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The Politics of Accountability: A Perspective from England and Wales

Author(s): John Fitz


Source: Peabody Journal of Education, Vol. 78, No. 4 (2003), pp. 230-241
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1492964
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PEABODY JOURNAL OF EDUCATION, 78(4), 230-241


Copyright ? 2003, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

The Politics of Accountability:


A Perspective From England and Wales
John Fitz
School of Social Sciences
Cardiff University

The notion of accountability is inherently political inasmuch as it raises


questions about who is accountable to whom and for what. How and
under what conditions accountability systems are constructed in turn
directs us toward issues of power and control. In this article, I examine
these interconnections operating in the British education system,1 and, for
analytical purposes, focus specifically on the 5 through 18 phase of
schooling. Although some of the structures and processes bear striking
similarities with the U.S. K-12 system, the British policy context stands
apart and provides an illuminating trans-Atlantic contrast because it is a
highly centralized national system of educational provision. It is also
highly market driven, with a strong emphasis on parental choice and
competition between diverse kinds of state schools. These two factors
mean there are some distinctive dimensions to the notion of accountability
as it operates in the United Kingdom.

1The term British formally denotes four territories, England, Scotland, Northern Ireland,

and Wales, each of which has a separate educational system. No recognized or elegant term
exists to speak of the combination of England and Wales, so I have chose to use British for
brevity and variety.

Requests for reprints should be sent to John Fitz, Cardiff University, School of Social
Sciences, 2.02 Glamorgan Building, King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff CF10 3WT, Wales,
U.K. E-mail: fitz@cf.ac.uk

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Politics of Accountability: England and Wales

Historical Background
In narrative terms, the 1944 Education Act provided the basis for the
governance of British education, much of which is still relevant today. As
well as establishing compulsory secondary education, the Act also created
the principle of local control through local education authorities (LEAs)
and local education committees. They were given the responsibility for
the planning and provision of education to meet community needs,
whereas the curriculum was a shared responsibility between LEAs and
schools, administrators, and teachers. They were expected to determine
curriculum content and modes of instruction in light of local preferences
and their own professional training and judgment. Often interpreted as a
national system locally administered, central government policy levers
were perceived as few and accountability diffuse. In the 1960s, one minister sardonically noted that his powers were limited to authorizing the
demolition of old air raid shelters on school grounds (Maclure, 2001).
Schools existed with low levels of external pressure either from government or from parents.

From the early 1960s, though, educational politics were dominated by


struggles over the existence of academically selective grammar schools,
and this resulted in central government intervention in a realm that hitherto was regarded as LEA territory, the local organization of schooling. A
series of studies had demonstrated that children from working class
backgrounds were underrepresented in the grammar schools, and such
schools came to be seen as the educational means by which social and
class divisions were reproduced (Floud, Halsey, & Martin, 1956). A grammar school education increased the chances of students obtaining qualifications required for higher education and entry into either the professions or into the better paid and more prestigious occupations in the
labor market. Nonselective, all-ability comprehensive schools were "bottom-up" creations, introduced by some LEAs in the late 1950s and early
1960s as means to overcome the perceived divisions caused by selective
education. Although Conservative governments supported selective
education, the first post-war Labour government acted cautiously and in
1965 issued only "guidance" to LEAs that it would fund only those
development plans that phased in nonselective schooling. It refused to
instruct LEAs to remove selective education, partly because of their historic powers, but it was equally keen not to lose the electoral support of
middle-class families. Today, of the 4,000 secondary schools in England
and Wales, about 160 are grammar schools, all of them located in
England. From the mid-1960s, the central government showed a greater
willingness to influence the local organization of schools, but curriculum
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J. Fitz

and pedagogy were still considered to be the responsibility of LEAs,


schools, and educational professionals.
Transformation came in the mid-1970s; an iconic speech by the then
Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan at Ruskin College, Oxford, in 1976
signaled the direction change was likely to take (Kogan, 2002; Phillips,
2001). He called attention to the wider social functions of education and

noted that it had to be responsive to the demands of a changing economy,


a restructured labor market, and the needs of employers. The curriculum
was no longer to be regarded as "the secret garden" of educational professionals. That was a precursor to radical changes in the policy-making
arena, which commenced under a neo-liberal Conservative government
in 1979. Between then and 1988, little attempt was made to consult with

teachers or LEAs, and bodies and organizations, such as the Schools


Council, which once had provided them with a voice at top table, were
disbanded. The Education Reform Act of 1988 (ERA 1988) represented both
the Conservative government's new right ideological preferences and its
commitment toward culturally conservative school knowledge (Fitz,
Halpin, & Power, 1993). The establishment of a National Curriculum and
local educational markets rolled back the 1944 principle of locally controlled public services in favor of the subordination of LEAs, schools, and
educational professionals to central agendas, in terms of both school organization and curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment.
Even in this brief historical outline of accountability in the British
system it will be evident that it is complex and somewhat paradoxical. In
the remaining sections of this article, I will tease out the politics of the
accountability system through a more detailed examination of the key
themes identified earlier: centralization and "choice and diversity."

Centralization: Reasserting Central Authority,


Putting on the Pressure
Centralization has been accomplished by the transformation of the state,
terms of both in institutional arrangements and an increase in the capacities

that this new ensemble has to regulate the various activities of LEAs,
schools, and educational professionals. At the heart of this process has been
the creation of a meso-state: nonelected, ministerially appointed agencies
responsible for the provision of aspects of education, social, and welfare
services. They are accountable upward to ministers, but have no clear lines
of accountability downward to citizens and electors. In education, for
example, teacher education is decided by the Teacher Training Agency
(TTA), whereas the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA)
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Politics of Accountability: England and Wales

monitors the National Curriculum and the national testing of students.

Nonministerial departments, the Office for Standards in Education


(OFSTED) in England and Estyn in Wales, operating with contracted registered private inspection teams, are the agencies responsible for the
inspection of LEAs, schools, and teacher education. These agencies also
have important functions in the policy-making arenas. It is also remains
that case that voices of LEAs remain muted. In the discourse of our time

they are "deliverers" of the curriculum and other policies, not the professional creators and crafters of teaching and learning polices and practices.
Within central government, and notably under Tony Blair's Labour
administration, prominence has been accorded to the coordinating role of
prime minister. His policy unit now ranks in influence alongside the
education secretary and civil servants in the department of state in the
governance of education.
The central state has also established a formidable institutional com-

plex with which to regulate curriculum and pedagogic practices in


schools and put pressure on schools. Central direction is conducted
through
1. A National Curriculum (NC), which all maintained schools are

required to teach, and associated testing procedures, in which children


undertake national tests at ages 7, 11, and 14 years, with the publication of
performance "league" tables for all schools in England, with Key Stage 1
(7 year olds) being the exception.
2. Inspection, on an initial 4-year cycle in England and a 5-year cycle in
Wales, by the semi-privatized inspectorates, against published criteria by
OFSTED in England and Estyn in Wales. Inspection reports are available
to parents. Schools under this system can be declared to be "failing," and,
if necessary, taken over and put into the "Fresh Start" program under
which existing teaching staff are dismissed. They are required to apply for
their former posts in the newly named and constituted schools. Similar
procedures also apply to LEAs.
3. National literacy and numeracy strategies (NLNS), introduced into
20,000 primary schools in 1998, requiring all primary schools in England
to devote 1 hour each day to teaching literacy and another hour to
numeracy. These hours are to follow a prescribed formula of whole-class
teaching and group and individual work. Wales has not adopted the prescribed hours.

4. A "national curriculum" for teacher education, devised by the TTA,


but bearing the marks of ministerial predilections, specifying, among
other things, length of training, period of school-based practice, and
levels of grammatical and numerical competence required by intending
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J. Fitz

teachers as well as a demonstrated ability in the management of wholeclass teaching (Carvel, 1997; Furlong, 2001; Gardiner 1997).
5. Target setting for schools and LEAs, another Labour government
initiative to set levels of attainment for each school and local authority
expressed in terms of the percentages of pupils achieving specified
grades. Persistent underperformance is likely to trigger the interest of
school inspectorates. Targets are also linked to:
6. Performance-related pay for teachers, although its official designation

is "threshold payments." Individual teachers apply to be assessed against a


basket of centrally generated criteria, including their students' performance.

The grip that the center has taken on the system has been justified as
action necessary to drive up standards. However, it also demonstrates a
lack of confidence in policies and practices of LEAs and educationists to
contribute to this policy goal. The accumulation of performance indicators, targets, and interventions on one hand and punitive initiatives on the
other shows in the starkest terms where power now resides. The Labour
government has not only been keenly committed to using the available
levers created by the Conservatives, but it has added a raft of its own, to
maintain pressure on schools to improve levels of attainment. Their first
"consultative" White Paper, Excellence in Schools, issued in 1997 (Department for Education and Employment, 1997), declared a zero-tolerance
policy for underperforming LEAs, schools, and teachers. That agenda has
been pursued more or less unremittingly through a series of standardsdriven reforms.

From the central government's standpoint, it can now point to the proportion of the 11-year-olds achieving benchmark standards in literacy and
numeracy rising by 19 percentage points and 20 percentage points,
respectively, in the period 1996 to 2002 (Earl, Watson, Levin, Leithwood, &
Fullan, 2003). Moreover, the figures show the number of 16-year-old students obtaining the official benchmark of five GCSE grades A* through C
has increased by 4 percentage points between 1996/1997 and 2000/2001

(Welsh Assembly Government, 2002). On this basis it has argued that


external, downward pressure and upward accountability really work and
that subordination of other stakeholders is less important than gains in
student attainment. However, how have the other stakeholders fared

under the accountability system just outlined?


LEAs have been squeezed and their former powers have been dimin-

ished in two respects. The central direction of curriculum and pedagogy leaves LEAs with important school and student support functions
(Firestone, Winter, & Fitz, 2000; Kogan, 2002; Riley & Louis, 2000) that
are primarily concerned with the "delivery" of central initiatives. They
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Politics of Accountability: England and Wales

act in this capacity in a number of ways: in the organization of the


numeracy and literacy strategies, by assisting and advising schools to
set performance targets, by providing guidance to schools in order for
them to meet the objectives set out in school inspection reports, and

through offering schools a menu of in-service professional development activities. Schools, as budget holders, however, can choose to pur-

chase continuing professional development services from LEAs or


other agencies, so in many respects a customer-client relationship now

exists between LEAs and "their" schools. Their second key role, as
planners, providers, and organizers of local schools, has been seriously
undermined by choice and diversity policies, and I discuss the implica-

tions for LEAs in the next section.

The organizational imperative in both primary and secondary schools


is to maximize levels of student performance in national assessments
(Gillborn & Youdell, 1999; Jeffrey, 2002). In response, many secondary
schools have been inclined to reintroduce forms of banding or streaming
(tracking students by ability) in the early years of high school (Earl et al.,
2003; Gillborn & Youdell, 1999). Moreover, many secondary schools have
also introduced measures to identify students at the threshold of C and D

grades in the GCSE classes (15- to 16-year-olds) and have put in extra
resources to maximize the chances of these students obtaining C grades,

because secondary schools are ranked according to the number of A*


through C grades students achieve in the GCSE exams (Gillborn &
Youdell, 1999). Primary schools have also been subjected to similar kinds
of pressures (Croll, 1996; Galton, Simon, & Croll, 1980; Pollard, Broadfoot,
Croll, Osbourne, & Abbott, 1994). In curriculum terms, schools have less
control over what is taught, its sequence, and pacing than prior to the
introduction of the NC. In order to teach the 10 NC subjects, one early
effect in primary schools was a reduction in the time devoted to literacy
and numeracy, with a subsequent fall-off in the standards achieved by
students in these fundamental areas (Galton et al., 1999). The literacy and
numeracy strategies have reversed those trends, but the time devoted to
the expressive side of the curriculum, in art, drama, and music, remains
unacceptably low.
For teachers, the debate focuses on whether and to what extent the
central government interventions have led to the "deskilling" of the profession (Croll, 1996; Furlong, 2001; Jeffrey, 2002). The most robust data
we have are those that come from two major longitudinal studies of primary school teachers (Croll, 1996; Galton et al., 1999; Galton, Simon, &

Croll, 1980; Pollard et al., 1994). These studies report a narrowing of


focus in the work of teachers, directed toward the interpretation and

implementation of the NC programs of study rather than the more


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J. Fitz

creative activities of innovative curriculum design matched to the particular needs of their children. There was also the sense that the NC and

its associated assessments were making teachers' relationships with students less personal. Although the immediate effect of the NC led teachers to feel more constrained in their professional practice in Pollard
et al.'s (1994) initial study, in its follow-up, teachers had redefined their
professional roles and reported feeling less constricted in their practices
(Croll, 1996). There is also broad acknowledgment that since 1988 teachers' work has intensified as they have been relocated, via the accountability system, into what is called a "discourse of performativity" (Ball,
2000; Jeffrey, 2002). In it, teaching success is narrowly defined in terms of

efficiency and outputs, as measured by student performance in tests,


meeting targets, and doing well in school inspection reports. There is,
however, an alternative to England's very strong accountability system
beginning to develop in Wales. It has abandoned national tests for 7year-olds, has more collaborative and less prescriptive national literacy
and numeracy strategies, no longer publishes league tables of school
performance, and is refining the NC for Wales, the Curriculum Cymreig.
Although schools and teachers are therefore monitored with a lighter
touch than their English counterparts, there is no research evidence yet
on whether, or to what extent, teachers in Wales have employed this
professional space to change or adjust their pedagogic and assessment
practices (Fitz, 2000).

Choice and Diversity: Power to Parents?


One of the key purposes of the Education Reform Act of 1988 (ERA

1988) was to diminish the LEAs' traditional role as planners and


providers of education. Local Management of Schools (LMS) effectively
devolved funding directly to schools. Subsequent to the 1988 Act, funding
arrangements progressively reduced the LEAs' share of the aggregated
school budget (the total sum available for schools and their administration). In effect, schools now have their own checkbooks and can purchase
services such as ground and building maintenance, professional development and in-service education, and school meals from contractors other
than their LEA. Schools have thus become relatively free-standing management units. School principals and governing bodies also continue to
have considerable control over hiring and firing. LEA representation on
governing bodies was reduced in favor of greater community and
parental membership, thus further diminishing their direct involvement
in the governance of schools.
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Politics of Accountability: England and Wales

The Act also introduced open enrollment, which meant parents could
express a preference for any school in their LEA (and after the Greenwich
high court judgment, any school), and, moreover, their children had a
right to attend any school with surplus places (Fitz, Taylor, Gorard, &
White, 2002). Open enrollment was linked to a per capita funding regime
where the number of students attending a school, not social or educational
needs, determined its share of the local budget. Any loss in student numbers therefore meant a reduction in a school's financial resources. School

are effectively under pressure to maintain their "market share" of students. The Act also created the grant-maintained (GM) schools policy
where, after a ballot of parents, enabled schools opt out of LEAs and
receive funding directly from the central government. The cumulative
effects of these policies transferred many LEA functions to schools and
parents. Previous plans to amalgamate, redesignate, or close schools in
order to reduce surplus places were disrupted by schools opting out or
threatening to do so from LEA control. Most striking is the fact the very
great majority of the grammar schools, which constitute 4% of all secondary schools in England, became grant-maintained. They preserved
the selective admissions policies in the face of LEAs, such as that of
Gloucestershire, that had progressively attempted to become fully comprehensive (Fitz, Gorard, & Taylor, 2002). There was downward pressure
on LEAs to become service agencies for schools, providing advice on
teaching and school effectiveness measures at a cost.
Even this brief account conveys the extent to which the then-Conservative

government put schools in the orbit of parental preferences. It further


increased school accountability to parents by the publication of school
inspection reports, league tables of schools' attainments in national tests,
and publication of student attendance rates. Labour governments since
1997 have embraced these policies. However, the historical planning and
providing powers of LEAs, especially their control over school admissions policies, have been further diminished under Labour's determination to "diversify" the system of secondary education.
I mentioned GM schools, although these have since been redesignated
as "foundation" schools. LEA-maintained schools are now called "com-

munity" schools, and faith-based state schools have become "voluntary"


schools. The ERA 1988 consolidated central funding for another group of
schools outside the control of the LEA, the City Technology Colleges
(CTCs). That trend to create schools outside LEA control extended into the

creation of "technology schools" in an initiatives that invited schools to


bid for funding to specialize in math, technology, and, later, languages,
performing arts, and sport. The Labour government seized on and
expanded what is now known as the "specialist schools" program and by
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J. Fitz

the end of 2003 aims to have about 30% of all secondary schools in
England designated as "specialist," a target it is well on track to achieve
(Gorard & Taylor, 2001). This is not the only program by which schools
can bid to the central government for extra resources. The Education
Action Zone (EAZ) initiative was an area-based policy designed to target
resources at disadvantaged communities (Gerwirtz, 1999). A zone includes
one or two secondary schools and designated primary schools working
together under a zone director and guided by a forum of parents and educational and local community and business representatives. In both these
initiatives, LEAs have been marginalized by the funding arrangements; in
addition, in the case of specialist schools, the schools themselves can
determine admissions arrangements. What is also significant in these
policies is Labour's determination to fund them via public-private coalitions. Applicant specialist schools and EAZs had to show they had raised
sums or had promises, in cash or kind-in the case of specialist schoolsof ?50,000 or more in order to attract matching grants from the central
government. How much hard cash has actually been raised from the private sector is difficult to judge, but it has proved less than easy for many
applicants to raise the required funds. At the time of writing, there is con-

siderable doubt as to whether either of these programs has contributed to


the government's objective of raising standards. The EAZs are being
wound up, and the measurable differences in performance between specialist and nonspecialist secondary schools, where they exist, can probably be accounted for by changes in the student intake of specialist schools
(Gorard & Taylor, 2001).
Different systems of choice, however, coexist in the United Kingdom
outside England. Wales, for example, has pulled away from England in a
number of respects. It has sustained and promoted a secondary school
system based on all-ability comprehensive schools. There are no selective
grammar schools in Wales, and it has not adopted the specialist schools
program, nor did it introduce EAZs. The intention has been to create a
system of choice between community-based schools broadly similar in
character.

The broad trend toward educational initiatives, in England and elsewhere in the United Kingdom, based on public-private partnerships has

been interpreted as the progressive privatization of public education


(Hatcher, 1998). The paradoxical situation of a Labour government purs-

ing such a course has not gone unnoticed. Programs such as the Private
Finance Initiative (PFI) funding of new schools and the refurbishment of
others involve financial consortia undertaking building projects that are
then leased back to LEAs for a substantial fee over a 30-year period (Fitz
& Beers, 2002). There are two sets of accountability issues here. The first
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Politics of Accountability: England and Wales

relates to the commercialization of education and the implications that


has for the character of a public service and student identities. The second
relates to questions of who owns and controls schools, for under PFI
arrangements, schools have to negotiate with contractors when and how
school buildings will be used for other, possibly noneducational purposes.
Moreover, it may also be the case that PFIs require maintenance staff contracts to move from schools to the private contractors. Thus far, few
schools have been privatized, but a strong framework now exists that
would enable many more to be taken over by private commercial or notfor-profit organizations.

Conclusion

I have examined the British education system along two dimensions.


Three broad conclusions can be drawn about the politics of accountability
within the current policy framework. The first is the general tendency
toward centralization. Developments in educational policy over the last
three decades have repositioned three key agents-central government,
LEAs, and educational professionals-in new relations of power and control. In general, this has involved transfers of authority from, and the sub-

ordination of, LEAs and the professionals to central government's policy


preferences. For LEAs, this means that they have a greatly reduced planning function, although they retain responsibility for supporting schools
and students in areas of curriculum and pedagogy. The implication for
teachers and other educational professionals is that they have become
reconstituted knowledge workers whose primary task is to deliver
nationally determined curricular and pedagogic strategies. The creative
side of teaching-devising instructional and assessment programs suited
to the needs and capabilities of actual students in class-has been considerably diminished. At the same time, a series of performance indicators in
the form of examination league tables, school inspection resorts, and targets measure their relative outputs and renders them both more visible
and more accountable to government and parents.
Second, policies such as open enrollment, per capita funding, and selfmanagement have created schools as free-standing cost centers and thus
subject to the vagaries of parental preferences and demographic changes.
LEAs have very few powers to protect schools from these external forces.
It can be argued that schools, and indeed families, have been placed in a
situation of "manufactured uncertainty" (Halpin, Fitz, & Power, 1997)
where many schools and parents face uncertain futures in competitive
local education markets. Schools certainly have become managerially
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J. Fitz

efficient, more market-aware, pressured institutions and parents have


been asked to bear greater personal responsibility for the choices they
make in school. In the language of poststructuralism, schools have
become self-policing institutions, doing what is needed to survive in the
market and staying below the radar of the school inspectors. In political
terms, however, this also looks like regulation via self-subordination.
Finally, in party political terms, Labour governments have shown surprising enthusiasm to intervene in the operation of schools in pursuit of
standards, to a degree that exceeds previous Conservative ambitions.
Both parties set education high on their electoral agendas, but Labour,
perhaps remaining true to its party's heritage of winning state power in
order to use it as a lever for a more equitable society, has recently invoked
it in order to lever up levels of student attainment. Paradoxically, it has
also shown itself willing to transfer the operations of schools and LEAs
officially judged to be failing to provide inadequate standards of education over to private, commercial organizations. Even where its social justice orientation shows through in targeting resources at socially disadvantaged communities, in policies such as the EAZs, it has insisted on
public-private partnerships to fund these initiatives. In these cases, public
schools find themselves located within a matrix of accountability relationships; upward to government and outward to communities and private
organizations involved directly in their governance.
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