MUST READ CASES (LABOR LAW)

LABOR STANDARDS
Estrellita G. Salazar vs Philippine Duplicators, Inc, G.R. No. 154628
December 6, 2006
The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be
a sword to oppress employers. The commitment under the fundamental law
is that the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer
when the law is clearly on its side.
People of the Philippines vs. Teresita Tessie Laogo. G.R. No.
176264 January 10, 2011
Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that recruitment
activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority are
deemed illegal and punishable by law. When the illegal recruitment is
committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group, then it
is deemed committed in large scale and carries with it stiffer penalties as the
same is deemed a form of economic sabotage. But to prove illegal
recruitment, it must be shown that the accused, without being duly
authorized by law, gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the
power or ability to send them abroad for work, such that the latter were
convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. It is important
that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the
person posing as a recruiter, whether locally or abroad.
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY INC. v. CABILES, G.R. No.
170139, August 5, 2014
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,
this court ruled that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause and substantive due process.
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It
"confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all."
When a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment
of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was
already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances
have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

Sycip, Gorres, Velayo & Company vs. Carol De Raedt. G.R. No.
161366; June 16, 2009
To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, case law
has consistently applied the four-fold test, to wit: (a) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of
dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control the employee on the
means and methods by which the work is accomplished. The so-called
"control test" is the most important indicator of the presence or absence of
an employer-employee relationship.
Manila Water Company, Inc. vs. Jose J. Dalumpines. G.R. No. 175501;
October 4, 2010
It should be remembered that the control test merely calls for the existence
of the right to control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof. It is not
essential that the employer actually supervises the performance of duties of
the employee. It is enough that the former has a right to wield the power.
Macarthur Malicdem and Hermenigildo Flores vs. Marulas Industrial
Corporation. G.R. No. 204406; February 26, 2014
The test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer.
KASAMMA-CCO v. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 159828; April 19, 2006
A casual employee is only casual for one year, and it is the passage of time
that gives him a regular status.
Jose Y. Sonza vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, G.R. No.
138051, June 10, 2004
Television-radio talent is not an employee. Relationship of a big name talent
and a television-radio broadcasting company is one of an independent
contracting arrangement. ABS-CBN engaged Sonzas services specifically to
co-host the "Mel & Jay" programs. ABS-CBN did not assign any other work to
Sonza. To perform his work, Sonza only needed his skills and talent. How
Sonza delivered his lines, appeared on television, and sounded on radio were
outside ABS-CBNs control. Sonza did not have to render eight hours of work
per day. The Agreement required Sonza to attend only rehearsals and tapings
of the shows, as well as pre- and post-production staff meetings. ABS-CBN
could not dictate the contents of Sonzas script.
Gapayao v Fulo, et al., G.R. No. 193493 (2013)

Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees. The
Court has consistently held that seasonal employees may be considered as
regular employees. Regular seasonal employees are those called to work
from time to time. The nature of their relationship with the employer is such
that during the off season, they are temporarily laid off; but reemployed
during the summer season or when their services may be needed. They are
in regular employment because of the nature of their job, and not because of
the length of time they have worked.
This rule, however, is not absolute. Seasonal workers who have worked for
one season only may not be considered regular employees. Also when
seasonal employees are free to contract their services with other farm
owners, then the former are not regular employees. For regular employees to
be considered as such, the primary standard used is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity they perform and the usual trade
or business of the employer.
FVR Skills and Services Exponents, Inc. (SKILLEX), et al. v. Jovert
Seva, et al., G.R. No. 200857, October 22, 2014
For an employee to be validly categorized as a project employee, it is
necessary that the specific project or undertaking had been identified and its
period and completion date determined and made known to the employee at
the time of his engagement. This provision ensures that the employee is
completely apprised of the terms of his hiring and the corresponding rights
and obligations arising from his undertaking. Notably, the petitioner's service
contract with Robinsons was from January 1 to December 31, 2008. The
respondents were only asked to sign their employment contracts for their
deployment with Robinsons halfway through 2008, when the petitioner's
service contract was about to expire.
Under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, contracts where the consent of a party
was vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud, are
voidable or annullable. The petitioner's threat of nonpayment of the
respondents' salaries clearly amounted to intimidation. Under this situation,
and the suspect timing when these contracts were executed, we rule that
these employment contracts were voidable and were effectively questioned
when the respondents filed their illegal dismissal complaint. Respondents are
thus regular employees.
Pasos v Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No.
192394 (2013)
Project employee is deemed regularized if services are extended without
specifying duration. While for first three months, petitioner can be

considered a project employee of PNCC, his employment thereafter, when his

services were extended without any specification of as to the duration, made
him a regular employee of PNCC. And his status as a regular employee was
not affected by the fact that he was assigned to several other projects and
there were intervals in between said projects since he enjoys security of
tenure.
Alcatel Phils. vs Relos, G.R. No. 164315. July 3, 2009
However, a project or work pool employee who has been continuously
rehired by the same employer for the same tasks that are necessary to the
usual business of the employer must be deemed a regular employee.
Fuji Television Network, Inc. v Arlene S. Espiritu, G.R. No. 20494445, 03 December 2014
An employee can be a regular employee with a fixed-term contract. The law
does not preclude the possibility that a regular employee may opt to have a
fixed-term contract for valid reasons. This was recognized in Brent: For as
long as it was the employee who requested, or bargained, that the contract
have a definite date of termination, or that the fixed-term contract be
freely entered into by the employer and the employee, then the validity of
the fixed-term contract will be upheld.
GMA Network, Inc. v Pabriga, et al., G.R. No. 176419 (2013)
Petitioners allegation that respondents were merely substitutes or what they
call pinch-hitters (which means that they were employed to take the place of
regular employees of petitioner who were absent or on leave) does not
change the fact that their jobs cannot be considered projects within the
purview of the law. Every industry, even public offices, has to deal with
securing substitutes for employees who are absent or on leave. Such tasks,
whether performed by the usual employee or by a substitute, cannot be
considered separate and distinct from the other undertakings of the
company. While it is managements prerogative to device a method to deal
with this issue, such prerogative is not absolute and is limited to systems
wherein employees are not ingeniously and methodically deprived of their
constitutionally protected right to security of tenure.
Avelino Lambo vs NLRC. G.R. No. 111042 October 26, 1999
There is no dispute that petitioners were employees of private respondents
although they were paid not on the basis of time spent on the job but
according to the quantity and the quality of work produced by them. There
are two categories of employees paid by results: (1) those whose time and
performance are supervised by the employer. (Here, there is an element of

control and supervision over the manner as to how the work is to be

performed. A piece-rate worker belongs to this category especially if he
performs his work in the company premises.); and (2) those whose time and
performance are unsupervised. (Here, the employers control is over the
result of the work. Workers on pakyao and takay basis belong to this group.)
Both classes of workers are paid per unit accomplished. Piece-rate payment
is generally practiced in garment factories where work is done in the
company premises, while payment on pakyao and takay basis is commonly
observed in the agricultural industry, such as in sugar plantations where the
work is performed in bulk or in volumes difficult to quantify. Petitioners
belong to the first category, i.e., supervised employees.
PCL Shipping Philippine, Inc. and U-Ming Marine Transport
Corporation, vs NLRC. G.R. No. 153031,December 14, 2006
With respect, however, to the award of overtime pay, the correct criterion in
determining whether or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not
whether they were on board and cannot leave ship beyond the regular eight
working hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess of
said number of hours. In the present case, the Court finds that private
respondent is not entitled to overtime pay because he failed to present any
evidence to prove that he rendered service in excess of the regular eight
working hours a day.
Bisig Manggawa sa Tryco, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 151309
October 15, 2008
D.O. No. 21 sanctions the waiver of overtime pay in consideration of the
benefits that the employees will derive from the adoption of a compressed
workweek
scheme,
thus:
The compressed workweek scheme was originally conceived for
establishments wishing to save on energy costs, promote greater work
efficiency and lower the rate of employee absenteeism, among others.
Workers favor the scheme considering that it would mean savings on the
increasing cost of transportation fares for at least one (1) day a week;
savings on meal and snack expenses; longer weekends, or an additional 52
off-days a year, that can be devoted to rest, leisure, family responsibilities,
studies and other personal matters, and that it will spare them for at least
another day in a week from certain inconveniences that are the normal
incidents of employment, such as commuting to and from the workplace,
travel time spent, exposure to dust and motor vehicle fumes, dressing up for
work, etc. Thus, under this scheme, the generally observed workweek of six
(6) days is shortened to five (5) days but prolonging the working hours from
Monday to Friday without the employer being obliged for pay overtime
premium compensation for work performed in excess of eight (8) hours on
weekdays, in exchange for the benefits abovecited that will accrue to the

employees. Moreover, the adoption of a compressed workweek scheme in

the company will help temper any inconvenience that will be caused the
petitioners by their transfer to a farther workplace.
Rosario A. Gaa vs CA G.R. No. L-44169 Dec. 3, 1985
The term "wages" differs from the term "salary." Wages apply to
compensation for manual labor, skilled or unskilled, paid at stated times and
measured by the day, week, month or season; while salary denotes a higher
grade of employment or a superior grade of services and implies a position
or office. By contrast, the term "wages" indicates a considerable pay for a
lower and less responsible character of employment, while "salary" is
suggestive of a larger and more important service
The distinction between salary and wage in Gaa vs CA was only for the
purpose of Art. 1708 of the Civil Code which provides that "the laborers'
wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment except for debts
incurred for food, shelter, clothing, and medical attendance.
Our Haus Realty Development Corporation v. Alexander Parian, et
al., G.R. No. 204651, 06 August 2014
The benefit or privilege given to the employee which constitutes an extra
remuneration above and over his basic or ordinary earning or wage is
supplement; and when said benefit or privilege is part of the laborers' basic
wages, it is a facility. The distinction lies not so much in the kind of benefit or
item (food, lodging, bonus or sick leave) given, but in the purpose for which
it is given. In the case at bench, the items provided were given freely by SLL
for the purpose of maintaining the efficiency and health of its workers while
they were working at their respective projects.
Ultimately, the real difference lies not on the kind of the benefit but on the
purpose why it was given by the employer. If it is primarily for the
employees gain, then the benefit is a facility; if its provision is mainly for the
employers advantage, then it is a supplement. Again, this is to ensure that
employees are protected in circumstances where the employer designates a
benefit as deductible from the wages even though it clearly works to the
employers greater convenience or advantage.
Under the purpose test, substantial consideration must be given to the
nature of the employers business in relation to the character or type of work
performed by the employees involved.
Bluer Than Blue Joint Ventures Company v Glyza Esteban, G.R. No.
192582, 7 April 2014

The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, meanwhile, provides:

SECTION 14. Deduction for loss or damage. - Where the employer is
engaged in a trade, occupation or business where the practice of
making deductions or requiring deposits is recognized to answer for
the reimbursement of loss or damage to tools, materials, or
equipment supplied by the employer to the employee, the employer
may make wage deductions or require the employees to make
deposits from which deductions shall be made, subject to the
following conditions:
(a) That the employee concerned is clearly shown to be responsible
for the loss or damage;
(b) That the employee is given reasonable opportunity to show
cause why deduction should not be made;
(c) That the amount of such deduction is fair and reasonable and
shall not exceed the actual loss or damage; and
(d) That the deduction from the wages of the employee does not
exceed 20 percent of the employee's wages in a week.
Petitioner failed to sufficiently establish that Esteban was responsible for the
negative variance it had in its sales for the year 2005 to 2006 and that
Esteban was given the opportunity to show cause why the deduction from
her last salary should not be made. The Court cannot accept the petitioners
statement that it is the practice in the retail industry to deduct variances
from an employees salary, without more.
Lilia P. Labadan vs. Forest Hills Academy. G.R. No. 172295 December
23, 2008
Respecting petitioners claim for holiday pay, Forest Hills contends that
petitioner failed to prove that she actually worked during specific holidays.
Article
94
of
the
Labor
Code
provides,
however,
that
(a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays,
except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten
(10) workers; (b) The employer may require an employee to work on any
holiday but such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice
his
regular
rate.
The provision that a worker is entitled to twice his regular rate if he is
required to work on a holiday implies that the provision entitling a worker to
his regular rate on holidays applies even if he does not work.
BPI Employees union-Davao City-FUBU v Bank of the Philippine
Islands, et al., G.R. No. 174912 (2013)
Contracting out of services is not illegal per se. It is an exercise of business
judgment or management prerogative. Absent proof that the management

acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise of judgment by an employer. BPIs policy of contracting out
cashiering and bookkeeping services was considered as a valid exercise of
management prerogative which is further authorized by the Central Bank in
CBP Circular No. 1388, Series of 199.
Central Azucarera De Tarlac vs. Central Azucarera De Tarlac Labor
Union-NLU. G.R. No. 188949, July 26, 2010
Article 100 of the Labor Code, otherwise known as the Non-Diminution Rule,
mandates that benefits given to employees cannot be taken back or reduced
unilaterally by the employer because the benefit has become part of the
employment contract, written or unwritten. The rule against diminution of
benefits applies if it is shown that the grant of the benefit is based on an
express policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time and
that the practice is consistent and deliberate. Nevertheless, the rule will not
apply if the practice is due to error in the construction or application of a
doubtful or difficult question of law. But even in cases of error, it should be
shown that the correction is done soon after discovery of the error.
Netlink Computer Incorporated v Eric Delmo, G.R. No. 160827, 18
June 2014
With regard to the length of time the company practice should have been
observed to constitute a voluntary employer practice that cannot be
unilaterally reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the
employer, we find that jurisprudence has not laid down any rule requiring a
specific minimum number of years. In Davao Fruits Corporation v. Associated
Labor Unions, the company practice lasted for six years. In Davao Integrated
Port Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez, the employer, for three years and
nine months, approved the commutation to cash of the unenjoyed portion of
the sick leave with pay benefits of its intermittent workers. In Tiangco v.
Leogardo, Jr., the employer carried on the practice of giving a fixed monthly
emergency allowance from November 1976 to February 1980, or three years
and four months. In Sevilla Trading Company v. Semana, the employer kept
the practice of including non-basic benefits such as paid leaves for unused
sick leave and vacation in the computation of their 13th-month pay for at
least two years.
With the payment of US dollar commissions having ripened into a company
practice, there is no way that the commissions due to Delmo were to be paid
in US dollars or their equivalent in Philippine currency determined at the time
of the sales. To rule otherwise would be to cause an unjust diminution of the
commissions due and owing to Delmo.

Bankard Employees Union-Workers Alliance Trade Unions vs NLRC.

G.R. No. 140689 February 17, 2004
Even assuming that there is a decrease in the wage gap between the pay of
the old employees and the newly hired employees, to Our mind said gap is
not significant as to obliterate or result in severe contraction of the
intentional quantitative differences in the salary rates between the employee
group. As already stated, the classification under the wage structure is based
on the rank of an employee, not on seniority. For this reason, ,wage distortion
does not appear to exist.
Rogelio Reyes vs NLRC. G.R. No. 160233, August 8, 2007
Under the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851, the
following compensations are deemed not part of the basic salary:
a) Cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree 525 and
Letter
of
Instruction
No.
174;
b)
Profit
sharing
payments;
c) All allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or
integrated as part of the regular basic salary of the employee at the time of
the promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975.
Producers Bank v. NLRC. G.R. No. 100701. March 28, 2001
Bonus is not demandable as a matter of right. It is a management
prerogative, given in addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly due
to the recipient.
Philipiine Telegraph vs. Laplana. G.R. No. 76645; July 23, 1991
It is the employers prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of
its employees qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move them
around in the various areas of its business operations in order to ascertain
where they will function with maximum benefit to the company. When an
employees transfer is not unreasonable, nor inconvenient or prejudicial to
him, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or diminution of his salaries,
benefits and other privileges, the employee may not complain that it
amounts to a constructive dismissal.
UE v. PEPANIO, G.R. No. 193897, January 23, 2013
The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not
unreasonable. The operation of educational institutions involves public
interest. The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in
possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed

to teach in such institutions. Government regulation in this field of human

activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public as
well from ill-prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or
technical knowledge. They may be required to take an examination or to
possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment.
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC. G.R. No. 125792; November 9,
1998
In legitimate job contracting, no employer-employee relation exists between
the principal and the job contractor's employees. The principal is responsible
to the job contractor's employees only for the proper payment of wages. But
in labor-only contracting, an employer-employee relation is created by law
between the principal and the labor-only contractor's employees, such that
the former is responsible to such employees, as if he or she had directly
employed them
Vigilla, et al. v Philippine College of Criminology, Inc., G.R. No.
200094 (2013)
In legitimate job contracting, the principal employer becomes jointly and
severally liable with the job contractor only for the payment of the
employees' wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. On the
other hand, in labor-only contracting, the principal employer becomes
solidarily liable with the labor-only contractor for all the rightful claims of the
employees. In this case, the releases, waivers and quitclaims executed by
employees in favor of the labor-only contractor redounded to the benefit of
the principal.
San Miguel Corp. vs. MAERC Integrated Systems. G.R. No. 144672;
July 10, 2003
The employer is deemed the direct employer and is made liable to the
employees of the contractor for a more comprehensive purpose (wages,
monetary claims, and all other benefits in the Labor Code such as
SSS/Medicare/Pag-Ibig). The labor-only contractor is deemed merely an
agent. A finding that a contractor is a labor-only contractor is equivalent to
declaring that there is an ER-EE relationship between the principal and the
employees of the labor-only contractor.
Cheryll Santos Leus v St. Scholasticas College Westgrove, et al.,
G.R. No. 187226, 28 January 2015
That an employee was employed by a Catholic educational institution per se
does not absolutely determine whether her pregnancy out of wedlock is
disgraceful or immoral. There is still a necessity to determine whether the

petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or immoral in

accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct. To stress, pre-marital
sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to
marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock,
gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not amount
to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
Duncan vs. Glaxo Wellcome. G.R. No. 162994; September 17, 2004
Prohibition of marriage or existing or future relationships between employees
of competing companies is not violative of the equal protection clause.
Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. v National
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 200575 (2014)

Labor

Relations

Cabiles contention that his employment with Intel HK is a continuation of his

service with Intel Phil alleging that it was but an assignment by his principal
employer, similar to his assignments to Intel Arizona and Intel Chengdu is
untenable.
Eugene Arabit, et al. v Jardine Pacific Finance, Inc., G.R. No. 181719,
21 April 2014
It is illogical for Jardine to terminate the petitioners employment and replace
them with contractual employees. The replacement effectively belies
Jardines claim that the petitioners positions were abolished due to
superfluity. Redundancy could have been justified if the functions of the
petitioners were transferred to other existing employees of the company.
To dismiss the petitioners and hire new contractual employees as
replacements necessarily give rise to the sound conclusion that the
petitioners services have not really become in excess of what Jardines
business requires. To replace the petitioners who were all regular employees
with contractual ones would amount to a violation of their right to security of
tenure.
Supreme Steel Pipe Corp. vs. Bardaje, G.R. No. 170811; April 24,
2007
Although fighting within company premises may constitute serious
misconduct (possible ground for disciplinary actions), not every fight with in
company premises in which an employee is involved automatically warrant
dismissal from service.
Punzal vs. ETSI Technologies. G.R. No. 170384-85. March 9, 2007

Halloween invitation sent out by employee for office trick-or-treating without

clearance from higher management is considered misbehavior. The
circumstances in the case were differentiated from Samson vs. NLRC where
the offensive remarks were verbally made during informal Christmas
gathering.
Lores Realty Enterprises, Inc. v. Virginia E. Pacia, March 2011
Petitioner employer ordered the respondent employee to prepare checks for
payment of petitioners obligations. Respondent did not immediately comply
with the instruction since petitioner employer had no sufficient funds to
cover the checks. Petitioner employer dismissed respondent employee for
willful disobedience. The Court held that respondent employee was illegally
dismissed. Though there is nothing unlawful in the directive of petitioner
employer to prepare checks in payment of petitioners obligations,
respondent employees initial reluctance to prepare the checks, although
seemingly disrespectful and defiant, was for honest and well intentioned
reasons. Protecting the petitioner employer from liability under the Bouncing
Checks Law was foremost in her mind. It was not wrongful or willful. Neither
can it be considered an obstinate defiance of company authority. The Court
took into consideration that respondent employee, despite her initial
reluctance, eventually did prepare the checks on the same day she was
tasked to do it.
Gonzales vs. NLRC. G.R. No. 131653; March 26, 2001
The act constituting the breach must be work-related such as would show
the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer.
Jardine Davies vs. NLRC. G.R. No. 106915; August 31, 1993
For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment
there must be a deliberate unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment. This refusal must be clearly shown. Mere absence is not
sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts pointing to the fact that the
employee simply does not want to work anymore.
SME Bank, Inc., et al. v De Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 184517 (2013)
While resignation letters containing words of gratitude may indicate that the
employees were not coerced into resignation, this fact alone is not
conclusive proof that they intelligently, freely and voluntarily resigned. To
rule that resignation letters couched in terms of gratitude are, by
themselves, conclusive proof that the employees intended to relinquish their
posts would open the floodgates to possible abuse. In order to withstand the
test of validity, resignations must be made voluntarily and with the intention

of relinquishing the office, coupled with an act of relinquishment. Therefore,

in order to determine whether the employees truly intended to resign from
their respective posts, we cannot merely rely on the tenor of the resignation
letters, but must take into consideration the totality of circumstances in each
particular case.
Sanoh Fulton Phils., Inc., et al. v Bernardo, et al., G.R. No. 187214
(2013)
A lull caused by lack of orders or shortage of materials must be of such
nature as would severely affect the continued business operations of the
employer to the detriment of all and sundry if not properly addressed. Sanoh
asserts that cancelled orders of wire condensers led to the phasing out of the
Wire Condenser Department, which triggered retrenchment. Sanoh
presented the letters of cancellation given by Matsushita and Sanyo as
evidence of cancelled orders. The evidence presented by Sanoh barely
established the connection between the cancelled orders and the projected
business losses that may be incurred by Sanoh.
Hocheng Philippines Corporation v Antonio M. Farrales, G.R. No.
211497, 18 March 2015
Theft committed by an employee against a person other than his employer,
if proven by substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious
misconduct. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and
aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Such
misconduct, however serious, must, nevertheless, be in connection with the
employees work to constitute just cause for his separation.
Emeritus Security and Maintenance Systems, Inc. v Janrie C. Dailig,
G.R. No. 204761, 2 April 2014
A floating status of a security guard for more than six months constitutes
constructive dismissal. The temporary inactivity or "floating status" of
security guards should continue only for six months. Otherwise, the security
agency concerned could be liable for constructive dismissal. The failure of
petitioner to give respondent a work assignment beyond the reasonable sixmonth period makes it liable for constructive dismissal.
Exocet Security and Allied Services Corporation and/or Ma. Teresa
Marcelo v Armando D. Serrano, G.R. No. 198538, 29 September 2014
It is manifestly unfair and unacceptable to immediately declare the mere
lapse of the six-month period of floating status as a case of constructive
dismissal, without looking into the peculiar circumstances that resulted in the
security guards failure to assume another post. This is especially true in the

present case where the security guards own refusal to accept a non-VIP
detail was the reason that he was not given an assignment within the sixmonth period. The security agency, Exocet, should not then be held liable for
constructive dismissal.
Philippine Sheet Metal Workers Union vs. CIR. G.R. No. L-2028; April
28, 1949
Reduction of the number of workers in a companys factory made necessary
by the introduction of machinery in the manufacture of its products is
justified. There can be no question as to the right of the manufacturer to use
new labor-saving devices with a view to effecting more economy and
efficiency in its method of production.
Oriental Petroleum & Minerals Corp. vs. Fuentes. G.R. No. 151818.
October 14, 2005
Standards to Justify Retrenchment:
The losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis
in
extent;

The substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent. It be

reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected
losses;

The employer should have taken other measures prior or parallel to

retrenchment
to
forestall
losses;

The alleged losses if already realized, and the expected imminent

losses
must
be
proved
by
sufficient
and
convincing
evidence.

BPI v. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION DAVAO, G.R. No. 164301, October 19,
2011
By upholding the automatic assumption of the non-surviving corporations
existing employment contracts by the surviving corporation in a merger, the
Court strengthens judicial protection of the right to security of tenure of
employees affected by a merger and avoids confusion regarding the status
of their various benefits which were among the chief objections of our
dissenting colleagues. However, nothing in this Resolution shall impair the
right of an employer to terminate the employment of the absorbed
employees for a lawful or authorized cause or the right of such an employee

to resign, retire or otherwise sever his employment, whether before or after

the merger, subject to existing contractual obligations. In this manner,
Justice Brions theory of automatic assumption may be reconciled with the
majoritys concerns with the successor employers prerogative to choose its
employees and the prohibition against involuntary servitude.
King of Kings Transport vs. Mamac. G.R. No. 166208. June 29, 2007
In order to intelligently prepare the employees for their explanation and
defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and
circumstances that will serve as the basis for the charge against the
employee a general description of the change will not suffice.
Esguerra vs. Valle Verde Country Club. G.R. No. 173012. June 13,
2012
The law does not require that an intention to terminate ones employment
should be included in the first notice. It is enough that employees are
properly apprised of the charges brought against them so they can properly
prepare their defenses; it is only during the second notice that the intention
to terminate ones employment should be explicitly stated
Lavador vs. J Marketing Corporation and Soyao. G.R. No. 157757;
June 28, 2005
A hearing or conference should be held during which the employee
concerned, with the assistance of counsel, if the employee so desires, is
given the opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut
the evidence presented against him.
AGABON v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004
The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private
respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal
damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. Considering the
prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at
P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would serve to deter
employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of
employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this
fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules.
Jaka Food Processing v. Pacot. G.R. No. 151378.March 28, 2005

If the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 but the employer
failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed
upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect,
initiated by an act imputable to the employee. On the other hand, if the
dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 but the
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should
be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employers
exercise of his management prerogative.
Tangga-an v Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et al., G.R. No.
180636 (2013)
Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employees full backwages
shall be inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent. It is the obligation of the employer to pay an illegally dismissed
employee or worker the whole amount of the salaries or wages, plus all other
benefits and bonuses and general increases, to which he would have been
normally entitled had he not been dismissed and had not stopped working.
Reyes, et al. v RP Guardians Security Agency, Inc., G.R. No 193756
(2013)
Backwages and reinstatement are separate and distinct reliefs given to an
illegally dismissed employee in order to alleviate the economic damage
brought about by the employees dismissal. Reinstatement is a restoration
to a state from which one has been removed or separated while the
payment of backwages is a form of relief that restores the income that was
lost by reason of the unlawful dismissal. Therefore, the award of one does
not bar the other.
Crisanto F. Castro, Jr. vs Ateneo De Naga University, et al., G.R. No.
175293, 23 July 2014
The Court holds that the order of reinstatement of the petitioner was not
rendered moot and academic. He remained entitled to accrued salaries from
notice of the LA's order of reinstatement until reversal thereof. In Islriz
Trading v. Capada, we even clarified that the employee could be barred from
claiming accrued salaries only when the failure to reinstate him was without
the fault of the employer.
Considering that the respondents reinstated the petitioner only in November
2002, and that their inability to reinstate him was without valid ground, they
were liable to pay his salaries accruing from the time of the decision of the
LA (i.e., September 3, 2001) until his reinstatement in November 2002. It did
not matter that the respondents had yet to exercise their option to choose

between actual or payroll reinstatement at that point because the order of

reinstatement was immediately executory.
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Reynaldo V. Paz, G.R. No. 192924, 26
November 2014
The rule is that the employee is entitled to reinstatement salaries
notwithstanding the reversal of the LA decision granting him said relief. The
test is two-fold: (1) there must be actual delay or the fact that the order of
reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2)
the delay must not be due to the employers unjustified act or omission. If
the delay is due to the employers unjustified refusal, the employer may still
be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor
Arbiters decision.
A scrutiny of the circumstances, however, will show that the delay in
reinstating the respondent was not due to the unjustified refusal of PAL to
abide by the order but because of the constraints of corporate rehabilitation.
The inopportune event of PALs entering rehabilitation receivership justifies
the delay or failure to comply with the reinstatement order of the LA. In light
of the fact that PALs failure to comply with the reinstatement order was
justified by the exigencies of corporation rehabilitation, the respondent may
no longer claim salaries which he should have received during the period
that the LA decision ordering his reinstatement is still pending appeal until it
was overturned by the NLRC.
Globe Mackay v. NLRC. G.R. No. 82511; March 3, 1992
When the employer can no longer trust the employee and vice-versa, or
there were imputations of bad faith to each other, reinstatement could not
effectively serve as a remedy. This doctrine applies only to positions which
require trust and confidence.
Wenphil Corporation vs. Abing, G.R. No. 207983, 7 April 2014
Even outside the theoretical trappings of the discussion and into the
mundane realities of human experience, the "refund doctrine" easily
demonstrates how a favorable decision by the Labor Arbiter could harm,
more than help, a dismissed employee. The employee, to make both ends
meet, would necessarily have to use up the salaries received during the
pendency of the appeal, only to end up having to refund the sum in case of a
final unfavorable decision. It is mirage of a stop-gap leading the employee to
a risky cliff of insolvency.
Unilever Philippines v Rivera, G.R. No. 201701 (2013)

As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just
causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a
separation pay. In exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted
separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of social justice
or on equitable grounds. In both instances, it is required that the dismissal
(1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral
character of the employee. In this case, the transgressions were serious
offenses that warranted employees dismissal from employment. Hence,
employee is not entitled to separation pay.
Agricultural and Industrial Supplies Corp. et al vs. Jueber P. Siazar,
G.R. No. 177970 August 25, 2010
In awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee, in lieu of
reinstatement, the amount to be awarded shall be equivalent to one month
salary for every year of service reckoned from the first day of employment
until the finality of the decision. Payment of separation pay is in addition to
payment of backwages. And if separation pay is awarded instead of
reinstatement, backwages shall be computed from the time of illegal
termination up to the finality of the decision.
Zenaida Paz v Northern Tobacco Redrying Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No.
199554, 18 February 2015
The award of financial assistance to an employee who rendered almost three
decades of dedicated service to an employer without a single transgression
or malfeasance of any company rule or regulation, coupled with her old age
and infirmity which now weaken her chances of employment is justified and
allowed under special circumstances. These circumstances indubitably merit
equitable concessions, via the principle of compassionate justice for the
working class.
Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative Inc. vs NLRC. G.R. No.
163561, July 24, 2007
Although long years of service might generally be considered for the award
of separation benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the
effects of termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for generosity
under the Labor Code nor under our prior decisions. The fact that private
respondent served petitioner for more than twenty years with no negative
record prior to his dismissal, in our view of this case, does not call for such
award of benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and
worse, betrayal of the company. If an employees length of service is to be
regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, such
gesture will actually become a prize for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of

social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of
undesirables.

Conrado A. Lim v. HMR Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 201483, 04

August 2014
No essential change is being made (in a final judgment) by a recomputation
because such is a necessary consequence which flows from the nature of the
illegality of the dismissal. To reiterate, a recomputation, or an original
computation, if no previous computation was made, as in the present case, is
a part of the law that is read into the decision, namely, Article 279 of the
Labor Code and established jurisprudence. Article 279 provides for the
consequences of illegal dismissal, one of which is the payment of full
backwages until actual reinstatement, qualified only by jurisprudence when
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is allowed, where the finality of the
illegal dismissal decision instead becomes the reckoning point.
The nature of an illegal dismissal case requires that backwages continue to
add on until full satisfaction. The computation required to reflect full
satisfaction does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final
decision being implemented as the illegal dismissal ruling stands. Thus, in
the present case, a computation of backwages until actual reinstatement is
not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.
Zuellig Pharma Corporation v Sibal, et al., G.R. NO. 173587 (2013)
In the present case, the CBA contains specific provisions which effectively
bar the availment of retirement benefits once the employees have chosen
separation pay or vice versa. Section 2 of Article XIV explicitly states that
any payment of retirement gratuity shall be chargeable against separation
pay.
Clearly, respondents cannot have both retirement gratuity and
separation pay, as selecting one will preclude recovery of the other. To
illustrate the mechanics of how Section 2 of Article XIV bars double recovery,
if the employees choose to retire, whatever amount they will receive as
retirement gratuity will be charged against the separation pay they would
have received had their separation from employment been for a cause
which would entitle them to severance pay. These causes are enumerated in
Section 3, Article XIV of the CBA (i.e., retrenchment, closure of business,
merger, redundancy, or installation of labor-saving device). However, if the
cause of the termination of their employment was any of the causes
enumerated in said Section 3, they could no longer claim retirement gratuity
as the fund from which the same would be taken had already been used in
paying their separation pay. Put differently, employees who were separated
from the company cannot have both retirement gratuity and separation pay

as there is only one fund from which said benefits would be taken.
Inarguably, Section 2 of Article XIV effectively disallows recovery of both
separation pay and retirement gratuity. Consequently, respondents are
entitled only to one. Since they have already chosen and accepted
redundancy pay and have executed the corresponding Release and
Quitclaim, they are now barred from claiming retirement gratuity.
Grace Christian High School, represented by its Principal, Dr. James
Tan v Filipinas A. Lavandera, G.R. No. 177845, 20 August 2014
RA 7641, which was enacted on December 9, 1992, amended Article 287 of
the Labor Code, providing for the rules on retirement pay to qualified private
sector employees in the absence of any retirement plan in the
establishment. The said law states that an employees retirement benefits
under any collective bargaining [agreement (CBA)] and other agreements
shall not be less than those provided under the same that is, at least onehalf () month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6)
months being considered as one whole year and that [u]nless the parties
provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half () month salary shall
mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13 th month pay and the
cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.
The foregoing provision is applicable where (a) there is no CBA or other
applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits to employees, or (b)
there is a CBA or other applicable agreement providing for retirement
benefits but it is below the requirement set by law. Verily, the determining
factor in choosing which retirement scheme to apply is still superiority in
terms of benefits provided.
The Court, in the case of Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., has recently
affirmed that one-half () month salary means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5
days representing one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the
remaining 5 days for [SIL]. The Court sees no reason to depart from this
interpretation. GCHS argument therefore that the 5 days SIL should be
likewise pro-rated to their 1/12 equivalent must fail.
Noriel R. Montierro v Rickmers Marine Agency Phils., Inc., G.R. No.
210634, January 14, 2015
When a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the
vessel, his fitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated
physician. The physician has 120 days, or 240 days, if validly extended, to
make the assessment. If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees
with the assessment of the company-designated physician, the opinion of a
third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer,
whose decision shall be final and binding on them.

Sealanes Marine Services, Inc., et al. v Arnel G. Dela Torre, G.R. No.
214132, 18 February 2015
For the purpose of determining temporary total disability, the seafarer shall
submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a companydesignated physician within three working days upon his return except when
he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the
agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the
seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in
his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. If a doctor appointed
by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed
jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctors decision
shall be final and binding on both parties.
LABOR RELATIONS
Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor
and Employment, et al., G.R. No. 162355, August 14, 2009
Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as any union or
association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of
collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and
conditions of employment. Upon compliance with all the documentary
requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the
applicant labor organization a certificate indicating that it is included in the
roster of legitimate labor organizations. Any applicant labor organization
shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of
the certificate of registration.
T&H Shopfitters Corporation/Gin Queen Corporation, et al. v T&H
Shopfitters Corporation Corporation/Gin Queen Workers Union, et
al., G.R. No. 191714 (2014)
The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees
in the exercise of their right to self-organization, is, whether the employer
has engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere
with the free exercise of employees rights; and that it is not necessary that
there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or
coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable
inference that the anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse
effect on self-organization and collective bargaining.

Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor

and Employment, et al., G.R. No. 162355, August 14, 2009
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of
all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to
the employer, indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights
and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law. The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective
bargaining unit are:
(1)
the
will
of
the
employees
(Globe
Doctrine);
(2) affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial similarity
of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions
(Substantial
Mutual
Interests
Rule);
(3)
prior
collective
bargaining
history;
and
(4) similarity of employment status.
Coastal
Subic
Bay
Terminal,
157117,November 20, 2006

Inc.,

vs

DOLE.

G.R.

No.

Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, supervisory employees are not eligible
for membership in a labor union of rank-and-file employees. The supervisory
employees are allowed to form their own union but they are not allowed to
join the rank-and-file union because of potential conflicts of interest. Further,
to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank-and-file or
where the supervisors labor union would represent conflicting interests, a
local supervisors union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national
federation of unions of rank-and-file employees where that federation
actively participates in the union activity within the company. Thus, the
limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors wanting to join a rank-andfile union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors local union applying for
membership in a national federation the members of which include local
unions of rank-and-file employees.
San Miguel Foods, Inc. vs. San Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt
Union. G.R. No. 146206. August 1, 2011
The general rule is that an employer has no standing to question the process
of certification election, since this is the sole concern of the workers. Law and
policy demand that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification
elections. The bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free
from any extraneous influence of management. The only exception is where
the employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article 258 of the
Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively.
Holy Child Catholic School v Hon. Sto Tomas, et al., G.R. No. 179146
(2013)

A certification election is the sole concern of the workers, except when the
employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor
Code, as amended, but even after such filing its role in the certification
process ceases and becomes merely a bystander. The employer clearly lacks
the personality to dispute the election and has no right to interfere at all
therein.
Inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to
represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of
its status as a legitimate labor organization.
NUWHRAIN MPHC v. SLE. G.R. No. 181531, July 31, 2009
It is wellsettled that under the double majority rule for there to be a valid
certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted and
the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast.
Following the ruling that all the probationary employees votes should be
deemed valid votes while that of the supervisory Ees should be excluded, it
follows that the number of valid votes cast would increase. Under Art. 256 of
the LC, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible
voters shall be certified as the sole exclusive bargaining agent of all the
workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1.
Benguet Consolidated Inc. v. BCI Ees and Workers UnionPAFLU.
G.R. No. L24711, April 1968
The Er cannot revoke the validly executed CB contract with their Er by the
simple expedient of changing their bargaining agent. The new agent must
respect the contract. It cannot be invoked to support the contention that a
newly certified CB agent automatically assumes all the personal
undertakings of the former agentlike the no strike clause in the CBA
executed by the latter.
Takata Philippines Corporation vs Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R.
No. 196276, 4 June 2014
For the purpose of de-certifying a union such as respondent, it must be
shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in
connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or
amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification; or, in connection with the
election of officers, the minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters,
or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly
elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.

The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those who
participated in the organizational meeting would not, to our mind, provide a
valid reason to cancel respondents certificate of registration. The
cancellation of a unions registration doubtless has an impairing dimension
on the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud and misrepresentation to
be grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code, the
nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling
enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.
Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free workers vs. Cirtek
Electronics, Inc., G.R. No. 190515. June 6, 2011
A local union may disaffiliate at any time from its mother federation, absent
any showing that the same is prohibited under its constitution or rules. Such
disaffiliation, however, does not result in it losing its legal personality. A local
union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It
is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the will
of its members. The mere act of affiliation does not divest the local union of
its own personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to
act independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency
where the former acts in representation of the latter. In the present case,
whether the FFW went against the will of its principal (the memberemployees) by pursuing the case despite the signing of the MOA, is not for
the Court, nor for respondent employer to determine, but for the Union and
FFW to resolve on their own pursuant to their principal-agent relationship.
Moreover, the issue of disaffiliation is an intra-union dispute which must be
resolved in a different forum in an action at the instance of either or both the
FFW and the union or a rival labor organization, but not the employer as in
this case.
Legend International Resorts Limited v. Kilusang Manggagawa ng
Legenda. G.R. No. 169754, February 23, 2011
The pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not
preclude collective bargaining, and that an order to hold a certification
election is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the
unions registration because at the time the respondent union filed its
petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order
cancelling its registration. The legitimacy of the legal personality of
respondent cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification
election proceeding but only through a separate action instituted particularly
for the purpose of assailing it.
The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed
registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its
certificate of registration. Once a certificate of registration is issued to a

union, its legal personality cannot be subject to a collateral attack. It may be

questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance
with Section 5 of
Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules.
Tabangao Shell Refinery Employees Association v Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation, G.R. No. 170007, 7 April 2014
The duty to bargain does not compel any party to accept a proposal or to
make any concession. While the purpose of collective bargaining is the
reaching of an agreement between the employer and the employees union
resulting in a binding contract between the parties, the failure to reach an
agreement after negotiations continued for a reasonable period does not
mean lack of good faith. The laws invite and contemplate a collective
bargaining contract but do not compel one. For after all, a CBA, like any
contract is a product of mutual consent and not of compulsion. As such, the
duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.
Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form ManufacturingUnited Workers
of the Phils v. NLRC. G.R. No. 113856, Sept. 7, 1998
There is no perfect test of good faith (GF) in bargaining. The GF or BF is an
inference to be drawn from the facts and is largely a matter for the NLRCs
expertise. The charge of BF should be raised while the bargaining is in
progress. With the execution of the CBA, BF can no longer be imputed upon
any of the parties thereto. All provisions in the CBA are supposed to have
been jointly and voluntarily incorporated therein by the parties. This is not a
case where private respondent exhibited an indifferent attitude towards CB
because the negotiations were not the unilateral activity of petitioner union.
The CBA is good enough that private respondent exerted reasonable effort
of GF bargaining.
FVC Labor Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers
Organization (FVCLU-PTGWO) Vs. Sama-samang Nagkakaisang
Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity of Independent and General Labor
Organization (SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO. G.R. No. 176249, November 27,
2009
While the parties may agree to extend the CBAs original five-year term
together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in
excess of five years will not carry with it a change in the unions exclusive
collective bargaining status. By express provision of the above-quoted Article
253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the
representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree
upon. In other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more
than five y ears, either as an original provision or by amendment, the

bargaining unions exclusive bargaining status is effective only for five years
and can be challenged within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the
CBAs first five years.
Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Services Inc., v. Confessor. G.R.
No. 111809, May 5, 1997
The signing of the CBA does not determine whether the agreement was
entered into within the 6 month period from the date of expiration of the old
CBA. In the present case, there was already a meeting of the minds between
the company and the union prior to the end of the 6 month period after the
expiration of the old CBA. Hence, such meeting of the mind is sufficient to
conclude that an agreement has been reached within the 6 month period as
provided under Art. 253A of the LC.
Teodoro S. Miranda, Jr. vs. Asian Terminals, Inc. and Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 174316, June 23, 2009
A shop steward leads to the conclusion that it is a position within the union,
and not within the company. A shop steward is appointed by the union in a
shop, department, or plant and serves as representative of the union,
charged with negotiating and adjustment of grievances of employees with
the supervisor of the employer. He is the representative of the union
members in a building or other workplace. Blacks Law Dictionary defines a
shop steward as a union official elected to represent members in a plant or
particular department. His duties include collection of dues, recruitment of
new members and initial negotiations for the settlement of grievances. A
judgment of reinstatement of the petitioner to the position of union Shop
Steward would have no practical legal effect since it cannot be enforced.
Based on the requirements imposed by law and the APCWU-ATI CBA, and in
the nature of things, the subsequent separation of the petitioner from
employment with respondent ATI has made his reinstatement to union Shop
Steward incapable of being enforced.
Herminigildo Inguillom, et al. vs. First Philippine Scales, Inc., et al.
G.R. No. 165407, June 5, 2009
Union security is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends
closed shop, union shop, maintenance of membership or any other
form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire
or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment. There is
union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union
within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. There
is maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union
members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter
become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for

continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the

bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. A closed-shop, on the other
hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the
employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may be
employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he
or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a
member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the
employees in interest are a part.
In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the Union
Security Clause, the employer needs only to determine and prove that:
(1) the union security clause is applicable;
(2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security
provision in the CBA; and
(3) there is sufficient evidence to support the unions decision to expel the
employee from the union or company.
Standard Chartered Bank v. Confessor. G.R. No. 114974, June 16,
2004
Whether or not the union is engaged in bluesky bargaining is determined by
the evidence presented by the union as to its economic demands. Thus, if
the union requires exaggerated or unreasonable economic demands, then it
is guilty of ULP. In order to be considered as unfair labor practice, there must
be proof that the demands made by the union were exaggerated or
unreasonable. In the minutes of the meeting show that the union based its
economic proposals on data of rank-and-file employees and the prevailing
economic benefits received by bank employees from other foreign banks
doing business in the Philippines and other branches of the bank in the Asian
region. Hence, it cannot be said that the union was guilty of ULP for blue-sky
bargaining.
General Santos Coca Cola Plant Free Workers Union-Tupas vs. COCACOLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. G.R. No. 178647. Feb. 13, 2007
Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers right to
organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers right to selforganization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts,
even if unfair, are not unfair labor practices.
Arellano University Employees and Workers Union vs Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 139940, September 19, 2006
To constitute ULP, however, violations of the CBA must be gross. Gross
violation of the CBA, under Article 261 of the Labor Code, means flagrant
and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions thereof.

Evidently, the University can not be faulted for ULP as it in good faith merely
heeded the above-said request of Union members.
Salunga v. CIR. G.R. No. L22456, Sep. 27, 1967
Labor unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for
membership and a closed shop applicants provision will not justify the
employer in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of an
employee whom the union thus refuses to admit to membership without any
reasonable ground thereof.
Phil. Can Co. v. CIR. G.R. No. L3021, July 13, 1950
A coercive measure resorted to by laborers to enforce their demands. The
idea behind a strike is that a company engaged in a profitable business
cannot afford to have its production or activities interrupted, much less,
paralyzed.
Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc., etc. vs. Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Hyatt-National Union of Workers in the Hotel
Restaurant, etc., G.R. No. 165756, June 5, 2009
The requisites for a valid strike are:
(a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date
thereof or 15 days in case of ULP;
(b) a strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for
that purpose; and
(c) a notice to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven (7) days
before the intended strike. The requirements are mandatory and failure of a
union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal.
Club Filipino, Inc., et al. v Benjamin Bautista, et al., G.R. No. 168406,
January 2015
The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code states the companys counterproposal shall be attached to the notice of strike "as far as practicable." In
this case, attaching the counter-proposal of the company to the notice of
strike of the union was not practicable. It was absurd to expect the union to
produce the company's counter-proposal which it did not have. Indeed,
compliance with the requirement was impossible because no counterproposal existed at the time the union filed a notice of strike.

NSFW vs. Ovejera. G.R. No. 59743, May 31, 1982

The coolingoff period in Art. 264(c) and the 7day strike ban after the strike
vote report prescribed in Art. 264 (f) were meant to be mandatory. The law
provides that the labor union may strike should the dispute remain
unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the filing of the
notice, this clearly implies that the union may not strike before the lapse of
the coolingoff period. The coolingoff period is for the Ministry of Labor and
Employment to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a
voluntary settlement. The mandatory character of the 7day strike ban is
manifest in the provision that in every case the union shall furnish the
MOLE with the results of the voting at least 7 days before the intended
strike. This period is to give time to verify that a strike vote was actually
held.
In the event the result of the strike/lockout ballot is filed within the cooling
off period, the 7day requirement shall be counted from the day following the
expiration of the coolingoff period.
Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Greenfield v. Ramos.
G.R. No. 113907, Feb. 28, 2000
A no strike/lockout clause is legal, but it is applicable only to economic
strikes, not ULP strikes. As a provision in the CBA, it is a valid stipulation
although the clause may be invoked by an employer (Er) only when the
strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other
concessions from the Er that are not mandated to be granted by the law
itself. It would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which is grounded on ULP.
Interphil Laboratories Ees UnionFFW v. Interphil Laboratories, Inc.
G.R. No. 142824, Dec. 19, 2001
The concept of a slowdown is a "strike on the installment plan." It is a willful
reduction in the rate of work by concerted action of workers for the purpose
of restricting the output of the employer (Er), in relation to a labor dispute; as
an activity by which workers, without a complete stoppage of work, retard
production or their performance of duties and functions to compel
management to grant their demands. Such a slowdown is generally
condemned as inherently illicit and unjustifiable, because while the
employees (Ees) "continue to work and remain at their positions and accept
the wages paid to them," they at the same time "select what part of their
allotted tasks they care to perform of their own volition or refuse openly or
secretly, to the Er's damage, to do other work;" in other words, they "work on
their own terms.

Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International, et al.

vs. Secretary of Department of Labor and Employment, et
al./Triumph International (phils.), Inc. vs. Bagong Pagkakaisa ng
Manggagawa ng Triumph International, et al., G.R. No. 167401, July
5, 2010
The assumption of jurisdiction powers granted to the Labor Secretary under
Article 263(g) is not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or
lockout that may have preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the
incidents of the strike or lockout that in the meanwhile may have taken
place. As the term assume jurisdiction connotes, the intent of the law is to
give the Labor
Secretary full authority to resolve all matters within the dispute that gave
rise to or which arose out of the strike or lockout, including cases over which
the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.
Sarmiento v. Tuico. G.R. Nos. 7527173, June 27, 1988
Where the return to work order is issued pending the determination of the
legality of the strike, it is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if
the strike is legal and may be disregarded if illegal. Precisely, the purpose of
the return to work order is to maintain the status quo while the
determination is being made.
Manila Diamond Hotel Ees Union v. SLE, G.R. No. 140518, Dec. 16,
2004
Payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement but there must be
showing of special circumstances rendering actual reinstatement
impracticable, or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purpose of the law
in providing for assumption of jurisdiction by the SLE in a labor dispute that
affects the national interest.
Solid Bank Corp. Ernesto U. Gamier, et al. and Solid Bank Corp., et
al. vs. Solid Bank Union and its Dismissed Officers and Members, et
al. G.R. No. 159460 and G.R. No. 159461, November 15, 2010
Under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, a strike that is
undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption
order and/or certification is illegal. So is a declaration of a strike during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike. In the present
case, there is no dispute that when respondents conducted their mass
actions on April 3 to 6, 2000, the proceedings before the Secretary of Labor
were still pending as both parties filed motions for reconsideration of the
March 24, 2000 Order. Clearly, respondents knowingly violated the aforesaid
provision by holding a strike in the guise of mass demonstration.

Jackbilt Industries, Inc. Vs. Jackbilt Employees Workers Union-NafluKMU, G.R. No. 171618-19, March 13, 2009
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code prohibits any person engaged in picketing
from obstructing the free ingress to and egress from the employers
premises. Since respondent was found in the July 17, 1998 decision of the
NLRC to have prevented the free entry into and exit of vehicles from
petitioners compound, respondents officers and employees clearly
committed illegal acts in the course of the March 9, 1998 strike. The use of
unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal.
Therefore, pursuant to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the
March 9, 1998 strike was ipso facto illegal. The filing of a petition to declare
the strike illegal was thus unnecessary.
Yolito Fadriquelan, et al. vs. Monterey Foods Corporation/Monterey
Foods Corporation v. Bukluran ng mga Manggagawa sa MontereyILAW, et al., G.R. No. 178409/G.R. No. 178434, June 8, 2011
A distinction exists between the ordinary workers liability for illegal strike
and that of the union officers who participated in it. The ordinary worker
cannot be terminated for merely participating in the strike. There must be
proof that he committed illegal acts during its conduct. On the other hand, a
union officer can be terminated upon mere proof that he knowingly
participated in the illegal strike. Moreover, the participating union officers
have to be properly identified. In the present case, with respect to those
union officers whose identity and participation in the strike having been
properly established, the termination was legal.
Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC. G.R. No. 86000,
Sep. 21, 1990
No backwages will be awarded to union members as a penalty for their
participation in the illegal strike. As for the union officers, for knowingly
participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates that a union officer may
be terminated from employment and they are not entitled to any relief.
MSF Tire & Rubber v. CA, G.R. 128632, Aug. 5, 1999
The innocent by stander must show: Compliance with the grounds specified
in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, and That it is entirely different from, without
any
connection
whatsoever
to,
either party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign to
the
context
thereof.

Victor Meteoro, et al. v. Creative Creatures, Inc. G.R No. 171275, July
13, 2009
In sum, respondent contested the findings of the labor inspector during and
after the inspection and raised issues the resolution of which necessitated
the examination of evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of
inspection. Hence, the Regional Director was divested of jurisdiction and
should have endorsed the case to the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC. Considering, however, that an illegal dismissal case had been filed by
petitioners wherein the existence or absence of an employer-employee
relationship was also raised, the CA correctly ruled that such endorsement
was no longer necessary.
Honda Cars Philippines, Inc. v. Honda Cars Technical Specialist and
Supervisors Union, G.R. No. 204142, 19 November 2014
The Voluntary Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to settle tax matters. The
Voluntary Arbitrator has no competence to rule on the taxability of the gas
allowance and on the propriety of the withholding of tax. These issues are
clearly tax matters, and do not involve labor disputes. To be exact, they
involve tax issues within a labor relations setting as they pertain to questions
of law on the application of Section 33 (A) of the NIRC. They do not require
the application of the Labor Code or the interpretation of the MOA and/or
company personnel policies.
The University of the Immaculate Conception, et al. vs. NLRC, et al.,
G.R. No. 181146, January 26, 2011
Article 217 of the Labor Code states that unfair labor practices and
termination disputes fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter. As an exception, under Article 262 the Voluntary Arbitrator,
upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor
disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. For the
exception to apply, there must be agreement between the parties clearly
conferring jurisdiction to the voluntary arbitrator. Such agreement may be
stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement. However, in the absence of a
collective bargaining agreement, it is enough that there is evidence on
record showing the parties have agreed to resort to voluntary arbitration.
Samar-Med Distribution v National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 162385 (2013)
The non-inclusion in the complaint of the issue of dismissal did not
necessarily mean that the validity of the dismissal could not be an issue. The
rules of the NLRC require the submission of verified position papers by the
parties should they fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, and bar the

inclusion of any cause of action not mentioned in the complaint or position

paper from the time of their submission by the parties. In view of this,
respondents cause of action should be ascertained not from a reading of his
complaint alone but also from a consideration and evaluation of both his
complaint and position paper.
Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd., et al. vs. Estanislao Surio, et
al. G.R. No. 154213, August 23, 2012
Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10, transferred the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide money claims involving
overseas Filipino workers from the POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did
not remove from the POEA the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide all disciplinary action cases and other special cases administrative in
character involving such workers. The obvious intent of Republic Act No.
8042 was to have the POEA focus its efforts in resolving all administrative
matters affecting and involving such workers. The NLRC had no appellate
jurisdiction to review the decision of the POEA in disciplinary cases involving
overseas contract workers.
Peoples Broadcasting Service vs. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment. G.R. No. 179652, March 6, 2012
If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee relationship, the
jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE,
and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is
properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which
provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms
and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement.
If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employeremployee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The
findings of the DOLE, however, may still be questioned through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Rolando L. Cervantes vs. PAL Maritime Corporation and/or Western
Shipping Agencies. G.R. No. 175209. January 16, 2013
There was substantial compliance with the NLRC Rules of Procedure when
the respondents PAL Maritime Corporation and Western Shipping Agencies,
Pte., Ltd. filed, albeit belatedly, the Joint Declaration Under Oath, which is
required when an employer appeals from the Labor Arbiters decision
granting a monetary award and posts a surety bond. Under the NLRC rules,
the following requisites are required to perfect the employers appeal: (1) it
must be filed within the reglementary period; (2) it must be under oath, with
proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or

surety bond; and (3) it must be accompanied by typewritten or printed

copies of the memorandum of appeal, stating the grounds relied upon, the
supporting arguments, the reliefs prayed for, and a statement of the date of
receipt of the appealed decision, with proof of service on the other party of
said appeal. If the employer posts a surety bond, the NLRC rules further
require the submission by the employer, his or her counsel, and the bonding
company of a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond
posted is genuine and that it shall be in effect until the final disposition of the
case.
In the case at bar, the respondents posted a surety bond equivalent to the
monetary award and filed the notice of appeal and the appeal memorandum
within the reglementary period. When the NLRC subsequently directed the
filing of a Joint Declaration Under Oath, the respondents immediately
complied with the said order. There was only a late submission of the Joint
Declaration. Considering that there was substantial compliance with the
rules, the same may be liberally construed. The application of technical rules
may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demands of substantial justice.
Mcburnie v Ganzon, et al., G.R. No. 178034 (2013)
While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject
to the conditions that (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on
meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the
monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion
to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
The qualification effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the
reduction of the cash bond within the 10-day reglementary period, the
employer is still expected to post the cash or surety bond securing the full
amount within the said 10-day period. If the NLRC does eventually grant the
motion for reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed, the correct
relief would be to reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by the
employer within the 10-day period.
AGG Trucking and/or Alex Ang Gaeid vs. Melanio B. Yuag. G.R. No.
195033, October 12, 2011
On the issue of the propriety of entertaining the Petition for Certiorari despite
the prescribed Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC, the SC found that
the CA committed error when it entertained the petition for certiorari and
explained that when respondent failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration of
the NLRCs 30 November 2006 Resolution within the reglementary period,
the Resolution attained finality and could no longer be modified by the Court
of Appeals. Untimeliness in filing motions or petitions is not a mere technical
or procedural defect, as leniency regarding this requirement will impinge on

the right of the winning litigant to peace of mind resulting from the laying to
rest of the controversy.
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September
16, 1998
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to
supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and
hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the
Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of
courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Manila Pavilion Hotel, etc. vs. Henry Delada. G.R. No. 189947,
January 25, 2011
In Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Deputy Administrator Magsalin, the Supreme
Court ruled that the voluntary arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and
authority to interpret the agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scope
of his own authority subject only, in a proper case, to the certiorari
jurisdiction of this Court. It was also held in that case that the failure of the
parties to specifically limit the issues to that which was stated allowed the
arbitrator to assume jurisdiction over the related issue. In Ludo & Luym
Corporation v. Saornido, the Supreme Court recognized that voluntary
arbitrators are generally expected to decide only those questions expressly
delineated by the submission agreement; that, nevertheless, they can
assume that they have the necessary power to make a final settlement on
the related issues, since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of
disputes. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that even if the specific issue
brought before the arbitrators merely mentioned the question of whether an
employee was discharged for just cause, they could reasonably assume that
their powers extended beyond the determination thereof to include the
power to reinstate the employee or to grant back wages. In the same vein, if
the specific issue brought before the arbitrators referred to the date of
regularization of the employee, law and jurisprudence gave them enough
leeway as well as adequate prerogative to determine the entitlement of the
employees to higher benefits in accordance with the finding of regularization.
Indeed, to require the parties to file another action for payment of those
benefits would certainly undermine labor proceedings and contravene the
constitutional mandate providing full protection to labor and speedy labor
justice.
Philippine Electric Corporation v Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
168612, 10 December 2014

The rule is that a Voluntary Arbitrators award or decision shall be appealed

before the Court of Appeals within 10 days from receipt of the award or
decision. Should the aggrieved party choose to file a motion for
reconsideration with the Voluntary Arbitrator, the motion must be filed within
the same 10-day period since a motion for reconsideration is filed within the
period for taking an appeal.
Peoples Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils) v. Secretary of Labor, et
al.
GR No. 179652, May 8, 2009
It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and
enforcement power somehow has to make a determination of the existence
of an employer-employee relationship. Such prerogatival determination,
however, cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement power
itself. Indeed, such determination is merely preliminary, incidental and
collateral to the DOLEs primary function of enforcing labor standards
provisions. The determination of the existence of employer-employee
relationship is still primarily lodged with the NLRC. This is the meaning of the
clause in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists in
Art. 128(b).
Thus, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor
standards provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is
a finding by the DOLE that there is an existing employer-employee
relationship, the DOLE exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If
the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee relationship, the
jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE ,
and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is
properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which
provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms
and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement.
If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employeremployee relationship, the jurisdiction is purely with the DOLE. The findings
of the DOLE, however may still be questioned through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Manolito Barles, et al. v. Hon. Benedicto Bitonio, et al. GR No.
120270, June 16, 1999
The BLR shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own
initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and
intra-union conflicts. As already held by the Court in La Tondena Workers
Union v. Secretary of Labor, intra-union conflicts such as examinations of

accoutns are under the jurisdiction of the BLR. However, the Rules of
Procedure on Mediation-Arbitration purpose and expressly separated or
distinguished examinations of union accounts from the genus of intra-union
conflict and provided a different procedure for the resolution of the same.
Original jurisdiction over complaints for examinations of union accounts is
vested on the Regional Director and appellate jurisdiction over decisions of
the former is lodged with the BLR. This is apparent from Sections 3 and 4 of
the Med-Arbitration Rules as already mentioned. Contrast these two sections
from Section 2 and Section 56 of the same rules. Section 2 expressly vests
upon Med-Arbiters original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide inter
alia all other inter-union or internal union disputes. Section 5 states that
the decisions of the Med-Arbiter shall be appealable to the DOLE Secretary.
Without a doubt, the rules of Procedure on Mediation-Arbitration did not
amend or supplant substantive law but implemented and filled in details of
procedure left vacuous or ambiguous by the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules.
Araullo v Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 194169 (2013)
The Writ of Execution in the instant case was procedurally irregular, as it preempted the NLRC Rules which require that where further computation of the
award in the decision is necessary during the course of the execution
proceedings, no Writ of Execution shall be issued until after the computation
has been approved by the Labor Arbiter in an order issued after the parties
have been duly notified and heard on the matter. When the writ was issued,
there was as yet no order approving the computation made by the NLRC
Computation and Examination Unit, and there was a pending and unresolved
Motion to Recompute filed by Club Filipino. A cursory examination of the
motion reveals that it raised valid issues that required determination in order
to arrive at a just resolution, so that none of the parties would be unjustly
enriched.
Virgilio Anabe v. Asian Construction. GR No. 183233, December 23,
2009
To properly construe Article 291 of the Labor Code, it is essential to ascertain
the time when the third element of a cause of action transpired. Stated
differently, in the computation of the three-year prescriptive period, a
determination must be made as to the period when the act constituting a
violation of the workers right to the benefits being claimed was committed.
For if the cause of action accrued more than three (3) years before the filing
of the money claim, said cause of action has already prescribed in
accordance with Article 291.
George A. Arriola v Pilipino Star .Ngayon, Inc. and/or Miguel G.
Belmont, G.R. No. 175689, 13 August 2014

This court ruled that Callantas complaint for illegal dismissal had not yet
prescribed. Although illegal dismissal is a violation of the Labor Code, it is not
the "offense" contemplated in Article 290. Article 290 refers to illegal acts
penalized under the Labor Code, including committing any of the prohibited
activities during strikes or lockouts, unfair labor practices, and illegal
recruitment activities. The three-year prescriptive period under Article 290,
therefore, does not apply to complaints for illegal dismissal.
Instead, "by way of supplement," Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines governs complaints for illegal dismissal. Under Article 1146, an
action based upon an injury to the rights of a plaintiff must be filed within
four years. This court explained:
. . . when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of
livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one's
dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action
predicated "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff," as
contemplated under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be
brought within four [4] years.
This four-year prescriptive period applies to claims for backwages, not
the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code.
A claim for backwages, according to this court, may be a money claim
"by reason of its practical effect." Legally, however, an award of
backwages "is merely one of the reliefs which an illegally dismissed
employee prays the labor arbiter and the NLRC to render inhis favor as
a consequence of the unlawful act committed by the employer."
Though it results "in the enrichment of the individual [illegally
dismissed], the award of backwages is not in redress of a private right,
but, rather, is in the nature of a command upon the employer to make
public reparation for his violation of the Labor Code."
Actions for damages due to illegal dismissal are likewise actions "upon an
injury to the rights of the plaintiff." Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, therefore, governs these actions.
SOCIAL LEGISLATION
SSS v. Aguas. G.R. No. 165546; February 27, 2006
A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to
be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the
contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living
together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was
dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable
of providing for herself.

Bernardina P. Bartolome v Social Security System, et al., G.R. No.

192531, 12 November 2014
Cornelios adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the
right to receive the benefits stemming from Johns death as a dependent
parent given Cornelios untimely demise during Johns minority. Since the
parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the
Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner,
John's sole remaining beneficiary. The rule limiting death benefits claims to
the legitimate parents is contrary to law.
The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents,
whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption.
Hacienda Cataywa, et al. v Rosario Lorezo, G.R. No. 179640, 18
March 2015)
To be exempted from the coverage of SSS Law on the basis of casual
employment, the services must not merely be irregular, temporary or
intermittent, but the same must not also be in connection with the business
or occupation of the employer. The primary standard, therefore, of
determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual
business or trade of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The
connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work
performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade
in its entirety.
GSIS vs. De Leon. G.R. No. 186560; November 17, 2010
Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he
acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process
clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a
right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner
acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under
the terms of the public employees pension statute. No law can deprive such
person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without
notice and opportunity to be heard.
GSIS vs. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 128524; April 20, 1999
The 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and
circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which,

although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service
in character.
Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. ECC. G.R. No. L-26341. Nov. 27,
1968
When the injury is sustained when the employee is proceeding to or from his
work on the premises of the employer, the injury is compensable.
Enao v. ECC G.R. No. L-46046; April 5, 1985
The company which provides the means of transportation in going to, or
coming from the place of work, is liable to the injury sustained by the
employees
while
on
board
said
means
of
transportation.