Valderrama vs, North Negros Sugar

CATALINO VALDERRAMA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO., INC.,defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-23810
December 18, 1925
Ponente: VILLAMOR, J.
Facts:
Several hacienda owners Manapla, Occidental Negros entered into a
contract with Osorio, known as milling contract, wherein Osorio agreed
to install in Manapla a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons,
for grinding and milling all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda
owners, who in turn bound themselves to furnish the central with all the
cane they might produce in their estates for 30 years from the execution
of the contract, all in accordance with the conditions specified therein.
Later on, the defendant North Negros Sugar acquired the rights and
interest of Osorio in the milling contract aforesaid. Thereafter,
Valderrama (case No. 23810) and the following month of the same year,
Rodriguez (case No. 23811) and Urra, Huarte and Auzmendi (case No.
23812) made with the appellant other milling contracts identical with
the first one, with some new conditions. Thereafter transferred to
Auzmendi, and the latter to Echarri, their interest in the milling contract
executed by them.

to run across the estates of the plaintiffs for the purpose of transporting
sugar cane of any agriculturist of Cadiz, Occidental Negros.
The defendant admitted some allegations thereof and denying others. It
alleged that the plaintiffs respectively granted the defendant, for the
period of 50 years from the date of the aforesaid contracts, an easement
of way 7meters wide upon the lands of the plaintiffs for the construction
and operation of a railroad for the transportation of sugar cane; that said
easement of way was established without any restriction whatsoever, as
regards the ownership of the cane to be transported over the said
railroad; that said contract was then in full force and effect and had
never been annulled or modified.
The trial court entered one single judgment for all of them, holding that
the defendant had no right to pass through the lands of the plaintiffs for
the transportation of sugar cane not grown from any of the haciendas of
the plaintiffs. From this judgment, the defendant appealed.
Issue:
Whether the defendant has the right to an easement of 7meters wide
upon the lands of the plaintiffs as stipulated in the milling contract.
Held:
Yes.

In view of the fact that the haciendaowners, who were up to that time
customers of the central, could not furnish sufficient cane for milling, as
required by the capacity of said central, the defendant made other
milling contracts with various hacienda owners in order to obtain
sufficient cane to sustain the central; and this gave rise to the plaintiffs
filing their complaint, alleging that the easement of way, which each of
them has established in his respective hacienda, was only for the
transportation through each hacienda of the sugar cane of the owner
thereof, while the defendant maintains that it had the right to transport
to its central upon the railroad passing through the haciendas of the
plaintiffs, not only the sugar cane harvested in said haciendas, but also
that of the hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros.

Court Ratio:
The object of such a milling contract, from which arises the easement in
question, is undoubtedly to obtain mutual benefit to the procedures of
sugar cane and the corporation putting up the central. It is only by
taking this principal idea into account that it may be conceived why the
parties had come to an agreement to assume such obligation as are set
forth in the milling contract. But the contract could not produce any
benefit to the parties, if the explanation given by the plaintiffs would be
admitted, as to their intention in creating the aforesaid easement of way
upon their respective haciendas, that it was only in favor of their
respective haciendas. Such an explanation is inadmissible because it is
contrary to the object of the milling contract. It is against the nature of
the easement to pretend that it was established in favor of the servient
estates, because it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by
reason of ownership and not by reason of easement.

The plaintiffs, in separate complaints, prayed the CFI of Occidental

Negros to pronounce judgment, holding that the defendant had no right,
under the easement or otherwise, to cause its locomotives and wagons

This is a case of an easement for the benefit of a corporation, voluntarily

created by the plaintiffs upon their respective estates for the
construction of a railroad connecting said estates with the central of the

defendant. Once the road is constructed, the easement is apparent

because it is continuously exposed to view by the rails which reveal the
use and enjoyment of said easement. It is evident, as above stated, that
the cane of the plaintiffs if to be transported to the central by means of
wagons passing upon the railroad; but as the easement was created for
the benefit of the corporation, owner of the central, it may cause its
wagons to pass upon the road as many times as it may deem fit,
according to the needs of the central. If the plaintiffs do not produce
sufficient cane to cover the capacity of the central, it would be unjust to
impose upon the defendant corporation the burden of maintaining a
central, prohibiting it to obtain from another source sufficient cane with
which to maintain its business; this is specially true here, because in the
milling contract with the plaintiffs, there is nothing to prohibit the
defendant from making milling contracts with other planters, and obtain
in that way all cane necessary to cover the capacity of the central.
SC Ruling:
For the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in
finding that the appellant could not transport on its railroad passing
through the haciendas of the appellees, where it has an easement of
way established in its favor, the cane grown in the haciendas of the
procedures of Cadiz, Occidental Negros, to be milled in the central of the
appellant. And, therefore, the judgment appealed from must be reversed
and the appellant absolved, as it is hereby absolved, from the complaint,
without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

ESTER JAVELLANA, ROLANDO DEMAFILES, CESAR CRUZADA and

ANTONIO SISON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 4th CIVIL CASES
DIVISION, MARSAL & CO., INC., and MARCELINO FLORETE, SR.,
respondents.
G.R. No. 72837
April 17, 1989
PARAS, J.:
NATURE OF THE CASE
Petition for certiorari to review the Decision 1 dated August 14,1985
promulgated by respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. C.V.
No. 03781 which set aside the decision 2 rendered by the Regional Trial
Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, Iloilo City, dated December 15,
1983 in Civil Case No. 12791.
BRIEF OF THE CASE
The case at bar arose from a complaint for recovery of damages filed by
Marsal & Co., Inc. and Marcelino Florete, Sr. (private respondents herein)
against defendants Jose C. Hernani, Ester J. Javellana, Rolando
Demafiles, Cesar Crusada and Antonio Sison for allegedly denying
plaintiffs' access to, and use of a canal leading to plaintiffs' property and
to enjoin the City Mayor and City Engineer of Iloilo City from demolishing
the existing structures within plaintiffs property serving as dike entrance
gate to said canal situated at Barangay Navais, Mandurriao, Iloilo City.
Before the pre-trial conference the complaint as against the City Mayor
and City Engineer, was dismissed at the instance of plaintiffs on the
ground that said defendants had agreed not to demolish the pendency
of the action.
FACTS
Plaintiff Marsal & Co., Inc., is presently the owner of the parcel of
land adjoining the Iloilo River up to and adjacent the lot where

the L. Borres Elementary School is located at Barangay Navais

Mandurriao, Iloilo;
In 1961, when Marcelino Florete, Sr. was still the owner of said
Marsal property having acquired the same by purchase from its
former owners sometime in 1959, there existed a main canal
from the Iloilo River cutting across said property towards the lot
where the said school is located and thru a canal that traverses
the school premises going towards Lot 2344;
Before 1971, there were no houses standing within the school
compound and premises of L. Borres Elementary School;
At present, there are 15 to 16 houses in the said school
compound one of which is the house of the barangay captain of
Barangay Navais
Sometime in July 1978, plaintiffs closed the dike entrance of the
main canal to the canal running across the L. Borres Elementary
School premises to Lot 2344;
On petition of school P.T.A. officials of Barangay Navais, an ocular
inspection of the premises was made as a result of which a report
dated November 7, 1978 was prepared and submitted by 2nd
Asst. City Fiscal Serafin Abogado;
The plaintiffs had demolished the dike connecting the main canal
in plaintiffs' property with the canal running thru the school
premises toward 2344.

ISSUES
Whether or not an easement or servitude of water-right-of-way was
constituted on the property of the plaintiffs as servient estate in favor of
the L. Borres Elementary School land and nearby lands as dominant
estates.
COURTS RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The Court finds from the evidence that the main canal had been in
existence long before defendant Marcelino Florete, Sr. acquired
ownership of the land thru which the same passes from the Iloilo River
up to the premises of what is now known as the L. Borres Elementary
School. This fact was clearly brought to light by the testimonies of at
least three witnesses, including a member of the Maranon family from
whom Florete, Sr. acquired the land, in addition to the testimony of
defendant Antonio Sison, Barangay Captain of Barangay Navais where
the subject canal is situated. The Court, indeed, finds no reason to doubt
the testimonies of these witnesses not only because they ring true
throughout but also because the same emanate from reliable sources
who had been actual residents of the place, having had occasions to
take their bath in the same canal and with separate individual

experiences incident thereto to relate. As heretofore stated, the main

canal had long been in existence even before plaintiff Marcelino Florete
Sr. acquired ownership of the fishpond of the Maranons thru which the
same passes. This canal served as passage of salt water from Iloilo River
to the school fishpond and at the same time, as outlet and drainage
canal or channel of rainwater from the school premises and adjacent
lands that empties to the Iloilo River. An easement or servitude of
water-right of way had thus been constituted on the property of
the plaintiffs as the servient estate in favor of the L. Borres
Elementary School land and the nearby lands as the dominant
estates.
Even on the assumption that it was plaintiff Florete Sr. who constructed
the subject canal in 1961, an easement or servitude of water-right-ofway had nonetheless been constituted on subject property because
since then the same had been in continuous use for no less than fifteen
(15) years by the school fishpond as well as by the adjacent lands. A
positive easement (Art 616, New Civil Code) had thereby been created
and plaintiffs have no right to terminate it unilaterally without violating
Art. 629 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 629: The owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in any manner
whatsoever, the use of the servitude. Nevertheless, if by reason of the
place originally assigned or of the manner established for the use of the
easement, the same should become very inconvenient to the owner of
the servient estate, or should prevent him from making any important
works, repairs or improvements thereon, it may be charged at his
expense, provided he offers another place or manner equally
convenient and in such a way that no injury is caused thereby to the
owner of the dominant estate or to those who may have a right to the
use of the easement.
Plaintiffs, however, did not recognize, much less, follow the abovequoted law on easement. They closed the entrance of the canal and
demolished portions of the main dike thus impairing the use of the
servitude by the dominant estate. And by so doing, plaintiffs violated not
only the law on easement but also Presidential Degree No. 296
which enjoins any person, natural or juridical, to demolish
structures or improvements which tend to obstruct the flow of
water through rivers, creeks, esteros and drainage channels.
For this canal did not serve merely to supply salt water to the school
fishpond but also serves as drainage charged or channel of rainwater
from adjacent lands to the Iloilo River. Before the canal was closed, the

residents had not experienced any flood in the area or in the school
premises. It was only after the canal was closed by plaintiffs on July 25,
1978, that the residents began to experience flood in the school
premises particularly in the month of August every year thereafter when
rainy season comes. Rainwater from adjoining areas accumulate at the
school premises without any chance of going out. Flood waters remain
stagnant for days and became filthy and veritable breeding place of
mosquitoes.
Plaintiffs claimed that they closed the canal because the residents of the
place threw waste matter and garbage into the canal and so the waters
therein were dirtied and rendered totally unsanitary for human use,
particularly for salt-making. But this claim was belied by defendants'
showing that what motivated plaintiffs to close the canal was the fact
that the residents engaged in salt-making using plastic bags and thus,
somehow, competed with plaintiffs in the production of salt in the area.
At any rate, regardless of what motivated plaintiffs into closing the
canal, the fact is that plaintiffs act ran roughshod over the aforequoted
provisions of law on easement and transgressed Presidential Decree No.
296.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the
respondent appellate court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 12791 is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

EDUARDO C TAEDO, Petitioner, vs. HON. JUANITO BERNARD

G.R. No L66580 August 30, 1988
Extinguishment of Easement
An easement continues by operation of law. Alienation of the D and S
estates to different persons is not a ground for extinguishment of
easements absent a statement extinguishing it.
FACTS:

Antonio Cardenas (resp) is the original owner of 2 parcels of land (7501A and 7501-B). He constructed an apartment bldg in Lot A and in Lot B
he constructed an apartment, house, bodega and a septic tank for
common use of the occupants of the two lots.
Cardenas sold Lot A and mortgaged Lot B to Eduardo Taedo (pet). He
also agreed that should be decide to sell Lot B he would sell it to Taedo.
However, Cardenas sold Lot B to Spouses Sim (resp). Sim blocked the
sewage pipe connecting the building on Lot A to the septic tank. He also
asked Tanedo to remove that portion of his building encroaching Lot B.
Taedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages against resps.
Cardenas admitted that he had agreed to sell the lot to pet and claimed
by way of cross claim against spouses Sim that the Deed of Sale he had
executed was only intended as an equitable mortgage. RTC dismissed
the complaint and the cross claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to continue to use the septic tank ceased upon
the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners.
RULING: NO
The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons
is not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On the
contrary, use of the easement is continued by operation of law as
provided in Art 624 because no abolishment or extinguishment was
provided in the deed of absolute sale. Nor did Cardenas stop the use of
the drain pipe and septic tanks before he sold the lots. Accordingly, the
spouses Sim cannot impair, in any manner, the use of the servitude.
Ayala de Roxas vs. City of Manila
DOCTRINE:The powers of the City administration do not extend to the
establishment of new easements upon private property but simply to
preserve old ones, whenever a recent and easily proven usurpation
exists.
CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS and PEDRO P. ROXAS, plaintiffs,
vs.

THE CITY OF MANILA and ROBERT G. DIECK, as city engineer,

defendants.

the general interest of navigation, flotation, fishing, and salvage," citing

the Law of Waters and the Civil Code.

G.R. No. L-3144

November 19, 1907
Ponente: ARELLANO, C. J.:

Issue/s of the Case:

1. Whether the City of Manila was correct in denying the application
of permit by the plaintiff.

Nature of Case:
Petition for Certiorari

Actions of the Court

SC: Overruled the defendants demurred to the amended complaint

Brief:
This is a petition for certiorari regarding the demurer entered by
Supreme Court affirming the decision of the City of Manila not to grant
license to construct a terrace to the plaintiffs.

Court Rationale on the Above Facts:

The matter at issue herein being the enforcement of the Law of Waters
and of the Civil Code, it is not out of place nor untimely, even now, to
point out the administrative law which ought to have been applied had
this act of the city of Manila been carried out by the late ayuntamiento
during the former sovereignty; an administrative law which, owing to its
having been so often repeated, is now raised to the rank of an
incontrovertible principle of law on the matter.

Facts:
On 15th of January, 1906, the plaintiff, as owner of the property situated
on the Escolta, district of Binondo, city of Manila, the eastern boundary
of which adjoins the canal of San Jacinto or Sibacon to the extent of
23.50 meters, applied to the city engineer, Robert G. Dieck, the
defendant herein, for a license to construct a terrace over "the strip of
land 3 meters in width between the main wall of her house and the edge
of the said canal of Sibacon or San Jacinto, which strip of land belongs
exclusively to her"; but the defendant refused to grant the license or
authorize the plaintiff to build the terrace.
That the plaintiff's ownership of the whole ground and of the strip in
question is beyond all doubt, both by reason of her title thereto and the
entry thereof in the registry of property, and by the acknowledgment
thereof made by the city itself when obtaining by means of
condemnation proceedings a portion of the same property adjoining the
public road.
That according to Engineer Dieck, a defendant, the purpose of the city
was to use the said strip of 3 meters as a place for discharging and
landing goods, and as a place of shelter for shipwrecked persons and for
fishermen, and to devote it also, together with other strips along the
canal, by the gradual acquisition of land, to a towpath for craft passing
through the canal.
The intention of the Municipal Board when denying the permit asked for
by the plaintiff is to subject the place the "easement of public use for

The powers of the administration do not extend to the establishment of

new easements upon private property but simply to preserve old ones,
whenever a recent and easily proven usurpation exists. Ayuntamientos
are not authorized to impose an easement upon private property;
therefore, any order thus given cannot be held to have been issued in
the exercise of their lawful powers.
The question involved here is not the actual establishment of an
easement which might be objected to by an action in court, but a mere
act of obstruction, a refusal which is beyond the powers of the city of
Manila, because it is not simply a measure in connection with building
regulations, but is an attempt to suppress, without due process of law,
real rights which are attached to the right of ownership.
Supreme Court Ruling:
Therefore, we hereby command the defendants, the city of Manila, and
Robert G. Dieck, as city engineer, or whomsoever may now be acting as
such, to immediately issue a license in favor of the plaintiff herein, Doa
Carmen Ayala de Roxas, to construct the terrace as aforesaid in
accordance with the plan and specification as per Exhibit A, the said
defendants to pay the costs of these proceedings. So ordered.

EASEMENT

Macario Solis vs. Benedicta Pujeda, G.R. No. L-16392, January 13, 1922,
En Banc

Facts:
The defendant Benedicta Pujeda is the owner of a strip of land in the
barrio of Calibuyo, municipality of Tanza, Cavite, lying along a stream
known as the estero of Calibuyo. Prior to the institution of this action the
three plaintiffs named in the caption hereof constructed a dam of stone
or concrete across said stream in order to obtain water for irrigation
purposes, and one of the wings of the dam was made to rest upon the
bank which belongs to Benedicta Pujeda. As a result of this construction,
not only were several square meters of land belonging to Benedicta
Pujeda appropriated by the plaintiffs for purposes of construction, but
several hundred additional square meters lying along the stream above
the dam and belonging to her were flooded by the rise of the water
consequent upon the building off the dam. Believing herself to be
aggrieved by this, Benedicta Pujeda, with the aid of one Roman Araas,
on or about July 20, 1918, made an opening in that portion of the dam
which abuts upon her property, to the extent necessary to free the water
that had accumulated upon her property. The perforation thus effected
in the dam was about 1 meter wide and 2 meters deep.
Thereafter the present action was instituted by the plaintiffs to restrain
Benedicta Pujeda (with whom is joined her husband Valentin Giongco)
and Roman Araas from interfering with the reparation of the dam by
the plaintiffs, and to enjoin the same defendants from molesting the
plaintiffs in the use of said dam in the future. The plaintiffs also asked
that the defendants be adjudged to pay the sum of P90 to the plaintiffs
as damages resulting from the breaking of the dam. The defendants
answered generally and interposed a counterclaim, praying that they be
absolved from the complaint and that the plaintiffs in turn be required to
remove the aforesaid dam and that they be enjoined from

reconstructing it or maintaining any other dam in that place to the

prejudice of the defendants. The defendants furthermore prayed that
the plaintiffs should be required to pay damages to the defendants in
the amount of P3,000, with costs.
In this connection it appears that when this work was first undertaken
several years ago, the plaintiffs expected to obtain the approval of the
Director of Lands for the project, and at that time they promised to
indemnify Benedicta Pujeda for any damaged caused to her by the
construction of the dam. However, after the work had progressed to a
certain extent, the Director of Lands ordered its removal. Later, the
Director of Lands proposed as a reasonable solution of the controversy
that, if the plaintiffs desired to continue with the construction of the
dam, they should within thirty days deposit with the Bureau of Lands the
sum of P371.68 to cover the damage that would probably be done to
Benedicta Pujeda. This deposit was apparently made. Still later, upon
further protest from Benedicta Pujeda, security was given by bond to the
extent of P1,000. The Director of Lands having thus, inferentially at
least, approved the project under the conditions stated, the plaintiffs
proceeded with the construction, and reliance is now placed by them
upon the authority thus granted by the Director of Lands as sufficient
justification for their continuing the work.
Issue. whether the plaintiffs have justified the invasion by them of the
rights of Benedicta Pujeda in the manner above stated for it is evident
that if the building of the dam by the plaintiffs was unauthorized, so
much of the construction as rests upon the land of Benedicta Pujeda
constitutes a private nuisance and may be lawfully demolished or
removed by her or by any person acting under her directions. It is
incumbent upon the plaintiffs to prove that they had legal authority to
build the dam.
Held.
For the purposes of this decision it may be taken for granted that the
Bureau of Lands is the proper repository of the administrative authority
conferred in said article with respect to the decreeing of the easement in
case of public waters, and the Director of Lands may be assumed to be
the proper official to conduct the investigation and make the appropriate

order. Nevertheless, the making of the investigation of record is an

essential prerequisite to the exercise of the power. This implies that the
interest parties shall have an opportunity to be heard and that record be
made of the proof adduced with reference to the proposed servitude and
the damage to result therefrom. These formalities are essential;
otherwise the decreeing of the servitude would be obnoxious to the
constitutional provision which forbids the taking of property without due
process of law. The administrative investigation contemplated in article
143 of the Law of Waters must proceed along the lines of a judicial
inquiry, at least to the extent of giving the parties an opportunity to be
heard and making record of the proof pertinent to their respective
contentions.

Under the prayer of their cross-complaint the defendants Benedicta

Pujeda, with her husband, Valentin Giongco, are entitled to an order,
which will be accordingly entered, requiring the plaintiffs within a
reasonable time to remove so much of the dam as constitutes a burden
upon the land of Benedicta Pujeda, and to the extent necessary to avoid
the flooding or her land by the obstruction of the dam. In addition to
this, judgment will be entered that the same defendants recover of the
plaintiffs the sum of P80, plus the further sum of P6.80 for each year
from April, 1915, until the obstruction mentioned shall have been
removed, as ordered. No special pronouncement will be made as to
costs of either instance. So ordered.

In the case now before us no investigation of record was made. About all
that appears to have been done was that the watermaster, as
representative of the Director of Lands, inspected the site of the dam
and recommended that it be removed, reporting that it had been a
failure. The letters referred to by the court as constituting a license from
the Director of Lands to the plaintiffs to proceed with the work, under
the conditions already stated, show a praiseworthy effort on the part of
that official to adjust the controversy upon a fair basis, but they afford
no legal warrant for the plaintiffs to proceed with the construction of the
dam.
It appears that the land owned by Benedicta Pujeda is of the class
known as friar lands; and his Honor, the trial judge, seems to have
supposed that section 19 of Act No. 1120, referring to these lands, gives
the Government special authority to construct, or to authorized another
to construct, improvements of this character upon such lands. However,
we discover nothing in said provision which, when rightly interpreted,
could be considered as conferring upon the Director of Lands any such
extraordinary power as has been here claimed.
It results that the dam in question has been constructed without legal
authority, and the action instituted by the plaintiffs cannot be
maintained. The judgment appealed from will therefore be reversed, and
the defendants will be absolved from the complaint.

G.R. No. L-57641 | October 23, 1982

ANTOLIN A. JARIOL, and PAULO S. RODRIGUEZ, In their
capacities as Joint Executors of the Estate of Humiliano
Rodriguez, deceased, petitioners vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINO JAGDON, in his Capacity as
Administrator of the Estate of Timoteo Rodriguez, et al,
respondent

Nature of Case:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in its Case No. CA-G.R. No. 47020-R. The Petition was
initially denied but upon a second Motion for Reconsideration, the
denial was reconsidered and it was given due course.
Facts
The deceased Quirino Rodriguez left four children: Humiliano,
Timoteo, Jose, all surnamed Rodriguez, and Ines Rodriguez de
Pages.
On November 25, 1951, these heirs (Jose, then deceased, being
represented by Ines Vda. de Rodriguez and his adult children
Abdulia, Dolores and Juanita), entered into an extrajudicial partition
to divide a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-345 (T-193) of the Registry of Deeds, Cebu City, in the name of
the deceased. The deed was signed by two witnesses and notarized
by Atty. Bernardo B. Solotan. In this agreement, the property was
divided into Lots "A" to "G" inclusive. Lot "F" was adjudicated to
Humiliano, and Lot "G" to Timoteo. Lot "G" has no egress to the
public roads.
On November 16, 1953, the original and copies of the Deed of
Partition were allegedly burned when the Quirino Rodriguez Building
was razed by fire.
On May 22, 1956, Timoteo died and his son, Clemente Rodriguez,
was appointed executor of the estate, but was later replaced by
Dominino Jagdon. They are two of the private respondents herein.
After Humiliano's death in 1961 or 1962, petitioners Antolin A. Jariol,
his son-in- law, and Paulo S. Rodriguez, his son, were appointed
executors of his estate.
On June 27, 1960, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, with
annotations and additions on the left and right hand margins on
page 4 and below the notarial acknowledgment on page 5, was
registered by Clemente Rodriguez, son of Timoteo, in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Cebu. The annotations are:
(a) That on the approved subdivision plan with reference to the
existing actual private lane, Lots 802-B-2-B-2-C, 802-B-2-B-2-D,
802-B-2-B-2B shall allot for the private lane three (3) meters
each on their respective sides and thence six (6) meters for lot
802-B-2-B-2-F following the existing private lane, more
particularly described at the bottom of page 5 of this document.
(b) That the contracting parties to the aforementioned extrajudicial
partition of the estate of the deceased, Quirino Rodriguez,
hereby will and bind themselves together with all the heirs,
successors, and assigns to an the provisions of the said
document.

(c) That the owners of the following lots bind themselves for their
mutual benefit a perpetual easement of right of way.
No signatures or initials of the two witnesses are found with any of
the insertions. To be noted from the partition agreement is the fact
that four heirs were to contribute for the easement of right-of-way
three (3) meters each, while Humiliano, to whom Lot "F"
appertained, was to give six meters.
Upon the contention that they had discovered the annotations only
in 1964, petitioners Antolin A. Jariol and Paulo S. Rodriguez, as joint
executors of Humiliano's estate, together with Ines Rodriguez de
Pages, filed an action with the Court of First Instance of Cebu on
March 11, 1965 against respondents Dominino Jagdon as
administrator of the estate of Timoteo Rodriguez, Clemente
Rodriguez, Dolores Rodriguez, and Ines Vda. de Rodriguez, seeking
to declare the nullity of the annotations and insertions for having
been surreptitiously and maliciously added long after the execution
of the principal document, and the cancellation of the easements of
right of way noted as encumbrances on the Certificates of Title
issued for the subdivided lots, particularly on "Lot F". It was alleged
that the initials of Humiliano and Ines Rodriguez de Pages affixed to
the insertions were forged as found by a handwriting expert; that
not all the parties to the document had affixed their initials to the
insertions; that had the annotations been made at the time of the
execution of the document, Timoteo, who was still alive, should
have signed the annotations and not his son Clemente. The
Complaint was amended three times to include other heirs either as
parties plaintiffs or parties defendants.
During the trial, petitioners presented the deposition of Ines
Rodriguez de Pages, then 81 years old, to the effect that the initials
"I.R.P. " appearing in the insertions were not her own.
Defendants-respondents, on the other hand, sustained the
genuineness and due execution of the annotations or additions and
presented their own handwriting expert. They averred that the
agreement merely confirmed the existing right of way.

ISSUE/S of the CASE:

(a) Whether or not lot G is entitled to a legal easement of right-ofway automatically attaches to lot F adjudicated to Humiliano,
as the servient estate.
(b) Whether or not the forged alterations and insertions on the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition are legally binding and are
relevant.
ACTIONS of the COURT

RTC: - It is the conclusion of this Court therefore, that the initials of Ines
Rodriguez de Pages and Humiliano Rodriguez were forged and that
Clemente Rodriguez, in initialing the said insertions or additions without
any power of attorney from Timoteo Rodriguez does not bind the latter.
Hence, the alleged agreement creating the easement is of no force and
legal effect upon the heirs of Quirino Rodriguez.
Declared the alterations or annotations complained of illegal and
unlawful and without any legal force and effect; ordered the Register of
Deeds of Cebu to cancel the easement of right of way noted as
encumbrances on the title; and finding that Clemente Rodriguez was
responsible for the "falsification of the insertions" and the "forgery" of
the initials of Humiliano and Ines Rodriguez de Pages, required
defendants therein to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages as well
as attorney's fees for having "abetted" the "wrondoing" of Clemente.
After defendants-respondents' Motion for New Trial on the ground
that the deposition of Ines R. de Pages should not have been admitted in
evidence, was denied, they appealed to the Court of Appeals.

provide the owners of the dominant estate (Lot 802-B-2-B-2-G in this

case) egress to the public road. Had the partition been the other way
around, surely appellees would want a way out to the street. Justice and
equity demand that the status quo be maintained with regards to the
easement of right-of-way.

CA: - reversed the judgment appealed from and dismissed the Third
Amended Complaint as well as all counterclaims principally on the
ground that the right-of-way involved, which was a pre-existing one,
even prior to the extra judicial partition, sprang not from any voluntary
concession but from law. Hence this petition.

2. No. The questioned insertions and annotations refer to an "existing

actual private lane." The question of legality of those insertions is linked
with the need for its continued existence and the laws on easement
cannot but have a definite bearing. The annotations did not "create" a
right-of-way, contrary to the opinion of the Trial Court. They merely
confirmed are existing one. Respondent Appellate Tribunal did not "by
judicial fiat" establish a "legal easement of right- of- way" on Lot "F". It
found that it had been pre-existing and that under the circumstances,
the laws on easement were applicable. A chapel exits in the interior
constructed by the deceased Quirino Rodriguez, who was also
responsible for giving chapel-goers access thereto from the street. 9 The
right-of-way exists for the mutual benefit of most of the heirs of Quirino
Rodriguez. As aptly stated by respondent Court "justice and equity
demand that the status quo be maintained with regards to the easement
of right of way."

SUPREME COURT RULING

1. YES. It cannot be denied that easements of right-of-way, being
discontinuous, cannot be acquired by prescription. However, a close
perusal of the subdivision plan of Lot 802-B-2-B-2 reveals that Lot 802-B2-B-2-G with an area of 1422 square meters has no access to the public
roads. Corner no. 1 of this lot is almost 80 meters from Juan Luna street
and about 73 meters from Colon Street, the latter through Lot No. 802-B2-B-2-F. Under the partition agreement, Lot 802-B-2-B-2- G appertained
to Timoteo Rodriguez and his heirs. A legal easement of right-of- way
can therefore be established in favor of the heir to which this lot went.
Section 652 of the New Civil Code reads: "Whenever a piece of land
acquired by sale, exchange or partition is surrounded by other estates of
the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, he shall be obliged to grant a rightof-way without indemnity." Section 651 explains: "The width of the
easement of right-of-way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of
the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to
time." From the foregoing discussions, it would be immaterial to delve
into whether the insertions in the extrajudicial partition are illegal and
unauthorized. The right of the dominant estate to demand a right-of-way
springs not from any voluntary concession but from law. Appellees must

In point of fact, a road right of way providing access to the public road
from "Lot G" existed long before the execution of the extrajudicial
partition even during the lifetime of Quirino Rodriguez. The Deed of
Partition merely sought to legalize and give stability to the access road
already existing. That was confirmed by the testimony of Mrs.
Casafranca. That is also the position taken by the other heirs who have
been included as defendants respondents. As a matter of law,
considering that "Lot G " has no access to the public road, the easement
is explicitly provided for in Article 652 of the Civil Code 7 , its width
being determined by the needs of the servient estate pursuant to Article
651 8 of the same law.

WHEREFORE, let this Petition for Review be, as it is, hereby denied for
lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.

Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 60968-R, promulgated on

September 7, 1982. Francisco contends that both Courts are wrong, and
asks this Court to reverse them. About the basic facts there is no
dispute.
Facts:
Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta Estate. Lot
860 was owned by Cornelia and Frisca Dila, and had a frontage along
Parada Road measuring 51.90 meters. Adjoining Lot 860 was Lot 226,
owned by Eusebio Francisco, as aforestated; it also had a frontage along
Parada Road of 62.10 meters.
Some months later, in March, 1972, after having set up a piggery on his
newly acquired property, Ramos asked for a right of way to Francisco
through the latter's land. Negotiations thereafter had however failed to
bring about a satisfactory arrangement.

Eusebio Francisco vs. IAC and Cresencio Ramos

DOCTRINE: Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to
serve as its basis for the creation of a legal or compulsory easement of
way. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not
fictitious or artificial, necessity for it.
EUSEBIO FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
respondents.

and

CRESENCIO

J.

RAMOS,

G.R. No. L-63996

September 15, 1989
Ponente: NARVASA, J.:
Nature of Case:
Petition for Certiorari
Brief:
Contested in the appellate proceedings at bar is the entitlement of
Cresencio J. Ramos, owner of Lot 860-A of the Malinta Estate, to an
easement of right of way through the land belonging to petitioner
Eusebio Francisco, Lot 266 also of the same Malinta Estate. The Court of
First Instance of Bulacan declared Ramos to be so entitled, by judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 66-V-73. That judgment was affirmed by the

Later that year, 1972, Ramos succeeded, through the intercession of

Councilor Tongco of Valenzuela, in obtaining a three-meter wide
passageway through Lot 860-B of Epifania Dila . Yet in August, 1973, he
inexplicably put up a ten-foot high concrete wall on his lot, this was in
August, 1973, and thereby closed the very right of way granted to him
across Lot 860-B. It seems that what he wished was to have a right of
passage precisely through Francisco's land, considering this to be more
convenient to him, and he did not bother to keep quiet about his
determination to bring suit, if necessary, to get what he wanted.
Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing the
barbed-wire fence on his lot along Parada Road with a stone wall, also in
August, 1973.
10 Shortly thereafter, Francisco was served with
summons and a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. 66-V-73 of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, instituted by Ramos, as well as a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction directing him to remove his stone
fence and keep his lot open for Ramos' use .
Francisco moved to dissolve the mandatory injunction. The Court
appointed a commissioner who conducted an ocular inspection of the
lots in question, Lots 860-A, 860-B and 266 and submitted a report of his
findings. On the basis of the commissioner's report, the Court issued
another Order on September 10, 1973,
----granting Ramos.
Ramos posted the required bond of P 350 (P 20 per square meter), and
Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction.

After filing his answer with counterclaim, Francisco once more moved
for the setting aside of the injunctive writs on the ground that they had
been issued in excess of the Court's jurisdiction. By Order dated
November 19, 1973, the Court dissolved the injunctions, setting aside its
Orders of August 31, and September 10, 1973. Six (6) days later,
however, the Court handed down its verdict, adversely to Francisco. The
CA affirmed the Trial Courts judgement.
Issue/s of the Case:
1. Whether the right of way instituted to Fransciscos lot was valid.
Actions of the Court
SC: Reversed CA and Trial Courts decision
Court Rationale on the Above Facts:
In Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Capital Subdivision, Inc., 22 this
Court held that a compulsory easement of way cannot be obtained
without the presence of four (4) requisites provided for in Articles 649
and 650 of the Civil Code, which the owner of the dominant tenement
must establish, to wit:

then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. The third of

the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not himself
procured the isolation of his property had not been met indeed the
respondent had actually brought about the contrary condition and
thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not do to assert
that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was diffficult or
inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide
enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been
held that mere inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of
way does not justify a claim for a similar easement in an alternative
location.
Supreme Court Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. 66-V-73 of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan is DISMISSED, the private respondent
declared without right to the easement sued for, and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued in said case is LIFTED. Costs
against the private respondent.. So ordered.

(1) That the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables

and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
(2) After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1, end);
(3) That the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; and
(4) That the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
(Art. 650).
The evidence is, therefore, persuasively to the effect that the private
respondent had been granted an adequate access to the public highway
(Parada Road) through the adjacent estate of Epifania Dila even as he
was trying to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with petitioner
Francisco for another passageway through the latter's property.
But the law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent
has done, by his own act isolate his property from a public highway and

REMIGIO O. RAMOS, SR. vs. GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC., ET AL.

G.R. No. 75905; October 12, 1987
Brief
This is a petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner assails the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 1986 which affirmed
the November 14, 1984 order of the RTC of Pasay City dismissing the
petitioners civil action for a right of way with prayer for preliminary
injunction.

FACTS
Plaintiff Ramos acquired from Science Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision a
house and lot containing an area of 901 square meters situated at Barrio
San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila. In the subdivision survey plan,
two road lots abut plaintiff's property namely lot 4133-G-12 with an area
of 2,160 square meters clearly appearing as a proposed road in the
Lombos subdivision plan and Lot 4135 of the Paraaque Cadastre now
known as Pambansa Road but more commonly referred to as Gatchalian
Avenue. Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135. Gatchalian Avenue is
alongside Lot 4135. Respondent Gatchalian Realty was granted the road
right of way and drainage along Lot 4135 to service the Gatchalian and
Asprec subdivision, by the respondent Asprecs. On April 30, 1981,
Ramos filed a complaint for an easement of a right of way with
preliminary mandatory injunction against the private respondents,
alleging, among others the that he constructed his house at 27
Gatchalian Avenue (also known as Pambansa Road), Paranaque, and has
since resided therein with his family from 1977 up to the present; that
during construction of the house, Gatchalian Realty, Inc. built a 7-8, feet
high concrete wall right in front of his premises, blocking his
entrance/exit to Gatchalian Road, the nearest being only about 100
meters, most convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the public road
or highway, the Sucat Road (now known as Dr. A. Santos Avenue,
Paraaque); that with the construction of the 7-8 feet concrete wall has
constrained plaintiff and his family to use as temporary ingress/egress
and with great inconvenience and hardship other lots belonging to
different owners, and this becomes all the more pronounced during the
rainy season due to flood and mud; and, lastly, that the aforesaid
concrete wall is dangerously leaning towards appellant's premises
posing great danger or hazard. The lower court dismissed the complaint
for insufficiency of evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that
the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of the pre-conditions in
order that he could legally be entitled to an easement of a right of way
as it affirmed the lower court's order.

Issue
Whether the plaintiff has successfully shown that all the requisites
necessary for the grant of an easement of a right of way in his favor are
present. (No)
Action of the courts

RTC dismissed
CA affirmed RTC decision
SC affirmed CA decision
Ratio
The Court finds the petition not to be impressed with merit. An
easement or servitude in an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable
for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner as
defined in Article 613 of the Civil Code. It is established either by law, in
which case it is called legal or by the will of the parties, in which event it
is a voluntary easement. Since there is no agreement between the
contending parties in this case granting a right of way by one in favor of
the other, the establishment of a voluntary easement between the
plaintiff and the respondent company and/or the other private
respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of a right of way.
A compulsory right of way can not be obtained unless the following four
requisites are first shown to exist:
(1) That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet toa public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
(2) After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, p. 1. end);
(3) That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts (Art. 649,
last par.); and
(4) That the right of way claimed is "at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest." (Art.650).
On the first requisite, the Court finds no reason to disturb the appellate
court's finding of fact that the plaintiff failed to prove the non-existence
of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian
Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case, there is a road right of
way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as
Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots. The fact
that said lot is still
undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the plaintiff when he uses it
to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the
legal requisite. The Court agree with the appellate court's observation
that the plaintiff should have, first and foremost, demanded from the
Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and

maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was

from said subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the
Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec. To allow the plaintiff access
to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue in spite of a road right of way
provided by the plaintiff's subdivision for its buyers simply because
Gatchalian Avenue allows plaintiff a much greater ease in going to and
coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what
jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years regarding
an easement of a right of way, that "mere convenience for the dominant
estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this
servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial,necessity for
it."
Considering that the plaintiff has failed to prove the existence of the first
requisite as aforestated, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the
rest of the preconditions for a legal or compulsory right of way.

Facts:
The house No.65 Calle Rosario, property of the wife of the plaintiff, has
certain windows therein, through which it receives light and air, said
windows opening on the adjacent house, No. 63 of the same street; that
these windows have been in existence since the year 1843, and that the
defendant, the tenant of the said house No. 63, has commenced certain
work with the view to raising the roof of the house in such a manner that
one-half of one of the windows in said house No. 65 has been covered,
thus depriving the building of a large part of the air and light formerly
received through the window. The court practically finds the preceding
facts, and further finds that the plaintiff has not proven that he has, by
any formal act, prohibited the owner of house No. 63 from making
improvements of any kind therein at any time prior to the complaint.
The contention of the plaintiff is that by the constant and uninterrupted
use of the windows during a period of fifty-nine years he acquired by
prescription an easement of light in favor of the house No.65, and as a
servitude upon house No.63, and, consequently, has acquired the right
to restrain the making of any improvements in the latter house which
might in any manner be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the easement.
He contends that the easement of light is positive; and that therefore
the period of possession for the purposes of the acquisition of a
prescriptive title is to begin from the date on which the enjoyment of the
same commenced, or, in other words, applying the doctrine to this case,
from the time that said windows were opened with the knowledge of the
owner of the house No.63, and without opposition on his part. However,
the defendant contends that the easement is negative, and that
therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition thereof must begin
from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may have
prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the servient estate from doing
something which would be lawful but for the existence of the easement.
The court ruled that the easement of light is negative.
Issue:

Cortes v. Yu-Tibo
GR No. 911, March 12, 1903

Whether or not the easement of light in the case of windows opened in

ones own wall is negative.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court said that the case involves windows opened in a
wall belonging to the wife of the plaintiff and it is of their opinion that
the windows opened in ones own wall is of negative character, and, as
such, can not be acquired by prescription under Art.538 of the Civil
Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which
the owner of the dominant estate may, by a formal act, have prohibited
the owner of the servient estate from doing something which it would be
lawful for him to do were it not for the easement. That, in consequence
thereof, the plaintiff, not having executed any formal act of opposition to
the right of the owner of house No.63 Calle Rosario (of which the
defendant is tenant), to make therein improvements which might
obstruct the light of house No.65 of the same street, the property of the
wife of the appellant, at any time prior to the complaint, as found by the
court below in the judgment assigned as error, he has not acquired, nor
could he acquire by prescription, such easement of light, no matter how
long a time might have elapsed since the windows were opened in the
wall of the said house no.65, because the period which the law demands
for such prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to run, the
act with which it must necessarily commence not having been
performed.
When a person open windows in his own building he does nothing more
than exercise an act of ownership inherent in the right of property with
no limitations other than those established by law. By reason of the fact
that such an act is performed wholly on a thing which is wholly the
property of the one opening the window, it does not in itself establish
any easement, because the property is used by its owner in the exercise
of dominion, and not as the exercise of an easement. It is that the use if
the windows opened in a wall on ones own property, in the absence of
some covenant or express agreement to the contrary, is regarded as an
act of mere tolerance on the part of the owner of the abutting property
and does not create any right to maintain the windows to the prejudice
of the latter. The mere toleration of such an act does not imply on the
part of the abutting owner a waiver of his right to freely build upon his
land as high as he may see fit, nor does it avail the owner of the
windows for the effects of possession according to Art.1942 of the Civil
Code, because it is a mere possession at will. From all this it follows that

the easement of light with respect to the openings made in ones own
edifice does not consist precisely in the fact of opening them or using
them. The easement really consists in prohibiting or restraining the
adjacent owner from doing anything which may tend to cut off or
interrupt the light; in short, it is limited to the obligation of not impeding
the light.

Fabie vs. Lichauco, G.R. No. L-3598, July 24, 1908

Doctrine: Respondent who claims the said easement is obliged
to prove the aforementioned gallery, in which the apparent sign
of easement is made to consist in the present case, existed at the
time of ownership of her property and that of the petitioner were
separated.
Facts:
Petitioner Fabie applied for the registration of his property in
Manila free form any encumbrances except to the easement of
right of way in favor of the respondent. In addition to the right of
way, the respondents also claim that of light and view and
drainage. However, the claim was later reduced only to that of
light and view. Lichauco claimed that when Juan Baustita Coloma,
the original owner of both estates, establish not only an easement
of right of way but also of light and view and that when both
properties are alienated, the apparent signs were not removed.
The apparent sign allegedly consists of a gallery with windows
through which light is admitted. It was supported on columns
erected on the ground belonging to the petitioner and a balcony
on Lichaucos property is supported by upright erected on the
land by petitioner. The parties admitted the existence of such
gallery. The house was now afrontage of 18 meters and 60
centimeters, of which 16 meters and 60 centimeters correspond
to the main part of the same, and 1 meter and 90 centimeters to
gallery in question. It results therefore, that at the present day,

the houses has nearly 2 meters more frontage than when it was
alienated by Coloma. Therefore, at the present day the house is
erected partly on the land belonging to the owner and partly, that
gallery, over the lot belonging to another, that is over that of the
petitioner. When it was sold on October 1848, no portion of the
house occupied that lot last mentioned, but the entire building
was erected over a lot belonging to the owner as set forth in the
instrument of the sale. The lower court held that the right of way
and drainage exist in favor of the respondents respective
properties. The claim as to the easement of light and view was
dismissed by the Court.
Issue: WON the Respondents are entitled to the easement of
light and view.
Ruling and Ratio:
NO. The burden is not on the petitioner to prove on what time the
gallery in controversy was constructed in as much as he limits
himself to sustaining and defending the freedom of his property,
denying easement of light and view of the respondent pretends to
impose over it. A property is assumed to be free from all
encumbrances unless the contrary is proved. Respondent who
claims the said easement is obliged to prove the aforementioned
gallery, in which the apparent sign of easement is made to
consist in the present case, existed at the time of ownership of
her property and that of the petitioner were separated. And in as
much as this issue has not been proven, the claim of the
respondents as to the easement of light and view which the
petitioner does not admit, must of necessity be dismissed.
Therefore, it does not appear from the agreement of the parties
that the respondent has balconies over the land of the petitioner,
and as it is, since it has not been positively shown that the said
balconies exceed the limit of the land owned by the former, nor
less that they invade the atmospheric area of the loft belonging to
the latter, it follows that, even in accordance with the theory

maintained by the respondents with which on account of its lack

of basis, we consider it unnecessary to deal hear in as to its other
aspect, the easement of view, which might result in such case
from the existence of the balconies alluded to, would be negative
and not a positive one, because the erection of the same would
not constitute, according to their statement, an invasion of the
right of another, but the lawful exercise of the right inherent to
the dominion of the respondents to construct within their own lot.
And as said easement is negative, it cannot be prescribed in favor
of the property of the respondent in the absence of any act of
opposition, according to the agreement, by which they or their
principals would have prohibited the petitioner or his principals to
do any work which obstructs the balconies in question, in as much
as the said act of opposition is what constitutes the necessary
and indispensable point of departure for computing the time
required by law for the prescription of negative easements. Thus
the judgment appealed from is affirmed intoto.

PROPERTY | EASEMENT
ART. 581. The owner of a wall which is not a party wall, adjoining
another's estate, may make in it windows or openings to admit light,
at the height of the ceiling joists or immediately under the ceiling, of
the dimensions of thirty centimeters square, and, in any case, with
an iron grate embedded in the wall and a wire screen.
ART. 582. Windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar
openings projecting over the estate of the neighbor, cannot be made
if there is not a distance of, at least, two meters between the wall in
which they are built and said estate.
G.R. L-No. 2085
August 10, 1909
TIBURCIO SAENZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.

FIGUERAS HERMANOS, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

The plaintiff Saenz and the defendant Hermanos own adjoining

lots within the municipality of Iloilo.

Hermanos had constructed or was constructing a house of strong

materials upon its lot. The line of the said house on the side
toward the lot belonging to Saenz was less than two meters from
dividing line of the two lots. The said house was of two stories.

The side of the house toward the lot of Saenz, the Hermanos
placed three windows; and in the second story had placed five
windows, each looking directly upon the lot of the Saenz.
Hermanos had not obtained the permission of the plaintiff to
place the said windows and balconies in the manner above
indicated.

ISSUE

The defendants have constructed a two-story house on their lot

at a distance of 71 centimeters from the dividing line at the front
part, and at a distance of 70 centimeters at the rear. The
defendants 3 windows on the ground floor of their house, in the
part that overlooks the lot of the plaintiff, are 1 meter and 20
centimeters wide and 2 meters high; on the upper floor there are
5 windows, each 2 meters and 11 centimeters high and 1 meter
and 60 centimeters wide; a balcony was constructed at the front
part of the house above the ground floor, opening directly upon
the lot of the plaintiff, and another balcony at the rear part of the
house, which up to the present time opens directly upon the
plaintiff's lot, although the defendants state that, according to
the plan, said part is to be closed with boards.
Saenz claims that, under articles 581 and 582 of the Civil Code,
Hermanos is prohibited from constructing his house and opening
the windows and balconies looking directly upon his property in
the manner above described, and prays that the court issue an
order directing the defendant to close said windows and that the
said defendant be prohibited perpetually from constructing
openings in its house except in conformity with said articles of
the Civil Code.

Is Hermanos entitled to the easement of light and view which the

windows and openings give him? Is Hermanos in violation of Art 581 and
582?
HELD
Lower Court
Although the windows of the house come within the prohibition
contained in article 582 of the Civil Code, Saenz is not entitled to the
judgment asked for, or for any other judgment in his favor. Therefore, it
is ordered that judgment be entered in favor of the defendant for the
recovery of the costs herein. (Signed) Henry C. Bates, judge of the
Ninth Judicial District.
Supreme Court
Defendant Hermanos is not entitled to the easement of light and view
which the windows and openings, which he was made in the house in
question, give him, and, because of the fact that he has constructed his
houses nearer than 2 meters to the dividing line between his property
and the property of the plaintiff, he is only entitled to the easement of
light and view provided for in said article 581 above quoted. Therefore,
let a judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the lower court
with costs, and directing the defendants, within a period of thirty days
from the receipt of the notice of this decision, to close the said openings
and windows, in the said house, looking directly upon the property of
the plaintiff. So ordered.
Court Rationale
Article 582 absolutely prohibits the construction of windows
with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings
projecting over adjoining property, unless there is a distance of
at least 2 meters between the wall in which they are built and
the adjoining property. The distance between the wall of the house
of the defendant and the dividing line between the two lots was only 71
centimeters. The defendant, therefore, has violated the provisions of
said article 582 by building in his house nearer the line of the property
of the plaintiff than a distance of 2 meters.

Article 581 provides the character of windows or openings in a

wall adjoining the property of another when such wall is
constructed nearer the dividing line of the two properties than
2 meters. In the present case the defendant constructed his house so
that the wall looking upon the property of the plaintiff was less than 2
meters from the dividing line. He can, therefore, only construct such
windows as are provided for in said article 581.

Mapa, J.
Nature of case:
Defendant is in possession of a parcel of land on the corner of
Calles Pescadores and P. Rada in the district of Tondo, City of
Manila, and he erected a house thereon flush with the boundary
line of the adjacent property. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, are
the owners of the land on both sides of the defendants house.
The defendant in the building of his house has made several
openings and windows in the walls of the house on both sides
overlooking the properties of the plaintiffs. At the time the
defendant was building his house and the windows and the
openings were being made, the plaintiffs protested, and later on
and in the year 1905 made written protest and demand on the
defendant, and the defendant received the written protest and
referred it to his counsel who, from evidence, appears to have
suggested an amicable and adjustment of the matter, but the
adjustment was not made. Hence, this action was brought.
Issue:
Whether the openings made in the house of the defendant
Santamaria should be closed because it directly overlook the
premises of the plaintiffs.
Ruling:
CFI: Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for closing all the windows
or openings in the walls of the defendants house which directly
overlook the premises of the plaintiffs or that in some other way
the provisions of the law be complied with so that they may
remain open.
SC: Affirmed CFIs decision with modification.

CHOCO VS. SANTAMARIA

GR No. 6076
December 29, 1911

Ratio:
It is unquestionable that Window 1 directly overlooks the
appellants lot and it is situated perpendicularly above a part of
the wall that belongs to the appellants which is a manifest
violation of the provisions of article 582 of the Civil Code which
requires that (i) windows with direct views or balconies or any
similar openings projecting over the estate of the neighbor, can
not be made if there is not a distance of at least 2 meters

between the wall in which they are built and said estate; and (ii)
neither can side nor oblique views be opened over said property,
unless there is a distance of 60 centimeters. Because of the lack
of the distance required by law, the window in question must be
closed.
With regards to windows 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 which are all
situated immediately under the ceiling of the first door and are
provided with wire screen some of them measure more and
other less than 30 centimeters square and none of them have
iron gates embedded in the wall which do not comply with
Article 581 of the Civil Code. The appellants alleged that the
option allowing defendant to keep these windows open, provided
that he brought them within the terms of the law, is illegal.
Every story has a ceiling and not, as the appellants maintain, the
upper one alone. Each floor necessarily has joists, that is, beams,
since they are what support and secure the structure of the story
immediately above, therefore it is not true that there may be
joists only in the top story, as the appellants claim by saying that

they understand to be such the long timbers to which are

fastened the boards of the ceiling at the top of the building. The
object of the law in authorizing the opening of the windows in
question in all the stories of the building, without any exception,
is clear. Their purpose is, as article 581 itself says, to furnish light
to the rooms and it is evident at a glance that the rooms of the
lower stories have as much need for light as those of the top
story. No good reason exists for having one story in better
condition than another, whichever it may be, connection with this
provision of law.