Labor - Cases - Full-Midterm - 1.docx Filename UTF-8''Labor Cases Full-Midterm 1

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
171448
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
*
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
CHARLIE COMILA and Promulgated:
AIDA COMILA,
Accused-Appellants. February 28, 2007
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
On April 5, 1999, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, an Information [1] for Illegal
Recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate, as defined and penalized under Article 13(6) in
relation to Articles 38(b), 34 and 39 of Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the New Labor
Code, as amended, was filed against Charlie Comila, Aida Comila and one Indira Ram Singh Lastra,
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of September, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously offer, recruit, and promise employment as contract workers in Italy, to the herein
complainants, namely: MARLYN ARO y PADCAYAN, ANNIE FELIX y BAKISAN, ELEONOR
DONGGA-AS y ANGHEL, ESPERANZA BACKIAN y LAD-EY, ZALDY DUMPILES y MALIKDAN, JOEL
EDIONG y CALDERON, RICKY WALDO y NICKEY, JEROME MONTAEZ y OSBEN, DOVAL
DUMPILES y SAP-AY, JONATHAN NGAOSI y DUMPILES, EDMUND DIEGO y SUBIANGAN and
MARLON PETTOCO y SUGOT, without said accused having first secured the necessary license
or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Information was docketed in the RTC as Crim. Case No. 16427-R and raffled to Branch 60
thereof.
On the same date April 5, 1999 and in the same court, twelve (12) separate Informations [2] for
Estafa were filed against the same accused at the instance of the same complainants. Docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 16428-R to 16439-R and likewise raffled to the same branch of the court, the twelve
(12) Informations for Estafa, varying only as regards the names of the offended parties and the respective
amounts involved, uniformly recite:
That on or about the 10th day of November, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud one ZALDY DUMPILES Y MALIKDAN by way of false pretenses, which are
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows, to wit: the
accused knowing fully well that he/she/they is/are not AUTHORIZED job RECRUITERS for
persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said Zaldy Dumpiles y Malikdan and
pretended that he/she/they could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of
the sum ofP25,000.00 and representing the placement and medical fees when in truth and
in fact could not; the said Zaldy Dumpiles y Malikdan deceived and convinced by the false
pretenses employed by the accused parted away the total sum of P25,000,00 in favor of the
accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said Zaldy Dumpiles y Malikdan in the
aforementioned amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00), Philippine
currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Of the three accused named in all the aforementioned two sets of Informations, only accused Aida
Comila and Charlie Comila were brought under the jurisdiction of the trial court, the third, Indira Ram Singh
Lastra, being then and still is at large.
Arraigned with assistance of counsel, accused Aida Comila and Charlie Comila entered a plea of
NOT GUILTY not only to the Information for Illegal Recruitment (Crim. Case No. 16427-R) but also to the
twelve (12) Informations for Estafa (Crim. Case Nos. 16428-R to 16439-R).
Thereafter, a joint trial of the cases ensued.
Of the twelve (12) complainants in both the illegal recruitment and estafa charges, the prosecution was
able to present only seven (7) of them, namely: Annie Felix y Bakisan; Ricky Waldo y Nickey; Jonathan
Ngaosi y Dumpiles; Marilyn Aro y Padcayan; Edmund Diego y Subiangan; Jerome Montaez y Osben; and
Eleonor Dongga-as y Anghel. A certain Jose Matias of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) was supposed to testify for the prosecution but his testimony was dispensed after the defense
agreed that he will merely testify to the effect that as per POEA records, accused Aida Comila and Charlie
Comila were not duly licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.
In a consolidated decision[3] dated October 3, 2000, the trial court found both accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate, as charged
in Crim. Case No. 16427-R, and of estafa, as charged in Crim. Case Nos. 16430-R; 16431-R, 16432-R,
16434-R, 16436-R, 16438-R, and 16439-R. The other informations for estafa in Crim. Case Nos. 16428-R,
16429-R, 16433-R, 16435-R and 16437-R were, however, dismissed for lack of evidence. We quote
the fallo of the trial courts decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby finds the accused, Aida Comila and
Charlie Comila:
1.
In Criminal Case No. 16427-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale Committed by a
Syndicate. They are hereby sentenced to each suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00;
2.

of the crime of Estafa. There being no mitigating and aggravating
circumstances and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to each suffer an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum. They shall also jointly and severally pay the
complainant, Marilyn Aro, the sum of P25,500.00 plus interest from the
date this Information was filed until it is fully paid;
3.

circumstances and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum. They shall also jointly and severally pay the complainant,
Annie Felix, the sum of P50,000.00 plus interest from the date this
Information was filed until it is fully paid;
4.

circumstances, and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
Eleanor Dongga-as, the sum of P50,000.00 plus interest from the date
this Information was filed until it is fully paid;
5.

circumstances and applying the provisions of Indeterminate Sentence
Law, they are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. They shall
also jointly and severally pay the complainant, Edmund Diego, the sum
of P25,000.00 plus interest from the date this Information was filed
until it is fully paid;
6.

indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
Jonathan Ngaosi, the sum of P25,000.00 plus interest from the date
this Information was filed until it is fully paid;
7.

correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor as
Ricky Waldo, the sum of P25,000.00 plus interest from the date this
Information was filed until it is fully paid;
8.

correccional, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
Jerome Montaez, the sum of P25,000.00 plus interest from the date this
Information was filed; and
9.
Criminal Cases Nos. 16428-R; 16429-R; 16433-R; 16435-R and

16437-R are hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
In the service of the various prison terms herein imposed upon the accused Aida Comila and
Charlie Comila, the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code shall be observed.
As to the accused, Indira Sighn Lastra, let all these cases be archived in the
meantime until the said accused is arrested.
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to a Notice of Appeal[4] filed by the two accused, the trial court forwarded the records of
the cases to this Court in view of the penalty of life imprisonment meted in Crim. Case No. 16427-R (Illegal
Recruitment in large scale). In its Resolution [5] of October 3, 2001, the Court resolved to accept the appeal
and the subsequent respective briefs for the appellants [6] and the appellee[7] as well as the appellants reply
brief.[8]
Thereafter, and consistent with its pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[9] the Court, via its
Resolution[10] of September 22, 2004, transferred the cases to the Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate
action and disposition. In the CA, the cases were assigned one docket number and thereat docketed as CAG.R. CR H.C. No. 01615.
In a decision[11] promulgated on December 29, 2005, the appellate court affirmed that of the trial
court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated October 3, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 60, in Criminal Cases Nos. 16427-R to 16439-R
finding accused-appellants guilty of (1) illegal recruitment committed in large scale; and (2)
seven (7) counts of estafa is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
The cases are again with this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal
[12]
interposed by the herein
accused-appellants from the aforementioned affirmatory CA decision.

Acting thereon, the Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desire.
In their respective manifestations,[13] the parties opted not to file any supplemental brief and
instead merely reiterated what they have said in their earlier appellants and appellee's briefs.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in the brief [14] it filed for appellee People, summarizes the facts of
the case in the following manner:
Annie Felix was introduced by her sister-in-law, Ella Bakisan, to appellant Aida Comila
in August 1998 (pp. 3, 24, tsn, September 14, 1999). Ella Bakisan told her that appellant
Aida Comila could help her find work abroad as she was recruiting workers for a factory
in Palermo, Italy (ibid.). Annie Felix then went to meet appellant Aida Comila at the Jollibee
outlet along Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City in August, 1998 to inquire about the supposed
work in Italy (pp. 3-4, tsn, ibid.). There were other applicants, aside from Annie at the Jollibee
outlet at the time, similarly inquiring about the prospective jobs abroad (ibid.).
Annie met appellant again at the St. Theresas College on or about September 6 or 7,
1998 (p.11, ibid.). there were around fifty (50) to sixty (60) applicants at that time (ibid.).
Appellant introduced them to a certain Erlinda Ramos, one of the agents of Mrs. Indira
Lastra, a representative of the Far East Trading Corporation (p.4,11, ibid.). Accordingly,
Erlinda Ramos would be responsible for the processing of the applicants visas (ibid.). Erlinda
Ramos even showed them the copy of the job order from Italy (ibid.). Like Ramos, appellant
likewise introduced herself to Annie and the other applicants as an agent of Lastra (pp. 3-4,
ibid.).
Annie submitted all her requirements to appellant, along with the amount of two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) as processing fee (p.6, tsn, ibid.). She also paid a total of twenty
three thousand (P23,000.00) as partial payment of her placement fee of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) on or about September 6 or 7, 1998. Appellant issued a common receipt
detailing the amounts she received not only from Annie Felix (23,000.00) but also for her
fellow applicants, Zaldy Dumpiles (P23,000.00), Joel Ediong (P25,000.00), and Ricky Baldo
(P25, 000.00) (p. 8, tsn, ibid.).
Annie went to Manila several times to complete her medical examination as required
(pp. 14-16, tsn, ibid.). Considering appellant Aida Comilas pregnancy at that time, her
husband Charlie Comila, also an agent of Lastra, accompanied Annie and the other
applicants during their medical check-up (pp. 22-24, ibid.).
On the last week of October, 1998, Annie again paid appellant the total amount of
twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) to complete her placement fee of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00). Annie was told that her flight to Italy was scheduled on September 14,
1998 (p. 20, ibid.). Later on, Erlinda Ramos told Annie that her flight to Italy was rescheduled to October, 1998 due to a typhoon (p.20, ibid.).
There were others like Annie Felix who were similarly enticed to apply for the
promised job in Italy (pp. 4-5, tsn, September 22, 1999). Among them were Ricky Waldo,
Edmund Diego, Eleanor Donga-as, Jonathan Ngaosi, Marilyn Aro and Jerome Montaez (pp. 45; 19-28, tsn, September 22, 1999, afternoon session).
In the briefing at St. Theresas College, Navy Road, Pacdal, Baguio City, (p. 7, tsn,
September 22, 1999; pp. 29-30, tsn, September 14, 1999) appellant briefed Ricky Waldo and
the rest of the applicants on their application requirements (pp. 7-8, tsn, Sept. 22, 1999).
The briefing was conducted by appellants Aida Comila, Charlie Comila, and Erlinda Ramos
who alternately talked about the documents to be submitted for the processing of their
applications and the processing fee of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) they have to pay
(p.8, tsn, September 22, 1999). In the same briefing, they were also told that Erlinda Ramos
was scheduled to go to Italy on September 14, 1998 and that whoever would pay
P25,000.00 first, or half of the P50,000.00 processing fee would be able to go with her
to Italy (p. 8. tsn, September 22, 1999). Per the job order shown to Jonathan Ngaosi, for
instance, male workers were to receive a salary of two thousand three hundred dollars
($2,300.00) plus an additional eight dollars ($8.00) for overtime work (p.8, tsn, September
21, 1999, afternoon session).
After undergoing the required medical examination in Manila, applicants Ricky Waldo
and company paid the following amounts for their respective processing fees, which were
duly receipted by appellant Aida Comila in three separate documents, thus:
8-23-98, received the amount of P14,000.00 from Ella Bakisan. Signed, Aida Comila.
The second document again is a piece of paper of which the following is written: 9-7-98.
Received the amount of the following: Philip Waldo, P20,000.00; Doval Dumpiles, P23,000.00
Edmund Diego, P25,000.00; Jerome Montaez, P25,000.00 Total- P93,000.00. Received by A.
Comila. The 3rd document is page of a yellow pad and it reads 9-7-98, received the following
amounts from Zaldy Dumpiles - P23,000.00; Joel Ediong - P25,000.00; Ricky WaldoP25,000.00; Annie Felix - P23,000.00; Marlon Tedoco P23,000.00. Total P119,000.00.
Received by Aida Comila; witnesses Ella Bakisan. (p.14, tsn, of witness Edmund
Diego, September 22, 1999, morning session).
Considering the payments they made, Ricky Waldos flight to Italy was scheduled on
September 14, 1999 while those of Marilyn Aro, Edmund Diego, Jerome Montanez, Jonathan
Ngaosi, and Eleanor Donga-as were scheduled on October 27, 1999 (pp. 8-9, tsn, September
22, 1999; pp. 32-33, tsn, September 14, 1999; pp. 2-4, tsn, September 15, 1999; p. 24,
September 21, 1999; p.10, tsn, September 22, 1999, morning session; p. 27, tsn, September
22, 1999, afternoon session).
Like Annie Felix, Ricky Waldos flight did not push through as scheduled on September
14, 1999 (pp. 32-34, tsn, September 14, 1999; pp. 2-4, tsn, September 15, 1999). Appellant
Aida Comila explained that the re-scheduling was due to typhoon (ibid.). Rickys flight was
then re-scheduled to October 7, 1999 but was again moved to October 27, 1999 as,
according to appellant Aida Comila, there were some problems in his papers and that of the
other applicants (pp. 2-3, ibid.).
On October 25, 1998, appellant Aida Comila called the applicants for a briefing at
the St. Therese Building at the Navy Base, Baguio City (p.24, tsn, September 21, 1999). In
the same briefing, Erlinda Ramos, as representative of the supposed principal, Indira Lastra,
explained to the applicants that their flight on October 27, 1999 was cancelled but will be rescheduled (ibid.). Appellant Aida Comila told them that they have to wait for the notice from
the Italian Embassy (ibid.).
On the first week of November, 1998, appellant Charlie Comila told Marilyn Aro and
several other applicants that their visas would be released (p. 25, September, 21, 1999).
Appellant Charlie Comila accompanied them and the others to the Elco Building at Shaw
Boulevard, Pasig City purportedly to see Erlinda Ramos (p.25, tsn, September 21, 1999).
When Erlinda Ramos arrived, she told Marilyn and the other applicants to wait for the
release of their visas, the following day (p.25, ibid.). Marilyn and the rest came back each
day for one whole week but the promised visas were not released to them (ibid.).
Marilyn and the other applicants complained to appellant Charlie Comila about the
delay and told him of their doubts about their application and the promised job
in Italy (ibid.). At this point, appellant Charlie Comila assured them that they should not
worry and that everything will be alright (ibid). Appellant Charlie Comila then brought them
to Indira Lastra (p.26, ibid.).
Marilyn Aro, Annie Felix, and the rest were all shocked to find out that Indira Lastra
was actually an inmate of Manila (Quiapo) city jail. (p.26, ibid.; p. 13, tsn, September 14,
1999). They felt at once that they were, indeed, victims of illegal recruitment (ibid.).When
they demanded the return of their money from Indira Lastra, the latter told them to
withdraw their money from appellant Aida Comila (p.26. ibid.).
Upon their return to Baguio, Marilyns group proceeded to appellant Aida Comilas
residence at Km. 6, La Trinidad, Benguet to demand the return of their money (p. 27, tsn,
ibid.). Appellant Aida Comila, however, told them to wait as Indira Lastra will soon be out of
jail and will personally process their papers at the Italian Embassy (ibid.). Marilyn and the
other applicants followed-up several times with appellant Aida Comila the return of the
amounts of money they paid for their supposed placement fee, but were simply told to wait
(ibid.). the last time complainants visited them, appellants Aida Comila and Charlie Comila
were already in a Bulacan jail (p. 27, ibid.).
In April, 1999, Marilyn Aro, Edmund Diego, Annie Felix, Eleanor Donga-as, Jerome
Montanez, Ricky Waldo and Jonathan Ngaosi filed their complaint against appellants Aida
Comila and Charlie Comila before the Criminal Investigation Group (CIG).
In the same month of April 1999, separate Informations for estafa and illegal
recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate or violation of Article 13 (b) in relation
to Article 38 (b) 34, and 39 of P.D. No. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines were filed against appellants Charlie Comila, Aida Comila and Indira Lastra.
In their appellants brief, accused-appellants would fault the two courts below in (1) finding them
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa; and (2) totally disregarding
the defense of denial honestly advanced by them.
It is not disputed that accused-appellants Charlie Comila and Aida Comila are husband-andwife. Neither is it disputed that husband and wife knew and are well-acquainted with their co-accused,
Indira Ram Singh Lastra, and one Erlinda Ramos. It is their posture, however, that from the very beginning,
appellant Aida Comila never professed that she had the authority to recruit and made it clear to the
applicants for overseas employment that it was Erlinda Ramos who had such authority and who issued the
job orders fromItaly. Upon this premise, this appellant contends that the subsequent transactions she had
with the applicants negate the presence of deceit, an essential element of estafa under paragraph 2(a) of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. On the charge of illegal recruitment, this appellant argues that she
was merely trying to help the applicants to process their papers, believing that Indira Ram Sighn Lastra
and Erlinda Ramos would really send the applicants to Italy. With respect to co-appellant Charlie Comila,
the defense submits that the prosecution miserably failed to prove his participation in the illegal
recruitment and estafa.
The appeal must fail.
After a careful and circumspect review of the records, we are fully convinced that both the trial and
appellate courts committed no error in finding both appellants guilty beyond moral certainty of doubt of
the crimes charged against them. Through the respective testimonies of its witnesses, the prosecution has
satisfactorily established that both appellants were then engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement
activities. The combined testimonies of the prosecution witnesses point to appellant Aida Comila as the
one who promised them foreign employment and assured them of placement overseas through the help of
their co-accused Indira Ram Singh Lastra. For sure, it was Aida herself who informed them of the existence
of job
orders from Palermo, Italy,
and
of the
documents needed for the
processing of
their
applications. Aida, in fact, accompanied the applicants to undergo medical examinations in Manila. And
relying completely on Aidas representations, the applicants-complainants entrusted their money to her
only to discover later that their hopes for an overseas employment were but vain. In the words of the trial
court:
Aida Comila cannot escape culpability by the mere assertion that the recruitment
activities were done by Ella Bakisan, Erlinda Ramos and Indira Lastra as if she was just a
mere observer of the activities going on right under her nose, especially so that the seven
complainants who testified all pointed to her as their recruiter. She could not adequately
explain why: (1) she had to show and explain the job order and the work and travel
requirements to the complainants; (2) she had to meet the complainants at Jollibee,
Magsaysay Ave., Baguio City and in her residence; (3) she had to be present at the briefings
for the applicants; (4) she received the placement fees even if she claims that she received
them from Ella Bakisan; (5) she had to go down to Manila and accompanied the
complainants for their medical examination; and (6) she had to go out of her way to do all
these things even when she was pregnant and was about to give birth. Certainly, she was
not a social worker or a humanitarian who had all the time in this world to go out of her way
to render free services to other people whom she did not know or just met. To be sure, Aida
Comila had children to attend to and a husband who was unemployed to be able to conduct
such time-consuming charitable activities.[15]
Running in parallel vein is what the CA wrote in its appealed decision: [16]
As regards appellant Aida Comilas contention that she did not represent herself as a
licensed recruiter, and that she merely helped complainants avail of the job opportunity on
the belief that Indira Lastra and Erlinda Ramos would really send them to Italy, the same
hardly deserves merit. The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when, among other
things, a person who, without being duly authorized according to law represents or gives the
distinct impression that he or she has the power or the ability to provide work abroad
convincing those to whom the representation is made or to whom the impression is given to
thereupon part with their money in order to be assured of that employment.
In fact, even if there is no consideration involved, appellant will still be deemed as
having engaged in recruitment activities, since it was sufficiently demonstrated that she
promised overseas employment to private complainants. To be engaged in the practice and
placement, it is plain that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from
the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or abroad.
As regards appellant Charlie Comila, it is inconceivable for him to feign ignorance of the illegal
recruitment activities of his wife Aida, and of his lack of participation therein. Again, we quote with
approval what the trial court has said in its decision: [17]
Charlie Comila could not, likewise, feign ignorance of the illegal transactions. It is
contrary to human experience, hence, highly incredible for a husband not to have known the
activities of his wife who was living with him under the same roof. In fact, he admitted that
when Aida gave birth, he had to accompany the complainants to Manila for their medical
examination and again, on another trip, to bring them to the office of Erlinda Ramos to
follow-up their visas. The fact that he knew the ins and outs of Manila was a desperate
excuse or reason why he accompanied the complainants to Manila considering that, as he
and his wife claimed, they have nothing to do with the recruitment activities. Furthermore, if
he and his wife had nothing to do with the recruitment of the complainants, why did he have
to sign the letter and accommodate the request of Myra Daluca whom they have not really
known. But damning was his statement that he signed the letter because Aida was not there
to sign it. Such a statement would only show that they were indeed parties to these illegal
transactions. Charlie Comila would even claim that he was just an elementary graduate and
so he did not understand what he was asked to sign. But his booking sheet showed that he
was a high school graduate. He was a conductor of a bus company who should know and
understand how to read and write. Furthermore, he was already a grown up man in his
thirties who knew what was right and wrong and what he should or should not do.
It is well
established in jurisprudence that
person
may
be
charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern:
illegal
recruitment
is malum
prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the first, the
criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such an intent is imperative. Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person who defrauds
another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud.[18] Here, it has been sufficiently proven that both appellants
represented themselves to the complaining witnesses to have the capacity to send them to Italyfor
employment, even as they do not have the authority or license for the purpose. Doubtless, it is this
misrepresentation that induced the complainants to part with their hard-earned money for placement and
medical fees. Such act on the part of the appellants clearly constitutes estafa under Article 315, paragraph
(2), of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellants next bewail the alleged total disregard by the two courts below their defense of denial
which, had it been duly considered and appreciated, could have merited their acquittal.
The Court disagrees. The two courts below did consider their defense of denial. However, given the
positive and categorical testimonies of the complainants who were one in pointing to appellants, in
cahoots with their co-accused Indira Ram Singh Lastra, as having recruited and promised them with
overseas employment, appellants defense of denial must inevitably collapse.
All told, we rule and so hold that the two courts below committed no error in adjudging both
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate in
large scale and of estafa in seven (7) counts. We also rule that the penalties imposed by the court of origin,
as affirmed by the CA, accord with law and jurisprudence.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision of the CA,
affirmatory of that the trial court, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED
BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER G.R. Nos. 182978-79
AND PROMOTION, INC.,
Petitioner, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J.(Chairperson),
- versus - Carpio Morales,*
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Peralta, JJ.
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA
CUARESMA (for and in behalf of
their daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma),
WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC.
and JAIME ORTIZ (President,
White Falcon Services, Inc.),
Respondents.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA G.R. Nos. 184298-99

CUARESMA (for and in behalf of
their daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma),
Petitioners,
- versus WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. Promulgated:

and BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER
AND PROMOTION, INC.,
Respondents. April 7, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
These consolidated petitions assail the Amended Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 14,
2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 finding White Falcon Services, Inc. and Becmen
Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. solidarily liable to indemnify spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma the
amount of US$4,686.73 in actual damages with interest.
On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service Exporter and
Promotion, Inc.[2] (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(KSA), for a contract duration of three years, with a corresponding salary of US$247.00 per month.
Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning.
Jessie Fajardo, a co-worker of Jasmin, narrated that on June 21, 1998, Jasmin was found dead by a
female cleaner lying on the floor inside her dormitory room with her mouth foaming and smelling of
poison.[3]
Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital,
who conducted an autopsy of Jasmins body, the likely cause of her death was poisoning. Thus:
According to letter No. 199, dated 27.2.1419H, issued by Al-Birk Police Station, for
examining the corpse of Jasmin Cuaresma, 12.20 P.M. 27.2.1419H, Sunday, at Al-Birk
Hospital.
1. The Police Report on the Death

2. The Medical Diagnosis
Sex: Female Age: 25 years Relg: Christian
The said person was brought to the Emergency Room of the hospital; time 12.20 P.M.
and she was unconscious, blue, no pulse, no respiration and the first aid esd
undertaken but without success.
3. Diagnosis and Opinion: Halt in blood circulation respiratory system and brain
damage due to an apparent poisoning which is under investigation.[4]
Name: Jasmin Cuaresma

Sex: Female
Marital Status: Single Nationality: Philipino (sic)
Religion: Christian Profession: Nurse
Address: Al-Birk Genrl. Hospital Birth Place: The Philippines
On 27.2.1419H, Dr. Tariq Abdulminnem and Dr. Ashoki Komar, both have examined
the dead body of Jasmin Cuaresma, at 12.20 P.M., Sunday, 22.2.14189H, and the
result was:
1. Report of the Police on the death

2. Medical Examination: Blue skin and paleness on the Extrimes (sic), total halt to
blood circulation and respiratory system and brain damage. There were no external
injuries. Likelypoisoning by taking poisonous substance, yet not determined.
There was a bad smell in the mouth and unknown to us.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
Jasmins body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following day, the City Health
Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical report indicated that Jasmin
died under violent circumstances, and not poisoning as originally found by the KSA examining
physician. The City Health Officer found that Jasmin had abrasions at her inner lip and gums; lacerated
wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated wounds and hematoma (contusions) on her
elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest;
rib fracture; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora of the vaginal area. [6]
On March 11, 1999, Jasmins remains were exhumed and examined by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). The toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested negative for non-volatile, metallic
poison and insecticides.[7]
Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmins parents and her surviving heirs, received
from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) the following amounts: P50,000.00 for death
benefits; P50,000.00 for loss of life; P20,000.00 for funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for medical
reimbursement.
On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its principal in the
KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and insurance benefits, as well as moral and
exemplary damages for Jasmins death.[8]
In their complaint, the Cuaresmas claim that Jasmins death was work-related, having occurred at
the employers premises;[9] that under Jasmins contract with Becmen, she is entitled to iqama insurance
coverage; that Jasmin is entitled to compensatory damages in the amount of US$103,740.00, which is the
sum total of her monthly salary of US$247.00 per month under her employment contract, multiplied by 35
years (or the remaining years of her productive life had death not supervened at age 25, assuming that
she lived and would have retired at age 60).
The Cuaresmas assert that as a result of Jasmins death under mysterious circumstances, they
suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish. The situation, they claim, was aggravated by findings in the
autopsy and exhumation reports which evidently show that a grave injustice has been committed against
them and their daughter, for which those responsible should likewise be made to pay moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.
In their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide, citing a prior
unsuccessful suicide attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on the medical report of the
examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital. They likewise deny liability because the Cuaresmas already
recovered death and other benefits totaling P130,000.00 from the OWWA. They insist that the Cuaresmas
are not entitled to iqama insurance because this refers to the issuance not insurance of iqama, or
residency/work permit required in the KSA. On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, they claim that
the Cuaresmas are not entitled to the same because they have not acted with fraud, nor have they been in
bad faith in handling Jasmins case.
While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation and motion for substitution alleging that
Rajab terminated their agency relationship and had appointed White Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) as
its new recruitment agent in the Philippines. Thus, White Falcon was impleaded as respondent as well, and
it adopted and reiterated Becmens arguments in the position paper it subsequently filed.
On February 28, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision [10] dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit. Giving weight to the medical report of the Al-Birk Hospital finding that Jasmin died of poisoning, the
Labor Arbiter concluded that Jasmin committed suicide. In any case, Jasmins death was not serviceconnected, nor was it shown that it occurred while she was on duty; besides, her parents have received all
corresponding benefits they were entitled to under the law. In regard to damages, the Labor Arbiter found
no legal basis to warrant a grant thereof.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (Commission) reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Relying on the findings of the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City and the NBI as
contained in their autopsy and toxicology report, respectively, the Commission, via its November 22, 2002
Resolution[11] declared that, based on substantial evidence adduced, Jasmin was the victim of compensable
work-connected criminal aggression. It disregarded the Al-Birk Hospital attending physicians report as well
as the KSA police report, finding the same to be inconclusive. It declared that Jasmins death was the result
of an accident occurring within the employers premises that is attributable to her employment, or to the
conditions under which she lived, and thus arose out of and in the course of her employment as
nurse. Thus, the Cuaresmas are entitled to actual damages in the form of Jasmins lost earnings, including
future earnings, in the total amount of US$113,000.00. The Commission, however, dismissed all other
claims in the complaint.
Becmen, Rajab and White Falcon moved for reconsideration, whereupon the Commission issued its
October 9, 2003 Resolution[12] reducing the award of US$113,000.00 as actual damages to US$80,000.00.
[13]
The NLRC likewise declared Becmen and White Falcon as solidarily liable for payment of the award.
Becmen and White Falcon brought separate petitions for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. [14] On
June 28, 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision, [15] the dispositive portion of which reads, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the subject petitions are DENIED but in the execution of the decision, it
should first be enforced against White Falcon Services and then against Becmen Services
when it is already impossible, impractical and futile to go against it (White Falcon).
SO ORDERED.[16]
The appellate court affirmed the NLRCs findings that Jasmins death was compensable, the same
having occurred at the dormitory, which was contractually provided by the employer. Thus her death
should be considered to have occurred within the employers premises, arising out of and in the course of
her employment.
Becmen and White Falcon moved for reconsideration. On May 14, 2008, the appellate court
rendered the assailed Amended Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. Accordingly, the award
of US$80,000.00 in actual damages is hereby reduced to US$4,686.73 plus interest at the
legal rate computed from the time it became due until fully paid. Petitioners are hereby
adjudged jointly and solidarily liable with the employer for the monetary awards with
Becmen Service Exporter and Promotions, Inc. having a right of reimbursement from White
Falcon Services, Inc.
SO ORDERED.[17]
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals found that although Jasmins death was
compensable, however, there is no evidentiary basis to support an award of actual damages in the amount
of US$80,000.00. Nor may lost earnings be collected, because the same may be charged only against the
perpetrator of the crime or quasi-delict. Instead, the appellate court held that Jasmins beneficiaries should
be entitled only to the sum equivalent of the remainder of her 36-month employment contract, or her
monthly salary of US$247.00 multiplied by nineteen (19) months, with legal interest.
Becmen filed the instant petition for review on certiorari (G.R. Nos. 182978-79). The Cuaresmas, on
the other hand, moved for a reconsideration of the amended decision, but it was denied. They are now
before us via G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
On October 6, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 184298-99 with G.R. Nos. 18297879.
In G.R. Nos. 182978-79, Becmen raises the following issues for our resolution:
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GAVE MORE CREDENCE AND
WEIGHT TO THE AUTOPSY REPORT CONDUCTED BY THE CABANATUAN CITY HEALTH OFFICE
THAN THE MEDICAL AND POLICE REPORTS ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF
KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND AL-BIRK HOSPITAL.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ON THE BASIS OF THE POSITION
PAPERS AND ANNEXES THERETO INCLUDING THE AUTOPSY REPORT, IT CONCLUDED THAT
THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA WAS CAUSED BY CRIMINAL AGGRESSION.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DEATH OF
JASMIN CUARESMA WAS COMPENSABLE PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN TALLER VS. YNCHAUSTI, G.R. NO. 35741, DECEMBER 20, 1932, WHICH IT FOUND TO BE
STILL GOOD LAW.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA NOTWITHSTANDING ITS ADMISSIONS THAT IQAMA INSURANCE
WAS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR SINCE IQAMA IS NOT AN INSURANCE.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE DEATH
OF JASMIN WAS WORK RELATED.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE TO

JASMINS BENEFICIARIES FOR THE REMAINDER OF HER 36-MONTH CONTRACT COMPUTED IN
THIS MANNER: MONTHLY SALARY OF US$246.67 MULTIPLIED BY 19 MONTHS, THE
REMAINDER OF THE TERM OF JASMINS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, IS EQUAL TO US$4,686.73.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE TO PAY
INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE FROM THE TIME IT WAS DUE UNTIL FULLY PAID.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN AND WHITE
FALCON JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE EMPLOYER NOTWITHSTANDING THE
ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY EXECUTED BY WHITE FALCON IN FAVOR OF BECMEN.
On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 184298-99, the Cuaresmas raise the following issues:
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF THE

CIVIL CODE CONSIDERED GENERAL LAW DESPITE THE CASE BEING COVERED BY E.O. 247,
R.A. 8042 AND LABOR CODE CONSIDERED AS SPECIAL LAWS.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE DECEASEDS

FUTURE EARNINGS WHICH IS (AN) INHERENT FACTOR IN THE COMPUTATION OF DEATH
BENEFITS OF OVERSEAS FILIPINO CONTRACT WORKERS.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN REDUCING THE DEATH BENEFITS

AWARDED BY NLRC CONSIDERED FINDINGS OF FACT THAT CANNOT BE DISTURBED
THROUGH CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
The issue for resolution is whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by way of
benefits and damages, for the death of their daughter Jasmin.
The terms and conditions of Jasmins 1996 Employment Agreement which she and her employer
Rajab freely entered into constitute the law between them. As a rule, stipulations in an employment
contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the force of law between the
contracting parties.[18] An examination of said employment agreement shows that it provides for no other
monetary or other benefits/privileges than the following:
1.
2.
1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;
Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her contract and to the Philippines at the
end thereof, as well as for her vacation at the end of each twenty four-month service;
3.
Transportation to and from work;
4.
Free living accommodations;
5.
Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental operations, plastic
surgery charges and lenses, and medical treatment obtained outside of KSA;
6.
Entry visa fees will be shared equally between her and her employer, but the
exit/re-entry visa fees, fees for Iqama issuance, renewal, replacement, passport
renewal, sponsorship transfer and other liabilities shall be borne by her;
7.
Thirty days paid vacation leave with round trip tickets to Manila after twenty
four-months of continuous service;
8.
Eight days public holidays per year;
9.
The indemnity benefit due her at the end of her service will be calculated as
per labor laws of KSA.
Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for insurance, or for accident, death or other
benefits that the Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the labor tribunals and appellate court granted
variably in the guise of compensatory damages.
However, the absence of provisions for social security and other benefits does not make Jasmins
employment contract infirm. Under KSA law, her foreign employer is not obliged to provide her these
benefits; and neither is Jasmin entitled to minimum wage unless of course the KSA labor laws have been
amended to the opposite effect, or that a bilateral wage agreement has been entered into.
Our next inquiry is, should Jasmins death be considered as work-connected and thus
compensable? The evidence indicates that it is not. At the time of her death, she was not on duty, or else
evidence to the contrary would have been adduced. Neither was she within hospital premises at the time.
Instead, she was at her dormitory room on personal time when she died. Neither has it been shown, nor
does the evidence suggest, that at the time she died, Jasmin was performing an act reasonably necessary
or incidental to her employment as nurse, because she was at her dormitory room. It is reasonable to
suppose that all her work is performed at the Al-birk Hospital, and not at her dormitory room.
We cannot expect that the foreign employer should ensure her safety even while she is not on
duty. It is not fair to require employers to answer even for their employees personal time away from work,
which the latter are free to spend of their own choosing. Whether they choose to spend their free time in
the pursuit of safe or perilous undertakings, in the company of friends or strangers, lovers or enemies, this
is not one area which their employers should be made accountable for. While we have emphasized the
need to observe official work time strictly, [19] what an employee does on free time is beyond the employers
sphere of inquiry.
While the employers premises may be defined very broadly not only to include premises owned by
it, but also premises it leases, hires, supplies or uses, [20] we are not prepared to rule that the dormitory
wherein Jasmin stayed should constitute employers premises as would allow a finding that death or injury
therein is considered to have been incurred or sustained in the course of or arose out of her
employment. There are certainly exceptions,[21] but they do not appear to apply here. Moreover, a
complete determination would have to depend on the unique circumstances obtaining and the overall
factual environment of the case, which are here lacking.
But, did Jasmin commit suicide? Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon vehemently insist that she did;
thus, her heirs may not claim benefits or damages based on criminal aggression. On the other hand, the
Cuaresmas do not believe so.
The Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while halfway into her
employment contract. It is beyond human comprehension that a 25-year old Filipina, in the prime of her
life and working abroad with a chance at making a decent living with a high-paying job which she could not
find in her own country, would simply commit suicide for no compelling reason.
The Saudi police and autopsy reports which state that Jasmin is a likely/or apparent victim of
poisoning are patently inconclusive. They are thus unreliable as evidence.
On the contrary, the autopsy report of the Cabanatuan City Health Officer and the exhumation
report of the NBI categorically and unqualifiedly show that Jasmin sustained external and internal injuries,
specifically abrasions at her inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left and
right ears; lacerated wounds and hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and
hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest; a fractured
rib; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora of the vaginal area. The NBI toxicology
report came up negative on the presence of poison.
All these show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly raped prior to her death.
Even if we were to agree with the Saudi police and autopsy reports that indicate Jasmin was
poisoned to death, we do not believe that it was self-induced. If ever Jasmin was poisoned, the assailants
who beat her up and possibly raped her are certainly responsible therefor.
We are not exactly ignorant of what goes on with our OFWs. Nor is the rest of the world blind to the
realities of life being suffered by migrant workers in the hands of some foreign employers. It is
inconceivable that our Filipina women would seek employment abroad and face uncertainty in a foreign
land, only to commit suicide for unexplained reasons. Deciding to leave their family, loved ones, and the
comfort and safety of home, to work in a strange land requires unrivaled strength and courage. Indeed,
many of our women OFWs who are unfortunate to end up with undesirable employers have been there
more times than they care to, beaten up and broken in body yet they have remained strong in mind,
refusing to give up the will to live. Raped, burned with cigarettes, kicked in the chest with sharp highheeled shoes, starved for days or even weeks, stabbed, slaved with incessant work, locked in their rooms,
forced to serve their masters naked, grossly debased, dehumanized and insulted, their spirits fought on
and they lived for the day that they would once again be reunited with their families and loved ones. Their
bodies surrendered, but their will to survive remained strong.
It is surprising, therefore, that Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon should insist on suicide, without
even lifting a finger to help solve the mystery of Jasmins death. Being in the business of sending OFWs to
work abroad, Becmen and White Falcon should know what happens to some of our OFWs. It is impossible
for them to be completely unaware that cruelties and inhumanities are inflicted on OFWs who are
unfortunate to be employed by vicious employers, or upon those who work in communities or

environments where they are liable to become victims of crime. By now they should know that our women
OFWs do not readily succumb to the temptation of killing themselves even when assaulted, abused,
starved, debased and, worst, raped.
Indeed, what we have seen is Rajab and Becmens revolting scheme of conveniently avoiding
responsibility by clinging to the absurd theory that Jasmin took her own life.Abandoning their legal, moral
and social obligation (as employer and recruiter) to assist Jasmins family in obtaining justice for her death,
they immediately gave up on Jasmins case, which has remained under investigation as the autopsy and
police reports themselves indicate. Instead of taking the cudgels for Jasmin, who had no relative or
representative in the KSA who would naturally demand and seek an investigation of her case, Rajab and
Becmen chose to take the most convenient route to avoiding and denying liability, by casting Jasmins fate
to oblivion. It appears from the record that to this date, no follow up of Jasmins case was ever made at all
by them, and they seem to have expediently treated Jasmins death as a closed case. Despite being given
the lead via the autopsy and toxicology reports of the Philippine authorities, they failed and refused to act
and pursue justice for Jasmins sake and to restore honor to her name.
Indeed, their nonchalant and uncaring attitude may be seen from how Jasmins remains were
repatriated. No official representative from Rajab or Becmen was kind enough to make personal
representations with Jasmins parents, if only to extend their condolences or sympathies; instead, a mere
colleague, nurse Jessie Fajardo, was designated to accompany Jasmins body home.
Of all lifes tragedies, the death of ones own child must be the most painful for a parent. Not
knowing why or how Jasmins life was snuffed out makes the pain doubly unbearable for Jasmins parents,
and further aggravated by Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcons baseless insistence and accusation that it
was a self-inflicted death, a mortal sin by any religious standard.
Thus we categorically hold, based on the evidence; the actual experiences of our OFWs; and the
resilient and courageous spirit of the Filipina that transcends the vilest desecration of her physical self, that
Jasmin did not commit suicide but a victim of murderous aggression.
Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcons indifference to Jasmins case has caused unfathomable pain and
suffering upon her parents. They have turned away from their moral obligation, as employer and recruiter
and as entities laden with social and civic obligations in society, to pursue justice for and in behalf of
Jasmin, her parents and those she left behind. Possessed with the resources to determine the truth and to
pursue justice, they chose to stand idly for the sake of convenience and in order that they may avoid
pecuniary liability, turning a blind eye to the Philippine authorities autopsy and toxicology reports instead
of taking action upon them as leads in pursuing justice for Jasmins death. They have placed their own
financial and corporate interests above their moral and social obligations, and chose to secure and insulate
themselves from the perceived responsibility of having to answer for and indemnify Jasmins heirs for her
death.
Under Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
[22]
the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in country or overseas, in general,
and Filipino migrant workers, in particular. [23] The State shall provide adequate and timely social, economic
and legal services to Filipino migrant workers. [24] The rights and interest of distressed[25] overseas Filipinos,
in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular, documented or undocumented, are adequately
protected and safeguarded.[26]
Becmen and White Falcon, as licensed local recruitment agencies, miserably failed to abide by the
provisions of R.A. 8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend assistance to their deployed OFWs,
especially those in distress. Instead, they abandoned Jasmins case and allowed it to remain unsolved to
further their interests and avoid anticipated liability which parents or relatives of Jasmin would certainly
exact from them. They willfully refused to protect and tend to the welfare of the deceased Jasmin, treating
her case as just one of those unsolved crimes that is not worth wasting their time and resources on. The
evidence does not even show that Becmen and Rajab lifted a finger to provide legal representation and
seek an investigation of Jasmins case. Worst of all, they unnecessarily trampled upon the person and
dignity of Jasmin by standing pat on the argument that Jasmin committed suicide, which is a grave
accusation given its un-Christian nature.
We cannot reasonably expect that Jasmins parents should be the ones to actively pursue a just
resolution of her case in the KSA, unless they are provided with the finances to undertake this herculean
task. Sadly, Becmen and Rajab did not lend any assistance at all in this respect. The most Jasmins parents
can do is to coordinate with Philippine authorities as mandated under R.A. 8042, obtain free legal
assistance and secure the aid of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Labor and
Employment, the POEA and the OWWA in trying to solve the case or obtain relief, in accordance with
Section 23[27] of R.A. 8042. To our mind, the Cuaresmas did all that was within their power, short of actually
flying to the KSA. Indeed, the Cuaresmas went even further. To the best of their abilities and capacities,
they ventured to investigate Jasmins case on their own: they caused another autopsy on Jasmins remains
as soon as it arrived to inquire into the true cause of her death. Beyond that, they subjected themselves to
the painful and distressful experience of exhuming Jasmins remains in order to obtain another autopsy for
the sole purpose of determining whether or not their daughter was poisoned. Their quest for the truth and
justice is equally to be expected of all loving parents. All this time, Rajab and Becmen instead of extending
their full cooperation to the Cuaresma family merely sat on their laurels in seeming unconcern.
In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC,[28] a seaman who was being repatriated after his
employment contract expired, failed to make his Bangkok to Manila connecting flight as he began to
wander the streets of Bangkok aimlessly. He was shot to death by Thai police four days after, on account of
running amuck with a knife in hand and threatening to harm anybody within sight. The employer, sued for
death and other benefits as well as damages, interposed as defense the provision in the seafarer
agreement which provides that no compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity,
disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman. The Court rejected the defense
on the view, among others, that the recruitment agency should have observed some precautionary
measures and should not have allowed the seaman, who was later on found to be mentally ill, to travel
home alone, and its failure to do so rendered it liable for the seamans death. We ruled therein that
The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a
companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its
agreement to assure the safe return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by
petitioners who, knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from
some mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone, is
appalling to say the least. Such attitude harks back to another time when the
landed gentry practically owned the serfs, and disposed of them when the latter
had grown old, sick or otherwise lost their usefulness.[29] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, more than just recruiting and deploying OFWs to their foreign principals, recruitment agencies
have equally significant responsibilities. In a foreign land where OFWs are likely to encounter uneven if not
discriminatory treatment from the foreign government, and certainly a delayed access to language
interpretation, legal aid, and the Philippine consulate, the recruitment agencies should be the first to
come to the rescue of our distressed OFWs since they know the employers and the addresses where they
are deployed or stationed. Upon them lies the primary obligation to protect the rights and ensure the
welfare of our OFWs, whether distressed or not. Who else is in a better position, if not these recruitment
agencies, to render immediate aid to their deployed OFWs abroad?
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. Article 21 of the Code states that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage. And, lastly, Article 24 requires that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the
parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness,
tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcons acts and omissions are against public policy because
they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs abroad, who are entitled to full
protection under the law. They set an awful example of how foreign employers and recruitment agencies
should treat and act with respect to their distressed employees and workers abroad. Their shabby and
callous treatment of Jasmins case; their uncaring attitude; their unjustified failure and refusal to assist in
the determination of the true circumstances surrounding her mysterious death, and instead finding
satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence that she committed suicide just so they can conveniently avoid
pecuniary liability; placing their own corporate interests above of the welfare of their employees all these
are contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, and constitute taking advantage of the poor
employee and her familys ignorance, helplessness, indigence and lack of power and resources to seek the
truth and obtain justice for the death of a loved one.
Giving in handily to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide, and adamantly insisting on it just to
protect Rajab and Becmens material interest despite evidence to the contrary is against the moral law and
runs contrary to the good custom of not denouncing ones fellowmen for alleged grave wrongdoings that
undermine their good name and honor.[30]
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine
labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in
keeping with the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between
workers and employers. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code which
states that laws which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
in a foreign country.[31]
The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public interest, [32] and neither shall
act oppressively against the other, or impair the interest or convenience of the public. [33] In case of doubt,
all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the
laborer.[34]
The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconduct on the part of the employer
is sanctioned by Article 2219 (10) [35] of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of such damages in actions
referred to in Article 21.[36]
Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Cuaresmas are entitled to moral damages,
which Becmen and White Falcon are jointly and solidarily liable to pay, together with exemplary damages
for wanton and oppressive behavior, and by way of example for the public good.
Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer
for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. This joint and solidary liability
imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved
worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him. [37] If the recruitment/placement agency is
a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. [38]
White Falcons assumption of Becmens liability does not automatically result in Becmens freedom or
release from liability. This has been ruled in ABD Overseas Manpower Corporation v. NLRC.[39] Instead, both
Becmen and White Falcon should be held liable solidarily, without prejudice to each having the right to be
reimbursed under the provision of the Civil Code that whoever pays for another may demand from the
debtor what he has paid.[40]
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No.
80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 is SET ASIDE. Rajab & Silsilah Company, White Falcon Services,
Inc., Becmen
Service
Exporter
and
Promotion,
Inc., and their
corporate
directors
and
officers are found jointly and solidarily liable and ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of Jasmin Cuaresma,
spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma, the following amounts:
1) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as moral damages;
2) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as exemplary damages;
3) Attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award; and,
4) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
PCL SHIPPING PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 153031
INC. and U-MING MARINE

TRANSPORT CORPORATION,
Present:
Petitioners,
*
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
(Working Chairperson)
- versus -
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR. and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
Promulgated:
and STEVE RUSEL,

Respondents.
December 14, 2006

x------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 18, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59976, which affirmed
the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 22, 2000 in NLRC NCR CA No.
018120-99; and the Resolution of the CA dated April 10, 2002, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[2]
The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:

In April 1996, Rusel was employed as GP/AB seaman by manning agency, PCL
Shipping Philippines, Inc. (PCL Shipping) for and in behalf of its foreign principal, U-Ming
Marine Transport Corporation (U-Ming Marine). Rusel thereby joined the vessel MV Cemtex
General (MV Cemtex) for the contract period of twelve (12) months with a basic monthly
salary of US$400.00, living allowance of US$140.00, fixed overtime rate of US$120.00 per
month, vacation leave with pay of US$40.00 per month and special allowance of US$175.00.
On July 16, 1996, while Rusel was cleaning the vessels kitchen, he slipped, and as a
consequence thereof, he suffered a broken and/or sprained ankle on his left foot. A request
for medical examination was flatly denied by the captain of the vessel. On August 13, 1996,
feeling an unbearable pain in his ankle, Rusel jumped off the vessel using a life jacket and
swam to shore. He was brought to a hospital where he was confined for eight (8) days.
On August 22, 1996, a vessels agent fetched Rusel from the hospital and was
required to board a plane bound for the Philippines.
On September 26, 1996, Rusel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
wages, overtime pay, claim for medical benefits, sick leave pay and damages against PCL
Shipping and U-Ming Marine before the arbitration branch of the NLRC. In their answer, the
latter alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by jumping off the vessel.
On July 21, 1998, the labor arbiter rendered his decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
Wherefore, above premises duly considered we find the respondent

liable for unjust repatriation of the complainant.
Accordingly, the following award is hereby adjudged against the

respondent:
1. The amount of $2,625.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of

payment representing three (3) months salary of the complainant due to his
illegal dismissal.
2. The amount of $1,600.00 or its peso equivalent, representing sick
wage benefits.
3. The amount of $550.00 or its peso equivalent, representing living

allowance, overtime pay and special allowance for two (2) months.
4. The amount of $641.66 or its peso equivalent, representing unpaid

wages from August 11 to 22, 1996.
5. Attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.
The rest of the claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Aggrieved by the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, herein petitioners appealed to the NLRC. In its
Decision dated March 22, 2000, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter but modified the
appealed Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is as it is hereby ordered

MODIFIED in that the amount representing three months salary of the complainant due to
his illegal dismissal is reduced to US$1,620.00. Further the award of sick wage benefit is
deleted.
All other dispositions are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same in its Decision of May 3,
2000.
[5]
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.[6] In its Decision dated December 18, 2001, the CA
dismissed the petition and affirmed the NLRC Decision.[7]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated April 10,
2002.[8]
Hence, the instant petition with the following assignment of errors:
I. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent was illegally dismissed
from employment.
xxxx
II. Likewise, the Court of Appeals erred in not upholding petitioners right to preterminate private respondents employment.
xxxx
III. The private respondent is not entitled to other money claims, particularly as to the
award of attorneys fees.[9]
As to their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the CA erred in affirming the findings of the
NLRC that Rusels act of jumping ship does not establish any intent on his part to abandon his job and
never return. Petitioners argue that Rusels very act of jumping from the vessel and swimming to shore is
evidence of highest degree that he has no intention of returning to his job. Petitioners further contend that
if Rusel was indeed suffering from unbearable and unmitigated pain, it is unlikely that he is able to swim
two (2) nautical miles, which is the distance between their ship and the shore, considering that he needed
to use his limbs in swimming. Petitioners further assert that it is error on the part of the CA to disregard the
entries contained in the logbook and in the Marine Note Protest evidencing Rusels offense of desertion
because while these pieces of evidence were belatedly presented, the settled rule is that additional
evidence may be admitted on appeal in labor cases. Petitioners also contend that Rusels act of desertion is
a grave and serious offense and considering the nature and situs of employment as well as the nationality
of the employer, the twin requirements of notice and hearing before an employee can be validly
terminated may be dispensed with.
As to their second assigned error, petitioners contend that assuming, for the sake of argument, that
Rusel is not guilty of desertion, they invoked the alternative defense that the termination of his
employment was validly made pursuant to petitioners right to exercise their prerogative to pre-terminate
such employment in accordance with Section 19(C) of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which provision was incorporated in
Rusels Contract of Employment with petitioners. Petitioners assert that despite the fact that this issue was
raised before the CA, the appellate court failed to resolve the same.
Anent the last assigned error, petitioners argue that it is error on the part of the CA to affirm the
award of living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance for two months because Rusel
failed to submit substantial evidence to prove that he is entitled to these awards. Petitioners further argue
that these money claims, particularly the claim for living allowance, should not be granted because they
partake of the nature of earned benefits for services rendered by a seafarer. Petitioners also contend that
the balance of Rusels wages from August 11-22, 1996 should be applied for the payment of the costs of his
repatriation, considering that under Section 19(E) of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, when a seafarer is discharged for any just
cause, the employer shall have the right to recover the costs of his replacement and repatriation from the
seafarers wages and other earnings. Lastly, petitioners argue that the award of attorneys fees should be
deleted because there is nothing in the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC which states the reason
why attorneys fees are being awarded.
In his Comment, private respondent contends that petitioners are raising issues of fact which have
already been resolved by the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA. Private respondent argues that, aside from
the fact that the issues raised were already decided by three tribunals against petitioners favor, it is a
settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. While there are exceptions to this rule, private respondent contends that the instant
case does not fall under any of these exceptions. Private respondent asserts that petitioners failed to
substantiate their claim that the former is guilty of desertion. Private respondent further contends that the
right to due process is available to local and overseas workers alike, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution on labor and equal protection as well as the declared policy contained in the Labor
Code. Private respondent argues that petitioners act of invoking the provisions of Section 19(C) of the
POEA Contract as an alternative defense is misplaced and is inconsistent with their primary defense that
private respondent was dismissed on the ground of desertion. As to the award of attorneys fees, private
respondent contends that since petitioners act compelled the former to incur expenses to protect his
interest and enforce his lawful claims, and because petitioners acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy private respondents lawful claims, it is only proper that attorneys fees be awarded in
favor of the latter. Anent the other monetary awards, private respondent argues that these awards are all
premised on the findings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA that private respondents dismissal was
improper and illegal.
The Court finds the petition without merit.
Anent the first assigned error, it is a settled rule that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised in this Court. [10] Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its
determination.[11] Firm is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater
force in labor cases.[12] Factual issues may be considered and resolved only when the findings of facts and
conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with those of the NLRC and the CA. [13] The reason
for this is that the quasi-judicial agencies, like the Arbitration Board and the NLRC, have acquired a unique
expertise because their jurisdiction are confined to specific matters. [14] In the present case, the question of
whether private respondent is guilty of desertion is factual. The Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA are
unanimous in their findings that private respondent is not guilty of desertion and that he has been illegally
terminated from his employment. After a review of the records of the instant case, this Court finds no
cogent reason to depart from the findings of these tribunals.
Petitioners assert that the entries in the logbook of MV Cemtex General[15] and in the Marine Note
Protest[16] which they submitted to the NLRC confirm the fact that private respondent abandoned the vessel
in which he was assigned. However, the genuineness of the Marine Note Protest as well as the entries in
the logbook are put in doubt because aside from the fact that they were presented only during petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration filed with the NLRC, both the Marine Note Protest and the entry in the logbook
which were prepared by the officers of the vessel were neither notarized nor authenticated by the proper
authorities. Moreover, a reading of these entries simply shows that private respondent was presumed to
have deserted his post on the sole basis that he was found missing while the MV Cemtex General was
anchored at the port of Takehara,Japan. Hence, without any corroborative evidence, these documents
cannot be used as bases for concluding that private respondent was guilty of desertion.
Petitioners also question the findings and conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that what
caused private respondent in jumping overboard was the unmitigated pain he was suffering which was
compounded by the inattention of the vessels captain to provide him with the necessary treatment inspite
of the fact that the ship was moored for about two weeks at the anchorage of Takehara, Japan; and, that
private respondents act was a desperate move to protect himself and to seek relief for his physical
suffering.Petitioners contend that the findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which
were affirmed by the CA are based on conjecture because there is no evidence to prove that, at the time
he jumped ship, private respondent was really suffering from an ankle injury.
It is true that no substantial evidence was presented to prove that the cause of private respondents
confinement in a hospital in Takehara, Japan was his ankle injury. The Court may not rely on the letter
marked as Annex B and attached to private respondents Position Paper because it was unsigned and it was
not established who executed the same. [17] However, the result of the x-ray examination conducted by the
LLN Medical Services, Inc. on August 26, 1996, right after private respondent was repatriated to
thePhilippines, clearly showed that there is a soft-tissue swelling around his ankle joint. [18] This evidence is
consistent with private respondents claim that he was then suffering from an ankle injury which caused
him to jump off the ship.
As to petitioners contention that private respondent could not have traversed the distance between
the ship and the shore if he was indeed suffering from unbearable pain by reason of his ankle injury,
suffice it to say that private respondent is an able-bodied seaman and that with the full use of both his
arms and the help of a life jacket, was able to reach the shore.
As correctly defined by petitioners, desertion, in maritime law is:
The act by which a seaman deserts and abandons a ship or vessel, in which he had
engaged to perform a voyage, before the expiration of his time, and without leave. By
desertion, in maritime law, is meant, not a mere unauthorized absence from the ship,
without leave, but an unauthorized absence from the ship with an intention not to return
to her service; or as it is often expressed, animo non revertendi, that is, with an intention
to desert.[19] (emphasis supplied)
Hence, for a seaman to be considered as guilty of desertion, it is essential that there be evidence to prove
that if he leaves the ship or vessel in which he had engaged to perform a voyage, he has the clear
intention of abandoning his duty and of not returning to the ship or vessel. In the present case, however,
petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to show that when private respondent jumped ship,
he no longer had the intention of returning. The fact alone that he jumped off the ship where he was
stationed, swam to shore and sought medical assistance for the injury he sustained is not a sufficient basis
for petitioners to conclude that he had the intention of deserting his post. Settled is the rule that in
termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and
valid cause.[20] The case of the employer must stand or fall on its own merits and not on the weakness of
the employees defense.[21] In the present case, since petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving
that private respondent is guilty of desertion, the Court finds no reason to depart from the conclusion of
the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA that private respondents dismissal is illegal.
In their second assigned error, petitioners cite Section 19(C) of POEA Memorandum Circular No.
[22]
055-96
known as the Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of
Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels as their alternative basis in terminating the employment
of private respondent. Said Section provides as follows:
Section 19. REPATRIATION

xxxx
C. If the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three months before
the expiration of his contract, the master/ employer may repatriate the seafarer
from such port provided that the seafarer shall be paid all his earned wages. In
addition, the seafarer shall also be paid his leave pay for the entire contract
period plus a termination pay equivalent to one (1) month of his basic pay,
provided, however, that this mode of termination may only be exercised by the
master/employer if the original contract period of the seafarer is at least ten (10)
months; provided, further, that the conditions for this mode of termination shall
not apply to dismissal for cause.
The Court is not persuaded. POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 took effect on January 1,
1997 while the contract of employment entered into by and between private respondent and petitioners
was executed on April 10, 1996. Hence, it is wrong for petitioners to cite this particular Memorandum
because at the time of petitioners and private respondents execution of their contract of employment
Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 was not yet effective.
What was in effect at the time private respondents Contract of Employment was executed was
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989. It is clearly provided under the second paragraph of
private respondents Contract of Employment that the terms and conditions provided under Memorandum
Circular No. 41, Series of 1989 shall be strictly and faithfully observed. Hence, it is Memorandum Circular
No. 41, Series of 1989 which governs private respondents contract of employment.
Section H (6), Part I of Memorandum Circular No. 41, which has almost identical provisions with
Section 19 (C) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96, provides as follows:
SECTION H. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
xxxx
6. If the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three (3) months before
the expiration of the Contract, the master/employer may repatriate the seaman from such
port provided that the seaman shall be paid all his earned wages. In addition, the seaman
shall also be paid his leave pay for the entire contract period plus a termination pay
equivalent to one (1) month of his basic pay, provided, however, that this mode of
termination may only be exercised by the master/employer if the original contact period of
the seaman is at least ten (10) months; provided, further, that the conditions for this mode
of termination shall not apply to dismissal for cause.
The
Court
agrees
with
private
respondents
contention
that
petitioners
arguments
are
misplaced. Petitioners may not use the above-quoted provision as basis for terminating private
respondents employment because it is incongruent with their primary defense that the latters dismissal
from employment was for cause. Petitioners may not claim that they ended private respondents services
because he is guilty of desertion and at the same time argue that they exercised their option to
prematurely terminate his employment, even without cause, simply because they have the right to do so
under their contract. These grounds for termination are inconsistent with each other such that the use of
one necessarily negates resort to the other. Besides, it appears from the records that petitioners
alternative defense was pleaded merely as an afterthought because it was only in their appeal with the
NLRC that they raised this defense. The only defense raised by petitioners in their Answer with
Counterclaim filed with the office of the Labor Arbiter is that private respondent was dismissed from
employment by reason of desertion. [23] Under the Rules of Court, [24] which is applicable in a suppletory
character in labor cases before the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC pursuant to Section 3, Rule I of the New Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC[25], defenses which are not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived.[26]
Granting, for the sake of argument, that petitioners may use Section H (6), Part I of Memorandum
Circular No. 41 or Section 19(C) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 as basis for terminating private
respondents employment, it is clear that one of the conditions before any of these provisions becomes
applicable is when the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three (3) months before the
expiration of the contract of employment. In the present case, private respondents contract was executed
on April 10, 1996 for a duration of twelve months. He was deployed aboard MV Cemtex General on June
25, 1996 and repatriated to the Philippines on August 22, 1996. Hence, it is clear that petitioners did not
meet this condition because private respondents termination was not within a period of three months
before the expiration of his contract of employment.
Moreover, the Court finds nothing in the records to show that petitioners complied with the other
conditions enumerated therein, such as the payment of all of private respondents earned wages together
with his leave pay for the entire contract period as well as termination pay equivalent to his one month
salary.
Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the charges against him
and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his side. However,
petitioners contend that the twin requirements of notice and hearing applies strictly only when the
employment is within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed in cases of international
maritime or overseas employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford
protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines or abroad. Moreover,
the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this
jurisdiction.[27] In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of Employment entered into by and
between petitioners and private respondent was executed here in the Philippines with the approval of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with its
implementing rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. [28] Accordingly, as to
the requirement of notice and hearing in the case of a seafarer, the Court has already ruled in a number of
cases that before a seaman can be dismissed and discharged from the vessel, it is required that he be
given a written notice regarding the charges against him and that he be afforded a formal investigation
where he could defend himself personally or through a representative. [29] Hence, the employer should
strictly comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing without regard to the nature and situs of
employment or the nationality of the employer. Petitioners failed to comply with these twin requirements.
Petitioners also contend that the wages of private respondent from August 11-22, 1996 were
applied to the costs of his repatriation. Petitioners argue that the off-setting of the costs of his repatriation
against his wages for the aforementioned period is allowed under the provisions of Section 19(E) of
Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 which provides that when the seafarer is discharged for any just cause,
the employer shall have the right to recover the costs of his replacement and repatriation from the
seafarers wages and other earnings.
The Court does not agree. Section 19(E) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 has its counterpart
provision under Section H (2), Part II of Memorandum Circular No. 41, to wit:
SECTION H. REPATRIATION
xxxx
2. When the seaman is discharged for disciplinary reasons, the employer shall have
the right to recover the costs of maintenance and repatriation from the seamans balance of
wages and other earnings.
xxxx
It is clear under the above-quoted provision that the employer shall have the right to recover the cost of
repatriation from the seamans wages and other earnings only if the concerned seaman is validly
discharged for disciplinary measures. In the present case, since petitioners failed to prove that private
respondent was validly terminated from employment on the ground of desertion, it only follows that they
do not have the right to deduct the costs of private respondents repatriation from his wages and other
earnings.
Lastly, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners contention that the private respondent is not
entitled to his money claims representing his living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special
allowance as well as attorneys fees because he failed to present any proof to show that he is entitled to
these awards.
However, the Court finds that the monetary award representing private respondents three months
salary as well as the award representing his living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special
allowance should be modified.
The Court finds no basis in the NLRCs act of including private respondents living allowance as part
of the three months salary to which he is entitled under Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. The pertinent provisions of
the said Act provides:
Sec. 10. Money Claims
xxxx
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause

as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
xxxx
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that what is included in the computation of the amount due to
the overseas worker are only his salaries. Allowances are excluded. In the present case, since private
respondent received a basic monthly salary of US$400.00, he is, therefore, entitled to receive a sum of
US$1200.00, representing three months of said salary.
As to the awards of living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance, it is clearly
provided under private respondents Contract of Employment that he is entitled to these benefits as
follows: living allowance of US$140.00/month; vacation leave with pay equivalent to US$40.00/month;
overtime rate of US$120.00/month; and, special allowance of US$175.00/month. [30]
With respect, however, to the award of overtime pay, the correct criterion in determining whether
or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not whether they were on board and can not leave ship
beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess of said
number of hours.[31] In the present case, the Court finds that private respondent is not entitled to overtime
pay because he failed to present any evidence to prove that he rendered service in excess of the regular
eight working hours a day.
On the basis of the foregoing, the remaining benefits to which the private respondent is entitled is
the living allowance of US$140.00/month, which was removed in the computation of private respondents
salary, special allowance of US$175.00/month and vacation leave with pay amounting to US$40.00/month.
Since private respondent rendered service for two months these benefits should be doubled, giving a total
of US$710.00.
As to the award of attorneys fees, this Court ruled in Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[32] as follows:
x x x [T]here are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called
ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorneys fee is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the
latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement
with the client. In its extraordinary concept, attorneys fees are deemed indemnity for
damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The instances
where these may be awarded are those enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code,
specifically par. 7 thereof which pertains to actions for recovery of wages, and is payable not
to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the
lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. The extraordinary concept of attorneys
fees is the one contemplated in Article 111 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Art. 111. Attorneys fees. (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages,

the culpable party may be assessed attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent
of the amount of wages recovered x x x
The afore-quoted Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of strict

construction in the awarding of attorneys fees. Although an express finding of
facts and law is still necessary to prove the merit of the award, there need not be
any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld
the wages. There need only be a showing that the lawful wages were not paid
accordingly, as in this case.
In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing
regulations, the employees welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.
This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate
spirit of the law as provided in Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that [a]ll doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor] Code including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor, and Article 1702 of
the Civil Code which provides that [i]n case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
[33]
(Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, it is true that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC failed to state the reasons why attorneys
fees are being awarded. However, it is clear that private respondent was illegally terminated from his
employment and that his wages and other benefits were withheld from him without any valid and legal
basis. As a consequence, he is compelled to file an action for the recovery of his lawful wages and other
benefits and, in the process, incurred expenses. On these bases, the Court finds that he is entitled to
attorneys fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December
18, 2001 and Resolution dated April 10, 2002 are AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION to the effect that the
award
of
US$1620.00
representing
private
respondents
three
months
salary
is
reduced
to
US$1200.00. The award of US$550.00 representing private respondents living allowance, overtime pay,
vacation pay and special allowance for two months is deleted and in lieu thereof, an award of US$710.00 is
granted representing private respondents living allowance, special allowance and vacation leave with pay
for the same period.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 49549 August 30, 1990
EVELYN CHUA-QUA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant, and TAY TUNG HIGH
SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
William C. Gunitang and Jaime Opinion for petitioner.
Laogan Law Offices for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial and unique
situation that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen
(14) years her junior, was considered by the school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her
services.
Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational institution in Bacolod City. Petitioner had
been employed therein as a teacher since 1963 and, in 1976 when this dispute arose, was the class
adviser in the sixth grade where one Bobby Qua was enrolled. Since it was the policy of the school to
extend remedial instructions to its students, Bobby Qua was imparted such instructions in school by
petitioner. 1 In the course thereof, the couple fell in love and on December 24, 1975, they got married in a
civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro, City Judge of Iloilo. 2 Petitioner was then
thirty (30) years of age but Bobby Qua being sixteen (16) years old, consent and advice to the marriage
was given by his mother, Mrs. Concepcion Ong. 3 Their marriage was ratified in accordance with the rites of
their religion in a church wedding solemnized by Fr. Nick Melicor at Bacolod City on January 10, 1976. 4
On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with the sub-regional office of the Department of Labor at
Bacolod City an application for clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner on the following
ground: "For abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her
continued employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade the high moral values, of the
school." 5
Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay on March 12, 1976. 6 Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y.
Aguirre, Jr. of the National Labor Relations Commission, Bacolod City, to whom the case was certified for
resolution, required the parties to submit their position papers and supporting evidence. Affidavits 7 were
submitted by private respondent to bolster its contention that petitioner, "defying all standards of decency,
recklessly took advantage of her position as school teacher, lured a Grade VI boy under her advisory
section and 15 years her junior into an amorous relation." 8 More specifically, private respondent raised
issues on the fact that petitioner stayed alone with Bobby Qua in the classroom after school hours when
everybody had gone home, with one door allegedly locked and the other slightly open.
On September 17, 1976, Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., without conducting any formal hearing,
rendered an "Award" in NLRC Case No. 956 in favor of private respondent granting the clearance to
terminate the employment of petitioner. It was held therein that
The affidavits . . . although self-serving but were never disputed by the respondent pointed
out that before the marriage of respondent to Bobby Qua, fourteen (14) years her junior and
during her employment with petitioner, an amorous relationship existed between them. In
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the undisputed written testimonies of several
witnesses convincingly picture the circumstances under which such amorous relationship
was manifested within the premises of the school, inside the classroom, and within the sight
of some employees. While no direct evidences have been introduced to show that immoral
acts were committed during these times, it is however enough for a sane and credible mind
to imagine and conclude what transpired and took place during these times. . . . 9
Petitioner, however, denied having received any copy of the affidavits referred to.
10
On October 7, 1976, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission claiming denial of due
process for not having been furnished copies of the aforesaid affidavits relied on by the labor arbiter. She
further contended that there was nothing immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming
of a dignified school teacher, for a teacher to enter into lawful wedlock with her student. 11
On December 27, 1976, the National Labor Relations Commission unanimously reversed the Labor Arbiter's
decision and ordered petitioner's reinstatement with backwages, with the following specific findings:
Affiant Maselliones deposed and said that he saw appellant and Qua sitting on the student
desk inside a classroom after classes. The depositions of affiants Despi and Chin are of the
same tenor. No statements whatever were sworn by them that they were eyewitnesses to
immoral or scandalous acts.
xxx xxx xxx
Even if we have to strain our sense of moral values to accommodate the conclusion of the
Arbiter, we could not deduce anything immoral or scandalous about a girl and a boy talking
inside a room after classes with lights on and with the door open.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner-appellee naively insisted that the clearance application was precipitated by
immoral acts which did not lend dignity to the position of appellant. Aside from such
gratuitous assertions of immoral acts or conduct by herein appellant, no evidence to support
such claims was introduced by petitioner-appellee. We reviewed the the sequence of events
from the beginning of the relationship between appellant Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua up to
the date of the filing of the present application for clearance in search of evidence that could
have proved detrimental to the image and dignity of the school but none has come to our
attention. . . . 12
The case was elevated by private respondent to the Minister of Labor who, on March 30, 1977, reversed
the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. The petitioner was, however, awarded six (6)
months salary as financial assistance. 13
On May 20, 1977, petitioner appealed the said decision to the Office of the President of the
Philippines. 14 After the corresponding exchanges, on September 1, 1978 said office, through Presidential
Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, rendered its decision reversing the appealed decision. Private
respondent was ordered to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and with full back wages from the time she was not allowed to work until the date of her
actual reinstatement. 15
Having run the gamut of three prior adjudications of the case with alternating reversals, one would think
that this decision of public respondent wrote finis to petitioner's calvary. However, in a resolution dated
December 6, 1978, public respondent, acting on a motion for reconsideration 16 of herein private
respondent and despite opposition thereto, 17 reconsidered and modified the aforesaid decision, this time
giving due course to the application of Tay Tung High School, Inc. to terminate the services of petitioner as
classroom teacher but giving her separation pay equivalent to her six (6) months salary. 18
In thus reconsidering his earlier decision, public respondent reasoned out in his manifestation/comment
filed on August 14, 1979 in this Court in the present case:
That this Office did not limit itself to the legal issues involved in the case, but went further to
view the matter from the standpoint of policy which involves the delicate task of rearing and
educating of children whose interest must be held paramount in the school community, and
on this basis, this Office deemed it wise to uphold the judgment and action of the school
authorities in terminating the services of a teacher whose actuations and behavior, in the
belief of the school authorities, had spawned ugly rumors that had cast serious doubts on
her integrity, a situation which was considered by them as not healthy for a school campus,
believing that a school teacher should at all times act with utmost circumspection and
conduct herself beyond reproach and above suspicion; 19
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner relies on the following grounds for the reversal of the aforesaid
resolution of public respondent, viz.:
1. The dismissal or termination of petitioner's employment, despite Tay Tung's claim to the
contrary, was actually based on her marriage with her pupil and is, therefore, illegal.
2. Petitioner's right to due process under the Constitution was violated when the hearsay
affidavits of Laddy Maselliones, Eleuterio Despi, Pina D. Chiu, and Ong Lee Bing, were
admitted and considered in evidence without presenting the affiants as witnesses and
affording the petitioner the right to confront and cross-examine them.
3. No sufficient proofs were adduced to show that petitioner committed serious misconduct
or breached the trust reposed on her by her employer or committed any of the other
grounds enumerated in Article 283 (Now Article 282) of the Labor Code which will justify the
termination of her employment. 20
We first dispose of petitioner's claim that her right to due process was violated. We do not agree. There is
no denial of due process where a party was afforded an opportunity to present his side. Also, the procedure
by which issues are resolved based on position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence is
recognized as not violative of such right. Moreover, petitioner could have insisted on a hearing to confront
and cross-examine the affiants but she did not do so, obviously because she was convinced that the case
involves a question of law. Besides, said affidavits were also cited and discussed by her in the proceedings
before the Ministry of Labor.
Now, on the merits. Citing its upright intention to preserve the respect of the community toward the
teachers and to strengthen the educational system, private respondent submits that petitioner's
actuations as a teacher constitute serious misconduct, if not an immoral act, a breach of trust and
confidence reposed upon her and, thus, a valid and just ground to terminate her services. It argues that as
a school teacher who exercises substitute parental authority over her pupils inside the school campus,
petitioner had moral ascendancy over Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not abuse such authority and
respect extended to her. Furthermore, it charged petitioner with having allegedly violated the Code of
Ethics for teachers the pertinent provision of which states that a "school official or teacher should never
take advantage of his/her position to court a pupil or student." 21
On the other hand, petitioner maintains that there was no ground to terminate her services as there is
nothing wrong with a teacher falling in love with her pupil and, subsequently, contracting a lawful marriage
with him. She argued that she was dismissed because of her marriage with Bobby Qua This contention was
sustained in the aforesaid decision of the National Labor Relations Commission thus:
. . . One thing, however, has not escaped our observation: That the application for clearance
was filed only after more than one month elapsed from the date of appellant's marriage to
Bobby Qua Certainly, such belated application for clearance weakens instead of
strengthening the cause of petitioner-appellee. The alleged immoral acts transpired before
the marriage and if it is these alleged undignified conduct that triggered the intended
separation, then why was the present application for clearance not filed at that time when
the alleged demoralizing effect was still fresh and abrasive? 22
After a painstaking perusal of the records, we are of the considered view that the determination of the
legality of the dismissal hinges on the issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that
the antecedent facts which culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute
immorality and/or grave misconduct. To constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case
must be holistically considered and evaluated in the light of prevailing norms of conduct and the applicable
law. Contrary to what petitioner had insisted on from the very start, what is before us is a factual question,
the resolution of which is better left to the trier of facts.
Considering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are constrained to review the factual
conclusions arrived at by public respondent, and to nullify his decision through the extraordinary writ of
certiorari if the same is tainted by absence or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The
findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence; otherwise, this Court is not bound thereby. 23
We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion. As vividly and forcefully observed by
him in his original decision:
Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of Labor (actually the records
referred to are the affidavits attached as Annexes "A" to "D" of the position paper dated
August 10, 1976 filed by appellee at the arbitration proceedings) in arriving at his decision
are unbelievable and unworthy of credit, leaving many question unanswered by a rational
mind. For one thing, the affidavits refer to certain times of the day during off school hours
when appellant and her student were found together in one of the classrooms of the school.
But the records of the case present a ready answer: appellant was giving remedial
instruction to her student and the school was the most convenient place to serve the
purpose. What is glaring in the affidavits is the complete absence of specific immoral acts
allegedly committed by appellant and her student. For another, and very important at that,
the alleged acts complained of invariably happened from September to December, 1975, but
the disciplinenary action imposed by appellee was sought only in February, 1976, and what
is more, the affidavits were executed only in August, 1976 and from all indications, were
prepared by appellee or its counsel. The affidavits heavily relied upon by appellee are clearly
the product of after-thought. . . . The action pursued by appellee in dismissing appellant over
one month after her marriage, allegedly based on immoral acts committed even much
earlier, is open to basis of the action sought seriously doubted; on the question. The basis of
the action sought is seriously doubted; on the contrary, we are more inclined to believe that
appellee had certain selfish, ulterior and undisclosed motives known only to itself. 24
As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there was no direct evidence to
show that immoral acts were committed. Nonetheless, indulging in a patently unfair conjecture, he
concluded that "it is however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what
transpired during those times." 25 In reversing his decision, the National Labor Relations Commission
observed that the assertions of immoral acts or conducts are gratuitous and that there is no direct
evidence to support such claim, 26 a finding which herein public respondent himself shared.
We are, therefore, at a loss as to how public respondent could adopt the volte-face in the questioned
resolution, which we hereby reject, despite his prior trenchant observations hereinbefore quoted. What is
revealing however, is that the reversal of his original decision is inexplicably based on unsubstantiated
surmises and non sequiturs which he incorporated in his assailed resolution in this wise:
. . . While admittedly, no one directly saw Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua doing immoral acts
inside the classroom it seems obvious and this Office is convinced that such a happening
indeed transpired within the solitude of the classrom after regular class hours. The marriage
between Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua is the best proof which confirms the suspicion that the
two indulged in amorous relations in that place during those times of the day. . . . 27
With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the
alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent
utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If the two
eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to
the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to
this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the
circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of
contemporary social mores.
It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and educating children is being
unnecessarily bannered to justify the dismissal of petitioner. This policy, however, is not at odds with and
should not be capitalized on to defeat the security of tenure granted by the Constitution to labor. In
termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the
employer and his failure to do so would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as unwarranted and
illegal. It being apparent, however, that the relationship between petitioner and private respondent has
been inevitably and severely strained, we believe that it would neither be to the interest of the parties nor
would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of public respondent, dated
December 6, 1978 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is hereby
ORDERED to pay petitioner backwages equivalent to three (3) years, without any deduction or
qualification, and separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every year of service.
SO ORDERED.
JOSELANO GUEVARRA,
Complainant,
versus
A.C. No. 7136

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL

EALA,
Respondent.
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 1, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment[1] before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel
M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers
oath.
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann)
Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March
2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read I
love you, I miss you, or Meet you at Megamall.
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning
of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts,
she replied that she slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On
the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration at which he saw her
and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he
left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her
personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words I Love You
on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his
wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer
for you that you may find meaning in what youre about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience
eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because theres
a bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible
to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we
spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love
you until the life in me is gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a
lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL
ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS IM LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL
BE![2]
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street,
New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also
learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent
during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted
letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they
attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September
2001, the couple attended the launch of the Wine All You Can promotion of French wines,
held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was
reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page
21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: Irene
with Sportscaster Noli Eala. A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.[4] (Italics
and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their adulterous
relationship supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4.
Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the
matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective families , and that Respondent, as far as the
general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondents adulterous
conduct
with
the
complainants
wife and
his
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral
depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his
aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a piece of paper. Morally reprehensible was
his writing the love letter to complainants bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to
continue his love for her until we are together again, as now they are. [6] (Underscoring
supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint

regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity
thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being
that Respondents relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and
that as far as his relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his
wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is
aware ofRespondents special friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of
marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his
reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between
Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of
the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the
laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the
foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).[9]
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a
lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the
complainants wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family,
broke up the complainants marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the
legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint,
the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his
purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would
be a ground for disbarmentpursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
[11]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY, [12] alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and
Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girls father. Complainant attached to
the REPLY, as Annex A, a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth [13] bearing Irenes signature and naming
respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14,
2002 at St. Lukes Hospital.
Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS [14] dated January 10,
2003 from respondent in which he denied having personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth
attached to the complainants Reply.[15] Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of
a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for
adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.
During
the
investigation
before
the
IBP-CBD,
complainants
Complaint-Affidavit
and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his testimony on direct examination. [16]Respondents counsel did
not cross-examine complainant.[17]
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION[18] dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently
proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not
deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
engage
in
unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution
dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of
the above-entitled case for lack of merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c),
Rule 139[22] of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its
above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the present petition of complainant, that there is no
evidence against him.[24] The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. C) and the
news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. D), even taken together do not
sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with
complainants wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the
accusation of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent
through counsel made the following statements to wit: Respondent specifically
denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in
paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship
was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective families . . . ,
and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the
reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his
purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . .
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that

there is indeed a special relationship between him and complainants wife,
Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha
Louise Irene Moje (Annex H-1) sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child
Samantha. In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainants wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the
father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship
with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored
that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha
Louise Irene Moje.[25] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with
Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that committed by any married
woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void.
[26]
(Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it
was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families.
In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed
at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with
it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a
denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a
fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.[27] (Citations
omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal knowledge of Irenes daughter
Samantha Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a lawyer,
38 years old as the childs father. And the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired information on
DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate [28] with
her signature on the Marriage Certificate[29] shows that they were affixed by one and the same
person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being
the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the
Certificate of Live Birth that the childs father is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old and a
lawyer.[31]
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently
proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the
other[32] which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct
from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or
suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is required.[33] (Emphasis

supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was
not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or
other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an
attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any
of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.[34]

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the
phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous circumstances.Sexual intercourse under
scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman
who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished
by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman
elsewhere.
Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage
should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on the surrounding circumstances. [35] The
case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is
immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this
Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extramarital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such
illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of
fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. [37](Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did
contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case
substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of
Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with
a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low
regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable
behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor
and privileges which his license confers upon him.[39] (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission to practice law which
goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the
Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision,
obligates the husband and the wife to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.[40]
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule
7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation[41] on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainants petition
for nullity of his (complainants) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and
Irene based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case, which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainants Motion to Withdraw
Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the
petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department
Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that notwithstanding the perfection of the
appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in
which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been
taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void. [43] As a
lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [44] In carrying
on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant
was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution
held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly
omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003Motion to Withdraw his Petition for
Review,
the
DOJ
had
already
promulgated
Resolution
on September 22, 2003 reversing
the
dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for adultery. In reversing the
City Prosecutors Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair
estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of
adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to
complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when
complainant confronted her about Ealas frequent phone calls and text messages to
her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married
to complainant[.] In
fact,
he
(Eala)
himself
was
married
to
another
woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant
had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship
involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Mojes subsequent
relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away
from the church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially
since Ealas vehicle and that of Mojes were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she
came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The
happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office
for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said
address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout
after her separation from complainant. It was both respondents love nest, to put short; their
illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a
girl at the nearby hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center. What finally militates against the
respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished
the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful
and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainants
supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for
both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner,
that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus
leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if
respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in
court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court,
in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts
assume in trying criminal case[47] (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct
from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28,
2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippinesis ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of
his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of thePhilippines. And let copies of the
Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.

In Criminal Case No. 16427-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

In Criminal Case No. 16430-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

In Criminal Case No. 16431-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

In Criminal Case No. 16432-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

In Criminal Case No. 16434-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

In Criminal Case No. 16436-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

In Criminal Case No. 16438-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

In Criminal Case No. 16439-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

Criminal Cases Nos. 16428-R; 16429-R; 16433-R; 16435-R and

interposed by the herein

accused-appellants from the aforementioned affirmatory CA decision.

orders from Palermo, Italy,

documents needed for the

established in jurisprudence that

prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the first, the

SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA G.R. Nos. 184298-99

- versus WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. Promulgated:

Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning.

1. The Police Report on the Death

Sex: Female Age: 25 years Relg: Christian

Name: Jasmin Cuaresma

1. Report of the Police on the death

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE TO

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF THE

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE DECEASEDS

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN REDUCING THE DEATH BENEFITS

1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;

Transportation to and from work;

Free living accommodations;

Eight days public holidays per year;

unfortunate to be employed by vicious employers, or upon those who work in communities or

Inc., and their

1) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as moral damages;

2) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as exemplary damages;

PCL SHIPPING PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 153031

INC. and U-MING MARINE

and STEVE RUSEL,

December 14, 2006

The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:

Wherefore, above premises duly considered we find the respondent

Accordingly, the following award is hereby adjudged against the

1. The amount of $2,625.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of

3. The amount of $550.00 or its peso equivalent, representing living

4. The amount of $641.66 or its peso equivalent, representing unpaid

5. Attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.

The rest of the claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is as it is hereby ordered

All other dispositions are AFFIRMED.

Hence, the instant petition with the following assignment of errors:

The Court finds the petition without merit.

As correctly defined by petitioners, desertion, in maritime law is:

Section 19. REPATRIATION

Sec. 10. Money Claims

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause

Art. 111. Attorneys fees. (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages,

The afore-quoted Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of strict

G.R. No. 49549 August 30, 1990

EVELYN CHUA-QUA, petitioner,

A.C. No. 7136

ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL