EN BANC

G.R. No. 204819, April 08, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG AND LOVELYANN C. IMBONG, FOR THEMSELVES
AND IN BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG
AND BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG AND MAGNIFICAT CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners, v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS AND
HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 204934

CHESSIE RACHO & LAURA RACHO, SPOUSES DAVID R. RACHO &

ARMILYN A. RACHO FOR THEMSELVES AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR
MINOR CHILD GABRIEL RACHO, MINDY M. JUATAS AND ON BEHALF OF
HER MINOR CHILDREN ELIJAH GERALD JUATAS AND ELIAN GABRIEL
JUATAS, SALVACION M. MONTEIRO, EMILY R. LAWS, JOSEPH R. LAWS
& KATRINA R. LAWS,Petitioners, v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, HON. CORAZON
SOLIMAN, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND
DEVELOPMENT, HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON.
ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, SOCIOECONOMIC PLANNING SECRETARY
AND NEDA DIRECTORGENERAL, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON
WOMEN, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, REMEDIOS IGNACIO
RIKKEN, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT EDUARDO BANZON, THE LEAGUE OF
PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT
ALFONSO UMALI, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT OSCAR RODRIGUEZ, AND THE
LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY
ITS PRESIDENT DONATO MARCOS,Respondents.
G.R. NO. 204957

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI],

REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE,
SPOUSES REYNALDO S. LUISTRO & ROSIE B. LUISTRO, JOSE S.
SANDEJAS & ELENITA S.A. SANDEJAS, ARTURO M. GORREZ &
MARIETTA C. GORREZ, SALVADOR S. MANTE, JR. & HAZELEEN L.
MANTE, ROLANDO M. BAUTISTA & MARIA FELISA S. BAUTISTA,
DESIDERIO RACHO & TRAQUILINA RACHO, FERNAND ANTONIO A.
TANSINGCO & CAROL ANNE C. TANSINGCO FOR THEMSELVES AND ON
BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN, THERESE ANTONETTE C.
TANSINGCO, LORENZO JOSE C. TANSINGCO, MIGUEL FERNANDO C.
TANGSINGCO, CARLO JOSEMARIA C. TANSINGCO & JUAN PAOLO C.
TANSINGCO, SPOUSES MARIANO V. ARANETA & EILEEN Z. ARANETA
FOR THEMSELVES AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN,
RAMON CARLOS Z. ARANETA & MAYA ANGELICA Z. ARANETA, SPOUSES
RENATO C. CASTOR & MILDRED C. CASTOR FOR THEMSELVES AND ON
BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN, RENZ JEFFREY C. CASTOR,
JOSEPH RAMIL C. CASTOR, JOHN PAUL C. CASTOR & RAPHAEL C.
CASTOR, SPOUSES ALEXANDER R. RACHO & ZARA Z. RACHO FOR
THEMSELVES AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN
MARGARITA RACHO, MIKAELA RACHO, MARTIN RACHO, MARI RACHO &
MANOLO RACHO, SPOUSES ALFRED R. RACHO & FRANCINE V. RACHO
FOR THEMSELVES AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN
MICHAEL RACHO, MARIANA RACHO, RAFAEL RACHO, MAXI RACHO,

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. AND VALERIANO S.
AVILA, Petitioners, v.HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; AND HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., REPRESENTED BY DR.
NESTOR B. LUMICAO, M.D., AS PRESIDENT AND IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., REPRESENTED BY DR.
RODRIGO M. ALENTON, M.D., AS MEMBER OF THE SCHOOL BOARD AND
IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G.
IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIA P. NACES, PHD., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL
ANTHONY C. GAMBE AND MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners, v. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND HON. SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER AND THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioners, v. DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA,
FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, ATTY. RICARDO M.
RIBO, AND IN HIS OWN BEHALF, ATTY. LINO E.A. DUMAS, ROMEO B.
ALMONTE, OSMUNDO C. ORLANES, ARSENIO Z. MENOR, SAMUEL J.
YAP, JAIME F. MATEO, ROLLY SIGUAN, DANTE E. MAGDANGAL,
MICHAEL EUGENIO O. PLANA, BIENVENIDO C. MIGUEL, JR., LANDRITO
M. DIOKNO AND BALDOMERO FALCONE, Petitioners,v. HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HON. ARMIN
A. LUISTRO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, HON. MANUEL
A. ROXAS II, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN,
DIRECTORGENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, DIRECTORGENERAL, FOOD AND
DRUGS ADMINISTRATION, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, PHILIPPINE
HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, AND THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T.
DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADOLUMITAO, M.D.,
COLLECTIVELY KNOWN AS DOCTORS FOR LIFE, AND ANTHONY PEREZ,
MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO
JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, AND GABRIEL DY LIACCO

COLLECTIVELY KNOWN AS FILIPINOS FOR LIFE, Petitioners, v. HON.

PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; AND HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F.
PAGUIA, FOR THEMSELVES, THEIR POSTERITY, AND THE REST OF
FILIPINO POSTERITY, Petitioners, v.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
[G.R. NO. 205720] PROLIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC.,
REPRESENTED BY LORNA MELEGRITO, AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AND
IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z.
CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A.
MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B.
PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners, v. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA,
ATTY. CITA BORROMEOGARCIA, STELLA ACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI
CATALUA CAUSING, Petitioners, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B.
LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS
AND LOTA LATGUERRERO, PETITIONERS VS. HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HON. ARMIN
A. LUISTRO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS AND HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF

INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondents.

G.R. NO. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS
ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA
SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. AND
DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO., Petitioners, v. HON. PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HON. ARMIN
A. LUISTRO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS AND HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH AND ABDULHUSSEIN M.
KASHIM, Petitioners, v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, AND HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred
status, well aware that it is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty
of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with
the liberty of others and with the common good. 1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nations emergence
as a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger,
illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared
towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social
services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every
member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people
and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the
main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and
policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed
set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial
solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial
branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts

its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate.

Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly
embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation visvis the most vital and
enduring principle that holds Philippine society together the supremacy of
the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of
population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic
society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates 2 to
sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by sociopolitical activists to mass gatherings
organized by members of the clergy4 the clash between the seemingly
antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals
has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to
withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
(RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers
from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court,
beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.
Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the
Court now faces the iuris controversy as presented in fourteen (14) petitions
and two (2) petitions inintervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M.
Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens,
lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat
Child Learning Center, Inc., a domestic, privatelyowned educational institution
(Imbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation
Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche 7 and
several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the
generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas,
Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task
Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro
City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privatelyowned
educational institution, and several others, 13in their capacities as citizens
(Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen
(Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the
Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines, 16 in their capacities as a

citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of
Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (PAX);

are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution

which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception.35

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law
provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
ones health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36

The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners

contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee
respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public
funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is
included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom. 37

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others, 21 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria
Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens,
taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also
proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by ProLife Philippines
Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro
Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation,
Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita BorromeoGarcia, Stella Acedera, and
Berteni Catalua Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and
members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and
several others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat);
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ
Foundation, Inc. and several others,31 in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M.
Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) PetitionInIntervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his
capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) PetitionInIntervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (BUHAY),
an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following
GROUNDS:

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices and injectables which

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of

criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it
compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on
reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and
correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is
against their religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5.23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the RH Law (RHIRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are
public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health
Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital
staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically
charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory
sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their
religious beliefs.41
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not
absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the clear and present
danger test and the compelling state interest test to justify the
regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech. 42

The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary

servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical
practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under
the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide fortyeight (48)
hours of pro bono services for indigent women, under threat of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment. 43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by

PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render
reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation
would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to
avail of the practitioners services.44]

The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of nondelegation of

legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by
Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is
nonabortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List
(EDL).51

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is

claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes
them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45]

The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.52

The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local

Government Units(LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for
reproductive health measures at the local government level and the
ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM
under the Local Government Code and R.A. No. 9054. 54

The RH Law is voidforvagueness in violation of the due process

clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment
and/or fine for any violation, it is vague because it does not define
the type of conduct to be treated as violation of the RH Law. 46

In this connection, it is claimed that Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right
to due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their
own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what
kind of services they shall offer.47 It ignores the management prerogative
inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance
with their own discretion and judgment.

The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to

explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his
right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The
petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions
owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer
their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the
service or procedure.48]
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones
family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law
providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon
their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their
beliefs.49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo
reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between
the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters
pertaining to the overall wellbeing of their family. In the same breath, it is
also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are
deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective
commentsinintervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law.
Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the
petitions in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C.
Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral,
Jamie GalvezTan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez, 57 the Filipino Catholic Voices
for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa Risa Hontiveros,59and Atty.
Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective CommentsinIntervention in
conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S.
Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the
petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons
that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not
yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to
question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RHIRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the
Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and
implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and
twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of
the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the
parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the

oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013,
the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was
ordered extended until further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several
questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties. 64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale,
dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as
June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled An Act to
Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs
and Devices. Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they
could not be sold, dispensed or distributed unless such sale, dispensation and
distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions
relative to dispensing of abortifacients or anticonceptional substances and
devices. Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that no drug or chemical
product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as
classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any
person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician.
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on
Population, which recognized that the population problem should be considered
as the principal element for longterm economic development, enacted
measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate
population growth. 67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365,
approved on August 16, 1971, entitled An Act Establishing a National Policy
on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other
Purposes. The law envisioned that family planning will be made part of a
broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to
couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will
be further reduced.
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree.(P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which,
among others, made family planning a part of a broad educational program,
provided family planning services as a part of overall health care, and made
available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all
Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies.
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning
methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to

one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive

health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to ones right to freely
choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its
adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on
Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country
enacted R.A. No. 9710 or The Magna Carta for Women, which, among
others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and
programs for women, including family planning and sex education. 71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept
on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27
million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million
in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the
legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the
problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and
the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modern family
planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples
right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law
made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range
of modern family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to
provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law
criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make
effective the current laws on contraception, womens health and population
control.
Prayer of the Petitioners Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government
sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the
right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated
to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that the status quo ante the
situation prior to the passage of the RH Law must be maintained.73 It
explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives
per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729,
the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a
prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable
and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies
the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay
officials in the remotest areas of the country is made to play in the
implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible
using taxpayers money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all
forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by

ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range
of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the
Court has synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:
I.

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial

review over the controversy.
1]
2]
3]
4]
5]
6]

II.

Power of Judicial Review

Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule

SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM

DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing
rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts
that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and
respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being a
product of a majoritarian democratic process 75 and characterized by an
inordinate amount of transparency.76 The OSG posits that the authority of the
Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is weak, since

the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies

and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with
Congress.77It further asserts that in view of the Courts ruling in Southern
Hemisphere v. AntiTerrorism Council,78the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the
acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an as applied challenge, it cannot prosper
considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the
petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health
devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged on
its face as it is not a speechregulating measure. 80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the
actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court
temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of
its coequal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be
clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere.81 Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; 83 and (c) the judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of
government.85
In its relationship with its coequals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of
separation of powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of
the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of
government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as
unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and
caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or
political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the
Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co
equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the
same time, allows it to cross the line of separation but only at a very limited
and specific point to determine whether the acts of the executive and the
legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of
discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89 The Court must
demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and
principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of
review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of
legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social
legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier
point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative
and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective
wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their
respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If
after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then,
it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line
with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversiesinvolving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases
supplied]
As far back as Taada v. Angara, 91 the Court has unequivocally declared
that certiorari, prohibition andmandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied
in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92Aldaba v. COMELEC,93Magallona v. Ermita,94 and
countless others. In Taada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The
question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a
controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is
raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which
the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
Feliciano, judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government through the definition
and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To
him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or
instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing operation. 95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have
the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional
violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial
review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d)
the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any
actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be
implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not
yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with
violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the
petitioners rights has been adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is
contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable
definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof,
on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature,
as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence
of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOAAD) was put in question, it was
argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there
was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners
and the intervenors rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of
the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe.
Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.

any branch or instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of

Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering
that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is
evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated
earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.104

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged

that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no
actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of
government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to
the detriment of the Filipino people.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted
under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard
on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge

Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their
respective petitions. It contends that the as applied challenge lodged by the
petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and
applied against them, 111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive
health devices that are abortive. 112

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject
petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged on its face as it is
not a speech regulating measure.105

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the transcendental

importance doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing
the requisite locus standi.

The Court is not persuaded.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest

in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a

First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the
First Amendment. 106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the
press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances. 107 After all, the fundamental
right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but
component rights of the right to ones freedom of expression, as they are
modes which ones thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has
been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has
withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, 108 it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but
also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is
mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of

In relation to locus standi, the as applied challenge embodies the rule that
one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation
of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality
of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before
the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against thirdparty
standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, 117 the Court held that in

cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are

involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed
to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right
of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and
taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed
through an asapplied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted
liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected
by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental
importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing nontraditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may
not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects
and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny
that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social
and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper
and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the
wellentrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible
tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis
supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the
public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for
the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and
expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that
the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep
division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that
the petitions raise issues of transcendental importancewarranting
immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right
to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need
not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when
rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do

so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to
irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions
for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. 120 Suffice
it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the
Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over
which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has farreaching implications
and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.121
One SubjectOne Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that
it violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, 122 prescribing the one
subjectone title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health
with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent to act as a population
control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth
or population control measure,124 and that the concepts of responsible
parenthood and reproductive health are both interrelated as they are
inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees
it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is
geared towards the reduction of the countrys population. While it claims to
save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes
pregnancypreventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the
need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access
to information on the full range of modern family planning products and
methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however, are
clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the
manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births
in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide prenatal and
postnatal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the
dissemination of information and provisions on access to medicallysafe, non
abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care
services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent
pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the
RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are

related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained,
the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care
including preand postnatal services, prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the
Magna Carta for Women.128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis
Joseph G. Escudero, it was written:
It is wellsettled that the one titleone subject rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule so as not to cripple or impede
legislation. [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that
both reproductive health and responsible parenthood are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth.
As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and guarantees the
human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development,
the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education
and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law
must not be so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.129 Considering
the close intimacy between reproductive health and responsible parenthood
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving sustainable human
development as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe
that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of
the assailed legislation.
II SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health
of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed
legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions
abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion,
Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb as an abortifacient;
thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to
implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford
protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only nonabortifacient
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal,
nonabortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical
research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to
kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131 As it opposes the initiation of
life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State
sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the
dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food
and Drug Administration(FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be
used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that
abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the
agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and
supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes. 133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They
contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law
emphasizes that only nonabortifacient reproductive health care services,
methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the
public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that
contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law
was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with
the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it
is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination
and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on
determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of

ones right to life is not violated considering that various studies of the WHO
show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law
specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the
implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136
The Courts Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to
life.137 Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on
natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a
particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or
the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in
the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729,
entitled An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on
contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion
of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous
international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote
population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long
term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of
contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of
public health, particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting womens
rights and health and the overall promotion of the familys wellbeing. Thus,
aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or The Population Act of the
Philippines and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the The Magna Carta of
Women were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine
national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone
principles: principle of noabortion and theprinciple of non
coercion.141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely
grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional
protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee
religious freedom.

this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation,
however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could
express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the
particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents
in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception.
This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of.
For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen
because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the
scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving
the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is
synonymous with fertilization of the female ovum by the male sperm. 142 On
the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to
the implantation of the fertilized ovum in the uterus. 143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should
be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case
of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144

When Life Begins*

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well
settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should
be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according
to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at

The raison d tre for the rule is essentially twofold: First, because it is
assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express

the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is

not primarily a lawyers document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule
of law to prevail.

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum

is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.150

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word
conception which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable
sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning

of human life, it was explained:

Websters Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of

becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results
in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents. 145
Blacks Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term conception as the
fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human
life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions. 146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality.
In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Allan S. Montao,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of
the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior
to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme
Court, said that the State has respect for human life at all stages in the
pregnancy and a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and
promoting fetal life. Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or
cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the
Framers regarding the term conception used in Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of
fertilization. The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from the moment of conception.
When is the moment of conception?
xxx

xxx

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first
question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically
categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living
organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this
upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within.
Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell
division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no
question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical yes.
At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture.
As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23
chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome
count of 46 is found only and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the
fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude
that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it
must be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase from the moment of conception and
not from the moment of fertilization was not because of doubt when human
life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception was
described by us here before with the scientific phrase fertilized ovum may be
beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase
from the moment of conception.152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection
under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word unborn is sufficient for the purpose
of writing a Constitution, without specifying from the moment of conception.
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to
the Commissioners own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define
when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after
fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now
determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There
can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point.
Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise during the period of
interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed
right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of from the moment of conception, does this mean
when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine
whether certain contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not
because it is a fact that some of the socalled contraceptives deter the rooting
of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next
process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take
root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the
opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if
we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives
should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called
abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned
under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to
state whether or not these certain contraceptives are abortifacient.
Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are
already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations abovequoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the
Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both
the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that
is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female
ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that
to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine
when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not
intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact,
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a
constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination
of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which
should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. 155 From
the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum
should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives

that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and
those that similarly take actionprior to fertilization should be deemed non
abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. Gascon: x x x x. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro

life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but
also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear
free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic
implications of the term protection of the life of the unborn from the moment
of conception. I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I
interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask
that question again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception we are also actually saying no, not maybe, to
certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time.
Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be
preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some
contraceptives, such as the intrauterine device which actually stops the egg
which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say
from the moment of conception, what really occurs is that some of these
contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is
even admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded
that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as
abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor,
but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And its not, I have to admit its not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical
foundation. Mosbys Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines
conception as the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a
spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote.159 It describes
fertilization as the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from
which the embryo develops.160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by
medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human
person) begins at the moment of fertilizationwith the union of the egg and
the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic
composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: Human
development begins after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells
during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence
of events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a
secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the
haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes
to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid
cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being. 162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position.

They wrote: Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical

landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct
human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes
present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the
diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo
now exists as a genetic unity.
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with
a Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill) and
therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that
PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at
this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives
are sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those
new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would
be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins
immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the
continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a potential human being
can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot
escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human
organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically
well defined moment of conception. This conclusion is objective,
consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific
ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human
embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment
of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical
parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism
and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well
defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the ponente cannot subscribe to the theory advocated
by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation.165 According to him,
fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the
reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous.166 Citing a letter
of the WHO, he wrote that medical authorities confirm that the implantation of
the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected.167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or

scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the
viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate
object it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes.168Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience
by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute
textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

x x x.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

x x x.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization

of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the
uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religiousbased
divisiveness.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes abortion and

abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in
protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature
from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the
Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was
captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the
protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intentionis to make sure that there would be no proabortion laws
ever passedby Congress or any proabortion decision passed by
the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and
actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any
determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds thatthe RH Law itself
clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with
provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum
and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation. 170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of
the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the
fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] x x x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. For the purpose of this Act, the following
terms shall be defined as follows:

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods,
facilities, services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well
being by addressing reproductive healthrelated problems. It also includes
sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal
relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:

x x x.
2] x x x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to
decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the number,
spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning
reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the
information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual
health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health
rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] x x x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. Except for prevailing laws against abortion,
any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction,
administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the
Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting
abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient
as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb upon
determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from
the moment of fertilization. By using the word or, the RH Law prohibits not

only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce
abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers
womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mothers womb,
upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH
Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The
conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or
device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively
above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the
fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb is an abortifacient
(third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins
only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either
that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise
suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the
fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum
must be protected the moment it becomes existent all the way until
it reaches and implants in the mothers womb. After all, if life is only
recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum
implants there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or
destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to
the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the
Courts position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a
fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained but that
instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier.
And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion,
that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb, is
anabortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the
law that any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must
have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made
available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient

as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest
that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency
cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply
will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non
abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of
Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that any
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a
certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on
the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient. Such a construction is
consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section
that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by
any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that
will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RHIRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RHIRR
gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient.
The RH Law defines abortifacient as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. For the purpose of this Act, the following terms
shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb upon
determination of the FDA.
Section 3.01(a) of the IRR, however, redefines abortifacient as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.01(j) of the RHIRR, contraceptive, is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven
modern family planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or
artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized
ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mothers womb
in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).

The abovementioned section of the RHIRR allows contraceptives and

recognizes as abortifacient only those that primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb. 172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well
taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word primarily, Section
3.01(a) and (j) of the RHIRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, the addition of the word primarily, in Section 3.01(a) and (j) of the
RHIRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the
qualifier primarily will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in
the RHIRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered
as an abortifacient if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here,
the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of contraceptive would permit the
approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their
failsafe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that
these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the
definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared
policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be
included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that
do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mothers womb, but also those that do not have
thesecondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in
line with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its
constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be
consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word primarily in
Section 3.01(a) and (j) of the RHIRR should be declared void. To uphold the
validity of Section 3.01(a) and (j) of the RHIRR and prohibit only those
contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would
effectively open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation
of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the principle of no abortion embodied
in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.

2The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it
requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary
and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines
and supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter,
the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is
greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to
women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when
the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use
of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk
of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic
stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial
infarction. 177Given the definition of reproductive health and sexual health
under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the
assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and
satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is
not selfexecutory, it being a mere statement of the administrations principle
and policy. Even if it were selfexecutory, the OSG posits that medical
authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of
women.181
The Courts Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this
regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the
right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States duty to provide
for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach
to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health
and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to
paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug
regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development,
and research, responsive to the countrys health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for
their rehabilitation, selfdevelopment, and selfreliance, and their integration
into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from
substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondents notion, however, these provisions are self
executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of
the Constitution should be considered selfexecutory. There is no need for
legislation to implement these selfexecuting provisions. 182 In Manila Prince
Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are selfexecuting. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered selfexecuting
rather than nonselfexecuting. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly
ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI
prays that the status quo under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale
and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed
by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician be maintained. 185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave
intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away
with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied
with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that
the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive
drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With
R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the
public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the
public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same
cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation,
and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices and Republic Act No.
5921 or An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of
Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes are not
repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not
inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive
drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in
full:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to
sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any
contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is
by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Sec. 2. For the purpose of this Act:
(a) Contraceptive drug is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is
used exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum:
and
(b) Contraceptive device is any instrument, device, material, or agent
introduced into the female reproductive system for the primary purpose of
preventing conception.
Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this
Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an
imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the
discretion of the Court.
This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: June 18, 1966
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921
provides:
Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No
medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall
be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to

the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital

pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH
Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that
the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives,
whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and
baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the
RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. The DOH
shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning
supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate
local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and
distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on,
among others, the current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or
limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground
is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be
measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that
hormonal contraceptives and intrauterine devices are safe and non
abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory shall is to be
construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and
approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine
whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and
nonabortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply
from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a
determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, nonabortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no
predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are safe,
legal, nonabortifacient and effective without the proper scientific
examination.

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and
monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the
guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it
must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and
ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed
drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of
these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected
by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy
responsibility and burden is assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for
any injury, illness or loss of life resulting or incidental to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet
been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the
Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the
FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines
available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court

3 Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not
covered by the constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of
their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives,
whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners
who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of
contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things
dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that contraception is
gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal selfgiving of the spouses; it harms
true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human
life.188
The petitioners question the Statesponsored procurement of contraceptives,
arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the
guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious

beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address
religious sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the
constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes
upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking
reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able
to provide for the patients needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring
the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do
without violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objectors duty to refer is
recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking
reproductive health services and information no escape is afforded the
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(1) and (2), i.e. against a patient
seeking reproductive healthprocedures. They claim that the right of other
individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health
facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the
implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b); and c) teachers in
public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not
recognized.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that
the requirement to refer the matter to another health care service provider is
still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers.
They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 17 of the law are too
secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use
of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory
probono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious
freedom of those upon whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to
refer the person seeking reproductive health care services to another provider
infringes on ones freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an
unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic
teachings. While the right to act on ones belief may be regulated by the State,
the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm
nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to
justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk
or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of
the people (to equality, nondiscrimination of rights, sustainable human
development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions
according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of

responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify
the impairment of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would
be couples to attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and
to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces
individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it
contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of
penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of noncompliance with its
provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide,
support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their
beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom.
The Respondents Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide
that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or
artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point
out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing
accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure
maternal and child health, in line with the States duty to bring to reality the
social justice health guarantees of the Constitution, 197 and that what the law
only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to
reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to
guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be
compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should
be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right
to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality
of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is
unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the
Catholic Churchs sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this
on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not
violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully
balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one
hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer and that of the
citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that
the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the
respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3)
is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise ones religion without
unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others. 202 Whatever burden is placed
on the petitioners religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in
duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15, the
respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity

for wouldbe couples to have access to information regarding parenthood,

family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who
object to any information received on account of their attendance in the
required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They
are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain
the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the
State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural
family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic
hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the
changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years
and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its
followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It
is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and
backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in
practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups
to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is
tolerant towards all the religious people of different sects and the non
believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity,
whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and
enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the
present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in
order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that
shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve
and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime
of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate
this Constitution.
The Filipino people in imploring the aid of Almighty God manifested their
spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by
tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it
means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far
as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in
recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards
religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers
in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the
State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and viceversa. The

principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual
respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the
church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot
favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the
church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of
the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred
over another, the Constitution in the abovecited provision utilizes the term
church in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or
any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the Church means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample
barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the
Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and
Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
Section 29.
x x x.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or
to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two
guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause principally prohibits the State from sponsoring
any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a
strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups.206Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support
or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of ones belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious
freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of
any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form
of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also
assures the free exercise of ones chosen form of religion within limits
of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the
Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess
his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect
or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to
discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though
the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state
regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its
purpose and effect to advance the states secular goals, the statute is valid
despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can
accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 6 L ed. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 4445 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goalto promote freedom of
individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise
clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for
religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs
and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence
individual religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of ones religion is the principle that
the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to
believe, and the freedom to act on ones belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by
ones imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including
religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most
anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to

others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal

standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief,
there is quite a stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the
State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare.213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the
Court adheres to thedoctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been
clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was
stated that benevolent neutralityaccommodation, whether mandatory or
permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution.215 In the same case, it was further explained that
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to
promote the governments favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. The purpose of
accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
persons or institutions religion.216 What is sought under the theory of
accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral
law, but an exemption from its application or its burdensome effect, whether
by the legislature or the courts.217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling
state interest test is proper.218 Underlying the compelling state interest
test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws
burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits.
Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible
Society, the Court mentioned the clear and present danger test but did
not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases
on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of
permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established
institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the immediate
and grave danger test as well as the doctrine that a law of general
applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least
restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit
inappropriately, the compelling state interest test. After Victoriano,
German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the grave
and immediate danger test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent
case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the clear and present danger test in
the maiden case of American Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases

which employed the clear and present danger or grave and

immediate danger test involved, in one form or another, religious
speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On
the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious
freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and
law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been
overruled by Ebralinag which employed the grave and immediate danger
test. Victoriano was the only case that employed the compelling state
interest test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was
inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in American Bible Society,
Ebralinag andIglesia ni Cristo where the clear and present danger and
grave and immediate danger tests were appropriate as speech has easily
discernible or immediate effects. TheGerona and German doctrine, aside from
having been overruled, is not congruent with thebenevolent
neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar
toVictoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious
belief. The compelling state interest test is proper where conduct is
involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects
on the states interests: some effects may be immediate and short
term while others delayed and farreaching. A test that would protect the
interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or
delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would
suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental
right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights the most
inalienable and sacred of all human rights, in the words of Jefferson. This right
is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher
sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised
upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore
the aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and
establish a government. As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere
balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest
is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the
state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The
test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for
to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the
less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall
prevail between the states interest and religious liberty,
reasonableness shall be the guide. The compelling state interest
serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time
affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was
the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on
Saturdays. In the end, the compelling state interest test, by upholding the
paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without
which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original.
Underlining supplied.]
The Courts Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine
whether the use of contraceptives or ones participation in the support of
modern reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or
whether the same is right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief. For the
Court has declared that matters dealing with faith, practice, doctrine, form of
worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a churchare unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.220 The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood
only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court
stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the
Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and
religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can
be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious
convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious
freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right
to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2. The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant
thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section
2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias,
to all methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern
methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, nonabortifacient, and
effective in accordance with scientific and evidencebased medical research
standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and
marginalized as identified through the NHTSPR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also
provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family
planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs
of acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of
Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples
to have the number of children they desire with due consideration to the
health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to
them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious
convictions. [Section 3(f)]
5. The State shall respect individuals preferences and choice of family planning
methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and
cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the States obligations under various
human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs), womens and
peoples organizations, civil society, faithbased organizations, the
religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health
and population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the
priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7] Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond
to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared
responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of
children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life
aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status,
sociocultural and economic concernsconsistent with their religious
convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use
of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of
using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of
benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or
cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to
adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause
the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state
religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State
cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply
because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious
beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One
cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto
Caesar the things that are Caesars and unto God the things that are Gods. 221

The free exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health
manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the NonEstablishment
Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23
and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a
medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and
services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their
conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by
government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line
with the Courts espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor,
finds application. In this case, the conscientious objectors claim to religious
freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law,
unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state
interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily
so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objectors right
to religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that
an intense tugofwar plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him
into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while
the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The
scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose
religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law
violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the
medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on
modern reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an
act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner
Bernas) has written, at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect
for the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an optout clause, it is,
however, a false compromise because it makes prolife health providers
complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or
offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do
directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the
offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the
right to free speech, it being an externalization of ones thought and
conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to
individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for
simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to

utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through
informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious
conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct
or indirect, in the practice of ones religion.224

status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible

liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to
live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good. 10

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of

individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide
access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures
and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the
religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objectorshould be exempt from
compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act
contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of the
principle of noncoercion enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise
of religion.

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour
to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation
or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless,
when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a
constitutionallyprotected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its
disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive
health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.

Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotlands Inner House of the Court of

Session, found in the case ofDoogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and
Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors
under the provisions of Scotlands Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required
to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in
abortions.226 The Inner House stated that if participation were defined
according to whether the person was taking part directly or indirectly this
would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty.227

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RHIRR reads:

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle
was the same they could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be
against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to nonmaternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service
providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such
institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under
Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down
for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)
(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of
information regarding programs and services and in the performance of
reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service
providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the
Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of
our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RHIRR)

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or

municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged
with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these
Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The
conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious
belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they
should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection
accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical
practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private
sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the
protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one
acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in
the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills,
whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by
oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in
occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such
concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press,
assembly and petition, and freedom of association. 229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is
stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal
protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is
any conflict between the RHIRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.

Justice Mendoza:
Ill go to another point. The RH lawin your Comment inIntervention on
page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the
freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed
this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the
IRRImplementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, its a long IRR and I have not
thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. Its Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH
Law. But in the IRR it says: .skilled health professionals such as provincial,
city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged
with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules,
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners
who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be
considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against
the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must
prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents,
in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more
compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of
services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory
character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of
the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents submissions proved to be in
vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling
state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objectors
right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the
oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The
Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Justice De Castro:
Lets go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
...which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the
compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious
objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor,..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I dont believe that the standard is a
compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving
professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter.
This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors
and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit
the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in
number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom.
If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat,
State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also
means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And
this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against ones belief or is
prevented from acting according to ones belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or
health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions.
After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of
their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the
mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply
given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the
other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is
immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on
reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement
of the conscientious objectors religious freedom, the respondents have failed
to demonstrate the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests which

could limit or override a persons fundamental right to religious freedom. Also,

the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show
that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least
intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would
only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious
objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it
behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be
undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of
the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be
addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive healthrelated
procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person
who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of
the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and
cervical cancers, and other gynecological conditions and disorders;

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to
ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as
they stand now, R.A. No. 4729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or The
Population Act of the Philippines and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as
The Magna Carta of Women, amply cater to the needs of women in relation to
health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on
comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their childbearing years; and

Section 17. Womens Right to Health. (a) Comprehensive Health

Services. The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture
sensitive, and genderresponsive health services and programs covering all
stages of a womans life cycle and which addresses the major causes of
womens mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for
comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to womens
religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood,
and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices,
interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre and postnatal services to address pregnancy
and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health
services without prejudice to the primary right and duty of parents to educate
their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including
sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancyrelated

complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children
victims and survivors shall be provided with comprehensive health services
that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and
assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant
to ethical norms and medical standards;

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of

women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and
promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. The State shall
provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate
information and education on all the abovestated aspects of womens health
in government education and training programs, with due regard to the
following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth and the development of moral character and the right of children to be
brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and
strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a persons sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility
awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the
compelling state interest was Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of
thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x.235 He, however,
failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable
sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported
that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to
2008,236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such
revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths
constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social
healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a
measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in
exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set
forth in the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced
to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their
religious beliefs, an exception must be made in lifethreatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the
right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a
referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting
to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the
oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: the forced referral
clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of
religion does not contemplate an emergency.237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the
doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is
impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche
explained:
Principle of DoubleEffect. May we please remind the principal author of
the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of doubleeffect
wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never
justified to bring about a good effect. In a conflict situation between the life
of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always
to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily
the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no
direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the
loss of the childs life or the mothers life is not intentional and,
therefore,unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or
murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives
are equally valuable. 238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures
endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the
religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever
burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more
than justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the
issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable
exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed
provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all

violated. All the law requires is for wouldbe spouses to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not
even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the
seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG,
those who receive any information during their attendance in the required
seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are
completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the
State.
4The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates
the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and
autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the
family rather than promote its solidarity and total development. 240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it
is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted
entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with theirreligious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and
other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning
and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its notsohidden desire to control population
growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social

institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the
decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise
deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply
because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(2) refuse to perform legal and medicallysafe reproductive health procedures
on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of
the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of
disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall
prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal
litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual
consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues
intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the
Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the right of the spouses to
found a family. One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is
shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right to participate in
the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them is
equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decisionmaking.
By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure,
and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a
wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and
endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the
population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241
Decisionmaking involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter
which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would
reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the
number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to
undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses
as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally
guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not
shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their
destiny together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice LeonardoDe Castro, Section 19(c) of R.A. No. 9710,

otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Women, provides that women shall
have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations,
including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children.
Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is
a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law
should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to
decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure. 242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of
marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of
spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to
privacy was first recognized in Morfe v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Fernando, held that the right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it
is fully deserving of constitutional protection.244 Morfe adopted the ruling of the
US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O.
Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony
in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons.
Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples.
Justice Douglas inGrisworld wrote that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy.246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the
minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. X x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services,
whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access
to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their

parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has

had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor
is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from
the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even
if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just
because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care,
advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural
mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say
that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly antifamily. It does not
promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to
protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that
the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective primary to modify the right of
parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to
that of the State.248[Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental
control over their minorchild or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on
matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of ones
privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and
stronglyheld Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of
the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract
of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of
parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can
justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in
the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse
under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a
differentiation between access to information about family planning services,
on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern
family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to
information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the
acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the

second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her
own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that
of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make
informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones
health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be
allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their
parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise
parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in
lifethreatening cases that require the performance of emergency
procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a
miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for
lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the
appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that
is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be
struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to
only in elective surgical procedures, it denies the parents their right of
parental authority in cases where what is involved are nonsurgical
procedures. Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of
an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the
parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental
authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof,
mandating the teaching of Ageand DevelopmentAppropriate Reproductive
Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the
principle of academic freedom. According to the petitioners, these provisions
effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education
even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical
data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of
contraceptives has led to an increase of outofwedlock births; divorce and
breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the
feminization of poverty; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity
among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of
the RH Law is prematurebecause the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on ageappropriate reproductive

health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium
of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they
will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue,
the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the
1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents
in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it
places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children by recognizing that said role shall be primary, that is, that the right
of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. 252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents
in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes
mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in
nation building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age
appropriatereproductive health education, but also for values formation; the
development of knowledge and skills in selfprotection against discrimination;
sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of
gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional
changes in adolescents; womens rights and childrens rights; responsible
teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and
that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RHIRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself
provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity
and physical and emotional changes among adolescents the Court finds that
the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather
than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development
of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive
health education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent
teachercommunity associations, school officials and other interest groups, it
could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the
petitioners contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the
Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection
to their participation in the reproductive health education program provided
under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their
religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed
before it.
6 Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus
violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section
23 (a)(1) mentions a private health service provider among those who may
be held punishable but does not define who is a private health care service
provider. They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a private health care institution.
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts
hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive
health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if
these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive
health information under Section 23(a)(1), or from rendering reproductive
health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and
providing of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define
incorrect information.
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.255Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are
vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning
alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is,
every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of private health
care service provider, reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a public health service provider, viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care
institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the
maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease
prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness,
disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical
and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of
medicine, a nurse or a midwife; (3) public health worker engaged in the
delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has
undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and
who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after

having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in

accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health
(DOH).
Further, the use of the term private health care institution in Section 7 of the
law, instead of private health care service provider, should not be a cause of
confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from
being obligated to render reproductive health service and modern family
planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give
reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures.
Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right
to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and
modern family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from
being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms service and methods are broad
enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical
procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes
health care service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide
incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For
ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof,
and/or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and
access to a full range of legal, medicallysafe, nonabortifacient and effective
family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word incorrect here denotes failing to agree with
a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree
with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide
with the truth.257 On the other hand, the word knowingly means with
awareness or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to
Section 23(a)(1), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services
on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care
service providers give their honest and correct medical information in
accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care
service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions
regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must
be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public
deserves no less.

7Equal Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause
under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes
them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use. They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH
Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law
renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to
expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of
due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice
and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide
for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis
of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that
all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person
within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the states duly constituted authorities. In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially,
and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that
are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those
of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government
including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all

persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality

among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the
equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1)
The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it
must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the
class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute
symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same
characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long
as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the
other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all
others, does not justify the nonapplication of the law to him.
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must
be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or underinclude those
that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied;
citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments
reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution
which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the
health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach
to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health
and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to
paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only
seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the
use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As
Section 3(l) explains, the promotion and/or stabilization of the population
growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health.

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may
have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have
children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge
couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly
humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks
to do is to simplyprovide priority to the poor in the implementation of
government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it
to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate
attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction
sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial
distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational
institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic
freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education.
8Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates
the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that
Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and nongovernment
health care service providers to render fortyeight (48) hours of pro
bonoreproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude
because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will. 262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section
17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as
reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner
and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the
imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical
practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is welltaken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued
with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the
legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged
burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people.
A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress 263 to prescribe the
qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public
welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to
regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking
such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude

connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of

coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however,
reveals that it only encourages private and nongovernment reproductive
healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non
accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and nongovernment reproductive healthcare service
providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they
wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all.
Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render
pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not
consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary
incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate
state interest.

products standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety,

efficacy, quality and fill of container;

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be
emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long
as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render
reproductive health service, pro bono or otherwise.

(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters,

wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and nonconsumer users of health products
to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product
has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a
consumer, a patient, or any person;

9Delegation of Authority to the FDA

(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as

basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spotcheck for
compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers,
exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments
and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products
prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety,
efficacy, purity, and quality;

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the
power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the
Essential Drugs List (EDL).266

(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint
for health products, whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for
registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30)
days and may be extended for sixty (60) days only after due process has been
observed;

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have
the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health
services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render
such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that
health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated
with what is ordinarily understood as health products. In this connection,
Section 4 of R.A. No. 3720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of
any health product found to have caused death, serious illness or
serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all
concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for
the issuance of the appropriate authorization;

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office
to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of
Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary
and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and
regulations issued pursuant to the same;
(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health
products;
(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the
implementation of this Act;
(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health

x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA
are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being
the countrys premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and
medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary
powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of
necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public
health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes
service and methods. From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear
that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are
proven medically safe, legal, nonabortifacient, and effective in accordance
with scientific and evidencebased medical research standards. The philosophy
behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of
Justice,267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the
interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
10 Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH
Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government
units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17
vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of
basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be selfreliant and shall continue
exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently
vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities
of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such
other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental
to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities
enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions
and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the
national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in
their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision
provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationallyfunded
projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and
services funded by the National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those
wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this
Section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such
projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is

that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it

has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the
LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to
the establishment of health care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health
professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be
the national government that will provide for the funding of its
implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still
has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local
government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word endeavor, the LGUs are merely
encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of the
law which can be construed as making the availability of these services
mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law
amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the
autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local
governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not
infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A.
No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to
justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region,
refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government.
These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers
that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner,
be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation
that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable
autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in
the relationship between the national and the regional governments. 274 Except
for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution,
Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to
legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or
common interest.275
11 Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it
to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding
or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law

enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is
not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity
to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body.
Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights
espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the
philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in
the actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been
transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was
explained that the Court is not dutybound to examine every law or action and
whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural
law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving
rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking
away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to
enhance the population control program of the government by providing
information and making nonabortifacient contraceptives more readily available
to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it
seeks to provide access to medicallysafe, nonabortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and
supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors
of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to
achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a
recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one
religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the
society. Philippine modern society leaves enough room for diversity and
pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and openminded so that
peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape
the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and
unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial
issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if
population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the countrys
wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long
run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program
generations ago, are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of
their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These
young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped
them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now

trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one,
Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our
Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young
ablebodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed
down by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be
able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate
would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman. 280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State
should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law
against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the
Court is noninterference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its
duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not
the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a
given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look
into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the
legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy
every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a
particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if
that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial
caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of
interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and
mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Courts function is therefore limited, and
accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as
enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation
and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health
laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as
entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365),
the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women
or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of
the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of noabortion and non
coercion in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR insofar as they: a)
require private health facilities and nonmaternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor
parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modern methods

of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2] Section 23(a)(1) and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR,
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service
provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious
beliefs.
3] Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR insofar
as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or lifethreatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4] Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR insofar
as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical
procedures.
5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR,
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service
provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR, particularly
Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to
support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR regarding the
rendering of pro bonoreproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8] Section 3.01(a) and Section 3.01 (j) of the RHIRR, which added the
qualifier primarily in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they
are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the
RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended
by its Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions
of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Perez, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., tingnan ang aking opinyong sumasamgayon at sumasalungat.
Carpio, J, see concurring opinion.
LeonardoDe Castro, J., with separate concurring opinion.

Brion, J., see separate concurring opinion.

Del Castillo, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Abad, J., see concurring opinion.
Reyes, and PerlasBernabe, J., see concurring and dissenting
Leonen, J., see separate dissent.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the May 23, 2008 Decision3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 00523, which affirmed the January
31, 2005 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, Zamboanga
del Sur that granted the Petition for Naturalization 5 of respondent Azucena
Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).
Factual Antecedents
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the
RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. The case was docketed as Naturalization Case No.
03-001 and raffled to Branch 29 of said court.
Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes in the principles underlying
the Philippine Constitution; that she has conducted herself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the period of her stay in the Philippines, as well
as in her relations with the constituted Government and with the community in
which she is living; that she has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace their customs, traditions, and
ideals; that she has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of
the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473
(CA 473);6 that she is not opposed to organized government nor is affiliated
with any association or group of persons that uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized governments; that she is not defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the
success and predominance of mens ideas; that she is neither a polygamist nor
believes in polygamy; that the nation of which she is a subject is not at war
with the Philippines; that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the
Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China;
and that she will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the
filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 183110, October 07, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA
BATUIGAS, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 9 7 of CA 473 had

been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to
Dismiss8 on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a
lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. Finding the grounds relied
upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said
Motion.9 Thereafter, the hearing for the reception of Azucenas evidence was
then set on May 18, 2004.10
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Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the
day of the hearing. Hence, Azucenas counsel moved that the evidence be
presented ex-parte, which the RTC granted. Accordingly, the RTC designated its
Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive Azucenas evidence. 11 During the
November 5, 2004 ex-parte hearing, no representative from the OSG appeared
despite due notice.12
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It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship

to an alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to
maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family.1
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Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese

parents,13 Azucena has never departed the Philippines since birth. She has

resided in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur from 1941-1942; in Margosatubig,

Zamboanga del Sur from 1942-1968; in Bogo City for nine months; in Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur from 1969-1972; in Talisayan, Misamis Oriental from 19721976; and, in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, thereafter, up to the filing of
her Petition.
Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary,
secondary, and tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools, i.e.,
Margosatubig Central Elementary School in 1955,14Margosatubig Academy in
1959,15 and the Ateneo de Zamboanga in 1963,16 graduating with a degree in
Bachelor of Science in Education. She then practiced her teaching profession at
the Pax High School for five years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil for two years,
and in Talisayan High School in Misamis Oriental for another two years. 17
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In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas18 (Santiago), a

natural-born Filipino citizen.19 They have five children, namely Cynthia, Brenda,
Aileen, Dennis Emmanuel, and Edsel James.20 All of them studied in Philippine
public and private schools and are all professionals, three of whom are now
working abroad.21

the provisions of the Naturalization Law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted.
SO ORDERED.29
In its Omnibus Motion,30 the OSG argued that the ex-parte presentation of
evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court violates Section 10 of CA 473, 31 as
the law mandates public hearing in naturalization cases.
Rejecting this argument in its March 21, 2005 Order,32 the RTC held that the
public has been fully apprised of the naturalization proceedings and was free to
intervene. The OSG and its delegate, the Provincial Prosecutor, are the only
officers authorized by law to appear on behalf of the State, which represents
the public. Thus, when the OSG was furnished with a copy of the notice of
hearing for the reception of evidence ex-parte, there was already a sufficient
compliance with the requirement of a public hearing.

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After her stint in Talisayan High School, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal
partners, engaged in the retail business of and later on in milling/ distributing
rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted their joint
annual tax returns and balance sheets from 2000-2002 22 and from 20042005.23 The business name and the business permits issued to the spouses
store, Azucenas General Merchandising, are registered in Santiagos
name,24 and he is also the National Food Authority licensee for their rice and
corn business.25 During their marital union, the Batuigas spouses bought
parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.26
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To prove that she has no criminal record, Azucena submitted clearances issued
by the Philippine National Police of Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Office and by
the National Bureau of Investigation.27 She also presented her Health
Examination Record28 declaring her as physically and mentally fit.
To further support Azucenas Petition, Santiago and witnesses Eufemio Miniao
and Irineo Alfaro testified.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On January 31, 2005, the RTC found that Azucena has amply supported the
allegations in her Petition. Among these are her lack of a derogatory record,
her support for an organized government, that she is in perfect health, that
she has mingled with Filipinos since birth and can speak their language, that
she has never had any transgressions and has been a law abiding citizen, that
she has complied with her obligations to the government involving her business
operations, and that the business and real properties she and Santiago own
provide sufficient income for her and her family. Thus, the RTC ruled:
x x x In sum, the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to be admitted as citizen of the Philippines in accordance with
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The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA, 33 contending that
Azucena failed to comply with the income requirement under CA 473. The OSG
maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade Law (Republic
Act No. 1180) to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. Hence, she
cannot possibly meet the income requirement. And even if she is allowed, her
business is not a lucrative trade within the contemplation of the law or that
which has an appreciable margin of income over expenses in order to provide
for adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to
work. The OSG likewise disputed Azucenas claim that she owns real property
because aliens are precluded from owning lands in the country.
The OSG further asserted that the ex-parte proceeding before the
commissioner is not a public hearing as ex-parte hearings are usually done in
chambers, without the public in attendance. It claimed that the State was
denied its day in court because the RTC, during the May 18, 2004 initial
hearing, immediately allowed the proceeding to be conducted ex-parte without
even giving the State ample opportunity to be present.
Azucena countered that although she is a teacher by profession, she had to
quit to help in the retail business of her husband, and they were able to send
all their children to school.34 It is highly unlikely that she will become a public
charge as she and her spouse have enough savings and could even be given
sufficient support by their children. She contended that the definition of
lucrative trade/income should not be strictly applied to her. Being the wife
and following Filipino tradition, she should not be treated like male applicants
for naturalization who are required to have their own lucrative trade.
Azucena denied that the hearing for her Petition was not made public, as the
hearing before the Clerk of Court was conducted in the courts session hall.
Besides, the OSG cannot claim that it was denied its day in court as notices

have always been sent to it. Hence, its failure to attend is not the fault of the
RTC.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In dismissing the OSGs appeal,35 the CA found that Azucenas financial
condition permits her and her family to live with reasonable comfort in
accordance with the prevailing standard of living and consistent with the
demands of human dignity. It said:
Considering the present high cost of living, which cost of living tends to
increase rather than decrease, and the low purchasing power of the Philippine
currency, petitioner-appellee, together with her Filipino husband, nonetheless,
was able to send all her children to college, pursue a lucrative business and
maintain a decent existence. The Supreme Court, in recent decisions, adopted
a higher standard in determining whether a petitioner for Philippine citizenship
has a lucrative trade or profession that would qualify him/her for admission to
Philippine citizenship and to which petitioner has successfully convinced this
Court of her ability to provide for herself and avoid becoming a public charge or
a financial burden to her community. x x x36
As for the other issue the OSG raised, the CA held that the RTC had complied
with the mandate of the law requiring notice to the OSG and the Provincial
Prosecutor of its scheduled hearing for the Petition.
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Thus, the instant Petition wherein the OSG recapitulates the same arguments it
raised before the CA,i.e., the alleged failure of Azucena to meet the income
and public hearing requirements of CA 473.
Our Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either
judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under
Republic Act No. 9139 (the Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000). A
third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women
married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which
provides that:
[a]ny woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may
be deemed ipso factoPhilippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to
prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of
their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization.
Copying from similar laws in the United States which has since been amended,
the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects its
intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative
naturalization.37
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Thus, the Court categorically declared in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of

Immigration:38
Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating
otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473,
an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso
facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien
who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her
husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she
does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. 39
As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an alien wife to formalize the
conferment of Filipino citizenship is as follows:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a
Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed
in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a
petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging,
among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not
disqualified from acquiring her husbands citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition,
which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not
belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming
naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or
denying the petition.40
Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her
Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. 03070541 by reason of her marriage
to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of
Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient evidence that
Azucenas husband is a Filipino citizen42 as only their marriage certificate was
presented to establish his citizenship.
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Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to file
a Petition for judicial naturalization based on CA 473. While this would have
been unnecessary if the process at the CID was granted in her favor, there is
nothing that prevents her from seeking acquisition of Philippine citizenship
through regular naturalization proceedings available to all qualified foreign
nationals. The choice of what option to take in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship rests with the applicant. In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a
Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. The fact that her application
for derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not
prevent her from seeking judicial naturalization under the same law. It is to be
remembered that her application at the CID was denied not because she was
found to be disqualified, but because her husbands citizenship was not proven.
Even if the denial was based on other grounds, it is proper, in a judicial
naturalization proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there are in fact
grounds to deny her of Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial
naturalization proceedings.

As the records before this Court show, Santiagos Filipino citizenship has been
adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth
certificate indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also
submitted voters registration, land titles, and business registrations/licenses,
all of which are public records. He has always comported himself as a Filipino
citizen, an operative fact that should have enabled Azucena to avail of Section
15 of CA 473. On the submitted evidence, nothing would show that Azucena
suffers from any of the disqualifications under Section 4 of the same Act.
However, the case before us is a Petition for judicial naturalization and is not
based on Section 15 of CA 473 which was denied by the then Ministry of
Justice. The lower court which heard the petition and received evidence of her
qualifications and absence of disqualifications to acquire Philippine citizenship,
has granted the Petition, which was affirmed by the CA. We will not disturb the
findings of the lower court which had the opportunity to hear and scrutinize the
evidence presented during the hearings on the Petition, as well as determine,
based on Azucenas testimony and deportment during the hearings, that she
indeed possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
acquisition of Philippine citizenship.
The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the ground that Azucena does not
have the qualification required in no. 4 of Section 2 of CA 473 as she does not
have any lucrative income, and that the proceeding in the lower court was not
in the nature of a public hearing. The OSG had the opportunity to contest the
qualifications of Azucena during the initial hearing scheduled on May 18, 2004.
However, the OSG or the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor failed to appear in
said hearing, prompting the lower court to order ex parte presentation of
evidence before the Clerk of Court on November 5, 2004. The OSG was also
notified of the ex parte proceeding, but despite notice, again failed to appear.
The OSG had raised this same issue at the CA and was denied for the reasons
stated in its Decision. We find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA on
this issue. Neither should this issue further delay the grant of Philippine
citizenship to a woman who was born and lived all her life, in the Philippines,
and devoted all her life to the care of her Filipino family. She has more than
demonstrated, under judicial scrutiny, her being a qualified Philippine citizen.
On the second issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA that since the
government who has an interest in, and the only one who can contest, the
citizenship of a person, was duly notified through the OSG and the Provincial
Prosecutors office, the proceedings have complied with the public hearing
requirement under CA 473.
No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to become a Philippine
citizen:
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4.

He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation.

Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession

before she had to quit her teaching job to assume her family duties and take
on her role as joint provider, together with her husband, in order to support her
family. Together, husband and wife were able to raise all their five children,
provided them with education, and have all become professionals and
responsible citizens of this country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both
husband and wifes lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can
resume teaching at any time. Her profession never leaves her, and this is more
than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a charge to the only country she
has known since birth.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the
citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among
family members, thus:
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and
identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the
national treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it
cannot be that the husbands interests in property and business activities
reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership
and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts
but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare
instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and
we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the
instances where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4
of the Revised Naturalization Law.43
We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there is no proceeding
authorized by the law or by the Rules of Court, for the judicial declaration of
the citizenship of an individual.44 Such judicial declaration of citizenship cannot
even be decreed pursuant to an alternative prayer therefor in a naturalization
proceeding.45
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This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine

citizenship but rather a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the
first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare
or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner
acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the
privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements required under
CA 473. Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is
qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way
of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 23, 2008 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00523 which affirmed the January 31, 2005
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur that
granted the Petition for Naturalization, is hereby AFFIRMED. Subject to
compliance with the period and the requirements under Republic Act No. 530
which supplements the Revised Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of
Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien
Certificate of Registration should be cancelled.
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This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court assailing the November 20, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and its June 1, 2010 Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN,
which reversed and set aside the September 20, 2002 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City(RTC-Br. 37), declaring the
marriage between petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert) and private respondent
Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) null and void.

SO ORDERED.

The Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3)
children.
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC, Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC-Br. 23). On
March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the petition. Robert appealed this judgment
before the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261. On January
29, 1999, the CA reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision due to lack of participation
of the State as required under Article 48 of the Family Code.3 The case was
remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and its records were thereafter
transferred from RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as the latter was designated as
Family Court pursuant to the Family Code Act of 1997.
In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their
marriage, Luz was suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and
unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its essential
obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity became even more apparent
during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity,
irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to
cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred
that it was Robert who manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage.
Despite due notice, however, she did not appear during the trial. Assistant City
Prosecutor IsabeloSabanal appeared for the State.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015
ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner, v. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in California,
USA, and had married an American. He also revealed that when they were still
engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt.
Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in her duties
both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following circumstances: (1) it
was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to
keep order; (2)it was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister was
the one who washed their clothes because she did not want her polished nails
destroyed; (3)it was also her sister who took care of their children while she
spent her time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her
schooling, she dated different men; (5) he received anonymous letters
reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he was not home, she
would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house
when he was away; and (6) she would contract loans without his knowledge.

In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes

Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical
Center.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed
a petition for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First
Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision
declaring their marriage invalidab initio on the ground of grave lack of due
discretion on the part of both parties as contemplated by the second paragraph
of Canon 1095. This decision was affirmed by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).
Prior to that,on September 20, 2002, the RTC had rendered a decision
declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity
on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed
an appeal with the CA. The OSG argued that Robert failed to make a case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Luz. It pointed out that the real cause
of the marital discord was the sexual infidelity of Luz. Such ground, the OSG
contended, should not result in the nullification of the marriage under the law,
but merely constituted a ground for legal separation.
The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,4 granted the petition
and reversed the RTC decision. The decision, including the decretal portion,
partially reads:
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[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer scrutiny of
the records reveals, as correctly noted by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity
are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal
or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. x xx.
xxxx
In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the evidence
adduced by Robert fell short of establishing the fact that at the time of their
marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived
[her] of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities.
xxxx
We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellees undeserved marital plight. Yet,
Our paramount duty as a court compels Us to apply the law at all costs,
however harsh it may be on whomsoever is called upon to bear its unbiased
brunt.

FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September 20, 2002 in
Civil Case No. 94-178 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its
June 1, 2010 Resolution,6stating that the arguments of Robert were mere
rehash of the same ground, arguments and discussion previously pointed out
by him, and that no new substance was brought out to warrant the
reconsideration or reversal of its decision.
Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE WIFE UNDERSCORES
THE EVIDENTIAL GAP TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION OF THE RTC
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL
AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL
APPELLATE MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS
CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACK OF DUE
DISCRETION.
III
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his marriage
even in the absence of any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination of
the wife by a competent and qualified professional. To bolster his claim, he
avers that the Metropolitan Tribunal already declared that Luz exhibited grave
lack of discretion in judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations
mutually given and accepted in marriage. The said decision was affirmed by
the NAMT.
Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with different men
coupled with the fact that she failed to function as a home maker to her family
and as a housewife to him incapacitated her from accepting and complying

with her essential marital obligations. For said reason, he asserts that the case
of Luz was not a mere case of sexual infidelity, but clearly an illness that was
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition which incapacitated her to
carry out the responsibilities of a married woman. Robert avers that a
sexmaniac is not just a mere sexual infidel but one who is suffering from a
deep psychological problem.

The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that
Luzwas psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Position of the State

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the

Family Code which provides:

The petition is bereft of merit.

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The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of evidence
presented by Robert was not sufficient to support a finding that Luz was
psychologically incapacitated. His evidence fell short of establishing his
assertion that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a
psychological defect which deprived her of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the NAMT, the OSG
claims that the same were only given persuasive value and were not controlling
or decisive in cases of nullity of marriage. Further, the decision was based on
grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial rights and
obligations due to outside factors other than psychological incapacity as
contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. The OSG also raises the strong
possibility of collusion between the parties as shown by the events that took
place after the issuance of the March 7, 1996 RTC Decision. The OSG wrote:

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Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its March 7,
1996 Decision unmistakably show the collusion between the parties to obtain
the reliefs pleaded. Among others, respondents Retraction of Testimony was
executed without the presence of counsel sometime in 1998, a few months
before she married an American. This irregularity was even noticed by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:
xxxx
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The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General became

indispensable, in the present recourse, when, in a whirlwind turn of events, the
Appellee made a VOLTE FACE executed a Retraction of Testimony and a
Waiver of Custody waiving custody of Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a minor, her
son by the Appellant. It bears stressing that the Appellee, in the Court a quo,
obdurately denied the material allegations of the Appellants complaint and
declared that it was the Appellant who was psychologically incapacitated. The
sudden turn-about of the appellee, in the present recourse, to the
extent of disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and even praying
for the reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is strongly
suggestive, if not constitutive, of collusion or amodus vivendi between
the parties, outlawed by the Family Code of the Philippines and the
Constitution. x x x
The Courts Ruling

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36of
the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68of the Family Code, among
others, include their mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect
and fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.7
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Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a)

gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only
emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 8
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In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr., 9the Court

reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,10 based on Article 36 of the Family Code.Thus:
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(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.

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xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code

requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x xx.

receiving different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within
the parameters of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.

xxxx

The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as
well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity,cannot rise to
the level of psychological incapacity that justifies the nullification of the parties'
marriage. The Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity
contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 11Indeed, to be
declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant
to perform one's duties is another. Psychological incapacity refers only to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 12

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(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the

celebration" of the marriage. x x x.
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xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. x xx.
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xxxx

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(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. x x x.
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xxxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x xx.
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xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that
Roberts evidence failed to establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage. Other than his self-serving testimony, no other
evidence was adduced to show the alleged incapacity of Luz. He presented no
other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on her behavior. Thus, his
testimony was self-serving and hadno serious value as evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not
medically or clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial. Based
on the records, Robert failed to prove that her disposition of not cleaning the
room, preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and propensity for dating and

As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment

do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based
on psychological incapacity. Robert arguesthat the series of sexual indiscretion
of Luz were external manifestations of the psychological defect that she was
suffering within her person, which could be considered as nymphomania or
excessive sex hunger. Other than his allegations, however, no other
convincing evidence was adduced to prove that these sexual indiscretions were
considered as nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable within the term of psychological incapacity embodied in Article 36. To
stress, Roberts testimony alone is insufficient to prove the existence of
psychological incapacity.
In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the
Philippines,13 the Court ruled that the respondents act ofliving an adulterous
life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder,
especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait
already existing at the inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to
establish that the respondents unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a
disordered personality, which made her completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state.
Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the
Northern Mindanao Medical Center, Cagayan de Oro City, was insufficient to
prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. There was nothing in the records
that would indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was subjected to a
psychological examination. The finding as to her psychological incapacity was
based entirely on hearsay and the self-serving information provided by Robert.
Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the
psychological incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that in the case of Republic
v. Court of Appeals and Molina,14 the Court stated that interpretations given by
the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the
law on evidence. Thus:
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Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to

harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on
evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly
void x xx. (Emphasis supplied)
Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

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1.

those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2.

those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment

concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be
mutually given and accepted;

3.

those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are

unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

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The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose of which the evidence is offered must be specified.
In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT cannot be
given value since it wasnot offered during the trial, and the Court has in no
way of ascertaining the evidence considered by the same tribunal.
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis
of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT was not the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature
similar to Article 36 of the Family Code, but the second paragraph of Canon
1095 which refers to those who suffer from grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to
be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portions of the
NAMT decision are as follows:

In Najera v. Najera,17the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of

whether to consider an annulment by the NAMT as also covering psychological
incapacity, the only ground recognized in our law.In the said case, the NAMT
decision was also based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court
ruled that it was not similar to, and only annulments under the third
paragraph of, Canon 1095 should be considered. Elucidating, the Court
wrote:
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Petitioners argument is without merit.

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The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on
the deposition of the petitioner the respondent understandably ignored the
proceedings completely for which she was duly cited for Contempt of Court
and premised on the substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the
woman Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through her action and
reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of
due discretion in judgement for marriage intents and purposes basically by
reason of her immaturity of judgement as manifested by her emotional
ambivalence x x x.
WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having invoked the Divine
Name and having in mind the Law, the Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining
to the Case, hereby declares and decrees the confirmation of the nullity
decision rendered by the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN JAMISOLAMIN with Prot.
N. 63/2000 on the ground provided by Canon 1095 par. 2CIC on the part
of the woman Respondent but NOT on the part of the man Petitioner for lack
of evidence. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)15
In Santos v. Santos,16the Court referred to the deliberations during the
sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to
provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It went out to
state that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon
1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
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In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did
not have the opportunity to consider the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals
considered the Matrimonial Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated August 5,
2004 when it resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the said
Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now
raised before this Court and correctly held that petitioners motion for
reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002,
which was forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which
include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated
June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to
be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate
Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the
husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave
lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his
marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw
the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have
broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother
with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was
according to his friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this
affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later very

talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the
infidelity of his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a
policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol
abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and
attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having
invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant
Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees
the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the
nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2
of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other
than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies of the following
persons only, to wit: AldanaCeledonia (petitioner-appellants mother), Sonny
de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates
(psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of
July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of
the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial
Tribunal, petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and friends of the opposing parties
were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the
latters testimonies, this Court is without any clue.
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the
Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However,
the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on
evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly
void xxx.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose of which the evidence is offered must be specified.
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Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to

give credence to the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
when, apparently, it was made on a different set of evidence of which We have
no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the
evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430
[2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no ample reason to
reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.31

similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which
reads:
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Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of
marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological
nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those
who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and
accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
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The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which
include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated
June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right
to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this
Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude
that the husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from
grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory
his marital contract x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having
invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant
Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees
the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the
nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2
of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.x x x.
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by
petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a
quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner,
therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates
regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.

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Santos v. Santos18cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family

Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the
import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC.
(Emphases in the original; Underscoring supplied)
Hence, Roberts reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To repeat, the

decision of the NAMT was based on the second paragraph of Canon

1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion
of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to
be mutually given and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under
Article 36 of the Family Code. A cause of psychological nature similar to Article
36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon
Law (Santos v. Santos19), which for ready reference reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, dated November 20, 2009, and its Resolution,
dated June 1, 2010, are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice.

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

Velasco, Jr.,*and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.

Carpio, (Chairperson), J., I join the dissent of J. Leonen.
Leonen, J., I dissent. see separate opinion.

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xxxx
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second
paragraph of Canon 1095 should also be covered would be to expand what the
lawmakers did not intend to include. What would prevent members
of other religious groups from invoking their own interpretation of psychological
incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent, interpretations?
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under
Article 36 would be legislating from the bench. As stated in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina,20 interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines are given great respect by our courts, but they are not
controlling or decisive.
In Republic v. Galang,21it was written that the Constitution set out a policy of
protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and the
marriage was the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution
protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the
nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly
reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly
entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness
existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to
adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological
incapacity of Luz.
As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a case for legal
separation. Hence, this decision is without prejudice to an action for legal
separation if a party would want to pursue such proceedings. In this
disposition, the Court cannot decree a legal separation because in such
proceedings, there are matters and consequences like custody and separation
of properties that need to be considered and settled.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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chanroble slaw

Endnotes:

Designated Acting member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per

Special Order No. 1910, dated January 12, 2015.
*

Rollo, pp. 47-60, penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, and

Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren and Associate Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba,
concurring.
1

Id. at 76-77.

Id. at 48.

Id. at 47 penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, and Associate

Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, with Associate Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba,
concurring.
4

Id. at 57-59.

Id. at 76.

Republic v. Garcia, G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014.

Ligarde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 315, 320
321.
8

G.R. No. 159594, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 33, 42-43.

10

335 Phil. 664, 676 678 (1997).

11

Republic v. Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013, 668 SCRA 215, 221.

12

Republic v. Gracia, supra note 7.

13

Supra note 8, at 322.

14

15

Supra note 10, at 679.

substituted its own judgment for that of the trial court by ruling that the
absence of the psychological examination of the wife underscores the evidential
gap to sustain the Decision of nullity of marriage rendered by the RTC.6 Even
the church tribunals7 found Luz to be suffering from Grave Lack of Discretion
in Judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations mutually given and
accepted in marriage[.]8 Robert refers to Luzs sexual indiscretion with
different men and her failure to act as homemaker for her family as bases for
her incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations. 9 He argues that
nymphomania is much more than sexual infidelity, an illness rooted within the
body of a woman.10 Luz was sexually involved not with one man, but with
several.11 She would even bring her paramour to their conjugal home, showing
no sense of right or wrong.12

Rollo, p. 83.

16

310 Phil. 21, 37 (1995).

17

609 Phil. 316, 336 (2009), also citing Santos v. Santos, supra.

18

Supra note 16.

19

Supra note 16.

20

Supra note 10, at 679.

21

G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 524, 543-544.

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The Office of the Solicitor General counters that Roberts evidence failed to
establish that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a
psychological disorder depriving her of the ability to assume the essential
marital duties.13 The church tribunals findings have persuasive effect, but
these are not controlling.14 In any case, the church tribunals decisions
anchored on lack of discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial rights and
obligations [that] is due to outside factors other than a psychological incapacity
as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.15

Dissenting Opinion

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LEONEN, J.:

The Office of the Solicitor General also argues collusion, considering that Luz
had executed a Retraction of Testimony and Waiver of Custody16 without the
presence of counsel sometime in 1998, or a few months before she married an
American.17
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Petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert) filed separate Petitions one before our
courts and another before the tribunals of the Catholic Church to have his
marriage with Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) declared void.
On September 20, 2002, the Regional Trial Court voided their marriage after
finding Luz to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.1

The ponencia affirmed the Court of Appeals in setting aside the trial court
Decision voiding the marriage. It found that Robert failed to prove Luzs
alleged psychological incapacity as to warrant a declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.18
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I dissent.

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On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal) declared their marriage invalid ab
initio on the ground of the grave lack of due discretion on the part of both
parties[.]2 The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal affirmed this
declaration on April 8, 2003.3

Preliminarily, the argument on collusion deserves no merit. The factual

antecedents alleged that Robert filed the Complaint for declaration of nullity on
March 16, 1994. The trial court denied the Complaint. Luz submitted a
Retraction of Testimony and Waiver of Custody during the pendency of the case
before the Court of Appeals.19
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Despite the declarations of nullity by both the trial court and the church
tribunals, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts Decision by declaring
the marriage valid and subsisting.4 This prompted Roberts appeal before this
court.5
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On January 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court by voiding
the Complaint and Answer for failure to comply with Article 48 of the Family
Code on collusion. The case was remanded to the designated family court.
The lower court then rendered the September 20, 2002 Decision voiding the
marriage of Robert and Luz.20
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Robert submits that the trial court had considered all evidence before it ruled
that the totality of unrebutted and credible evidence showing the wifes
actions before and during the marriage leaves no doubt as to her incapacity to
act as wife. . . . Unfortunately, the Honorable Court of Appeals had comfortably

Thus, the issue on collusion was already addressed when the case was
remanded to the trial court, and the city prosecutor would be furnished a copy
of the Complaint and Answer. This complies now with Article 48 of the Family
Code:
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Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,

the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be
based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
Psychological incapacity
guidelines
Examining the development of jurisprudence21 interpreting Article 36 of the
Family Code will lead toSantos v. Court of Appeals22 as the first case
attempting to lay down standards for the concept of psychological incapacity.
The marriage in Santos was declared valid and subsisting for failure to meet
the following characteristics:
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Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I), who opines that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage. . . .
. . . . Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.23 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
Two years later, this court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina24 listed
specific guidelines when interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family
Code:
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(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution

at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected
by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically
ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not
to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
orincurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,

proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on
evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.
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manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time

of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.33 It
also states that [i]n case mediation is not availed of or where it fails, the court
shall proceed with the pre-trial conference, on which occasion it shall consider
the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may
aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.34
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A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC thus codified the ruling in Marcos that examination by a
physician or psychologist is not a conditio sine qua non for a declaration of
nullity of marriage.35
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In 2010, this court voided the marriage in Camacho-Reyes v.

Reyes36 discussing that [t]he lack of personal examination and interview of the
respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does
not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors [and] [n]either do their
findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as
evidence.37
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This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage
and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.25 (Emphasis in the original,
citations omitted)
This court has since applied the Molina guidelines in deciding cases for
declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity.26 In all
psychological incapacity cases resolved from 1997 to 2009 applying the Molina
guidelines, only the parties in Antonio v. Reyes27 were found to have complied
with all the requirements of Molina.28
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Thus, the psychological report of Myrna de los Reyes Villanueva, a Guidance

Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center in Cagayan de
Oro,38 cannot be considered hearsay on the ground that Luz was not
interviewed and examined. A marriage involves two persons only. Necessarily,
these two are in the best position to testify on the others behavior during their
marriage. Put in this context, Roberts testimony cannot be disregarded for
being self-serving.
In any event, Myrna de los Reyes Villanueva administered five tests 39 on Robert
before concluding that Robert Malillin [sic] is psychologically incapacitated to
[c]arry out the responsibility of married lifeespecially with an individual who is
equally emotionally infertile and immature[.]40 Robert quoted Myrna de los
Reyes Villanuevas testimony as follows:
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Medical, psychiatric, or
psychological examination
Luz did not appear during trial. Robert disclosed that she was already living
in California, USA and was married to an American.30 This can explain why no
medical, psychiatric, or psychological examination could be conducted on Luz.
In any event, the reversal of the trial courts finding of psychological incapacity
cannot hinge on this lack of examination.
29

Q:
A:

In 2000, this court in Marcos v. Marcos31 ruled that if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.32

Q:

This court then issued A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC also known as the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. This rule took effect on March 15, 2003.

A:

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The rule provides that [t]he complete facts should allege the physical

Can you explain to the court what is your recommendation?

He is emotionally infantile and immature considering also
that he is of age and as there is chronological age
responsibility, we have profound emotional quotation
chronologically. In one of my interview with client, he
manifested that he was left out that most have created the
vaccum. . . . often times in his relationship with woman, he
would look for a woman, more or less has a mother figure.
As you said in your recommendation, Mr. Malillin is
psychologically incapacitated to carry out responsibility with
the emotional infantile and immature, egocentric and
mother dependence?
In our psychological examination, there is said stress in him
as a person as that of the child, the ego, the adult, the
parents, what is dominant traits in person, what behavior

Q:
A:

Q:
A:
Q:
A:

appear when I say youth, the individual display more on a

child on him, it is the child who is concern with the feeling or
reaction, if the person react more incapable impulses that is
distracted, he is more of infantile than adult, in the case of
Robert Malillin if we cite, he related to me that he is having
some affairs with some women so I can see that he is quite
speaking of nature and individual getting through serious
responsibilities of married life.
Since you stated that you have interviewed this Robert
Malillin, several incidents, have you talk matters regarding
his wife?
Yes, he told me that the wife had several affairs in fact,
there was a short doubt of his first son because upon
learning that he offered marriage, the woman refused and
that fuel his doubt later because he learns that the woman is
with another guys and he said that woman contracting loans
without his knowledge and the woman is not even taking
care of the child.
Considering that Mr. Malilllin had dispute with his wife, he
would say that the wife is infantile and immature?
The transaction is the same because they were both child
and the child here has no decision made then there is
nothing to reach up.
Base on your observation with this case Malillin is infantile
and immature?
Both parties were infantile, immature, what would happen,
just imagine two children living, what would be the
relationship of the husband and wife, they would keep on
challenging each other.41 (Emphasis supplied)

National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal
interpretations
The ponencia discussed that the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
Decision was not offered during trial as required under Rule 132, Section 34 of
the Rules of Court.42 The ponencia added that even if the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal Decision was considered, this was based on the second
paragraph of Canon 1095 on grave lack of discretion and not the third
paragraph, which was similar to Article 36 of the Family Code.43
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Robert could not have offered the church tribunal rulings during trial since the
trial court had rendered its Decision on September 20, 2002, or before the
Metropolitan Tribunal rendered its Decision on October 10, 2002. 44
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The Metropolitan Tribunals Decision even included a restrictive clause to the

effect that neither of the parties may enter into another marriage without the
express permission of this tribunal, in deference to the sanctity and dignity of
the sacrament as well as for the protection of the intended spouse.45 The
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirmed this nullity Decision,
discussing its findings as follows:
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The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on
the deposition of the Petitioner the Respondent understand[a]bly ignored the
proceedings completely for which she was duly cited for Contempt of Court
and premised on the substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses,
the woman Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through her action
and reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of
due discretion in judgment for marriage intents and purposes basically by
reason of her immaturity of judgement as manifested by her emotional
ambivalence and affective instability that were sufficiently evidenced by the
three following more salient factors in the Case which are de officio abbreviated
and generalized for judicial prudence in deference [to] her person: One, THAT
theRespondent already practiced a fundamental ambivalence in her
emotional constitution by engaging in multiple carnal
attachements [sic] at an early age. Two, THAT the Respondent was in
effect ultimately rendered pregnant by the Petitioner when she was but
nineteen years old. Three, THAT the Respondent after her de facto
marriage with the Petitioner demonstrated her affective instability by
entertaining as well several carnal relationships that finally terminated
the union of some fourteen years that were punctuated by several temporary
separations and that brought to life no less than three children. As to the
matter of the relatively long time frame of the union, it should be noted that
just as the mere passage of time does not nullify an ab initio valid marriage,
neither does it ipso facto validate an ab initio null and void marriage. As to the
question of the number of children born of the union, just as there are valid
marriages without children, the[re] are invalid marriages with children. The
presence of children from a union directly prove biological potency on the part
of both the Parties in Causa not necessarily their tenure of due discretion in
judgement for marriage.46 (Emphasis supplied)
On Canon 1095, the marriage in Antonio v. Reyes47 was also annulled by the
Metropolitan Tribunal. That marriage was affirmed with modification by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,48 finding that respondent was
impaired by a lack of due discretion.49 This court discussed that:
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Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then
in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation
of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the
Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of
psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, and as one member
admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already
annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. It
would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church

doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article

36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local
Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly
the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the
concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the
Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular
progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is
merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court
interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.
....

On the other hand, both the trial court and the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal voided the marriage between Robert and Luz. Assuming the two
tribunals considered different sets of evidence, they nevertheless reached the
same conclusion of declaring the nullity of the marriage.
A declaration of nullity of marriage by the church requires two positive
decisions to be executory one by the first instance tribunal and another by
the second instance tribunal.56 This process, though not conclusive, warrants
respect by this court. The decisions of these tribunals must be considered for
their persuasive effect, especially in fulfillment of the intent behind Article 36 of
the Family Code to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith [such that]
. . . subject to our law on evidence[,] what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.57
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As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed

the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion dated 30 March 1995,
citing the lack of due discretion on the part of respondent. Such decree of
nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, and
the Roman Rota of the Vatican. In fact, respondents psychological incapacity
was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence
of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the
Tribunals consent.50 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Najera v. Najera51 came three years later and differentiated the second and
third paragraphs of Canon 1095. This court discussed how Article 36 of the
Family Code was based on the third paragraph of Canon 1095 as a ground and
not the second paragraph:52
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In the end, every case filed on Article 36 of the Family Code requiring an
application of the Molinaguidelines must be considered on a case-to-case
basis.58
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Flexible Molina guidelines

In 2009, this court in Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu-Te59 voided Kenneth and
Rowenas marriage on the ground of their psychological incapacity. This court
observed how [t]he resiliency with which the concept [of psychological
incapacity] should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been
rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards
in Molina[.]60 This court expressed fear that Molinabecame a straitjacket for
all subsequent Article 36 cases.61
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Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1.

those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2.

those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment

concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be
mutually given and accepted;

3.

those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to

assume the essential obligations of marriage.53 (Emphasis supplied)

The facts of Najera are not in point. In Najera, the trial court considered the
evidence presented and decreed only the legal separation of the parties, and
not annulment of the marriage.54 The Court of Appeals no longer considered
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunals Decision since it was made on a
different set of evidence of which [w]e have no way of ascertaining their
truthfulness . . . [a]nd based on the evidence on record, [w]e find no ample
reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.55
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This court in Ngo Te was clear in not suggesting the abandonment

of Molina[,]62 but stressed how courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.63 Ting v. Velez-Ting64 promulgated a month after Ngo Te suggested
a relaxation of the stringent requirements65laid down in Molina.
In 2010, Suazo v. Suazo66 explained that Ngo Te stands for a more flexible
approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based
on psychological incapacity67 and upholds an evidentiary approach:
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By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.
....
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert
testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity,

and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v.
Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment
of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.68 (Emphasis
in the original, citation omitted)
Since Ngo Te, it appears that only the parties in Azcueta v. Republic,69Halili v.
Santos-Halili,70Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes,71 and Aurelio v. Aurelio72 obtained a
decree of nullity of their marriage under Article 36.
The difficulty in obtaining a declaration of nullity of marriage in this jurisdiction,
so evident from our jurisprudence with only a handful of granted petitions,
reflects an absolute position taken by the state to contest all petitions until it
reaches this court.
The Constitution no doubt mandates the state to protect the social institution
that is marriage the foundation of the family. However, the Constitution also
mandates the state to defend [t]he right of spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood[.]73 In other words, the right to family must be based on ones
own personal convictions. The state, under the guise of protecting the
marriage, should not force two people to stay together, albeit in paper, when
they are incapable of complying with their essential marital obligations with
each other.
Right to family
In Antonio v. Reyes, this court discussed that the Constitution itself does not
establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution
and the foundation of the family.74
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The Constitution describes marriage as inviolable75 while the law portrays it

as a permanent union.76 Nevertheless, the state cannot insist on such
permanence and inviolability under the pretense of its constitutional mandate
to protect the existence of every marriage. The states interest in any and all
marriages entered into by individuals should not amount to an unjustified
intrusion into ones right to autonomy and human dignity.77
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The notion of permanent is not a characteristic that inheres without a

purpose. The Family Code clearly provides for the purpose of entering into
marriage, that is, for the establishment of conjugal and family life.78
Consequently, the states interest in protecting the marriage must anchor on

ensuring a sound conjugal union capable of maintaining a healthy environment

for a family, resulting in a more permanent union. The states interest cannot
extend to forcing two individuals to stay within a destructive marriage.
The Family Code provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents [of
marriage] are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,79 but this does
not go as far as reaching into the choices of intimacy inherent in human
relations. These choices form part of autonomy, protected by the liberty80 and
human dignity81 clauses. Human dignity includes our choices of association,
and we are as free to associate and identify as we are free not to associate or
identify.
Our choices of intimate partners define us inherent ironically in our
individuality. Consequently, when the law speaks of the nature, consequences,
and incidents of marriage governed by law, this refers to responsibility to
children, property relations, disqualifications, privileges, and other matters
limited to ensuring the stability of society. The states interest should not
amount to unwarranted intrusions into individual liberties.
Since the states interest must be toward the stability of society, the notion of
psychological incapacity should not only be based on a medical or psychological
disorder, but should consist of the inability to comply with essential marital
obligations such that public interest is imperiled.
The Molina guidelines provide that church tribunal decisions have persuasive
effect on our courts. Nevertheless, the notion of psychological incapacity
should not be religious. None of our laws should be based on any religious law,
doctrine, or teaching. We are a secular state. The separation of state and
church must at all times be inviolable.82
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The state protects the family by not forcing its structure; otherwise, there will
be broken families. The Constitution does not define family, but
characterizes it as the basic autonomous social institution.83 The state should
encourage all family arrangements, whether or not borne out of love or in
love. The presumption should be in favor of choices.
Thus, when both husband and wife, the trial court that considered first-hand all
evidence presented, as well as two levels of church tribunals, have all
determined without reservation that one or both of the parties are incapable of
complying with the essential marital obligations, or gravely lack the discretion
of judgment regarding these marital obligations, the state must be open to the
possibility that there was never a marriage as contemplated by the
Constitution and law to protect.
Under these conditions, there is no interest, public or private, to protect in the
continued declaration of the existence of a marriage. If at all, the couple now
separated and living their own lives are imposed with an unjust burden of a
false status. This is pure and simple cruelty.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition

The accused seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on August 29,
2002,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for bigamy
under the judgment rendered on October 30, 2000 in Criminal Case No. 49808
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, in Iloilo City.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1968,2 Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court of
San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and
Socorro Patingo3 without the benefit of a marriage license.4 The records show
that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to
excuse the lack of the marriage license.5 On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and
Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr.
Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo City.6They submitted no
marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose. 7 Both ceremonies
were evidenced by the corresponding marriage certificates.8 In 1982, Lasanas
and Patingo separated de factobecause of irreconcilable differences.9
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On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban
in a religious ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria
Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage certificate reflected the civil status of the
accused as single.10
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On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and
damages against Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo City,11 which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 23133 and raffled to Branch 39 of the RTC. The complaint alleged
that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in securing his
consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches, psychological
incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to suffer mental anguish,
sleepless nights and social humiliation warranting the award of damages. In
support of his complaint, he further alleged, among others, that:

FIRST DIVISION

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G.R. No. 159031, June 23, 2014

NOEL A. LASANAS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void and
inexistent for lack of a marriage license, is guilty of bigamy as defined and
penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Case

He was married to the defendant on February 16, 1968 which marriage was
officiated by Hon. Carlos B. Salazar, Municipal Judge of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as Exhibit A and
made part hereof; which marriage was ratified by a wedding at San Jose
Church, Iloilo City on August 27, 1980 and registered at the office of Iloilo City
Registrar. Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as Annex
B;
Plaintiff and defendant have no children and have no properties except some
personal belongings;
Plaintiff met the defendant sometime in the middle of 1967 at the house of Mr.
Raul L. Cataloctocan in Burgos Street, Lapaz, Iloilo City wherein the purpose of
their meeting was for the plaintiff to consult and seek treatment by the
defendant because the latter was a babaylan:

Plaintiff was treated by the defendant and the subsequent treatments were
performed by the defendant at her residence in Barangay, Banga, Mina, Iloilo,
the treatment made being on a continuing basis;
xxxx
On February 16, 1968, defendant asked the plaintiff to come with her to Iloilo
City. They went to Dainty Restaurant at J.M. Basa Street. Plaintiff saw several
persons therein. After eating plaintiff was made to sign the marriage contract,
which was null and void for lack of marriage license and based on a false
affidavit of cohabitation. After their marriage, they went home to Barangay
Bangac, Mina, Iloilo, which marked the start of a married life rocked with
marital differences, quarrels and incompatibilities, without love, but under the
uncontrollable fear of harm that should befall him should he not follow her;

legal.
The plaintiff Noel Lasanas is hereby ordered to give monthly support to his
wife, the defendant in this case, Ma. Socorro Patingo in the amount of
P3,000.00 a month, from the time that she filed her answer with counterclaim
on February 3, 1997, pursuant to Article 203 of the Family Code and every
month thereafter. Costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.16

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The accused appealed to the CA.17

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Ruling of the RTC

xxxx

On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed decision in
Criminal Case No. 49808, disposing thusly:

During the period the parties are living together defendant would nag the
plaintiff, fabricate stories against him and displayed her fit of jealousy, neglect
her marital obligations even committed infidelity, which psychological
incompatibilities and marital breaches have forced the petitioner to live
separately from defendant since 1982 up to the present. 12

WHEREFORE, finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the offense of BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
judgment is hereby entered ordering him to serve an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Iloilo City.13 After due proceedings, the accused was formally
indicted for bigamy under the information filed on October 20, 1998 in the RTC,
viz:

The accused is entitled to the privileges extended to him under Art. 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.

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SO ORDERED.18

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That on or about the 27th day of December, 1993 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, Noel Lasanas
being previously united in a lawful marriage with Socorro Patingo and without
the said marriage having been legally dissolve (sic) or annulled, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent
marriage with Josefa Eslaban.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

14

The criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 49808, was raffled to Branch
38 of the RTC in Iloilo City. The accused pleaded not guilty at his
arraignment,15 and trial ensued in due course.
In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered its
judgment in Civil Case No. 23133 dismissing the accuseds complaint for
annulment of marriage, and declaring the marriage between him and Socorro
valid and legal, as follows:

Decision of the CA
Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the
RTC thereby erred in finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the
absence of the marriage license, affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the
solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to
Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not established; that his good faith
and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his favor; and that he
had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration
of the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent
marriage.19
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On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision,

decreeing:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing

the complaint filed by the plaintiff Noel Arenga Lasanas against the defendant,
Socorro Patingo, considering that the marriage between them is valid and

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS
the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20

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Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He
argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied in Article
40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before one could
contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely criminal
prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he
should still be acquitted because his subsequent marriage was null and void for
being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in Article
53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that, consequently, an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be
valid, was lacking;25 and that his good faith and lack of criminal intent were
sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability.26
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Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
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Article 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has
been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity.27
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The CA specifically observed:

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This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and
private complainant Patingo was void because of the absence of a marriage
license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious wedding
ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the church
wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential and
formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of these requisites
is a valid marriage license except in those instances when this requirement
may be excused. There having been no marriage license nor affidavit of
cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the
religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.

But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured
a judicial declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant
Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that but after his
marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
Accuseds reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and People
v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these cases have
already been abandoned per Relova v. Landico, supra, and Wiegel v. SempioDiy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145
SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but Yaps ruling
too had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by Domingo v.
Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellants defense of good faith, the same is unavailing
pursuant to Maozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all
respect.28
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements
attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence
of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and
Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of
the Family Code, to wit:
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Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. (n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:29

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x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence
on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee
which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position
that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage
is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is

also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is
illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his
or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration
of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or
else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can
simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered
therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note that in
petitioners case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared
a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioners argument, even
assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the
offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier
marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be
allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability
or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on
complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioners
strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accuseds conviction for bigamy is affirmed. The crime
of bigamy was consummated from the moment he contracted the second
marriage without his marriage to Socorro being first judicially declared null and
void, because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, his
marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and subsisting due to such marriage
not being yet declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction.30 What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy, according
to People v. Odtuhan:31
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x x x is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the

subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted
to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The accuseds defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration
especially because the records show that he had filed a complaint for the
annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to the institution of the criminal
complaint against him but after he had already contracted his second marriage
with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon him because the RTC
(Branch 39) dismissed his complaint for annulment of marriage after the
information for bigamy had already been filed against him, thus confirming the
validity of his marriage to Socorro.

Considering that the accuseds subsequent marriage to Josefa was an

undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy was established. Nonetheless, he
submits that his marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a recorded
judgment of nullity of marriage. Such argument had no worth, however,
because it was he himself who failed to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of
his previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent marriage. In Tenebro
v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court has explained that [s]ince a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere
act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.33 The Court has further observed in Nollora, Jr. v. People:34
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x x x Nollora may not impugn his [subsequent] marriage to Geraldino in order

to extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the
doors to allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As
we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise
would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of
futurity and commitment.
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Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for bigamy is prision
mayor. With neither an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance attendant in
the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is the medium period
of prision mayor,35 which ranges from eight years and one day to 10 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence should be within the range of prision correccional, the penalty next
lower than that prescribed for the offense, which is from six months and one
day to six years. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence of two years and four
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day
of prision mayor as maximum, as imposed by the RTC, was proper.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on August 29, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner
Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband,
respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of
absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15,
2007.1 Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.2
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In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged

that he and Celerina rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro
Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18, 1980. 3 After a year, they
moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy and sell business. 4
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Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper.5 As a result, Celerina
convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong
Kong.6 Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he allowed
her to work abroad.7 She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita,
Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never
heard from again.8
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Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. 9 He went to

Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their
daughter's whereabouts.10 He also inquired about her from other relatives and
friends, but no one gave him any information.11
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Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial
Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.12
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Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in
October 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.13

SECOND DIVISION

chanrobleslaw

G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014

CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by
extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance
is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has
never been absent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing
the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial
court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.

On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of

judgment14 before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when
Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the
court that she was a resident of Tarlac City.15 According to Celerina, her true
residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City.16 This
residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until
Ricardo left in May 2008.17 As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was
deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her
presumptively dead.18
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Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and
worked as a domestic helper abroad.20 Neither did she go to an employment
agency in February 1995.21 She also claimed that it was not true that she had
been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal
dwelling in Quezon City.22 It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008
to cohabit with another woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed
by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations
in his petition.24
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Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's
petition because it had never been published in a newspaper.25 She added that
the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were
not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.26
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The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008,
dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong
mode of remedy.27 According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was
to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance
in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.28
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Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution

dated November 28, 2008.29 The Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration in the resolution dated March 5, 2009.30
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For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic

or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in
the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have
been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside
of the trial which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from
presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the
controversy.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud
when Ricardo deliberately made false allegations in the court with respect to
her residence.40 Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was absent for 12 years.
There was also no publication of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a
newspaper of general circulation.41 Celerina claimed that because of these, she
was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare
her presumptively dead.42
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Hence, this petition was filed.

The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a
fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the
Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the
spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a wellfounded belief of the spouse's death.31 She added that it would be
inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the
first place.32 She insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper
when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently.33
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Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42

of the Family Code would not be a sufficient remedy because it would not
nullify the legal effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive death. 34

Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration
of presumptive death were false.43 Celerina further claimed that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's petition. 44
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These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged
in her petition with the Court of Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of
judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment 45 on November 17, 2008.
This was less than two years from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her
presumptively dead and about a month from her discovery of the decision in
October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period
allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by
laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction. 46
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In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is

not the proper remedy because it cannot be availed when there are other
remedies available. Celerina could always file an affidavit of reappearance to
terminate the subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals'
ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina under Article 42 of the Family Code
is the appropriate remedy.
The petition is meritorious.

There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of
her discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain
admissions, presumptions, and conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse
that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a
second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage. 47
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Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's

judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner."36
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The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.37 This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of
Legaspi:38
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The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being
terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears.
Thus:
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Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance

of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous

marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be
recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent
marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact
of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
(Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with
the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first
spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he
or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.

Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere reappearance will not terminate the
subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were
notified if there was "no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent marriage,
either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]" 53 "Since
the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the
former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse's
physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded
as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided
by law."54
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The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining
the status of the second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad
faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous
subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are
present:
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Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination
of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions:
(1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of
the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the
subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of
reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always
immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of
the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the
subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family
Code are present.

1) The prior spouse had been absent for four

consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of
the absent spouse.55

Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or
presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already
been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the
reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses'
residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact
of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet
rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.

A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a

court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a wellfounded belief56 that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be
considered as. validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid
termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and
void.57 Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by
law.

When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of

presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead
and that the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the
continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. 48 The second
marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid.49 The burden of proof to
show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person
assailing the validity of the second marriage.50

Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is
also not immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for
being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of
another marriage still applies.58

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This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for

terminating the subsequent marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de

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If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to
declare her presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent
marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the
element of "well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is

essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to apply.59

chanrobleslaw

The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the

termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was
declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This
court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be
terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage."60
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Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the
termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects.
She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only
terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration
of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42
of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage
shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in
such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages."61 If it is terminated by
mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before
the termination shall still be considered legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment
declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.63
chanroble slaw

It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent
marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in
relation to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent
for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may
be filed solely by the husband or wife."64 This means that even if Celerina is a
real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of
an action to nullify the second marriage,65 this remedy is not available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but
also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not
suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will,
therefore, lie.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment
of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
SO ORDERED.

In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City
(Bacolod RTC) a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages against
respondent Edna G. Siasat. Docketed as Civil Case No. 96-9591 and assigned
to Branch 49 of the Bacolod RTC, the Complaint 7 alleged that petitioner is the
only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner)
discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that
someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same; that he executed
affidavits of loss of the subject titles and filed the same with the Registries of
Deeds of Bacolod and Bago; that on June 22, 1996, he filed before the Bacolod
RTC a Petition for the issuance of second owners copy of Certificate of Title No.
T-25896, which respondent opposed; and that during the hearing of the said
Petition, respondent presented the two missing owners duplicate copies of the
subject titles. Petitioner thus prayed for mandatory injunctive relief, in that
respondent be ordered to surrender to him the owners duplicate copies of the
subject titles in her possession; and that damages, attorneys fees, and costs
of suit be awarded to him.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, Petitioner v. EDNA G. SIASAT, Respondents.

In her Answer,8 respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by
the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart; that petitioner is
not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar
predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the
conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar,
her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the
subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping by
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt. By way of counterclaim,
respondent prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees.
During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar
spouses as their son. To prove filiation, he presented the following documents,
among others:

DECISION

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DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 30, 2006
Decision2 and December 20, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229 affirming the August 17, 1999 Decision 4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591
and denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.5
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chanroble slaw

2.

Factual Antecedents
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses)
died, intestate and without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994,
respectively. Included in their estate are two parcels of land (herein subject
properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T(15462) 1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the subject
titles).6
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His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary School, Purok
No. 2, Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company (BMMC), Bacolod City (Exhibit
C and submarkings), wherein it is stated that Alfredo Aguilar is
petitioners parent;
His Individual Income Tax Return (Exhibit F), which indicated that
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother;
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3.

Alfredo Aguilars Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated October
10, 1957 (Exhibit G), a public instrument subscribed and made
under oath by Alfredo Aguilar during his employment with BMMC,
which bears his signature and thumb marks and indicates that
petitioner, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his son and
dependent;
chanroble slaw

4.

Alfredo Aguilars Information Sheet of Employment with BMMC dated

October 29, 1954 (Exhibit L), indicating that petitioner is his son;
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5.

Petitioners Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan (Exhibit M), where

it is declared that the Aguilar spouses are his parents; and

June 22, 1933 in Miag-ao, Iloilo; that she is the sister of Candelaria SiasatAguilar; that she does not know petitioner, although she admitted that she
knew a certain Rodolfo whose nickname was Mait; that petitioner is not the
son of the Aguilar spouses; and that Alfredo Aguilar has a sister named Ester
Aguilar-Pailano.12
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Respondent also offered an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria SiasatAguilar (Exhibit 2) announcing among others that she and Alfredo have no
issue, and that she is the sole heir to Alfredos estate.

6.

Letter of the BMMC Secretary (Exhibit O) addressed to a BMMC

supervisor introducing petitioner as Alfredo Aguilars son and
recommending him for employment.

7.

Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil
Registry to the effect that the record of births during the period 1945
to 1946 were all destroyed by nature, hence no true copies of the
Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner could be issued as requested
(Exhibit Q).9

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife, Luz Marie Abendan-Aguilar
(Abendan-Aguilar), and Ester Aguilar-Pailano (Aguilar-Pailano), his aunt and
sister of Alfredo Aguilar. Abendan-Aguilar confirmed petitioners identity, and
she testified that petitioner is the son of the Aguilar spouses and that during
her marriage to petitioner, she lived with the latter in the Aguilar spouses
conjugal home built on one of the subject properties. On the other hand, 81year old Aguilar-Pailano testified that she is the sister of Alfredo Aguilar; that
the Aguilar spouses have only one son herein petitioner who was born at
BMMC; that after the death of the Aguilar spouses, she and her siblings did not
claim ownership of the subject properties because they recognized petitioner
as the Aguilar spouses sole child and heir; that petitioner was charged with
murder, convicted, imprisoned, and later on paroled; and that after he was
discharged on parole, petitioner continued to live with his mother Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar in one of the subject properties, and continues to live there with
his family.10

On August 17, 1999, the Bacolod RTC issued its Decision, decreeing as
follows:
From the evidence thus adduced before this Court, no solid evidence attesting
to the fact that plaintiff herein is either a biological son or a legally adopted one
was ever presented. Neither was a certificate of live birth of plaintiff ever
introduced confirming his biological relationship as a son to the deceased
spouses Alfredo and Candelaria S. Aguilar. As a matter of fact, in the affidavit
of Candelaria S. Aguilar (Exhibit 2) she expressly announced under oath that
Alfredo and she have no issue and that she is the sole heir to the estate of
Alfredo is (sic) concrete proof that plaintiff herein was never a son by
consanguinity nor a legally adopted one of the deceased spouses Alfredo and
Candelaria Aguilar.
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This being the case, Petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient interest in
this action to be considered qualified or entitled to the issuance of the writ of
mandatory injunction and damages prayed for.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs complaint with
cost.
The counterclaim of the defendant is likewise dismissed for lack of legal basis.

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For her evidence, respondent testified among others that she is a retired
teacher; that she does not know petitioner very well, but only heard his name
from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is not related by
consanguinity or affinity to petitioner; that she attended to Candelaria SiasatAguilar while the latter was under medication in a hospital until her death; that
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilars hospital and funeral expenses were paid for by
Nancy Vingno; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar executed an affidavit to the effect
that she had no issue and that she is the sole heir to her husband Alfredo
Aguilars estate; that she did not steal the subject titles, but that the same
were entrusted to her by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that a prior planned sale of
the subject properties did not push through because when petitioners opinion
thereto was solicited, he expressed disagreement as to the agreed price. 11
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Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera (SiasatNicavera), 74 years old, who stated that the Aguilar spouses were married on

SO ORDERED.13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.14 Docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV No.
64229, the appeal essentially argued that petitioner is indeed the Aguilar
spouses son; that under Article 172 of the Family Code,15 an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned constitutes proof of filiation; that through the
documentary evidence presented, petitioner has shown that he is the
legitimate biological son of the Aguilar spouses and the sole heir to their
estate. He argued that he cannot present his Certificate of Live Birth as all the
records covering the period 1945-194616 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod
City were destroyed as shown by Exhibits Q to Q-3; for this reason, he
presented the foregoing documentary evidence to prove his relationship to the
Aguilar spouses. Petitioner made particular reference to, among others,

Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit G), arguing that the same was made
under oath and thus sufficient under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish
that he is a child and heir of the Aguilar spouses. Finally, petitioner questioned
the trial courts reliance upon Candelaria Siasat-Aguilars affidavit (Exhibit 2)
attesting that she and Alfredo have no children and that she is the sole heir to
the estate of Alfredo, when such piece of evidence has been discarded by the
trial court in a previous Order dated April 1, 1998, stating thus:
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Except for defendants Exhibit 2, all other Exhibits, Exhibits 1, 3, 4 and

5, together with their submarkings, are all admitted in evidence. 17
On August 30, 2006, the CA issued the assailed Decision affirming the trial
courts August 17, 1999 Decision, pronouncing thus:
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The exhibits relied upon by plaintiff-appellant to establish his filiation with the
deceased spouses Aguilar deserve scant consideration by this Court. The
Elementary School Permanent Record of plaintiff-appellant cannot be
considered as proof of filiation. As enunciated by the Supreme Court in the
case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439:
Student record or other writing not signed by alleged father do not constitute
evidence of filiation.
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As regards the Income Tax Return of plaintiff-appellant filed with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, WE hold that it cannot be considered as evidence of
filiation. As stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Labagala vs. Santiago,
371 SCRA 360:
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A baptismal certificate, a private document is not conclusive proof of filiation.

More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that
income tax has been paid and the amount thereof.
With respect to the Certificate of Marriage x x x wherein it is shown that the
parents of the former are Alfredo and Candelaria Siasat Aguilar does not prove
filiation. The Highest Tribunal declared that a marriage contract not signed by
the alleged father of bride is not competent evidence of filiation nor is a
marriage contract recognition in a public instrument.
The rest of the exhibits offered x x x, except the Social Security Form E-1
(Exhibit G) and the Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar
(Exhibit L), allegedly tend to establish that plaintiff-appellant has been and is
presently known as Rodolfo Siasat Aguilar and he has been bearing the
surname of his alleged parents.

While the former is a public instrument and the latter bears the signature of
Alfredo Aguilar, they do not constitute clear and convincing evidence to show
filiation based on open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child. Filiation is a serious matter that must be resolved according to the
requirements of the law.
All told, plaintiff-appellants evidence failed to hurdle the high standard of
proof required for the success of an action to establish ones legitimate
filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous
possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Having resolved that plaintiff-appellant is not an heir of the deceased spouses
Aguilar, thereby negating his right to demand the delivery of the subject TCTs
in his favor, this Court cannot grant the writ of mandatory injunction being
prayed for.
xxxx
In the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that he has a clear and
unmistakable right that has been violated. Neither had he shown permanent
and urgent necessity for the issuance of the writ.
With respect to the damages prayed for, WE sustain the trial court in denying
the same. Aside from the fact that plaintiff-appellant failed to show his clear
right over the subject parcels of land so that he has not sustained any damage
by reason of the withholding of the TCTs from him, there is no clear testimony
on the anguish or anxiety he allegedly suffered as a result thereof. Well
entrenched in law and jurisprudence is the principle that the grant of moral
damages is expressly allowed by law in instances where proofs of the mental
anguish, serious anxiety and moral shock were shown.
ACCORDINGLY, in line with the foregoing disquisition, the appeal is hereby
DENIED. The impugned Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,19 but in a December 20, 2011
Resolution, the CA held its ground. Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
In an August 28, 2013 Resolution,20 this Court resolved to give due course to
the Petition, which raises the following issues:
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WE cannot sustain plaintiff-appellants argument. Use of a family surname

certainly does not establish pedigree.
Insofar as the SSS Form E-1 and Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo
Aguilar are concerned, WE cannot accept them as sufficient proof to establish
and prove the filiation of plaintiff-appellant to the deceased Aguilar spouses.

In issuing the assailed DECISION affirming in toto the Decision of RTC Branch
49, Bacolod City, and the Resolution denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error
[in] not taking into consideration petitioners Exhibit G (SSS E-1
acknowledged and notarized before a notary public, executed by Alfredo

Aguilar, recognizing the petitioner as his son) as public document that satisfies
the requirement of Article 172 of the [Family] Code in the establishment of the
legitimate filiation of the petitioner with his father, Alfredo Aguilar.
The herein [P]etition raises the issue of pure question of law with respect to
the application of Article 172 of the Family Code particularly [paragraph] 3
thereof in conjunction with Section 19 and Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court relating to public document which is substantial enough to merit
consideration of this Honorable Court as it will enrich jurisprudence and
forestall future litigation.21
Petitioners Arguments
In his Petition and Reply22 seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA
dispositions and praying that judgment be rendered ordering respondent to
surrender the owners duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896
and T-(15462) 1070, petitioner argues that Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1
(Exhibit G) satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to
the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends
that said SSS Form E-1 is a declaration under oath by his father, Alfredo
Aguilar, of his status as the latters son; this recognition should be accorded
more weight than the presumption of legitimacy, since Article 172 itself
declares that said evidence establishes legitimate filiation without need of court
action. He adds that in contemplation of law, recognition in a public instrument
such as the SSS Form E-1 is the highest form of recognition which partake
(sic) of the nature of a complete act of recognition bestowed upon him as the
son of the late Alfredo Aguilar; that respondent has no personality to impugn
his legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy; that the action to
impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171
of the Family Code;23 and that having proved his filiation, mandatory injunction
should issue, and an award of damages is in order.
Respondents Arguments
In her Comment24 and Memorandum,25 respondent simply echoes the
pronouncements of the CA, adding that the Petition is a mere rehash of the CA
appeal which has been passed upon succinctly by the appellate court.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon,26 has held that
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by
(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)
an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous

possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required.
In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does
not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a
claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of
limitations is essential in order to establish the childs acknowledgment.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the
marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify
Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established
and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days
of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a)
the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration
of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the
Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. 27 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be
concluded that petitioner who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the
marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar28 and before their
respective deaths29 has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of
the Aguilar spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form
E-1 (Exhibit G) satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship
to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said
document constitutes an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since
all the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of
Bacolod City were destroyed, which necessitated the introduction of other
documentary evidence particularly Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit
G) to prove filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as
mere proof of open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is

evidence of filiation under the first paragraph thereof, the same being an
express recognition in a public instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission
of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required. And, relative to said form of acknowledgment,
the Court has further held that:
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In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the
following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
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1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence

submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant
and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown
to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is
merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the paramount
consideration in resolving questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a
signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
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1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private

social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
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It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate
children x x x. Too, (t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to
children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.30 (Emphasis supplied)
This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he obtained a
copy of his Certificate of Live Birth from the National Statistics Office (NSO),
since the Bacolod City Civil Registry copy thereof was destroyed. He would not
have had to go through the trouble of presenting other documentary evidence;
the NSO copy would have sufficed. This fact is not lost on petitioner; the
Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry
(Exhibit Q) contained just such an advice for petitioner to proceed to the
Office of the Civil Registrar General at the NSO in Manila to secure a copy of his
Certificate of Live Birth, since for every registered birth in the country, a copy

of the Certificate of Live Birth is submitted to said office.

As to petitioners argument that respondent has no personality to impugn his
legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy, and that the action to
impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171
of the Family Code, the Court has held before that
Article 26331 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert
and prove that a person is not a mans child by his wife. However, the present
case is not one impugning petitioners legitimacy. Respondents are asserting
not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a
child of Jose at all.32
Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses, then he is as well heir to the latters estate. Respondent is then left
with no right to inherit from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilars estate, since
succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct line. 33
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WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 30, 2006 Decision and
December 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No.
64229, as well as the August 17, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 are REVERSEDand SET
ASIDE. Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby ordered to SURRENDER to the
petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the owners duplicates of Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070.
SO ORDERED

thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a
condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the
second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:

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ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious
law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at
that time when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married in a civil
ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Paraaque, Rizal on
September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the ProCathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNAs
marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L.
Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda,
Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After
almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually
agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to
separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written agreement
entitled AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT dated
November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA,
REPRESENTED BY GREGORIO Z. LUNA AND EUGENIA ZABALLEROLUNA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule
adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the
parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a
divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and
cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a
subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the
adverse decision promulgated on November 11, 2005, 1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on August 27,
2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.2The CA

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage
with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First
Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican
Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY.
LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY.
LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband
and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna,
Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the
managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang
Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium
Project (condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52
square meters, for P1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36
months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be used as
law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was
issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the following names:
JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E.
ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R.
PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ
SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x

Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio
R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for
which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following
names:
JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E.
ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON,
married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was
partitioned by the partners but the same was still registered in common under
CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the
condominium unit would be 25/100 share.

(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the
SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by
Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;

ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty.
Renato G. De la Cruz and used a portion of the office condominium unit as their
office. The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.

(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found
in the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the
plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have been made for transport
and storage.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the
lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by
Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then
leased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father
to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato
G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as
the law books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the
complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired
during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
through their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became
co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of
pro-indiviso share consisting of her share in the said properties plus her
share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the
latters last will and testament; and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA through
Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties.
The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the portion of
the subject properties; that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the
rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be
conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the subject
properties; and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorneys fees
and costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.3

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(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan
Luces Luna should be changed from JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L.
Luna to JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna;
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No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5

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Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6

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On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC,
namely:
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I.

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II.

III.

Ruling of the RTC

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WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
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On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the
aforementioned facts,4 disposing thusly:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT

WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES
LUNA;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF

THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED
OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT;
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IV.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE

FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED
PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
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V.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE

ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

jurisdiction. x x x10

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE

FACT THAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of

the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

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VI.

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VII.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF

THE FAMILY CODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
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VIII.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF

ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY
PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and

xxxx

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(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH
FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to
defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia ZaballeroLuna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole
industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
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IX.

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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE

INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY
FILING FEE.7

(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any

other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to
the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Soledad L. Luna to JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna;
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In contrast, the respondents attributed the following errors to the trial court, to
wit:
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I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW

BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE
USE OF PLAINTIFFS MONEY;
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II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED
FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNAS LAW OFFICE; and

(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia ZaballeroLuna (first marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus
Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme
Court Reports found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
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On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioners motion for

reconsideration.13
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III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING

PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO
RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND
ESTOPPEL.8

Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review
on certiorari that:
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A.

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified

decision,9 holding and ruling:

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for
Separation and Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent
Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was not
dissolved and liquidated;
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EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latters
death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in
the Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA
because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our

B.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican

Republic courts approval of the Agreement;
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C.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to

adduce sufficient proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of
purchase of the subject condominium unit; and
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D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not
entitled to the subject law books.14

The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties

should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share in the condominium unit;
and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law
that should determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and,
secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and
the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1.
Atty. Lunas first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was
solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the
time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the
nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the
effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine
laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having
remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated
their marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947
until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been
recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between
Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code,16 even if either or both of
the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of defective
marital unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages.
As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to
the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the

first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.18Conformably with the nationality

rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve
the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time
of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which
characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a
special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the
establishment of a conjugal and family life.20 The non-recognition of absolute
divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of
the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of
either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided by law. For as long as this
public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving
the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2.
The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into
and executed in connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed
reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage
settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property
relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the
time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in
the event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at
the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to
wit:
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Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree
upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of
marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in
this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Code has defined a conjugal partnership of gains
thusly:
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Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and
wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of
the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various
causes of termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
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Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

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(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled;

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(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per se
dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the
Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and
Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
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Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage

settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage
shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property,
and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced
to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent,
or when legal separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the
creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership
shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval or the voluntary dissolution
of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the
hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution
of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect
the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and
215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition
stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the

Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal

partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval
took place only as an incident of the action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna
and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their execution of the Agreement
were identical to the grounds raised in the action for divorce. 21 With the divorce
not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to
Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not
also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the
lifetime of their marriage.
3.
Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between
Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas subsequent marriage to Soledad on
January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous, 22 on the ground that the
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the
Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are
void. Article 71 of theCivil Code clearly states:
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Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or
incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent
marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered
voidab initio.24
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Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being
void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during
the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership,
conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
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Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but
they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)

purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due
to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof

to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became
imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the
acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient
and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court
explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25

In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioners assertions

on her actual contributions through the following findings and conclusions,
namely:

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In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of
co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and
adulterous union is without basis because they failed to substantiate their
allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed
properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the
controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must
be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness
of the opponents defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the
instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The
plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the
defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the
allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the
court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual
contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit in the aggregate amount
of at least P306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of P159,072.00, and
in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex Financing and
Banco Filipino totaling P146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions of
P306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the
purchase of the condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 of the units
purchase price of P1,449,056.00.28
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The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her
personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a thank you
note;29 that she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and

Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?

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SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own
independent funds were used to buy the law office condominium and the law
books subject matter in contention in this case proof that was required for
Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply
as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living
together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was
void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on coownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable to many situations
and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if the parties were not
in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for
it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior
conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful
wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148
provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions
and corresponding shares were prima facie presumed to be equal. However,
for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was
required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of
money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party
who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall
be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147.
The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith.
Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the
strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce
decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme
Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escao, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29,
1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit,
SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the
said property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she
presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in
the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial
court, viz.:

x x x The first check, Exhibit M for P55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz
Sison was issued on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before
the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit 7 was signed. Another check issued
on April 29, 1978 in the amount of P97,588.89, Exhibit P was payable to
Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, this was in payment of the loan of
Atty. Luna. The third check which was for P49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was
dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth
check, Exhibit M, for P4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the
foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for
the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was simply not
established. x x x
SOLEDADs claim that she made a cash contribution of P100,000.00 is
unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for SOLEDADs claim of co-ownership
over the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the trial court correctly
found that the same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA,
thus:
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The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit 9, covering the condominium unit was in
the name of Atty. Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of
the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The
same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from
Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of
Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that
she paid for them fully or partially. x x x
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the
name of JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna was no proof that
SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium unit. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration
does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase
married to preceding Soledad L. Luna is merely descriptive of the civil
status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that
SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for
the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to contribute and
that she actually purchased or paid for the law office amortization and for the
law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the
law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law
rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law
firm that he headed.30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both
because they were substantiated by the records and because we have not been
shown any reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the
party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her
mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, 31 did not serve the
purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out

of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should then be justly
concluded that the properties in litis legally pertained to their conjugal
partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole
ownership of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium
unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of
Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11,
2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no more

reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido
for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a
Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had
already been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She
likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked
jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September 17, 2003, applying
Article 129 of the Family Code. It ruled in this wise:
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WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering

the conjugal property of the former Spouses Leonardo and Marietta Nonato, a
house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361 located at Eroreco, Bacolod City,
which was their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to the defendant Marietta
Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to
remain.
Furthermore, defendants counterclaim is hereby granted, ordering plaintiff to
pay defendant P10,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish and
unnecessary inconvenience brought about by this suit; and an additional
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages to deter others from following suit; and
attorneys fees of P2,000.00 and litigation expenses of P575.00.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner, v. LEONARDO V.
NONATO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For the Courts resolution is a Petition for Review filed by petitioner Marietta N.
Barrido questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
November 16, 2006, and its Resolution2 dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 00235. The CA affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City, Branch 53, dated July 21, 2004, in Civil Case No. 03-12123,
which ordered the partition of the subject property.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

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In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner

Marietta N. Barrido, they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco,
Bacolod City, consisting of a house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared

SO ORDERED.4
Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. On July 21, 2004, the
Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the
MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a
reversible error in adjudicating the subject property to Barrido. Its dispositive
portion reads:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated September 17, 2003 is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the parties:
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(1) to equitably partition the house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361;
(2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount
advanced by them in payment of the debts and obligation of TCT No. T-140361
with Philippine National Bank;
(3) to deliver the presumptive legitimes of Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo
Nonato pursuant to Article 51 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.5

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Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision on November 16, 2006. It held
that since the propertys assessed value was only P8,080.00, it clearly fell
within the MTCCs jurisdiction. Also, although the RTC erred in relying on
Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of
its decision still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property.
Barrido filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack
of merit.

costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the

assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691) 9
Here, the subject propertys assessed value was merely P8,080.00, an amount
which certainly does not exceed the required limit of P20,000.00 for civil
actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC.
Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
The records reveal that Nonato and Barridos marriage had been declared void
for psychological incapacity under Article 3610 of the Family Code. During their
marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property
relations. Although Article 12911 provides for the procedure in case of
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers
the effects of void marriages on the spouses property relations. Article 147
reads:

Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via a Petition for Review. She
assigned the following errors in the CA Decision:
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I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTCC
HAD JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT CASE.

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Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOT
COVERED BY TCT NO. T-140361 IS CONJUGAL AFTER BEING SOLD TO THE
CHILDREN, JOSEPH LEO NONATO AND JOSEPH RAYMUND NONATO.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ARTICLE 129
OF THE FAMILY CODE HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE PRESENT CASE, ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. 6

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The petition lacks merit.

Contrary to Barridos contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of real actions or those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of
possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a
mortgage on real property.7 Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang
1298 provides:
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Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts

and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
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(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to,
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where theassessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of
the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong
to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. 12
It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman:
(1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void. Here, all these elements are present.13

The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the
legal capacity of a party to contract marriage.14 Any impediment to marry has
not been shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They
lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage
was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.15
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Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima faciepresumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the
same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household.16 Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property
by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.17
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In the analogous case of Valdez,18 it was likewise averred that the trial court
failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family
dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of
psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the contract of
marriage. The Court held that the court a quo did not commit a reversible
error in utilizing Article 147 of the Family Code and in ruling that the former
spouses own the family home and all their common property in equal shares,
as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
that they owned in common, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil
Code should aptly prevail.19 The rules which are set up to govern the
liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of
gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between commonlaw spouses or spouses of void marriages. 20
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Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property
during the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly
owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, however, claims that the ownership
over the property in question is already vested on their children, by virtue of a
Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in
the names of the former spouses, said document of sale does not bear a
notarization of a notary public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal,
a document remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public
document,21making it inadmissible in evidence unless properly
authenticated.22 Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution and
authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position
paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by
Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on
co-ownership.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated November 16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated

January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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Villarama, Jr., Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe,** and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Peralta,* (Acting Chairperson

defining the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the decree of
legal separation in accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) of the
Family Code, or alternatively, in accordance with the provisions of Article 176
of the Civil Code.
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Antecedent Facts
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint
for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). [3]
Subsequently, the RTC rendered a Decision[4]dated October 10, 2005, the
dispositive portion of which provides:
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WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby

rendered declaring the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and
defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55.
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As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other,
but the marriage bond shall not be severed.
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Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children,
namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the
custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.
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Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the
RCBC, all the remaining properties, namely:

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No 176556 : July 04, 2012]
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, PETITIONER, VS. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C.
QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR
MOTHER RITA QUIAO, RESPONDENTS.

1.

coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

2.

coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

3.

corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

4.

coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;

5.

a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in

Tungao, Butuan City;

6.

a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in

Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;

7.

a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao,

Butuan City;

8.

Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;

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DECISION
REYES, J.:
The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in
the family where children are born and molded either to become useful
citizens of the country or troublemakers in the community. Thus, we are
saddened when parents have to separate and fight over properties, without
regard to the message they send to their children. Notwithstanding this, we
must not shirk from our obligation to rule on this case involving legal
separation escalating to questions on dissolution and partition of properties.
The Case
This case comes before us via Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner seeks that we vacate and set aside
the Order[2] dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
1, Butuan City. In lieu of the said order, we are asked to issue a Resolution

shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject

to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid
conjugal liabilities of [P]45,740.00.

(b) P19,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal

partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.

On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the
Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,
[12]
asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned.

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He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of [P]19,000.00 as

attorney's fees and litigation expenses of [P]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.[5]
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period
provided for under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation. [6]

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library

On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution [7] which
the trial court granted in its Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

(c) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.[11]

To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an

Order[13] dated August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase NET PROFIT
EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.[14]
The Order further held that after determining the remainder of the properties,
it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending
spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned,
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. [15] The
dispositive portion of the Order states:
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Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby granted.
Let a writ of execution be issued for the immediate enforcement of the
Judgment.

WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends to forfeit

all the remaining properties after deducting the payments of the debts for
only separate properties of the defendant-respondent shall be delivered to
him which he has none.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the Decision.

Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of

Execution[9] which reads as follows:

IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]

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NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO
B. QUIAO you cause to be made the sums stated in the afore-quoted
DECISION [sic], together with your lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all in
the Philippine Currency.
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Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[17] on September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued
another Order[18] dated November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider
the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the
meaning of net profit earned.[19] Furthermore, the same Order held:
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But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this

execution and your lawful fees, then we command you that of the lands and
buildings of the said [petitioner], you make the said sums in the manner
required by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed Section 9, Rule 39,
Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
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You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings immediately
after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full in consonance with
Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. [10]
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the
respondents the amount of P46,870.00, representing the following
payments:

ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set
aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the]
parties' common children, is ordered to be computed in accordance [with] par.
4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.[20]
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
[21]
praying for the correction and reversal of the Order dated November 8,
2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007,[22] the trial court had changed its ruling
again and granted the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration whereby the
Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated
August 31, 2006.
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(a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;

Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27,
2007 this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

raising the following:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a
record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final
order.

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Issues
I

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IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE

COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF
THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125
(SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
II
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE
FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF
FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER
THE CIVIL CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE
SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
AS A RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL
SEPARATION?[23]
Our Ruling
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of
certain laws, we are well-aware that the respondents have called our attention
to the fact that the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has attained finality
when the Motion for Clarification was filed.[24] Thus, we are constrained to
resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October 10, 2005
and subsequently discuss the matters that we can clarify.
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The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory
at the time the Motion for Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] we clarified that to standardize the appeal
periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, we held that it would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt
of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.[26]
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In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule
40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of
the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.[27] In other words, a
party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from
his receipt of the trial court's decision or final order denying his motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day
period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the decision or
final order in question final and executory.
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In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005.
The petitioner neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of
appeal. On December 16, 2005, or after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court
issued an order granting the respondent's motion for execution; and on
February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ
of execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially executed, the
petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed his Motion for
Clarification on the definition of the net profits earned. From the foregoing,
the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question the RTCs Decision
dated October 10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a single
issue until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the time
the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial courts decision has
become final and executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when
the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within
such period. Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can arrogate unto
itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that
became final.[28]
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The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment.

Being such, the petitioner's thesis is that it can still be disturbed even after
270 days had lapsed from the issuance of the decision to the filing of the
motion for clarification. He said that a void judgment is no judgment at all.
It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any right nor any
obligation.[29] But what precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction?
When does a judgment becomes void?
A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power
to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties
or both.[30] In other words, a court, which does not have the power to decide
a case or that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, will
issue a void judgment or a coram non judice.[31]
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the October 10, 2005 judgment has already become immutable and
unalterable, to wit:
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(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited
with a woman who is not his wife;[38]
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(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent
Rita;[39]
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(c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership; [40]

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(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership;[41]
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The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment.
For sure, the trial court has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family
Court of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide, among
others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status and property
relations of the husband and wife or those living together.[32] The Rule on
Legal Separation[33] provides that the petition [for legal separation] shall be
filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing
or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.[34] In the instant case, herein
respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six
months prior to the date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has
jurisdiction over the respondent's petition below. Furthermore, the RTC also
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both parties, considering that
summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes were served upon the
herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein petitioner filed
his Answer to the Complaint on January 9, 2001.[35] Thus, without doubt, the
RTC, which has rendered the questioned judgment, has jurisdiction over the
complaint and the persons of the parties.

(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody; [42]

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(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the
innocent spouse by intestate succession;[43]
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(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the
will of the innocent spouse;[44]
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(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal
partnership of gains and pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code, all
properties acquired during the marriage, whether acquired by one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved; [45]
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(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties
while they were living together;[46]
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(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
foreclosed;[47]
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From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005 judgment of the
trial court is clearly not voidab initio, since it was rendered within the ambit of
the court's jurisdiction. Being such, the same cannot anymore be disturbed,
even if the modification is meant to correct what may be considered an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law.[36] In fact, we have ruled that for [as]
long as the public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by
him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of
judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal.[37] Granting
without admitting that the RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005 was
erroneous, the petitioner's remedy should be an appeal filed within the
reglementary period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do this. He has
already lost the chance to question the trial court's decision, which has
become immutable and unalterable. What we can only do is to clarify the
very question raised below and nothing more.

(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved
and liquidated and the fact that respondent Rita was the one who took charge
of the administration of these properties;[48]
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(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters
included under Article 121 of the Family Code and the conjugal liabilities
totaling P503,862.10 shall be charged to the income generated by these
properties;[49]
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(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner
had separate properties which can satisfy his share for the support of the
family;[50]
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(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7); [51]

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For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since

(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance
shall therefore be divided equally between the petitioner and the respondent

without prejudice to the children's legitime;[52]

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(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children; [53] and
(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of
P19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P5,000.00. [54]

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After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated October 10,
2005, we will discuss the following issues for the enlightenment of the parties
and the public at large.
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Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present

case since the parties' property relation is governed
by the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains.

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the
respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same
applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the
Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter
provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code
[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
law.[58]
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Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common
properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited
them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family
Code?
We respond in the negative.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129
of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article
102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
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Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that Article
129(7) of the Family Code applies in this case. We agree with the trial court's
holding.
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First, let us determine what governs the couple's property relation. From the
record, we can deduce that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital
knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows,
the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and
since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations
between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains.[55] Article 119 of the Civil Code
provides:
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Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon
absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements,
or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the
property relations of the petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal
partnership of gains. And under this property relation, the husband and the
wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work or industry.[56] The husband and wife also own in
common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains. [57]
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Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired,
arguing: As earlier adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over
half of the conjugal properties, the same being owned in common by the
spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to be given retroactive
application to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in
the net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs
his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.[59] In other
words, the petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the
spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the
Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of
the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
which provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in
common by the husband and wife.[60] Thus, since he is one of the owners of
the properties covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested
right over half of the said properties, even after the promulgation of the
Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family Code may
deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code
which prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will
prejudice a person's vested right.
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However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on
stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[61] we define and explained vested
right in the following manner:
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A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend
upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no
obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not
dependent upon a contingency. The term vested right expresses the
concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice,
should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
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To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or equitableto the

present or future enjoyment of property.[62] (Citations omitted)
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party
List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita,[63] we also explained:
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From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis
considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the
conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal
separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the
chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact
be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty
party.
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The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional

guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in
right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it
includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but
also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become
vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a
present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
[64]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his
vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
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In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due
process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her
complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.[65] In fact, in
his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community
assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and
evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community
properties of the parties.[66] Second, when the Decision dated October 10,
2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling
forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article
129(7) of the Family Code.[67] Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being
deprived of his right to due process.
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More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,[68] we reiterated our long-standing

ruling that:
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[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each

spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which
constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into
title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the
liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net
remainder or remanente liquido (haber ganancial) resulting from the
liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the
right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest
until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after
dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after
settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be
divided between the spouses or their respective heirs. [69] (Citations omitted)
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision
dated October 10, 2005 that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of
the Family Code.[70] The petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration nor
a notice of appeal. Thus, the petitioner is now precluded from questioning the
trial court's decision since it has become final and executory. The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us from disturbing
the Decision dated October 10, 2005 because final and executory decisions
can no longer be reviewed nor reversed by this Court.[71]
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Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's

vested right is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code,
but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129
of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the
conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:
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Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her
share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the
children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior
marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or
entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from
the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not
apply.
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In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the
net profits.

From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to
the present case since the parties' property relation is governed by the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains and since the
trial court's Decision has attained finality and immutability.
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The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of
the separate properties of the spouses and the products of their labor
and industry.
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under
Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that since there is no other provision
under the Family Code, which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture
as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code applies.
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What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of net
profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the
computation of net profits earned in the absolute community?
Now, we clarify.

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shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.[74]
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First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the
property relations between the parties and the applicable law as to the
definition of net profits. As earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code
applies as to the property relations of the parties. In other words, the
computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under
Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of net profits, we
cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly
provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture
under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this
provision, net profits shall be the increase in value between the market value
of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
the market value at the time of its dissolution.[72] Thus, without any iota of
doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute
community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
Code. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the
processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under
Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
Code.
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Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute
community regime and the conjugal partnership regime.
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On Absolute Community Regime:

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband
and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage.
Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired
during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family
Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the
couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided
between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion
the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.[73]
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Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an

inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each; then the debts and
obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute
community's assets and if the community's properties are insufficient, the
separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered to each
of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net assets, which

Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the net profits requires that we first
find the market value of the properties at the time of the community's
dissolution. From the totality of the market value of all the properties, we
subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute community and this result
to the net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute
community, from which we deduct the market value of the properties at the
time of marriage, which then results to the net profits.[75]
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Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us
see what will happen if we apply Article 102:
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(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have
no separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all
part of the absolute community. And its market value at the time of the
dissolution of the absolute community constitutes the market value at
dissolution.
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally
separated, all the properties which remained will be liable for the debts and
obligations of the community. Such debts and obligations will be subtracted
from the market value at dissolution.
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the
total assets of the absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net
asset. And from such net asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent's
remaining properties, the market value at the time of marriage will be
subtracted and the resulting totality constitutes the net profits.
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and
nothing would be returned to each of them, what will be divided equally
between them is simply the net profits. However, in the Decision dated
October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in
favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case (which
should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both parties
entered into their marriage without bringing with them any property.
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On Conjugal Partnership Regime:

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Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we

make it clear that Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant
case for purposes only of defining net profit. As earlier explained, the
definition of net profits in Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies to both
the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided
for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on

Legal Separation.

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Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of

gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in
common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work
or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either
spouse during the marriage.[76] From the foregoing provision, each of the
couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to
effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses.
Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.[77]
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Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family
Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's
properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved, to
wit:
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Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
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(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon
the partition in accordance with Article 51.
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(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have
chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is
no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best
interests of said children.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation
of the properties of the spouses:
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(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing
the couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties. [78] In the
instant case, the trial court found that the couple has no separate
properties when they married.[79] Rather, the trial court identified the
following conjugal properties, to wit:
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(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the
conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
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1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal

debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal
partnership as an asset thereof.

2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds
in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property,
the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.

4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;

3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

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(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of
the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall
be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.

5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao,

Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
Bugabos, Butuan City;

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(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall

thereafter be delivered to each of them.

7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao,

Butuan City;

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(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or
deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to
either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from
the conjugal funds, if any.
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(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute
the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements
or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as
provided in this Code.
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8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.[80]

(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership
during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal
partnership;[81] and if the community is enriched at the expense of the
separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such
properties to their respective owners shall be made.[82]
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(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the
conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses
shall be paid from their respective separate properties. But if the conjugal

partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses
with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable.[83]
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(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband
and of the wife shall be returned to each of them. [84] In the instant
case, since it was already established by the trial court that the
spouses have no separate properties,[85] there is nothing to return to
any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties
should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.
[86]
However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his
share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of
the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again,
lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime,
because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in
the guilty party's favor.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner
is not entitled to any property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 of the trial court. However, we must clarify, as we
already did above, the Order dated January 8, 2007.
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WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for
Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated
January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in
accordance with the above discussions.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr.
Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008 decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents

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SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Sereno, JJ., concur.

The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were
scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic
Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the
wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to
solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a
marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong
tagalong, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents,
sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino
Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner,
an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the
same date. He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the
bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their
invited guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, was filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage
ceremony.5

The petitioner entered the plea of not guilty to the crime charged on
arraignment.
The prosecutions witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the
incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was
the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride
walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings,
kiss each other, and sign a document.6 She heard the petitioner instructing the
principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the
reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also
identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare
during the ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife. 8 Days
after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate
that no marriage license was issued to the couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his
act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage
as contemplated by law.10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, and imposed on him a P200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act
No. 3613. It held that the petitioners act of giving a blessing constitutes a
marriage ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the
cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that in
performing a marriage ceremony without the couples marriage license, the
petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided
under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the
Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions
that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated, shall
be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment
of not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for
violation of the latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of
a fine in the amount of P200.00.12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances
surrounding the act of the petitioner in blessing the couple unmistakably
show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that the
positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than

the petitioners negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the basis
of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs ruling. The CA observed that although
there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage,
the law provides minimum standards in determining whether a marriage
ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear
personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they
take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses
of legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these
requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a
requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioners criminal liability under Article 352
of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were
charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code. 16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is
Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be
promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds:
First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not define what
constitutes an illegal marriage ceremony. Assuming that a marriage
ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code
and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration
that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate
containing the declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting
parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner likewise
maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife. 18
Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot
interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony.
Therefore, the State cannot convert the blessing into a marriage
ceremony.19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the blessing in
good faith for purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple. 20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article
350 of the RPC, as amended, should preclude the filing of the present case
against him.21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The
present case is not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner
was not found violating its provisions nor a regulation promulgated
thereafter. 22
THE COURTS RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime
punishable under Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, were proven by
the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing
officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The
elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer;
and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to
solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the
alleged blessing by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an
illegal marriage ceremony which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a
marriage ceremony and what constitutes its illegal performance, Articles
3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions
were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied
from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments.
Article 625 of the Family Code provides that [n]o prescribed form or religious
rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary,
however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.26
Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly
defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of
the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
the rule was clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization
of the marriage is required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets
the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there
should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a
solemnizing officer; and second,their declaration in the presence of not less

than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared
before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second
requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioners allegation, the
prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting
parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The petitioners allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading
questions to Florida fails to persuade us. A judge may examine or crossexamine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the
credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or
rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against
him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths
that tend to destroy the theory of one party.28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge
objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking
any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioners
admission regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support Floridas
testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by the couple that they
take each other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their
declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and convincing
pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution
witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the
petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of
church and State precludes the State from qualifying the church blessing into
a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioners allegation, this principle has
been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required.
This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in
conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the
core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on
the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which
the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the
enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of
marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such
as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts
resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted
was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were

complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a blessing, the
presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony
qualified this blessing into a marriage ceremony as contemplated by Article
3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of
this marriage ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of
marriage is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case,
the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license,
yet he conducted the blessing of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite
knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set
by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The
petitioners knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his
defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate
negates his criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if
a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not
included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as
discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate
criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not
make this an element of the crime.
The penalty imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
this provision clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the
provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are
Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows:
Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:

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Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage Any priest or minister

solemnizing marriage without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine
National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the
authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties or parents,
grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or officer,
priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices
whereof require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a
marriage in accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate
solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any
officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act,
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than
two years, or by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two
thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:

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Section 44. General Penal Clause Any violation of any provision of this Act
not specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the
proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred
pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the
discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the
CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered
under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present
case. As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the
provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is
only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this provision which is
referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the
provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any
violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one
of such regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of P200.00
pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe,
JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing
the July 24, 2012 Decision1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for
a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at
that time already married to someone else.3 Out of this illicit relationship, two
sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on
October 13, 1999).4 The children were not expressly recognized by respondent
as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The
parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the
United States with her two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent
Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take
Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of
Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized
Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children. 5

On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein

respondent Antonio, ruling that [t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that
the best interest of the children can be promoted if they are under the sole
parental authority and physical custody of [respondent Antonio].6 Thus, the
court a quo decreed the following:

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on
the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence
respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate
children.9 In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified in part the
Decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants

[Antonios] prayer for recognition and the same is hereby judicially approved. x
x x Consequently, the Court forthwith issues the following Order granting the
other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed

Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case
No. 114492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:

a.

Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati

to cause the entry of the name of [Antonio] as the father of
the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of
Live Birth and causing the correction/change and/or
annotation of the surnames of said minors in their
Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio;

b.

Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental

Authority with [Grande] over the persons of their minor
children, Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;

c.

Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over

the parties minor children Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard
Patrick Grande who shall stay with [Antonios] residence in the
Philippines from Monday until Friday evening and to [Grandes]
custody from Saturday to Sunday evening;

d.

Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and

custody of minors Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick
Grande unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the Order;

e.

Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the

aforenamed minors outside of the country, without the written
consent of the other and permission from the court.

f.

Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor

children Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the
amount of P30,000 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio]
and 30% for [Grande].7 (Emphasis supplied.)

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion

was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated November 22, 2010 8 for
being pro forma and for lack of merit.

a.

The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City

Civil Registrar of Makati City are DIRECTED to enter the
surname Antonio as the surname of Jerard Patrick and
Andre Lewis, in their respective certificates of live birth,
and record the same in the Register of Births;

b.

[Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard

Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein
appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby
awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;

c.

[Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and

may only take the children out upon the written consent of
[Grande]; and

d.

The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the

minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount
of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and
30% for [Grande]. (Emphasis supplied.)

In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the fathers
recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental
custody over them absent the most compelling of reasons.10 Since respondent
Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that
adversely affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to
raise the minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over
their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the
recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the
minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected best
interestofthechild clause, compels the use by the children of the
surname ANTONIO.11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order
considering that not only did Antonio express his willingness to give support, it
is also a consequence of his acknowledging the paternity of the minor

children.12 Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent

Antonio of his visitorial right especially in view of the constitutionally inherent
and natural right of parents over their children.13
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial
motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as
it decreed the change of the minors surname to Antonio. When her motion
was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition. In it, she
posits that Article 176 of the Family Codeas amended by Republic Act No.
(RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive languagemay not be invoked by a
father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without the
consent of their mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname
by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the
core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased
as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of onehalf of the
legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions
in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 14 which now
reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized
by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove nonfiliation during his lifetime. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall consist of onehalf of the legitime of a legitimate
child. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by
the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of
the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of

recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction
or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public
document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he
wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and
an official declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother;
hence, respondents prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is
given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the
mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is
there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to
that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit
and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA
9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the
mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal
meaning free from any interpretation.16 Respondents position that the court
can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is
no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word may in the
provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under
no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word
may is permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate
children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting
children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of childrens
surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the
fathers surname serves the best interest of the minor child. InAlfon v.
Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue
using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it
serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from
using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon
v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the child concerned,

even allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames of the childs
father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a childs surname is
second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best possible
situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice
of an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best
serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons
name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional
rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not
be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the
right to present evidence in favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of
the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the
trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented
during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art.
176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never
recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her
child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized
by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his
mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United States.
This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and
son. (Emphasis supplied.)

7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the
child shall use the surname of the father upon the submission of the
accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the
child shall use the surname of the father upon submission of a public
document or a private handwritten instrument supported by the documents
listed in Rule 7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if
he/she has reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in a
separate instrument duly notarized.
xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child
in the Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in
the Register of Births.
xxxx

An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the

fathers surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,21 which states:

8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother

Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father

8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of
Live Birth or in a separate public document or in a private handwritten
document, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of
Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:

7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public
document is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live
Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the
child shall use the surname of the father, provided the registration is
supported by the following documents:
xxxx

The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new
surname) pursuant to RA 9255.
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and
Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the
public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal
Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live Birth
and the Register of Births as follows:

Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child

ishereby changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot
amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong
Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the
legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law
cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal
a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the
basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails,
because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance an
administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.
Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no
ambiguity in law and/or the construction is clearly erroneous.23 What is more,
this Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and
declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial
bodies24 when found contrary to statutes and/or the Constitution.25 Section
5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:

At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now
aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their
opposition to have their names changed to Antonio.26 However, since these
letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not
provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against
petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the
childrens choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24,
2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED,
the dispositive portion of which shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case
No. 114492 isMODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a.

[Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard

Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein
appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby
awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;

b.

[Antonio] shall have visitation rights 28 at least twice a week,

and may only take the children out upon the written consent
of [Grande];

c.

The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the

minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount
of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and
30% for [Grande]; and

d.

The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan for the sole purpose of
determining the surname to be chosen by the children
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the abovequoted provisions of the
IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate
children of their fathers surname upon the latters recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word shall in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no
moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of may in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers surname discretionary
controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the
surnames by which they will be known.

Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby
declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, LeonardoDe Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, PerlasBernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.

Mendoza, J., no part.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE PHILIPPINE
MILITARY ACADEMY, REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER RENATO P. CUDIA,
WHO ALSO ACTS ON HIS OWN BEHALF, AND BERTENI CATALUA
CAUSING, Petitioners, v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF
THE PMA AND HC MEMBERS, AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS
BOARD (CRAB), Respondents.
FILIPINA P. CUDIA, IN BEHALF OF CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P.
CUDIA, AND ON HER OWN BEHALF, Petitioner-Intervenor.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The true test of a cadets character as a leader rests on his personal
commitment to uphold what is morally and ethically righteous at the most
critical and trying times, and at the most challenging circumstances. When a

cadet must face a dilemma between what is true and right as against his
security, well-being, pleasures and comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is his
honor and those that [define] his values. A man of an honorable character does
not think twice and chooses the fore. This is the essence of and the Spirit of
the Honor Code it is championing truth and righteousness even if it may
mean the surrender of ones basic rights and privileges.1
The Procedural Antecedents
Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation ceremonies of the Philippine
Military Academy (PMA), petitioners Renato P. Cudia, acting for himself and in
behalf of his son, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia (Cadet 1CL Cudia), and
Berteni Catalua Causing filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus with application for extremely urgent temporary restraining order
(TRO).2
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In a Resolution dated March 17, 2014, the Court denied the prayer for TRO
and, instead, required respondents to file their comment on the petition. 3

The Facts
Cadet 1CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, the
countrys premiere military academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio
City. He belonged to the A Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class.
As claimed by petitioners and petitioner-intervenor (hereinafter collectively
called petitioners, unless otherwise indicated), he was supposed to graduate
with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the
top Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine
Navy.
On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1CL
cadets had a lesson examination (LE) on Operations Research (OR432) under
Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr. Costales) at the PMAFI Room. Per published
schedule from the Headquarters Academic Group, the 4th period class in OR432
was from 1:30-3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5th period class in ENG412
was from 3:05-4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H).

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On March 25, 2014, Filipina P. Cudia, acting for herself and in behalf of her son
Cadet 1CL Cudia, filed a motion for leave to intervene, attaching thereto the
petition-in-intervention.4 Per Resolution dated March 31, 2014, the Court
granted the motion and resolved to await respondents comment on the
petition.5

Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5 th period class
issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1CL Cudia because he was
[l]ate for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class x x x.17 Cadets 1CL Narciso,
Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and Dela Cruz were also reported late
for five minutes.18
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A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on April 3, 2014, recommending

the admission of the petition-in-intervention and adopting it as an integral part
of their petition.6 On May 20, 2014, petitioner-intervenor filed a manifestation
with motion for leave to admit the Final Investigation Report of the Commission
on Human Rights (CHR) dated April 25, 2014.7 The Report8 was relative to
CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029 filed by the spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia
(Spouses Cudia), for themselves and in behalf of their son, against the PMA
Honor Committee (HC) members and Major Vladimir P. Gracilla (Maj.
Gracilla)9 for violation of Cadet 1CL Cudias rights to due process, education,
and privacy of communication. Subsequently, on June 3, 2014, petitioners filed
a motion for leave to adopt the submission of the CHR Report. 10 The
manifestation was granted and the motion was noted by the Court in its
Resolution dated July 7, 2014.
After filing three motions for extension of time, 11 respondents filed their
Consolidated Comment12 on June 19, 2014. In a motion, petitioner-intervenor
filed a Reply, which was later adopted by petitioners.13 Submitted as Annex A
of the Reply was a copy of the CHR Resolution dated May 22, 2014 regarding
CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029.14 We noted and granted the same on August
11, 2014 and October 13, 2014.
Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a manifestation with motion to submit the case
for early resolution,15which the Court noted in a Resolution dated August 11,
2014 and October 13, 2014.16
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On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers.

They were logged and transmitted to the Company Tactical Officers (CTO) for
explanation of the concerned cadets. Two days later, Cadet 1CL Cudia received
his DR.
In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1CL Cudia
reasoned out that: I came directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit
late by our instructor Sir.19
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On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj. Hindang), the
CTO of Cadet 1CL Cudia, meted out to him the penalty of 11 demerits and 13
touring hours. Immediately, Cadet 1CL Cudia clarified with Maj. Hindang his
alleged violation. The latter told him that the basis of the punishment was the
result of his conversation with Dr. Costales, who responded that she never
dismissed her class late, and the protocol to dismiss the class 10-15 minutes
earlier than scheduled. When he expressed his intention to appeal and seek
reconsideration of the punishment, he was advised to put the request in
writing. Hence, that same day, Cadet 1CL Cudia addressed his Request for
Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Benjamin L. Leander, Senior
Tactical Officer (STO), asserting:
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4 th period
class ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H
also. Immediately after 4th period class, I went to my next class without any
intention of being late Sir.20
A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his comments on the
request of Cadet 1CL Cudia and to indicate if there were other cadets belonging
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to the same section who were also late.

1.

How could this be lying?

On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj. Leander
pointing out that, based on his investigation, the 4th period class was not
dismissed late. As a result, Maj. Leander sustained the penalty imposed.
Petitioners alleged that Cadet 1CL Cudia came to know of the denial of his
request only on January 24, 2014 upon inquiry with Maj. Leander.

2.

What is wrong with the side of Maj. Hindang (why did he come up to
that honor report)?

3.

What are his assumptions?

Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia was informed
that Maj. Hindang reported him to the HC21 for violation of the Honor Code. The
Honor Report stated:
Lying that is giving statement that perverts the truth in his written appeal,
stating that his 4th period class ended at 1500H that made him late in the
succeeding class.22
Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1CL Mike Anthony P. Mogol (Cadet 1CL
Mogol), as to what Maj. Hindang meant in his Report, Cadet 1CL Cudia learned
that it was based on Maj. Hindangs conversations with their instructors and
classmates as well as his statement in the request for reconsideration to Maj.
Leander. He then verbally applied for and was granted an extension of time to
answer the charge against him because Dr. Costales, who could shed light on
the matter, was on emergency leave.
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On January 13, 2014, Dr. Costales sent text messages to Cadet 1CL Cudia,
conveying:
Gud pm cdt cudia. Mam belandres gave me bkground na. She told me its a
report dated november. When maj hindang ask me, no time referens.
(04:25:11 P.M.)

I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and truth[,] that my case be reopened
and carefully reviewed for I did not violate the honor code/system, I can
answer NO to both questions (Did I intend to deceive? Did I intend to take
undue advantage?) and for the following reasons:
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1.

The honor report of Maj. Hindang was already settled and finalized
given the fact that no face-to-face personal conversation with Ms.
Costales was conducted to clarify what and when exactly was the issue
at hand.

2.

Statements of the respondents support my explanation.

3.

My explanation to my appeal to my DR (Request for reconsideration of

meted punishment) further supports my explanation in my
delinquency report.

4.

My understanding of the duration of the CLASS covers not just a

lecture in a typical classroom instruction but includes every transaction
and communication a teacher does with her students, especially that in
our case some cadets asked for queries, and I am given instruction by
which (sic) were directly related to our CLASS. Her transaction and
communication with our other classmates may have already ended but
ours extended for a little bit.

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All the while I thot he was refering to dismisal during last day last december.
Whc i told, i wud presume they wil finish early bec its grp work. (04:29:21
P.M.)23
The next day, Cadets 1CL Cudia and Arcangel approached Dr. Costales, who
reaffirmed that she and Maj. Hindang were not in the same time reference
when the latter asked her.
Later, Cadet 1CL Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the Honor Report.
He averred:
Sir,
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We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell
rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor,
Ms. Costales. After which, I and Cadet 1cl Arcangel asked for some query with
regards (sic) to the deductions of our previous LE. Our instructor gladly
answered our question. She then told me that she will give the copy of our
section grade, so I waited at the hallway outside the ACAD5 office, and then
she came out of the room and gave me a copy of the grades. Cadet Arcangel,
Cadet Narciso and I immediately went to our 5th period class which is ENG412.
With these statements, I would like to clarify the following:

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I agree and consider that because Cadet CUDIA is under my

instruction to wait, and the other cadets still have business with me, it
is reasonable enough for him to say that Our class was dismissed a
bit late (dealing with matter of seconds or a minute particularly 45
seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds)
And with concern to (sic) OR432 class, I can say it ended on time
(1500H).
(signed)
M. COSTALES
w/ attached certification

5.

6.

7.

I was transparent and honest in explaining the 2-minute delay and did
not attempt to conceal anything that happened or I did.
Furthermore, CPT DULAWAN PA, the Tactical Officer of Hawk
Company[,] and I had a conversation with regards (sic) to the same
matter for which he can give important points of my case.
Cadet 1cl DIAZ D Co can also stand as a witness that I waited for
Ms. Costales.24

On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a preliminary

investigation on the reported honor violation of Cadet 1CL Cudia. The Foxtrot
Company was designated as the investigating team and was composed of
Cadet 1CL Hasigan as Presiding Officer, and Cadets 1CL Mogol, 1CL Raguindin,
2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL Poncardas as members. 25 Soon
after, the team submitted its Preliminary Investigation Report recommending
that the case be formalized.
The formal investigation against Cadet 1CL Cudia then ensued. The Presiding
Officer was Cadet 1CL Rhona K. Salvacion, while the nine (9) voting members
were Cadets 1CL Jairus O. Fantin, 1CL Bryan Sonny S. Arlegui, 1CL Kim Adrian
R. Martal, 1CL Jeanelyn P. Cabrido, 1CL Shu-Aydan G. Ayada, 1CL Dalton John
G. Lagura, 2CL Renato A. Cario, Jr., 2CL Arwi C. Martinez, and 2CL Niko
Angelo C. Tarayao.26 Acting as recorders tasked to document the entire
proceedings were 4CL Jennifer A. Cuarteron and 3CL Leoncio Nico A. de Jesus
II.27 Those who observed the trial were Cadets 1CL Balmeo, Dag-uman,
Hasigan, Raguindin, Paulino, Arcangel, and Narciso; Cadets 2CL Jocson and
Saldua, Jr.; and Cadet 3CL Umaguing.28
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The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20, 2014 and lasted
until early morning the next day. Cadet 1CL Cudia was informed of the charge
against him, as to which he pleaded Not Guilty. Among those who testified
were Cadet 1CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and Cadets 1CL Arcangel and Narciso. On
the second night of the hearing held on January 21, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia
again appeared and was called to the witness stand along with Cadets Brit and
Barrawed. Dr. Costales also testified under oath via phone on a loudspeaker.
Deliberation among the HC voting members followed. After that, the ballot
sheets were distributed. The members cast their votes through secret balloting
and submitted their accomplished ballot sheets together with their written
justification. The result was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. Cadet 1CL Dalton
John G. Lagura (Cadet 1CL Lagura) was the lone dissenter. Allegedly, upon the
order of HC Chairman Cadet 1CL Mogol, the Presiding Officer and voting
members went inside a chamber adjoining the court room for further
deliberation. After several minutes, they went out and the Presiding Officer
announced the 9-0 guilty verdict. Cadet 1CL Cudia, who already served nine
(9) touring hours, was then informed of the unanimous votes finding him guilty
of violating the Honor Code. He was immediately placed in the PMA Holding
Center until the resolution of his appeal.

On January 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia filed a written appeal addressed to the
HC Chairman, the full text of which stated:
WRITTEN APPEAL
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14 NOVEMBER 2013
This is when I was reported for Late for two (2) minutes in Eng412 class, my
explanation on this delinquency report when I received it, is that Our class
was dismissed a (little) bit late and I came directly from 4 th period class... etc.
Knowing the fact that in my delinquency report, it is stated that ENG412
classes started 1500H and I am late for two minutes, it is logical enough for I
(sic) to interpret it as I came 1502H during that class. This is the explanation
that came into my mind that time. (I just cannot recall the exact words I used
in explaining that delinquency report, but what I want to say is that I have no
intention to be late). In my statements, I convey my message as since I was
not the only one left in that class, and the instructor is with us, I used the term
CLASS, I used the word DISMISSED because I was under instruction (to
wait for her to give the section grade) by the instructor, Ms. Costales. The
other cadets (1CL MIRANDA, 1CL ARCANGEL) still have queries and business
with her that made me decide to use the word CLASS, while the others who
dont have queries and business with her (ex: 1CL NARCISO and 1CL DIAZ)
were also around.
Note:

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The four named cadets were also reported late.

Reference: Para 171.0. (Leaving the Classroom Prior to Dismissal Time)(Sec
XVII, CCAFPR s2008)
It is stated in this reference that Cadets shall not linger in the place of
instruction after the section has been dismissed. EXCEPT when told or allowed
to do so by the instructor or by any competent authority for official purposes.
The instruction by Ms. Costales was given to me before the two bells rang
(indicating the end of class hour, 1500H). I waited for her for about 45 seconds
to 1 minute and 30 seconds, that made me to decide to write a little bit late
in my explanation. Truly, the class ENDED 1500H but due to official purpose
(instruction by Ms. Costales to wait) and the conflict in academic schedule (to
which I am not in control of the circumstances, 4thPD class 1330H-1500H and
5th PD class 1500H-1600H), and since Ms. Costales, my other classmates, and I
were there, I used the word CLASS.
19 December 2013
I was informed that my delinquency report was awarded, 11 Demerits and 13
Touring hours. Not because I dont want to serve punishment, but because I
know I did nothing wrong, I obeyed instruction, and believing that my reason
is justifiable and valid, that is why I approached our tactical officer, MAJ
HINDANG PAF, to clarify and ask why it was awarded that day.

In our conversation, he said that he had a phone call to my instructor and he

even added that they have a protocol to dismiss the class, 15 minutes or 10
minutes before 1500H. I explained:
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Sir, I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our

4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started
1500H also. Immediately after 4th period class, I went to my next class without
any intention of being late Sir.
These statements are supplementary to my explanation in my delinquency
report, in here, I specified the conflict in the schedule and again, I have no
intention to be late. After explaining it further with these statements, my
tactical officer said that since I was reported in a written form, I should make
an appeal in a written form. Thinking that he already understood what I want
to say, I immediately made an appeal that day stating the words that I used in
having conversation with him.29
Attached to the written appeal was a Certification dated January 24, 2014,
wherein Dr. Costales attested:
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1.

That Cadet MIRANDA, ARCANGEL, [and] NARCISO was (sic) with

Cadet CUDIA in making query about their latest grades in OR432
and/or results of UE1 outside the ACADS office. The following facts
may explain their queries on 14 November 2013:

recall an account that is more than two (2) months earlier. According
to my records, there was a lecture followed by an LE during (sic) on 14
November 2013. To determine the time of my dismissal, maybe it can
be verified with the other members of class I was handling on that said
date.30
Respondents contend that the HC denied the appeal the same day, January 24,
as it found no reason to conduct a re-trial based on the arguments and
evidence presented.31 Petitioners, however, claim that the written appeal was
not acted upon until the filing of the petition-in-intervention. 32
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From January 25 to February 7, 2014, respondents allege that the

Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted an informal review to check the
findings of the HC. During the course of the investigation, Prof. Berong was
said to have confirmed with the Officer-in-Charge of the HC that classes
started as scheduled (i.e., 3:05 p.m. or 1505H), and that Cadet 1CL Barrawed,
the acting class marcher of ENG412, verified before the Commandant,
Assistant Commandant, and STO that the class started not earlier than
scheduled.
Meantime, on February 4, 2014, the OIC of the HC forwarded the Formal
Investigation Report to the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for review. The next
day, the SJA found the report to be legally in order.

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a.

That I held my class in the PMAFI room instead of room 104.

b.

That OR432 releases grades every Wednesday and cadets are

informed during Thursday, either in class or posted grades in
the bulletin board (grades released was [sic] based on the
previous LEs: latest LE before UE was Decision Trees).

c.

That UE papers were already checked but not yet recorded

due to (sic) other cadets have not taken the UE. Cadets were
allowed to verify scores but not to look at the papers.

d.

2.

Last 23 January 2014, Captain Dulawan clarified if indeed

Cadet NARCISO and ARCANGEL verified grades. The two
cadets said that they verified something with me after the
OR432 class and they were with Cadet CUDIA. That the
statements of the three (3) cadets are all the same and
consistent, thus[,] I honor that as true.

As to the aspect of dismissing late, I could not really account for the
specific time that I dismissed the class. To this date, I [cannot] really

On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col. Briguez), the

Commandant of Cadets, affirmed the HC findings and recommended to Vice
Admiral Edgar Abogado, then PMA Superintendent, the separation from the
PMA of Cadet 1CL Cudia for violation of the First Tenet of the Honor Code
(Lying, pursuant to Sec. VII.12.b of the CCAFPR S-2008). On the same date,
Special Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA Headquarters placing Cadet 1CL
Cudia on indefinite leave of absence without pay and allowances effective
February 10, 2014 pending approval of his separation by the AFP-GHQ, barring
him from future appointment and/or admission as cadet, and not permitting
him to qualify for any entrance requirements to the PMA. 33
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Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the recommendation to dismiss
Cadet 1CL Cudia.
On February 13, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the
Commandant of Cadets requesting for reinstatement by the PMA of his status
as a cadet.34
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Four days passed, Annavee P. Cudia (Annavee), the sister of Cadet 1CL Cudia,
posted his plight in her Facebook account. The day after, the Spouses Cudia
gave a letter to Major General Oscar Lopez (Maj. Gen. Lopez), the new PMA
Superintendent, asking to recognize the 8-1 voting of the HC, 35 copies of which
were furnished to the AFP Chief of Staff and other concerned military officials.
Subsequently, Maj. Gen. Lopez was directed to review Cadet 1CL Cudias case.
The latter, in turn, referred the matter to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board

(CRAB).
On February 19, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia made his personal appeal letter to
Maj. Gen. Lopez. On even date, the AFP Chief of Staff ordered a reinvestigation
following the viral Facebook post of Annavee demanding the intervention of the
military leadership.

time, until March 19, 2014, to file his appeal and submit evidence. PAO also
wrote a letter to AFP Chief of Staff General Emmanuel T. Bautista (Gen.
Bautista) seeking for immediate directive to the PMA to expeditiously and
favorably act on Cadet 1CL Cudias requests. 42
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Exactly a week prior to the commencement exercises of Siklab Diwa Class, the
following events transpired:
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Petitioners claim that, on February 21, 2014, Special Order No. 1 was issued
directing all PMA cadets to ostracize Cadet 1CL Cudia by not talking to him and
by separating him from all activities/functions of the cadets. It is said that any
violation shall be a Class 1 offense entailing 45 demerits, 90 hours touring,
and 90 hours confinement. Cadet 1CL Cudia was not given a copy of the order
and learned about it only from the media.36 According to an alleged news
report, PMA Spokesperson Major Agnes Lynette Flores (Maj. Flores) confirmed
the HC order to ostracize Cadet 1CL Cudia. Among his offenses were: breach of
confidentiality by putting documents in the social media, violation of the PMA
Honor Code, lack of initiative to resign, and smearing the name of the
PMA.37
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On February 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia requested the CRAB for additional
time, until March 4, 2014, to file an appeal on the ground that his intended
witnesses were in on-the-job training (OJT).38 As additional evidence to support
his appeal, he also requested for copies of the Minutes of the HC proceedings,
relevant documents pertaining to the case, and video footages and recordings
of the HC hearings.
The next day, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family engaged the services of the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO) in Baguio City.
The CRAB conducted a review of the case based on the following: (a) letter of
appeal of the Spouses Cudia dated February 18, 2014; (b) directive from the
AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case; and (c) guidance from Maj. Gen. Lopez.
On February 26, 2014, Brigadier General Andre M. Costales, Jr. (Brig. Gen.
Costales, Jr.), the CRAB Chairman, informed Cadet 1CL Cudia that, pending
approval of the latters request for extension, the CRAB would continue to
review the case and submit its recommendations based on whatever evidence
and testimonies received, and that it could not favorably consider his request
for copies of the HC minutes, relevant documents, and video footages and
recordings of the HC hearings since it was neither the appropriate nor the
authorized body to take action thereon.39 Subsequently, upon verbal advice,
Cadet 1CL Cudia wrote a letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez reiterating his request. 40

On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the assistance of PAO Chief Public
Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta.43 On the other hand, the CRAB submitted a
report to the AFP-GHQ upholding the dismissal of Cadet 1CL Cudia. 44
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On March 11, 2014, PAO received a letter from Maj. Gen. Lopez stating the
denial of Cadet 1CL Cudias requests for extension of time to file an Appeal
Memorandum in view of the ample time already given, and to be furnished with
a copy of relevant documents because of confidentiality and presumption of
regularity of the HC proceedings.45 Cadet 1CL Cudia, through PAO, then filed an
Appeal Memorandum46before the CRAB.
On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter to President Benigno Simeon
C. Aquino III (Pres. Aquino), who is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP,
attaching thereto the Appeal Memorandum.47 On the same day, Special Orders
No. 48 was issued by the PMA constituting a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation
Body composed of the CRAB members and PMA senior officers to conduct a
deliberate investigation pertaining to Cadet 1CL Cudias Appeal
Memorandum.48 The focus of the inquiry was not just to find out whether the
appeal has merit or may be considered but also to investigate possible
involvement of other cadets and members of the command related to the
incident and to establish specific violation of policy or regulations that had been
violated by other cadets and members of the HC.49
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On March 13, 2014, the Cudia family and the Chief Public Attorney had a
dialogue with Maj. Gen. Lopez.
On March 14, 2014, the CHR-CAR came out with its preliminary findings, which
recommended the following:
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a.

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b.

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Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter-complaint before the CHRCordillera Administrative Region (CAR) Office against the HC members and Maj.
Gracilla for alleged violation of the human rights of Cadet 1CL Cudia,
particularly his rights to due process, education, and privacy of
communication.41
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On March 4, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia, through the PAO, moved for additional

For the PMA and the Honor Committee to respect and uphold the 8
Guilty 1 Not guilty vote;
For the PMA and the Honor Committee to officially pronounce Cdt
Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed against him before the Honor
Committee;
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c.

For the PMA to restore Cadet Cudias rights and entitlements as a fullfledge graduating cadet and allow him to graduate on Sunday, 16
March 2014;
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d.

For the PMA to fully cooperate with the CHR in the investigation of
Cudias Case.50

ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity, due process, education, privacy/privacy of

communication, and good life.

On March 15, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family had a meeting with Pres.
Aquino and Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary Voltaire T.
Gazmin. The President recommended that they put in writing their appeal,
requests, and other concerns. According to respondents, the parties agreed
that Cadet 1CL Cudia would not join the graduation but it was without
prejudice to the result of the appeal, which was elevated to the AFP Chief of
Staff. The President then tasked Gen. Bautista to handle the reinvestigation of
the case, with Maj. Gen. Oscar Lopez supervising the group conducting the
review.
Four days after Siklab Diwa Class graduation day, petitioner Renato S. Cudia
received a letter dated March 11, 2014 from the Office of the AFP Adjutant
General and signed by Brig. Gen. Ronald N. Albano for the AFP Chief of Staff,
affirming the CRABs denial of Cadet 1CL Cudias appeal. It held:
After review, The Judge Advocate General, AFP finds that the action of the PMA
CRAB in denying the appeal for reinvestigation is legally in order. There was
enough evidence to sustain the finding of guilt and the proprietary (sic) of the
punishment imposed. Also, your son was afforded sufficient time to file his
appeal from the date he was informed of the final verdict on January 21, 2014,
when the decision of the Honor Committee was read to him in person, until the
time the PMA CRAB conducted its review on the case. Moreover, the continued
stay of your son at the Academy was voluntary. As such, he remained subject
to the Academys policy regarding visitation. Further, there was no violation of
his right to due process considering that the procedure undertaken by the
Honor Committee and PMA CRAB was consistent with existing policy. Thus, the
previous finding and recommendation of the Honor Committee finding your
son, subject Cadet guilty of Lying and recommending his separation from the
Academy is sustained.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR Office RESOLVED to indorse to

competent authorities for their immediate appropriate action on the following
recommendations:
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1.

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2.

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Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR issued its Resolution with respect
to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029, concluding and recommending as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission on Human RightsCAR Office finds PROBABLE CAUSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS against the officers and members of the PMA Honor Committee
and certain PMA officials, specifically for violations of the rights of CADET

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The PMA, the AFP Chief of Staff, and the President in whose hands rest
the ends of justice and fate of Cadet Cudia, to:
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2.1officially proclaim Cadet Cudia a graduate and alumnus of the

Philippine Military Academy;
2.2issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding Diploma for the degree
of Bachelors of Science; and
2.3Issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding official transcript of his
academic records for his BS degree, without conditions therein
as to his status as a PMA cadet.

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In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters resolved to deny your appeal for
lack of merit.51
Thereafter, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body issued its Final
Investigation Report on March 23, 2014 denying Cadet 1CL Cudias
appeal.52 Subsequently, on April 28, 2014, the special investigation board
tasked to probe the case submitted its final report to the President. 53 Pursuant
to the administrative appeals process, the DND issued a Memorandum dated
May 23, 2014, directing the Office of AFP Chief of Staff to submit the complete
records of the case for purposes of DND review and recommendation for
disposition by the President.54

The Philippine Military Academy must set aside the 9-Guilty, 0-Not
Guilty verdict against Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia, for being null and
void; to uphold and respect the 8-Guilty, 1-Not Guilty voting result
and make an official pronouncement of NOT GUILTY in favor of Cadet
Cudia;

3.

The Public Attorneys Office to provide legal services to Cadet Cudia in

pursuing administrative, criminal and civil suits against the officers and
members of the Honor Committee named hereunder, for violation of
the Honor Code and System and the Procedure in Formal
Investigation, dishonesty, violation of the secrecy of the ballot,
tampering the true result of the voting, perjury, intentional omission in
the Minutes of substantive part of the formal trial proceedings which
are prejudicial to the interest of justice and Cadet Cudias fundamental
rights to dignity, non-discrimination and due process, which led to the
infringement of his right to education and even transgressing his right
to a good life.

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7

Cdt
Cdt
Cdt
Cdt
Cdt
Cdt
Cdt

1CL
1CL
2CL
2CL
2CL
1CL
1CL

MIKE ANTHONY MOGUL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

RHONA K. SALVACION, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
ARWI C. MARTINEZ
RENATO A. CARIO, JR.
NIKO ANGELO C. TARAYAO
JEANELYN P. CABRIDO, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
KIM ADRIAN R. MARTAL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.8 Cdt
3.9 Cdt
3.10 Cdt
3.11 Cdt

1CL
1CL
1CL
1CL
3.12Cdt 4CL
3.13Cdt 3CL

JAIRUS O. FANTIN, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

BRYAN SONNY S. ARLEGUI, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
DALTON JOHN G. LAGURA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
BIANCHIHEIMER L. EDRA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
JENNIFER A. CUARTERON (recorder)
LEONCIO NICO A. DE JESUS II (recorder)

Jeff P. Cudia), and all the respondents. Also, to the PMA Superintendent, the
AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, His Excellency The
President of the Philippines, The Public Attorneys Office.
SO RESOLVED.55
On June 11, 2014, the Office of the President sustained the findings of the AFP
Chief of Staff and the CRAB. The letter, which was addressed to the Spouses
Cudia and signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., stated in
whole:
This refers to your letters to the President dated 12 March 2014 and 26 March
2014 appealing for a reconsideration of the decision of the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA) Honor Committee on the case of your son, Cadet 1CL Aldrin
Jeff Cudia.
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4.

The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA competent authorities
should investigate and file appropriate charges against Maj. VLADIMIR
P. GRACILLA, for violation of the right to privacy of Cadet Cudia and/or
failure, as intelligence officer, to ensure the protection of the right to
privacy of Cudia who was then billeted at the PMA Holding Center;
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5.

The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and PMA competent authorities
should investigate Maj. DENNIS ROMMEL HINDANG for his failure and
ineptness to exercise his responsibility as a competent Tactical Officer
and a good father of his cadets, in this case, to Cadet Cudia; for failure
to respect exhaustion of administrative remedies;
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6.

The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed

Forces of the Philppines, the PMA Superintendent, to immediately
cause the comprehensive review of all rules of procedures, regulations,
policies, including the so-called practices in the implementation of the
Honor Code; and, thereafter, adopt new policies, rules of procedures
and relevant regulations which are human-rights based and consistent
with the Constitution and other applicable laws;

After carefully studying the records of the case of Cadet Cudia, the decision of
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Honor
Code System of the AFP Cadet Corps, this Office has found no substantial basis
to disturb the findings of the AFP and the PMA Cadet Review Appeals Board
(CRAB). There is no competent evidence to support the claim that the decision
of the Honor Committee members was initially at 8 Guilty votes and 1 Not
Guilty vote. The lone affidavit of an officer, based on his purported
conversation with one Honor Committee member, lacks personal knowledge on
the deliberations of the said Committee and is hearsay at best.
Similarly, the initial recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights
cannot be adopted as basis that Cadet Cudias due process rights were
violated. Apart from being explicitly preliminary in nature, such
recommendations are anchored on a finding that there was an 8-1 vote which,
as discussed above, is not supported by competent evidence.

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7.

The Congress of the Philippines to consider the enactment of a law

defining and penalizing ostracism and discrimination, which is
apparently being practiced in the PMA, as a criminal offense in this
jurisdiction;
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8.

His Excellency The President of the Philippines to certify as priority, the

passage of an anti-ostracism and/or anti-discrimination law; and

9.

Finally, for the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA authorities to ensure
respect and protection of the rights of those who testified for the cause
of justice and truth as well as human rights of Cadet Cudia.

RESOLVED FURTHER, to monitor the actions by the competent authorities on

the foregoing CHR recommendations.
Let copy of this resolution be served by personal service or by substituted
service to the complainants (the spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia; and Aldrin

In the evaluation of Cadet Cudias case, this Office has been guided by the
precept that military law is regarded to be in a class of its own, applicable only
to military personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization
requiring a system of discipline separate from that of civilians (Gonzales v.
Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, 10 August 2005 citing Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d
184 [1975] and Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 US 83 [1953]). Thus, this Office
regarded the findings of the AFP Chief, particularly his conclusion that there
was nothing irregular in the proceedings that ensued, as carrying great weight.
Accordingly, please be informed that the President has sustained the findings of
the AFP Chief and the PMA CRAB.56
The Issues
To petitioners, the issues for resolution are:
I.

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WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND

THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA
FROM THE ACADEMY IN UTTER DISREGARD OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

CONSIDERING THAT:
A.

B.

C.

Despite repeated requests for relevant documents regarding his case,

Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was deprived of his right to have
access to evidence which would have proven his defense, would have
totally belied the charge against him, and more importantly, would
have shown the irregularity in the Honor Committees hearing and
rendition of decision
Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was vaguely informed of the
decisions arrived at by the Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy
The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the
Philippine Military Academy have afforded Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff
Cudia nothing but a sham trial

D. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the
Philippine Military Academy violated their own rules and principles as
embodied in the Honor Code
E.

The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the
Philippine Military Academy, in deciding Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff
Cudias case, grossly and in bad faith, misapplied the Honor Code so as
to defy the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the unquestionable fact
that the former should yield to the latter.

LIST OF GRADUATES OF SIKLAB DIWA CLASS OF 2014 AND BE ALLOWED TO

TAKE PART IN THE COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES HAS ALREADY BEEN
RENDERED MOOT.
II.
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE ACTUALLY FACTUAL WHICH ARE
BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND
MANDAMUS.
III.
MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL RESPONDENTS TO GRANT THE
RELIEFS PRAYED FOR.
IV.
IT IS PREMATURE TO INVOKE JUDICIAL REDRESS PENDING THE DECISION OF
THE PRESIDENT ON CADET CUDIAS APPEAL.
V.
WITH UTMOST DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT MUST EXERCISE
CAREFUL RESTRAINT AND REFRAIN FROM UNDULY OR PREMATURELY
INTERFERING WITH LEGITIMATE MILITARY MATTERS.
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
VI.

II
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND
THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA
LIED, THEREBY VIOLATING THE HONOR CODE
III
WHETHER THE RESULT OF THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION
INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCTED BY THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS OF
SUCH GREAT WEIGHT AND PERSUASIVE NATURE THAT THIS HONORABLE
COURT MAY HONOR, UPHOLD AND RESPECT57
On the other hand, in support of their prayer to dismiss the petition,
respondents presented the issues below:
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
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I.
THE MANDAMUS PETITION PRAYING THAT CADET CUDIA BE INCLUDED IN THE

CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED CERTAIN

CIVIL LIBERTIES BY VIRTUE OF HIS ENTRY INTO THE PMA.
VII.
THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH AUTHORIZES IT TO
IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND PUNISHMENT AS IT DEEMS FIT AND
CONSISTENT WITH THE PECULIAR NEEDS OF THE ACADEMY.
VIII.
CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
The PMA has regulatory authority to administratively terminate cadets despite
the absence of statutory authority.
Violation of the Honor Code warrants the administrative dismissal of a guilty
cadet.

Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by providing untruthful
statements in the explanation for his tardiness.
The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt the findings of the
Honor Committee.
The procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case were properly
accorded to Cadet Cudia.
The subtle evolution in the voting process of the Honor Committee, by
incorporating executive session/chambering, was adopted to further strengthen
the voting procedure of the Honor Committee.
Cadet Lagura voluntarily changed his vote without any pressure from the other
voting members of the Honor Committee.
Ostracism is not a sanctioned practice of the PMA.
The findings of the Commission on Human Rights are not binding on the
Honorable Court, and are, at best, recommendatory.
Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his future when he was dismissed
from the PMA.58
The Ruling of the Court
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
Propriety of a petition for mandamus
Respondents argue that the mandamus aspect of the petition praying that
Cadet 1CL Cudia be included in the list of graduating cadets and for him to take
part in the commencement exercises was already rendered moot and academic
when the graduation ceremonies of the PMA Siklab Diwa Class took place on
March 16, 2014. Also, a petition for mandamus is improper since it does not lie
to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Invoking Garcia v. The
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,59 respondents assert
that a mandamus petition could not be availed of to compel an academic
institution to allow a student to continue studying therein because it is merely
a privilege and not a right. In this case, there is a clear failure on petitioners
part to establish that the PMA has the ministerial duty to include Cadet 1CL
Cudia in the list, much less award him with academic honors and commission
him to the Philippine Navy. Similar to the case of University of San Agustin,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,60 it is submitted that the PMA may rightfully exercise
its discretionary power on who may be admitted to study pursuant to its
academic freedom.

manner when there is a violation of a constitutional right, and that the

certiorari aspect of the petition must still be considered because it is within the
province of the Court to determine whether a branch of the government or any
of its officials has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess thereof.
We agree that a petition for mandamus is improper.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for
mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or
duty. An act is ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given state
of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's]
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done." The tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform the
act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby
the officer has the choice to decide how or when to perform the duty.61
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In this case, petitioners pray for, among others:

Also, after due notice and hearing, it is prayed of the Court to issue a Writ of
Mandamusto:
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1.

direct the PMA to include Cadet Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab
Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, including inclusion in the yearbook;
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2.

direct the PMA to allow Cadet Cudia to take part in the commencement
exercises if he completed all the requirements for his baccalaureate
degree;
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3.

direct the PMA to award unto Cadet Cudia the academic honors he
deserves, and the commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign;
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4.

direct the Honor Committee to submit to the CRAB of the PMA all its
records of the proceedings taken against Cadet Cudia, including the
video footage and audio recordings of the deliberations and voting, for
the purpose of allowing the CRAB to conduct intelligent review of the
case of Cadet Cudia;
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In response, petitioners contend that while the plea to allow Cadet 1CL Cudia
to participate in the PMA 2014 commencement exercises could no longer be
had, the Court may still grant the other reliefs prayed for. They add
that Garcia enunciated that a respondent can be ordered to act in a particular

5.

direct the PMAs CRAB to conduct a review de novo of all the

records without requiring Cadet Cudia to submit new evidence if it
was physically impossible to do so;
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6.

direct the PMAs CRAB to take into account the certification signed by
Dr. Costales, the new evidence consisting of the affidavit of a military
officer declaring under oath that the cadet who voted not guilty
revealed to this officer that this cadet was coerced into changing his
vote, and other new evidence if there is any;
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7.

8.

direct the PMAs CRAB to give Cadet Cudia the right to a counsel who is
allowed to participate actively in the proceedings as well as in the
cross-examinations during the exercise of the right to confront
witnesses against him; and
direct the Honor Committee in case of remand of the case by the CRAB
to allow Cadet Cudia a representation of a counsel.62

Similarly, petitioner-intervenor seeks for the following reliefs:

A. x x x

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There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued.
Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology,
what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than
a right. She [in this case, Cadet 1CL Cudia] cannot therefore satisfy the prime
and indispensable requisite of a mandamusproceeding.65
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed
against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of
discretion or judgment.66 For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear
legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on
the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated. 67
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The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being sought by
petitioners, which pertain to the HC and the CRAB proceedings. In the absence
of a clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus petition does not
lie to require anyone to a specific course of conduct or to control or review the
exercise of discretion; it will not issue to compel an official to do anything
which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.68
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B. a Writ of Mandamus be issued commanding:

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a.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to respect and

uphold the 8 Guilty - 1 Not Guilty vote;
b.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to officially
pronounce Cadet Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed
against him before the Honor Committee;
c.) The PMA to restore Cadet Cudias rights and entitlements
as a full-fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma
and awards.63
Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet 1CL Cudia in the list of
graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 and to allow him to take part in the
commencement exercises, the same was rendered moot and academic when
the graduation ceremonies pushed through on March 16, 2014 without
including Cadet 1CL Cudia in the roll of graduates.
With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet 1CL Cudias
rights and entitlements as a full-fledged graduating cadet, including his
diploma, awards, and commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign, the same
cannot be granted in a petition for mandamus on the basis of academic
freedom, which We shall discuss in more detail below. Suffice it to say at this
point that these matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by the right of
academic freedom; therefore, beyond the province of the Court to
decide.64 The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant awards, and
commission officers in the military service are discretionary acts on the part of
the President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief. Borrowing the words
of Garcia:
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The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of the case must proceed since,
as argued by petitioners, the Court is empowered to settle via petition
for certiorari whether there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondents in dismissing Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA.
Factual nature of the issues
According to respondents, the petition raises issues that actually require the
Court to make findings of fact because it sets forth several factual disputes
which include, among others: the tardiness of Cadet 1CL Cudia in his ENG412
class and his explanation thereto, the circumstances that transpired in the
investigation of his Honor Code violation, the proceedings before the HC, and
the allegation that Cadet 1CL Lagura was forced to change his vote during the
executive session/chambering.
In opposition, petitioners claim that the instant controversy presents legal
issues. Rather than determining which between the two conflicting versions of
the parties is true, the case allegedly centers on the application, appreciation,
and interpretation of a persons rights to due process, to education, and to
property; the interpretation of the PMA Honor Code and Honor System; and
the conclusion on whether Cadet 1CL Cudias explanation constitutes lying.
Even if the instant case involves questions of fact, petitioners still hold that the
Court is empowered to settle mixed questions of fact and law.
Petitioners are correct.
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of
the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being
admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, there is a question of fact
when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged

facts. When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the
conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.69
The petition does not exclusively present factual matters for the Court to
decide. As pointed out, the all-encompassing issue of more importance is the
determination of whether a PMA cadet has rights to due process, to education,
and to property in the context of the Honor Code and the Honor System, and,
if in the affirmative, the extent or limit thereof. Notably, even respondents
themselves raise substantive grounds that We have to resolve. In support of
their contention that the Court must exercise careful restraint and should
refrain from unduly or prematurely interfering in legitimate military matters,
they argue that Cadet 1CL Cudia has necessarily and voluntarily relinquished
certain civil liberties by virtue of his entry into the PMA, and that the Academy
enjoys academic freedom authorizing the imposition of disciplinary measures
and punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the
PMA. These issues, aside from being purely legal questions, are of first
impression; hence, the Court must not hesitate to make a categorical ruling.

We rule for petitioners.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a party may
directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the following is present:

In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened

injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. The
rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is that
courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits
unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and
the proper authorities, who are competent to act upon the matter complained
of, have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged
errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.74 In the U.S. case
of Ringgold v. United States,75 which was cited by respondents, it was
specifically held that in a typical case involving a decision by military
authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his remedies within the military before
appealing to the court, the doctrine being designed both to preserve the
balance between military and civilian authorities and to conserve judicial
resources.

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Respondents assert that the Court must decline jurisdiction over the petition
pending President Aquinos resolution of Cadet 1CL Cudia appeal. They say
that there is an obvious non-exhaustion of the full administrative process.
While Cadet 1CL Cudia underwent the review procedures of his guilty verdict at
the Academy level the determination by the SJA of whether the HC acted
according to the established procedures of the Honor System, the assessment
by the Commandant of Cadets of the procedural and legal correctness of the
guilty verdict, the evaluation of the PMA Superintendent to warrant the
administrative separation of the guilty cadet, and the appellate review
proceedings before the CRAB he still appealed to the President, who has the
utmost latitude in making decisions affecting the military. It is contended that
the Presidents power over the persons and actions of the members of the
armed forces is recognized in B/Gen. (Ret.) Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga70 and in
Section 3171 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 1 (also known as "The National
Defense Act"). As such, the President could still overturn the decision of the
PMA. In respondents view, the filing of this petition while the case is pending
resolution of the President is an irresponsible defiance, if not a personal
affront. For them, comity dictates that courts of justice should shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.
From the unfolding of events, petitioners, however, consider that President
Aquino effectively denied the appeal of Cadet 1CL Cudia. They claim that his
family exerted insurmountable efforts to seek reconsideration of the HC
recommendation from the AFP officials and the President, but was in vain. The
circumstances prior to, during, and after the PMA 2014 graduation rites, which
was attended by President Aquino after he talked to Cadet 1CL Cudias family
the night before, foreclose the possibility that the challenged findings would
still be overturned. In any case, petitioners insist that the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not absolute based on the Corsiga v.
Defensor72 and Verceles v. BLR-DOLE73 rulings.

1.

when there is a violation of due process;

2.

when the issue involved is purely a legal question;

3.

when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction;

4.

when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency

concerned;

5.

when there is irreparable injury;

6.

when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter

ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the
latter;

7.

when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be

unreasonable;

8.

when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;

9.

when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;

10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
and

11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial

intervention.76
Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of Cadet
1CL Cudia from the PMA. Thus, it may be a ground to give due course to the
petition despite the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Yet more
significant is the fact that during the pendency of this case, particularly on June
11, 2014, the Office of the President finally issued its ruling, which sustained
the findings of the AFP Chief and the CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this
supervening event bars any objection to the petition based on failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
Courts interference within military affairs
Respondents cite the U.S. cases of Bois v. Marsh77 and Schlesinger v.
Councilman78 to support their contention that judicial intervention would pose
substantial threat to military discipline and that there should be a deferential
review of military statutes and regulations since political branches have
particular expertise and competence in assessing military needs. Likewise,
in Orloff v. Willoughby79 andParker v. Levy,80 it was allegedly opined by the
U.S. Supreme Court that the military constitutes a specialized community
governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian. According to
respondents, the U.S. courts respect to the military recognizes that
constitutional rights may apply differently in the military context than in civilian
society as a whole. Such military deference is exercised either by refusing to
apply due process and equal protection doctrines in military cases or applying
them but with leniency.
In respondents view, although Philippine courts have the power of judicial
review in cases attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, policy considerations call for the widest latitude of
deference to military affairs. Such respect is exercised by the court where the
issues to be resolved entail a substantial consideration of legitimate
governmental interest. They suppose that allowing Cadet 1CL Cudias case to
prosper will set an institutionally dangerous precedent, opening a Pandoras
box of other challenges against the specialized system of discipline of the PMA.
They state that with the PMAs mandate to train cadets for permanent
commission in the AFP, its disciplinary rules and procedure necessarily must
impose a different standard of conduct compared with civilian institutions.
Petitioners, on the other hand, consider that this Court is part of the States
check-and-balance machinery, specifically mandated by Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution to ensure that no branch of the government or any of its officials
acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They assert that judicial noninterference in military affairs is not deemed as absolute even in the U.S. They
cite Schlesinger and Parker, which were invoked by respondents, as well
as Burns v. Wilson81 and Harmon v. Brucker,82 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court
reviewed the proceedings of military tribunals on account of issues posed

concerning due process and violations of constitutional rights. Also, in Magno

v. De Villa83 decided by this Court, petitioners note that We, in fact, exercised
the judicial power to determine whether the AFP and the members of the court
martial acted with grave abuse of discretion in their military investigation.
Petitioners contentions are tenable.
Admittedly, the Constitution entrusts the political branches of the government,
not the courts, with superintendence and control over the military because the
courts generally lack the competence and expertise necessary to evaluate
military decisions and they are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon
discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might
have.84 Nevertheless, for the sake of brevity, We rule that the facts as well as
the legal issues in the U.S. cases cited by respondents are not on all fours with
the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia. Instead, what applies is the 1975 U.S. case
ofAndrews v. Knowlton,85 which similarly involved cadets who were separated
from the United States Military Academy due to Honor Code violations.
Following Wasson v. Trowbridge86 and Hagopian v. Knowlton,87 Andrews reaffirmed the power of the district courts to review procedures used at the
service academies in the separation or dismissal of cadets and midshipmen.
While it recognized the constitutional permissibility of the military to set and
enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics, it said that the
courts have expanded at an accelerated pace the scope of judicial access for
review of military determinations. Later, in Kolesa v. Lehman,88 it was opined
that it has been well settled that federal courts have jurisdiction "where there
is a substantial claim that prescribed military procedures violates one's
constitutional rights." By 1983, the U.S. Congress eventually made major
revisions to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by expressly providing,
among others, for a direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court of decisions by
the militarys highest appellate authority.89
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Even without referring to U.S. cases, the position of petitioners is still

formidable. In this jurisdiction, Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
expanded the scope of judicial power by mandating that the duty of the courts
of justice includes not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.90 Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law.91
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The proceedings of the Cadet Honor Committee can, for purposes of the Due
Process Clause, be considered a governmental activity. As ruled in Andrews:
The relationship between the Cadet Honor Committee and the separation
process at the Academy has been sufficiently formalized, and is sufficiently

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interdependent, so as to bring that committee's activities within the definition

of governmental activity for the purposes of our review. While the Academy
has long had the informal practice of referring all alleged violations to the
Cadet Honor Committee, the relationship between that committee and the
separation process has to a degree been formalized. x x x
Regardless of whether the relationship be deemed formal or informal, the
Honor Committee under its own procedures provides that a single "not guilty"
vote by a member ends the matter, while a "guilty" finding confronts a cadet
with the hard choice of either resigning or electing to go before a Board of
Officers. An adverse finding there results not only in formal separation from the
Academy but also in a damaging record that will follow the cadet through life.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Cadet Honor Committee, acting not unlike a
grand jury, is clearly part of the process whereby a cadet can ultimately be
adjudged to have violated the Cadet Honor Code and be separated from the
Academy. Therefore, the effect of the committee's procedures and
determinations on the separation process is sufficiently intertwined with the
formal governmental activity which may follow as to bring it properly under
judicial review.92
No one is above the law, including the military. In fact, the present Constitution
declares it as a matter of principle that civilian authority is, at all times,
supreme over the military.93 Consistent with the republican system of checks
and balances, the Court has been entrusted, expressly or by necessary
implication, with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in
appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive
action.94
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17897 (as amended by E.O. No. 100598), AFP Code of Ethics, Oath of Cadet
Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor System, military professionalism, and,
in general, military culture. They maintain that the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA,
grossly and in bad faith misapplied the Honor Code and the Honor System in
deciding Cadet 1CL Cudias case considering that these should not be
implemented at the expense of human rights, due process, and fair play.
Further, under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, they can never
overpower or defy the 1987 Constitution since the former should yield to the
latter. Petitioners stress that the statement that a cadet can be compelled to
surrender some civil rights and liberties in order for the Code and System to be
implemented simply pertains to what cadets have to sacrifice in order to prove
that they are men or women of integrity and honor, such as the right to
entertain vices and the right to freely choose what they want to say or do. In
the context of disciplinary investigation, it does not contemplate a surrender of
the right to due process but, at most, refers to the cadets rights to privacy and
to remain silent.
We concur with the stand of petitioners.
Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to subordinate
his private interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution he
attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a student at a civilian public
school.99 In fact, the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook of the PMA
expresses that, [as] a training environment, the Cadet Corps is a society
which has its own norms. Each member binds himself to what is good for him,
his subordinates, and his peers. To be part of the Cadet Corps requires the
surrender of some basic rights and liberties for the good of the group.100
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SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
Cadets relinquishment of certain civil liberties
Respondents assert that the standard of rights applicable to a cadet is not the
same as that of a civilian because the formers rights have already been
recalibrated to best serve the military purpose and necessity. They claim that
both Gudani and Lt. Col. Kapunan, Jr. v. Gen. De Villa95 recognized that, to a
certain degree, individual rights of persons in the military service may be
curtailed by the rules of military discipline in order to ensure its effectiveness in
fulfilling the duties required to be discharged under the law. Respondents
remind that, as a military student aspiring to a commissioned post in the
military service, Cadet 1CL Cudia voluntarily gave up certain civil and political
rights which the rest of the civilian population enjoys. The deliberate surrender
of certain freedoms on his part is embodied in the cadets Honor Code
Handbook. It is noted that at the beginning of their academic life in the PMA,
Cadet 1CL Cudia, along with the rest of Cadet Corps, took an oath and
undertaking to stand by the Honor Code and the Honor System.
To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his fundamental human rights, including
the right to due process, is, for petitioners, contrary to the provisions of
Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,96 Executive Order (E.O.) No.

It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and Hagopian, which were
adopted by Andrews, that a cadet facing dismissal from the military academy
for misconduct has constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or
property); hence, disciplinary proceedings conducted within the bounds of
procedural due process is a must.101 For that reason, the PMA is not immune
from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,
the minimal requirements of the due process clause must be
satisfied.102Likewise, the cadet faces far more severe sanctions of being
expelled from a course of college instruction which he or she has pursued with
a view to becoming a career officer and of probably being forever denied that
career.103
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The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable as they do not
specifically pertain to dismissal proceedings of a cadet in a military academy
due to honor violation. In Gudani, the Court denied the petition that sought to
annul the directive from then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which
enjoined petitioners from testifying before the Congress without her consent.
We ruled that petitioners may be subjected to military discipline for their
defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. On the other hand,
in Kapunan, Jr., this Court upheld the restriction imposed on petitioner since
the conditions for his house arrest (particularly, that he may not issue any

press statements or give any press conference during the period of his
detention) are justified by the requirements of military discipline. In these two
cases, the constitutional rights to information, transparency in matters of
public concern, and to free speech not to due process clause were
restricted to better serve the greater military purpose.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Petitioners posit that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC
may be used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet
from the PMA. They argue that Honor Code violation is not among those listed
as justifications for the attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and
the Honor System do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically terminated
or dismissed from service. To them, the Honor Code and Honor System are
gentlemans agreement that cannot take precedence over public interest in
the defense of the nation and in view of the taxpayers money spent for each
cadet. Petitioners contend that, based on the Civil Code, all written or verbal
agreements are null and void if they violate the law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, and public safety.
In opposition, respondents claim that the PMA may impose disciplinary
measures and punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar
needs of the Academy. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has
regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets since it is deemed
reasonably written into C.A. No. 1. Moreover, although said law grants to the
President the authority of terminating a cadets appointment, such power may
be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision
and control over the cadets.

In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown in Isabelo, Jr. and Ateneo,
academic freedom is not absolute and cannot be exercised in blatant disregard
of the right to due process and the 1987 Constitution. Although schools have
the prerogative to choose what to teach, how to teach, and who to teach, the
same does not go so far as to deprive a student of the right to graduate when
there is clear evidence that he is entitled to the same since, in such a case, the
right to graduate becomes a vested right which takes precedence over the
limited and restricted right of the educational institution.
While both parties have valid points to consider, the arguments of respondents
are more in line with the facts of this case.
We have ruled that the school-student relationship is contractual in nature.
Once admitted, a students enrolment is not only semestral in duration but for
the entire period he or she is expected to complete it. 111 An institution of
learning has an obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete
the course they seek to pursue.112 Such contract is imbued with public interest
because of the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the
grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions.113
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The school-student relationship has also been held as reciprocal. [It] has
consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of such kind it
gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The school
undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to enable them to
pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree
to abide by the academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules
and regulations.114
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Respondents likewise contend that, as an academic institution, the PMA has the
inherent right to promulgate reasonable norms, rules and regulations that it
may deem necessary for the maintenance of school discipline, which is
specifically mandated by Section 3 (2),104 Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
As the premiere military educational institution of the AFP in accordance with
Section 30,105Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59,106 Chapter 9,
Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987?),
the PMA is an institution that enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by Section
5 (2),107 Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. In Miriam College Foundation,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,108 it was held that concomitant with such freedom is
the right and duty to instill and impose discipline upon its students. Also,
consistent with Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc.109and Ateneo
de Manila University v. Capulong,110 the PMA has the freedom on who to admit
(and, conversely, to expel) given the high degree of discipline and honor
expected from its students who are to form part of the AFP.
For respondents, Cadet 1CL Cudia cannot, therefore, belatedly assail the Honor
Code as basis of the HCs decision to recommend his dismissal from the PMA.
When he enlisted for enrolment and studied in the PMA for four years, he knew
or should have been fully aware of the standards of discipline imposed on all
cadets and the corresponding penalty for failing to abide by these standards.

Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities

and institutions of higher learning,115 has been enshrined in our
Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.116 In Garcia, this Court espoused the
concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy
v. New Hampshire,117 which enumerated the four essential freedoms of a
university: To determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2)
what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted
to study.118 An educational institution has the power to adopt and enforce such
rules as may be deemed expedient for its government, this being incident to
the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to the successful
management of the college.119 It can decide for itself its aims and objectives
and how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or interference except
when there is an overriding public welfare which would call for some
restraint.120 Indeed, academic freedom has never been meant to be an
unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise
it responsibly. An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well
expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.121
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The schools power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their

academic freedom and that the establishment of rules governing universitystudent relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be
regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the
institution, but to its very survival.122 As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school
without discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the
mill, so does the school's disciplinary power assure its right to survive and
continue operating.123 In this regard, the Court has always recognized the right
of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss
or expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules.124 In Miriam College
Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,125 this Court elucidated:
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third
freedom,i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an
atmosphere of anarchy.
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Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational

institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an
orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment
conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the
protection of the students, faculty, and property.
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a
necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling
discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the
student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."
Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline
in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.
[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster
love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national
heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties
of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character
and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden
scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.
In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to
carry out its responsibility to help its students "grow and develop into mature,
responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community."
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident
than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to
determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine
whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions
such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges. 126
The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after
graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto. In University of the
Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals,127 We upheld the universitys

withdrawal of a doctorate degree already conferred on a student who was

found to have committed intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. Thus:
Art. XIV, 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." This is nothing new. The 1935
Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic
freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to
"institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority
certainly extending to the choice of students." If such institution of higher
learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also
determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its
graduates.
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Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained

through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or
distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not
terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, as the Court of Appeals held. For
it is precisely the "graduation" of such a student that is in question. It is
noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent's case began before
her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24,
1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board of
Regents finally decided she should not have been allowed to graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher
learning, for the constitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote again
from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, "is
not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion."
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of
the University of the Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon the
recommendation of the University Council. It follows that if the conferment of a
degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered,
subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has granted
without violating a student's rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be
powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not
rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a
university's highest academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the
same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the
university's concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take
measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their
education, the USC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue its
academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see to it
that this freedom is not jeopardized.128
It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to develop
the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and
attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total
man.129 Essentially, education must ultimately be religious, i.e., one which

inculcates duty and reverence.130 Under the rubric of "right to education,"

students have a concomitant duty to learn under the rules laid down by the
school.131 Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study,
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements.132

requirements outlined inAng Tibay as the Court merely stated that the
minimum requirements in the Guzman case are moreapropos.
Respondents rightly argued.

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The PMA is not different. As the primary training and educational institution of
the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke academic freedom in the
enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code
and the Honor System in particular.
The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral principle.
It is the minimum standard for cadet behavior and serves as the guiding spirit
behind each cadets action. It is the cadets responsibility to maintain the
highest standard of honor. Throughout a cadets stay in the PMA, he or she is
absolutely bound thereto. It binds as well the members of the Cadet Corps
from its alumni or the member of the so-called Long Gray Line.
Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the cadets character
development. It defines the desirable values they must possess to remain part
of the Corps; it develops the atmosphere of trust so essential in a military
organization; and it makes them professional military soldiers. 133 As it is for
character building, it should not only be kept within the society of cadets. It is
best adopted by the Cadet Corps with the end view of applying it outside as an
officer of the AFP and as a product of the PMA.134
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The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary means of
achieving the cadets character development and as ways by which the
Academy has chosen to identify those who are deficient in conduct. 135 Upon the
Code rests the ethical standards of the Cadet Corps and it is also an
institutional goal, ensuring that graduates have strong character,
unimpeachable integrity, and moral standards of the highest order.136 To
emphasize, the Academy's disciplinary system as a whole is characterized as
"correctional and educational in nature rather than being legalistic and
punitive." Its purpose is to teach the cadets "to be prepared to accept full
responsibility for all that they do or fail to do and to place loyalty to the service
above self-interest or loyalty to friends or associates."137

Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong141 already settled the issue as it held

that although both Ang Tibay and Guzman essentially deal with the
requirements of due process, the latter case is more apropossince it specifically
deals with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. That Guzman is the authority on
the procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by the
Court in the fairly recent case of Go v. Colegio De San Juan De Letran.142
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In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum standards which must be
met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process, to wit:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.143
We have been consistent in reminding that due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice; 144 that the
proceedings may be summary;145 that cross-examination is not an essential
part of the investigation or hearing;146 and that the required proof in a student
disciplinary action, which is an administrative case, is neither proof beyond
reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence
or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.147
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Respondents stress that Guzman v. National University138 is more appropriate

in determining the minimum standards for the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions in academic institutions. Similarly, with the guideposts set
in Andrews, they believe that Cadet 1CL Cudia was accorded due process.

What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of fairness
to the individual, which generally encompass the right of adequate notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.148 As held in De La Salle University, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals:149
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to
which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in
administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity
to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said
that there was denial of due process.

On the other hand, petitioners argue that the HC, the CRAB and the PMA fell
short in observing the important safeguards laid down in Ang Tibay v.
CIR139 and Non v. Judge Dames II,140 which set the minimum standards to
satisfy the demands of procedural due process in the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions. For them, Guzman did not entirely do away with the due process

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to
due process it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present
supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. To be heard does
not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court one may also be

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Procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case

heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through

pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. 150
The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding
conducted to investigate a cadets honor violation need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. It articulates that
The Spirit of the Honor Code guides the Corps in identifying and assessing
misconduct. While cadets are interested in legal precedents in cases involving
Honor violations, those who hold the Spirit of the Honor Code dare not look
into these precedents for loopholes to justify questionable acts and they are
not to interpret the system to their own advantage.
The Spirit of the Honor Code is a way for the cadets to internalize Honor in a
substantive way. Technical and procedural misgivings of the legal systems may
avert the true essence of imparting the Spirit of the Code for the reason that it
can be used to make unlawful attempt to get into the truth of matters
especially when a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights and
liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented. By virtue of
being a cadet, a member of the CCAFP becomes a subject of the Honor Code
and System. Cadets actions are bound by the existing norms that are logically
applied through the Code and System in order to realize the Academys mission
to produce leaders of character men of integrity and honor.151
One of the fundamental principles of the Honor System also states:
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2.

The Honor System correlates with legal procedures of the states

Justice System but it does not demean its Spirit by reducing the Code
to a systematic list of externally observed rules. Where
misinterpretations and loopholes arise through legalism and its
technicalities, the objective of building the character of the cadets
becomes futile. While, generally, Public Law penalizes only the faulty
acts, the Honor System tries to examine both the action and the
intention.152

Like in other institutions of higher learning, there is aversion towards undue

judicialization of an administrative hearing in the military academy. It has been
said that the mission of the military is unique in the sense that its primary
business is to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise, and
that over-proceduralizing military determinations necessarily gives soldiers less
time to accomplish this task.153 Extensive cadet investigations and complex due
process hearing could sacrifice simplicity, practicality, and timeliness.
Investigations that last for several days or weeks, sessions that become
increasingly involved with legal and procedural points, and legal motions and
evidentiary objections that are irrelevant and inconsequential tend to disrupt,
delay, and confuse the dismissal proceedings and make them unmanageable.
Excessive delays cannot be tolerated since it is unfair to the accused, to his or
her fellow cadets, to the Academy, and, generally, to the Armed Forces. A good
balance should, therefore, be struck to achieve fairness, thoroughness, and
efficiency.154
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Considering that the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia is one of first impression in the

sense that this Court has not previously dealt with the particular issue of a
dismissed cadets right to due process, it is necessary for Us to refer to U.S.
jurisprudence for some guidance. Notably, our armed forces have been
patterned after the U.S. Army and the U.S. military code produced a salutary
effect in the military justice system of the Philippines.155 Hence, pertinent case
laws interpreting the U.S. military code and practices have persuasive, if not
the same, effect in this jurisdiction.
We begin by stating that U.S. courts have uniformly viewed that due process
is a flexible concept, requiring consideration in each case of a variety of
circumstances and calling for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.156Hagopian opined:
In approaching the question of what process is due before governmental action
adversely affecting private interests may properly be taken, it must be
recognized that due process is not a rigid formula or simple rule of thumb to be
applied undeviatingly to any given set of facts. On the contrary, it is a flexible
concept which depends upon the balancing of various factors, including
the nature of the private right or interest that is threatened, the extent
to which the proceeding is adversarial in character, the severity and
consequences of any action that might be taken, the burden that would
be imposed by requiring use of all or part of the full panoply of trialtype procedures, and the existence of other overriding interests, such
as the necessity for prompt action in the conduct of crucial military
operations. The full context must therefore be considered in each
case.157 (Emphasis supplied)
Wasson, which was cited by Hagopian, broadly outlined the minimum
standards of due process required in the dismissal of a cadet. Thus:
[W]hen the government affects the private interests of individuals, it may not
proceed arbitrarily but must observe due process of law. x x x Nevertheless,
the flexibility which is inherent in the concept of due process of law precludes
the dogmatic application of specific rules developed in one context to entirely
distinct forms of government action. "For, though 'due process of law' generally
implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to
answer, and a trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings, * *
* yet, this is not universally true." x x x Thus, to determine in any given case
what procedures due process requires, the court must carefully determine and
balance the nature of the private interest affected and of the government
interest involved, taking account of history and the precise circumstances
surrounding the case at hand.
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While the government must always have a legitimate concern with the subject
matter before it may validly affect private interests, in particularly vital and
sensitive areas of government concern such as national security and military
affairs, the private interest must yield to a greater degree to the governmental.
x x x Few decisions properly rest so exclusively within the discretion of the
appropriate government officials than the selection, training, discipline and
dismissal of the future officers of the military and Merchant Marine. Instilling
and maintaining discipline and morale in these young men who will be required
to bear weighty responsibility in the face of adversity -- at times extreme -- is
a matter of substantial national importance scarcely within the competence of

the judiciary. And it cannot be doubted that because of these factors

historically the military has been permitted greater freedom to fashion its
disciplinary procedures than the civilian authorities.
We conclude, therefore, that due process only requires for the dismissal of a
Cadet from the Merchant Marine Academy that he be given a fair hearing at
which he is apprised of the charges against him and permitted a
defense. x x x For the guidance of the parties x x x the rudiments of a fair
hearing in broad outline are plain. The Cadet must be apprised of the
specific charges against him. He must be given an adequate
opportunity to present his defense both from the point of view of time
and the use of witnesses and other evidence. We do not suggest,
however, that the Cadet must be given this opportunity both when demerits
are awarded and when dismissal is considered. The hearing may be
procedurally informal and need not be adversarial.158 (Emphasis supplied)
In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that Wasson and Hagopian are
equally controlling in cases where cadets were separated from the military
academy for violation of the Honor Code. Following the two previous cases, it
was ruled that in order to be proper and immune from constitutional infirmity,
a cadet who is sought to be dismissed or separated from the academy must be
afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges against him, and be
given an adequate opportunity to present his or her defense both from the
point of view of time and the use of witnesses and other
evidence.159Conspicuously, these vital conditions are not too far from what We
have already set in Guzman and the subsequent rulings in Alcuaz v. Philippine
School of Business Administration160 and De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals.161

the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.
It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained
from the handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions,
the factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if
not finality by the Court, unless such findings are not supported by evidence or
vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the
findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave
abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.162 In the case
of Cadet 1CL Cudia, We find no reason to deviate from the general rule. The
grounds therefor are discussed below seriatim:
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As to the right to be represented by a counsel

For petitioners, respondents must be compelled to give Cadet 1CL Cudia the
right to be represented by a counsel who could actively participate in the
proceedings like in the cross-examination of the witnesses against him before
the CRAB or HC, if remanded. This is because while the CRAB allowed him to
be represented by a PAO lawyer, the counsel was only made an observer
without any right to intervene and demand respect of Cadet 1CL Cudias
rights.163 According to them, he was not sufficiently given the opportunity to
seek a counsel and was not even asked if he would like to have one. He was
only properly represented when it was already nearing graduation day after his
family sought the assistance of the PAO. Petitioners assert that Guzman is
specific in stating that the erring student has the right to answer the charges
against him or her with the assistance of counsel, if desired.

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In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1CL Cudias Honor Code violation
followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was
notified of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the
opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his
options and the entire process that the case would undergo. The preliminary
investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a written
explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written
report together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC
thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the honor case
was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct
the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the
charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to
explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in
his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was
found to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict
underwent the review process at the Academy level from the OIC of the HC,
to the SJA, to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A
separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the
directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by
the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the
CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a
deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to

On the other hand, respondents cited Lumiqued v. Exevea164 and Nera v. The
Auditor General165 in asserting that the right to a counsel is not imperative in
administrative investigations or non-criminal proceedings. Also, based on Cadet
1CL Cudias academic standing, he is said to be obviously not untutored to fully
understand his rights and express himself. Moreover, the confidentiality of the
HC proceedings worked against his right to be represented by a counsel. In any
event, respondents claim that Cadet 1CL Cudia was not precluded from seeking
a counsels advice in preparing his defense prior to the HC hearing.
Essentially, petitioners claim that Cadet 1CL Cudia is guaranteed the right to
have his counsel not just in assisting him in the preparation for the
investigative hearing before the HC and the CRAB but in participating fully in
said hearings. The Court disagrees.
Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution
stating that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented
by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable.
Further, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,166 the Court held that a
party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. Hence, the administrative body is under no duty to
provide the person with counsel because assistance of counsel is not an

absolute requirement.
More in point is the opinion in Wasson, which We adopt. Thus:
The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all of
the other aspects of the hearing. Where the proceeding is non-criminal in
nature, where the hearing is investigative and not adversarial and the
government does not proceed through counsel, where the individual concerned
is mature and educated, where his knowledge of the events x x x should
enable him to develop the facts adequately through available sources, and
where the other aspects of the hearing taken as a whole are fair, due process
does not require representation by counsel.167
To note, U.S. courts, in general, have declined to recognize a right to
representation by counsel, as a function of due process, in military academy
disciplinary proceedings.168 This rule is principally motivated by the policy of
"treading lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous regard for the power
and authority of the military establishment to govern its own affairs within the
broad confines of constitutional due process" and the courts' views that
disciplinary proceedings are not judicial in nature and should be kept informal,
and that literate and educated cadets should be able to defend
themselves.169 In Hagopian, it was ruled that the importance of informality in
the proceeding militates against a requirement that the cadet be accorded the
right to representation by counsel before the Academic Board and that unlike
the welfare recipient who lacks the training and education needed to
understand his rights and express himself, the cadet should be capable of
doing so.170 In the subsequent case of Wimmer v. Lehman,171 the issue was not
access to counsel but the opportunity to have counsel, instead of oneself,
examine and cross-examine witnesses, make objections, and argue the case
during the hearing. Disposing of the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by the argument that an individual of a
midshipman's presumed intelligence, selected because he is expected to be
able to care for himself and others, often under difficult circumstances, and
who has full awareness of what he is facing, with counsel's advice, was
deprived of due process by being required to present his defense in person at
an investigatory hearing.
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In the case before Us, while the records are bereft of evidence that Cadet 1CL
Cudia was given the option or was able to seek legal advice prior to and/or
during the HC hearing, it is indubitable that he was assisted by a counsel, a
PAO lawyer to be exact, when the CRAB reviewed and reinvestigated the case.
The requirement of due process is already satisfied since, at the very least, the
counsel aided him in the drafting and filing of the Appeal Memorandum and
even acted as an observer who had no right to actively participate in the
proceedings (such as conducting the cross-examination). Moreover, not to be
missed out are the facts that the offense committed by Cadet 1CL Cudia is not
criminal in nature; that the hearings before the HC and the CRAB were
investigative and not adversarial; and that Cadet 1CL Cudias excellent
academic standing puts him in the best position to look after his own vested
interest in the Academy.
As to the confidentiality of records of the proceedings

Petitioners allege that when Maj. Gen. Lopez denied in his March 11, 2014
letter Cadet 1CL Cudias request for documents, footages, and recordings
relevant to the HC hearings, the vital evidence negating the regularity of the
HC trial and supporting his defense have been surely overlooked by the CRAB
in its case review. Indeed, for them, the answers on whether Cadet 1CL Cudia
was deprived of due process and whether he lied could easily be unearthed
from the video and other records of the HC investigation. Respondents did not
deny their existence but they refused to present them for the parties and the
Court to peruse. In particular, they note that the Minutes of the HC dated
January 21, 2014 and the HC Formal Investigation Report dated January 20,
2014 were considered by the CRAB but were not furnished to petitioners and
the Court; hence, there is no way to confirm the truth of the alleged
statements therein. In their view, failure to furnish these documents could only
mean that it would be adverse if produced pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 131
of the Rules of Court.172
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For lack of legal basis on PMAs claim of confidentiality of records, petitioners

contend that it is the ministerial duty of the HC to submit to the CRAB, for the
conduct of intelligent review of the case, all its records of the proceedings,
including video footages of the deliberations and voting. They likewise argue
that PMAs refusal to release relevant documents to Cadet 1CL Cudia under the
guise of confidentiality reveals another misapplication of the Honor Code, which
merely provides: A cadet who becomes part of any investigation is subject to
the existing regulations pertaining to rules of confidentiality and, therefore,
must abide to the creed of secrecy. Nothing shall be disclosed without proper
guidance from those with authority (IV. The Honor System, Honor Committee,
Cadet Observer). This provision, they say, does not deprive Cadet 1CL Cudia of
his right to obtain copies and examine relevant documents pertaining to his
case.
Basically, petitioners want Us to assume that the documents, footages, and
recordings relevant to the HC hearings are favorable to Cadet 1CL Cudias
cause, and, consequently, to rule that respondents refusal to produce and
have them examined is tantamount to the denial of his right to procedural due
process. They are mistaken.
In this case, petitioners have not particularly identified any documents, witness
testimony, or oral or written presentation of facts submitted at the hearing that
would support Cadet 1CL Cudias defense. The Court may require that an
administrative record be supplemented, but only "where there is a 'strong
showing of bad faith or improper behavior' on the part of the agency," 173 both
of which are not present here. Petitioners have not specifically indicated the
nature of the concealed evidence, if any, and the reason for withholding it.
What they did was simply supposing that Cadet 1CL Cudias guilty verdict
would be overturned with the production and examination of such documents,
footages, and recordings. As will be further shown in the discussions below, the
requested matters, even if denied, would not relieve Cadet 1CL Cudias
predicament. If at all, such denial was a harmless procedural error since he
was not seriously prejudiced thereby.

As to the ostracism in the PMA

To petitioners, the CRAB considered only biased testimonies and evidence
because Special Order No. 1 issued on February 21, 2014, which directed the
ostracism of Cadet 1CL Cudia, left him without any opportunity to secure
statements of his own witnesses. He could not have access to or approach the
cadets who were present during the trial and who saw the 8-1 voting result. It
is argued that the Order directing Cadet 1CL Cudias ostracism is of doubtful
legal validity because the Honor Code unequivocally announced: x x x But by
wholeheartedly dismissing the cruel method of ostracizing Honor Code
violators, PMA will not have to resort to other humiliating means and shall only
have the option to make known among its alumni the names of those who
have not sincerely felt remorse for violating the Honor Code.
On their part, respondents assert that neither the petition nor the petition-inintervention attached a full text copy of the alleged Special Order No. 1. In any
case, attributing its issuance to PMA is improper and misplaced because of
petitioners admission that ostracism has been absolutely dismissed as an
Academy-sanctioned activity consistent with the trend in International
Humanitarian Law that the PMA has included in its curriculum. Assuming that
said Order was issued, respondents contend that it purely originated from the
cadets themselves, the sole purpose of which was to give a strong voice to the
Cadet Corps by declaring that they did not tolerate Cadet 1CL Cudias honor
violation and breach of confidentiality of the HC proceedings.
More importantly, respondents add that it is highly improbable and unlikely
that Cadet 1CL Cudia was ostracized by his fellow cadets. They manifest that
as early as January 22, 2014, he was already transferred to the Holding Center.
The practice of billeting an accused cadet at the Holding Center is provided for
in the Honor Code Handbook. Although within the PMA compound, the Holding
Center is off-limits to cadets who do not have any business to conduct therein.
The cadets could not also ostracize him during mess times since Cadet 1CL
Cudia opted to take his meals at the Holding Center. The circumstances
obtaining when Special Order No. 1 was issued clearly foreclose the possibility
that he was ostracized in common areas accessible to other cadets. He
remained in the Holding Center until March 16, 2014 when he voluntarily left
the PMA. Contrary to his claim, guests were also free to visit him in the Holding
Center.
However, petitioners swear that Cadet 1CL Cudia suffered from ostracism in the
PMA. The practice was somehow recognized by respondents in
their Consolidated Comment and by PMA Spokesperson Maj. Flores in a news
report. The CHR likewise confirmed the same in its Resolution dated May 22,
2014. For them, it does not matter where the ostracism order originated from
because the PMA appeared to sanction it even if it came from the cadets
themselves. There was a tacit approval of an illegal act. If not, those cadets
responsible for ostracism would have been charged by the PMA officials. Finally,
it is claimed that Cadet 1CL Cudia did not choose to take his meals at the
Holding Center as he was not allowed to leave the place. Petitioners opine that

placing the accused cadet in the Holding Center is inconsistent with his or her
presumed innocence and certainly gives the implication of ostracism.
We agree with respondents. Neither the petition nor the petition-in-intervention
attached a full text copy or even a pertinent portion of the alleged Special
Order No. 1, which authorized the ostracism of Cadet 1CL Cudia. Being
hearsay, its existence and contents are of doubtful veracity. Hence, a definite
ruling on the matter can never be granted in this case.
The Court cannot close its eyes though on what appears to be an admission of
Cadet 1CL Mogol during the CHR hearing that, upon consultation with the
entire class, the baron, and the Cadet Conduct Policy Board, they issued an
ostracism order against Cadet 1CL Cudia.174 While not something new in a
military academy,175 ostracisms continued existence in the modern times
should no longer be countenanced. There are those who argue that the
"silence" is a punishment resulting in the loss of private interests, primarily
that of reputation, and that such penalty may render illusory the possibility of
vindication by the reviewing body once found guilty by the HC. 176 Furthermore,
in Our mind, ostracism practically denies the accused cadets protected rights
to present witnesses or evidence in his or her behalf and to be presumed
innocent until finally proven otherwise in a proper proceeding.
As to Cadet 1CL Cudias stay in the Holding Center, the Court upholds the
same. The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook provides that, in case a
cadet has been found guilty by the HC of violating the Honor Code and has
opted not to resign, he or she may stay and wait for the disposition of the
case. In such event, the cadet is not on full-duty status and shall be billeted at
the HTG Holding Center.177Similarly, in the U.S., the purpose of Boarders
Ward is to quarter those cadets who are undergoing separation actions.
Permitted to attend classes, the cadet is sequestered therein until final
disposition of the case. In Andrews, it was opined that the segregation of
cadets in the Ward was a proper exercise of the discretionary authority of
Academy officials. It relied on the traditional doctrine that "with respect to
decisions made by Army authorities, 'orderly government requires us to tread
lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and
authority of the military establishment to govern its own affairs within the
broad confines of constitutional due process.'" Also, in Birdwell v.
Schlesinger,178the administrative segregation was held to be a reasonable
exercise of military discipline and could not be considered an invasion of the
rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association.
Late and vague decisions
It is claimed that Cadet 1CL Cudia was kept in the dark as to the charge
against him and the decisions arrived at by the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA. No
written decision was furnished to him, and if any, the information was unjustly
belated and the justifications for the decisions were vague. He had to
constantly seek clarification and queries just to be apprised of what he was
confronted with.

Petitioners relate that upon being informed of the guilty verdict, Cadet 1CL
Cudia immediately inquired as to the grounds therefor, but Cadet 1CL Mogol
answered that it is confidential since he would still appeal the same. By March
11, 2014, Maj. Gen. Lopez informed Cadet 1CL Cudia that the CRAB already
forwarded their recommendation for his dismissal to the General Headquarters
sometime in February-March 2014. Even then, he received no
decision/recommendation on his case, verbally or in writing. The PMA
commencement exercises pushed through with no written decision from the
CRAB or the PMA on his appeal. The letter from the Office of the Adjutant
General of the AFP was suspiciously delayed when the Cudia family received
the same only on March 20, 2014. Moreover, it fell short in laying down with
specificity the factual and legal bases used by the CRAB and even by the Office
of the Adjutant General. There remains no proof that the CRAB and the PMA
considered the evidence presented by Cadet 1CL Cudia, it being uncertain as to
what evidence was weighed by the CRAB, whether the same is substantial, and
whether the new evidence submitted by him was ever taken into account.
In refutation, respondents allege the existence of PMAs practice of orally
declaring the HC finding, not putting it in a written document so as to protect
the integrity of the erring cadet and guard the confidentiality of the HC
proceedings pursuant to the Honor System. Further, they aver that a copy of
the report of the CRAB, dated March 10, 2014, was not furnished to Cadet 1CL
Cudia because it was his parents who filed the appeal, hence, were the ones
who were given a copy thereof.
Petitioners contentions have no leg to stand on. While there is a constitutional
mandate stating that [no] decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based,179 such provision does not apply in Cadet 1CL Cudias case.
NeitherGuzman nor Andrews require a specific form and content of a decision
issued in disciplinary proceedings. The Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook also has no written rule on the matter. Even if the provision applies,
nowhere does it demand that a point-by-point consideration and resolution of
the issues raised by the parties are necessary.180 What counts is that, albeit
furnished to him late, Cadet 1CL Cudia was informed of how it was decided,
with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions
of the reviewing body, assuring that it went through the processes of legal
reasoning. He was not left in the dark as to how it was reached and he knows
exactly the reasons why he lost, and is able to pinpoint the possible errors for
review.
As to the blind adoption of the HC findings
Petitioners assert that, conformably with Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only
President Aquino as the Commander-in-Chief has the power to appoint and
remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law gives no authority to the HC as
the sole body to determine the guilt or innocence of a cadet. It also does not
empower the PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the HC as a basis for
recommending the cadets dismissal. In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, it is
claimed that the PMA blindly followed the HCs finding of guilt in terminating his

military service.
Further, it is the ministerial duty of the CRAB to conduct a review de novo of all
records without requiring Cadet 1CL Cudia to submit new evidence if it is
physically impossible for him to do so. In their minds, respondents cannot
claim that the CRAB and the PMA thoroughly reviewed the HC recommendation
and heard Cadet 1CL Cudias side. As clearly stated in the letter from the Office
of the AFP Adjutant General, [in] its report dated March 10, 2014, PMA CRAB
sustained the findings and recommendations of the Honor Committee x x x It
also resolved the appeal filed by the subject Cadet. However, the Final
Investigation Report of the CRAB was dated March 23, 2014. While such report
states that a report was submitted to the AFP General Headquarters on March
10, 2014 and that it was only on March 12, 2014 that it was designated as a
Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, it is unusual that the CRAB would do
the same things twice. This raised a valid and well-grounded suspicion that the
CRAB never undertook an in-depth investigation/review the first time it came
out with its report, and the Final Investigation Report was drafted merely as an
afterthought when the lack of written decision was pointed out by petitioners
so as to remedy the apparent lack of due process during the CRAB
investigation and review.
Despite the arguments, respondents assure that there was a proper
assessment of the procedural and legal correctness of the guilty verdict against
Cadet 1CL Cudia. They assert that the higher authorities of the PMA did not
merely rely on the findings of the HC, noting that there was also a separate
investigation conducted by the HTG from January 25 to February 7, 2014.
Likewise, contrary to the contention of petitioners that the CRAB continued
with the review of the case despite the absence of necessary documents, the
CRAB conducted its own review of the case and even conducted another
investigation by constituting the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body. For
respondents, petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proof in showing bad
faith on the part of the PMA. In the absence of evidence to the contrary and
considering further that petitioners allegations are merely self-serving and
baseless, good faith on the part of the PMAs higher authorities is presumed
and should, therefore, prevail.
We agree with respondents.
The Honor Committee, acting on behalf of the Cadet Corps, has a limited role
of investigating and determining whether or not the alleged offender has
actually violated the Honor Code.181 It is given the responsibility of
administering the Honor Code and, in case of breach, its task is entirely
investigative, examining in the first instance a suspected violation. As a means
of encouraging self-discipline, without ceding to it any authority to make final
adjudications, the Academy has assigned it the function of identifying
suspected violators.182 Contrary to petitioners assertion, the HC does not have
the authority to order the separation of a cadet from the Academy. The results
of its proceedings are purely recommendatory and have no binding effect. The
HC determination is somewhat like an indictment, an allegation, which, in
Cadet 1CL Cudias case, the PMA-CRAB investigated de novo.183 In the U.S., it

was even opined that due process safeguards do not actually apply at the
Honor Committee level because it is only a "charging body whose decisions had
no effect other than to initiate de novo proceedings before a Board of
Officers."184
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Granting, for arguments sake, that the HC is covered by the due process
clause and that irregularities in its proceedings were in fact committed, still,
We cannot rule for petitioners. It is not required that procedural due process be
afforded at every stage of developing disciplinary action. What is required is
that an adequate hearing be held before the final act of dismissing a cadet
from the military academy.185 In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, the OIC of HC,
the SJA, the Commandant of Cadets, and the PMA Superintendent reviewed
the HC findings. A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG.
Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review
was conducted by the CRAB. Finally, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body
composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to
conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. The Board/Body actually held
hearings on March 12, 13, 14 and 20, 2014. Instead of commendation,
petitioners find it unusual that the CRAB would do the same things twice and
suspect that it never undertook an in-depth investigation/review the first time
it came out with its report. Such assertion is mere conjecture that deserves
scant consideration.
As to the dismissal proceedings as sham trial
According to petitioners, the proceedings before the HC were a sham. The
people behind Cadet 1CL Cudias charge, investigation, and conviction were
actually the ones who had the intent to deceive and who took advantage of the
situation. Cadet 1CL Raguindin, who was a senior HC member and was the
second in rank to Cadet 1CL Cudia in the Navy cadet 1CL, was part of the team
which conducted the preliminary investigation. Also, Cadet 1CL Mogol, the HC
Chairman, previously charged Cadet 1CL Cudia with honor violation allegedly
for cheating (particularly, conniving with and tutoring his fellow cadets on a
difficult topic by giving solutions to a retake exam) but the charge was
dismissed for lack of merit. Even if he was a non-voting member, he was in a
position of influence and authority. Thus, it would be a futile exercise for Cadet
1CL Cudia to resort to the procedure for the removal of HC members. 186
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Further, no sufficient prior notice of the scheduled CRAB hearing was given to
Cadet 1CL Cudia, his family, or his PAO counsel. During one of her visits to him
in the Holding Center, petitioner-intervenor was advised to convince his son to
resign and immediately leave the PMA. Brig. Gen. Costales, who later became
the CRAB Head, also categorically uttered to Annavee: Your brother, he lied!
The CRAB conferences were merely used to formalize his dismissal and the
PMA never really intended to hear his side. For petitioners, these are
manifestations of PMAs clear resolve to dismiss him no matter what.
For their part, respondents contend that the CHRs allegation that Maj. Hindang
acted in obvious bad faith and that he failed to discharge his duty to be a good
father of cadets when he paved the road to [Cadet 1CL Cudias] sham trial by

the Honor Committee is an unfounded accusation. They note that when Maj.
Hindang was given the DR of Cadet 1CL Cudia, he revoked the penalty
awarded because of his explanation. However, all revocations of awarded
penalties are subject to the review of the STO. Therefore, it was at the instance
of Maj. Leander and the established procedure followed at the PMA that Maj.
Hindang was prompted to investigate the circumstances surrounding Cadet 1
CL Cudias tardiness. Respondents add that bad faith cannot likewise be
imputed against Maj. Hindang by referring to the actions taken by Maj. Jekyll
Dulawan, the CTO of Cadets 1CL Narciso and Arcangel who also arrived late for
their next class. Unlike the other cadets, Cadet 1CL Cudia did not admit his
being late and effectively evaded responsibility by ascribing his tardiness to Dr.
Costales.
As to the CHRs finding that Cadet 1CL Mogol was likewise in bad faith and
determined to destroy [Cadet 1CL] Cudia, for reasons of his own because the
former previously reported the latter for an honor violation in November 2013,
respondents argue that the bias ascribed against him is groundless as there is
failure to note that Cadet 1CL Mogol was a non-voting member of the HC.
Further, he cannot be faulted for reporting a possible honor violation since he is
the HC Chairman and nothing less is expected of him. Respondents emphasize
that the representatives of the HC are elected from each company, while the
HC Chairman is elected by secret ballot from the incoming first class
representatives. Thus, if Cadet 1CL Cudia believed that there was bias against
him, he should have resorted to the procedure for the removal of HC members
provided for in the Honor Code Handbook.
Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive on the part of
the PMA to prevent Cadet 1CL Cudia from graduating because the Academy
does not stand to gain anything from his dismissal. On the contrary, in view of
his academic standing, the separation militates against PMAs mission to
produce outstanding, honorable, and exceptional cadets.
The Court differs with petitioners.

Partiality, like fraudulent intent, can never be presumed. Absent some showing
of actual bias, petitioners allegations do not hold water. The mere imputation
of ill-motive without proof is speculativeat best. Kolesa teaches us that to
sustain the challenge, specific evidence must be presented to overcome
a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it
must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weaknesses, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the
same individual poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the
practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
implemented.187
Although a CTO like Maj. Hindang must decide whether demerits are to be
awarded, he is not an adversary of the cadet but an educator who shares an
identity of interest with the cadet, whom he counsels from time to time as a
future leader.188 When the occasion calls for it, cadets may be questioned as to

the accuracy or completeness of a submitted work. A particular point or issue

may be clarified. In this case, the question asked of Cadet 1CL Cudia
concerning his being late in class is proper, since there is evidence indicating
that a breach of regulation may have occurred and there is reasonable cause to
believe that he was involved in the breach of regulations. 189

1.

For lack of actual proof of bad faith or ill-motive, the Court shall rely on the
non-toleration clause of the Honor Code, i.e., We do not tolerate those who
violate the Code. Cadets are reminded that they are charged with a
tremendous duty far more superior to their personal feeling or
friendship.190 They must learn to help others by guiding them to accept the
truth and do what is right, rather than tolerating actions against truth and
justice.191 Likewise, cadets are presumed to be characteristically honorable;
they cannot overlook or arbitrarily ignore the dishonorable action of their
peers, seniors, or subordinates.192 These are what Cadet 1CL Mogol exactly did,
although he was later proven to have erred in his accusation. Note that even
the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook recognizes that interpretation of
ones honor is generally subjective. 193

2.

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That after CDT 1CL CUDIA [was] convicted for honor violation, I
[cannot] remember exactly the date but sometime in the morning of
23rd or 24th of January 2014, I was in my office filling up forms for the
renewal of my passport, CDT 1CL LAGURA entered and had business
with my staff;
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When he was about to leave I called him. Lags, halika muna

dito, and he approached me and I let him sit down on the chair in
front of my table. I told and asked him, Talagang nadali si Cudia
ah... ano ba ang nangyari? Mag-Tagalog or mag-Bisaya ka. He
replied, Talagang NOT GUILTY ang vote ko sa kanya sir, and I
asked him, Oh, bakit naging guilty di ba pag may isang nag
NOT GUILTY, abswelto na? He replied Chinamber ako sir, bale
pinapa-justify kung bakit NOT GUILTY vote ko, at na-pressure
din ako sir kaya binago ko, sir. So, I told him, Sayang sya,
matalino at mabait pa naman and he replied oo nga sir. After
that conversation, I let him go.194

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Moreover, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Cadets 1CL Raguindin and
Mogol as well as Brig. Gen. Costales have an axe to grind against Cadet 1CL
Cudia and were bent on causing, no matter what, the latters downfall, their
nefarious conduct would still be insignificant. This is so since the HC (both the
preliminary and formal investigation), the CRAB, and the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body are collegial bodies. Hence, the claim that the
proceedings/hearings conducted were merely a farce because the three
personalities participated therein is tantamount to implying the existence of a
conspiracy, distrusting the competence, independence, and integrity of the
other members who constituted the majority. Again, in the absence of specifics
and substantial evidence, the Court cannot easily give credence to this
baseless insinuation.
As to the HC executive session/chambering
Petitioners narrate that there was an irregular administrative hearing in the
case of Cadet 1CL Cudia because two voting rounds took place. After the result
of the secret balloting, Cadet 1CL Mogol ordered the voting members to go to a
room without the cadet recorders. Therein, the lone dissenter, Cadet 1CL
Lagura, was asked to explain his not guilty vote. Pressured to change his
vote, he was made to cast a new one finding Cadet 1CL Cudia guilty. The
original ballot was discarded and replaced. There was no record of the change
in vote from 8-1 to 9-0 that was mentioned in the HC formal report.
The Affidavit of Commander Junjie B. Tabuada executed on March 6, 2014 was
submitted by petitioners since he purportedly recalled Cadet 1CL Lagura telling
him that he was pressured to change his not guilty vote after the voting
members were chambered. In the sworn statement, Commander Tabuada
said:
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It is claimed that the HC gravely abused its discretion when it committed

voting manipulation since, under the rules, it is required to have a unanimous
nine (9) votes finding an accused cadet guilty. There is nothing in the
procedure that permits the HC Chairman to order the chambering of a
member who voted contrary to the majority and subjects him or her to
reconsider in order to reflect a unanimous vote. Neither is there an order from
the Chief of Staff or the President sanctioning the HC procedure or approving
any change therein pursuant to Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1. The HC, the
CRAB, and the PMA violated their own rules and principles as embodied in the
Honor Code. Being a clear deviation from the established procedures, the
second deliberation should be considered null and void.
Petitioners further contend that the requirement of unanimous vote involves a
substantive right which cannot be unceremoniously changed without a
corresponding amendment/revision in the Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook. In their view, chambering totally defeats the purpose of voting by
secret ballot as it glaringly destroys the very essence and philosophy behind
the provisions of the Honor System, which is to ensure that the voting member
is free to vote what is in his or her heart and mind and that no one can
pressure or persuade another to change his or her vote. They suggest that if
one voting member acquits an accused cadet who is obviously guilty of the
offense, the solution is to remove him or her from the HC through the vote of
non-confidence as provided for in the Honor Code.195
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Anent the above arguments, respondents contend that a distinction must be

made between the concepts of the Honor Code and the Honor System.
According to them, the former sets the standard for a cadets minimum ethical
and moral behavior and does not change, while the latter is a set of rules for
the conduct of the observance and implementation of the Honor Code and may
undergo necessary adjustments as may be warranted by the incumbent
members of the HC in order to be more responsive to the moral training and

Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa Chamber. Nung nasa

chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos
isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan
ko, eh naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not
Guilty to Guilty Sir. He replied: Sayang si Cudia ano? And I
said: Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at
matalino.196

character development of the cadets. The HC may provide guidelines when the
Honor System can be used to supplement regulations. This being so, the voting
process is continuously subject to change.
Respondents note that, historically, a non-unanimous guilty verdict
automatically acquits a cadet from the charge of Honor violation. The voting
members only write either guilty or not guilty in the voting sheets without
stating their name or their justification. However, this situation drew criticisms
since there were instances where a reported cadet already admitted his honor
violation but was acquitted due to the lone vote of a sympathetic voting
member.
In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, the HC adopted an existing practice that
should the voting result in 7-2 or 8-1 the HC would automatically sanction a
jury type of discussion called executive session or chambering, which is
intended to elicit the explanation and insights of the voting member/s. This
prevents the tyranny of the minority or lone dissenter from prevailing over the
manifest proof of guilt. The assailed voting practice has been adopted and
widely accepted by the PMA Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 since their first year in
the Academy. The allegations of conspiracy and sham trial are, therefore,
negated by the fact that such practice was in place and applied to all cases of
honor violations, not solely to the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia.
It is emphasized by respondents that any decision to change vote rests solely
on the personal conviction of the dissenter/s, without any compulsion from the
other voting members. There can also be no pressuring to change ones vote to
speak of since a vote may only be considered as final when the Presiding
Officer has affixed his signature.

Cadet 1CL Lagura restated the above in the Counter-Affidavit

executed on March 12, 2014, which he submitted before the CHR
wherein he attested to the following:
3. I was chosen to be a voting member of the Honor Committee
for Honor Code violation committed by Cadet Cudia, for lying.
As a voting member, we are the one who assess or investigate
the case whether the reported Cadet is Guilty for his actions or
not.
4.

I was the only one who INITIALLY voted NOT GUILTY among
the nine (9) voting members of the Honor Committee in the
case of Cdt Cudia for Lying.

5.

I initially voted NOT GUILTY for the reason that after the
proceedings and before the presiding Officer told the members
to vote, I was confused of the case of Cadet Cudia. I have
gathered some facts from the investigation to make my
decision but for me it is not yet enough to give my verdict of
guilty to Cdt Cudia so I decided to vote NOT GUILTY with a
reservation in my mind that we will still be discussing our
verdicts if we will arrive at 8-1 or 7-2. Thus, I can still change
my vote if I may be enlightened with the others justifications.

6.

After the votes were collected, the Presiding Officer told us

that the vote is 8 for guilty and 1 for not guilty. By way of
practice and as I predicted, we were told to go inside the
anteroom for executive meeting and to discuss our respective
justifications. I have been a member for two (2) years and the
voting committee will always go for executive meeting
whenever it will meet 8-1 or 7-2 votes.

To debunk Commander Tabuadas statements, respondents raise the argument

that the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body summoned Cadet 1CL Lagura
for inquiry. Aside from his oral testimony made under oath, he submitted to the
Board/Body an affidavit explaining that:
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11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the

Department of Naval Warfare to ask permission if it is possible
not to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will be
attending our baseball game outside the Academy.

12 After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I

. was about to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B TABUADA PN,

our Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my

attention. I approached him and he said: Talagang nadali si
Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari? At first, I was hesitant
to answer because of the confidentiality of the Honor
Committee proceedings. He again said: Wag kang mag-alala,
atin, atin lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi. Then I
answered: Ako yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding

7. I listened to them and they listened to me, then I saw things

that enlightened my confusions that time. I gave a thumbs-up

sign and asked for another sheet of voting paper. I then

changed my vote from NOT GUILTY to GUILTY and the

voting members of the Honor Committee came up with the
final vote of nine (9) votes for guilty and zero (0) votes for not
guilty.

9. Cdt Cudia was called inside the courtroom and told that the

verdict was GUILTY of LYING. After that, all persons inside the
courtroom went back to barracks.

10. Right after I changed to sleeping uniform, I was approached by

Cdt Jocson and Cdt Cudia, inquiring and said: Bakit ka naman
nagpalit ng boto? I answered: Nasa process yan, may mali
talaga sa rason mo. They also asked who were inside the
Chamber and I mentioned only Cdt Arlegui and Cdt Mogol.
That was the last time that Cdt Cudia and Cdt Jocson talked to
me.

11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the

Department of Naval Warfare to asked (sic) permission if it is

possible not to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will
be attending our baseball game outside the Academy.

12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I

was about to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B TABUADA

PN, our Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my
attention. I approached him and he said: Talagang nadali si
Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari? At first, I was hesitant
to answer because of the confidentiality of the Honor
Committee proceedings. He again said: Wag kang mag-alala,
atin, atin lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi. Then I
answered: Ako yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung]
Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa Chamber.
Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng
Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty.
Nung pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung
boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir. He replied: Sayang si
Cudia ano? And I said: Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait
pa naman at matalino.197

Still not to be outdone, petitioners argue that the very fact that Cadet 1CL
Lagura, as the lone dissenter, was made to explain in the presence of other HC
members, who were in disagreement with him, gives a semblance of

intimidation, force, or pressure. For them, the records of the HC proceedings,

which were not presented assuming they actually exist, could have been the
best way to ensure that he was free to express his views, reject the opinion of
the majority, and stick to his decision. Also, it was pointed out that Cadet 1CL
Lagura failed to clearly explain in his affidavit why he initially found Cadet 1CL
Cudia not guilty and what made him change his mind. His use of general
statements like he was confused of the case and saw things that
enlightened my confusions could hardly suffice to establish why he changed
his vote. Finally, petitioners note the admission of Cadet 1CL Lagura during the
CHR investigation that he was the only one who was given another ballot sheet
while in the chamber and that he accomplished it in the barracks which he only
submitted the following day. However, as the CHR found, the announcement of
the 9-0 vote was done immediately after the HC came out from the chamber
and before Cadet 1CL Lagura submitted his accomplished ballot sheet.
We rule for respondents.
As to the manner of voting by the HC members, the Honor Code tersely
provides:
After a thorough discussion and deliberation, the presiding member of the
Board will call for the members to vote whether the accused is GUILTY or NOT
GUILTY. A unanimous vote (9 votes) of GUILTY decides that a cadet is found
guilty of violating the Honor Code.198
From the above-quoted provision, it readily appears that the HC practice of
conducting executive session or chambering is not at all prohibited. The HC
is given leeway on the voting procedures in actual cases taking into account
the exigency of the times. What is important is that, in the end, there must be
a unanimous nine votes in order to hold a cadet guilty of violating the Honor
Code.
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Granting, for arguments sake, that the HC violated its written procedure, 199 We
still rule that there is nothing inherently wrong with the practice of
chambering considering that the presence of intimidation or force cannot
automatically be inferred therefrom. The essence of secret balloting and the
freedom to vote based on what is in the heart and mind of the voting member
is not necessarily diluted by the fact that a second/final voting was conducted.
As explained by Cadet 1CL Mogol before the CRAB:
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13. x x x [The] dissenting voter would have to explain his side and insights
regarding the case at hand. The other members, on the other hand,
would be given the chance to explain their votes as well as their
insights to the dissenting voter. The decision to change the vote of the
dissenting voter rests solely on his personal conviction. Thus, if he [or
she] opted not to change his/her vote despite the discussion, his [or
her] vote is accorded respect by the Honor Committee.200
It is elementary that intimidation or force is never presumed. Mere allegation is
definitely not evidence. It must be substantiated and proved because a person
is presumed to be innocent of a crime or wrong and that official duty has been

regularly performed.201

p.m. Respondents, however, claim that the class started at 3:05 p.m. Thus,
Cadet 1CL Cudia was not late.

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The oral and written statements of Cadet 1CL Lagura should settle the issue.
Before the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body and the CHR, he consistently
denied that he was pressured by the other voting members of the HC. His
representation must be accepted as it is regardless of whether he has
satisfactorily elaborated his decision to change his vote. Being the one who was
chambered, he is more credible to clarify the issue. In case of doubt, We
have to rely on the faith that Cadet 1CL Lagura observed the Honor Code,
which clearly states that every cadet must be his or her own Final Authority in
honor; that he or she should not let other cadets dictate on him or her their
sense of honor.202Moreover, the Code implies that any person can have
confidence that a cadet and any graduate of the PMA will be fair and just in
dealing with him; that his actions, words and ways are sincere and true. 203
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As to the other alleged irregularities committed such as not putting on record

the initial/first voting and Cadet 1CL Laguras bringing of his ballot sheet to and
accomplishing it in the barracks, the Court shall no longer dwell on the same
for being harmless procedural errors that do not materially affect the validity of
the HC proceedings.
Cadet 1CL Cudias alleged untruthful statements
Petitioners insist that Cadet 1CL Cudia did not lie. According to them, there is
no clear time reference as to when was the actual dismissal or what was the
exact time of dismissal whether it should be the dismissal inside the room or
the dismissal after the section grade was given by Dr. Costales in the minds
of Cadet 1CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and the HC investigators and voting
members. They claim that during long examinations, the time of dismissal was
usually five minutes before the class was set to end and the protocol of
dismissing the class 15 minutes earlier was not observed. When Maj. Hindang
stated in accusatory language that Cadet 1CL Cudia perverted the truth by
stating that OR432 class ended at 1500H, he did not state what was the true
time of dismissal. He did not mention whether the truth he was relying on was
5 or 15 minutes before the scheduled end of class.

Relative to his explanation to the delinquency report, petitioners were of the

view that what appears to have caused confusion in the minds of respondents
is just a matter of semantics; that the entire incident was a product of
inaccuracy, not lying. It is malicious for them to insinuate that Cadet 1CL Cudia
purposely used incorrect language to hide the truth. Citing Merriam Websters
Dictionary, petitioners argue that dismiss means to permit or cause to leave,
while class refers to a body of students meeting regularly to study the same
subject. According to them, these two words do not have definite and precise
meanings but are generic terms. Other than the words class and dismiss
used by Cadet 1CL Cudia, which may actually be used in their generic sense,
there is nothing deceiving about what he said. Thus, the answer he chose
might be wrong or not correct, but it is not false or not true.
For petitioners, Cadet 1CL Cudias explanations are evidently truthful and with
no intent to deceive or mislead. He did not manipulate any fact and was
truthful of his explanation. His statements were clear and unambiguous but
were given a narrow-minded interpretation. Even the Honor Code
acknowledges that [e]xperience demonstrates that human communication is
imperfect at best, and some actions are often misinterpreted.
Lastly, petitioners contend that Cadet 1CL Cudias transcript of records reflects
not only his outstanding academic performance but proves his good conduct
during his four-year stay in the Academy. He has above-average grades in
Conduct, with grades ranging from 96 to 100 in Conduct I to XI. His propensity
to lie is, therefore, far from the truth.

It is also averred that Cadet 1CL Cudias only business was to ask Dr. Costales
a query such that his business was already finished as soon as she gave an
answer. However, a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales, which is, Cadet
1CL Cudia must stay and wait for the section grade. At that point in time, he
was no longer in control of the circumstances. Petitioners claim that Dr.
Costales never categorically stated that Cadet 1CL Cudia was lying. She
recognized the confusion. Her text messages to him clarified his alleged
violation. Also, the CHR noted during its investigation that she could not
exactly recall what happened in her class on November 14, 2013.

On the other hand, respondents were equally adamant to contend that Cadet
1CL Cudia was obviously quibbling, which, in the military parlance, is
tantamount to lying. He fell short in telling a simple truth. He lied by making
untruthful statements in his written explanation. Respondents want Us to
consider the following:
First, their OR432 class was not dismissed late. During the formal
investigation, Dr. Costales testified that a class is dismissed as long as the
instructor is not there and the bell has rung. In cases of lesson examinations
(LE), cadets are dismissed from the time they have answered their respective
LEs. Here, as Cadet Cudia stated in his Request for Reconsideration of Meted
Punishment, We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class.
When the first bell rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted
it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. xxx Clearly, at the time Cadet Cudia
submitted his papers, he was already considered dismissed. Thus, he cannot
claim that his [OR432] class ended at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H) or a bit
late.

Furthermore, petitioners reasoned out that when respondents stated that

ENG412 class started at 3:05 p.m., it proves that Cadet 1CL Cudia was
obviously not late. If, as indicated in his Delinquency Report, he was late two
(2) minutes in his 1500-1600H class in ENG 412, he must have arrived 3:02

Second, Cadet Cudia was in control of the circumstances leading to his

tardiness. After submitting his paper, Cadet Cudia is free to leave and attend
his next class. However, he initiated a conversation with Dr. Costales regarding
their grades. He was not under instruction by Dr. Costales to stay beyond the

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period of her class.

result in punitive action under the CCPB and CCAFPR. 206

Furthermore, during the investigation of the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating

Body, Dr. Costales clarified her statements in her written explanation. She
explained that the instruction to wait is a response to Cadet Cudias request
and that it was not her initiated instruction. Clearly, there was no directive
from Dr. Costales for Cadet Cudia and the other cadets to stay. On the
contrary, it was them who wanted to meet with the instructor.

To refresh, in his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1CL

Cudia justified that: I came directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a
bit late by our instructor Sir. Subsequently, in his Request for Reconsideration
of Meted Punishment to Maj. Leander, he reasoned out as follows:
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4 th period
class ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H
also. Immediately after 4th period class, I went to my next class without any
intention of being late Sir.207
In this case, the Court agrees with respondents that Cadet 1CL Cudia
committed quibbling; hence, he lied in violation of the Honor Code.

Third, contrary to Cadet Cudias explanation, his subsequent class, ENG412,

did not exactly start at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H). In the informal review
conducted by the HTG to check the findings of the HC, Professor Berong
confirmed that her English class started as scheduled (3:05 in the afternoon, or
1505H) and not earlier. Cadet 1 CL Barrawed, the acting class marcher of
ENG412 also testified that their class started as scheduled (3:05 in the
afternoon, or 1505) and not earlier.204
Respondents were unimpressed with the excuse that Cadet 1CL Cudia had no
intention to mislead or deceive but merely used wrong and unfitting words in
his explanations. For them, considering his academic standing, it is highly
improbable that he used incorrect language to justify his mistake.
Respondents arguments are tenable.
The issue of whether Cadet 1CL Cudia committed lying is an issue of fact.
Unfortunately for petitioners, the Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot pass
upon factual matters as it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the
evidence considered in the proceedings below. Moreover, We reiterate the long
standing rule that factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily
accorded respect if not finality by the Court. In this case, as shown in the
previous discussions, there is no evidence that the findings of the investigating
and reviewing bodies below are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud,
imposition or collusion; that the procedure which led to the findings is
irregular; that palpable errors were committed; or that a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. With respect to the core
issue of whether lying is present in this case, all investigating and reviewing
bodies are in consonance in holding that Cadet 1CL Cudia in truth and in fact
lied.
For purposes of emphasis though, We shall supplement some points.
As succinctly worded, the Honor Code of the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the
Philippines (CCAFP) states: We, the Cadets, do not lie, cheat, steal, nor
tolerate among us those who do.
The First Tenet of the Honor Code is We do not lie. Cadets violate the Honor
Code by lying if they make an oral or written statement which is contrary to
what is true or use doubtful information with the intent to deceive or
mislead.205 It is expected that every cadets word is accepted without challenge
on its truthfulness; that it is true without qualification; and that the cadets
must answer directly, completely and truthfully even though the answer may

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Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the term "Quibbling" has been

defined in one U.S. case as follows:
A person can easily create a false impression in the mind of his listener by
cleverly wording what he says, omitting relevant facts, or telling a partial truth.
When he knowingly does so with the intent to deceive or mislead, he is
quibbling. Because it is an intentional deception, quibbling is a form of lying. 208
The above definition can be applied in the instant case. Here, instead of
directly and completely telling the cause of his being late in the ENG412 class
of Prof. Berong, Cadet 1CL Cudia chose to omit relevant facts, thereby, telling a
half-truth.
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The two elements that must be presented for a cadet to have committed an
honor violation are:
1. The act and/or omission, and
2. The intent pertinent to it.
Intent does not only refer to the intent to violate the Honor Code, but intent to
commit or omit the act itself.209
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The basic questions a cadet must always seek to answer unequivocally are:
1. Do I intend to deceive?
2. Do I intend to take undue advantage?
If a cadet can answer NO to BOTH questions, he or she is doing the honorable
thing.210

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Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must
ordinarily be inferred from the facts, and therefore, can only be proved by
unguarded expressions, conduct and circumstances generally.211 In this case,
Cadet 1CL Cudias intent to deceive is manifested from the very act of
capitalizing on the use of the words dismiss and class. The truth of the
matter is that the ordinary usage of these two terms, in the context of an
educational institution, does not correspond to what Cadet 1CL Cudia is trying
to make it appear. In that sense, the words are not generic and have definite
and precise meaning.
By no stretch of the imagination can Cadets 1CL Cudia, Miranda, Arcangel, and
Narciso already constitute a class. The Court cannot agree that such term
includes every transaction and communication a teacher does with her

students. Clearly, it does not take too much intelligence to conclude that Cadet
1CL Cudia should have been accurate by pinpointing who were with him when
he was late in the next class. His deceptive explanation is made more obvious
when compared with what Cadets 1CL Archangel and Narciso wrote in their DR
explanation, which was: We approached our instructor after our class.212
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Further, it is unimportant whether the time of dismissal on November 14, 2013

was five or fifteen minutes ahead of the scheduled end of class. Worth noting is
that even Dr. Costales, who stood as a witness for Cadet 1CL Cudia,
consistently admitted before the HC, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating
Body, and the CHR that he was already dismissed when he passed his LE
paper.213 During the hearing of the Board/Body, she also declared that she
merely responded to his request to see the results of the UE1 and that she had
reservations on the phrases under my instruction and dismissed a bit late
used in his letter of explanation to the HC. In addition, Dr. Costales manifested
her view before the CHR that the act of Cadet 1CL Cudia of inquiring about his
grade outside their classroom after he submitted his LE paper is not part of the
class time because the consultation, being cadet-initiated, is voluntary.214
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Assuming, for the sake of argument, that a new business was initiated by Dr.
Costales when Cadet 1CL Cudia was asked to stay and wait for the section
grade, still, this does not acquit him. Given such situation, a responsible cadet
who is fully aware of the time constraint has the last say, that is, to politely
decline the invitation and immediately go to the next class. This was not done
by Cadet 1CL Cudia. Thus, it cannot be said that he already lost control over
the circumstances.
It is apparent, therefore, that Cadet 1CL Cudia cunningly chose words which
led to confusion in the minds of respondents and eventually commenced the
HC inquiry. His case is not just a matter of semantics and a product of plain
and simple inaccuracy. There is manipulation of facts and presentation of
untruthful explanation constitutive of Honor Code violation.
Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1CL Cudia. While his
Transcript of Records (TOR) may reflect not only his outstanding academic
performance but his excellent grade in subjects on Conduct during his fouryear stay in the PMA,215 it does not necessarily follow that he is innocent of the
offense charged. It is enough to say that evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do
the same or similar thing at another time.216 While the TOR may be received to
prove his identity or habit as an exceptional PMA student, it does not show his
specific intent, plan, or scheme as cadet accused of committing a specific
Honor Code violation.
Dismissal from the PMA as unjust and cruel punishment
Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants separation of the
guilty cadet from the cadet corps. Under the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the
Philippines Regulation (CCAFPR), a violation of the Cadet Honor Code is
considered Grave (Class 1) delinquency which merits a recommendation for a

cadets dismissal from the PMA Superintendent. The same is likewise clear from
the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. Cadet 1CL Cudia is, therefore,
presumed to know that the Honor Code does not accommodate a gradation or
degree of offenses. There is no difference between a little lie and a huge
falsehood. Respondents emphasize that the Honor Code has always been
considered as an absolute yardstick against which cadets have measured
themselves ever since the PMA began and that the Honor Code and System
seek to assure that only those who are able to meet the high standards of
integrity and honor are produced by the PMA. As held in Andrews, it is
constitutionally permissible for the military to set and enforce uncommonly
high standards of conduct and ethics. Thus, in violating the Honor Code, Cadet
1CL Cudia forfeits his privilege to graduate from the PMA.
On their part, petitioners concede that if it is proven that a cadet breached the
Honor Code, the offense warrants his or her dismissal since such a policy may
be the only means to maintain and uphold the spirit of integrity in the
military.217 They maintain though that in Cadet 1CL Cudias case there is no
need to distinguish between a little lie and a huge falsehood since he did
not lie at all. Absent any intent to deceive and to take undue advantage, the
penalty imposed on him is considered as unjust and cruel. Under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, the penalty of dismissal is not
commensurate to the fact that he is a graduating cadet with honors and what
he allegedly committed does not amount to an academic deficiency or an
intentional and flagrant violation of the PMA non-academic rules and
regulations. Citing Non, petitioners argue that the penalty imposed must be
proportionate to the offense. Further, Isabelo, Jr. is squarely applicable to the
facts of the case. Cadet 1CL Cudia was deprived of his right to education, the
only means by which he may have a secure life and future.
Considering Our finding that Cadet 1CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied and his
acceptance that violation of the Honor Code warrants the ultimate penalty of
dismissal from the PMA, there is actually no more dispute to resolve. Indeed,
the sanction is clearly set forth and Cadet 1CL Cudia, by contract, risked this
when he entered the Academy.218 We adopt the ruling in Andrews219 wherein it
was held that, while the penalty is severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not
arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process. It quoted the
disposition of the district court, thus:
The fact that a cadet will be separated from the Academy upon a finding that
he has violated the Honor Code is known to all cadets even prior to the
beginning of their careers there. The finding of a Code violation by hypothesis
includes a finding of scienter on the part of the offender. While separation is
admittedly a drastic and tragic consequence of a cadet's transgression, it is not
an unconstitutionally arbitrary one, but rather a reasonable albeit severe
method of preventing men who have suffered ethical lapses from becoming
career officers. That a policy of admonitions or lesser penalties for single
violations might be more compassionate -- or even more effective in achieving
the intended result -- is quite immaterial to the question of whether the
harsher penalty violates due process.220
Nature of the CHR Findings
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Petitioners contend that the PMA turned a blind eye on the CHRs
recommendations. The CHR, they note, is a constitutional body mandated by
the 1987 Constitution to investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights, and to conduct investigative monitoring of
economic, social, and cultural rights, particularly of vulnerable sectors of
society. Further, it was contended that the results of CHRs investigation and
recommendations are so persuasive that this Court, on several occasions like in
the cases of Cruz v. Sec. of Environment & Natural Resources 221 and Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections,222 gave its findings serious
consideration. It is not, therefore, too late for the Court to hear what an
independent and unbiased fact-finding body has to say on the case.
In opposition, respondents assert that Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human
Rights223 ruled that the CHR is merely a recommendatory body that is not
empowered to arrive at a conclusive determination of any controversy.
We are in accord with respondents.
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely
recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this Court. The reason is that
the CHRs constitutional mandate extends only to the investigation of all forms
of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. 224 As held inCario
v. Commission on Human Rights225 and a number of subsequent cases,226 the
CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency.
It is not empowered to adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or
controversies. The power to investigate is not the same as adjudication:
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such,
the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
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xxxx
[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or
delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
investigate is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to

search or inquire into: x x x to subject to an official probe x x x: to conduct an

official inquiry;" The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find
out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion
of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired
into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step
by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to
examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire;
to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for
the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,
judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the
term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case)
on the merits of issues raised: xx to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x x
act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with
judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy x x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x x Implies a judicial determination of a
fact, and the entry of a judgment."227
All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and exemplary damages in
accordance with Articles 19, 2217, 2219 and 2229 of the Civil Code. The
dismissal of Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA did not effectively deprive him of a
future. Clich though it may sound, being a PMA graduate is not the be-all and
end-all of his existence. A cadet separated from the PMA may still continue to
pursue military or civilian career elsewhere without suffering the stigma
attached to his or her dismissal. For one, as suggested by respondents, DNDAFP Circular No. 13, dated July 15, 1991, on the enlistment and reenlistment in
the AFP Regular Force, provides under Section 14 (b) thereof that priority shall
be given to, among others, the ex-PMA or PAFFFS cadets. 228 If the positions
open does not appeal to his interest for being way below the rank he could
have achieved as a PMA graduate, Cadet 1CL Cudia could still practice other
equally noble profession or calling that is best suited to his credentials,
competence, and potential. Definitely, nobody can deprive him of that choice.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet First Class
Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from the Philippine Military Academy is hereby AFFIRMED.

at STCs high school department, learned from her students that some seniors
at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed
only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls
in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe
Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID
SUZARA, Petitioners, v. ST. THERESAS COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T.
ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:

Using STCs computers, Escuderos students logged in to their respective

personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students,
which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking
cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu
wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black
brassieres. What is more, Escuderos students claimed that there were times
when access to or the availability of the identified students photos was not
confined to the girls Facebook friends,4 but were, in fact, viewable by any
Facebook user.5
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Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her
students Facebook page, showed the photos to Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol),
STCs Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an
investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in
a manner proscribed by the schools Student Handbook, to wit:
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The individuals desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in

society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually
engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for
privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others,
in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in
which he lives.

1.

Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2.

Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

3.

Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages in public places;

4.

Apparel that exposes the underwear;

5.

Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity;

contains sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and

6.

Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body
exposure.

~ Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, 1 otherwise known as
the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data. Petitioners herein assail the July 27,
2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP.
Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors,
were, during the period material, graduating high school students at St.
Theresas College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing
into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and
Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad
only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela
Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the
pictures in question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma.
Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STCs high school principal and ICM 6 Directress.
They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally
abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant
Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr.
Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty,
they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March
30, 2012.

A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angelas mother, Dr. Armenia
M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of
Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594. 7 In it,
Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the
sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises. On
March 25, 2012, petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia,
joined the fray as an intervenor.
On March 28, 2012, defendants in Civil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their
memorandum, containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as
annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a
motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned
students from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of
the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the
issuance of the TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the
following considerations:
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1.

The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were

taken for posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the
occasion of a birthday beach party;

2.

The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at

Friends Only. They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy
which must be respected.

6.

All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly
broadcasted by respondents through their memorandum submitted to
the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.

To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their

childrens privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas data be issued;
(b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and
printed copies of the subject data before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c)
after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and digital
images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been
illegally obtained in violation of the childrens right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an
Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same
Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return,
together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from
service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTCs directive and filed their verified
written return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition,
viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners
are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ
of habeas data may issue; and (d) there can be no violation of their right to
privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

3.

4.

5.

Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to

have known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily,
respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls, whose
privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the
offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were called
immoral and were punished outright;
The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their
rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently
showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of
petitioners children were intruded upon;
The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of
information, data, and digital images happened at STCs Computer
Laboratory; and

On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition
for habeas data. The dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:

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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is

hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or
threatened violation of the minors right to privacy, one of the preconditions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quo held that the
photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may
view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC
gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is,
the implementation of the schools policies and rules on discipline.

Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court
pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.10
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The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out in this case is whether or not a writ
of habeas data should be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving
the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was
indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life,
liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.

leaves an indelible trace in the providers databases, which are outside the
control of the end-usersis there a right to informational privacy in OSN
activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the
procedural issues in this case.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to
cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearancesContrary to
respondents submission, the Writ of Habeas Data was not enacted solely for
the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparo in cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Our Ruling

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Sec. 2. Who May File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ
of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

We find no merit in the petition.

Procedural issues concerning the
availability of the Writ of Habeas Data

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The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an
independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide
a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy. It
seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.12

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the

aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and
parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of
the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis
supplied)

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In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an

individuals right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law
scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as a procedure designed to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.13 The writ,
however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access
to information about a person. Availment of the writ requires the existence of a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a persons right to
informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an
actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be
extended.15
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Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational

privacy, a habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of
the case at bar, this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online
social network (OSN)(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction
among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers, 16 bridging the
gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only
to cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above
underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance ofhabeas
data situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed to safeguard individual freedom from
abuse in the information age.17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability
to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations
to the Rule prepared by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court,
after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo,
pointed out that:
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The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent

remedy to enforce ones right to privacy, more specifically the right to
informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can
include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database
or information or files in possession or in control of respondents. 18 (emphasis
Ours)
Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in

cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

The right to informational privacy on Facebook

Meaning of engaged in the gathering,

collecting or storing of data or informationRespondents contention that
the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to
a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.

The Right to Informational Privacy

The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly
recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Punos speech, The Common
Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy,
viz: (1) locational or situational privacy;21 (2) informational privacy; and (3)
decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is
the right to informational privacyusually defined as the right of
individuals to control information about themselves. 23

To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection
shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the
business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided under
Section 1 of the Rule:
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Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)

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With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data
sharing nowadays, not to mention each systems inherent vulnerability to
attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every individuals right to
control said flow of information should be protected and that each individual
should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several
commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree
that given the millions of OSN users, [i]n this [Social Networking]
environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but
rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.24
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The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys
the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of
public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering,
collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not
be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To engage in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour.
To engage means to do or take part in something.19 It does not necessarily
mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is
that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or
information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such
undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business,
and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for
no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting
to said person or entity.
To agree with respondents above argument, would mean unduly limiting the
reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose
business is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the
effectiveness of the writ as an instrument designed to protect a right which is
easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and
communications technologya right which a great majority of the users of
technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core
of the controversy.

It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for
judicial remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of
data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right to
privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the
landmark case, H v. W,26 promulgated on January 30, 2013, recognized that
[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities not only
technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the
people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing
times, acting cautiously and with wisdom. Consistent with this, the Court, by
developing what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas
data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation
of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging
in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to what extent is the right to privacy protected
in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal information.
At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializingsharing a myriad of
information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained personal.
Facebooks Privacy Tools: a response to
the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact
and to stay connected to other members of the same or different social media
platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others,
depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room
filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or walls, the contents of which
are under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a
user/owner can post anythingfrom text, to pictures, to music and videos

access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of
the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN
phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social networking
sites, including the one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com
(Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use to stay connected
with friends and family, to discover whats going on in the world, and to share
and express what matters to them.28
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Facebook connections are established through the process of friending

another user. By sending a friend request, the user invites another to connect
their accounts so that they can view any and all Public and Friends Only
posts of the other. Once the request is accepted, the link is established and
both users are permitted to view the other users Public or Friends Only
posts, among others. Friending, therefore, allows the user to form or
maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his
or her Facebook friend access to his or her profile and shares certain
information to the latter.29
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To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose,

Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the
accessibility of a users profile31 as well as information uploaded by the user.
In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users
to customize their privacy settings, but did so with this caveat: Facebook
states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a users
information, these privacy settings are not fool-proof.33
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For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility
of digital images (photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or wall,
except for the users profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired
privacy setting:
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(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the users Facebook friends and their friends can
view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or
networks of the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up
barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content,
statuses, and photos, among others, from another users point of view. In
other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of
their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to when and to what extent to
disclose facts about [themselves] and to put others in the position of
receiving such confidences.34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on
ones desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold
certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal
information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting,

fewer Facebook users can view that users particular post.

STC did not violate petitioners daughters right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents contention that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct.
However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy
tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation
that only those to whom they grant access to their profile will view the
information they post or upload thereto.35
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This, however, does not mean that any Facebook user automatically has a
protected expectation of privacy in all of his or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is
first necessary that said user, in this case the children of
petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through
the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility.36 And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through
the utilization of the OSNs privacy tools. In other words, utilization of
these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the users
invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.37
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Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or
deny access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the
informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice. 38
Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if,
for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her
Facebook page and sets its privacy level at Only Me or a custom list so that
only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed
public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photos visibility and
accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of
their function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep
said photo or information within the confines of his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to
other Facebook users and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In
other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the
images were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is
necessary in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of
privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be
protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their childrens privacy right being
violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their childrens Facebook accounts,
downloaded copies of the pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them,
this was a breach of the minors privacy since their Facebook accounts,
allegedly, were under very private or Only Friends setting safeguarded with
a password.39Ultimately, they posit that their childrens disclosure was only
limited since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore,

according to them, people who are not their Facebook friends, including
respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and
consent. As petitioners children testified, it was Angela who uploaded the
subject photos which were only viewable by the five of them,40 although who
these five are do not appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit 41 that my students showed
me some pictures of girls clad in brassieres. This student [sic] of mine
informed me that these are senior high school [students] of STC, who are their
friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many other
photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab,
these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed
from there the various photographs x x x. They even told me that there had
been times when these photos were public i.e., not confined to their friends in
Facebook.
In this regard, We cannot give much weight to the minors testimonies for one
key reason: failure to question the students act of showing the photos to Tigol
disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of
them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images
were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escuderos
claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements
are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration. 42
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It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escuderos sworn account
that her students, who are the minors Facebook friends, showed her the
photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no
special means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted
to by Escuderos students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that
the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2)
by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is Public, it can be
surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on
Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:
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[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to

forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective
measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the
photograph itself.45
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Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that [t]he more open the method of
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to
the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.

That the photos are viewable by friends only does not necessarily bolster the
petitioners contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the
digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the
zones of privacy in view of the following:
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(1 Facebook allows the world to be more open and

) connected by giving its users the tools to interact
and share in any conceivable way;47
(2 A good number of Facebook users befriend other
) users who are total strangers;48
(3 The sheer number of Friends one user has, usually
) by the hundreds; and
(4 A users Facebook friend can share49 the formers
) post, or tag50 others who are not Facebook friends
with the former, despite its being visible only to his
or her own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a posts or profile details
privacy to Friends is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another
user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The users
own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook
friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook
friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person
is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post
or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at
Friends.
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are
not Facebook friends. If C, As Facebook friend, tags B in As post, which is set
at Friends, the initial audience of 100 (As own Facebook friends) is
dramatically increased to 300 (As 100 friends plus Bs 200 friends or the
public, depending upon Bs privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can
view the post is effectively expandedand to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebooks
proclivity towards user interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or
privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has
been said that OSNs have facilitated their users self-tribute, thereby resulting
into the democratization of fame.51 Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or
even a post, with visibility set at Friends Only cannot easily, more so
automatically, be said to be very private, contrary to petitioners argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the
sanctioned students Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to

task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors Facebook
friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of
what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate
access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the
minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents
imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images
to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents
reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners
attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than
the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their
memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No.
CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minors
informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more
precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature,
likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors
enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any
evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebooks privacy
settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without
proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of
their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the
original uploader, through the Me Only privacy setting, or that the users
contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the
Custom setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the
intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to
the public at large or all the users friends en masse, becomes more manifest
and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that the best filter is the one between your childrens
ears.53 This means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet
consumers in general is the best means of avoiding privacy rights
violations.54 As a cyberspace community member, one has to be proactive in
protecting his or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users,
especially minors, fail. Responsible social networking or observance of the
netiquettes56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to
the widespread notion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they
generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves
sensibly in a public forum.57
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Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good

cyber citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online

conduct may be most timely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools
and organizations have already deemed it important to include digital literacy
and good cyber citizenship in their respective programs and curricula in view of
the risks that the children are exposed to every time they participate in online
activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world and its
pervasiveness, as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or
unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace,
the participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children
about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and
organizations. In fact, it is believed that to limit such risks, theres no
substitute for parental involvement and supervision.59
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As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its
students to be responsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace,
particularly in OSNs, when it enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the
Student Handbook, absent a showing that, in the process, it violated the
students rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to
whenever they engage in cyberspace activities. Accordingly, they should be
cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion
regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give up.
Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind
of data or information online, they are automatically and inevitably making it
permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of
their control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise
private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by
third parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their
online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their
rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here,
requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right
which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot
afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter
within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to
learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the
information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy
settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious
for changing these settings and the sites layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors
privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case
disposition of the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu

City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.

annul the judgment of the trial court that granted respondents' decree of
adoption.3
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No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel
Gregorio (Jd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro
(Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the
father of Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known by her
baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. Castro" and her nickname, "Jayrose."

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Peralta, Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur

Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag
City. Their marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a child, Rose Marie,
who was born in 1963, but succumbed to congenital heart disease and only
lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of months because
of the incompatibilities between them.4
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Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to
Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for about
a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would
visit her in Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they separated permanently
because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual tendencies. 5 She insisted,
however, that they "remained friends for fifteen (15) years despite their
separation(.)"6
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On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before the Regional Trial
Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and Regina
were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth), 8 whom
Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.9 At the time of the filing of the
petition, Jose was 70 years old.10

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014

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ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M.

CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M.
CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA
MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:

According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the Social Welfare Officer
of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family, being one
of the three children of former Governor Mauricio Castro.
He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte. 12 The report
mentioned that he was once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not
produce any children.13 It also stated that he met and fell in love with Lilibeth
in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on August 1987,
and Regina on March 1989.14 Under "Motivation for Adoption," the social
welfare officer noted:
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The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a
showing of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural
devices. In all instances where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a
child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate children must be
personally notified through personal service of summons. It is not enough that
they be deemed notified through constructive service.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, which denied the petition for annulment of
judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the appellate court sought to

Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not able
to fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However, with the presence of his 2
illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention to legalize
their relationship and surname. . . .15
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina
temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte.16 The children have allegedly been in his
custody since Lilibeth's death in July 1995.17
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On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption, 18 having ruled that
"[n]o opposition had been received by this Court from any person including the
government which was represented by the Office of the Solicitor General." 19 A
certificate of finality20 was issued on February 9, 2006.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V.
Saguisag, filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.21 In her complaint, she alleged that Jose had been remiss in
providing support for their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36 years. 22 She
alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to
Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover,
Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of adopting Larry's
two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne's knowledge and
consent.23She also alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the trial court by
alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Larry's wife,
Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual relationship with Larry.24
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In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies being
remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He alleged that he
always offered help, but it was often declined.25He also alleged that he adopted
Jed and Regina because they are his illegitimate children. He denied having
committed any of the falsification alluded to by Rosario. He also stated that he
had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him paralyzed. He alleged that his
income had been diminished because several properties had to be sold to pay
for medical treatments.26 He then implored the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to weigh on the case with "justice and equity." 27
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On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte. 28

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On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of
Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court
approving Jed and Regina's adoption.29
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In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption
sometime in 2005.30 They allege that Rosario's affidavit of consent, marked by
the trial court as "Exh. K,"31 was fraudulent.32 They also allege that Jed and
Regina's birth certificates showed different sets of information, such as the age
of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They argue that one set of
birth certificates states the father to be Jose and in another set of National
Statistic Office certificates shows the father to be Larry, Jose's driver and
alleged lover.33 It was further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually
Jose's illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who
were married at the time of their birth.34
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On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.

While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne
of the adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is "no explicit provision in
the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . . should be

personally notified of the hearing."35

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The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by [Jose]
in obtaining an adoption decree in favor of [his illegitimate children] to the
prejudice of the interests of his legitimate heirs"36 but stated that its hands
were bound by the trial court decision that had already attained "finality and
immutability."37
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The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained
in the different sets of birth certificates required the determination of the
identities of the persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope
of the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud was also
perpetrated during the trial and could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which
is required in an action for annulment of judgment. 38
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When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 10,
2009,39 they filed this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the
petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its
application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a judgment. 40 They
argue that because of the fabricated consent obtained by Jose and the alleged
false information shown in the birth certificates presented as evidence before
the trial court,41 they were not given the opportunity to oppose the petition
since the entire proceedings were concealed from them.42
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Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and misapplied
the law on jurisdiction despite the denial of due process, notice, and noninclusion of indispensable parties.43 They argue that the adoption of illegitimate
children requires the consent, not only of the spouse, but also the legitimate
children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such consent was never secured
from Joanne.44
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Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could not have
been deprived of their day in court since their interest was "amply protected by
the participation and representation of the Solicitor General through the
deputized public prosecutor."45
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Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through publication
for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, which
constitutes not only notice to them but also notice to the world of the adoption
proceedings.46 They argue that since the alleged fraud was perpetrated during
the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not
a ground for annulment of judgment.47 They also argue that petitioners were
not indispensable parties because adoption is an action in rem and, as such,
the only indispensable party is the state.48
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The petition is granted.

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an
action with the Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be
available if "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner."49
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In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals:50

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A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in

nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and
only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought, to be annulled was
rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the
remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and
readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or
resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds
for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing
in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show
that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards
cannot prosper.

Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature of
the action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the parties. 53 Extrinsic
fraud, on the other hand, is "[that which] prevents a party from having a trial
or from presenting his entire case to the court, or [that which] operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured."54
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The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court
did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable
decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
vis-a-vis the law on adoption
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court of
the adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the
proceedings.
Petitioners are correct.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action." 55 As Jose filed the
petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 56 which
applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the adoption
by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his
wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.

The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final

order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the timehonored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid
corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid
delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly
the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts
exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and
whether the modification is made by the court that rendered the decision or by
the highest court of the land. As to the latter, controversies cannot drag on
indefinitely because fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice demand that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang
in suspense for an indefinite period of time.51 (Emphasis supplied)

Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first
obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of
wedlock:

Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds
by which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which
must be brought four years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must
be brought before it is barred by estoppel or laches.52

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis
supplied)

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ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. The following may adopt:

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Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

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(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified, his/her consent
thereto; or

The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a

joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re: Petition for
Adoption of Michelle P. Lim:57
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The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with
the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.58
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation
where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In
this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to
adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and
Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to
be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to
the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent. His
submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be
considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given
notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have had a reasonable
opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent was not
obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic Act
No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the
spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are
protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case.
Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of
the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
There was extrinsic fraud
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may have
been committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud, rather than extrinsic
fraud. This is erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece:59

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The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are
10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552:

Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is
prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him
away from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or where
the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by
the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
connives at his defeat.60 (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. After being properly

counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of
the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
required:

An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four
years from discovery.61Petitioners alleged that they were made aware of the
adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is within
the period allowed by the rules.

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over,
of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis supplied)

The badges of fraud are present in this case.

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It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that
she was over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written
consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.

First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation to any of
the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City, llocos Norte.62 Larry and Lilibeth
were residents of Barangay 6, Laoag City.63 Jed and Regina were born in San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.64 Rosario and Joanne were residents of Paraaque City,
Manila.65 The petition for adoption, however, was filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte.66 The trial court gave due course to the petition on
Jose's bare allegation in his petition that he was a resident of Batac, 67 even
though it is admitted in the Home Study Report that he was a practicing lawyer
in Laoag City.68

To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court

that he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being
notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the
adoption was not valid.

Second, using the process of delayed registration,69 Jose was able to secure
birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to be the father and Larry as
merely the informant.70 Worse still is that two different sets of fraudulent
certificates were procured: one showing that Jose and Lilibeth were married on

The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures harmony

among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on
notice that they will have to share their parent's love and care, as well as their
future legitimes, with another person.

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December 4, 1986 in Manila,71 and another wherein the portion for the
mother's name was not filled in at all.72 The birth certificates of Jed and Regina
from the National Statistics Office, however, show that their father was Larry R.
Rentegrado.73 These certificates are in clear contradiction to the birth
certificates submitted by Jose to the trial court in support of his petition for
adoption.
Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his motivation
for adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario, were childless,74 to the
prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. The consent of Rosario to the adoption was
also disputed by Rosario and alleged to be fraudulent.75
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All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court in
approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from
participating in the proceedings or opposing the petition.
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as
intrinsic on the basis that they were "forged instruments or perjured
testimonies"76 presented during the trial. It failed to understand, however, that
fraud is considered intrinsic when the other party was either present at the trial
or was a participant in the proceedings when such instrument or testimony was
presented in court, thus:
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[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and
just determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or things, like
falsification and false testimony, could have been litigated and determined at
the trial or adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic fraud does not
deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can guard against that
kind of fraud through so many means, including a thorough trial preparation, a
skillful, cross-examination, resorting to the modes of discovery, and proper
scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of documents and evidence
for use at the trial and perjury in court testimony have been regarded as not
preventing the participation of any party in the proceedings, and are not,
therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud.77 (Emphasis supplied)
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any
other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of
whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or
perjured testimony during the trial.
Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable
opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to
participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose's petition since
he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law. There can be no
other conclusion than that because of Jose's acts, the trial court granted the
decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its provisions.
Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 8552:
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ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties.

(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6)

years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a
fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of
the court shall be imposed on any person who shall
commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion,
undue influence, fraud, improper material
inducement, or other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards
provided by the law for adoption; or
(iii)subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to
danger, abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration
of the birth of a child under the name(s) of a
person(s) who is not his/her biological parent(s)
shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be
punished by prision mayor in its medium period and
a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos
(P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his
criminal liabilities.78 Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any provision on
the status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have been obtained
fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic
Act No. 855279 since rescission of adoption can only be availed of by the
adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in law other than
the annulment of the judgment.
The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is
reason to believe that Joanne has grown up having never experienced the love
and care of a father, her parents having separated a year after her birth. She
has never even benefited from any monetary support from her father. Despite
all these adversities, Joanne was able to obtain a medical degree from the
University of the Philippines College of Medicine 80 and is now working as a

doctor in Canada.81 These accomplishments, however, are poor substitutes if

the injustice done upon her is allowed to continue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16, 2000
of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in SP. Proc. No.
3445-17 is rendered NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Reyes,* JJ., concur.

The pertinent facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner, are as follows:

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3. On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese

National, in a civil wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. A copy of their
Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex A and made an integral
part hereof.
4. On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was validly
granted under Japanese laws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with
petitioner. A copy of the Divorce Certificate duly issued by the ConsulateGeneral of Japan and duly authenticated by the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Manila, is hereto as Annex B and made an integral part hereof.
5. Said Divorce Certificate was duly registered with the Office of the Civil
Registry of Manila. A copy of the Certification dated 28 October 2005 is hereto
attached as Annex C and made an integral part hereof.
6. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that
by such she reverted to her single status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando
on 13 September 2005 in a civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga. A
copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex D and made
an integral part hereof.
7. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27 December
2005. A copy of the Japanese Family Registry Record of Kobayashi showing the
divorce he obtained and his remarriage with Ryo Miken, duly authenticated by
the Consulate-General of Japan and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila,
is hereto attached as Annex E and made an integral part hereof.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 195432, August 27, 2014
EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Respondent.

8. Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to

indicate her surname with her husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at
the Department of Foreign Affairs that the same cannot be issued to her until
she can prove by competent court decision that her marriage with her said
husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
xxxx

DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
nullification of the Orders dated 14 January and 8 February 2011 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Third Judicial Region, Branch 45, 1 City of San
Fernando, Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 137, which dismissed the Petition for
Declaratory Relief filed therein.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE

12. Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioners marriage with her said husband
Masatomi Y. Ando must therefore be honored, considered and declared valid,
until otherwise declared by a competent court. Consequently, and until then,
petitioner therefore is and must be declared entitled to the issuance of a
Philippine passport under the name Edelina Ando y Tungol. Hence, this
petitioner pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. 2
On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory
Relief, which was later raffled off to Branch 46. She impleaded the Department
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as respondent and prayed for the following reliefs
before the lower court:
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WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that

after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered, as follows:

2011, the trial court dismissed the Petition anew on the ground that petitioner
had no cause of action. The Order reads thus:

(a) declaring as valid and subsisting the marriage between petitioner Edelina
T. Ando and her husband Masatomi Y. Ando until otherwise declared by a
competent court;

The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to be declared as
valid is already her second marriage, a bigamous marriage under Article 35(4)
of the Family Code considering that the first one, though allegedly terminated
by virtue of the divorce obtained by Kobayashi, was never recognized by a
Philippine court, hence, petitioner is considered as still married to Kobayashi.
Accordingly, the second marriage with Ando cannot be honored and considered
as valid at this time.

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(b) declaring petitioner entitled to the issuance of a Philippine Passport under

the name Edelina Ando y Tungol; and
(c) directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to honor petitioners marriage
to her husband Masatomi Y. Ando and to issue a Philippine Passport to
petitioner under the name Edelina Ando y Tungol.
Petitioner prays for such other just and equitable reliefs.3
On 15 November 2010, in an Order dismissing the Petition for want of cause
and action, as well as jurisdiction, the RTC held thus:

Petitioners allegation of Sec. 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is misplaced. The

fact that no judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage with Ando was
rendered does not make the same valid because such declaration under Article
40 of the Family Code is applicable only in case of re-marriage. More
importantly, the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is not
even a requisite to make a marriage valid.

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Records of the case would reveal that prior to petitioners marriage to

Masatomi Y. Ando, herein petitioner was married to Yuichiro Kobayashi, a
Japanese National, in Candaba, Pampanga, on September 16, 2001, and that
though a divorce was obtained and granted in Japan, with respect to the their
(sic) marriage, there is no showing that petitioner herein complied with the
requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code that is obtaining a
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute divorce in our country.
It is therefore evident, under the foregoing circumstances, that herein
petitioner does not have any cause of action and/or is entitled to the reliefs
prayed for under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. In the same vein, though there
is other adequate remedy available to the petitioner, such remedy is however
beyond the authority and jurisdiction of this court to act upon and grant, as it
is only the family court which is vested with such authority and jurisdiction. 4
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On 3 December 2010, petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration of

the Order dated 15 November 2010. In an Order dated 14 December 2010, the
RTC granted the motion in this wise:
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WHEREFORE, considering that the allegations and reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner in her petition and the instant Motion for Reconsideration falls within
the jurisdiction of the Special Family Court of this jurisdiction and for the
interest of substantial justice, the Order of the Court dated November 15, 2010
is hereby reconsidered.
Let the record of this case be therefore referred back to the Office of the Clerk
of Court for proper endorsement to the Family Court of this jurisdiction for
appropriate action and/or disposition.5
Thereafter, the case was raffled to Branch 45 of the RTC. On

14 January

In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of this case is imperative. 6

On 1 February 2011, petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order dated 14 January 2011. The motion was denied by the RTC in open
court on 8 February 2011, considering that neither the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) nor respondent was furnished with copies of the motion.
On 24 March 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, raising the
sole issue of whether or not the RTC erred in ruling that she had no cause of
action.
Petitioner argues that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on the
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, it is solely the wife or the husband who can file a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage. Thus, as the state is not
even allowed to file a direct petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of
a void marriage, with even more reason can it not collaterally attack the
validity of a marriage, as in a petition for declaratory relief. Further, petitioner
alleges that under the law, a marriage even one that is void or voidable
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Petitioner also argues that assuming a court judgment recognizing a judicial
decree of divorce is required under Article 13 of the Family Code,
noncompliance therewith is a mere irregularity in the issuance of a marriage
license. Any irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage, such as with
respect to the marriage license, shall not affect the legality of the marriage.
Petitioner further claims that all the requisites for a petition for declaratory
relief have been complied with.
With respect to the failure to furnish a copy of the Ex Parte Motion for
Reconsideration to the OSG and the DFA, petitioner avers that at the time of

the filing, the RTC had yet to issue a summons to respondent; thus, it had yet
to acquire jurisdiction over them.
Thereafter, the DFA, through the OSG, filed a Comment on the Petition. The
latter raised the following arguments: (1) the Petition was improperly verified,
as the jurat in the Verification thereof only stated that the affiant had exhibited
her current and valid proof of identity, which proof was not properly
indicated, however; (2) prior judicial recognition by a Philippine court of a
divorce decree obtained by the alien spouse is required before a Filipino spouse
can remarry and be entitled to the legal effects of remarriage; (3) petitioner
failed to show that she had first exhausted all available administrative
remedies, such as appealing to the Secretary of the DFA under Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 8239, or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, before resorting to the
special civil action of declaratory relief; and (4) petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration before the RTC was a mere scrap of paper and did not toll the
running of the period to appeal. Hence, the RTC Order dated 14 January 2011
is now final.
On 29 November 2011, petitioner filed her Reply to the Comment, addressing
the issues raised therein.
THE COURTS RULING
The Court finds the Petition to be without merit.
First, with respect to her prayer to compel the DFA to issue her passport,
petitioner incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She
should have first appealed before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since
her ultimate entreaty was to question the DFAs refusal to issue a passport to
her under her second husbands name.
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which was
adopted on 25 February 1997, the following are the additional documentary
requirements before a married woman may obtain a passport under the name
of her spouse:
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SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed women

shall be made in accordance with the following provisions:
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b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified

true copy of her annotated Marriage Contract or Certificate of Registration and
the Court Order effecting the annulment.
c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she must
present a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the
Philippine Embassy or consular post which has jurisdiction over the place where
the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular
mission in the Philippines.
When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true copy
of the Divorce Decree or a certified true copy of the Certificate of Divorce from
the Shariah Court or the OCRG.
d) In the event that marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband, the
applicant must present the original or certified true copy of the Death
Certificate of the husband or the Declaration of Presumptive Death by a Civil or
Shariah Court, in which case the applicant may choose to continue to use her
husbands surname or resume the use of her maiden surname.
From the above provisions, it is clear that for petitioner to obtain a copy of her
passport under her married name, all she needed to present were the
following: (1) the original or certified true copy of her marriage contract and
one photocopy thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and
Counseling Seminar, if applicable; and (3) a certified true copy of the Divorce
Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post that has
jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned
foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.
In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a
Philippine passport under her second husbands name. Should her application
for a passport be denied, the remedies available to her are provided in Section
9 of R.A. 8239, which reads thus:
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Sec. 9. Appeal. Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the application
of this Act of the implementing rules and regulations issued by the Secretary
shall have the right to appeal to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs from whose
decision judicial review may be had to the Courts in due course.

a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt the surname
of her husband pursuant to Art. 370 of Republic Act No. 386, she must present
the original or certified true copy of her marriage contract, and one photocopy
thereof.

The IRR further provides in detail:

In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in the Philippines to a

foreigner, shall be required to present a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance
and Counselling Seminar conducted by the CFO when applying for a passport
for the first time.

In the event that an application for a passport is denied, or an existing one

cancelled or restricted, the applicant or holder thereof shall have the right to
appeal in writing to the Secretary within fifteen (15) days from notice of denial,
cancellation or restriction.

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ARTICLE 10
Appeal

Clearly, she should have filed an appeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the
event of the denial of her application for a passport, after having complied with
the provisions of R.A. 8239. Petitioners argument that her application cannot
be said to have been either denied, cancelled or restricted by [the DFA], so as
to make her an aggrieved party entitled to appeal,7 as instead she was
merely told8 that her passport cannot be issued, does not persuade. The law
provides a direct recourse for petitioner in the event of the denial of her
application.
Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage
as valid, petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial
recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband.
In Garcia v. Recio,9 we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence
requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven and like any other fact. 10
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While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before
a trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief,11 we are still
unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to
be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the national law
of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under
that national law. 12Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can
only be made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce
decree and the national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the
proper forum.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to petitioners
recourse to the proper remedies available.
SO ORDERED.

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Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perez, and *Mendoza, JJ., concur.

(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage) based on improper venue and the
lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring
his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without
the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15
May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void
on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC
entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage). Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such
annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
National Statistics Office (NSO).6

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, Petitioner, v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI
MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the
Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The RTC dismissed the petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

RTC immediately dismissed few days after filing the petition. the RTC cited
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). The trial court based
its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that
[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground
for immediate dismissal of the petition. The RTC took the view that only the
husband or the wife, in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the
petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact, and not a civil action which is
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong. In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the
status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and
(2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring

the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy.
The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines 11 on bigamy and was
therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to
void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be
absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words
of Fujiki, [i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in
having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the
prior, pre-existing marriage.14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the procedural
implementation of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in relation to Article
413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of
the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the
dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized.17Section 2 of Rule 108
provides that entries in the civil registry relating to marriages, judgments of
annulments of marriage and judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC
sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court
on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court
gravely erred when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper
venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with
the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court
to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio
dismissing the case.20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should
not have immediately dismissed the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a third person 22 in the proceeding
because he is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x.23On the
other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only
said that [a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for

dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited
by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x.24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based
on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that [i]n a special proceeding for
correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x
x.26 Braza emphasized that the validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and
filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of
entry] x x x.27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a
jurisdictional ground to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and
certification against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as
required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also
warranted the immediate dismissal of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the
petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment,
the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs
pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-1110-SC x x x be set aside and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for
further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of
the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General
cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court
explained:
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[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had
only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous,
and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus,
in such circumstance, the injured spouse who should be given a legal remedy
is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be

a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior
marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v.
Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that [t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact.37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case
the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the
parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the
procedure to record [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil
Code. In other words, [t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity
and status x x x.38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the
civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a
Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in
assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De
Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that [t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked.41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the
directive for them to comment on the petition. 42 Maekara wrote that Marinay
concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose
the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she
say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

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(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his
or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does
not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules
of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted
in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. 49 Petitioner may prove
the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If
the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of
foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow
its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pretrial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it
will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.57 The
interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that [i]f every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back
on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation.59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign
judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of
the Civil Code provides that [l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad. This is the rule of lex nationaliiin
private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity
in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment

affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the
status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume
to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of
the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgmentas a fact according
to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment
or final order against a person creates a presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that the judgment or final
order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, Philippine
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to
delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The rule on limited review
embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as
well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states. 62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized
foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64Divorce involves the
dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does
not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine
courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to
remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy,
as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the

judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction

of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that [a] special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are
recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, 66 which
the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General,
in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that [t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

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Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under
Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the
civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property
relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported in keeping with the financial capacity of the family 70 and preserving
the property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution,72 but a spouses right in a marriage extends further to relational
rights recognized under Title III (Rights and Obligations between Husband and
Wife) of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot diminish, increase,
or modify the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his
marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this
substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife
of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a

subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the
ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that [a] petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void
from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the
husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from
the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can
initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action
which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a
subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest
of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the
purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is
clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the
suit.79Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse is clearly the aggrieved party
as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse.80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is
entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose,
he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous
marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel
the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this
Court held that a trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages in a
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.81 Thus, the validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only
in a direct action to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack
on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil

registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action
is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the
limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the
spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to
determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as
a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be
filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is
located.87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is
neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under
R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing
trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that [w]here a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of
the second paragraph of Article 26 which is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse 89 under the
laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a
case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the
anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not
allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly
consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign

spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is
made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree,
which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Courts decision
in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the
foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot
remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to
the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the
extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A
critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed
in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not
the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice
to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine
courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the
rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and
(2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the
foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency

with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign
judgment is already presumptive evidence of a right between the parties.
Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and
the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in
the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and
fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment
and the public records in the Philippines.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and
94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, [t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when
the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago.
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need
to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition
under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and
the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107,
Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 areREVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur

Estate Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of
Calamba City. The public auction sale was set on May 9, 2001.
At the sale, the creditors son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona (spouses
Lapitan) emerged as the highest bidders with the bid amount of P2.5 million.
Then, they were issued a Certificate of Sale8 which was registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Calamba City and annotated at the back of TCT No. T412512 under Entry No. 615683 on November 15, 2002.9

FIRST DIVISION

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[G.R. NO. 178288 - August 15, 2012]

The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza

redeeming the mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership on November 20, 2003 and caused the cancellation
of TCT No. T-412512 and the registration of the subject property in their
names under TCT No. T-53594510 on February 4, 2004. Despite the foregoing,
the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitan s formal demand 11 to vacate and
surrender possession of the subject property.

SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA

FORTALEZA, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES RAUL LAPITAN and RONA
LAPITAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Unless a case falls under recognized exceptions provided by law and
jurisprudence, courts should maintain the ex parte, non-adversarial, summary
and ministerial nature of the issuance of a writ of possession.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 10, 2007 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 86287 which affirmed the Order3of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Calamba City Branch 35, dated September 16, 2005 in SLRC Case No.
2528-2004-C granting an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of
possession. Likewise assailed is the CA Resolution4 dated June 6, 2007 which
denied the Motion for Reconsideration5 of the said assailed Decision.
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza (spouses Fortaleza) obtained a loan from
spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan (creditors) in the amount of P1.2 million
subject to 34% interest per annum. As security, spouses Fortaleza executed on
January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage 6 over their residential house
and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baos, Laguna (subject
property) registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-412512. 7

Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court

On August 27, 2004, spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance
of writ of possession with Branch 35 of the RTC of Calamba City docketed as
SLRC Case No. 2528-2004-C.12 As new registered owners of the subject
property, spouses Lapitan claimed that they were entitled to its possession
pursuant to Section 7 of Act No. 3135,13 as amended by Act No. 4118.
In their opposition,14 spouses Fortaleza questioned the validity of the real
estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale. They argued that the mortgage was
void because the creditors bloated the principal amount by the imposition of
exorbitant interest. Spouses Fortaleza added that the foreclosure proceeding
was invalid for non-compliance with the posting requirement.
Later, for repeated failure of spouses Fortaleza to appear at the scheduled
hearings, the RTC allowed spouses Lapitan to present evidence ex parte.
Eventually, on September 16, 2005, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of
possession explaining that it is a ministerial duty of the court especially since
the redemption period had expired and a new title had already been issued in
the name of the spouses Lapitan, thus:
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When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests
and penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Opposition with counterclaim filed by

the respondents is denied while this instant petition is hereby granted.

Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to issue a Writ of

Possession directing the provincial sheriff of Laguna to place the petitioner in
possession of the above described property free from any adverse occupants
thereof.
SO ORDERED.15

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Spouses Fortaleza moved for reconsideration,16 claiming that the subject

property is their family home and is exempt from foreclosure sale. On October
11, 2005, however, the RTC issued an Order17 denying their motion.
Accordingly, the branch clerk of court issued the Writ of Possession 18 and the
sheriff served the corresponding Notice to Vacate 19 against spouses Fortaleza.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
Dissatisfied, spouses Fortaleza elevated the case to the CA via Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 86287. With the perfection of an
appeal, the RTC held in abeyance the implementation of the writ. 20 After the
parties submitted their respective briefs, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision21dated January 10, 2007 dismissing the appeal:
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WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Order dated September

16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Calamba City in SLRC Case
No. 2528-2004-SC, is AFFIRMED. The court a quo is DIRECTED to enforce the
Writ of Possession it issued on October 24, 2005.
SO ORDERED.22

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In affirming the ruling of the RTC, the CA stressed that any question regarding
the regularity and validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised
as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession since the
proceedings is ex parte and non-litigious. Moreover, until the foreclosure sale is
annulled, the issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial.
Issues
Unsuccesful with their quest to have the CA reconsider its Decision, 23 spouses
Fortaleza filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari 24 raising the following
errors:
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I
WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE TWO
(2)-RAFFLE RULE PRESCRIBED BY AND LONG ESTABLISHED UNDER THE
REVISED INTERNAL RULES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WHEN IT IMMEDIATELY
RENDERED THE ASSAILED DECISION BARELY AFTER THE SUBMISSION OF THE
PARTIES BRIEFS. IN SO DOING, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ENGAGED IN PROCEDURAL SHORTCUTS AND ACTED WITH UNDUE HASTE AND
INDECENT SPEED, THUS RENDERING ITS DECISION AS NULL AND VOID AND
CHARACTERIZED BY MANIFEST BIAS AND PARTIALITY TO THE RESPONDENTS.
II
WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT S ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF POSSESSION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO
ESTABLISH THEIR ENTITLEMENT TO THE ISSUANCE OF SAID WRIT, THE NONCOMPLIANCE BY THE ORIGINAL MORTGAGORS AND THE RESPONDENTS OF
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF
MORTGAGE UNDER ACT NO. 3135, AND THE FATAL DEFECTS OF THE
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE PETITIONERS WERE PREVENTED BY THE RESPONDENTS FROM
EXERCISING THEIR RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OVER THE FORECLOSED
PROPERTY BY DEMANDING A REDEMPTION PRICE OF A HIGHLY INEQUITABLE
AND MORE THAN DOUBLE THE AMOUNT OF THE FORECLOSED PROPERTY,
ESPECIALLY THAT THE FORECLOSED MORTGAGED PROPERTY IS THE FAMILY
HOME OF PETITIONERS AND THEIR CHILDREN.25
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First, spouses Fortaleza point out that the CA violated its own 2002 Internal
Rules of Procedure when it decided the case without passing the two-raffle
system. They claim that the justice assigned in the completion stage also
decided the case on the merits. This procedural shortcut, according to spouses
Fortaleza, evinces the appellate court s bias and prejudgment in favor of the
spouses Lapitan.
Second, citing Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court26 and Cometa v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,27and reiterating the irregularities that allegedly

attended the foreclosure sale, the spouses Fortaleza insist that the issuance of
writ of possession is not always ministerial and the trial court should have
accorded them opportunity to present contrary evidence.

case to the Justice concerned for the issuance of a resolution declaring the
case submitted for decision and referring the same to the Raffle Committee for
raffle to a Justice for study and report; (Sec. 5(b), Rule 3, RIRCA
[a]).31 (Emphasis supplied.)

Last, spouses Fortaleza maintain that the subject property is a family home
exempt from forced sale. Hence, in the spirit of equity and following the rulings
in Tolentino v. Court of Appeals,28 and De los Reyes v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,29 the Court should allow them to exercise the right of redemption even
after the expiration of the one-year period.

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However, the two-raffle system is already abandoned under the 2009 IRCA. As
the rule now stands, the Justice to whom a case is raffled shall act on it both at
the completion stage and for the decision on the merits, thus:
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SEC. 2. Raffle of Cases.

(a) Cases shall be assigned to a Justice by raffle for completion of records,
study and report, subject to the following rules:
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(1) Cases, whether original or appealed, shall be raffled to individual

justices;

Our Ruling

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On Matters of Procedure
True, under the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA), appealed
civil cases undergo two-raffle system. First, a preliminary raffle is held to
determine the Justice to whom the case will be assigned for completion of
records. After completion, a second raffle is conducted to determine the Justice
to whom the case will be assigned for study and report. "Each stage is distinct
and it may happen that the Justice to whom the case was initially raffled for
completion may not be the same Justice who will write the decision thereon." 30

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Thus:

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Section 2. Raffle of Cases.

(a) Assignment of cases to a Justice, whether for completion of records or for
study and report, shall be by raffle, subject to the following rules:
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(1) Appealed cases for completion of records shall be raffled to individual

Justices; (Sec. 5(a), Rule 3, RIRCA [a])
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(1.1) Records are deemed completed upon filing of the required briefs or
memoranda or the expiration of the period for the filing thereof and resolution
of all pending incidents. Thereupon, the Division Clerk of Court shall report the

(1.1) Records are deemed completed upon filing of the required pleadings,
briefs or memoranda or the expiration of the period for the filing thereof and
resolution of all pending incidents. Upon such completion, the Division Clerk of
Court shall report the case to the Justice concerned for the issuance of a
resolution declaring the case submitted for decision.32(Emphasis supplied.)
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Corollarily, the alleged defect in the processing of this case before the CA has
been effectively cured. We stress that rules of procedure may be modified at
any time and become effective at once, so long as the change does not affect
vested rights.33 Moreover, it is equally axiomatic that there are no vested rights
to rules of procedure.34 Thus, unless spouses Fortaleza can establish a right by
virtue of some statute or law, the alleged violation is not an actionable
wrong.35 At any rate, the 2002 IRCA does not provide for the effect of noncompliance with the two-raffle system on the validity of the decision. Notably
too, it does not prohibit the assignment by raffle of a case for study and report
to a Justice who handled the same during its completion stage.
We also find that personal bias and prejudgment cannot be inferred from the
alleged breach of internal rules. It is settled that clear and convincing evidence
is required to prove bias and prejudice.36 Bare allegations and mere suspicions
of partiality are not enough in the absence of evidence to overcome the
presumption that a member of the court will undertake his noble role to
dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or

favor.37 Moreover, no acts or conduct of the division or the ponente was shown
to indicate any arbitrariness against the spouses Fortaleza. What is extant is
that the opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are all based on
the evidence presented.
On the Issuance of Writ of Possession
Spouses Fortaleza claim that the RTC grievously erred in ignoring the apparent
nullity of the mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure sale. For them, the RTC
should have heard and considered these matters in deciding the case on its
merits. They relied on the cases of Barican38 and Cometa39 in taking exception
to the ministerial duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession.
But the cited authorities are not on all fours with this case. In Barican, we held
that the obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be
ministerial if there is a third party holding the property adversely to the
judgment debtor. Where such third party exists, the trial court should conduct
a hearing to determine the nature of his adverse possession. And in Cometa,
there was a pending action where the validity of the levy and sale of the
properties in question were directly put in issue which this Court found preemptive of resolution. For if the applicant for a writ of possession acquired no
interest in the property by virtue of the levy and sale, then, he is not entitled
to its possession. Moreover, it is undisputed that the properties subject of said
case were sold at an unusually lower price than their true value. Thus,
equitable considerations motivated this Court to withhold the issuance of the
writ of possession to prevent injustice on the other party.
Here, there are no third parties holding the subject property adversely to the
judgment debtor. It was spouses Fortaleza themselves as debtors-mortgagors
who are occupying the subject property. They are not even strangers to the
foreclosure proceedings in which the ex parte writ of possession was applied
for. Significantly, spouses Fortaleza did not file any direct action for annulment
of the foreclosure sale of the subject property. Also, the peculiar circumstance
of gross inadequacy of the purchase price is absent.

property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during
the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of
the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it
be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without
complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under
oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion x x x and the court shall, upon
approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the
sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said
order immediately. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the provision cited above, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may
apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period. Notably, in this
case, the one-year period for the spouses Fortaleza to redeem the mortgaged
property had already lapsed. Furthermore, ownership of the subject property
had already been consolidated and a new certificate of title had been issued
under the name of the spouses Lapitan. Hence, as the new registered owners
of the subject property, they are even more entitled to its possession and have
the unmistakable right to file an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession. As aptly explained in Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 42 the duty
of the trial court to grant a writ of possession in such instances is ministerial,
and the court may not exercise discretion or judgment, thus:
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Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration
of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no
redemption is made. x x x The purchaser can demand possession at any time
following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of
a new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser s name for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser s right to possession ripens
into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a
writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title becomes merely a
ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion.
(Emphasis in the original.)

Accordingly, unless a case falls under recognized exceptions provided by

law40 and jurisprudence,41 we maintain the ex parte, non-adversarial, summary
and ministerial nature of the issuance of a writ of possession as outlined in
Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, which provides:

In this case, spouses Lapitan sufficiently established their right to the writ
of possession. More specifically, they presented the following documentary
exhibits: (1) the Certificate of Sale and its annotation at the back of spouses
Fortaleza s TCT No. T-412512; (2) the Affidavit of Consolidation proving that
spouses Fortaleza failed to redeem the property within the one-year
redemption period; (3) TCT No. T-535945 issued in their names; and, (4) the
formal demand on spouses Fortaleza to vacate the subject property.

SECTION 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser
may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the

Lastly, we agree with the CA that any question regarding the regularity and
validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised as a justification for

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opposing the petition for the issuance of the writ of possession. 43 The said
issues may be raised and determined only after the issuance of the writ of
possession.44 Indeed, "[t]he judge with whom an application for writ of
possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the
manner of its foreclosure."45 The writ issues as a matter of course. "The
rationale for the rule is to allow the purchaser to have possession of the
foreclosed property without delay, such possession being founded on the right
of ownership."46 To underscore this mandate, Section 847 of Act No. 3135 gives
the debtor-mortgagor the right to file a petition for the setting aside of the
foreclosure sale and for the cancellation of a writ of possession in the same
proceedings where the writ was issued within 30 days after the purchasermortgagee was given possession. The court s decision thereon may be
appealed by either party, but the order of possession shall continue in effect
during the pendency of the appeal.
"Clearly then, until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled
by a court of competent jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ of possession
remains the ministerial duty of the trial court. The same is true with its
implementation; otherwise, the writ will be a useless paper judgment a result
inimical to the mandate of Act No. 3135 to vest possession in the purchaser
immediately."48
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On exemption of the subject property

and the exercise of right of redemption
Spouses Fortaleza s argument that the subject property is exempt from forced
sale because it is a family home deserves scant consideration. As a rule, the
family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. 49 However,
Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family
home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily
executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject
property which was even notarized by their original counsel of record. And
assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did
not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it
was sold at the public auction. As elucidated inHonrado v. Court of Appeals:50

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While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or
forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption
should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at
public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the
exemption. As this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:
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Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim
the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right of
exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such,
it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the time of
the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter.51 (Emphasis supplied.)
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Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on exemption does not mean
a time after the expiration of the one-year period for a judgment debtor to
redeem the property.52
rll

Equally without merit is spouses Fortaleza s reliance on the cases

of Tolentino53 and De Los Reyes54 in praying for the exercise of the right of
redemption even after the expiration of the one-year period. InTolentino, we
held that an action to redeem filed within the period of redemption, with a
simultaneous deposit of the redemption money tendered to the sheriff, is
equivalent to an offer to redeem and has the effect of preserving the right to
redemption for future enforcement even beyond the one-year period. 55And
in De Los Reyes, we allowed the mortgagor to redeem the disputed property
after finding that the tender of the redemption price to the sheriff was made
within the one-year period and for a sufficient amount.
The circumstances in the present case are far different. The spouses Fortaleza
neither filed an action nor made a formal offer to redeem the subject property
accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment. It is also
undisputed that they allowed the one-year period to lapse from the registration
of the certificate of sale without redeeming the mortgage. For all intents and
purposes, spouses Fortaleza have waived or abandoned their right of
redemption.
Although the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original
owner of the property, we cannot apply the privilege of liberality to
accommodate the spouses Forteza due to their negligence or omission to
exercise the right of redemption within the prescribed period without justifiable
cause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision

dated January 10, 2007 and Resolution dated June 6, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86287 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, v. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8
December 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora,
Branch 96.
The factual antecedents are as follow:

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David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3

December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United
States of America (USA) where they eventually acquired American citizenship.
They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T. Noveras, who was born on 4
November 1990 and Jena T. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was engaged
in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco,
California.
During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines
and in the USA:
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PHILIPPINES
PROPERTY
House and Lot with an area of
150 sq. m. located at 1085

FAIR MARKET
VALUE
P1,693,125.00

Norma Street, Sampaloc,

Manila (Sampaloc property)
Agricultural land with an area
of 20,742 sq. m. located at
Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora
A parcel of land with an area
of 2.5 hectares located at
Maria Aurora, Aurora
A parcel of land with an area
of 175 sq.m. located at
Sabang Baler, Aurora
3-has. coconut plantation in
San Joaquin Maria Aurora,
Aurora

P400,000.00
P490,000.00
P175,000.003
P750,000.00

House and Lot at 1155

Hanover Street, Daly City,
California
Furniture and furnishings
Jewelries (ring and watch)
2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4
pickup truck
Bank of America Checking
Account
Bank of America Cash Deposit
Life Insurance (Cash Value)
Retirement, pension, profitsharing, annuities

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for
divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The
California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly
entered on 29 June 2005.6 The California court granted to Leticia the custody
of her two children, as well as all the couples properties in the USA. 7
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USA
PROPERTY

with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David agreed to
and executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of Davids father,
Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3 December 2003 stating that: 1) the P1.1Million
proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall be paid to and collected
by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia P750,000.00, which is
equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc
property; and 3) that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest
in the conjugal and real properties situated in the Philippines. 5David was able
to collect P1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving an
unpaid balance of P410,000.00.

FAIR MARKET VALUE

$550,000.00 (unpaid
debt of $285,000.00)

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal

Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003
Joint Affidavit and Davids failure to comply with his obligation under the same.
She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal properties in the
Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the
subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be
forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as
share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of
P50,000.00 and P100,000.00 litigation expenses. 8
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$3,000
$9,000
$13,770.00
$8,000

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their
marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties,
which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorneys fees of both parties be charged against the
conjugal partnership.9
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$10,000.00
$100,000.00
$56,228.004

The Sampaloc property used to be owned by Davids parents. The parties

herein secured a loan from a bank and mortgaged the property. When said
property was about to be foreclosed, the couple paid a total of P1.5 Million for
the redemption of the same.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in
2001. In December 2002, Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for P2.2 Million. According to
Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived

The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:

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1.

Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of

abandonment and marital infidelity which can result into the forfeiture
of the parties properties in favor of the petitioner and their two (2)
children.

2.

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in

California, U.S.A. and the same can be included in the judicial
separation prayed for.

3.

Whether or not the Joint Affidavit x x x executed by petitioner Leticia

T. Noveras and respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or
forfeiture of the latters property rights over their conjugal properties.

4.

Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras is entitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the P2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc,
Manila and one-half of the P1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the property
of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.

5.

How the absolute community properties should be distributed.

6.

Whether or not the attorneys fees and litigation expenses of the

parties were chargeable against their conjugal properties.

Corollary to the above is the issue of:

5.

For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena,
respondent David A. Noveras shall give them US$100.00 as monthly
allowance in addition to their income from their presumptive legitimes,
while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing,
education and other needs while they are in her custody in the USA.
The monthly allowance due from the respondent shall be increased in
the future as the needs of the children require and his financial
capacity can afford;

6.

Of the unpaid amount of P410,000.00 on the purchase price of the

Sampaloc property, the Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay
P5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and P405,000.00 to the two
children. The share of the respondent may be paid to him directly but
the share of the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in
Baler, Aurora, in a joint account to be taken out in their names,
withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by their
representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such
payment/deposit shall be made within the period of thirty (30) days
after receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the passbook of the joint
account to be submitted to the custody of the Clerk of Court of this
Court within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from
the Clerk of Court only by the children or their attorney-in-fact; and

7.

The litigation expenses and attorneys fees incurred by the parties

shall be shouldered by them individually.11

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Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support
and presumptive legitimes.10
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On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

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1.

The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared

DISSOLVED;

2.

The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in

the Philippines are hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David
A. Noveras only, with the properties in the United States of America
remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree issued by the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo, United States of America,
dissolving the marriage of the parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles
presently covering said properties shall be cancelled and new titles be
issued in the name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;

3.

4.

One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in

the preceding paragraph are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two
minor children with petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as
their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on
the titles covering the said properties. Their share in the income from
these properties shall be remitted to them annually by the respondent
within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;
One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are
hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two minor children with
respondent David A. Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and said
legitimes must be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said
properties. Their share in the income from these properties, if any,
shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner within the first half
of January of each year, starting January 2008;

The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that
cover their legal and personal status are those of the USA. With respect to their
marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their
marriage issued by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo on 24
June 2005. Under their law, the parties marriage had already been dissolved.
Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for
liquidation of the absolute community of property regime with the
determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children, instead of
an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their
property regime as absolute community of property because they did not
execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization of their marriage
pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in
accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should
apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the
parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The trial court held that
as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the law for the
grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute community properties
cannot be forfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court
observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment and infidelity with
preponderant evidence.

The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements
she is praying for considering that she already acquired all of the properties in
the USA. Relying still on the principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the
Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of the childrens
presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of the Family
Code, the waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the
Joint Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision by directing
the equal division of the Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover
with respect to the common childrens presumptive legitime, the appellate
court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the amount of
P520,000.00, thus:
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WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of

the assailed Decision dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler,
Aurora Province, in Civil Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as
follows:
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2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the
Philippines are hereby divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David A. Noveras;
xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in
paragraph 2 shall pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their
presumptive legitimes which shall be annotated on the titles/documents
covering the said properties. Their share in the income therefrom, if any, shall
be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first half of January,
starting 2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each
ordered to pay the amount of P520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and
Jena, as their presumptive legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc property
inclusive of the receivables therefrom, which shall be deposited to a local bank
of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latters names. The
payment/deposit shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt
of a copy of this Decision and the corresponding passbook entrusted to the
custody of the Clerk of Court a quo within the same period, withdrawable only
by the children or their attorney-in-fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:

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8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia

Tacbiana (sic) the amount of P1,040,000.00 representing her share in the

proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property.

The last paragraph shall read as follows:

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Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local
civil registry of Quezon City; the Civil Registrar-General, National Statistics
Office, Vibal Building, Times Street corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome
Noveras and Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12

chanrobleslaw

In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have
recognized the California Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to
him because said judgment was part of the pleading presented and offered in
evidence before the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia to share in
the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia
considering that the latter was already granted all US properties by the
California court.
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens
who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree
of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court
awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their
properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of
conjugal properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which
severed the bond of marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas,13 we stated that:
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The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the

acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal
of another country. This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself
or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for
the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as
an integral aspect of his claim or defense.14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law
of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for
Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.15
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Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign

authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2)
a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official
publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody
thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine
embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The
required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California
law on divorce were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the
requirement on certification where we held that [petitioner therein] was
clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a
copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court
issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient. In this case however, it appears that
there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts
did with respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of
divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not
recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines.
17

Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are
still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding
directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made
before the celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed
provided that the modification is judicially approved and refers only to the
instances provided in Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code. 18

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Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of
property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:

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Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial
separation of property:
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(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)

That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced

to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially
declared an absentee;
That loss of parental authority of the spouse of
petitioner has been decreed by the court;
That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the
latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations
to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5 That the spouse granted the power of administration
) in the marriage settlements has abused that power;
and
(6 That at the time of the petition, the spouses have
) been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the
final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for
the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this
case to necessitate judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of
Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court ratiocinated:
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Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above,
must be for a valid cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the
other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning.
The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic]
abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts
within the period of three months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to
and stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went
several times to visit him there after the alleged abandonment. Also, the
respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their children until
the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in
October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a
petition for dissolution of marriage with the California court. Such turn for the
worse of their relationship and the filing of the said petition can also be
considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines. 19
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Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of

property was not tackled in the trial courts decision because, the trial court
erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of
properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had
indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is
undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David
decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second,
Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita
Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who
worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw
the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation
form.20 Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was
granted by the California court in June 2005.

(3
)
(4
)

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least
one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property
should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property
automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the
4th paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code, thus:
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Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

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(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under
Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the
absolute community regime and the following procedure should apply:
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Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following
procedure shall apply:
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(1 An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all

) the properties of the absolute community and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2 The debts and obligations of the absolute community
) shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency
of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable

(5
)
(6
)

for the unpaid balance with their separate properties

in accordance with the provisions of the second
paragraph of Article 94.
Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the
spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of
them.
The net remainder of the properties of the absolute
community shall constitute its net assets, which shall
be divided equally between husband and wife, unless
a different proportion or division was agreed upon in
the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a
voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code.
For purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and
63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in
value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.
The presumptive legitimes of the common children
shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with
Article 51.
Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the
partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and
the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to
the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below the age of
seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother,
unless the court has decided otherwise. In case
there is no such majority, the court shall decide,
taking into consideration the best interests of said
children.

At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court.
Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the
trial courts Decision with respect to liquidation.

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire
jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article
16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

Sereno,* C.J., Carpio, J., (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,** Del Castillo, and Perez,
JJ., concur

We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the
share of the spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines,
as well as the payment of their childrens presumptive legitimes, which the
appellate court explained in this wise:
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Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the
Sampaloc property. While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption
of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their contributions came
from, the same is presumed to have come from the community property. Thus,
Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
Davids allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be given
full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00 incurred in going to and from
the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of
P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the
absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received
by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the
criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not
benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in the
proceeds of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00 or in the respective
amounts of P1,040,000.00.
xxxx

G.R. No. 182839, June 02, 2014

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. JOSE GARCIA AND
CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE GARCIA, JR., BOBBY GARCIA AND
JIMMY GARCIA AND HEIRS OF ROGELIO GARCIA NAMELY: CELEDONIO
GARCIA, DANILO GARCIA, ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA, HEHERSON
GARCIA, GREGORIO GARCIA, IMELDA GARCIA AND JANE
GARCIA, Respondent.
DECISION

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, (t)he legitime of
legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother. The children are therefore entitled to
half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community,
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as
to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of
P410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the
amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom. 21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

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BRION, J.:
We resolve this petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 dated
September 26, 2007 and the resolution3 dated May 6, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71356.
These challenged CA rulings reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela, dismissing Civil Case No. Branch
23-500-96 for lack of cause of action.
The Factual Background
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized
below.

The subject of the present case is a parcel of residential land with all its
improvements (subject property) located in Barrio Olango, Mallig, Isabela. The
land is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44422 under the
name of Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose Sr.) who acquired the subject propertyduring
his marriage with Ligaya Garcia. Ligaya died on January 21, 1987.
The marriage of Jose Sr. and Ligaya produced the following children: Nora, Jose
Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, all surnamed Garcia, who are the respondents in the
present case.
Sometime in 1989, the spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia (Spouses
Garcia) obtained a loan facility from the petitioner, Philippine National Bank
(petitioner bank), initially for P150,000.00. The loan was secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage over their property covered by TCT No. 177585. The spouses
Garcia increased their loan to P220,000.00 and eventually to P600,000.00. As
security for the increased loan, they offered their property covered by TCT No.
75324 and the subject property covered by TCT No. T-44422.

In their answer, the Spouses Garcia alleged that Jose Sr. was indebted to them
in the amount of P133,800.00. To settle this indebtedness, Jose Sr.
volunteered to give the subject property as additional security for their (the
Garcias) loan to the petitioner bank.
The petitioner bank, on the other hand, claimed that the mortgage was made
in good faith and for value, and maintained that the respondents complaint
stated no cause of action against it. It alleged that the real estate mortgage
over the properties was duly registered and inscribed on their titles and was
thus binding on the whole world.
In the course of the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy executed an
SPA dated May 31, 1996 authorizing Jose Sr. to act as their attorney-in-fact
during the pretrial of the case.
The Ruling of the RTC

Jose Sr. agreed to accommodate the spouses Garcia by offering the subject
property as additional collateral security for the latters increased loan. For this
purpose, Jose Sr. executed Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) dated April 14,
1992 and October 6, 1993, respectively, expressly authorizing the Spouses
Garcia to apply for, borrow, or secure any loan from the petitioner bank, and to
convey and transfer the subject property by way of mortgage. Jose Sr. also
executed an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the petitioner
bank. The SPAs and the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage are both
inscribed on TCT No. T-44422. All of these transactions, however, were without
the knowledge and consent of Jose Sr.s children.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. The court held
that the subject property was a conjugal property since it was acquired by Jose
Sr. during his marriage with his now deceased wife. As a conjugal property, it is
presumed that upon the death of his spouse, one-half of the property passed
on to Jose Sr., while the other half went to Jose and his children as co-owners
and as forced heirs of his deceased spouse. Without the consent of the
children, the trial court ruled that the conjugal property could only be
transferred or encumbered to the extent of Jose Sr.s share in the conjugal
partnership, plus his share as an heir in the other half pertaining to the estate
of his deceased spouse.

On maturity of the loan on April 20, 1994, the spouses Garcia failed to pay
their loan to the petitioner bank despite repeated demands.

The RTC nevertheless declared that by virtue of the SPA executed by Nora,
Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy in this suit, they are already estopped from
questioning the mortgage and from alleging lack of consent or knowledge in
the transaction. It held Jose Sr. liable as an accommodation party and upheld
the petitioner banks right to collect the debt.

On January 12, 1996, the respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for
Nullity of the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage, Damages with Preliminary
Injunction against the spouses Garcia and the petitioner bank. They claimed
that the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage was null and void as to
respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy as they were not parties to the
contract.
The respondents alleged that the subject property was a conjugal property of
Jose Sr. and his deceased spouse, Ligaya, as they acquired the subject
property during their marriage; that upon Ligayas death, Jose Sr., together
with his children Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, by law, became owners pro
indivisoof the subject property; that the petitioner bank was at fault for not
including Jose Sr. as payee to the check representing the loan despite its
knowledge that Jose Sr. was a signatory to the real estate mortgage; that the
real estate mortgage executed by Jose Sr. could not bind his children as they
did not give their consent or approval to the encumbrance; and that the real
estate mortgage was also void as to Jose Sr. since he never benefitted from the
loan.

The respondents disagreed with the RTC ruling and elevated the case to the CA
via an ordinary appeal.
cra1awredjgc

The Ruling of the CA

On September 26, 2007, the CA upheld the trial courts finding that the subject
property was conjugal, but reversed and set aside its ruling in so far as it
declared valid and binding the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage between
the petitioner bank, on one hand, and the spouses Garcia and Jose Sr., on the
other hand, with respect to respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy.
Relying on the Courts ruling in Nufable v. Nufable,4 the CA ruled that the
encumbrance Jose Sr. made over the entire conjugal property, without his
childrens conformity, was null and void because a mere part owner could not
alienate the shares of the other co-owners.

The CA also declared that the conjugal property could only be liable to the
extent of Jose Sr.s shares; Jose Sr.s acts could not affect his childrens proindiviso shares in the subject property. It disagreed with the trial courts
estoppel theory and held that their execution of the SPA should not be
construed as acquiescence to the mortgage transaction. Lastly, it ruled that
Jose Sr. could not escape liability from the mortgage since he voluntarily bound
himself as the Spouses Garcias accommodation mortgagor.
cra1awre djgc

The petition
The petitioner bank disputes the CAs finding that the subject property was
conjugal in nature. It argues that, as can be gleaned from TCT No. T-44422,
the subject property was registered in the name of Jose Sr. alone, who
was described in the title as widower and not married. The petitioner
bank posits that as a mortgagee in good faith, it had the right to rely on the
mortgagors certificate of title; in the absence of any indication that could
arouse suspicion, it had no obligation to undertake further investigation and
verify whether the property was conjugal or was acquired during marriage or
thereafter.
Since the subject property belonged to Jose Sr., insofar as petitioner bank as
mortgagee was concerned, Jose Sr. had the right under Article 428 of the Civil
Code to mortgage it without the consent of his children. Accordingly, the
mortgage in its entirety should be declared valid.
cra1awredjgc

The Comment
The respondents state that the issues raised by petitioner bank are essentially
factual; hence, they are beyond the competence of this Court in a petition for
review. They submit that in a certiorari petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, only questions of law may be entertained because the Court is not a
trier of facts.
cra1awre djgc

The Courts Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The petition before us raises both questions of fact and of law. Whether
petitioner bank is a mortgagee in good faith and for value and whether the
subject property was conjugal, are factual issues that this Court cannot look
into as our examination would entail going into factual matters and records of
the case. In Rule 45 petitions, only questions of law may be put into issue.
Questions of fact cannot be entertained.5
Although there are exceptions to the rule that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition forcertiorari, the petitioner bank failed to show that this
case falls under any of the established exceptions. Too, since the CA partially
affirmed the findings of the trial court and absent any indication that these

courts committed a serious error in its findings, this Court is bound by these
courts findings.6
Moreover, even if we were to review the factual issues raised by the petitioner
bank, we still find no reason to depart from the CAs ruling.
The Subject Property is Conjugal
a. All property acquired during marriage
is presumed conjugal
Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, their property relations were governed by the conjugal partnership of
gains as provided under Article 119 of the Civil Code. Under Article 160 of the
Civil Code, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife.
In his testimony, Jose Sr. admitted that at the time he acquired the land
through sale, he was already married. The material portion of his testimony is
as follows:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

Upon the death of your wife did you and your

wife ever own a piece of land?
Yes, sir.
Where is that land situated?
In Centro, District 2, Mallig[,] Isabela.
Is that land titled in your names?
Yes, sir.
xxxx
You and your wife acquired that piece of
land?
Yes, sir.
xxxx
May we know from you[,] Mr. Witness, how did
you acquire this parcel of land presently embraced
and covered by TCT No. T-44422?
I purchased that piece of land from the Baniqued
Family during my incumbency as Municipal Mayor,
sir.
What was your civil status at the time you
purchased that piece of land?

A:

I was already married, sir. (Emphasis ours,

TSN, July 24, 1997, Jose Garcia Sr.)7

Because of the petitioner banks failure to rebut the allegation that the subject
property was acquired during the formers marriage to Ligaya, the legal
presumption of the conjugal nature of the property, in line with Article 160 of
the Civil Code, applies to this property. Proof of the subject propertys
acquisition during the subsistence of marriage suffices to render the statutory
presumption operative.8
b. Registration of the subject property in
the name of one spouse does not destroy
the presumption that the property is conjugal
The petitioner bank claims that the CA failed to consider that the subject
property was registered in the name of Jose Sr. alone. Likewise, it raises the
argument that Jose Sr.s change of status in the subject propertys title from
married to widower prior to the constitution of the real estate mortgage
showed that the property was no longer conjugal.
We do not consider this argument persuasive.
Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy its
conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the property was
acquired.9 The registration of the property is not conclusive evidence of the
exclusive ownership of the husband or the wife. Although the property appears
to be registered in the name of the husband, it has the inherent character of
conjugal property if it was acquired for valuable consideration during
marriage.10 It retains its conjugal nature.
In order to rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the property, the
petitioner must present strong, clear and convincing evidence of exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses.11 The burden of proving that the property
belongs exclusively to the wife or to the husband rests upon the party
asserting it.
In the present case, aside from its allegation that the subject property is no
longer conjugal and its assertion that it is a mortgagee in good faith, the
petitioner bank offered no evidence, convincing to this Court, that the subject
property exclusively belonged to Jose Sr. As stated earlier, the petitioner bank
failed to overcome the legal presumption that the disputed property was
conjugal. Thus, the conclusion of both lower courts that the subject property
was conjugal property holds. Factual findings of the CA affirming those of the
trial court are binding on this Court unless there is a clear showing that such
findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.12
The conjugal partnership was converted
into an implied ordinary co-ownership
upon the death of Ligaya

Upon the death of Ligaya on January 21, 1987, the conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved and terminated pursuant to Article 175(1) of the Civil
Code,13 and the successional rights of her heirs vest, as provided under Article
777 of the Civil Code, which states that [t]he rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary
co-ownership between the surviving spouse, on the one hand, and the heirs of
the deceased, on the other.14 This resulting ordinary co-ownership among the
heirs is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code which reads:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied)
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Under this provision, each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or share
in the co-ownership and may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it except
when personal rights are involved. Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the
co-owned property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only
to the extent of the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.15 In Carvajal v. Court of Appeals,16 the
Court said:
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the
full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and
he may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect
to the co-owners, shall be limited, by mandate of the same article, to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to sell or alienate a
concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to the
exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over the thing is
represented by an abstract or Ideal portion without any physical
adjudication.3An individual co- owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim
title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until its
actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to that time all that the
co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire
thing owned in common by all the co-owners. 4 What a co owner may dispose of
is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be limited to the portion that
may be allotted to him upon partition. [emphasis supplied].
In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject
property after the death of Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. While under Article 493 of the Civil Code, even if he had the right

to freely mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the disputed property,
he could not dispose of or mortgage the entire property without his childrens
consent. As correctly emphasized by the trial court, Jose Sr.s right in the
subject property is limited only to his share in the conjugal partnership
as well as his share as an heir on the other half of the estate which is
his deceased spouses share. Accordingly, the mortgage contract is void
insofar as it extends to the undivided shares of his children (Nora, Jose Jr.,
Bobby and Jimmy) because they did not give their consent to the transaction. 17
Accordingly, the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage constituted by Jose Sr.
over the entire property without his co-owners consent is not necessarily void
in its entirety. The right of the petitioner bank as mortgagee is limited though
only to the portion which may be allotted to Jose Sr. in the event of a division
and liquidation of the subject property.
cra1awlaw1ibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM the Decision dated

September 26, 2007of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71356. Costs
against petitioner Philippine National Bank.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur

Dr. Favis died intestate on 29 July 1995 leaving the following properties:
1. A parcel of residential land located at Bonifacio St. Brgy. 1, Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
consisting an area of 898 square meters, more or less, bounded on the north
by Salvador Rivero; on the East by Eleutera Pena; on the South by Bonifacio
St., and on the West by Carmen Giron; x x x;
2. A commercial building erected on the aforesaid parcel of land with an
assessed value ofP126,000.00; x x x;
3. A parcel of residential land located in Brgy. VII, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, containing
an area of 154 sq. ms., more or less, bounded on the North by the High School
Site; on the East by Gomez St., on the South by Domingo [G]o; and on the
West by Domingo Go; x x x;

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR. represented by their co-heirs and
Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. FAVIS and NELLY FAVISVILLAFUERTE, Petitioners, v. JUANA GONZALES, her son MARIANO G.
FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, all
minors represented herein by their parents SPS. MARIANO FAVIS and
LARCELITA D. FAVIS,Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review assailing the 10 April 2008
Decision1 and 7 January 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86497 dismissing petitioners complaint for annulment of the Deed of
Donation for failure to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise.
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina)
with whom he had seven children named Purita A. Favis, Reynaldo Favis,
Consolacion Favis-Queliza, Mariano A. Favis, Jr., Esther F. Filart, Mercedes A.
Favis, and Nelly Favis-Villafuerte. When Capitolina died in March 1944, Dr. Favis
took Juana Gonzales (Juana) as his common-law wife with whom he sired one
child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano). When Dr. Favis and Juana got married in
1974, Dr. Favis executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his
legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with
whom he has four children, named Ma. Theresa Joana D. Favis, Ma. Cristina D.
Favis, James Mark D. Favis and Ma. Thea D. Favis.

4. A house with an assessed value of P17,600.00 x x x;

5. A parcel of orchard land located in Brgy. VI, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, containing an
area of 2,257 sq. ma. (sic) more or less, bounded on the North by Lot 1208;
on the East by Mestizo River; on the South by Lot 1217 and on the West by Lot
1211-B, 1212 and 1215 x x x.3
Beginning 1992 until his death in 1995, Dr. Favis was beset by various
illnesses, such as kidney trouble, hiatal hernia, congestive heart failure,
Parkinsons disease and pneumonia. He died of "cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to multi-organ/system failure secondary to sepsis secondary to
pneumonia."4
On 16 October 1994, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation 5 transferring
and conveying properties described in (1) and (2) in favor of his grandchildren
with Juana.
Claiming that said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with
Capitolina, petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of
Donation, inventory, liquidation and partition of property before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20 against Juana, Spouses
Mariano and Larcelita and their grandchildren as respondents.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents assert that the properties
donated do not form part of the estate of the late Dr. Favis because said
donation was made inter vivos, hence petitioners have no stake over said
properties.6

The RTC, in its Pre-Trial Order, limited the issues to the validity of the deed of
donation and whether or not respondent Juana and Mariano are compulsory
heirs of Dr. Favis.7
In a Decision dated 14 November 2005, the RTC nullified the Deed of Donation
and cancelled the corresponding tax declarations. The trial court found that Dr.
Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have had full
control of his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation. Holding
that the subsequent marriage of Dr. Favis and Juana legitimated the status of
Mariano, the trial court also declared Juana and Mariano as compulsory heirs of
Dr. Favis. The dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing considerations, the Deed of Donation dated October 16, 1994 is
hereby annulled and the corresponding tax declarations issued on the basis
thereof cancelled. Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. having died without a will, his estate
would result to intestacy. Consequently, plaintiffs Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis,
Sr., namely Purita A. Favis, Reynaldo A. Favis, Consolacion F. Queliza, Mariano
A. Favis, Jr., Esther F. Filart, Mercedes A. Favis, Nelly F. Villafuerte and the
defendants Juana Gonzales now deceased and Mariano G. Favis, Jr. shall inherit
in equal shares in the estate of the late Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. which consists of
the following:
1. A parcel of residential land located at Bonifacio St. Brgy. 1, Vigan City, Ilocos
Sur, consisting an area of 89 sq. meters more or less, bounded on the north by
Salvador Rivero; on the East by Eleutera Pena; on the South by Bonifacio St.,
and on the West by Carmen Giron;
2. A commercial building erected on the aforesaid parcel of land with an
assessed value ofP126,000.00;
3. One-half (1/2) of the house located in Brgy. VI, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur[,]
containing an area of 2,257 sq. meters more or less, bounded on the north by
Lot 1208; on the east by Mestizo River; on the South by Lot 1217 and on the
West by Lot 1211-B, 1212 and 1215.
4. The accumulated rentals of the new Vigan Coliseum in the amount of One
Hundred Thirty [Thousand] (P130,000.00) pesos per annum from the death of
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr.8

Respondents interposed an appeal before the Court of Appeals challenging the

trial courts nullification, on the ground of vitiated consent, of the Deed of
Donation in favor of herein respondents. The Court of Appeals ordered the
dismissal of the petitioners nullification case. However, it did so not on the
grounds invoked by herein respondents as appellant.
The Court of Appeals motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for
failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Code.
The appellate court justified its order of dismissal by invoking its authority to
review rulings of the trial court even if they are not assigned as errors in the
appeal.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the case is not
subject to compromise as it involves future legitime.
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners contention when it ruled that the
prohibited compromise is that which is entered between the decedent while
alive and compulsory heirs. In the instant case, the appellate court observed
that while the present action is between members of the same family it does
not involve a testator and a compulsory heir. Moreover, the appellate court
pointed out that the subject properties cannot be considered as "future
legitime" but are in fact, legitime, as the instant complaint was filed after the
death of the decedent.
Undaunted by this legal setback, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the
following arguments:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals GRAVELY and SERIOUSLY ERRED in
DISMISSING the COMPLAINT.
2. Contrary to the finding of the Honorable Court of Appeals, the verification of
the complaint or petition is not a mandatory requirement.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously failed to appreciate that the filing
of an intervention by Edward Favis had placed the case beyond the scope of
Article 151 of the Family Code.
4. Even assuming arguendo without admitting that the filing of intervention by
Edward Favis had no positive effect to the complaint filed by petitioners, it is
still a serious error for the Honorable Court of Appeals to utterly disregard the

fact that petitioners had substantially complied with the requirements of Article
151 of the Family Code.

xxx
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

5. Assuming arguendo that petitioners cannot be construed as complying

substantially with Article 151 of the Family Code, still, the same should be
considered as a non-issue considering that private respondents are in estoppel.
6. The dismissal of the complaint by the Honorable Court of Appeals amounts
to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction and a
complete defiance of the doctrine of primacy of substantive justice over strict
application of technical rules.
7. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely and seriuosly erred in not affirming
the decision of the Court a quo that the Deed of Donation is void. 9
In their Comment, respondents chose not to touch upon the merits of the case,
which is the validity of the deed of donation. Instead, respondents defended
the ruling the Court of Appeals that the complaint is dismissible for failure of
petitioners to allege in their complaint that earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been exerted.
The base issue is whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of
dismissal of the complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made. The appellate court committed
egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The appellate courts decision
hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code, viz:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is
shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise
under the Civil Code.
The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Section 1. Grounds.Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on
any of the following grounds:

The appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of

the grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished
from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with
dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. ? Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall
dismiss the claim.
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu
proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (b) litis pendentia ; (c) res judicata ; and (d) prescription of
action.10 Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin,11 cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr.,12 the
Court held:
x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to
instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action
for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or
with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio
dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard.
Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17,
of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu
proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on
record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is
another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause,
or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x
x x.13
The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if the consideration of the
issue is kept within the confines of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and
Section 1 of Rule 9. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been

complied with, a ground for a motion to dismiss emanating from the law that
no suit between members from the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made but had failed, is, as the Rule so words, a ground for a motion
to dismiss. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed
"within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim." The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to
dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so
inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule,
namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia ; res
judicata ; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that
earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the
exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived.

To illustrate, Tamayo v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.,17 allowed an amendment

which " merely corrected a defect in the allegation of plaintiff-appellants cause
of action, because as it then stood, the original complaint stated no cause of
action." We there ruled out as inapplicable the holding in Campos Rueda
Corporation v. Bautista,18 that an amendment cannot be made so as to confer
jurisdiction on the court x x x. (Italics supplied).

It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas14 cited in P.L. Uy Realty

Corporation v. ALS Management and Development Corporation 15 where we
noted that the second sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 does not only supply
exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases
motu propio on any of the enumerated grounds. The tenor of the second
sentence of the Rule is that the allowance of a motu propio dismissal can
proceed only from the exemption from the rule on waiver; which is but logical
because there can be no ruling on a waived ground.

x x x The defect may however be waived by failing to make seasonable

objection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere procedural
imperfection which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. 20 (Underscoring
supplied).

Why the objection of failure to allege a failed attempt at a compromise in a suit

among members of the same family is waivable was earlier explained in the
case of Versoza v. Versoza,16 a case for future support which was dismissed by
the trial court upon the ground that there was no such allegation of
infringement of Article 222 of the Civil Code, the origin of Article 151 of the
Family Code. While the Court ruled that a complaint for future support cannot
be the subject of a compromise and as such the absence of the required
allegation in the complaint cannot be a ground for objection against the suit,
the decision went on to state thus:
The alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state a cause of
action. The proposed amendment seeks to complete it. An amendment to the
effect that the requirements of Article 222 have been complied with does not
confer jurisdiction upon the lower court. With or without this amendment, the
subject-matter of the action remains as one for support, custody of children,
and damages, cognizable by the court below.

Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a
compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a
jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action.
Versoza was cited in a later case as an instance analogous to one where the
conciliation process at the barangay level was not priorly resorted to. Both
were described as a "condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in
Court."19 In such instances, the consequence is precisely what is stated in the
present Rule. Thus:

In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course.
The complaint of petitioners was answered by respondents without a prior
motion to dismiss having been filed. The decision in favor of the petitioners
was appealed by respondents on the basis of the alleged error in the ruling on
the merits, no mention having been made about any defect in the statement of
a cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on
the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial court;
neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent
brought before the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or
objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as partiesdefendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioners
complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on
earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not
have any authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioners
complaint.
Indeed, even if we go by the reason behind Article 151 of the Family Code,
which provision as then Article 222 of the New Civil Code was described as
"having been given more teeth"21 by Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rule of Court,

it is safe to say that the purpose of making sure that there is no longer any
possibility of a compromise, has been served. As cited in commentaries on
Article 151 of the Family Code
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sudden and more
tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is
necessary that every effort should be made towards a compromise before a
litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a
lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between
strangers.22
The facts of the case show that compromise was never an option insofar as the
respondents were concerned. The impossibility of compromise instead of
litigation was shown not alone by the absence of a motion to dismiss but on
the respondents insistence on the validity of the donation in their favor of the
subject properties. Nor could it have been otherwise because the Pre-trial
Order specifically limited the issues to the validity of the deed and whether or
not respondent Juana and Mariano are compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis.
Respondents not only confined their arguments within the pre-trial order; after
losing their case, their appeal was based on the proposition that it was error
for the trial court to have relied on the ground of vitiated consent on the part
of Dr. Favis.
The Court of Appeals ignored the facts of the case that clearly demonstrated
the refusal by the respondents to compromise. Instead it ordered the dismissal
of petitioners complaint on the ground that it did not allege what in fact was
shown during the trial. The error of the Court of Appeals is patent.
Unfortunately for respondents, they relied completely on the erroneous ruling
of the Court of Appeals even when petitioners came to us for review not just on
the basis of such defective motu propio action but also on the proposition that
the trial court correctly found that the donation in question is flawed because
of vitiated consent. Respondents did not answer this argument. The trial court
stated that the facts are:
x x x To determine the intrinsic validity of the deed of donation subject of the
action for annulment, the mental state/condition of the donor Dr. Mariano
Favis, Sr. at the time of its execution must be taken into account. Factors such
as his age, health and environment among others should be considered. As
testified to by Dr. Mercedes Favis, corroborated by Dr. Edgardo Alday and Dra.
Ofelia Adapon, who were all presented as expert witnesses, Dr. Mariano Favis,
Sr. had long been suffering from Hiatal Hernia and Parkinsons disease and had

been taking medications for years. That a person with Parkinsons disease for a
long time may not have a good functioning brain because in the later stage of
the disease, 1/3 of death develop from this kind of disease, and or dementia.
With respect to Hiatal Hernia, this is a state wherein organs in the abdominal
cavity would go up to the chest cavity, thereby occupying the space for the
lungs causing the lungs to be compromised. Once the lungs are affected, there
is less oxygenation to the brain. The Hernia would cause the heart not to pump
enough oxygen to the brain and the effect would be chronic, meaning, longer
lack of oxygenation to the brain will make a person not in full control of his
faculties. Dr. Alday further testified that during his stay with the house of Dr.
Mariano Favis, Sr. (1992-1994), he noticed that the latter when he goes up and
down the stairs will stop after few seconds, and he called this pulmonary
cripplea very advanced stage wherein the lungs not only one lung, but both
lungs are compromised. That at the time he operated on the deceased, the left
and right lung were functioning but the left lung is practically not even five
(5%) percent functioning since it was occupied by abdominal organ. x x x.
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. during the execution of the Deed of Donation was already
92 years old; living with the defendants and those years from 1993 to 1995
were the critical years when he was sick most of the time. In short, hes
dependent on the care of his housemates particularly the members of his
family. It is the contention of the defendants though that Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr.
had full control of his mind during the execution of the Deed of Donation
because at that time, he could go on with the regular way of life or could
perform his daily routine without the aid of anybody like taking a bath, eating
his meals, reading the newspaper, watching television, go to the church on
Sundays, walking down the plaza to exercise and most importantly go to the
cockpit arena and bet. Dr. Ofelia Adapon, a neurology expert however, testified
that a person suffering from Parkinsons disease when he goes to the cockpit
does not necessarily mean that such person has in full control of his mental
faculties because anyone, even a retarded person, a person who has not
studied and have no intellect can go to the cockpit and bet. One can do
everything but do not have control of his mind. x x x That Hiatal Hernia creeps
in very insidiously, one is not sure especially if the person has not complained
and no examination was done. It could be there for the last time and no one
will know. x x x.
The Deed of Donation in favor of the defendants Ma. Theresa, Joana D. Favis,
Maria Cristina D. Favis, James Mark D. Favis and Maria Thea D. Favis, all of
whom are the children of Mariano G. Favis, Jr. was executed on [16 October]
1994, seven (7) months after Dra. Mercedes Favis left the house of Dr. Favis,
Sr. at Bonifacio St., Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, where she resided with the latter
and the defendants.

Putting together the circumstances mentioned, that at the time of the

execution of the Deed of Donation, Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. was already at an
advanced age of 92, afflicted with different illnesses like Hiatal hernia,
Parkinsons disease and pneumonia, to name few, which illnesses had the
effects of impairing his brain or mental faculties and the deed being executed
only when Dra. Mercedes Favis had already left his fathers residence when Dr.
Mariano Favis, Sr. could have done so earlier or even in the presence of Dra.
Mercedes Favis, at the time he executed the Deed of Donation was not in full
control of his mental faculties. That although age of senility varies from one
person to another, to reach the age of 92 with all those medications and
treatment one have received for those illnesses, yet claim that his mind
remains unimpaired, would be unusual. The fact that the Deed of Donation was
only executed after Dra. Mercedes Favis left his father's house necessarily
indicates that they don't want the same to be known by the first family, which
is an indicia of bad faith on the part of the defendant, who at that time had
influence over the donor.23
The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The
respondents opted to rely only on what the appellate court considered,
erroneously though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial court's factual finding,
therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents did not provide us with any
argument to have it reversed.
The issue of the validity of donation was fully litigated and discussed by the
trial court. Indeed, the trial court's findings were placed at issue before the
Court of Appeals but the appellate court chose to confine its review to the
procedural aspect. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, even if it dealt only

with procedure, is deemed to have covered all issues including the correctness
of the factual findings of the trial court. Moreover, remanding the case to the
Court of Appeals would only constitute unwarranted delay in the final
disposition of the case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION