G.R. No.

164527

15 August 2007

FACTS:
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition raising
constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161
approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan
Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo,
Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.
As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-cost
housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came
into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the
importance of private sectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino
proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others. The same MO also
established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the plan, respectively,
to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).
Notices of public bidding to become NHAs venture partner for SMDRP were published in
newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. ThenPresident Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development
into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance
the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay
Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be
owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the
Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate
RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding
that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of such revocation,
cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves
clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the current
residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced
incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended
and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done
to successfully implement the project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were
decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares
to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President
Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase
II of the project.

Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of
an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August
1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both
parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported
that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over
by RBI.
ISSUES:
Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands
of the public domain as this power is vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner
Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim
foreshore and submerged lands
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands considered as
alienable and outside the commerce of man
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said
lands are no longer needed for public use
Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands
Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding
Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public
domain
Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the SMDRP
Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position
HELD:
Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing,
and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. This
does not mean that it shall be responsible for all. The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation
project are approval by the President (which were provided for by MOs), favourable
recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM),
and undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract of PEA or by the National Government
Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under consultation with
PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).
Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have granted the
authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is one of the members of the
EXECOM which provides reviews for the project. ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given
by the DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, it
was the President via the abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation. It

must be noted that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine
President.
The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by President
Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President Ramos.
Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no longer needed
for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be disposed to qualified
beneficiaries. Furthermore, these lands have already been necessarily reclassified as alienable
and disposable lands under the BOT law.
Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights and interests
and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem appropriate.
There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to become its
joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project. It was noted that notices were published
in national newspapers. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards Committee on
May 18, 1992.
RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid a portion as
percentage of the reclaimed land subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino
citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In addition, when
the lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by
which it has the power to sell the same to any qualified person.
This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to information on matters of
public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue of MOA
between RBI and NHA. The properties and rights in question after the passage of around 10
years from the start of the projects implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned. The
petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample
opportunity to question the said project, but did not do so. The moment to challenge has passed.
G.R. No. L-28565 January 30, 1971
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE. SPOUSES FRANCISCO LAHORA and
TORIBIA MORALIZON, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
EMILIO DAYANGHIRANG, JR., and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositors-appellees.
Occena and Ocampo Law Offices for petitioners-appellants.
Jose C. Magune for oppositor-appellee Emilio Dayanghirang, Jr.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The spouses Francisco Lahora and Toribia Moralizon brought the present appeal to this Court from
the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao (in Land Reg. Case No. N-86), dismissing their
petition with respect to Lot No. 2228 on the ground of previous registration, said appellants claiming
that the question of the validity of a certificate of title based on a patent allegedly obtained by fraud
can be raised by them in a land registration proceeding, contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.
The records show that on 26 November 1965 herein appellants petitioned the Court of First Instance
of Davao for registration of nine (9) parcels of land located in barrio Zaragosa, municipality of Manay,
province of Davao, one-half of which having been acquired by appellant Toribia Moralizon allegedly
by inheritance, and the other half by purchase and by continuous, open, public and adverse
possession in the concept of owner. One of the said parcels of land is identified as lot No. 2228, plan
SWO-36856, Manay Cadastre.
The petition was opposed by Emilio Dayanghirang, Jr., who alleged that lands belonging to him and
his wife were included in the application for registration, mentioning specifically Lot No. 2228 which
was said to be already covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-6055 in the name of oppositor's
wife. The Director of Lands also filed an opposition to the petition, contending that the applicants or
their predecessors-in-interest never had sufficient title over the parcels of land sought to be
registered, nor have they been in open, continuous, and notorious possession thereof for at least 30
years.
On 14 June 1967, counsel for the private oppositor filed a motion for correction of the number of the
certificate of title covering Lot No. 2228, erroneously referred to as OCT No. P-6055, when it should
properly be OCT No. P-6053. It is likewise prayed in the same motion that the petition be dismissed
insofar as it includes Lot No. 2228, for the reason that said lot was already registered and titled in
the name of oppositor's wife as of 21 June 1956. In its order of 18 June 1967, which was amended
on 29 June 1967, the court granted the oppositor's motion and directed the dismissal of the petition
as regards Lot No. 2228, on the ground that it having been previously registered and titled, said
parcel of land can no longer be the subject of adjudication in another proceeding. Hence, this appeal
by the petitioners.
It may be recalled that the action filed by petitioners-appellants in the lower court on 26 November
1965 was for original registration of certain parcels of land, including Lot No. 2228 of the Manay
Cadastre. It is not here denied by appellants that said Lot No. 2228 was the subject of a public land
grant in favor of the oppositor's wife, and by virtue of which grant or patent Original Certificate of Title
No. P-6053 was issued in her name on 21 June 1956. Appellants, however, try to make a case
against the dismissal-order of the lower court by contending that the patent issued to oppositor's wife
was procured by fraud, because appellants, the alleged actual occupants of the land, were not
notified of the application for patent therefor and of its adjudication. Thus, according to appellants,
since they were the actual occupants of the property, the government could not have awarded it to
oppositor's wife, and the patent issued to the latter, as well as the original certificate of title
subsequently obtained by her, were null and void.
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of title
that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private
individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the
grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration
Act1, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the
said Act.2 In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become
irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding. 3

In the present case, Lot No. 2228 was registered and titled in the name of oppositors' wife as of 21
June 1956, nine (9) years earlier. Clearly, appellants' petition for registration of the same parcel of
land on 26 November 1965, on the ground that the first certificate of title (OCT No. P-6053) covering
the said property is a nullity, can no longer prosper. Orderly administration of justice precludes that
Lot 2228, of the Manay Cadastre, should be the subject of two registration proceedings. Having
become registered land under Act 496, for all legal purposes, by the issuance of the public land
patent and the recording thereof, further registration of the same would lead to the obviously
undesirable result of two certificates of title being issued for the same piece of land, even if both
certificates should be in the name of the same person. And if they were to be issued to different
persons, the indefeasibility of the first title, which is the most valued characteristic of Torrens titles,
would be torn away. For this reason, this Court has ruled in Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558,
that in a cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already
decreed in an earlier case; and that a second decree for the same land would be null and void. 4 Of
course, if the patent had been issued during the pendency of the registration proceedings, the situation
would be different.5
Even assuming arguendo, that there indeed exists a proper case for cancellation of the patent for
intrinsic fraud, the action for review of the decree should have been filed before the one year period
had elapsed. 6 Thereafter, the proper party to bring the action would only be the person prejudiced by the
alleged fraudulent act the owner and grantor,7 and not another applicant or claimant. Furthermore, the
relief provided by the law in such instance may be secured by the aggrieved party, not in another
registration, for land already registered in the name of a person can not be the subject of another
registration8, but in an appropriate action such as one for reconveyance or reversion 9, or for damages in
case the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. 10
As regards the complaint against the alleged correction of the number of the certificate of title
covering Lot No. 2228 which was erroneously stated in the oppositor's motion as OCT No. P-6055,
when it should properly be OCT No. P-6053, it appearing that the motion was intended to rectify a
clearly typographical mistake, there is nothing irregular in the lower court's order granting the same.

FACTS:
The Bureau of Forestry issued an advertisement for public bidding for a
certain tract of forest land in Olongapo, Zambales. The public forest land was
located within the former US Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of
timberland. Petitioner submitted his application in due form along with nine
other applicants. Thereafter, President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to
the Director of the Bureau of Forestry to draft a proclamation establishing the
said area as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo and that the bids
received for the issuance of timber license be rejected. The Secretary of
Agriculture and National Resources sustained the recommendations of the
Director of Forestry who concluded that it would be beneficial to the public
interest if the area is made available for exploitation under certain
conditions. Finally, the area was awarded to petitioner. Ravago Commercial
Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were
denied by the Director of Forestry. Ravago appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, which later on, declared the license

issued to petitioner by Director of Forestry as null and void. Petitioners

motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the license of the petitioner is valid.
HELD:
No, the license of the petitioner was void ab initio since it was granted
without authority.
The Supreme Court held that the area covered by petitioner-appellant's
timber license practically comprises the entire Olongapo watershed. It is of
public knowledge that watersheds serves as a defense against soil erosion
and guarantees the steady supply of water. As a matter of general policy, the
Philippine Constitution expressly mandated the conservation and proper
utilization of natural resources, which includes the country's watershed.
Watersheds in the Philippines had been subjected to rampant abusive
treatment due to various unscientific and destructive land use practices.
Once lush watersheds were wantonly deforested due to uncontrolled timber
cutting by licensed concessionaries and illegal loggers. This is one reason
why, in paragraph 27.of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary
timber license it is stated:
The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at
the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license
may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests
so.
Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case, the
Court therefore took judicial notice of the fact that, the area covered by
petitioner-appellant's timber license has been established as the Olongapo
Watershed Forest Reserve by virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 238 by
then President Diosdado Macapagal.
The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the
impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the
authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what is of greatest
importance is the date of the release or issuance, and not the date of the
signing of the license. While petitioner-appellant's timber license might have
been signed on December 19, 1963 it was released only on January 6, 1964.
Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee. As pointed out by the

trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the
license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired
any legal right under such void license. This is evident on the face of his
petition as supplemented by its annexes which includes Ordinary Timber
License No. 20-'64 (NEW).
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid,
still respondents-appellees can validly revoke his timber license. As pointed
out earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary
timber license states: "The terms and conditions of this license are subject to
change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may
be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require". A
timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation" Thus, the Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can
be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power and that the State
has inherent pow

Director of Lands v. Rivas

This is a land registration case involving what the Republic of the Philippines claims to be grazing
land, a part of the forest reserve.
The evidence shows that on March 14, 1873 the Alcalde Mayor and judge of the Court of First
Instance in Tuguegarao, Cagayan purportedly granted to Domingo Bunagan a possessory
information title for a tract of land, called Nottab, "3,500 brazas de largo y 3,000 brazas de ancho",
"destinado al pasto de sus ganados" y bajo la condicion de sin perjuicio del derecho que el Estado o
otro tercero pudiera tener en referida finca rustica" (Exh. I and K).

The Gaceta de Manila dated November 3, 1885 mentions Bunagan as having obtained a
"composicion gratuita" for a parcel of land in Enrile, Cagayan (Exh. J-1) or a gratuitous adjustment
title as distinguished from an onerous adjustment title. **
What happened to the Nottab land? The conflicting evidence of the oppositor Cagayan Valley
Agricultural Corporation (Cavaco) and petitioner Pacifico Vijandre shows that two persons, the
brothers Luis Guzman Rivas and Lope Guzman Rivas, sons of Pablo Guzman, played decisive roles
in its disposition.
The evidence is conflicting because, according to Cavaco's evidence, the whole land was sold to
Luis Guzman Rivas and later to Cavaco, whereas, according to Vijandre's evidence, only a portion
was sold to Luis and the remainder was sold to Lope Guzman Rivas who in turn sold portions to
Vijandre and Fernando A. Pascua.
The Solicitor General's view is that the whole Nottab land, whatever its area, is forestal and grazing
land, and consequently, was inalienable land and, therefore, all supposed sales regarding that land
were void.
According to Cavaco's evidence, after Bunagan's death, his son-in-law, Ceferino Saddul,
as apoderado of Bunagan's heirs, sold the land to one Manuel Guzman sometime in 1904 or 1905 or
1908.
The administratrix of Manuel Guzman's estate, with the approval of the probate court, sold the land
in 1934 to Luis Guzman Rivas who died in 1944. The land passed to his widow, Dolores Enriquez,
who sold the northern portion of the land to Saturnino Moldero in 1944 and the southern portion to
Rafael Gonzales in 1951.
Moldero in 1948 sold his northern portion to the spouses Antonio and Josefa Estrada. In 1951 the
Estrada spouses and (Gonzales sold the land to Cavaco (Exh. 12-A to 15Pascua, 242 Joint
Record on Appeal).
The trial court and the Court of Appeals in a land registration case adjudicated to Cavaco 1,222
hectares of the Nottab land. It is the registered owner of the land. Right or wrong that decision is the
law of the case. (Cagayan Valley Agricultural Corporation vs. Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No, 2493132, December 9, 1960).
The trial court correctly held that the said adjudication means that the respondent herein cannot use
anymore in this case the supposed 1873 informacion posesoria and the 1885 composicion
gratuita as bases of their application for registration. The reason is that said Spanish titles were
already used in the Cavaco case.
Under those Spanish titles a land grant could not exceed 1,000 hectares (Director of Lands vs,
Reves, L-27594, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 191 and other cases). It may be repeated that
Cavaco obtained more than 1,000 hectares by virtue of the said Spanish titles. Parenthetically, it
may be stated that Presidential Decree No. 892 since 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as
evidence in land registration proceedings.
It is the supposed remainder of Bunagan's land that is now involved in this case, the portion
transferred to Lope Guzman Rivas as differentiated from the Cavaco land which came from Lope's

brother Luis. It should be stressed that according to the Cavaco case the whole land was sold to
Luis and, therefore, no remainder could have been transferred to Lope.
On the other hand, according to Vijandre's evidence in this case, on July 26, 1915, Manuela
Bunagan, the sole heir of Domingo, sold to Pablo Guzman for Pl,000 the remainder of the land in
Nottab, Enrile, Cagayan, "una parcela de pasto de ganaderia", covered by Tax Declaration No. 626
(Exh. H).
Pablo Guzman died in 1927. The Nottab land was inherited by his son, petitioner Lope Guzman
Rivas, who leased the land for grazing purposes to other persons. Lope has been residing in Makati,
Metro Manila since 1961 because he has a heart ailment.
In 1958 about 800 hectares of the said land were sold by Lope to Ignacio Pascua who in 1962 sold
the same portion to his son, Fernando.
Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre filed in May, 1968 an application for the registration of two parcels
of land located at Sitio Nottab, the same Nottab land previously applied for by Cavaco. It is covered
by Plan Psu-178846, embracing thirteen lots with an area of 1,033 hectares, and Plan Psu-179101
covering fifteen lots with an area of 890 hectares, or a total of 1,92.7 hectares.
Before the application was filed, Lope Guzman Rivas sold to his co-petitioner Vijandre l/2 of the
entire land at P50 a hectare. Vijandre undertook to finance the registration of the land. Should the
registration of the land not materialize for causes not imputable to Vijandre, then Lope would return
to mall scashadvances(9-16, Joint Record on Appeal).
The learned trial court declared the disputed land public land and dismissed the applications of Lope
Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and the claims of Pascua and Cavaco.
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's decision. It granted the application of Lope and
Vijandre, except with respect to Lot No. 13, which was already covered by OCT No. 0-393. The
Directors of Lands and Forest Development appealed to this Court. Lope Guzman Rivas and
Vijandre did not file any appellees' brief.
The Solicitor General contends that the Appellate Court erred (1) in not declaring that the disputed
land is part of a forest reservation; (2) in not finding that Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and their
predecessors have not been in the open, continuous, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious
possession of the disputed land and that their possession was not in the concept of owner: (3) in not
finding that Domingo Bunagan's Spanish titles were not authentic and (4) in not finding that the 1960
decision in favor of Cavaco is not res judicata.
On the other hand, lawyer Pascua argues (1) that the disputed land was already private in the hands
of Domingo Bunagans (2) that portions of said land, 1,222 hectares and 9 hectares, were titled in the
names of Cavaco and Melardo Agapay (Benjamin V. Pascua) respectively; (3) that the pasture lease
agreements did not convert private land into public land and (4) that Bunagan's Spanish titles were
authentic and valid.
We hold that the disputed land is inalienable public grazing land, being a part of the forest reserve. It
is part of Timberland Project No. 15-A of Enrile, Cagayan. It is included in the Bureau of Forestry
Map L. C. 2263, comprising the Timberland of the Cagayan Land Classification, containing an area

of 8,249 hectares, situated in Enrile, Solana and Amulong, Cagayan. It is non-registerable (Exh. 2Rep.). It cannot be appropriated by private persons. It is not disposable public agricultural land.
Said land is a part of the to forest reserve under Presidential Proclamation No. 159 dated February
13, 1967. It is intended for "wood production watershed soil protection and other forest uses" (Exh.
1-B and 7, Rep.; 63 OG 3364). The reservation was made prior to the instant 1968 application for
registration.
Applicant Lope Guzman Rivas and oppositor Pascua and their predecessors have always treated
the 1,923 hectares as pasture land. Portions of the land had been the object of pasture lease
agreements with the Bureau of Forestry. Among the lessees were oppositor Fernando A.
Pascua himself, Eliseo Lasam and J.T.Torres, Jr. (Exh. 3 and 4, Rep.).
The 1960 and 1968 tax declarations of applicant Lope Guzmian Rivas describe the 2,000 hectares
of land in question as for "pasture exclusively", meaning it is grazing land (Exh. R and S). Similarly,
the 1960 and 1962 tax declarations submitted in evidence by oppositor Pascua describe 790 or 767
hectares of the land as "pasture land" (Exh. 27 and 28Pascua).
We have stated that the supposed possessory information title issued in 1873 to the original
claimant, Domingo Bunagan, describes the land as "una estancia de ganado al terreno" (grazing
land), or "un terreno destinado al pasto de sus ganados" or la estancia para ganados denominada
Nottab".
The application for the possessory information title was approved "bajo la condicion de sin perjuicio
determination derecho que el Estado o otro tercero pudiera tener en referida finca rustica" (Exh. 1).
(Note that Exhibit J, the 1885 resolution published in Gaceta de Manila, is not a composition title at
all).
Manuela Bunagan, the supposed heir to Domingo Bunagan, sold in 1915 the 2,000 hectares in
question to Pablo Guzman at fifty centavos a hectare as "una parcela de pasto de ganaderia (Exh.
H). Similarly, Ignacio A. Pascua bought from Lope Guzman Rivas the 800 hectares in 1962 as "a
parcel of pasture land" (Exh. I Pascua).
Grazing lands and timber lands are riot alienable under section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. Section 10 distinguishes strictly
agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing lands (inalienable).
Lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the object of private ownership
(Republic vs. Animas, L- 37682, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 499; Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 132
Phil. 637; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56077, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 156 and
other cases).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Appellate Court is reversed and set aside. The application for
registration of Lope Guzman Rivas and Pacifico V. Vijandre and the counter-application of lawyer
Fernando A. Pascua are dismissed. No costs.

Republic vs. Judge Pio Marcos, Kosen Piraso et al (219 SCRA 517) Related Topic:
Jurisdiction "This is an original action for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and

prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court whereby herein petitioners
seek to annul and set aside: (1) The Order denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by
the City Fiscal of Baguio City in behalf of oppositors-government agencies, and thus
insisting on assuming jurisdiction over the subject matter (a military reservation);
(2) The Decisions decreeing the registration of parcels of land within the so-called
'U.S. Fleet Naval Reservation Center' in favor of private respondents Daisy Pacnos;
Albino Reyes; and Kosen Piraso, et al...., all issued in Civil Reservation Case entitled
'In the Matter of the Petition for Reopening of Judicial Proceedings, Kosen Piraso, et
al., Facts : By virtue of RA 931, private respondents caused the reopening of a
cadastral proceedings over parcels of land situated within the so-called 'U.S. Fleet
Naval Reservation Center-pursuant to Executive Order No. 5139, during American
regime. After independence, the United States relinquished to the Republic of the
Philippines all claims to title over the military bases including the aforesaid lots.
Judge (Pio Marcos) decreed the registration of the disputed land despite the filing of
motion to dismiss the reopening of said cadastral case. Private respondents avers
that the land in question, particularly the area decreed in their name, is not part of
a military reservation and the proclamation declaring certain areas to be naval
reservations of the Government of the United States expressly states that such
reservations are "subject to private rights if any there be." Upon the Philippines'
becoming independent in 1946, said areas, by virtue of Executive Agreements,
reverted to disposable lands administered by the Bureau of Lands of the Republic of
the Philippines." Issue: Whether or not Judge Pio Marcos has jurisdiction over the
subject matter in the case at bar? Ruling: The defendant's contention that the
respondent court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to order the registration of
portions of a legally established military reservation cannot be sustained. The
establishment of military reservations is governed by Act No. 627 of the Philippine
Commission and Section 1 of that Act provides that 'All lands or buildings, or any
interest therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the
areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be
forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act, (citing
Government v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, a 1926 decision.) Held:
Respondent Judge is devoid of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of private
respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 931. RA 931 provided that all
persons "claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral
proceedings" in actual possession of the same at the time of the survey but unable
for some justifiable reason to file their claim in the proper court during the time,
limit established by law, "in case such parcels of land on account of their failure to
file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain
by virtue of judicial proceedings" instituted within the forty-year period next
preceding June 20, 1953, the time of the approval of this particular enactment, are
granted "the right within five years" from said date to petition for a reopening of the
judicial proceedings but "only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have
not been alienated, RESERVED, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or
permanently disposed of by the Government.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ESTEBAN MENDOZA and LEON PASAHOL
G.R. No. 71285 November 5, 1987
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On December 18, 1968, a petition was filed by Esteban Mendoza and Leon Pasahol with the then Court
of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I, alleging ownership of the land in question (Lot 444) by purchase
from its original owners and thereafter, actual, continuous, public and adverse possession by them tacked
on to their predecessors-in-interest for a period exceeding 30 years.
Petitioners' predecessors-in-interest failed to answer in the cadastral court for lack of knowledge of the
existence of an ongoing cadastral proceeding because of which Lot No. 444 was declared public land by
CFI Bataan.
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision which granted the private
respondents' petition to reopen the cadastral registration proceeding of the lot in dispute and ordering its
registration in the names of the respondents.
In this instant petition, the petitioner challenges the decision of the appellate court as being contrary to
law on the ground that it held that the subject land is agricultural and alienable land of the public domain
and that the same can be subject to acquisitive prescription of thirty (30) years of open, continuous and
uninterrupted possession.
The petitioner maintains that unless the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Natural
Resources, reclassifies and declares a particular land as agricultural or disposable, its status as military
reservation or forest land remains unaltered and no amount of physical occupation and cultivation thereof
can change it to agricultural land and bring it within the provisions of the Public Land Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have a bona fide claim of ownership as to entitle them to registration
and title over the subject land. NO
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the fact remains that the subject land has not yet been released from its
classification as part of the military reservation zone and still has to be reclassified as alienable public
land with the approval of the President of the Philippines as required by the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141) and Republic Act No. 1275.
Therefore, the SC cannot sustain the appellate court's ruling that the land in dispute is no longer part of
the military reservation on the basis of a mere proposal to classify the same as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain. A proposal cannot take the place of a formal act declaring forest land released
for disposition as public agricultural land. To sustain the appellate ruling would be to pre-empt the
executive branch of the government from exercising its prerogative in classifying lands of the public
domain.

It was ruled in the case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, (129 SCRA 689, 692-693) that:
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department
of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land
remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition, This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State (Secs. 8 & 10, Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution), and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979])
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicant may have had, and,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

Director of lands vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
The land in question is situated in Obando, Bulacan. It adjoins the Kailogan
River and private respondent Valeriano have converted it into a fishpond.
In their application in 1976, private respondents claimed that they are the coowners in fee simple of the land partly through inheritance and partly by purchase
and that; it is not within any forest or military reservation.
The Republic of the Phil., represented by the Dir of the Bureau of Forest
Development, opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied
for is WITHIN THE UNCLASSIFIED REGION of Obando, Bulacan and that such area are
denominated as FOREST LANDS-do not form part of the disposable and alienable
portion of the public domain.
The Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the
Valerianos. This was affirmed by the CA which said in part that since the subject
property is entirely devoted to fishpond purposes, it cannot be categorized as part
of forest lands.
Issue:
WON the courts can reclassify the subject public land.
Held:
Courts cannot reclassify... its beyond their competence and jurisdiction.
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department of the Government (Bureau of Forest Development) and not of the
Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land
until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.

Since the subj property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants

(Valeriano) may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
The conversion of the subj property into a fishpond by Applicants does not
automatically render the property as alienable and disposable.
The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subj property from
unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the matter.

G.R. No. L-57112 November 29, 1984

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE SINFOROSO FAGONIL, of CFI Baguio and Benguet, Branch IV, MODESTA PARIS,
LAGYA PARIS, SAMUEL BALIWAN, PABLO RAMOS, JR., JOSEPHINE ABANAG, MENITA T.
VICTOR, EMILIANO BAUTISTA and ODI DIANSON, respondents.
Beltran, Beltran & Beltran Law Office for respondent Ramos, Jr.
Nicolas R. Cruz for respondent S. Baliwan.
Benigno M. Sabbar, Jr. for respondent E. Bautista.
Melchor Raras for respondent Paris.
Benedicto T. Carantos for respondent Odi Dianson.

AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the registration of lots located within the Baguio Townsite Reservation. As
background, it should be noted that in 1912 a petition was filed in the Court of Land Registration
regarding the Baguio Townsite Reservation, Expediente de Reserve No. 1, GLRO Reservation
Record No. 211. In 1914, when the Land Registration Court was abolished, the record was
transferred to the Court of First Instance of Benguet.
The purpose of Case No. 211 was to determine once and for all what portions of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation were private and registerable under Act No. 496 as provided in section 62 of
Act No. 926. Once so determined, no further registration proceeding would be allowed (Secs. 3 and
4, Act No. 627).
The court on July 22, 1915 issued a notice requiring all persons claiming lots inside the reservation
to file within six months from the date of the notice petitions for the registration of their titles under
Act No. 496. On June 13, 1922, the General Land Registration Office submitted to the court a report
regarding the applications for registration. The case was duly heard.

Judge C. M. Villareal in a decision dated November 13,1922 held that all lands within the
Reservation are public lands with the exception of (1) lands reserved for specified public uses and
(2) lands claimed and adjudicated asprivate property. He ruled that claims for private lands by all
persons not presented for registration within the period fixed in Act No. 627, in relation to the first
Public Land Law, Act No. 926, were barred forever. (Secs. 3 and 4, Act No. 627.)
That 1922 decision established the rule that lots of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, being public
domain, are not registerable under Act No. 496. As held by Judge Belmonte in a 1973 case, the
Baguio Court of First Instance "has no Jurisdiction to entertain any land registration proceedings"
under Act No. 496 and the Public Land Law, covering any lot within the Baguio Townsite Reservation
which was terminated in 1922 (Camdas vs. Director of Lands, L-37782, Resolution of this Court of
March 8, 1974, dismissing petition for review of Judge Belmonte's ruling).
In the instant case, after more than half a century from the 1922 decision declaring the townsite
public domain, or during the years 1972 to 1976, Modesta Paris, Lagya Paris, Samuel Baliwan,
Pablo Ramos, Jr., Josephine Abanag, Menita T. Victor, Emiliano Bautista and Odi Dianson filed with
the Court of First Instance of Baguio applications for the registration of lots (with considerable areas)
inside the Baguio Townsite Reservation.
Alternatively, they allege that in case the lots are not registerable under Act No. 496, then section 48
(b) and (c) of the Public Land Law should be applied because they and their predecessors have
been in possession of the lots for more than thirty years.
The Director of Lands opposed the applications. He filed motions to dismiss on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction, prescription and res judicata. He relied on the decision in the first registration case, a
proceeding in rem, which barred all subsequent registrations of the Baguio Townsite lots. He
contended that the disposition of said lots should be made by the Director of Lands under Chapter
11 of the Public Land Law regarding Townsite Reservations. (See Cojuangco vs. Marcos, 82 SCRA
156).
The trial judge admits that section 48 cannot be invoked by the applicants because it applies only to
disposable agricultural lands situated outside the reservation. He concedes that lands within the
Baguio Townsite Reservation may not be acquired by long possession for over thirty years
subsequent to Case No. 211 (p. 195, Rollo).
But he refused to dismiss the applicants because in his opinion "there is a necessity of (for) the
presentation of satisfactory evidence in a regular hearing as to the presence or absence of complete
service of notice" so that the court can determine whether the applications are barred by res
judicata. He relies on the isolated case of Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 58 Phil. 156.
The Solicitor General assailed by certiorari that order denying the motions to dismiss.
Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 627, the law governing military reservations, contemplate notification to
two classes of persons, namely, (1) those who are living upon or in visible possession of any part of
the military reservation and (2) persons who are not living upon or in visible possession but are
absentees.
A distinction is made between these two classes of persons as to the manner in which service of the
notice shall be made. Service is complete as to absentees when publication of the notice in the

newspaper is completed and duly fixed upon the four corners of the premises. The six-month period
commences to run from that time.
On the other hand, as to those who are living upon or in visible possession of the lands, service is
not complete, and the six-month period does not begin to run until the notice is served upon them
personally. Their rights relative to the period within which they must respond are determined by the
date of the personal service.
Their notice was a personal notice given by personal service. Only such notice could set the running
of the six-month period against them. (Lagariza, Saba and Garcia vs. Commanding General, 22 Phil.
297, 302; Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 58 Phil. 156,159- 160.)
As already noted, the fact is that the notice in Case No: 211 was issued on July 22, 1915. The clerk
of court certified that 134 persons living upon or in visible possession of any part of the reservation
were personally served with notice of the reservation. Section 3 of Act No. 627 provides that the
certificate of the clerk of court is "conclusive proof of service". (Zarate case, pp. 158,162.)
In the Zarate case, the applications for registration of lots within the Baguio Townsite Reservation
were filed in 1930 and 1931 or more than eight years after the decision was rendered in 1922.
The Zarate case is truly an exceptional case because the applicants were able to prove that in 1915
they were in visible occupation of their lots and the clerk of court did not serve personal notice upon
them. The expediente of Case No. 211 was then still existing. The Zarate case cannot be a
precedent at this late hour.
The situation in the Zarate case has not been duplicated since 1933. Judge Fangonil seeks to apply
the ruling therein to the instant eight cases. We find that his order is unwarranted or unreasonable. It
would reopen Case No. 211. It would give way to baseless litigations intended to be foreclosed by
that 1912 case.
Private claimants to lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation were given a chance to register
their lands in Case No. 211. The provisions of Act No. 627, allowing them to do so, are in harmony
with the 1909 epochal decision of Justice Holmes in Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449,
41 Phil. 935. The two Igorots named Zarate and those who were allowed to register their lots in Case
No. 211, like Mateo Carino, the Igorot involved in the Cario case, inherited their lands from their
ancestors. They had possession of the lands since time immemorial. The Igorots were allowed to
avail themselves of registration under Act No. 496.
Here, the eight applicants do not base their applications under Act No. 496 on any purchase or grant
from the State nor on possession since time immemorial. That is why Act No. 496 cannot apply to
them. (See Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, L- 49623, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA
799.) They are not "Igorot claimants" (See p. 35, Memo of Solicitor General).
Moreover, Annex I of the petition for certiorari shows that the previous attempts of some applicants
and their predecessors to reopen Case No. 211 were dismissed as shown below:
Name Date Filed Date Dismissed

1) Samuel Baliwan Dec. 27, 1968 Aug. 15, 1970

2) Tommy Banguillas, predecessor of
Pablo Ramos, Jr. May 6, 1965 June 19, 1967
3) Josephine Abanag Jan. 9, 1961 July 9, 1963
4) Sergio Molintas, predecessor of
Josephine Abanag Dec. 26, 1968 Oct. 31, 1974
5) Josephine Abanag April 26, 1966 Nov. 12, 1974
6) Lagya Paris Oct. 15, 1965 Nov. 13, 1974
In the case of Abanag, she succeeded to two lots claimed by Sumay and Molintas for which Torrens
titles were issued in Case No. 211 on October 21, 1919 (Annexes J and K of Petition). The lots,
which Abanag now seeks to register, were not previously claimed by her predecessors in Case No.
211 (p. 33, Sol. Gen.'s Memo).
We hold that the trial court erred in requiring the presentation of evidence as to the notice required
under Act No. 627. Such evidence cannot be produced at this time because the court record of Case
No. 211 was completely destroyed during the last war.
Anyway, the applicants have the burden of proving that their predecessors were living upon or in
visible possession of the lands in 1915 and were not served any notice. If they have such
evidence, apart from unreliable oral testimony, they should have produced it during the hearing on
the motions to dismiss.
To support his motions to dismiss, the Solicitor General introduced evidence proving that after Case
No. 211 it has always been necessary to issue Presidential proclamations for the disposition of
portions of the Baguio Townsite Reservation (Annex E of Petition).
The period of more than fifty years completely bars the applicants from securing relief due to the
alleged lack of personal notice to their predecessors. The law helps the vigilant but not those who
sleep on their rights. "For time is a means of destroying obligations and actions, because time runs
against the slothful and contemners of their own rights."
WHEREFORE, the order denying the motions to dismiss is reversed and set aside. The applications
for registration are hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.