Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6332

April 17, 2012

IN RE: SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION DATED 28 APRIL 2003 IN G.R. NOS.

145817 AND 145822
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Factual Background
This administrative case originated when respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea filed
an Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion
dated 30 January 20031 (the subject Motion to Inhibit) in two consolidated petitions
involving respondent that were pending before the Court.2 This motion is directed
against the then ponente of the consolidated petitions, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, and
reads in part:
PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEA, pro se, respectfully states:
1. Despite all the obstacles respondent has had to hurdle in his quest for justice
against Urban Bank and its officials, he has remained steadfast in his belief
that ultimately, he will be vindicated and the wrongdoers will get their just
deserts [sic]. What respondent is about to relate however has, with all due
respect, shaken his faith in the highest Court of the land. If an anomaly as
atrocious as this can happen even in the august halls of the Supreme Court,
one can only wonder if there is still any hope for our justice system.
2. Private respondent wishes to make clear that he is not making a sweeping
accusation against all the members of this Honorable Court. He cannot
however remain tight-lipped in the face of the overwhelming evidence that has
come to his knowledge regarding the actuation of the ponente of this
Honorable Division.
3. In the evening of 19 November 2002, private respondent received a call
from the counsel for petitioners, Atty. Manuel R. Singson (through his cell
phone number 09189137383) who very excitedly bragged that they had been
able to secure an order from this Honorable Court suspending the redemption
period and the consolidation of ownership over the Urban Bank properties sold
during the execution sale. Private respondent was aghast because by them,
more than two weeks had lapsed since the redemption period on the various

properties had expired. At that juncture in fact, Certificates of Final Sale had
already been issued to the purchasers of the properties. The only step that had
to be accomplished was the ministerial act of issuance of new titles in favor of
the purchasers.
4. Private respondent composed himself and tried to recall if there was any
pending incident with this Honorable Court regarding the suspension of the
redemption period but he could not remember any. In an effort to hide his
discomfort, respondent teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to get
such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did not even bother to deny
and in fact explained that they obviously had to exert extra effort because they
could not afford to lose the properties involved (consisting mainly of almost all
the units in the Urban Bank Plaza in Makati City) as it might again cause the
bank (now Export Industry Bank) to close down.
5. Since private respondent himself had not received a copy of the order that
Atty. Singson was talking about, he asked Atty. Singson to fax him the
"advance" copy that they had received. The faxed "advance" copy that Atty.
Singson provided him bore the fax number and name of Atty. Singsons law
office. A copy thereof is hereto attached as Annex "A".
6. Private respondent could not believe what he read. It appeared that a
supposed Motion for Clarification was filed by petitioners through Atty. Singson
dated 6 August 2002, but he was never furnished a copy thereof. He asked a
messenger to immediately secure a copy of the motion and thereafter
confirmed that he was not furnished a copy. His supposed copy as indicated in
the last page of the motion was sent to the Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz
(ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA, however, was never respondents counsel and
was in fact the counsel of some of the petitioners. Respondents copy, in other
words, was sent to his opponents.
7. The Motion for Clarification was thus resolved without even giving
respondent an opportunity to comment on the same. In contrast, respondents
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 19 November 2001 had
been pending for almost a year and yet petitioners motions for extension to
file comment thereon [were] being granted left and right.
8. In view of these circumstances, private respondent filed on 10 December
2002, an Urgent Omnibus Motion (to Expunge Motion for Clarification and
Recall of the 13 November 2002 Resolution). He filed a Supplement to the said
motion on 20 December 2002.
9. While private respondent was waiting for petitioners to respond to his
motion, he received sometime last week two documents that confirmed his
worst fears. The two documents indicate that this Honorable Court has not
actually granted petitioners Motion for Clarification. They indicate that the
supposed 13 November 2002 Resolution of this Honorable Court which Atty.
Singson had bragged about WAS A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT!

10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the
official Agenda of the First Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November
2002, the date when the questioned Resolution was supposedly issued. In both
copies (apparently secured from the office of two different members of the
Division, one of which is the copy of the ponente himself), it is clearly indicated
that the members of the Division had agreed that petitioners Motion for
Clarification and Urgent Motion to Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT
GRANTED contrary to what was stated in the 13 November 2002 Resolution.
This makes the 13 November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that was
released to the parties) a falsified document because it makes it appear that a
Resolution was issued by the First Division granting petitioners Motion for
Clarification when in fact no such Resolution exists. The real Resolution arrived
at by the First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda merely NOTED
said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and
"C."
11. At this point, private respondent could not help but conclude that this
anomaly was confirmatory of what Atty. Singson was bragging to him about.
The clear and undeniable fact is the Honorable members of this Division agreed
that petitioners Motion for Clarification would only be NOTED but the ponente
responsible for the 13 November 2002 Resolution misrepresented that the
same was GRANTED.
12. Respondent is not just speculating here. He is CERTAIN that the ponente
has a special interest in this case. Recently, he also found out that the ponente
made a special request to bring this case along with him when he transferred
from the Third Division to the First Division. Respondent has a copy of the
Resolution of this Honorable Court granting such request (hereto attached as
Annex "D"). Indeed, this circumstance, considered with all the foregoing
circumstance, ineluctably demonstrates that a major anomaly has occurred
here.
13. In view of these, private respondent is compelled to move for the inhibition
of the ponente from this case. This matter should be thoroughly investigated
and respondent is now carefully considering his legal options for redress. It
has taken him seven years to seek vindication of his rights against petitioners,
he is not about to relent at this point. In the meantime, he can longer expect
a fair and impartial resolution of this case if the ponente does not inhibit
himself.
14. This Honorable Court has time and again emphasized the importance of
impartiality and the appearance of impartiality on the part of judges and
justices. The ponente will do well to heed such pronouncements.
15. Finally, it is has now become incumbent upon this Honorable Court to
clarify its real position on the 19 November 2001 Resolution. It is most
respectfully submitted that in order to obviate any further confusion on the
matter, respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 09 December 2002 (as

well as the Supplement dated 19 November 2002) should be resolved and this
Honorable Court should confirm that the stay order contained in the 19
November 2001 Resolution does not cover properties already sold on
execution. xxx (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In support of his claims to inhibit the ponente, Atty. Pea attached to the subject
Motion to Inhibit two copies of the official Agenda for 13 November 2002 of the First
Division of this Court, which he claimed to have anonymously received through the
mail.3 He also attached a copy of the Courts internal Resolution regarding the
transfer of the case from the Third Division to the First Division, upon the request of
Justice Carpio, to establish the latters alleged special interest in the case.4
In response, the Court issued a resolution on 17 February 2003 to require Atty. Pea
and Atty. Manuel R. Singson, counsel of Urban Bank in the consolidated petitions, to
appear before the Court on 03 March 2003 for an Executive Session.5
The reason for the required appearance of the two lawyers in the Executive Session
is explained in the Courts Resolution dated 03 March 2003.6 It states:
The executive session started at 10:20 a.m. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
formally opened the executive session and then requested Associate Justice Jose C.
Vitug to act as chair. Justice Vitug stated that the executive session was called
because the Court is perturbed by some statements made by respondent Atty.
Magdaleno Pea involving strictly confidential matters which are purely internal to
the Court and which the latter cites as grounds in his "Urgent Motion to Inhibit and
to Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion."
Respondent/movant Atty. Magdaleno Pea and counsel for petitioner Atty. Manuel R.
Singson attended the session.
The matters under inquiry were how respondent was able to obtain copies of the
documents he used as annexes in his motion to inhibit, and whether the annexes are
authentic.
The court also clarified that these matters were to be taken as entirely different and
apart from the merits of the main case.
Justice Vitug called the attention of respondent to the three (3) annexes attached to
the motion to inhibit, Annexes "B", "C" and "D," questioned how the latter was able
to secure copies of such documents which are confidential to the Court and for the
sole use of the Office of the Clerk of Court, First Division and the Justices concerned.
Annex "B" is alleged to be a photocopy of the supplemental agenda of the First
Division for November 13, 2002 (pages 61-62), with an entry in handwriting reading
"10 AC" on the left side and what appear to be marginal notes on the right side of
both pages. Annex "C" is alleged to be a photocopy of the same supplemental agenda
of the First Division for November 13, 2002, with marginal notes on the right side of
pages 61-62. Annex "D" appears to be a photocopy of the resolution dated September

4, 2002 of the Third Division transferring the instant case to the First Division (an
internal resolution).
Atty. Pea was made to understand that all his statements taken during this
executive session were deemed under oath. Atty. Pea acceded thereto.
Atty. Pea was asked whether he knows any personnel of the Court who could
possibly be the source. Atty. Pea replied in the negative and added that he obtained
those documents contained in the annexes through ordinary mail addressed at his
residence in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, sometime in the second or third week
of January 2003; but failed to give the exact date of his receipt. He said Annexes "B"
and "C" were contained in one envelope while Annex "D" was mailed in a separate
envelope. He did not bring the envelopes but promised the Court he would do his
best to locate them. On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Pea admitted that the
envelopes may no longer be found. He was unable to respond to the observation of
the Chief Justice that the Court would be in no position to know whether the
envelopes he would later produce would be the same envelopes he allegedly received.
Atty. Pea further admitted that his office did not stamp "Received" on the envelopes
and the contents thereof; neither did he have them recorded in a log book.
When asked by the Chief Justice why he relied on those annexes as grounds for his
motion to inhibit when the same were coursed only through ordinary mail under
unusual circumstances and that respondent did not even bother to take note of the
postal marks nor record the same in a log book, Atty. Pea answered that he was
100% certain that those documents are authentic and he assumed that they came
from Manila because the Supreme Court is in Manila.
At this juncture, Atty. Pea was reminded that since he assured the authenticity of
Annexes "B", "C" and "D", he should be willing to accept all the consequences if it
turns out that there are no such copies in the Supreme Court or if said annexes turn
out to be forged. Atty. Pea manifested that he was willing to accept the
consequences.
When further asked by the Court whether he had seen the original that made him
conclude that those photocopies are authentic, he replied in the negative, but he
believed that they are official documents of the Court inasmuch as he also received
a copy of another resolution issued by the Court when the same was faxed to him by
Atty. Singson, counsel for petitioner.
Atty. Pea expressed his disappointment upon receiving the resolution because he
was not even furnished with a copy of petitioners motion for clarification, which was
resolved. He found out that his copy was addressed to Abello Concepcion Regala and
Cruz Law Offices, which was never respondents counsel and was in fact the counsel
of some of the petitioners.
He also expressed misgivings on the fact that the motion for clarification was acted
upon even without comment from him, and he admitted that under said
circumstances, he made imputation of bribery as a joke.

As to the statement of the Chief Justice making it of record that Justice Carpio and
Justice Azcuna denied that Annex "B" is their copy of pp. 61 and 62 of the agenda,
Justice Carpio also said that per verification, Annex "B" is not Justice Santiagos copy.
Thus, Justice Carpio added that Annex "B" does not belong to any of the Justices of
the First Division. It was also pointed out that each of the Justices have their
respective copies of the agenda and make their own notations thereon. The official
actions of the Court are contained in the duly approved minutes and resolutions of
the Court.
Meanwhile, Justice Vitug called the attention of both Atty. Pea and Atty. Singson to
paragraphs 3 and 4 of respondents "Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve
Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion, which contain the following allegations: "(Atty.
Singson) very excitedly bragged that they had been able to secure an order from this
Honorable Court suspending the redemption period and the consolidation of
ownership over the Urban Bank properties sold during the execution sale. Private
respondent was aghast because by then, more than two weeks had lapsed since the
redemption period on the various properties had expired. In an effort to hide his
discomfort, respondent (Atty. Pea) teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente
to get such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did not even bother to deny
and in fact explained that they obviously had to exert extra effort because they could
not afford to lose the properties involved."
For his part, Atty. Singson admitted that he faxed a copy of the resolution dated
November 13, 2002 to Atty. Pea and expressed his belief that there was nothing
wrong with it, as the resolution was officially released and received by his office. He
explained that his staff merely copied the parties in the resolution of February 13,
2002 when the motion for clarification was prepared. Hence, the respondent was
inadvertently not sent a copy.
Atty. Singson further denied the allegations made in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the motion
to inhibit, reasoning that all he said was about the suspension of the redemption
period which was the subject of the motion for clarification. Atty. Singson branded as
false the allegation of Atty. Pea that he, Atty. Singson, resorted to bribery in order
that the suspension of the redemption period would be granted.
On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Pea admitted that he was only joking to
Atty. Singson when on the cellular phone he intimated that Justice Carpio could have
been bribed because he has a new Mercedes Benz. When pressed many times to
answer categorically whether Atty. Singson told him that Justice Carpio was bribed,
Atty. Pea could not make any candid or forthright answer. He was evasive.
After further deliberation whereby Atty. Pea consistently replied that his only source
of the documents in the annexes is the regular mail, the Court Resolved to require
Atty. Magdaleno Pea within fifteen (15) days from today to SHOW CAUSE why he
should not be held in contempt and be subjected to disciplinary action as a lawyer if
he will not be able to satisfactorily explain to Court why he made gratuitous
allegations and imputations against the Court and some of its members that tend to
cast doubt or aspersion on their integrity.

Atty. Manuel Singson was also required to submit within fifteen (15) days from today
his response to the allegations of Atty. Pea, particularly those in paragraphs 3, 4
and 6 of respondents motion to inhibit.
The Court excused Attys. Pea and Singson from the executive session at 11:35 a.m.
and resumed its regular session on the agenda.
In connection with the pleadings filed in these cases, the Court Resolves to GRANT
the motion by counsel for petitioner praying that intervenor-movant Unimega
Properties Holdings Corp. be directed to furnish aforesaid counsel with a copy of the
motion for reconsideration and intervention and that they be granted an additional
period of ten (10) days within which to file comment thereon and require said
intervenor-movant to SUBMIT proof of such service within five (5) days from notice.
The manifestation and comment of petitioners in G.R. No. 145882, Benjamin de Leon,
et al., on the motion for reconsideration with intervention by Unimega Property
Holdings Corp. is NOTED. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Pea duly submitted his Compliance with the Courts Order, where he stated
that:7
PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEA, pro se, respectfully submits the
following explanation in compliance with the Resolution of this Honorable Court dated
3 March 2003:
1. This Honorable Court in its 3 March 2003 Resolution required respondent to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt and be subjected to
disciplinary action as a result of the allegations he made in his "Urgent Motion
to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion" dated 30
January 2003. As this Honorable Court stated during the 3 March 2003 hearing,
the members of the Court were "perturbed" by some statements respondent
made in the motion.
2. At the outset, respondent wishes to apologize for the distress his statements
may have caused the members of this Honorable Court. While such distress
may have been the unavoidable consequence of his motion to inhibit the
ponente, it was certainly not his intended result.
3. In the course of the discussion during the 3 March 2003 hearing, it appeared
that this Honorable Court was most concerned with how respondent was able
to secure Annexes "B" and "C" of his motion (referring to the two copies of the
Supplemental Agenda of the First Division for 13 November 2002) and why
respondent used those documents as basis for his Urgent Motion to Inhibit.
4. Respondent had explained that he received the two annexes by ordinary
mail at his residence in Brgy. Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros Occidental sometime
during the second week of January. The sender of the document was unknown

to respondent because there was no return address. Despite efforts to locate

the envelope in which these documents came, he was unable to do so.
5. Respondent has no record keeper or secretary at his residence. Since he is
often in Manila on business, it is usually the househelp who gets to receive the
mail. While he had given instructions to be very careful in the handling of
documents which arrive by registered mail, the envelopes for Annexes "A" and
"B" may have been misplaced or disposed by the househelp because it did not
bear the stamp "registered mail."
6. When respondent read the documents, he had absolutely no reason to doubt
their authenticity. For why would anyone bother or go to the extent of
manufacturing documents for the benefit of someone who does not even know
him? The documents contained a detailed list of the incidents deliberated by
this Honorable Court on 13 November 2002. Definitely, not just anyone could
have access to such information. Moreover, respondent subsequently received
another mail from apparently the same sender, this time containing a pink
copy of this Honorable Courts 4 September 2002 Resolution (Annex "D",
Urgent Motion to Inhibit) transferring this case from the Third Division to the
First Division. The receipt of this last document somehow confirmed to
respondent that whoever sent him the copies of the Supplemental Agenda
really had access to the records of this Honorable Court.
7. Respondent wishes to reiterate that the main basis of his motion to inhibit
was the information relayed to him by Atty. Singson during their telephone
conversation on 19 November 2002. As stated in respondents Urgent Motion
to Inhibit, while Atty. Singson did not categorically claim that they had bribed
the ponente to secure the 13 November 2002 resolution, however, he made
no denial when respondent, in order to obtain information, half-seriously
remarked that this was the reason why the ponente had a brand new car. Atty.
Singson retorted that obviously, they had to take extra-ordinary measures to
prevent the consolidation of ownership of the properties sold as the bank may
again close down. Indeed, one would normally be indignant upon being
accused of bribery but Atty. Singson even chuckled and instead justified their
"extra-ordinary" efforts.
8. Respondent very well knew that mere suspicion was not enough. An implied
admission of bribery on the part of Atty. Singson, sans evidence, may not have
been sufficient basis for a motion to inhibit. However, respondent did not have
to look far for evidence. Atty. Singson in not denying the allegation of bribery
is considered an admission by silence, under Section 32 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. Further, Atty. Singson faxed to him the "advance copy" of the
13 November 2002 Resolution. To respondent, that was solid evidence and in
fact to this day, Atty. Singson fails to explain exactly when, from whom, and
how he was able to secure said advance copy. The records of this Honorable
Court disclosed that Atty. Singsons official copy of the 13 November 2002
Resolution was sent to him by registered mail only on 20 November 2002 (a
copy of the daily mailing report is hereto attached as Annex "A"). Why then

was he able to fax a copy to respondent on 19 November 2002 or a day before

the resolution was released for mailing?
9. Despite all these, respondent hesitated to file a motion to inhibit. He only
finally decided to proceed when he received the copies of the Supplemental
Agenda. To emphasize, the Supplemental Agenda merely confirmed what Atty.
Singson had earlier told him. Contrary to the apparent impression of this
Honorable Court, respondents motion is not primarily anchored on
anonymously received documents but on the word of petitioners counsel
himself. The copies of the Supplemental Agenda are merely corroborative
(albeit extremely convincing) evidence.
10. Indeed, any conscientious lawyer who comes into possession of the
information relayed by Atty. Singson and the copies of the Supplemental
Agenda would bring them to the attention of this Honorable Court. In doing
so, respondent was compelled by a sense of duty to inform this Honorable
Court of any apparent irregularity that has come to his knowledge. It was not
done out of spite but a deep sense of respect.
11. In all honesty, respondent had been advised by well-meaning friends to
publicize the incident and take legal action against the parties involved.
Instead, respondent decided that a motion to inhibit before this Honorable
Court was the most appropriate channel to ventilate his concerns. Respondent
is not out to cast aspersions on anybody, most especially members of this
Honorable Court. He had to file the Urgent Motion to Inhibit because he
sincerely believed, and still firmly believes, that he could not get impartial
justice if the ponente did not recuse himself.
12. Respondent sincerely regrets that documents considered confidential by
this Honorable Court leaked out and assures this Honorable Court that he had
absolutely no hand in securing them. Respondent just found himself in a
position where he had to come out with those documents because his opponent
was crude enough to brag that their "extra-ordinary" efforts to secure a stay
order from a certain ponente had bore fruit. Respondent has devoted at least
seven years of his life to this cause. He almost lost his life and was nearly
driven to penury fighting this battle. Certainly, he cannot be expected to simply
raise his hands in surrender.
13. At this point, respondent is just relieved that it was confirmed during the
3 March 2003 hearing that Annex "C" of his Urgent Motion to Inhibit is a faithful
reproduction/"replica" of the relevant portions of the Supplemental Agenda
(TSN dated 3 March 2003, pp. 72-73 and 81) on record with the first Division.
With this, respondent rests his case. 8 (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Atty. Singson, as part of his Compliance and Affidavit dated 28
July 2003,9 categorically denied having bragged to Atty. Pea and that he did not
employ "extra efforts" to obtain a favorable suspension order from the Court.10

After considering and evaluating the submissions made by the two lawyers, the Court
ordered that a formal investigation be undertaken by the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) on the actions of Atty. Pea.11 The Courts Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in
the consolidated petitions, which is the subject matter of this separate administrative
case, reads:
On January 30, 2003, respondent Magdaleno M. Pea filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit
the ponente of the instant case. Respondent Pea attached to his Urgent Motion
Annex "B", a copy of pp. 61-62 of the First Divisions Agenda of 13 November 2002.
Respondent Pea claimed that Annex "B" bears the recommended actions, in
handwritten notations, of a member of the Court (First Division) on Item No. 175 of
the Agenda. Item No. 175(f) refers to the Urgent Motion for Clarification filed by
petitioner on 7 August 2002. The purported handwritten notation on Annex "B" for
Item No. 175 (f) is "N", or to simply note the motion. However, the Court issued a
Resolution on 13 November 2002 granting the Urgent Motion for Clarification. In his
Urgent Motion to Inhibit, respondent Pea claimed that the Resolution of 13
November 2002 was forged because the recommended and approved action of the
Court was to simply note, and not to approve, the Urgent Motion for Clarification.
Thus, respondent Pea stated in his Urgent motion to Inhibit:
"9. While private respondent was waiting for petitioners to respond to his
motion, he received sometime last week two documents that confirmed his
worst fears. The two documents indicate that this Honorable Court had not
actually granted petitioners Motion for Clarification. They indicate that the
supposed 13 November 2002 Resolution of this Honorable Court which Atty.
Singson had bragged about WAS A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT!
10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the
official Agenda of the First Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November
2002, the date when the questioned Resolution was supposedly issued. In both
copies (apparently secured from the office of two different members of the
Division, one of which is the copy of the ponente himself), it is clearly indicated
that the members of the Division had agreed that petitioners Motion for
Clarification and Urgent Motion to Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT
GRANTED contrary to what was stated in the 13 November 2002 Resolution.
This makes the 13 November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that was
released to the parties) a falsified document because it makes it appear that a
Resolution was issued by the First Division granting petitioners Motion for
Clarification when in fact no such Resolution exists. The real Resolution arrived
at by the First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda merely NOTED
said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and
"C".
11. At this point, private respondent could not help but conclude that this
anomaly was confirmatory of what Atty. Singson was bragging about. The clear
and undeniable fact is the Honorable members of this Division agreed that
petitioners Motion for Clarification would only be NOTED but the ponente

responsible for the 13 November 2002 Resolution misrepresented that the

same was GRANTED."
On 3 March 2003, the Court called respondent Pea and Atty. Manuel Singson,
counsel for petitioner Urban Bank, to a hearing to determine, among others, the
authenticity of the annexes to respondent Peas Urgent Motion to Inhibit, including
Annex "B". In the hearing, respondent Pea affirmed the authenticity of the annexes
and even manifested that he was willing to accept the consequences if the annexes,
including Annex "B", turned out to be forgeries.
In the same hearing, the members of the Court (First Division) informed respondent
Pea that the handwritten notations on Annex "B" did not belong to any of them. In
particular, Justice Carpio, to whom the case was assigned and the apparent object of
respondent Peas Urgent Motion to Inhibit as the "ponente responsible for the 13
November 2002 Resolution," stated that his recommended action on Item No. 175(f)
was "a & f, see RES," meaning on Items 175(a) and (f), see proposed resolution. In
short, the handwritten notations on Annex "B", purportedly belonging to a member
of the Court, were forgeries. For ready reference, attached as Annexes "1" and "2"
to this Resolution are a copy of pp. 61-62 of Justice Carpios 13 November 2002
Agenda, and a copy of Justice Carpios recommended actions for the entire 13
November 2002 Agenda, respectively.
In the same hearing, the Court directed respondent Pea to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt and subjected to disciplinary action for submitting the
annexes to his Motion to Inhibit. In his Compliance dated 3 April 2003, respondent
Pea did not give any explanation as to why he attached "B" to his Urgent Motion to
Inhibit. In fact, in his Compliance, respondent Pea did not mention at all Annex "B".
Respondent Pea, however, stated that he "just found himself in a position where he
had to come out with those documents because his opponent was crude enough to
brag that their extra-ordinary efforts to secure a stay order from a certain ponente
had bore fruit." In petitioners Opposition to the Urgent Motion to Inhibit, Atty.
Singson stated that he "categorically denied that he had bragged to PEA about the
Resolution of this Honorable Court dated November 13, 2002 and that extra efforts
have been exerted to obtain the same."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby DIRECTS the Office of the Bar
Confidant to conduct a formal investigation of respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea
for submitting to the Court a falsified document, Annex "B", allegedly forming part of
the confidential records of a member of the Court, in support of his Motion to Inhibit
that same member of the Court. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to submit
its findings, report and recommendation within 90 days from receipt of this
Resolution.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
During the proceedings with the OBC, Attys. Pea13 and Singson14 duly submitted
their respective Affidavits.
While the administrative case was still pending, some of the other parties in the
consolidated petitions specifically, Benjamin L. de Leon, Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., and

Eric L. Lee, (the De Leon Group), the petitioners in G.R. No. 145822 manifested
before the Court other malicious imputations allegedly made by Atty. Pea during the
course of the proceedings in the said petitions. They moved that these be considered
as sufficient and additional basis to cite him for contempt of court.15 The Court
likewise referred this matter to the OBC.16
In reply to the accusations leveled against him by the De Leon Group, respondent
Pea denied having used abrasive, insulting and intemperate language in his
pleadings; and argued that his statements therein were privileged and could not be
used as a basis for liability.17 He also accused Urban Bank and its directors and
officers of violating the rule against forum shopping by dividing themselves into
separate groups and filing three Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817, 145818 and 145822)
against the same Decision of the Court of Appeals with the same causes of actions
and prayers for relief.18
The OBC thereafter conducted a hearing, wherein respondent Pea and Atty. Singson
appeared and testified on matters that were the subject of the administrative
cases.19 Several hearings were also held with respect to the additional contempt
charges raised by the De Leon Group. Thereafter, respondent Pea filed his
Memorandum.20
The OBC submitted to the Court its Report on the instant administrative case and
made recommendations on the matter (the OBC Report). As a matter of policy, this
Court does not quote at length, nor even disclose the dispositive recommendation of
the OBC in administrative investigations of members of the bar. However, Atty. Pea,
despite the fact that the OBC Report is confidential and internal, has obtained,
without authority, a copy thereof and has formally claimed that this Court should
apply to him the non-penalty of an admonition against him, as recommended by the
OBC.21
Furthermore, he has already voiced suspicion that the present ponente of the
consolidated petitions22 from which this separate administrative case arose, Justice
Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, would exclude or suppress material evidence found in
the OBC report from her ponencia in the parent case in alleged gratitude to the
alleged help that Justice Carpio had given her by allegedly recommending her to the
Supreme Court.23 The specific allegation on the supposed loyalty by one Member of
the Court to another, without any extrinsic factual basis to support it, is too
undignified to warrant a response in this Decision. To allay his fears that Justice
Sereno would participate in any undue attempt to suppress material evidence, the
Court shall summarize and quote from the OBC Report the four charges of
professional misconduct in connection with the instant administrative case.
On the first charge of gratuitous imputations against members of the Court, the OBC
found that respondent Pea gave the impression that some anomaly or irregularity
was committed by the Courts First Division in issuing the questioned 13 November
2002 Resolution. According to respondent, Justice Carpio, the then ponente of the
consolidated petitions, purportedly changed the action of the First Division from
simply "NOTING" the motion for clarification filed by Urban Bank to "GRANTING" it

altogether. The OBC opines that although respondent Pea may appear to have been
passionate in the subject Motion to Inhibit, the language he used is not to be
considered as malicious imputations but mere expressions of concern based on what
he discovered from the internal documents of the Court that he had
secured.24 Moreover, the OBC ruled that respondent did not make a direct accusation
of bribery against Justice Carpio, and the formers remark about the latter having
received a new Mercedes Benz was not made in the presence of the court, but was
uttered in a private mobile phone conversation between him and Atty.
Singson.25 Respondents profound apologies to the Court were also taken cognizance
by the OBC, which suggests the imposition of a simple warning against any such
future conduct.26
Further, the OBC recommended the dismissal of the second charge that respondent
supposedly submitted falsified documents to this Court as annexes in the subject
Motion to Inhibit, specifically Annex "B" which appears to be a photocopy of the
agenda of the First Division on 13 November 2002 with some handwritten notes.27 It
reasoned that the submission of falsified documents partakes of the nature of a
criminal act, where the required proof is guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but
respondent Pea is not being charged with a criminal offense in the instant case. The
OBC noted the statement of the Clerk of Court during the 03 March 2003 Executive
Session that Annex "B" does not exist in the records.28
On the third charge for contempt against respondent filed by the De Leon Group and
Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, their counsel, the OBC likewise suggests the dismissal of the
same. To recall, respondent submitted pleadings in the consolidated petitions where
he allegedly charged Atty. Vinluan of having used his influence over Justice Arturo B.
Buena to gain a favorable resolution to the benefit of his clients.29 The OBC suggests
that respondent be acquitted of the charge of using abrasive and disrespectful
language against Members of the Court and his fellow lawyers, but nevertheless
recommends that respondent be advised to refrain from using unnecessary words or
statements in the future.30
Finally, the OBC desisted from making a finding on the fourth charge of forumshopping leveled by respondent Pea against Urban Bank and the individual bank
directors. In his counter-suit, respondent accused the bank and its directors and
officers of having violated the rule against forum-shopping by splitting into three
distinct groups and filing three separate petitions to question the unfavorable decision
of the Court of Appeals.31 However, since not all the parties to the consolidated
petitions participated in the hearings in the instant case, the OBC recommends that
separate proceedings be conducted with respect to this counter-suit in order to afford
Urban Bank and all of the concerned directors and officers, including their respective
counsel, to defend themselves and present witnesses and/or evidence in support of
their cause.32
Taking the foregoing in consideration, the
recommendations for approval of this Court:
RECOMMENDATIONS:

OBC

submitted

the

following

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended the

following:
A. On the charge of gratuitous allegations:
1. To DISMISS the charge on the ground that the statements in
his Motion to Inhibit, etc., do not constitute malicious imputations
as he was merely expressing his concern of what he has
discovered based on the documents he has obtained. However,
let this case serve as his FIRST WARNING, being an officer of the
court, to be more cautious, restraint and circumspect with his
dealings in the future with the Court and its Member.
2. To ADMONISH respondent for making such non-sense and
unfounded joke against Honorable Justice Antonio T. Carpio the
latter deserves due respect and courtesy from no less than the
member of the bar. Likewise, Atty. Singson should also be
ADVISED to be more cautious in his dealing with his opposing
counsel to avoid misconception of facts.
B. On the charge of falsification:
1. To DISMISS the charge of submitting falsified documents on
ground of lack of legal basis. A charge of submitting falsified
documents partakes of the nature of criminal act under Art. 172
of the Revised penal Code, and the quantum of proof required to
hold respondent guilty thereof is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
This is to avoid conflicting findings in the criminal case. The
administrative proceedings of the same act must await of the
outcome in the criminal case of falsification of document.
C. On the contempt of court filed by private complainant:
1. To DISMISS the charge considering that the statements cited
by Atty. Pea in his pleadings previously filed in related cases,
while it may appear to be offending on the part of the
complainant, but the same do not categorically contain
disrespectful, abusive and abrasive language or intemperate
words that may tend to discredit the name of the complainant.
Respondent merely narrated the facts based of his own
knowledge and discoveries which, to him, warranted to be
brought to the attention of the court for its information and
consideration. He must be ADVISED however, to refrain from
using unnecessary words and statements which may not be
material in the resolution of the issued raised therein.
D. On the counter-charge of forum-shopping

1. To RE-DOCKET the counter-charge of forum shopping, as

embodied in the Comment dated 22 August 2003 of Atty. Pea,
as a separate administrative case against the petitioners and
counsels in G.R. 145817, G.R. No. 145818 and G.R. No. 145822;
2. To FURNISH the petitioners and their counsel a copy of the said
comment dated 22 August 2003 for their information.
3. To REQUIRE the petitioners and their counsel, SINGSON
VALDEZ & ASSOCIATES, represented by ATTY. MANUEL R.
SINGSON, ANGARA ABELLO CONCEPCION REALA & CRUZ
represented by ATTY. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, ATTY. STEPHEN
GEORGE S. D. AQUINO and ATTY. HAZEL ROSE B. SEE to
comment thereon within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof.33 (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUES
In these administrative matters, the salient issues for the Courts consideration are
limited to the following:
(a) whether respondent Pea made gratuitous allegations and imputations
against members of the Court;
(b) whether he can be held administratively liable for submitting allegedly
"falsified documents" consisting of internal documents of the court;
(c) whether he can likewise be held administratively liable for the contempt
charges leveled against him in the Manifestation and Motion filed by the De
Leon Group; and
(d) whether Urban Bank and the individual bank directors and officers are
guilty of forum shopping.
OUR RULING
A. First Charge: Malicious and Groundless Imputation of Bribery and Wrongdoing
against a Member of the Court.
We do not adopt the recommendation of the OBC on this charge.
Respondent Pea is administratively liable for making gratuitous imputations of
bribery and wrongdoing against a member of the Court, as seen in the text of the
subject Motion to Inhibit, his statements during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session,
and his unrelenting obstinacy in hurling effectively the same imputations in his
subsequent pleadings. In moving for the inhibition of a Member of the Court in the

manner he adopted, respondent Pea, as a lawyer, contravened the ethical standards

of the legal profession.
As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and judicial officers.34 They are to abstain from offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the court35 and must refrain from attributing
to a judge motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the
case.36
While lawyers are entitled to present their case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of foul and abusive language.37 Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.38 A lawyers language should be
forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession.39
In the subject Motion for Inhibition, respondent Pea insinuated that the then
ponente of the case had been "bribed" by Atty. Singson, counsel of Urban Bank in
the consolidated petitions, in light of the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution,
suspending the period of redemption of the levied properties pending appeal. The
subject Motion to Inhibit reads in part:
4. Private respondent [Pea] composed himself and tried to recall if there was any
pending incident with this Honorable Court regarding the suspension of the
redemption period but he could not remember any. In an effort to hide his discomfort,
respondent teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to get such an order.
Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact explained
that they obviously had to exert extra effort because they could not afford to lose the
properties involved (consisting mainly of almost all the units in the Urban Bank Plaza
in Makati City) as it might cause the bank (now Export Industry Bank) to close
down.40(Emphasis supplied.)
During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session by the First Division of this Court,
respondent Pea explained that his reference to the bribe was merely a "joke" in the
course of a telephone conversation between lawyers:
CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE:
Regarding that allegation made by Atty. Pea on [sic] when you made mention earlier
of him saying about Justice Carpio?
ATTY. SINGSON:
Yes, Your Honor, he said "kaya pala may bagong Mercedez [sic] si Carpio, eh."
CHIEF JUSTICE:

He said to you that?

ATTY. SINGSON:
Yes, that was what he was referring to when he said about bribery.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. PEA:
First of all I would like to everything that he said, he told me that he got, they got
a stay order, it is a stay order from the Supreme Court through Justice Carpio and
then I gave that joke. That was just a joke really. He got a new Me[r]cedez [sic]
Benz, you see, he was the one who told me they got a stay order from the Supreme
Court through Justice Carpio, that was what happened
CHIEF JUSTICE:
You mean you made a joke?
ATTY. PEA:
You Honor?
CHIEF JUSTICE;
You made a joke after he told you supposedly that he got (interrupted)
ATTY. PEA:
He got a stay order from Justice Carpio.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
And you say that is the reason why he got a new Mercedez [sic] Benz, you made it
as a joke?
ATTY. PEA:
Your Honor, that is a joke between lawyers.
CHIEF JUSTICE;
That is correct, you are making it as a joke?
ATTY. PEA:

Your Honor, I think, because how they got (interrupted)

CHIEF JUSTICE:
If it were a joke why did you allege in your motion that it was Atty. Singson who said
that Justice Carpio was bribed or the ponente was bribed, is that also another
joke?41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent Pea insinuated ill motives to the then ponente of the consolidated
petitions with respect to the issuance of the 13 November 2003 Resolution. To
respondents mind and based on his interpretation of the two copies of the Agenda
which he anonymously received, the First Division agreed only to simply note Urban
Banks Motion for Clarification. Nevertheless, the questioned Resolution, which Atty.
Singson sent to him by facsimile, had instead granted the Motion. Hence, respondent
Pea attributed the modification of the action of the First Division to simply "note"
the Motion, one apparently unfavorable to respondent Pea, to Justice Carpio, who
had supposedly received a Mercedes Benz for the supposedly altered resolution.
However, as pointed out by the Court in the Resolution dated 03 March 2003, each
Justice has his own respective copy of the Agenda, where he can make his own
handwritten notations on the action for each item and case, but "[t]he official actions
of the Court are contained in the duly approved minutes and resolutions of the
Court."42 Hence, contrary to the insinuations made by respondent Pea, Justice
Carpio had not altered the action of the First Division in granting Urban Banks Motion
for Clarification in the consolidated petitions, as in fact, this was the approved
resolution agreed upon by the Justices then present. The ponente of the case had
not recommended that the Motion for Clarification be simply noted, but in fact, had
referred to a separate resolution, i.e., "a) & f) See RES.," disposing of the said item
(F) including item (A), which is the Motion to Inhibit Associate Justice Artemio
Panganiban. In addition to the official minutes of the 13 November 2002
Session,43 Justice Carpio submitted for the record his written recommendation on the
agenda item involving the consolidated petitions, to prove that this was his
recommendation, and the minutes confirm the approval of this recommendation.44
The Court, through a unanimous action of the then Members of the First Division,
had indeed adopted the recommended and proposed resolution of Justice Carpio, as
the then ponente, and granted the Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank. It is
completely wrong for respondent Pea to claim that the action had been issued
without any sufficient basis or evidence on record, and hence was done so with
partiality. A mere adverse ruling of the court is not adequate to immediately justify
the imputation of such bias or prejudice as to warrant inhibition of a Member of this
Court, absent any verifiable proof of specific misconduct. Suspicions or insinuations
of bribery involving a member of this Court, in exchange for a favorable resolution,
are grave accusations. They cannot be treated lightly or be "jokingly" alleged by
parties, much less by counsel in pleadings or motions. These suspicions or
insinuations strike not only at the stature or reputation of the individual members of
the Court, but at the integrity of its decisions as well.45

Respondent Pea attempts to draw a connection and direct correlation between

Urban Banks failure to furnish him a copy of its Motion for Clarification, purportedly
denying him an opportunity to refute the allegations therein, and the supposedly
corrupt means by which the unfavorable Resolution was thereby obtained. This is
completely untenable and irresponsible. Had he simply confined the issue to an
alleged deprivation of due process, then there would hardly be any controversy
regarding his conduct as a lawyer and an officer of the Court. The purported lack of
notice of the Motion for Clarification filed the bank in the consolidated petitions could
have been raised as a valid concern for judicial resolution. Instead, respondent Pea
insinuates ill motives on the part of Members of the Court imputing the failure of a
private party to give him due notice to be, in effect, a failure of the Court. This merits
the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers over him as a member of the Bar. To
allege that bribery has been committed by members of the judiciary, a complainant
especially, a lawyer must go beyond mere suspicions, speculations, insinuations
or even the plain silence of an opposing counsel.
Based on the two lawyers disclosures during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session,
respondent Pea appears to have been caught by surprise by his telephone
conversation with Atty. Singson, who informed him of the suspension of the
redemption period by the Court and its issuance of a Stay Order over the execution
pending appeal. The astonishment of respondent would seem natural, since he was
caught unawares of Urban Banks Motion for Clarification, which was the subject
matter of the 13 November 2002 Resolution. His supposed joke, which he himself
initiated and made without provocation, was disdainful all the same, as it suggested
that the bank had obtained the Order from this Court in exchange for an expensive
luxury automobile.
Atty. Pea cannot be excused for uttering snide and accusatory remarks at the
expense of the reputation and integrity of members of this Court, and for using those
unsubstantiated claims as basis for the subject Motion for Inhibition. Instead of
investigating the veracity of Atty. Singsons revelations, respondent read too much
into the declarations and the purported silence of opposing counsel towards his joke.
Respondent made unfounded imputations of impropriety to a specific Member of the
Court. Such conduct does not befit a member of the legal profession and falls utterly
short of giving respect to the Court and upholding its dignity.
Respondent Peas defense that the allegation of bribery and collusion between
Justice Carpio, Atty. Singson and the petitioners was a "joke" fails to convince, as in
fact, he was deadly serious about the charges he raised. Respondent insisted that his
alleged insinuation of ill motives was just a "joke" between two lawyers engaged in
a private telephone conversation regarding the case. Although the courts and judicial
officers are entitled to due respect, they are not immune to criticisms nor are they
beyond the subject matter of free speech, especially in the context of a private
conversation between two individuals. In this case, though, respondent himself was
responsible for moving the private matter into the realm of public knowledge by citing
that same "joke" in his own Motion for Inhibition filed before this Court. In general,
courts will not act as overly sensitive censors of all private conversations of lawyers
at all times, just to ensure obedience to the duty to afford proper respect and

deference to the former. Nevertheless, this Court will not shy away from exercising
its disciplinary powers whenever persons who impute bribery to judicial officers and
bring such imputations themselves to the courts attention through their own
pleadings or motions.
Contrary to his assertion that the accusation of bribery was only made in jest,
respondent has never backed down since he first made the accusation in January
2003 and continually raises as an issue in the consolidated petitions how Justice
Carpio purportedly changed the agreed action of the First Division when he issued
the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, even after the Court in the 03 March
2003 Executive Session had precisely explained to him that no impropriety had
attended the issuance of the said Resolution. In the Motions to Inhibit dated 21
January 201046 and 22 August 2011,47 he repeatedly insists on the
"anomalous/unusual circumstances" surrounding the issuance by Justice Carpio of
the same questioned Resolution, which was allegedly contrary to the handwritten
notes made in the copies of the Agenda that he received. Respondent Pea most
recently capitalized on the purported alteration or falsification supposedly committed
by Justice Carpio by filing an ethics complaint against the latter, where he alleged
that:
Sometime thereafter, respondent Pea received a copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda
1st Division of this Honorable Court with a notation in handwriting "10AC" on the left
side and marginal notes on the right side. A perusal thereof, reveals that when this
Honorable Court took up the matter of the Motion for Clarification of petitioner Urban
Bank, this Honorable Court merely "N" or "Noted" the Motion for Clarification of
petitioner Urban Bank and did not grant the same.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Considering the foregoing (I was not furnished a copy of the Motion for Clarification,
or required to comment by the Honorable Justice Carpio and opposing counsel, Atty.
Singson, being able to secure an advance copy of the assailed 13 November 2002
Resolution), the matter brought out in the Executive Session and the admission made
by Atty. Enriqueta Vidal and the Honorable Hilario Davide and the Honorable Justice
Vitug with regard to his copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda 1st Division of this Honorable
Court which was sent to respondent Pea was correct and that the Motion for
Clarification was merely "N" or "NOTED". However, the Honorable Justice Carpio
issued a Resolution "Granting" the Motion for Clarification.
Therefore, the Honorable Justice Carpio issued the 13 November 2002 Resolution in
an anomalous/falsified manner and in clear contravention of this Honorable Courts
Decision to merely "Note" the same. A clear judicial administrative
violation.48 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the bribery "joke" which respondent himself initiated has gotten the better
of him. Respondent has convinced himself of the veracity of his own malicious
insinuations by his own repetitious allegations in his subsequent pleadings.

The Court in the past refrained from imposing actual penalties in administrative cases
in the presence of mitigating factors, such as the acknowledgment of the infraction
and the feeling of remorse.49 In this case, the "profound" apologies50 offered by
respondent Pea for his insinuations against Justice Carpio are insincere and
hypocritical, as seen by his later actions. Although he expressed remorse for having
caused the Court distress because of his statements,51 he refuses to acknowledge
any unethical conduct on his part for his unfounded accusations against the actions
of Justice Carpio with respect to the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution.
Worse, he has persisted in attributing ill-motives against Justice Carpio, even after
the latter had recused himself from the case since 2003.
This is not the first time that respondent resorted to initiating unfounded and vicious
attacks against the integrity and impartiality of Members of this Court. Earlier in the
proceedings of the consolidated petitions, respondent assailed how retired Justice
Arturo B. Buena showed bias in favor of the De Leon Group, when the latters petition
in G.R. No. 145822 was reinstated on a second motion for reconsideration:52
It has come to the attention and knowledge of herein respondent that petitioners
counsel has been making statement to the effect that they could get a favorable
resolution from the Supreme Court, on their second motion for reconsideration. In
short, petitioners counsel is practically saying that they are sure to get the Supreme
Court to entertain the second motion for reconsideration even if it violates the rules.53
1. The motion for voluntary inhibition is directed at Justice Buena because it was he
who penned the challenged Resolution, which granted the second motion for
reconsideration in violation of the Rules. It was he who crafted, drafted and finalized
the said Resolution. It was he who tried to justify the violation of the Rules. It was
from Justice Buenas office that contents of the challenged Resolution was apparently
"leaked" to the petitioners counsel long before its promulgation.54
What miracle did Atty. Vinluan perform and what phenomenon transpired? Why are
herein petitioners "very special" in the eyes of Justice Buena?55
It is quite obvious that the partiality of Justice Buena has been affected by his
relationship with Atty. Vinluan, as evidenced by the above-described facts and
circumstances.56
Surprisingly, Justice Arturo B. Buena, the assigned ponente, reinstated the petition
without any explanation whatsoever, and in gross violation of Sec. 4, Rule 56 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This was highly irregular by itself. But what made
reinstatement more suspicious was the fact that even before the release of the
Resolution reinstating the petition in G. R. No. 145822, the counsel for petitioners,
Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, was already boasting that he would be able to reinstate their
petition. Obviously, even before the release of the Resolution in question, Atty.
Vinluan already knew what Justice Buenas resolution would be.57 (Emphasis
supplied.)

In no less than six motions,58 he similarly accused former Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban of prejudice based on his affiliation with the Rotary Club, wherein some
of the directors and officers of Urban Bank were also members. He even claimed that
Justice Panganiban went to Urban Bank to meet with some of the directors and
officers, who consulted him on the legal issues arising from criminal suits in relation
to the facts of the main petitions, citing only an unnamed "reliable source":
The friendship and close relationship of the three (Justice Panganiban and Urban
Banks Arsenio Archit Bartolome and Teodoro Ted Borlongan) went beyond their
being Rotarians. As a matter of fact, Justice Panganiban was seen a couple of times
going to Urban Bank to see Archit and/or Ted, before the banks closure. Respondent
has also discovered, through a reliable source, that Justice Panganiban was known
to have been consulted, and his legal advice sought, by Borlongan and Bartolome, in
connection with the above-entitled cases, while the same was still pending with the
Court of Appeals and in connection with the four (4) criminal cases filed the with the
MTC [Municipal Trial Court] at Bago City by herein respondent against Borlongan, et
al., for "introducing falsified documents in a judicial proceeding". In the latter cases,
it was even Justice Panganiban who furnished a copy of the SC Decision in Doris Ho
vs. People (his own ponencia) to Bartolome and Borlongan, for the purpose of giving
his friends a legal basis in questioning the issuance of the warrants of arrest against
Borlongan and the rest of his co-accused in Criminal Case Nos. 6683 to 6686, MTC
Bago City (now appealed to Supreme Court; see Footnote No. 1 below).59 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Lastly, respondent Pea raised the issue of "unmitigated partiality" against retired
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura on the ground that the latter resolved a separate
case involving related issues to the main petitions in favor of the opposing parties:
3. The Petitioners in G. R. No. 143591, entitled "Teodoro C. Borlongan, et al., v.
Magdaleno M. Pea, et al", are also the same petitioners in the above-entitled
consolidated cases G. R. Nos. 145817 and 145822; and the respondents in the aboveentitled consolidated case G. R. No. 162562. Under the circumstances, herein private
respondent is ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN that the extreme bias and prejudice of Justice
Nachura against him in G. R. No. 143591 would certainly be carried over to the
above-entitled consolidated cases.60 (Emphasis supplied.)
Not only has respondent Pea failed to show sincere remorse for his malicious
insinuations of bribery and wrongdoing against Justice Carpio, he in fact continually
availed of such unethical tactics in moving for the inhibition of eleven Justices of the
Court.61 Indeed, his pattern of behavior can no longer be seen as isolated incidents
that the Court can pardon given certain mitigating circumstances. Respondent Pea
has blatantly and consistently cast unfounded aspersions against judicial officers in
utter disregard of his duties and responsibilities to the Court.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,62 the Court chose to indefinitely suspend Atty. Alan
Paguia, when the latter imputed devious motives and questioned the impartiality of
members of the Court, despite its earlier warnings:

The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by
anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in
the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the
erosion of our peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been
privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed,
should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious
motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of
the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert
the dispensation of justice.
Respondent Peas actions betray a similar disrespectful attitude towards the Court
that cannot be countenanced especially for those privileged enough to practice law
in the country. To be sure, Atty. Paguia has just been recently reinstated to the
practice of law after showing sincere remorse and having renewed his belief and
respect for the Court, almost eight years from the time the penalty was imposed.
Thus, the Court orders respondent Pea be indefinitely suspended from the practice
of law for his apparently irredeemable habit of repeatedly imputing unfounded
motives and partiality against members of the Court.
B. Second Charge: Submission of Falsified Internal Court Documents.
We likewise reject the recommendation of the OBC with respect to the second charge.
It must be noted that the Court, in its Resolutions dated 03 March 2003 and 28 April
2003, expressed administrative concern over Atty. Peas behavior on three points:
(1) his submission of a falsified court document, (2) his access to Supreme Court
documents that are highly restricted and confidential, and (3) his use of court
documents (genuine or false) in his pleadings.
Respondent Pea submitted a falsified internal court document, Annex "B," had illegal
access to confidential court documents, and made improper use of them in the
proceedings before this Court. The Court directed the initial investigation by the OBC
based on the charge that respondent Pea had submitted a falsified document to this
Court.63 The charge of falsification stems from his submission of an alleged copy of
the Courts Agenda64 (Annex "B") purportedly belonging to a member of the Division
handling the case. The pertinent portion of the subject Motion to Inhibit reads:
10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the Official
Agenda of the First Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date
when the questioned Resolution was supposedly issued. In both copies (apparently
secured from the office of two different members of the Division, one of which is the
copy of the ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that the members of the Division
had allegedly agreed that petitioners Motion for Clarification and Urgent Motion to
Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to what was stated in the
13 November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that was released to the parties)

a falsified document because it makes it appear that a Resolution was issued by the
First Division granting petitioners Motion for Clarification when in fact no such
Resolution exists. The real Resolution arrived at by the First Division which can be
gleaned from the Agenda merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are
hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C".65 (Emphasis supplied.)
During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, respondent Pea expressed his
absolute conviction that the document attached as Annex "B" was an exact copy of
the Agenda of the then ponente of the case.66 It was later discovered, however, that
no such copy existed, either in the latters records or in those of any other member
of the Division concerned:
CHIEF JUSTICE:
We make of record again that insofar as Annex B is concerned it was confirmed by
the Office of the Clerk of Court of this Division that the original of that does not
appear in the record, is not in the record and that nobody, none of the members of
the division has a copy of, that copy of Annex B of your pleading does not come from
anyone of the members of the division. That is the position of the Court now as
explained earlier. Specifically Mr. Justice Carpio said that Annex B, specifically with
that capital A. capital C preceded by 10 did not come from his office, was not based
on the document in his office and that is also true to each of the members of this
Division.67(Emphasis supplied.)
The falsification, subject of the instant administrative case, lies in the fact that
respondent Pea submitted to the Court a document he was absolutely certain, at
the time of such submission, was a copy of the Agenda of the then ponente. In
supporting the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent misled the Court by presenting
a document that was not what he claimed it to be. Contrary to the assurances made
in the same motion68 he made allegations that were false and submitted documents
that were not borne out by the records of this case. Instead of verifying the contents
of Annex "B," which came to him through dubious means, he unquestioningly
accepted their genuineness and veracity. Despite the Courts own explanation that
Annex "B" does not exist, he continues to insist on its existence.
Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities exacted and expected from
members of the legal profession.69Thus, lawyers shall commit no falsehood, nor shall
they mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.70As disciples of truth,
their lofty vocation is to correctly inform the court of the law and the facts of the case
and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions.71 Courts are entitled
to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before
them.72 In the instant case, the submission of a document purporting to be a copy of
the Agenda of a member of this Court is an act of dishonesty that puts into doubt the
ability of respondent to uphold his duty as a disciple of truth.
Respondent Pea would argue, however, that falsification as a criminal act under
the Revised Penal Code was not judicially established during the proceedings of the
OBC investigation and, thus, he cannot be held liable for falsification. The comparison

of the present administrative and disciplinary proceedings with a criminal charge of

falsification is misplaced.
The subject matter of administrative proceedings is confined to whether there is
administrative liability for the submission of a falsified document namely Annex
"B," which respondent Pea claims (albeit mistakenly) to be a genuine copy of the
Agenda of the ponente. The issue, then, is whether he transgressed the ethical
standards demanded of lawyers, by which they should be truthful in their dealings
with and submissions to the Court. The investigation clearly does not include the
determination of criminal liability, which demands a different modicum of proof with
respect to the use of falsified documents. At this time, the Court makes no definitive
pronouncement as to the guilt of respondent over his violation of the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code regarding the use of falsified documents.
In brief, respondent led this Court to believe that what he submitted was a faithful
reproduction of the ponentes Agenda, just to support the subject Motion to Inhibit.
The original of the purported copy was later found to have been inexistent in the
courts records. Regardless of whether or not Annex "B" was criminally falsified or
forged is immaterial to the present disposition. What is now crucial is whether
respondent was candid and truthful in claiming absolute certainty with respect to the
genuineness and authenticity of his submissions.
The assertion of respondent Pea that the typewritten contents of Annexes "B" and
"C" appear to be genuine and accurate is unconvincing and cannot exonerate him
from liability. Although Annex "C" was determined to be in the Courts records,73 the
bare similarity of its typewritten contents with those of Annex "B" will not shield him
from disciplinary action. Although the typewritten contents of the two Agendas
appear identical, the handwritten notes located at the right-hand side are different.
Respondent, in fact, claims that the handwritten notes come from two different
members of the Division, one of them the then ponente of the case.
The subject Motion to Inhibit is anchored on the veracity of the handwritten remarks
not on the printed contents which are allegedly contrary to the substance of the
Courts 13 November 2002 Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson. Respondent
Pea cannot claim the genuineness of Annex "B" (which is not in the records), based
on the apparent identity of its printed contents with those of Annex "C" (which is in
the records). The handwritten notes are markedly different and, according to him,
made by two different members of the Court. In his Motion to Inhibit, respondent
failed to substantiate his assertion that Annex "B" and the notes made therein
belonged to any member of this Court.
More importantly, the Court notes that respondent Pea has not explained, to the
Courts satisfaction, how he managed to obtain internal and confidential documents.
Respondent Pea would have the Court believe that he happened to obtain the two
copies of the Agenda (Annexes "B" and "C") and the internal Resolution (Annex "D")
in two separate envelopes anonymously sent via ordinary mail. He supposedly
received them sometime during the second or the third week of January 2002 in his

home-cum-office in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.74 He, however, failed to present

the envelopes containing the documents, but explained that these may have already
been thrown away, since he had no system of recording incoming communications in
his home/office in the province. The Court is not persuaded by his account of the
receipt of these restricted court documents.
The Agenda, the Courts action thereon, as well as the Resolution (Annex "D"), are
internal documents that are accessible only to court officers,75 who are bound by
strict confidentiality. For respondent Pea to have been able to secure originals or
photocopies of the Courts Agenda is disturbing because that ability implies a breach
of the rules of strict confidentiality in the Court. Notably, the Agenda purportedly sent
to him did not contain all the items for deliberation by the Courts First Division for
that day; the copies sent were limited to the incidents pertaining to his pending case.
This circumstance can hardly be considered as random, since the exact item (Item
No. 175) of concern for him specifically, the Courts action on Urban Banks Motion
for Clarification was what had been sent directly to his provincial home/office, and
what he conveniently acquired thereby.
The Court finds it hard to believe that confidential court records just coincidentally
and anonymously appeared in the provincial home/office of respondent Pea through
ordinary mail. Also incredible is his explanation that the envelopes that contained the
documents, and that could have led to the identification of their source were
opportunely misplaced or thrown away, despite the grave importance he had ascribed
to them. It is highly improbable that a personnel of the Court would breach the rules
of strict confidentiality76 to send to litigants or their counsel the Courts Agenda,
together with handwritten notes and the internal resolutions of the Court, without
any prodding or consideration, and even at the risk of incurring grave criminal and
administrative penalties.77 Respondent Peas account of having lost the envelopes
appears too convenient an excuse to assuage the Courts skepticism towards this
breach of confidentiality within its own halls.
Worse, respondent Pea flaunted his continued access as recent as 2010 to other
internal and confidential records in the proceedings of this case. Despite the
administrative proceedings leveled against him for having "illicitly" obtained the
confidential Agenda of the Courts First Division, he brazenly resorted again to such
unethical behavior by surreptiously acquiring no less than the confidential and still
unreleased OBC Report on the very administrative case of which he himself is the
subject.
In his Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010,78 respondent Pea prayed
that the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution be recalled on the ground that
there was a mistake in its issuance based on the copies of the Agenda he had
mysteriously received. In support of this motion, he casually cited and attached a
photocopy of the confidential OBC Report.79 This OBC Report has not been released
to any party, and was then in fact still under deliberation by this Court. Curiously,
the attached photocopy bears marks corresponding to the unreleased copy of the
signed OBC Report, as it actually appears in the rollo of the administrative

case.80Unfortunately, respondent did not explain in the said motion how he was able
to obtain a copy thereof.
Regardless of the means employed by respondent, his acquisition of the OBC Report
from the Courts own records already speaks of an appalling pattern of unethical
behavior that the Court will no longer ignore. Even as he was the subject of an
administrative case for obtaining confidential court records, he continued to have
access to other internal documents of the Court. His actions have established that he
is incorrigible and not likely to change. His continued obstinacy in disregarding ethical
standards and ignoring the rule of confidentiality of court records deserves nothing
less than the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the profession.
Moreover, in the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent Pea even tried to bolster his
claim that the then ponente of the case had a special interest in the case by attaching
an internal resolution of the Court.81 In the said Internal Resolution dated 04
September 2002, the two consolidated petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822)
were transferred from the Third Division to the First Division, where Justice Carpio
was subsequently assigned.82 How respondent Pea was again able to secure this
internal document is another disturbing mystery in this case, especially since the
resolution was sent by the Third Division Clerk of Court to the First Division Clerk of
Court, the Raffle Committee and the Judicial Records Office only, and not to any of
the parties. Similar to the copies of the Agenda of the First Division, respondent Pea
again purportedly received this Internal Resolution by mail.83 What is more alarming
in this instance is that he received not just any photocopy of the Courts Resolution,
but a pink copy itself, the very same material used for such internal resolutions in
the Courts records. As he himself admitted, respondent Pea could not have gotten
hold of the said internal Resolution, which was on its face declared an internal matter,
without the assistance of a person who had access to the records of his case in the
Court.
This claimed "major anomaly" of the transfer of the case, which is being decried by
respondent in the subject Motion to Inhibit, stems from his gross misunderstanding
of the internal rules of the Court.
Upon the reorganization of the members of various Divisions due to the retirement
of other Justices, the cases already assigned to a Member-in-Charge are required to
be transferred to the Division to which the Member-in-Charge moves.84 Hence, in this
case, Justice Carpio, similar to other members of the Court at that time, did not lose
his case assignments but brought them with him when he transferred to the First
Division. In fact, the transfers of the assigned cases to the new Division are made by
request from the Member-in-Charge, because otherwise the rollo of the cases of
which he is Member-in-Charge will be retained by a Division in which he is no longer
a member. Thus, the transfer of the two consolidated petitions to the First Division
that is being heavily criticized by respondent Pea was simple compliance with the
established internal procedures of the Court, and not attributable to any undue
interest or malicious intention on the part of the then ponente to retain the case for
himself. Respondent had raised "irresponsible suspicions"85 against the integrity of

the ponente without any understanding of the Supreme Courts processes in the
transfer of cases.
Respondent Pea had, in fact, previously used this deplorable tactic of obtaining
internal court records to call for the inhibition of Justices of the Court. In previously
moving for the inhibition of Justice Buena, he assailed how supposedly the retired
Justice violated the rules with respect to a second motion for reconsideration when
the latter reinstated the Petition of the De Leon Group in G.R. No. 145822.
Respondent attributed the special treatment extended by Justice Buena to his
supposed association with the De Leon Groups counsel, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan of the
ACCRA Law Office. To establish this special treatment, he attached a complete copy
of the Minutes of the Division86 composed of 58 pages and showing 77 cases
dismissed by the Court due to failure to pay the required fees, which Justice Buena
allegedly did not reinstate:
10. A review of the records of the Supreme Court will show that for the past several
months alone, seventy-seven petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court, mainly
for failure to pay the required fees. Out of that number, NONE WERE REINSTATED
upon the filing of a SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. If Justice Buena
willingly disregarded the Rules by reinstating petitioners petition (De Leon Group
Petition in G. R. No. 145822) upon the filing of a second motion for reconsideration,
then he should have reinstated also the aforesaid 77 cases in order to be fair. At the
very least, he should now reinstate all of said 77 cases if only to show that he is not
biased in favor of herein petitioners. He could not and will not do so, however,
because those cases are not favored ones. Photocopies of the case titles and
numbers, as well as the resolutions dismissing the aforesaid seventy-seven cases,
consisting of 58 pages, are attached hereto collectively as Annex "A".87
Respondent Pea was able to attach to this motion for inhibition the portions of the
Courts Minutes on 12 April 2000, 07 February 2001, 12 February 2001, 14 February
2001, 26 February 2001, 28 March 2001, 14 April 2001, 18 April 2001, 26 April 2001,
16 May 2001, 11 July 2001, 08 August 2001, 13 August 2001, 20 August 2001, 29
August 2001, 05 September 2001, 24 September 2001, 08 October 2001 and others
which were undated. The attached Minutes pointed to specific cases which were
dismissed for failure to pay the necessary fees, among others. It was unclear if the
cases were specifically assigned to Justice Buena or if respondent Pea represented
any of the parties therein.
Nevertheless, what stands out is that he obtained confidential Minutes of the Court
pertaining to other cases, which specifically dismissed or denied petitions on the
failure of the parties to pay necessary fees. This could not have just been mere
coincidence again since it required some legal understanding and familiarity with the
cases in order to be able to sift through and identify the kinds of cases, which were
dismissed or denied on such grounds. Although the parties to these cases were
notified and given copies of the Courts resolutions, what respondent Pea obtained
were the actual copies of the Minutes that included other items in the Courts Agenda
and that were not released to the public. Under the Courts own Internal Rules, only
the Minutes pertinent to the parties are those that are distributed to the parties

concerned.88 Yet, respondent was able to attach wholesale Minutes of dozens of cases
to his pleading.
Although the above confidential documents that were accessed by respondent
totaling 58 pages in all are not the subject of the investigation of the administrative
case, his previous receipt or acquisition of the minutes of the Court as early as 2000
confirm in no uncertain terms his access to internal records of the Court, not just of
his case, but of other pending cases and that this access has continued as late as
2010. It seems rather ironic that respondent Pea would accuse his fellow lawyers of
allegedly having an "inside track" to members of the Court, when he in turn, on
record, had mysteriously easy access to confidential court documents. That internal
documents of the Court (whether voluminous or in relation to his case or otherwise)
would suddenly find themselves in the hands of respondent Pea through registered
mail is too incredible for this Court to attribute any good faith on his part.
Even if the Court were to give some modicum of credence to the unlikely story of
how respondent Pea came upon these internal documents, it looks with disapproval
upon his actions with respect to those documents, which were supposedly sent to
him anonymously. If indeed lawyers were sent official judicial records that are
confidential in nature and not easily accessible, the ethical recourse for them would
be to make a candid and immediate disclosure of the matter to the court concerned
for proper investigation, and not as proof to further the merits of their case. In fact,
respondent himself acknowledged that reporting the "leaked out" documents was a
duty he owed to the Court89 more so in this case, since the documents were sent
anonymously and through dubious circumstances.
No issue would have arisen with respect to his continuing fitness to be a member of
the legal profession, if he had simply reported his receipt of the "leaked" court
documents, and nothing more. Yet, he not only failed to immediately disclose the
suspicious circumstances of his having obtained confidential court records; he even
had the tenacity to use the documents sent through suspicious means to support his
request for inhibition. As a lawyer, he should have known better than to hinge his
motions and pleadings on documents of questionable origins, without even verifying
the authenticity of the contents by comparing them with sources of greater reliability
and credibility.
If respondent Pea entertained doubts as to the veracity of the Divisions actions with
respect to the pending incidents in his case, as allegedly embodied in the anonymous
Agendas sent to him, then he should have simply checked the records to verify the
genuineness of the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution faxed to him by Atty.
Singson. It is through officially released resolutions and decisions that parties and
their counsel are informed of and guided by the Courts actions on pending incidents,
and not by the confidential and handwritten notes of the individual members of the
Court. Respondents wholesale reliance on copies of the Agenda purported to be those
of individual members of the Court and anonymously sent to him is grossly misplaced.
The Court has already explained that there was in fact no discrepancy between the
agreed upon action of the Division and the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution,

contrary to the assertions of respondent Pea. He grounded the subject Motion to

Inhibit on the fact that the anonymously sent copies of the Agenda indicate that the
Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank should simply be noted,90 but it was
instead granted by the Court. The Court, however, made clear during the 03 March
2003 Executive Session, that there was nothing irregular about annotating the first
item with "SEE RES" (See Resolution) and marking the rest of the incidents with "N"
(Noted). In fact, these annotations conform with the recommended actions submitted
by the ponente for that particular item.91 The Resolution identified in the first item
governs and contains the actual disposition of two of the incidents in the pending
case.92 To be sure, what governs as the final action of the Court en banc or in Division
is the minutes of the proceedings,93 which lists the dispositions of the items taken up
during the session, reviewed by the members, and finally approved by the Chief
Justice or the Division chairperson. Contrary to respondents suspicions, the action
taken by the Division in its 13 November 2002 Session was accurately reflected in
the questioned Resolution released by the Court.
Respondent Pea has no one else to blame but himself, since he "allegedly," blindly
and mistakenly relied on "anonymously sent" unverified photocopies of the Courts
Agenda, in order to support his call for the inhibition of a member of the Court.
Neither can he rely on the alleged "bragging" of Atty. Singson which the latter
denies to impute ill motive to judicial officers. Whether Atty. Singson actually
exerted "extraordinary efforts" to secure the suspension Order or freely divulged it
in their telephone conversation, respondent should have been more circumspect in
making grave accusations of bribery (jokingly or not) without any extrinsic evidence
or proof to back up his claim.
Respondent Pea is sanctioned for knowingly using confidential and internal court
records and documents, which he suspiciously obtained in bolstering his case. His
unbridled access to internal court documents has not been properly explained. The
cavalier explanation of respondent Pea that this Courts confidential documents
would simply find themselves conveniently falling into respondents lap through
registered mail and that the envelopes containing them could no longer be traced is
unworthy of belief. This gives the Court reason to infer that laws and its own internal
rules have been violated over and over again by some court personnel, whom
respondent Pea now aids and abets by feigning ignorance of how the internal
documents could have reached him. It is not unreasonable to even conclude that
criminal liabilities have been incurred in relation to the Revised Penal Code94and the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, with Atty. Pea benefitting from the
same.95 Respondents actions clearly merit no other penalty than disbarment.
This second penalty of disbarment is all the more justified by the earlier imposition
of an indefinite suspension. If taken together, these two violations already speak of
respondent Peas inherent unworthiness to become a member of the Bar. Although
an indefinite suspension opens up the possibility of future reinstatement after a clear
showing of remorse and a change of ways (as in the case of Atty. Paguia), respondent
has shown to be incorrigible and no longer deserves the compassion of the Court.
Not only has respondent thumbed his nose on the integrity of the persons occupying
the Bench by casting grave aspersions of bribery and wrongdoing, he has also showed

disdain for the sanctity of court procedures and records by his haughty display of
illegal access to internal Supreme Court documents.
C. Third Charge: Respondent Peas insinuations of wrongdoing and collusion
between members of the Court and another counsel.
Aside from attributing bribery to the ponente, respondent Penas allegations of
collusion between previous members of the Court and the counsel for the De Leon
Group are unfounded and contravene the ethical duties of respondent to the Court
and his fellow lawyers. His actions reveal a pattern of behavior that is disconcerting
and administratively punishable.
However, considering the ultimate penalty of disbarment earlier imposed on
respondent Pea, the Court no longer finds the need to squarely rule on the third
charge, as any possible administrative liability on this matter would be a mere
superfluity.
D. Fourth Charge: The charge of forum shopping is not the proper subject of the
present allegations of administrative misconduct.
The counter-charge of forum shopping has been made by respondent Pea against
petitioners and their respective counsel in his defense.96 However, this is already
beyond the scope of the subject matter of this administrative case. It will be recalled
that he assailed the fact that Urban Bank, the De Leon Group, and the other group
of bank officers filed three separate Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817, 145818 and
145822, respectively) before the Court. They all questioned therein the rulings of the
appellate court affirming the grant of execution pending appeal.
Considering that this claim is the subject of administrative penalties, and that other
interested parties did not participate in the investigation conducted by the OBC
herein, prudence and equity dictate that the Court reserve judgment for the
meantime until the subject is fully ventilated and all parties are given an opportunity
to argue their cases.
The charges of forum shopping are hereby dismissed without prejudice to the filing
and/or hearing of separate administrative complaints97 against petitioners Urban
Bank, Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., P. Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C.
Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin L. de Leon and Eric L. Lee, and their respective counsel of
record. Considering their deaths, petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan and Ben T. Lim,
Sr., can no longer be included in any future administrative action in relation to these
matters. On the other hand, Ben Y. Lim, Jr., was mistakenly impleaded by respondent
Pea and therefore, is not a real and direct party to the case.
EPILOGUE
As parting words, the Court herein highlights the disorder caused by respondent
Peas actions in the administration of justice. In order to foreclose resort to such

abhorrent practice or strategy in the future, the Court finds the need to educate the
public and the Bar.
Lawyers shall conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their
professional colleagues.98They shall not, in their professional dealings, use language
that is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.99Lawyers shall use dignified
language in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system.100 The
use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of a
judicial forum.101
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of
strengthening their cause in a motion for inhibition, make grave and unfounded
accusations of unethical conduct or even wrongdoing against other members of the
legal profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause with which they are
charged.102
It has not escaped the Courts attention that respondent Pea has manifested a
troubling history of praying for the inhibition of several members of this Court or for
the re-raffle of the case to another Division, on the basis of groundless and unfounded
accusations of partiality. A sampling of his predilection for seeking the inhibition of,
so far, eleven Justices of this Court, in an apparent bid to shop for a sympathetic ear,
includes the following:
1. Peas Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Artemio V. Panganiban) dated 12
January 2001;
2. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Arturo Buena) dated 20 August 2001;
3. Letter Complaint (Re: Justice Buena) dated 28 October 2001;
4. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 18 February 2002;
5. Reply (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 15 March 2001;
6. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (re: ponente) dated 30 January 2003;
7. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing) dated 08 July 2004;
8. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004;
9. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Eduardo Antonio B. Nachura) dated 17
December 2007;
10. Motion for Inhibition (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004;

11. Reiteratory Motion to Recuse dated 03 March 2006 (Re: Justice

Panganiban);
12. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Nachura) dated 07 January 2008;
13. Urgent Consolidated Motion to Reiterate Request for Inhibition (Re: Justice
Antonio T. Carpio) dated 02 June 2008;
14. Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justice Presbitero J. Velasco) dated 10
July 2008;
15. Supplement to the Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Conchita
Carpio Morales and Dante O. Tinga) dated 04 August 2008;
16. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Carpio Morales,
Tinga and Velasco) dated 14 August 2008;
17. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Arturo D. Brion,
Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Carpio Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Quisumbing) dated
28 August 2008;
18. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Carpio) dated 21 January 2010;
19. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justices Carpio Morales and Ma. Lourdes
P. A. Sereno) dated 30 March 2011;
20. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit dated 22 August 2011 (Re: Justice Sereno);
and
21. Very Urgent Motion to Re-Raffle dated 01 September 2011 (Re: Justices
Carpio, Jose Perez and Sereno).
The grounds for inhibition of the Justices in these motions of respondent ranged from
flimsy and sparse relations between the parties and the members of the Court to wild
accusations of partiality on mere conjectures and surmises. For example, respondent
accused former Chief Justice Panganiban of bias based on his affiliation with the
Rotary Club, in which the late Teodoro Borlongan, then President of Urban Bank, was
likewise an officer.103He moved for the inhibition of Justice Sereno on the ground that
she was "a close judicial ally" of Justice Carpio, and in turn, the latter, according to
respondent, was antagonistic toward him during the Courts 03 March 2003 Executive
Session in this administrative case.104
Meanwhile, respondent recently sought to have the case re-raffled from the Courts
Third Division because Justice Jose Portugal Perez, a member thereof, was allegedly
appointed to the Court through the endorsement of former Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita, who was a close ally of the then Chairman Emeritus of Urban Bank,
former President Fidel V. Ramos.105 He similarly sought the inhibition of Justice Dante

O. Tinga for his close professional and political ties with former President
Ramos.106 He likewise assailed the partiality of Justice Arturo D. Brion, considering
he is a law school classmate and fraternity brother of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona,
who was then Presidential Legal Counsel of former President Ramos. Thus, according
to respondent Pea, "President Ramos, through Justice Corona, will most likely
exercise his influence over the Honorable Justice Brion."107
Curiously, in asking for the inhibition of Justice Nachura for his alleged partiality in
favor of Urban Bank because of his decision in a related case108 and his prior
appointment as Undersecretary of Education during the Ramos presidency,
respondent Pea impliedly prayed that his case be specifically retained in the Courts
Third Division.109 Respondents peculiar request, which was not included in his other
motions, gives the impression that in his quest to have Justice Nachura inhibit
himself, respondent nonetheless did not want his case to be raffled out of the Third
Division. If his only intention was to raise the possibility of bias against Justice
Nachura alone, then it would not matter whether his case remained with the Third
Division, with another member being designated to replace Justice Nachura, or raffled
to another Division altogether. Respondent Peas odd prayer in his motion for
inhibition bore signs of an intent to shop for a forum that he perceived to be friendly
to him, except for one member.
In Chin v. Court of Appeals,110 the Court warned against litigants contumacious
practice in successively asking for the inhibition of judges, in order to shop for one
who is more friendly and sympathetic to their cause:
We agree that judges have the duty of protecting the integrity of the judiciary as an
institution worthy of public trust and confidence. But under the circumstances here,
we also agree that unnecessary inhibition of judges in a case would open the
floodgates to forum-shopping. More so, considering that Judge Magpale was not the
first judge that TAN had asked to be inhibited on the same allegation of prejudgment.
To allow successive inhibitions would justify petitioners apprehension about the
practice of certain litigants shopping for a judge more friendly and sympathetic to
their cause than previous ones.
As held in Mateo, Jr. v. Hon. Villaluz, the invitation for judges to disqualify themselves
need not always be heeded. It is not always desirable that they should do so. It might
amount in certain cases to their being recreant about their duties. It could also be an
instrument whereby a party could inhibit a judge in the hope of getting another more
amenable to his persuasion. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Courts warning in Chin applies squarely to the multiple and successive requests
for inhibition and re-raffle filed by respondent Pea. Lest other litigants follow his
lead, the Court condemns in no uncertain terms the practice of shopping for a justice,
most especially in the highest tribunal of the land. This abhorrent practice is indeed
one of the reasons why this administrative case has dragged on for years. Not only
does it impute ill motive and disrepute to the members of the Court, but it likewise
delays the administration of justice.

Oddly enough, respondent Pea has been less concerned about the inordinate delay
in resolving the case than about making sure that the "wrong" or "unfriendly" Justices
in his perception do not sit and rule on the issues. He has thrived on the protracted
interruptions caused by his numerous motions for inhibition and re-raffle, resulting
in the case languishing in this Court for years and clogging its dockets. Respondent
stands out for this disorderly behavior and must be made an example so that litigants
be reminded that they cannot bend or toy with the rules of procedure to favor their
causes. Worse, respondent has thrown no less than the rules of basic courtesy in
imputing sinister motives against members of the Court.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Pea has violated several
canons of professional and ethical conduct expected from him as a lawyer and an
officer of the court. His conduct, demeanor and language with respect to his cause of
action in this Court, no less tend to undermine the integrity and reputation of the
judiciary, as well as inflict unfounded accusations against fellow lawyers. Most
disconcerting for this Court is his uncanny ability to obtain confidential and internal
court records and to use them shamelessly in his pleadings in furtherance of his
cause.
In addition, the Court cannot just make short shrift of his inclination towards casually
moving for the inhibition of Justices of the Court based on unfounded claims, since
he has not shown remorse or contrition for his ways. Atty. Pea has shown and
displayed in these proceedings that he has fallen short of the ethical standards of the
noble profession and must be sanctioned accordingly.1wphi1
PREMISES CONSIDERED, for violating Canons 8, 10 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for failing to give due respect to the Courts and his
fellow lawyers, respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Peas personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and other copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.
The En Banc Clerk of Court is directed to INVESTIGATE how respondent was able to
secure copies of the following: (a) copies of the Agenda dated 13 November 2002 of
the Courts First Division, attached as Annexes "B" and "C" of respondent Peas
Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion dated
30 January 2003; (b) the Internal Resolution dated 04 September 2002, attached as
Annex "D" of the same motion; (c) the Report and Recommendation dated 11
December 2007, issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant, attached as Annex "5" of
respondent Peas Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010; and (d) the
Minutes of the Court, consisting of 58-pages, attached as Annex "A" of the Reply (to
Petitioners Opposition to Motion to Urgent Motion to Inhibit) dated 31 October 2001
filed by respondent Pea. She is further required to SUBMIT such an investigation
report with recommendations on the administrative and disciplinary liabilities, if any,
of all court personnel possibly involved therein, as well as suggestions for protecting

confidential and internal court documents of pending cases within NINETY (90) DAYS
from receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO
Chief Justice

C.

(No
ANTONIO
T.
Associate Justice

part)
CARPIO*

CORONA

(No
part)
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

ARTURO
D.
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO
M.
Associate Justice

LUCAS
P.
Associate Justice

PERALTA

MARIANO C. DEL
Associate Justice

CASTILLO

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
Associate Justice
JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO
Associate Justice

JR.

ROBERTO
A.
Associate Justice
JOSE
PORTUGAL
Associate Justice

BRION

BERSAMIN

ABAD

PEREZ

MENDOZA

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

REYES

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

L.

Footnotes
*

No part.

Rollo (Vol. 1), pp. 16-24.

Urban Bank, Inc., v. Magdaleno M. Pea, G.R. No. 145817 and Delfin C.
Gonzales, Jr., et al., v. Magdaleno M. Pea, G.R. No. 145822. A separate
petition entitled Magdaleno M. Pea, v. Urban Bank, Inc., Teodoro Borlongan,
Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr., Benjamin L. de Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon, Eric L. Lee,
Ben T. Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa, and Arturo Manuel, Jr., and docketed as G.R.
No. 162562, was later filed and consolidated with the two earlier petitions.
2

(See Urban Bank v. Pea, G.R. No. 145817, 145822, 162562, 19 October
2011)
3

Annexes "A," "B" and "C," of the Motion; rollo (Vol. 1), pp. 25-32.

Annex "D," of the Motion; id. at 33.

"The manifestation of the Office of the Chief Legal counsel of PDIC with
motion with leave of court praying that the Export and Industry Bank with
office address at 36th Floor, Export and Industry Bank Plaza, Chino Roces
Avenue corner Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City be furnished with all the pleadings
and other court processes vice the PDIC for reasons mentioned therein is
NOTED and GRANTED.
5

Before acting on respondent Magdalena Penas Urgent Motion to Inhibit

and to Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion dated January 30,
2003, the Court Resolves to direct Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea and Atty.
Manuel R. Singson to APPEAR before this Court on Monday, March 3,
2003, at 10:00 a.m.
Let this resolution be served personally on aforesaid lawyers, if
feasible." (SC Resolution dated 17 February 2003; rollo [Vol. 1], pp. 3435)
6

SC Resolution dated 03 March 2003; id., pp. 38-43.

Respondent Peas Compliance dated 03 April 2003; rollo (G.R. No. 145817),
Vol. 2, pp. 1333-1340.
7

Id. at 1333-1338.

Rollo (Vol. 1), pp. 74-84.

Petitioner Urban Banks Opposition (to Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to

Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion) dated 28 February 2003; rollo
(Vol. 1), pp. 119-131.
10

11

SC Resolution dated 28 April 2003, at 4; rollo (Vol. 1), p. 54.

12

Rollo (Vol. 1), at 51-55.

13

Respondent Peas Affidavit dated 27 June 2003; id., pp. 68-71.

14

Atty. Singsons Affidavit dated 28 July 2003; id., pp. 75-84.

Petitioner De Leon Groups Manifestation and Motion dated 14 May 2003;

id., pp. 174-182.
15

SC Resolution dated 09 June 2003; id., pp. 183-184; see also SC Resolution
dated 19 January 2005, which allowed the OBC to proceed with the
investigation of the contempt charge against respondent Pea; id., pp. 325326.
16

17

Respondent Peas Comment dated 22 August 2003; id., pp. 196-220.

18

Id.

Office of the Bar Confidant TSN dated 10 August 2006; rollo (Vol. 3), pp.
714-774.
19

Respondent Peas Memorandum for the Respondent dated 03 November

2006; rollo (Vol. 2), pp. 363-379.
20

Respondent Peas Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010; rollo

(G. R. No. 145822), Vol. 2, pp. 3286-3293.
21

The three consolidated petitions in the main case include: (1) Urban Bank,
Inc., v. Magdaleno M. Pea, G.R. No. 145817; (2) Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., et
al., v. Magdaleno M. Pea. G.R. No. 145822; and (3) Magdaleno M. Pea v.
Urban Bank, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 162562.
22

" In fact, with all due respect, I believe the Honorable Justice Sereno will
attempt to protect the Honorable Justice Carpio by perhaps separating the
Admin Case No. 6332, thus separating the findings of the OBC regarding the
Agendas, and thus protecting the Honorable Justice Carpio." (Respondent
Peas Letter dated 16 September 2011, p. 6, which is Annex "A" of his
Supplement to the Very Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle dated 20 September 2011)
23

"While respondent may appear to have been passionate and agitated in his
language in his motion, the same may not be considered as malicious
imputations as he is merely expressing concern of what he has discovered
based on the documents he has obtained apparently from an anonymous
sender and based on his own discoveries." (OBC Report dated11 December
2007, p. 50; rollo [Vol. 4], p. 1706)
24

"Nevertheless, it is worthy [to note] that in respondents motion to inhibit,

etc., the latter did not make a direct accusation of bribery against the ponente
but merely narrated events, which in respondents view, warranted the
inhibition of the said ponente. The statements made by respondent in his
conversation with Atty. Singson, particularly his remark about Justice Carpio
having a new Mercedez Benz was not made in the presence of or so near a
court nor in any public place or in a published material as to create any
impression in the mind of the public or malign the integrity of any member of
the Court. Rather it was part of a private conversation between respondent
and Atty. Singson only." (OBC Report dated 11 December 2007, p. 51; rollo
[Vol. 4], p. 1707)
25

"In the highest interest of justice, let the apology and the begging of herein
respondent touches the Courts indulgence and compassion and accord
respondent the benefit of the doubt on his sincerity. However, let this
benevolence of the Court serve, as his first warning, being an officer of the
court, to be more cautious, restraint and circumspect with his dealing in the
future with the Members of the Court and the Supreme Court." (OBC Report
dated 11 December 2007, p. 52; rollo [Vol. 4], p. 1708)
26

27

OBC Report dated 11 December 2007, p. 53; rollo (Vol. 4), p. 1709.

"During the Executive Session on 3 March 2003, Hon. Justice Antonio T.

Carpio categorically denied that Annex B belong to him or any of the Members
of the First Division. On the other hand, Hon. Justice Jose C. Vitug admitted
that Annex C might be his copy and the same is on the record of the case as
confirmed by the Division Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court, however, averted
that there is no such Annex B in the records and the notation 10 AC as
appearing in Annex B is not present in Annex C." (OBC Report dated 11
December 2007, p. 53; id., p. 1709)
28

"During the investigation Atty. Vinluan appears. He identifies the affidavit

he executed on 16 May 2003, in support of the manifestation and motion of
private petitioners. He enumerates several pleadings of respondent in related
cases imputing that the uses his influence over Justice Buena to gain favorable
resolution of the case. He vehemently denies that imputations. According to
him this unfounded accusation tends to discredit his long-standing name and
hard-earned reputation before the Supreme Court and the legal profession."
(OBC Report dated 11 December 2007, p. 58; id., p. 1714)
29

"The statements may not appear to be abrasive and disrespectful but it

contains words that may offend the ego of the complainant, but prudence
dictates that respondent as a lawyer, he must refrain from using unnecessary
words and statements which may not be necessary in the resolution of the
incidents raised therein." (OBC Report dated 11 December 2007, p. 59; id., p.
1715)
30

"Atty. Pea argues that petitioners and their counsel violated the rule against
forum-shopping when they filed three separate petitions for certiorari
questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals raising the same issues and
reliefs before this Court." (OBC Report dated 11 December 2007, p. 60; id., p.
1716)
31

"Petitioners and their counsel should be given an opportunity to aptly defend

himself to produce witness/es and/or evidence relative thereto and to be heard
by himself or by counsel." (OBC Report dated 11 December 2007, p. 61; id.,
p. 1717)
32

33

OBC Report dated 11 December 2007, pp. 47-62; id., pp. 1703-1718.

34

Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 11.

35

Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 11, Rule 11.03.

36

Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 11, Rule 11.04.

Saberon v. Larong, A.C. No. 6567, 16 April 2008, 551 SCRA 359, citing Rubio
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84032, 29 August 1989, 177 SCRA 60, 63.
37

Id., citing Torres v. Javier, A.C. No. 5910, 21 September 2005, 470 SCRA
408, 421; Nuez v. Astorga, A.C. No. 6131, 28 February 2005, 452 SCRA 353,
364, citing Hueysuwan-Florido v. Florido, 465 Phil. 1, 7 (2004); Cruz v.
Cabrera, A.C. No. 5737, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 211, 219.
38

Ng v. Alar, A.C. No. 7252, 22 November 2006, 507 SCRA 465, citing
Hueysuwan-Florido v. Florido, A.C. No. 5624,20 January 2004, 420 SCRA 132,
136-137.
39

Respondent Peas Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents

Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 2006, at 2-3; rollo (Vol. 1), pp. 1718.
40

41

SC TSN dated 03 March 2002, at 55-58; rollo (Vol. 3), pp. 1052-1055.

42

SC Resolution dated 03 March 2003, p. 3; rollo (Vol. 1), p. 40.

43

Annex "1" of the SC Resolution dated 28 April 2003; id., pp. 8-9.

44

Annex "2" of the SC Resolution dated 28 April 2003; id., pp. 10-15.

"Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear
and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. Extrinsic
evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in
addition to the palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or order
itself." (Sinnott v. Barte, A. M. No. RTJ-99-1453, 14 December 2001, 423 Phil.
522)
45

"2. With all due respect, it is important to note that one of the matters taken
up or issues in A.C. No. 6332 was the issuance, by Justice Antonio T. Carpio,
of a Resolution dated 13 November 2002 and the anomalous/unusual
circumstances regarding the same for it being contrary to the Agenda of
November 2002 of the First Division of this Honorable Court. Further, this
incident was the subject of an executive hearing wherein the First Division
interrogated respondent/petitioner Pea as to who in the Supreme Court
supplied the questioned Agenda to him. During this executive hearing, the
Honorable
Justice
Carpio
was
confrontational
and
hostile
to
respondent/petitioner Pea for exposing the questioned Agenda and raising
46

issues therein." (Respondent Peas Motion to Inhibit dated 20 January 2010,

p. 2)
"3. One of the matters taken up and/or issues in A.C. No. 6332 was the
issuance, by Justice Antonio T. Carpio, of a Resolution dated 13 November
2002 and the anomalous/unusual circumstances regarding the same for it
being contrary to the Agenda of November 2002 of the First Division of this
Honorable Court. Further, this incident was the subject of an executive hearing
wherein the First Division interrogated me as to who in the Supreme Court
supplied me the questioned Agenda. During this executive hearing, the
Honorable Justice Carpio was confrontational and hostile to me for exposing
the questioned Agenda and raising issues therein." (Respondent Peas Motion
to Inhibit dated 22 August 2011, p. 2)
47

Respondent Peas Letter dated 16 September 2011, p. 2-4, which is Annex

"A" of his Supplement to the Very Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle dated 20
September 2011.
48

In Re: Raquel D. J. Razon, et al., A. M. No. P-06-2243, 26 September 2006,

503 SCRA 52.
49

"3. Once again, I wish to express my sincerest apologies to the members of

the Honorable Court whom I may have offended by the use of the two copies
of the Supplemental Agenda in my motion. It was never my intention to
undermine the integrity of the Honorable Court or any of its members. If I had
made remarks which gave the impression, I am certainly very sorry. My aim
was only to get to the truth." (Respondent Peas Affidavit dated 27 June 2003,
p. 1; rollo [Vol. 1], p. 68)
50

"2. At the outset, respondent wishes to apologize for the distress his
statements may have caused the members of this Honorable Court. While such
distress may have been the unavoidable consequence of his motion to inhibit
the ponente, it was certainly not his intended result." (Respondent Peas
Compliance dated 03 April 2003; rollo [G.R. No. 145817], Vol. 2, pp. 13331340).
51

Respondent Peas Reply (to Petitioners Opposition to Motion to Urgent

Motion to Inhibit) dated 31 October 2001; rollo (Vol. 1), pp. 85-108.
52

Respondent Peas Opposition (to Urgent Motion for Leave to Admit Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 14 February 2001 and 13
December 2000) dated 23 April 2001, at 4-5, rollo (Vol. 3), pp. 1116-1117.
53

Respondent Peas Reply (to Petitioners Opposition to Motion to Urgent

Motion to Inhibit) dated 31 October 2001, at 1; id., p. 1128.
54

55

Id., at 14; id., p. 1141.

56

Id.

Respondent Peas Motion to Inhibit dated 18 February 2002, at 5; id., p.

1156.
57

1. Peas Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Artemio V. Panganiban) dated 12

January 2001; 2. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 18 February
2002; 3. Reply (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 15 March 2001; 4. Motion to
Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004; 5. Motion for
Inhibition (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004; and 6.
Reiteratory Motion to Recuse dated 03 March 2006 (Re: Justice Panganiban).
58

Respondent Peas Motion to Inhibit dated 18 February 2002, pp. 2-3; rollo
(G.R. No. 145817), Vol. 1, pp. 901-902.
59

Respondent Peas Motion to Inhibit dated 07 January 2008, p. 3; rollo (G.R.

No. 145817), Vol. 3, p. 1953.
60

"The Court is concerned with the repeated attempts of Atty. Pea throughout
the entire course of these proceedings (whether through a direct motion to
inhibit, administrative ethics complaint, or, indirectly, through a motion for reraffle) to cause the inhibition of members of this Court. Eleven (11) Justices
so far have all been asked by Atty. Pea to inhibit themselves. Atty. Peas
inclination to disqualify members of the Court, whom he perceives to be
potentially adversarial to his cause, has certainly caused unwarranted and
unnecessary delay in the resolution of the case." (SC Resolution dated 17
October 2011 in the consolidated petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 145817,
145822 and 162562)
61

62

G.R. Nos. 159486-88, 25 November 2003, 416 SCRA 465.

63

Resolution dated 28 April 2003, at 4; rollo (Vol. 1), p. 6.

"The Clerk of Court and the Division Clerks of Court shall ensure that all
pleadings, communications, documents, and other papers duly filed in a case
shall be reported in the Agenda for the consideration by the Court en banc or
the Division. The Agenda items for each case shall adequately apprise the
Court of relevant matters for its consideration." (Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court [A. M. No. 10-4-20-SC, as amended], Rule 11, Sec. 1)
64

Respondent Peas Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents

Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 2003, at 4-5; rollo (Vol. 1), pp. 1920.
65

66

TSN dated 03 March 2002, pp. 38-44; rollo (Vol. 3), pp. 1036-1042.

67

TSN dated 03 March 2002, pp. 98-99; id., pp. 1094-1095.

In the verification portion of his Motion to Inhibit, respondent Pea under

oath swore and stated that he had caused the preparation of the motion, and
that all the allegations therein were true and correct, based on his knowledge
as well as the records of the case. (Respondent Peas Urgent Motion to Inhibit
and to Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 2003,
at 7-8; rollo [Vol. 1], pp. 22-23)
68

"A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the Court." (Code of
Professional Responsibility, Canon 10)
69

70

Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 10.01.

Samala v. Valencia, A. C. No. 5439, 22 January 2007, 512 SCRA 1, citing

Young v. Batuegas, 451 Phil. 155 (2003).
71

72

Id.

73

TSN dated 03 March 2002, at 73; rollo (Vol. 3), pp. 1070.

Respondent Peas Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents

Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 2003, at 4-5; rollo (Vol. 1), pp. 1920.
74

"Court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized person any

confidential information acquired by them while employed in the judiciary,
whether such information came from authorized or unauthorized sources.
75

"Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of

public record relating to pending cases, as well as information not yet
made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to
pending cases, including notes, drafts, research papers, internal
discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and
similar papers.
"The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal
memoranda, records of internal deliberations and similar papers that a
justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution or order shall
remain confidential even after the decision, resolution or order is made
public." (Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, AM No. 03-06-13-SC,
Canon II, Sec. 1)
"The Offices of the Clerk of Court and of the Division Clerks of Court are
bound by strict confidentiality on the action or actions taken by the Court prior
to the approval of the draft of the minutes of the court session release of the
resolutions embodying the Court action or actions." (Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court, as amended, Rule 11, Sec. 5, par. 1)
76

"11. I had no reason to doubt the documents authenticity simply because

there was no reason for anyone to bother or go to the extent of manufacturing
documents for the benefit of someone who does not even know him. The
documents contained a detailed list of the incidents deliberated by this
Honorable Court on 13 November 2002. Definitely, not just anyone could have
access to such information." (Respondent Peas Affidavit dated 27 June 2003,
at 3; rollo [Vol. 1], p. 70)
77

Respondent Peas Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010; rollo

(G. R. No. 145822), Vol. 2, pp. 3286-3293.
78

Annex "5" of respondent Peas Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February

2010; rollo (G. R. No. 145822), Vol. 2, pp. 3305-3366.
79

80

OBC Report dated 11 December 2007; rollo (Vol. 4), pp. 1657-1718.

"12. Respondent is not just speculating here. He is CERTAIN that the ponente
has a special interest in this case. Recently, he also found out that the ponente
made a special request to bring this case along with him when he transferred
from the Third Division to the First Division. Respondent has a copy of the
Resolution of this Honorable Court granting such request (hereto attached as
Annex D). Indeed this circumstance, considered with all the foregoing
circumstances, ineluctably demonstrate that a major anomaly occurred here."
(Peas Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus
Motion dated 30 January 2003, pp. 5-6; rollo [Vol. 1], pp. 20-21)
81

"Let this case be TRANSFERRED to the First Division, the same being
assigned to a Member thereof. [Internal Matter]" (Rollo [Vol. 1], p. 33)
82

"12. Moreover, I subsequently received another mail from apparently the

same sender, this time containing a pink copy of this Honorable Courts 4
September 2002 Resolution (annex D, Urgent Motion to Inhibit) transferring
this case from the Third Division to the First Division. The receipt of this last
document somehow confirmed to me that whoever sent the copies of the
Supplemental Agenda really had access to the records of this Honorable
Court." (Peas Affidavit dated 27 June 2003, p. 3; rollo [Vol. 1], p. 70)
83

"Effect of reorganization of Divisions on assigned cases. In the

reorganization of the membership of Divisions, cases already assigned to a
Member-in-Charge shall be transferred to the Division to which the Memberin-Charge moves, subject to the rule on the resolution of motions for
reconsideration under Section 7 of this Rule. The Member-in-Charge is the
Member given the responsibility of overseeing the progress and disposition of
a case assigned by raffle." (Internal Rules of the Supreme Court [A. M. No. 104-20-SC, as amended], Rule 2, Sec. 9)
84

"In this regard, respondent made an irresponsible suspicion. As an internal

policy of the Court, the case will automatically be transferred to the Division
85

to which the ponente of the case is a Member thereof." (OBC Report dated 11
December 2007, p. 50; rollo [Vol. 4], p. 1706)
Annex "A" of Peas Reply (to Petitioners Opposition to Motion to Urgent
Motion to Inhibit) dated 31 October 2001; rollo (G. R. No. 145822), Vol. 2, pp.
2776-2834.
86

Peas Reply (to Petitioners Opposition to Motion to Urgent Motion to Inhibit)

dated 31 October 2001, p. 6; rollo (Vol. 1), at 90.
87

"xxx Excerpts of the minutes pertaining to a particular case quoted in a letter

of the Clerk of Court or the Division Clerk of Court to the parties, and extended
resolutions showing the actions of the court on the cases on the agenda shall
be released to the parties only after the Chief Justice or the Division
Chairperson has approved the minutes in writing. xxx" (Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court, as amended, Rule 11, Sec. 4)
88

"13. I sincerely regret that the documents considered confidential by the

Honorable Supreme Court had leaked out but there was nothing I could do
about it. Once these documents were sent to me, my duty was to bring them
to [the] attention of the Court which, in its wisdom, would know best what to
do with them." (Respondent Peas Affidavit dated 27 June 2003, at 3; rollo
[Vol. 1], pp. 70)
89

"The term noted means that the Court has merely taken cognizance of the
existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious deliberation
or rendering a decision on the matter it does not imply agreement or
approval." (Sebastian v. Bajar, A. C. No. 3731, 07 September 2007, 532 SCRA
435, citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, 30 June 2005, 462 SCRA
310, 321)
90

Justice Carpios Agenda for 13 November 2002, Item 175 (a) & (f) as "See
RES."; rollo (Vol. 1), pp. 10-15.
91

92

TSN dated 03 March 2002, at 77-83; rollo (Vol. 3), pp. 1073-1079.

The Chief Justice or the Chairperson of the Division shall provide the Clerk
of Court or the Division Clerk of Court the latter notes on the actions taken by
the Court. The copy of the Agenda containing the handwritten notes of the
Chief Justice or Division Chairperson shall serve as the basis for the preparation
of the minutes of the session by the Office of the Clerk of Court or the Division
Clerk of Court. Within three working days from the time the copy of the Agenda
containing the handwritten actions of the Court is transmitted, the Clerk of
Court or the Division Clerk of Court shall submit the draft of the minutes of the
session for the approval by the Chief Justice or the Division Chairperson.
(Internal Rules of the Court, as amended, Rule 11, Sec. 3 and 4)
93

94

Revised Penal Code, Art. 229 (Revelation of Secrets).

"Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his

office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or
releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date,
xxx."(Republic Act No. 3019, Sec. 3 [k])
95

Respondent Peas Comment (with Motions to Explain and for Full

Investigation) dated 22 August 2003; rollo (Vol. 1), pp. 196-220.
96

97

Rules of Court, Rule 7, Sec. 5.

98

Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 8.

99

Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 8.01.

Barandon v. Ferrer, A. C. No. 5768, 26 March 2010, 616 SCRA 529, citing
Saberon v. Larong, A.C. No. 6567, 16 April 2008, 551 SCRA 359, 368.
100

101

Id., citing De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals Justices, 454 Phil. 718, 727 (2003).

Uy v. Depasucat, id., citing Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel,

G.R. No. L-27072, 09 January 1970, 31 SCRA 1.
102

Peas Motion to Inhibit dated 18 February 2002; rollo (G. R. No. 145822),
Vol. 2, pp. 2936-2945.
103

Peas Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit dated 30 March 2011; rollo (G. R. No.
145822), Vol. 3, pp. 3964-3971.
104

Peas Very Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle dated 01 September 2011; id., pp.
3972-3980.
105

Peas Supplement to the Urgent Motion for Re-raffle dated 04 August

2008; rollo (G. R. No. 162562). Vol. 2, pp. 1339-1344.
106

Peas Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle dated 28 August 2008; id.,
pp. 1355-1362.
107

108

Borlongan v. Pea, G. R. No. 143591, 23 November 2007, 538 SCRA 221.

"However, herein private respondent-movant (Pea) would like to make it

clear that he has full trust and confidence in the other members of the Third
Division, Considering that only Associate Justice Nachura has exhibited
extreme bias and prejudice against private respondent." (Peas Motion to
Inhibit dated 07 January 2008, p. 6; rollo [G. R. No. 162562], Vol. 2, p. 1278)
109

110

G. R. No. 144618, 15 August 2003, 456 Phil. 440.