence in the
said case and of their right to appeal because of the gross negligence of
respondent.[3]
In its Order[4] dated August 15, 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
directed Atty. Elayda to submit his Answer to the complaint with a warning
that failure to do so will result in his default and the case shall be heard ex
parte.
Atty. Elayda filed his Answer [5] dated September 1, 2006, in which he
narrated:
7. That this case also referred to [Atty. Elayda] sometime December 2004 after the
[spouses Aranda] and its former counsel failed to appear in court on February 7,
2005;
8. That from December 2004, the [spouses Aranda] did not bother to contact [Atty.
Elayda] to prepare for the case and in fact on May 30, 2005, [Atty. Elayda] had to
ask for postponement of the case for reason that he still have to confer with the
[spouses Aranda] who were not around;
9. That contrary to the allegations of the [spouses Aranda], there was not a single
instance from December 2004 that the [spouses Aranda] called up [Atty. Elayda] to
talk to him regarding their case;
10. That the [spouses Aranda] from December 2004 did not even bother to follow
up their case in court just if to verify the status of their case and that it was only on
July 19, 2006 that they verified the same and also the only time they tried to
contact [Atty. Elayda];
11. That the [spouses Aranda] admitted in their Complaint that they only tried to
contact [Atty. Elayda] when the writ of execution was being implemented on them;
12. That during the scheduled hearing of the case on February 14, 2006, [Atty.
Elayda] was in fact went to RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City and asked Mrs. Edith
Miano to call him in Branch 73 where he had another case if the [spouses Aranda]
show up in court so that [Atty. Elayda] can talk to them but obviously the [spouses
Aranda] did not appear and Mrs. Miano did not bother to call [Atty. Elayda];
13. That [Atty. Elayda] was not at fault that he was not able to file the necessary
pleadings in court because the [spouses Aranda] did not get in touch with him;
14. That [Atty. Elayda] cannot contact the [spouses Aranda] for the latter failed to
give their contact number to [Atty. Elayda] nor did the [spouses Aranda] go to his
office to leave their contact number;
14. That the [spouses Aranda] were negligent in their I dont care attitude towards
their case and for this reason that they alone should be blamed for what happened
to their case x x x.
At the mandatory conference hearing held on March 14, 2007, all the parties
appeared with their respective counsels. The parties were then given a
period of 10 days from receipt of the order within which to submit their
position papers attaching therewith all documentary exhibits and affidavits
of witnesses, if any.
After the submission of the parties position papers, Investigating

Commissioner Jordan M. Pizarras came out with his Decision [6] finding Atty.
Elayda guilty of gross negligence, and recommending his suspension from
the practice of law for a period of six months, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda is

suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months, which shall take
effect from the date of notice of receipt of the finality of this DECISION. He is sternly
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe
penalty.[7]
Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008128[8] dated March 6, 2008, adopting and approving Investigating
Commissioner Pizarras report, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and in view of respondents negligence and unmindful of his sworn duties
to his clients, Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six (6) months with Warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
merit a more severe penalty.[9]
Aggrieved, Atty. Elayda filed with this Court a Petition for Review
maintaining that he was not negligent in handling the spouses Arandas case
as to warrant suspension, which was too harsh a penalty under the
circumstances.
After a careful review of the records of the instant case, this Court finds no
cogent reason to deviate from the findings and the conclusion of the IBP
Board of Governors that Atty. Elayda was negligent and unmindful of his
sworn duties to his clients.
In Abay v. Montesino,[10] this Court held:
The legal profession is invested with public trust. Its goal is to render public
service and secure justice for those who seek its aid. Thus, the practice of law is
considered a privilege, not a right, bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications required for the
conferment of such privilege.
Verily, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency and of morality which includes honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They
must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and
their clients in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession, as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.Any conduct found wanting in
these considerations, whether in their professional or private capacity, shall subject
them to disciplinary action. In the present case, the failure of respondent to file the
appellants brief was a clear violation of his professional duty to his client. [11]
The Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request
for information.
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Atty. Elayda is duty bound to uphold and
safeguard the interests of his clients. He should be conscientious,
competent and diligent in handling his clients cases. Atty. Elayda should
give adequate attention, care, and time to all the cases he is handling. As
the spouses Arandas counsel, Atty. Elayda is expected to monitor the
progress of said spouses case and is obligated to exert all efforts to present
every remedy or defense authorized by law to protect the cause espoused
by the spouses Aranda.
Regrettably, Atty. Elayda failed in all these. Atty. Elayda even admitted that
the spouses Aranda never knew of the scheduled hearings because said
spouses never came to him and that he did not know the spouses
whereabouts. While it is true that communication is a shared responsibility
between a counsel and his clients, it is the counsels primary duty to inform
his clients of the status of their case and the orders which have been issued
by the court. He cannot simply wait for his clients to make an inquiry about
the developments in their case. Close coordination between counsel and
client is necessary for them to adequately prepare for the case, as well as to
effectively monitor the progress of the case. Besides, it is elementary
procedure for a lawyer and his clients to exchange contact details at the
initial stages in order to have constant communication with each
other. Again, Atty. Elaydas excuse that he did not have the spouses Arandas
contact number and that he did not know their address is simply
unacceptable.
Furthermore, this Court will not countenance Atty. Elaydas explanation that
he cannot be faulted for missing the February 14, 2006 hearing of the
spouses Arandas case. The Court quotes with approval the disquisition of
Investigating Commissioner Pizarras:
Moreover, his defense that he cannot be faulted for what had happened
during the hearing on February 14, 2006 because he was just at the other branch of
the RTC for another case and left a message with the court stenographer to just call
him when [the spouses Aranda] come, is lame, to say the least. In the first place,
the counsel should not be at another hearing when he knew very well that he has a
scheduled hearing for the [spouses Arandas] case at the same time. His attendance
at the hearing should not be made to depend on the whether [the spouses Aranda]
will come or not. The Order submitting the decision was given at the instance of the
other partys counsel mainly because of his absence there. Again, as alleged by the
[the spouses Aranda] and as admitted by [Atty. Elayda] himself, he did not take the
necessary remedial measure in order to ask that said Order be set aside. [12]
It is undisputed that Atty. Elayda did not act upon the RTC order submitting
the spouses Arandas case for decision. Thus, a judgment was rendered
against the spouses Aranda for a sum of money. Notice of said judgment
was received by Atty. Elayda who again did not file any notice of appeal or
motion for reconsideration and thus, the judgment became final and
executory. Atty. Elayda did not also inform the spouses Aranda of the
outcome of the case. The spouses Aranda came to know of the adverse RTC
judgment, which by then had already become final and executory, only
when a writ of execution was issued and subsequently implemented by the
sheriff.
Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as a

member of the legal profession. His conduct shows that he not only failed to
exercise due diligence in handling his clients case but in fact abandoned his
clients cause. He proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed on him by
his helpless clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda owes fealty, not only to his
clients, but also to the Court of which he is an officer. [13]
On a final note, it must be stressed that whenever a lawyer accepts a case,

it deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of
its importance and whether or not it is for a fee or free. [14] Verily, in Santiago
v. Fojas,[15] the Court held:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability
to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every
such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor
not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the
bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[16]
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and

adopting
the
Decision
of
the
Investigating
Commissioner
is
hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly,

respondent ATTY.
EMMANUEL
F.
ELAYDA is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX
(6) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar
act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Elaydas personal record with
the Office of the Bar Confidant and be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL
CASTILLO
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-5.
[2]
Id. at 3.
[3]
Id. at 1-3.
[4]
Id. at 39.
[5]
Id. at 40-43.
[6]
Id. at 116-124.
[7]
Id. at 124.
[8]
Id. at 114-115.
[9]
Id. at 114.
[10]
462 Phil. 496 (2003).
[11]
Id. at 503-504.
[12]
Rollo, p. 122.
[13]
Abiero v. Juanino, 492 Phil. 149, 158 (2005).
[14]
Jardin v. Villar, Jr., 457 Phil. 1, 9 (2003).
[15]
Adm. Case No. 4103, September 7, 1995, 248 SCRA 68.
[16]
Id. at 73-74.
SECOND DIVISION
OFELIA R. SOMOSOT,
Complainant,
versus -
ATTY. GERARDO F. LARA,

Respondent.
A.C. No. 7024

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CORONA,*
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 30, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Once again, we are faced in this complaint for disbarment with the problem of a client-lawyer
relationship developing into a legal action between the lawyer and the client. [1] The complaining
client is Ofelia R. Somosot (complainant), a defendant in a collection case before the trial court;
her defense was handled by Atty. Gerardo F. Lara (respondent).[2]
The Factual Background
In support of her complaint for disbarment, the complainant alleged that she retained the
services of the respondent as her counsel in Civil Case No. Q01-43544, entitled Golden
Collection Marketing Corporation v. Ofelia Somosot, et al., filed against her and her codefendants for the collection of a sum of money amounting to P1.3 Million. Her defense was that
it was the plaintiff who actually owed her P800,000.00. She claimed that she had the evidence to
prove this defense at the trial. The respondent agreed to handle the case and duly entered his
appearance as counsel after securing his acceptance fee.
The complainant expected the respondent to perform his duty as counsel and to defend her
interests to the utmost. She alleged, however, that after filing the Answer to the Complaint, the
respondent failed to fully inform her of further developments in the case. She only heard about
the case when there was already a decision against her and her co-defendants. She even belatedly
learned that the respondent had sought his discharge as counsel without her knowledge and
consent. Contrary to the respondent's claim that he could no longer locate her, she claimed that
the respondent knew all along where she lived and could have easily contacted her had he been
in good faith.
After the court denied the respondent's motion to withdraw from the case, the complainant
claimed that the respondent represented her interests in a half-hearted manner, resulting in the
grant of the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Allegedly, the respondent failed to
properly oppose the motion and she was thereafter deprived of the chance to present her
evidence. Execution of the courts decision followed, resulting in the sale of her house and lot at
public auction despite her efforts to reverse the judgment with the help of another
lawyer. Thereafter, a third party to whom her property had been mortgaged sued her.
The complainant bewailed the respondent's evasive attitude when she confronted him
about her problem with his representation. She found the respondents excuse that he could not
contact her because she had changed her office address to be unsatisfactory. She accused the
respondent of miserably failing to comply with his oath as a lawyer and to discharge his duty of
ably representing her.
In his comment,[3] the respondent denied that he failed to exercise the diligence required of
him as counsel in Civil Case No. Q01-43544. He argued that pursuant to his oath as counsel, he
pursued the complainant's case according to his own ability and knowledge. He alleged that:[4]
1. He filed the complainant's Answer with Counterclaim on July 16, 2001. He presented
all the complainants defenses and claims, but the plaintiff, Golden Collection
Marketing Corporation, filed for interrogatories and request for admission. He filed an
objection to the plaintiff's motion on the ground that the interrogatories and request for
admission are, by law, properly addressed to the complainant herself and not to him as
counsel.
2. He filed a reply to the plaintiff's comment (on his objection) and the case proceeded
despite the complainants failure to pay his billing from May 3, 2001 to August 2,
2001 amounting to P27,000.00
3. On November 1, 2001, he joined the government service as consultant in the Board of
Investments and full-time counsel to BOI Gov. J. Antonio Leviste. He tried to inform
the complainant of his appointment and to collect his billings at her office in
Greenhills, but the office was locked. A security guard told him that the complainant
had moved without leaving any forwarding address. He even tried to contact
complainant and her husband's cellular phones, to no avail.
4. Desperate, he filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance with the explanation that the
conformity of the complainant could not be obtained since the complainant's
corporation had moved its office without informing him of its new location, and the
complainant had not been communicating with him. [5] He later learned that the
complainant had moved to Pasig City.
5. In late December 2001, he was able to talk with the complainant by phone and he
informed her that he could no longer handle cases for the complainant's company,
thereby terminating his relationship with complainant. He advised the complainant to
look for another lawyer; the complainant replied that she already had another lawyer.
6. Despite his situation and aware that the court had denied his motion to withdraw from
the case, the respondent continued rendering legal services as the complainant's
counsel. He filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision dated June 3,
2002. He likewise filed an urgent opposition to the winning partys motion for
execution.
7. On September 2, 2005, he received a letter from the complainant giving him one final
opportunity to convince me, why she should not pursue disbarment proceedings.He
promptly prepared a reply which, upon her suggestion, he delivered at the
complainant's residence.
8. He thought that he had given the complainant a satisfactory explanation only to learn
later that she filed a complaint for disbarment against him.
9. The respondent expressed his regret for what happened to the case, but stressed that he
did not abandon the complainant and the cases he had been handling for her
company. He did not likewise neglect to perform his duties as counsel. On the
insinuation that he may have been bought, he emphasized he that cannot and will never
abandon a client as a Christian lawyer and a family man.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 2006, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The complainant filed a Position
Paper (dated January 12, 2007) before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline through her
counsel Honorato V. Reyes, Jr.[6] She reiterated in this position paper the allegations in her
complaint. She could not understand how a simple collection case against her where she felt she
had a good defense and which she expected to go through a full-blown litigation could be lost
virtually through a mere technicality, i.e., through a judgment on the pleadings for her failure to
answer the plaintiffs interrogatories and request for admission. She insisted she had not been
informed by the respondent of the plaintiff's motion for written interrogatories and request for
admission. Had he informed her, she could have responded.
The complainant was even more surprised to learn that the respondent tried to withdraw
from the case because she (the complainant) could not be contacted. She maintained that she had
never transferred her residence where she could be reached had the respondent exerted a
meaningful effort to contact her. She claimed that the respondent was able to do so later when he
was collecting the balance of his legal fees. She denied that she had not paid respondent his
retainer fees.
The complainant stressed that the respondent violated his oath as a lawyer by mishandling
her case, resulting in the loss of her house and lot and other damages.
The respondents Position Paper (dated January 3, 2007) essentially reflected the
arguments presented in his Comment before this Court. [7] He clarified that the complainant did
not incur extra expenses in defending herself in the collection case since its handling was part of
the services covered by his retainer. He insisted that he vigorously pursued the case and defended
the complainant to the utmost despite the complainants unpaid billings of P27,000.00.
The respondent contended that he had good reasons not to continue as the complainant's
counsel. He reasoned out that under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may
withdraw from a case upon a good cause such as when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees
for the lawyers services, or fails to comply with the terms of the retainer agreement, or when the
lawyer is elected or appointed to public office.[8] Two of these possible causes applied to his
situation; he was appointed legal consultant at the BOI requiring full-time work and the
complainant had failed to pay his legal fees to him amounting to P27,000.00. He filed the formal
notice of withdrawal without the conformity of the complainant because he could not locate her.
The respondent insinuated that that the complainant's real intent was merely to harass him
and his family as indicated by her non-appearance, despite due notice, at the preliminary
conference before the IBP. He argued that he could not be disbarred considering that it was the
complainant who was negligent in informing him of her whereabouts.While he expressed regret
for what happened in the case, he insisted that he exerted every effort to locate her, filed the
necessary pleadings, protected her and her company's interest as best as he could.
The IBP Recommendation
In a letter to the Chief Justice dated January 28, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors,
through the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, transmitted to the Court a Notice of
Resolution[9] and the records of the case. The resolution was for the adoption and approval of the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco who had investigated the
case. [10]
Commissioner Limpingco recommended that respondent be reprimanded for lack of
reasonable diligence in representing the complainant.
His recommendation was based on the following evaluation:
It appears that the respondent was to some degree, remiss in fulfilling his duties to complainant
Somosot. While it may be true that he had filed an answer in Civil Case No. Q01-43544,
objected to the plaintiff's interrogatories and requests for admission, asked for reconsideration of
the decision rendered by the court and opposed the adverse party's efforts to have the same
executed, it can nevertheless be seen that the remedial measures taken by the respondent were
inadequate, especially in view of the direction which the proceedings were taking.
The respondent is not incorrect in saying that a lawyer may be relieved of his duties even without
the conformity of his client when he lost all contact with the latter, and the complainant's failure
to settle his unpaid fees is not received without sympathy. The fact remains,however, that the
respondent's efforts to be discharged as counsel were disallowed by the court, under the
circumstances, he was bound by his oath to represent complainant Somosot and to advocate her
cause to the best of his ability.
The respondent claims that in late December 2001, he was finally able to talk to complainant
Somosot and was told that she already had another lawyer by the name of Atty. Tomas
Dulay.Considering his stated desire to withdraw from the case and his own declaration that he
had again come into the means of contacting the complainant, it is thus entirely puzzling why he
did not at this point, revive his efforts to be relieved of his responsibilities in Civil Case No.
Q02-43544 given complainant Somosot's alleged engagement of Atty. Tomas Dulay and her
presumed willingness to give her consent to such discharge. As it is, respondent Atty. Lara
remained as counsel of record and for some undisclosed reason did not appeal the decision
against his client.
This is not to say that the client is entirely without fault. While complainant Ofelia Somosot's
narrative is in many respects at odds with that of the respondent, it is nevertheless clear from her
submissions that she never made any effort to contact the respondent to follow up the status of
the case, but instead expected the latter to take complete initiative in this regard.
It has been held that it is the duty of a party-litigant to remain in contact with his lawyer in order
to be informed of the progress of his case. True enough, the party-litigant should not rely totally
on his counsel to litigate his case even if the latter expressly assures that the former's presence in
court will no longer be needed. No prudent party will leave the fate of his case entirely to his
lawyer. Absence in one or two hearings may be negligible but want of inquiry or update on the
status of his case for several months (four, in this case) is inexcusable. It is the duty of a partylitigant to be in contact with his counsel from time to time in order to be informed of the progress
of his case. Thus the complainant did not do, and such circumstance can only mitigate in
respondent's favor.
The Court's Ruling

As the IBP did, we find that the respondent deserves to be sanctioned for having fallen short of
the standards required of him as defense counsel in Civil Case No. Q01-43544. He violated the
basic rule, expressed under Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[11] that a lawyer
shall serve his client with competence and diligence.[12]
While it may be said that the respondent did not completely abandon the case, his handing of the
complainants defense left much to be desired.
The records show that the plaintiff in the collection case filed interrogatories and a request
for admission. The respondent duly filed his objection to the plaintiffs move, but the court
apparently allowed the interrogatories and request for admission and directed the complainant
(as the defendant in the civil case) to respond. The complainant was never informed of this
development and the omission eventually led to the grant of the plaintiffs motion for judgment
on the pleadings, which in turn led to the decision against the defendants.[13]
In his submissions before this Court and before the IBP, the respondent alleged that he
objected to the interrogatories and request for admission and did all he could, even filing a reply
to the defendants comment to his objection. He likewise alleged that from May 3, 2001 to
August 2, 2001, the complainant had not paid the billings sent to her; that the complainant could
not be contacted because she had closed her office without any forwarding address; [14] that as of
November 1, 2001, he had been appointed as a consultant in the office of BOI Governor J.
Antonio Leviste; and that he continued to represent the complainant even after the trial courts
decision by filing a motion for reconsideration and opposing the plaintiffs motion for execution.
[15]
After examining the whole record of the case, we find the respondent's positions to be very
revealing with respect to what they say and do not say.
First, the respondent failed to precisely allege in his submissions how he tried to contact
the defendant on or about the time the interrogatories and request for admission were pending. It
appears that he really had not; by his own admission, his attempt to contact the complainant
came in December 2001 and only to inform her of his government appointment and to collect his
billings. It was only after the discovery of the closure of the defendants office did the respondent
try to contact the complainant and her husband by cellular phone, but they could not be reached.
Second. The interrogatories/admission issue happened in August 2001, which tells us that
the respondent at about that time was already very sensitive about his billing issue against his
client as he had not been paid from May to August 2001. Assuming the non-payment to be true,
such failure should not be a reason not to inform the client of an important development, or
worse, to withhold vital information from her. As the court held in Luisito Balatbat v. Atty.
Edgardo Arias,[16] a client must never be left in the dark for to do so would destroy the trust, faith
and confidence reposed in the retained lawyer in particular and the legal profession in general.
Third. The respondent failed to provide details on the developments that led to the adverse
rulings on the interrogatories/admissions and the judgment on the pleadings. We gather under
Annex G of the respondents Comment filed with this Court that the trial court ruled in open
court on March 8, 2002 that a judgment on the pleadings was appropriate. This was confirmed
by an Order of the same date (attached as Annex B to the complainants Position Paper before the
IBP) which partly states;
The Court NOTES the manifestation of Atty. Honorato M. Guttierez, counsel for the
plaintiff that the defendants have not been appearing in the case for one (1) year as
per December 14, 2001 Order of this Court. The Court even denied the Notice of Withdrawal
of Appearance of Atty. Lara, counsel for the defendants, with the end purpose of obviating the
further delays of the proceedings of this case. Moreover, in the said Order, this Court ruled that
the Rule on judgment on the pleading under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court will now obtain.
The respondent never bothered to explain this court order whose highlighted portions give hints
on the reasons for the adverse developments for the defendants. While the records do not
explicitly state what remedies the respondent took to react to the Order and to the trial court
ruling on the interrogatories/admission issue, we feel it safe to assume that the respondent did
not move at all to question the trial courts rulings; nowhere in the records, both from the
complainants and the respondents end, is there any allegation that the respondent sought to
review the trial courts rulings. What intrigues us is that the respondent could have reacted to the
trial court's ruling on the interrogatories/request for admission; he was aware of the recourses
open to him under the ruling in Briboneria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 101682, December 4, 1992,
that he cited in his objection to the interrogatories and request for admission.
Fourth, on the matter of the respondents withdrawal from the case, the respondent might have
had valid reasons to withdraw and terminate his relationship with his client. As the
respondent now states, he could withdraw under paragraphs (e) and (f) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility[17] - i.e., deliberate failure of the client to pay the fees for the
services, or failure to comply with the retainer agreement, or appointment or election to public
office. However, he does not appear to have cited these reasons before the trial court. Instead, he
merely filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance, citing his clients unknown location and
failure to communicate as reasons for his clients lack of express consent to his withdrawal. [18] It
is undisputed that the trial court denied the respondent's notice of withdrawal; thus, he remained
as counsel of record burdened with all the responsibilities that his representation carried.
By his own admission, the respondent succeeded in contacting the complainant in late
December, 2001, i.e., soon after he filed his notice of withdrawal with the trial court. As
Commissioner Limpingco observed, it was quite puzzling that he did not then revive his efforts
to be relieved of his responsibilities in the case, given the complainant's reported engagement of
a new counsel. He could have then secured his clients consent to his withdrawal but did not.
Fifth. As Commissioner Limpingco did, we wonder why the respondent did not appeal the
decision against his client. It even appears from one of the annexes (Annex I of the respondents
comment) that he did not immediately inform the complainant of the decision against her. To
quote the complainants letter (Annex I):
However, for reasons you have not fully explained, you virtually
abandoned the case and interest therein after having initially filed an answer in my behalf.
You never informed me of any further developments in the case. As a result, I lost the said case
by reason of default and technicality.
You never informed me of this loss, thus denying me the opportunity to appeal the adverse
decision. . .
The respondent never bothered to refuse this very damaging allegation; neither in his Position
Paper before the IBP nor in the Comment filed with us did he offer an explanation.Thus, it
appears that the respondent could not have really taken any instructions from his client on how
to handle the trial courts adverse decision. He simply took it upon himself to decide not to
appeal the trial courts decision and the denial of his motion for reconsideration.
While the respondent expressed regret for the reverses the complainant suffered, regret is a
belated response that will not bring back the complainants lost case. It cannot erase the fact that
he mishandled the complainants defense. By the exacting standards of the legal profession, he
has been weighed and found wanting.
What lightens the impact of the respondents mishandling of the case is the complainants own
failings as a client. The non-payment of fees is a factor that we cannot simply disregard. As a
rule, law practice is not a pro bono proposition and a lawyers sensitivity and concern for unpaid
fees are understandable; lawyers incur expenses in running their practice and generally depend,
too, on their law practice income for their living expenses. Likewise, the respondents
appointment as a consultant should be considered although it is a matter that none of the parties
have fully examined. Both the non-payment of fees and the appoint to a public office, however,
were not reasons properly presented before the trial court through a motion that informed the
court of all the surrounding circumstances of the desired withdrawal. Instead, another reason was
given by way of a mere notice lacking the clients express consent. Thus, the courts denial of the
desired withdrawal was not totally unexpected.
More than these reasons and as Commissioner Limpingco correctly noted, the complainant
never made any effort to contact the respondent to follow up the status of her case, expecting
instead the respondent to take full and complete initiative in this regard. While the respondent, as
counsel, has the obligation to inform his client of the material developments in the case,
particularly of the aspects of the case that would require the clients instructions or participation,
this obligation is balanced by a complementary duty on the part of a party-litigant to remain in
contact with his lawyer in order to be informed of the progress of the case.
The complainants failing in this regard is her failure to inform her counsel of her change
of business address, a serious lapse but one that a resourceful counsel could have easily
handled. In a balancing, the greater fault still lies with the respondent as he did not appear, based
on the records of the case, to be a lawyer whose practice routine included regular reporting to
clients on matters other than billings. We note that he did not bother to report (or even allege that
he bothered to report) on the interrogatories and request for admission incidents that can make or
break a case as it did break the defendants case before the trial court. Despite knowledge of his
clients location gained in late December 2001, he did not likewise bother to inform the
complainant of the adverse decision against her in June 2002, taking it upon himself to simply
file a motion for reconsideration and to accept the courts ruling when his motion was denied. In
our view, these are law practice mortal sins that we cannot allow to simply be glossed over or be
penalized by a simple reprimand.
However, we cannot also disbar the respondent as the complainant demands in light of the
complainants own contributory faults. Disbarment is an ultimate remedy in the professional
world, no less serious and weighty as the power to impose reclusion perpetua in criminal cases;
in both, recovery from the penalty although not totally impossible is extremely difficult to attain.
Thus, we must at all times act with caution and due consideration, taking into account not only
the interests of the immediate parties, but the interest of the public, the bar and the administration
of justice as well.
The general public must know that the legal profession is a closely regulated profession
where transgressions merit swift but commensurate penalties; it is a profession that they can trust
because we guard our ranks and our standards well. The Bar must sit up and take notice of what
happened in this case to be able to guard against any repetition of the respondents transgressions,
particularly his failure to report the developments of an ongoing case to his clients. Unless the
Bar takes a pro-active stance, we cannot really blame members of the public who are not very
well disposed towards, and who may even distrust, the legal profession after hearing experiences
similar to what the complainant suffered. The administration of justice is served well when we
demonstrate that effective remedies exist to address the injustice and inequities that may result
from transgressions by those acting in the dispensation of justice process.
In these lights, we hold that while the respondent is liable for a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects his standing and character as an officer of the Court and as a member of the
Bar, this liability ought to be tempered by the mitigating circumstances we pointed out
above. We therefore cannot impose disbarment as penalty. Given the mitigating circumstances
and the extent of their effects on the respondents culpability, we hold that a three-month
suspension from the practice of law is the penalty that is more in keeping with the damage the
complainant suffered and the interests that the public, the bar and the administration of justice
have to protect.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent ATTY. GERARDO F. LARA is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months, effective upon
receipt of a copy of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 558 dated January 15, 2009.
Filed on January 19, 2006.
[2]
Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 1-5.
[3]
Id., pp. 9-15.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Annex F, respondent's position paper.
[1]
[6]
Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 20-24.

Id., pp. 4-15.
[8]
Canon 22.01(e) & (f).
[9]
Resolution No. XIII-2007-90, adopted on September 19, 2007 by the IBP Boardof Governors.
[10]
Id., Annex A.
[7]
[11]
Promulgated by the Court on June 21, 1988.

Canon 18.01 further provides - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render xxx
Rule 18.02. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
[12]
Rule 18.04. - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
the client's request for information.
[13]
Complainant's Position Paper; Rollo Vol. II, pp. 21-22.
[14]
Respondents Position Paper, id., p. 6.
[15]
Id.
[16]
A.C. No. 1666, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 1.
[17]
Supra note 8, p. 6.
[18]
Supra note 3, p. 3.
SECOND DIVISION
RURAL BANK OF CALAPE,
A.C. No. 5736
INC. (RBCI) BOHOL,

Complainant,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus -
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.
ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT

FLORIDO,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
June 18, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of the Board of

Directors[1] of the Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol against respondent
Atty. James Benedict Florido (respondent) for acts constituting grave
coercion and threats when he, as counsel for the minority stockholders of
RBCI, led his clients in physically taking over the management and
operation of the bank through force, violence and intimidation.
The Facts
On 18 April 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent.

[2]
RBCI alleged that respondent violated his oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code).
According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and his clients, Dr.

Domeciano Nazareno, Dr. Remedios Relampagos, Dr. Manuel Relampagos,
and Felix Rengel (Nazareno-Relampagos group), through force and
intimidation, with the use of armed men, forcibly took over the management
and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay),
the bank manager, destroyed the banks vault, and installed their own staff
to run the bank.
In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegations. Respondent explained

that he acted in accordance with the authority granted upon him by the
Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected Board of
Directors of RBCI. Respondent said he was merely effecting a lawful and
valid change of management. Respondent alleged that a termination notice
was sent to Garay but he refused to comply. On 1 April 2002, to ensure a
smooth transition of managerial operations, respondent and the NazarenoRelampagos group went to the bank to ask Garay to step down. However,
Garay reacted violently and grappled with the security guards long
firearm. Respondent then directed the security guards to prevent entry into
the bank premises of individuals who had no transaction with the
bank. Respondent, through the orders of the Nazareno-Relampagos group,
also changed the locks of the banks vault.
Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed
against him by RBCI was already dismissed; while the complaint for grave
coercion was ordered suspended because of the existence of a prejudicial
question. Respondent said that the disbarment complaint was filed against
him in retaliation for the administrative cases he filed against RBCIs counsel
and the trial court judges of Bohol.
Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to

prove their allegations. Respondent added that the affidavits attached to
the complaint were never identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants
and that none of the documentary exhibits were originals or certified true
copies.
The Ruling of the IBP
On 28 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.

(Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.) submitted his report and declared that
respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as
vanguard of law and justice.[3] Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. recommended the
imposition on respondent of a penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for six months to one year with a warning that the repetition of similar
conduct in the future will warrant a more severe penalty.
According to Commissioner Villadolid, Jr., respondent knew or ought to have

known that his clients could not just forcibly take over the management and
premises of RBCI without a valid court order. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.
noted that the right to manage and gain majority control over RBCI was one
of the issues pending before the trial court in Civil Case No.
6628. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. said that respondent had no legal basis to
implement the take over of RBCI and that it was a naked power grab without
any semblance of legality whatsoever.
Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. added that the administrative complaint against

respondent before the IBP is independent of the dismissal and suspension of
the criminal cases against respondent. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. also
noted that RBCI complied with the IBP Rules of Procedure when they filed a
verified complaint and submitted duly notarized affidavits. Moreover, both
RBCI and respondent agreed to dispense with the mandatory conference
hearing and, instead, simultaneously submit their position papers.
On 20 March 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII2006-120 which declared that respondent dismally failed to live up to the
exacting standards of the law profession and suspended respondent from
the practice of law for one year with a warning that repetition of similar
conduct will warrant a more severe penalty. [4]
On 5 July 2006, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11

December 2008 Resolution, the IBP denied respondents motion. [5]
The Ruling of the Court
We affirm the IBP Board of Governors resolution.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the
land.[6] Likewise, it is the lawyers duty to promote respect for the law and
legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law
or lessening confidence in the legal system. [7]
Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with
zeal within the bounds of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code
requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the law and
principles of fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client. [8] It is his duty to counsel his clients
to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing
an intentional wrong to their adversaries. [9]
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.s conclusion:
Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their
professional oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily, when
they appear before a tribunal, they act not merely as representatives of a party but,
first and foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty to protect their clients
interests is secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. While they are obliged to present every available legal
remedy or defense, their fidelity to their clients must always be made within the
parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense of truth, the law, and the fair
administration of justice.[10]
A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that
end, his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and
must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. [11] Any means,
not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in
the pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and
unethical.[12]
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of

violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and 15.07 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of
law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall
be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and in all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 842.
[1]
The complaint was signed by the following members: Lilia G. Dumadag, Mark Joel Go, Michael Jeffrey Go and Rosalina N. Go.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 1-2.
[3]
Id. at 273-286.
[4]
Id. at 272.
[5]
Id. at 354-355.
[6]
Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[7]
Rule 1.02, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[8]
Rule 19.01, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[9]
Ernesto Pineda, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, 211 (1999).
[10]
Rollo, p. 285.
[11]
Maglasang v. People, G.R. No. 90083, 4 October 1990, 190 SCRA 306.
[12]
Ernesto Pineda, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, 244 (1999).
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5798. January 20, 2005]
ALEX B. CUETO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE B. JIMENEZ, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a complaint for disciplinary action against Atty. Jose Jimenez, Jr. filed by Engr. Alex
B. Cueto with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline.
[1]
Engr. Alex Cueto alleged that sometime in October 1999 he engaged the services of respondent
as notary public, the latter being the father of the owner of the building subject of the Construction
Agreement to be notarized. He was then accompanied by a certain Val Rivera, the building
administrator of respondents son Jose Jimenez III.
[2]
After notarizing the agreement, respondent demanded P50,000 as notarial fee. Despite his
surprise as to the cost of the notarial service, complainant informed respondent that he only
had P30,000 in cash. Respondent persuaded complainant to pay the P30,000 and to issue a check
for the remaining P20,000. Being unfamiliar with the cost of notarial services, complainant paid all his
cash and issued a Far East Bank check dated December 28, 1999 for the balance.
[3]
Before the maturity date of the check, complainant requested respondent not to deposit the same
for lack of sufficient funds. He also informed respondent that the latters son Jose Jimenez III had not
yet paid his services as general contractor. Still, respondent deposited the check which was
consequently dishonored for insufficient funds. Meanwhile, the P2,500,000 check issued by
respondents son to complainant as initial payment pursuant to the Construction Agreement was itself
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account.
Subsequently, Atty. Jimenez lodged a complaint for violation of BP 22 against Cueto before the
City Prosecutors Office in Angeles City. The criminal case was tried in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch I.
In the meantime, Cueto filed his own administrative complaint against Jimenez on November 16,
2001. He alleged that Jimenez violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of
Professional Ethics when he filed the criminal case against Cueto so he could collect the balance of
his notarial fee.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, respondent Jimenez was required to
answer the complaint filed against him. Despite notice, however, respondent failed to file his answer
and to appear before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. After hearing the case ex-parte, the case
was deemed submitted for resolution.
[4]
[5]
In its report dated April 21, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent guilty
of violating Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that
Atty. Jose B. Jimenez, Jr. be reprimanded.
[6]
On June 29, 2002, the Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner:
[7]
[8]
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and in view of respondents violation of
Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent is hereby reprimanded.
Complainants claim that respondents P50,000 notarial fee was exorbitant is debatable. As
confirmed by the IBP, it is a recognized legal practice in real estate transactions and construction
projects to base the amount of notarial fees on the contract price. Based on the amount demanded by
respondent, the fee represented only 1% of the contract price of P5,000,000. It cannot be said
therefore that respondent notary demanded more than a reasonable recompense for his service.
We are also convinced that the two contracting parties implicitly agreed on the cost of Jimenezs
notarial service. It was Cuetos responsibility to first inquire how much he was going to be charged for
notarization. And once informed, he was free to accept or reject it, or negotiate for a lower amount. In
this case, complainants concern that the other party to the construction agreement was the son of
respondent notary and that his non-availment of respondents service might jeopardize the
agreement, was purely speculative. There was no compulsion to avail of respondents service.
Moreover, his failure to negotiate the amount of the fee was an implicit acquiescence to the terms of
the notarial service. His subsequent act of paying in cash and in check all the more proved it.
However, we agree with the IBP that respondents conduct in filing a criminal case for violation of
BP 22 against complainant (when the check representing the P20,000 balance was dishonored for
insufficient funds) was highly improper.
Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that [a] lawyer shall
avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to
prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Likewise, in Canon 14 of the Canons of Professional Ethics it
states that, [c]ontroversies with clients concerning compensation are to be avoided by the lawyer so
far as shall be compatible with his self-respect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense
for his service; and lawsuits with the clients should be resorted to only to prevent injustice, imposition
or fraud.
There was clearly no imposition, injustice or fraud obtaining in this case to justify the legal action
taken by respondent. As borne out by the records, complainant Cueto had already paid more than
half of respondents fee. To resort to a suit to recover the balance reveals a certain kind of shameful
conduct and inconsiderate behavior that clearly undermines the tenet embodied in Canon 15 that [A]
lawyer should observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.
And what can we say about the failure of respondents son Jose III to pay his own obligation to
complainant Cueto? It in all probability explains why Cueto ran short of funds. Respondent therefore
should have been more tolerant of the delay incurred by complainant Cueto.
We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and
to his clients. He should always remind himself that the legal profession is imbued with public service.
Remuneration is a mere incident.
[9]
Although we acknowledge that every lawyer must be paid what is due to him, he must never
resort to judicial action to recover his fees, in a manner that detracts from the dignity of the
profession.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose Jimenez, Jr. is hereby SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for violating Canon
20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
[1]
Records, pp. 1-3.
[2]
Id. at 9-15.
[3]
Id. at 4.
[4]
Id. at 5.
[5]
Id. at 7.
[6]
Id. at 18-20.
[7]
Id. at 17.
[8]
Commissioner Dennis B. Funa.
[9]
Reyes v. Javier, 426 Phil. 243 (2002).
EN BANC
ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. A.C. No. 5859

ALCANTARA, VICENTE P.
(Formerly CBD Case No. 421)
MERCADO, SEVERINO P.
MERCADO AND SPOUSES
JESUS
AND
ROSARIO
Present:
MERCADO,
Complainants,
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
- versus -
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
ATTY. EDUARDO
VERA,
Respondent.
C.
DE Promulgated:
November 23, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For our review is the Resolution[1]of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Eduardo C.
De Vera liable for professional malpractice and gross misconduct and
recommending his disbarment.
The facts, as appreciated by the investigating commissioner, [2]are
undisputed.
The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of
Rosario
P.
Mercado
in
a
civil
case
filed
in
1984
with
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an administrative case filed
before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension
Office.[3]
Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal
was issued in favor of Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal
counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the defendant, but did not turn over
the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the respondent turn over
the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter refused claiming that he had
paid part of the money to the judge while the balance was his, as attorneys
fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to file an administrative case for
disbarment against the respondent.[4]
On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a
Resolution holding the respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and
handling of clients funds and recommending to the Court his one-year
suspension from the practice of law. [5]
Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent
filed a series of lawsuits against the Mercado family except George Mercado.
The respondent also instituted cases against the family corporation, the
corporations accountant and the judge who ruled against the reopening of
the case where respondent tried to collect the balance of his alleged fee
from Rosario. Later on, the respondent also filed cases against the chairman
and members of the IBP Board of Governors who voted to recommend his
suspension from the practice of law for one year. Complainants allege that
the respondent committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family
problems, and use of intemperate language when he filed several frivolous
and unwarranted lawsuits against the complainants and their family
members, their lawyers, and the family corporation. [6]They maintain that
the primary purpose of the cases is to harass and to exact revenge for the
one-year suspension from the practice of law meted out by the IBP against
the respondent. Thus, they pray that the respondent be disbarred for
malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27, [7]Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court.
In his defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges
against him.
He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George
Mercado to file lawsuits against the complainants. He insists that the lawsuits
that he and George filed against the complainants were not harassment suits
but were in fact filed in good faith and were based on strong facts.[8]
Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping.
He argues that he was merely exhausting the remedies allowed by law and
that he was merely constrained to seek relief elsewhere by reason of the
denial of the trial court to reopen the civil case so he could justify his
attorneys fees.
Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his clients
family. He argues that the case that he and George Mercado filed against
the complainants arose from their perception of unlawful transgressions
committed by the latter for which they must be held accountable for the
public interest.
Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or
unprofessional language. On the contrary, he asserts that it was the
complainants who resorted to intemperate and vulgar language in accusing
him of extorting from Rosario shocking and unconscionable attorneys fees.[9]
After careful consideration of the records of this case and the parties
submissions, we find ourselves in agreement with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.[10] Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice
law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be
heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege
or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding

to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a
license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must
be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to
remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him
unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an
office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with
the administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney. [11]In Maligsa
v. Cabanting,[12]we explained that the bar should maintain a high standard
of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings
honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal
profession should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any
degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the legal profession. An attorney may be disbarred
or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and
counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the respondent committed professional
malpractice and gross misconduct particularly in his acts against his former
clients after the issuance of the IBP Resolution suspending him from the
practice of law for one year. In summary, the respondent filed against his
former client, her family members, the family corporation of his former
client, the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors of the IBP who
issued the said Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where
his former client received a favorable judgment, and the present counsel of
his former client, a total of twelve (12) different cases in various fora which
included the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Provincial
Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office; the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline; the Department of Agrarian Reform; and
the Supreme Court.[13]
In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed
cases which had previously been dismissed. The respondent filed six
criminal cases against members of the Mercado family separately docketed
as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138; 97-139; and 97-140. With the
exception of I.S. No. 97-139, all the aforementioned cases are re-filing of
previously dismissed cases.[14]
Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous
cases in different fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance
with the Rules, and without any ill-motive or purpose other than to achieve
justice and fairness. In the present case, however, we find that the barrage
of cases filed by the respondent against his former client and others close to
her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the
respondent does not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law.
The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing
them after being dismissed, the timing of the filing of cases, the fact that
the respondent was in conspiracy with a renegade member of the
complainants family, the defendants named in the cases and the foul
language used in the pleadings and motions [15]all indicate that the
respondent was acting beyond the desire for justice and fairness. His act of
filing a barrage of cases appears to be an act of revenge and hate driven by
anger and frustration against his former client who filed the disciplinary
complaint against him for infidelity in the custody of a clients funds.
In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz,[16]the Court pronounced that it is
professionally irresponsible for a lawyer to file frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we
stated in Prieto,
Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint.
Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate,
however, this right must be exercised in good faith. [17]
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous
petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.
A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court
itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial,
correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final
judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should
likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent
their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice. [18]Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must exert
every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits
that violated his duties as an officer of the court in aiding in the proper
administration of justice, but he did so against a former client to whom he
owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility[19]provides:
CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even
after the attorney-client relation is terminated.
Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information
acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own
advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the
circumstances consents thereto.
The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved
matters and information acquired by the respondent during the time when
he was still Rosarios counsel. Information as to the structure and operations
of the family corporation, private documents, and other pertinent facts and
figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the respondent in
pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired through the attorneyclient relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in direct violation of
the Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court.
WHEREFORE,
respondent
Atty.
Eduardo
C.
De
Vera
is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law effective immediately upon his
receipt of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread
on the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A.
SERENOAssociate Justice
On official leave.
[1]
Rollo, p. 254. In its Resolution No. XV-2002-391, the IBP Board of Governors resolved as follows:
to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A;
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that the Commission finds convincing, indeed compelling evidence to sustain the indictment against
Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera for professional malpractice and gross misconduct consisting of barratry, abuse of judicial
proceedings and processes, exploiting a familys personal problem for vengeful and illegal purposes and employing
unprofessional, intemperate and abusive language, Respondent is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law. The counter-petition against Atty. Carmen Leonor M. Alcantara is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
[2]
Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan, Report dated November 23, 2001, rollo, pp. 256-281.
[3]
Rollo, p. 264.
[4]
Id. at 265.
[5]
Id.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 265-266.
[7]
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension.
[8]
Rollo, p. 267.
[9]
Id. at 267-268.
[10]
Mecaral v. Velasquez, A.C. No. 8392 (Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2175), June 29, 2010, p. 4, citing Mendoza v. Deciembre, A.C.
No. 5338, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 26, 36; Yap-Paras v. Paras, A.C. No. 4947, February 14, 2005, 451 SCRA 194, 202.
[11]
Marcelo v. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, 214 SCRA 1, 13.
[12]
A.C. No. 4539, May 14, 1997, 272 SCRA 408, 413.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 270-273.
[14]
Id. at 273-274.
[15]
Id. at 278-280.
[16]
A.C. No. 6517, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 1, 11-12.
[17]
Duduaco v. Laquindanum, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601 (OCA-I.P.I No. 02-1213-MTJ), August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 428, 435.
[18]
Citing Agpalo, COMMENTS ON THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, p. 117 (2004 Ed.).
[19]
Promulgated by the Supreme Court on June 21, 1988.
THIRD DIVISION
MARIA EARL BEVERLY C. A.C. No. 6166

CENIZA,
Complainant, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, and
Peralta, JJ.
ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA,

Respondent. Promulgated:
October 2, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a verified complaint[1] dated July 25, 2003 filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian G. Rubia with
grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and falsification of public
documents.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On May 3, 2002, complainant sought the legal services of the respondent in

regard to the share of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos
Ceniza. As she had no money to pay for attorneys fees since her mother-inlaw would arrive from the United States only in June 2002, respondent made
her sign a promissory note for P32,000.00, which amount was lent by
Domingo Natavio. After her mother-in-law arrived and paid the loan,
respondent furnished them a copy of the complaint for partition and
recovery of ownership/possession representing legitime but with no docket
number on it. They kept on following up the progress of the
complaint. However, three months lapsed before respondent informed them
that it was already filed in court. It was then that they received a copy of the
complaint with Civil Case No. 4198 and a rubber stamped RECEIVED
thereon. However, when complainant verified the status of the case with the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, she was informed
that no case with said title and docket number was filed. [2]
Further, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance

of the law for intending to file the complaint in Davao del Sur when the
properties to be recovered were located in Koronadal, South Cotabato and
Malungon, Sarangani Province, in violation of the rule on venue that real
actions shall be filed in the place where the property is
situated. Complainant also alleged that respondent forged the signature of
her husband, Carlito C. Ceniza, in the Affidavit of Loss attached to a petition
for the issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate of title filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos City, Branch 20, in Misc. Case No. 1142202.[3]
In her comment, respondent assailed the personality of the complainant to

institute the administrative complaint for disbarment as she was not a party
to the action for partition and recovery of ownership/possession. As such,
her allegations in the administrative complaint were all hearsay, self-serving
and unsubstantiated. Further, the charge of forgery of the Affidavit of Loss
was belied by the March 3, 2003 decision of the trial court, wherein Carlito
C. Ceniza affirmed his statements in the said affidavit when he was called to
testify.[4]
On February 2, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the case to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On April 29, 2004, respondent filed a Supplemental Comment explaining the

rubber stamped RECEIVED on the complaint. According to her, when her
staff Jan Kirt Lester Soledad was at the RTC Office of the Clerk of Court, she
called him through cellular phone and directed him to stop the filing of the
complaint as the same lacked certain attachments. However, one copy
thereof was already stamped RECEIVED by the receiving court personnel,
who also assigned a docket number. She kept the copies of the complaint,
including the one with the stamp, to be filed later when the attachments are
complete.
Meanwhile, on November 7, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation with

Urgent Motion praying that the administrative complaint be likewise
dismissed in view of the dismissal of the criminal case due to complainants
apparent lack of interest to prosecute.
On January 19, 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended

that respondent be found guilty of falsification of public document and be
meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of
three years. The report reads in part, as follows:
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action, where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. It involved
no private interest. The complainant or person who called the attention of the court
to the attorneys misconduct is in no sense a party and has generally no interest in
its outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice. It affords no redress for private grievance. (Tejan v. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154)
Prescinding from the aforequoted ruling, it is therefore irrelevant and immaterial if

herein complainant is not a party to the subject civil complaint prepared by the
respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest
or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether on the basis of the
facts borne out by the record, the charge has been proven.
On the payment of the acceptance fee in the amount of P32,000.00, respondents

contention that she acted as guarantor of Carlos Ceniza, complainants husband,
when he borrowed money from a money lender, Domingo Natavio, the amount
representing the acceptance, does not inspire belief. The promissory note dated
May 3, 2002, appended as Annex A of the complaint-affidavit eloquently shows that
consistent with the complainants allegation, she was made to borrow said amount
to be paid as respondents acceptance fee. It bears stress that the date of the
promissory note is the same date when respondents services were engaged leading
to the preparation of the subject civil complaint. Complainants allegation is further
enhanced by the fact that such promissory note was even notarized by the
respondent.
On the alleged filing of the subject civil complaint, it is undisputed that the same
was not filed before the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Davao Del Sur, as
evidenced by a Certification from the said office appended as Annex A of
complainants Manifestation dated October 14, 2005. Thus, the claim of complainant
that respondent falsified or caused it to falsify the stamp marked received dated
May 10, 2002 including the case number 4198, finds factual and legal bases.
It bears stress that a copy of the subject civil complaint was obtained by
complainant from the respondent herself who tried to impress upon the former that
contrary to her suspicion, the subject civil complaint was already filed in
court. However, inquiry made by the complainant shows otherwise.
Respondents contention that after one copy of the complaint was already stamped
by court personnel in preparation for receiving the same and entering in the courts
docket, she caused it to be withdrawn after realizing that the same lacked certain
attachments, is bereft of merit.
In the first place, respondent miserably failed to mention these lacking attachments
that allegedly caused the withdrawal of the complaint. Secondly, and assuming
arguendo that the withdrawal was due to lacking attachments, how come the same
was not filed in the next office day complete with attachments. And lastly, the
Certification of the Clerk of Court clearly states that Civil Case No. 4188 is not the
case of Mercedes Callejo vda. De Ceniza, et al. vs. Charlotte Ceniza, et al.
xxxx
The fact that the City Prosecutors Office of Digos, upon motion for
reconsideration of the respondent, dismissed a similar complaint filed by herein
complainant will not in anyway affect the above captioned administrative complaint.
The pendency of a criminal action against the respondent, from the facts of
which the disciplinary proceeding is predicated, does not pose prejudicial question
to the resolution of the issues in the disbarment case. (Calo vs. Degano, 20 SCRA
447) His conviction is not necessary to hold the lawyer administratively liable
because the two proceedings and their objectives are different and it is not sound
public policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before the court act on a
complaint against a lawyer as it may emasculate the disciplinary power of the
court. (In re Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1) Nor is his acquittal, by this fact alone, a bar to an
administrative complaint against him. (Piatt vs. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350).
The other allegations in the complaint about ignorance of the law are found
to be without basis.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that herein respondent Atty.
Vivian C. Rubia, be found guilty of the charge of falsification of public document and
be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
years.
On May 31, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a

Resolution adopting the Investigating Commissioners recommendation with
modification, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-237

Adm. Case No. 6166
Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs.
Atty. Vivian G. Rubia
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents falsification of public
document, Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is hereby DISBARRED.
However, in its December 11, 2008 Resolution, the Board of Governors

reconsidered its May 31, 2007 Resolution by reducing the recommended
penalty of disbarment to five years suspension from the practice of law,
thus:
RESOLUTION NO. XVIII-2008-715

Adm. Case No. 6166
Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs.
Atty. Vivian G. Rubia
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the

Recommendation of the Board of Governors First Division of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with modification, that Resolution
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-237 of the Board of Governors dated 31 May 2007
recommending the Disbarment of Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is reduced to Five (5) years
Suspension from the practice of law.
On April 20, 2009, the IBP forwarded the instant case to this Court as
provided under Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court.
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent from the practice of law

for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law and for falsification of public
document. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment
or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that
clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty.[5]
The sole issue in this case is whether or not there is preponderant evidence
to warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against the respondent.
In accusing respondent of falsification of public document, complainant
alleged that respondent misrepresented to her that the complaint was
already filed in court, when in fact, upon verification with the RTC Clerk of
Court, it was not. Such misrepresentation is shown by the copy of the
complaint with a stamped RECEIVED and docket number thereon. Apart
from said allegations, complainant has not proferred any proof tending to
show that respondent deliberately falsified a public document.
A perusal of the records shows that complainants evidence consists

solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and the annexes attached therewith. She
did not appear in all the mandatory conferences set by the investigating
commissioner in order to give respondent the chance to test the veracity of
her assertions. It is one thing to allege gross misconduct, ignorance of the
law or falsification of public document and another to demonstrate by
evidence the specific acts constituting the same.
Indeed, complainant has no way of knowing the surrounding circumstances

behind the filing of the complaint by respondents staff because she was not
present when the same was filed with the trial court. Complainant failed to
disprove by preponderant evidence respondents claim that the case was not
filed but was in fact withdrawn after it was stamped with RECEIVED and
assigned with a docket number. We find this explanation satisfactory and
plausible considering that the stamp did not bear the signature of the
receiving court personnel, which is normally done when pleadings are
received by the court.
Further, the certification of the RTC Clerk of Court that the complaint was
not filed and that CIVIL CASE NO. 4198 pertained to another case, did not
diminish the truthfulness of respondents claim, but even tended to bolster
it. Necessarily, as the complaint was not filed, docket number 4198
indicated in the copy of the complaint was assigned to another case
thereafter filed in court.
Thus, for lack of preponderant evidence, the investigating commissioners

ruling that respondent was guilty of falsification of public document, as
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, has no factual basis to stand on.
However, we find that respondent committed some acts for which she
should be disciplined or administratively sanctioned.
We find nothing illegal or reprehensible in respondents act of charging

an acceptance fee of P32,000.00, which amount appears to be reasonable
under the circumstances.The impropriety lies in the fact that she suggested
that complainant borrow money from Domingo Natavio for the payment
thereof. This act impresses upon the Court that respondent would do
nothing to the cause of complainants mother-in-law unless payment of the
acceptance fee is made. Her duty to render legal services to her client with
competence and diligence should not depend on the payment of acceptance
fee, which was in this case promised to be paid upon the arrival of
complainants mother-in-law in June 2002, or barely a month after
respondent accepted the case.
Respondents transgression is compounded further when she severed

the lawyer-client relationship due to overwhelming workload demanded by
her new employer Nakayama Group of Companies, which constrained her to
return the money received as well as the records of the case, thereby
leaving her client with no representation. Standing alone, heavy workload is
not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her services.
Moreover, respondent failed to maintain an open line

communication with her client regarding the status of their complaint.
of
Clearly, respondent violated the Lawyers Oath which imposes upon

every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice,
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, and Canon 22 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thus:
CANON
18
A
LAWYER
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
SHALL
SERVE
HIS
CLIENT
WITH
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD

CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et

amore, he undertakes to give his utmost attention, skill and competence to
it, regardless of its significance. Thus, his client, whether rich or poor, has
the right to expect that he will discharge his duties diligently and exert his
best efforts, learning and ability to prosecute or defend his (clients) cause
with reasonable dispatch. Failure to fulfill his duties will subject him to grave
administrative liability as a member of the Bar. For the overriding need to
maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the legal profession
demands that an erring lawyer should be sanctioned. [6]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is

found GUILTY of violation of Rule 18.03 and Canon 22 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that
similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be
notified of this Decision, and be it duly recorded in the personal file of
respondent Atty. Vivian G. Rubia.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-5.
[2]
Id. p. 4.
[3]
Id. p. 5.
[4]
Id. pp. 18-23.
[5]
Berbano v. Barcelona, 457 Phil. 331, 341 (2003).
[6]
De Guzman v. Basa, A.C. No. 5554, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 1, 3.

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Republic of the Philippines

[A.C. No. 3405. June 29, 1998]

3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty x x x

Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

Code of Professional Responsibility.

Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-2.

Records, Vol. I, p. 11.

Records, Vol. III, pp. 34-37.

Through the office of then Chief Justice Fernan.

Dated November 11, 1991.

Records, Vol. III, pp. 40-42.

Records, Vol. II, pp. 15-16.

Compiled Answer/Comment and Counter-Affidavits, records, Vol. II, pp. 1-11.

Ibid., pp. 1-3.

Ibid., pp. 8-9.

Records, Vol. I, pp. 17-59.

Ibid., pp. 15-16.

27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Reyes vs. Wong, 63 SCRA 667, 673, January 29, 1975.

Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859, 869-870, April 30, 1963.

TSN, September 22, 1993, pp. 15-46.

Ibid., pp. 28-134.

TSN, November 3, 1993, pp. 16-41.

Ibid., pp. 42-55.

Ibid., pp. 58-71.

TSN, November 4, 1993, pp. 5-34.

Ibid., pp. 35-64.

TSN, January 17, 1994, pp. 3-14.

TSN, September 22, 1993, pp. 31-32.

Ibid., pp. 85-89.

TSN, November 3, 1993, pp. 43-44, 47-48 and 51

TSN, January 17, 1994, pp. 6-8 and 11.

Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

See Records, Vol. III, pp. 1-234.

Art. 68, Family Code.

TSN, November 4, 1993, pp. 28-30.

TSN, November 4, 1993, pp. 38-39 and 45-46.

179 SCRA 680, 683, November 29, 1989,

7 SCRA 757, April 27, 1963.

128 SCRA 485, April 2, 1984.

AC No. 4539, May 14, 1997, pp. 5-6, per curiam.

Rollo, pp. 1-23.

Id. at 75-83; 86-99.

590 Phil. 270 (2008).

See Cordova v. Cordova, 259 Phil. 278 (1989).

A.C. No. 7199

by using intemperate language.

CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

NTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Rollo (Vol. I of the CBD rollo), pp. 1-21.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 100643 December 12, 1995

Republic of the Philippines

solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will

not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who

of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R.

Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied

prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of