1

Introduction
Civil society is one of the three important sectors of society, along with government and
business. As one of the most important elements of democratization process in the Philippines,
its strength and weaknesses determine both the speed and depth of the transition and it will, in
time, help to sustain the democratic system itself. Civil society is an arena, a forum in which
citizens associate to achieve a range of different purposes, some positive and peaceful, some
perceived as negative and violent. Civil society as it is usually referred to in the Philippines
means those organizations in which citizens associate in order to push for greater democracy in
the country.
On the other hand, A social movement is a particular form of collective behaviour in
which the motive to act springs largely from the attitudes and aspirations of members, typically
acting within a loose organizational framework. Being part of a social movement requires a level
of commitment and political activism rather than formal or card-carrying membership; above all,
movements move. A movement is different from spontaneous mass action (such as an uprising or
rebellion) in that it implies a level of intended and planned action in pursuit of a recognized
social goal, not uncommonly, social movements embrace interest groups and may even spawn
political parties: trade unions and socialist parties, for instance, can be seen as part of a broader
labour movement.
Interest in social movements has been revived by the emergence of so-called new
social movements since the 1960s: the womens movement, the environmental or green
movement, the peace movement, and so on. However, social movements can be traced back to
the early nineteenth century. The earliest were the labour movement, which campaigned for
improved conditions for the growing working class, various national movements, usually
struggling for independence from multi-national European empires, and, in central Europe in
particular a catholic movement that fought for emancipation through the granting of legal and
political rights to Catholics. In the twentieth century it was also common for the fascist and rightwing authoritarian groups to be seen as movements rather than as conventional political parties.

I. Civil Society

The term Civil Society has become a buzzword in Philippine development circles,
official as well as non-governmental. Commonly, and as shown in existing literature, people use
it to refer to that section of society that is non-state and non-corporate. The meaning comes
across pretty much along Marc Nerfins notion of three political actors, namely, prince, merchant
and citizen (Korten, 1989). The prince is metaphor for state and represents public for public
good. The merchant represents the corporate sector or private for private good. The citizen is
what represents civil society or private for public good. Civil society is sometimes meant in
holistic ways. At its most basic, it is viewed as a society of law and order, as contrasted to a
society in total chaos, commonly described as barbarian or uncivilized. Another holistic view
sees civil society as a society born out of social contract in contrast to one supposedly ordained
by god or king. This one traces back to the conceptual construction of such Enlightenment
thinkers as Locke and others (Turner 1993).
The notion also takes on narrower meanings. These meanings focus and emphasize more
on either values and beliefs or on institutions. In the Philippines, use of civil society includes
both. However defined, civil society is used in the Philippines in rather liberal fashion in the
sense of shifting from one meaning to the other or combining these different meanings with little
thought about rigor or qualification (Serrano 1994).
The use of civil society has been a subject of criticism in some circles, academic and
leftist in particular. Academic critic points precisely to the lack of theoretical rigor. One criticism
from the radical left says that the concept of civil society obscures and blurs the notion of class
and class struggle and even asserts that the state-market-citizen paradigm is but a rehabilitation
of Mussolinis trisectoral paradigm (BAYAN International 1995).
Other criticisms are more practical, pointing to an aversion to the introduction of one
more fuzzy concept when one can do with current terms that are already in abundance. Echoing
the sentiment of a group of NGOs, ex-Jesuit Dennis Murphy tended to shun the introduction of
civil society and called for a moratorium on outside ideas and concentrate on digging into local
history, culture and spirituality (Caroll, 1994). Jesuit Father John Carroll, an initiator of dialogs
on civil society in the Philippines, insists that the concept is still an appropriate term to use
(Carroll, 1999). In any case, one view argues that theres more to it than just fascination with
something trendy (Serrano, 1994).

The term entered the Philippine development discourse in the early 1990s, following
political changes in Eastern Europe from 1989 onward. Initially, the concept was loosely used to
mean almost the same as NGOs. Later on the meaning tended to be more inclusive,
encompassing various types of non-corporate private voluntary institutions advancing a variety
of public causes. Yet, even the use of the term NGO itself is fairly recent, somewhat of a post
1986 democratic transition phenomenon. Official registration by the Securities and Exchange
Commission still retains the name private voluntary organization (PVO), an American coinage,
used for such old NGOs like the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) which was
founded and incorporated in 1952 a year before the UN adoption of the name NGO.
Before the 1986 democratic transition from the martial law regime the most common
terms used were peoples organizations, mass movements, trade unions, cooperatives,
community organizations, coalitions, networks, federations, alliances, united fronts and the like.
These names are still current even as civil society became a catch-all nomenclature embracing all
these different institutions. The cycle of UN summits has legitimized the use of civil society
organizations (CSOs) to denote these institutional forms (UN-NGLS Handbook 2000).
The concept of civil society has evolved through time. From the enlightenment period of
the eighteenth century to modern political thinkers, the notion of civil society transformed from
one unified with the political society to one separated from it. Both Hegel and Marx suggested
the separation between the realm of the state as political society and civil society as the arena of
the individual and market relations. De Tocqueville, in his celebrated study of democracy in
America, emphasized the importance of associationalism and self-organization as vital attributes
of civil society, or an active voluntary sector, to provide a check on state power.
The development of the nation-state, the debate between the public and private spheres
and assertion of social autonomy were the precursors for the need to problematize the state-civil
society dichotomy. In addition to these classical trends, the current discourse on civil society has
been heavily influence by the Gramscian notion of civil society as a complex arena of struggle
that must be transformed in the process of social emancipation. This context accords equal value
to the goals of social and civic sectors in changing political structures and includes state-oriented
projects of organized forces as part of the process of emancipation (Serrano, 1994)

In contemporary usage, there are different versions of the concept civil society. The
triadic paradigm of the state, market and civil society has emerged as the dominant model, giving
birth to the neo-liberal version of civil society (Kaldor, 2002). Against the state-civil society,
the triadic model suggests a further division of civil society into two-the individual as economic
actor or part of the corporate sector and the individual as plain citizen (Serrano, 1994) or third
sector, reflecting Tocquevillean notions of volunteerism, implies the possibility of a principled
partnership (Perlas, 1999) with both the state and the market. Such organizations are neither
controlled by the state nor the market, but which play an essential role in facilitating the role o
both (Kaldor, 2002). They can substitute for the state as alternative delivery systems, check
powers and call corporations to account (Salamon, 1999; Powell and Guerin, 1997; Perlas,
1999).
Activities considered part of civil society according to Scholte (2000) involve a
deliberate attempt from outside the state and market, and in some other organized fashion to
shape policies, norms and/or deeper social structures. Civil society constituencies include
academic institutes, business associations, community-based organizations, consumer
protection bodies, development cooperation groups, environmental campaigns, ethnic bodies
foundations, farmers groups, human right advocates, labor unions relief organizations, peace
activists, professional bodies, religious institutions, womens networks, youth campaigns and
more.
This notion of civil society is broadly adopted by international organizations, such as the
United Nations and the World Bank. For the UN, the term civil society encompasses the entitles
of the third sector distinct from the state and from the private sector, which are engaged in nonprofit activities:

a civil society is the result of different components of populations and

communities, and refers to the sphere in which citizens and social initiatives
organize themselves around objectives, constituencies and thematic interests.
They act collectively through their organizations known as civil society
organizations which include movements, entities, institutions autonomous

from the state which in principle, are non-profit-making, act locally, nationally
and internationally, in defense and promotion of social, economic and cultural
interests and for mutual benefit. They intermediate between their constituencies/
members, with the state as well as with United Nation bodies. They do this
through lobbying and/or provisions of services. Though belonging to the nonstate actor category, they are different from the private sector and NGO as they
may not be registered, may replace the public sector, are not always structured
and often their members are not officially recognized (UN WSIS).

The World Bank (WB), as well, differentiates civil society organizations (CSOs) from
business organizations. CSOs are referred to as non-governmental and not-for-profit
organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their
members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthrophic
considerations and excludes organizations engaged in business. The bank identifies CSOs as
those including not just NGOs but also trade unions, community-based organizations, social
movements, faith-based institutions, charitable organizations, research centers, foundations,
student organizations, professional associations and many others (World Bank).
Relating to the Philippine context, Carino (2002) opts to differentiate the importance of
organizations belonging to the nonprofit sector, which includes the philanthropic sector and
highlights the quality of voluntarism in the dynamics of civil society at present. She argues that
the term nonprofit sector adequately conveys the essence of the space between the space
between the state and the market which is reflective of the UN and World Bank definitions of
the term civil society. Noting that defining Philippine civil society as wholly non-government
organizations points to the crucial element of the state in describing itself. Thus, Carino uses the
cumbersome term, as she puts it, the nonprofit sector and civil society to describe and define
the civil society sector.
Second, there are scholars who regard civil society as a realm outside political parties
where individuals and groups aimed to democratize the state, to redistribute power, rather than to
capture power in a traditional sense (Kaldor, 2002) an understanding of civil society which

Kaldor terms as the activist version. This characterization of civil society is heavily influenced
by Gramsci, and illustrates the nature of both old liberation movements and the new social
movements. David (1997) terms this exclusive view of civil society, limiting the membership
to those groups that specifically contest the state power and its policies, opposite to what Coronel
Ferrer (1997) describes as an inclusive stance where civil society includes all individuals and
institutions short of the state and its various apparatus. David (1997) defines civil society as the
totality of these self-conscious organizations that are accountable to a defined constituency, that
contest the power of the state and insist on a culture of involvement.
A third version of civil societythe post-modern argues that both neo-liberal and
activist definitions are part of a Western discourse, and prefers more culturally sensitive
concept, which includes various national and regional groupings and a contestation of
narratives (Kaldor, 2002).

The Environment
The role of NGOs in shaping and facilitating environmental policy has sometimes been
as great as in the case of agrarian reform, but only in certain cases or on certain issues. Illegal
loggingwhich caused a flood in Leyte in 1991 that killed at least 4,000 peopleand
environmental damage by irresponsible mining companies were the two main problems. Again,
Aquino did not make an impressive start. She first appointed Ernesto Maceda as secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), but he himself turned out to be an
illegal logger. Fortunately, he resigned to run for the Senate.
Already in the 1980s environmental NGOs were multiplying, both at the national and
local levels. Haribon emerged as the leading organization, critiquing national policy and
coordinating local actions. But the DENR was as often an enemy as an ally. Evidence against an
illegal logger would be gathered and presented to the DENR, but often it would take no legal
action, perhaps because one of its own staff was involved. And even if the underpaid DENR
lawyers did file cases, they might find that the local judge had been bought by the loggers.
Sometimes local NGOs, perhaps with the support of a mayor, would become so frustrated with

inaction from Manila that they would set up roadblocks to prevent illegal loggers from bringing
their trucks to the sawmill.
There were a few cases of remarkable persistence by citizens in nonviolent action. But
the logger often had his own armed guards or goons to scare away the protesters. In extreme
cases, citizens who were hurt by illegal logging and threatened by logging goons, would call in
the communist revolutionaries of the New Peoples Army for protection. (Sometimes, however,
the NPA would find illegal loggers useful, forcing them to pay revolutionary taxes.) Enforcing
legal restrictions on logging in remote areas was not an easy task even with an aroused citizenry.
Environmental NGOs were pleased to learn that Pres. Ramos would appoint an environmental
scientist as head of DENR. But as an administrator he was quite disappointing. When brought
information about wrongdoing in his department he might order an investigation, but would then
cover up the critical findings, and even protect the violator. Already by 1981, when Marcos
cronies were still cutting logs as fast as they could, timber production was half what it had been a
decade earlier. By the mid-l990s the Philippines had become a net importer of forest products. So
corruption spread from illegal logging to reforestation projects, though it was reduced when local
POs were brought into the implementation process.
Not until the appointment of Secretary Ramos (no relation to the president) in 1995 did
the DENR more consistently enforce the law. But, events conspired to make mining, rather than
logging, the most urgent problem. The Mining Act of 1995 facilitated explorations that seriously
encroached on indigenous land rights, and even triggered violent clashes. Both national and
international NGOs came to the assistance of indigenous peoples, who were usually poorly
prepared to deal with difficult legal and technical problems. The Catholic Bishops Conference
of the Philippines, advised by environmental NGOs, even passed a resolution calling for the
repeal of the Mining Act. But the mining issue that demanded the most attention from Secretary
Ramos was waste disposal, especially on the island of Marinduque. Marcopper Mining Company
was one of those many properties in which Marcos had had an interest. So it is not surprising that
Marcopper was engaged in illegal dumping of tailings in Calancan Bay for years during the
1970s. Fishing was severely impaired and the health of residents put at risk by the presence of
heavy metals.

In 1981 the newly created Diocese of Boac began to organize Basic Christian
Communities around the island, many of which began to protest environmental damage from the
mine. A small environmental NGO in Manila, led by Sister Aida Velasquez, began to assist such
protests at the national level. Within a few months after Aquino took power, as a result of local,
national and international NGO protests, an order was issued in Manila to halt dumping of
tailings in Calancan Bay. But the dumping actually continued. In 1988, the Canadian-managed
mining company appealed to Aquino to lift the ban, which she did. It was not until 1991 that the
dumping actually stopped.
In 1996 the Tapian Pit itself ruptured, flooding the Boac River valley with tailings.
Thousands were left homeless. Heavy metals contaminated water sources. Fortunately, the event
got extensive press coverage. NGO and Church pressure on the president and the DENR led to
the cancellation of Marcoppers mining permit and criminal charges against management for
violation of various laws and administrative orders. Marcopper promised rehabilitation of the
Boac valley and compensation for damages, but such action moved at a snails pace. Meanwhile
the company tried, largely unsuccessfully, to court NGOs and to buy off village officials in order
to get approval to reopen the mine. But the DENR, monitored by NGOs, applied strict standards
for environmental approval. The mine was still closed when Estrada took office in 1998.
Estradas appointment of a former congressman and an illegal miner from Mindanao to
head the DENR was a new test of NGO influence. Secretary Antonio Cerilles was subject to one
of the most extensive hearings ever by the Commission on Appointments, with many opposing
the appointment. The chair of the commission was favorably impressed with the objections
raised. But ultimately Cerilles was backed by the president and by the Mindanao bloc in
Congress and his appointment was confirmed. He proceeded to behave in office much as the
NGOs had feared. In fact, on his last day, just before Estrada was forced out in January 2001,
Cerilles issued numerous environmental compliance certificates to mines that could not have
passed a proper screening. President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed another ex-congressman as
secretary, but one with some acquaintance with the environmental movement. Heherson Alvarez
has actually courted NGO cooperation, hoping to avoid opposition in the Commission on
Appointments. But he is not personally popular in the Congress, and had not secured
confirmation as of this writing. In the meantime he has made some environmentally sound

decisions, and others that are questionable. Marcopper Mining has not resumed operation; the
Church and its NGOs in Marinduque are still vigilant. But it is hard to assess the present state of
environmental activism nationally. If world mineral prices should rise, mining companies are
likely to regroup and expand their influence. (Vitug, 1993)

II. NGO Representation in Electoral Politics

Even though DJANGOs and their cooperating POs constitute a remarkable mass
movement in the Philippines, which has been recognized ever since the Aquino administration by
a few top level presidential appointments, this movement has had, until recently, no mechanism
for direct representation in the electoral process. In fact, it has been a cardinal principle of the
NGOs to adhere to a non-partisan stance. It was feared that electoral involvement would
endanger their freedom of activity or at least jeopardize the minimal cooperation with
government at all levels that is essential for carrying out their projects.
When NGOs strayed from this policy and backed the wrong horse, as they frequently
did, the negative consequences were indeed evident. It was also discouraging to note that when a
particular NGO did back a (usually local) candidate, either openly or quietly, the choice of
candidate was sometimes based on kinship, friendship, or accumulation of utang na loob
elements of the traditional patron-client systemrather than on the candidates public record.
Nevertheless, there were a number of committed reformers, with personal integrity, who
achieved municipal, or even provincial, office in the late l980s and 1990s with NGO backing.
Some of these served with distinction in their respective positions. Others, however, were
tempted to plan for a political career and began to make alliances with traditional parties and
politicians, abandoning much of their reformist platform in the process. There was elation in
NGO circles in 1991 when the enactment of the Local Government Code included provisions for
NGO membership in local development councils. Even though the councils role was mainly
advisory, they did, in the more progressive communities, give NGOs a voice in policy making.
More often than not, however, NGOs learned that to be members of such councils was to be
under the thumb of the mayor or governor.

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Gradually the best minds in the NGO movement began to recognize that they must have
their own political parties, dedicated to human rights, social justice and human development, in
order to have an adequate voice at the national level. Fortunately, a little-known provision in the
1987 Constitution could give them some prospect of success. It mandated the election of 20
percent of the House of Representatives by proportional representation and required
implementing legislation before the 1998 election. (Until that point the president had been
authorized to appoint members representing marginalized sectors, perpetuating the fascist
corporatism of the Marcos era.) The Party List Act was passed in 1995. There were a few parties
formed with the support of NGO activistsusually not acting under their organizational names
to take advantage of this new process, most notably AKBAYAN!, led by moderate socialists.
Still, other NGOs remained aloof from the electoral process. But despite a very sophisticated
national organization with high-caliber leadership at the local as well as national level,
AKBAYAN! elected only one member to the Housemore, to be sure, than would have been
possible in a single-member district election.
The woman elected has since been recognized nationally as one of the most principled
and effective representatives, and was reelected in 2001. But the 1998 party-list election
generally was a near disaster. Only 14 of the 52 seats were actually filled because of endless
disputes over interpretation of law, exacerbated by a Commission on Elections which, for the
most part, did not understand its meaning and, in any case, was riven by other disputes.
That factional struggle is today worse than ever, sustained by the audacious and often
illegal actions of an Estrada appointee. Only five seats have been filled so far from the
2001election, even though those voting for party-list candidates increased by more than 50
percent over 1998.8 The method of screening party-list parties and the procedure for allocating
seats has been changed again by the Supreme Court, but is still, quite rightly, under dispute. This
denouement is the result, in part, of some old politicians trying to muddy the waters, to prevent
the new mechanism from succeeding. The law is internally contradictory and quite confusing;
even the Supreme Court has not adequately understood it. The COMELEC, despite the presence
of a few excellent members, is more immersed in corruption and infighting than at any time in its
history.

11

So the future of all elections, not just party-list, is in jeopardy. There are
recommendations for revision of the law before Congress, but there is not even consensus among
NGOs about what changes should be made, let alone among members of Congress. Divisions
within the NGO community are exacerbated by the laws provision of a three-member cap for all
parties, no matter how many votes are garnered. Thus incentives for wide, stable coalitions
among NGOs and their political party manifestations are nil. Yet progressive groups are so afraid
of traditional politicians swamping the party-list elections that they defend this cap. What does
not seem to be understood is that over timethough not in the next electionthe party-list
system will probably change the character of all parties participating in that system.
To elect 52 members in nationwide constituencies is not easily susceptible to
manipulation by traditional political patrons, but encourages parties with distinct policies or
interests. If disputes among members of Congress, Supreme Court justices and the
commissioners of COMELEC can be resolved in light of the experience of other countries, there
is still hope that NGOs and POs will be better represented in the legislature. But the outcome is
in doubt. (Wurfel, 1999)

III. Legal, Regulatory and Tax Issues

Nonprofit, non-stock organizations are exempted from taxation. CSOs can engage in
income generating activities. They are not required to pay income tax as long as they do not issue
dividends to their members and their revenues are used solely for nonprofit activities. The
Philippine Constitution guarantees the freedoms of speech, association, and assembly. The
government is under mandate to ensure peoples participation at all levels of policy-making.
However, all these rights have been suppressed at times, as happened in the case of the writ
suspension in 1971 and subsequent imposition of martial law in 1972. There are some disturbing
signs indicating stricter regulation in the future. These include the proposed national ID system,
CSO inventorization and accreditation, and funding restrictions targeted at outspoken and critical
CSOs. Some CSOs see the need to register with the SEC, many others dont even bother. A SEC

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registration is necessary to qualify as recipient of donations. But it is not a precondition to the

exercise of ones right to self-organization.
It may be safely assumed that many CSOs do not appear in the SEC list. At some point
such registration was considered a security liability by many organizations born before and
during martial rule and had links to the opposition or the underground movement.

How are they funded?

CSOs in the Philippines generally rely on donations, direct and indirect subsidies,
membership dues and earned incomes from their own business activities. Donations come from
both local and foreign sources in cash or in kind. They receive official development assistance
(ODA) by way of co-financing arrangements between donor governments and donor-country
CSOs. Private donations are transferred directly from donor CSOs in developed countries to
recipient CSOs in the Philippines without passing through government. Nearly all assistance
come in the form of program or project funding. Strategic funding is hard to come by.
Endowment funds for development CSOs are rare.
Development CSOs are highly dependent on public and private foreign assistance.
Competition for this scarce and dwindling resource has grown over the years, thereby causing
relational problems among CSOs. The quality of ODA has been the subject of much debate.
Earlier studies had already warned that If the appropriate institutions cannot be funded or if they
cannot operate freely the poor will generally be served best by no aid at all. Only when the
fixation on the quantity of aid disappears can the quality of aid begin to improve. [Hellinger,
Hellinger & ORegan 1988:6]. NOVIB and other NGOS in donor countries have been closely
monitoring and reviewing the ODA flows and have been coming out with regular publication on
the reality of aid [EUROSTEP & ICVA 1998].
Activist CSOs of the extreme left variety are normally shut out by official donor agencies
but manage to devise creative ways to access ODA, including financial support from like-minded
foreign CSOs. An undetermined amount of direct and indirect subsidies for people involved with
radical CSOs is provided by communities in the form of housing, food, meeting places, and

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transportation expenses. CSOs that have access to ODA, private foreign donations, and direct
citizen contributions may also have been supporting activist CSOs. Funding trends have been
shifting since the 1990s. Despite the overall decline in ODA flows, there is a noticeable increase
in the percentage of ODA monies that find their way to CSOs. Explorations in direct funding of
CSOs from ODA sources have resulted in some pilot programs.
Endowment funds created out of debts swaps fall within this modality. One pioneering
example was the conversion of debt to set up an NGO managed fund for the environment, an
outcome of negotiations in 1989 involving on one side, US officials and US NGOs, and on the
other, Philippine officials and Philippine NGOs. The Foundation for the Environment (FPE) was
set up in January 1992 to take charge of trusteeship and management of the fund. The FPE itself
was an offshoot of earlier efforts of the Green Forum Philippines (GFP), a green coalition
founded by a group of Philippine NGO leaders who embarked on a mission on environment
policy in the US in 1989 and who themselves were a party to the green fund negotiation. A
variant of grant with recovery provision is a US $20 million Global Environment Facility (GEF)
allocation for CSO-managed biodiversity conservation project. The fund was set up after a long
process of negotiation between the World Bank and the Philippine government and a group of
Philippine NGOs which formed themselves into a coalition called NGOs for Integrated Protected
Areas (NIPA) in December 1993. Another example is a debt-for-development swap to set up an
NGO-managed trust fund. This involved the retirement of the entire debt stock of the Philippines
owed to Switzerland, amounting to US$35 million. Since its creation in September 1995, the
fund has been directly managed by the Foundation for a Sustainable Society (FSSI) set up by a
consortium of Philippine NGOs for the purpose. Much in line with other similar processes and
set-ups, this fund was also a product of negotiations between governments and NGOs in the two
countries involved.
A number of CSOs are beginning to plunge into more aggressive business ventures in
anticipation of sharp decline or withdrawal of external funding support. The expected economic
upturn (before the 1997 Asian crisis) had put the country in the low priority in development
assistance. Some CSOs have started borrowing from former donor partners, and others have
themselves gone into banking. Two examples of this are the New Rural Bank of San Leonardo
initiated by the Management and Organization for Development (MODE) and the Lagawe

14

Highland Rural Bank organized by PRRM. Floating bonds, already practiced by some local
government units (LGUs), is a new thing for CSOs. The CODE-NGO, has just ventured into this
form of funding using their connection with the Macapagal-Arroyo government. This particular
initiative of the CODE-NGO has been criticized by another coalition, the Freedom from Debt
Coalition (FDC), as another form of increasing public indebtedness for an already debt-burdened
country like the Philippines5.
Other groups have criticized such initiative as an immoral and impermissible case of
rent-seeking, influence-peddling, or even outright plunder. Corporate foundations are on the
rise, as a response to growing popular pressure and demand for corporate social responsibility.
From the 1950s onward, corporate donations have been channeled to organizations like PRRM.
At the height of the resurgence of the revolutionary movement in the 1970s, these corporate
donors decided to set up their own outfit, the Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP), to
do community relations and some form of community development. PBSP has been sustained
through a fund created out of corporate-member contribution equivalent to one percent of each
members yearly profit.
Additionally, it has been a major conduit of USAID assistance. A fairly recent trend,
some big corporations have been setting up their own foundations and have involved themselves
in development and environment issues. Some of the more notable examples are Ayala
Foundation and Shell Philippines Foundation, both PBSP members. Some critics pejoratively
call this greenwashing, a trendy sort of corporate initiative to acquire a green image and avoid
accounting fully for the environmental costs of corporate practice. Competition for scarce
resources is creating a new dynamic among CSOs in the Philippines. Jealousies and mistrust
have resulted in strained relations and difficulties in building coalition around common issues.
Erosion of social capital due to the breakdown of mutual trust is a distinct possibility. Negative
trends notwithstanding, each CSO continues in its own way to make some contributions towards
strengthening the civic infrastructure of Philippine society. The bigger challenge is how these
otherwise disparate voices can come together to build a broad social consensus for the sake of
the countrys common future.

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How much do they matter?

CSOs in the Philippines do matter in many ways, but especially in influencing the course
of development in general. They do matter in politics and governance, in the way the economy
and society are being run. Such is their overall and collective impact. But different CSOs make
differentiated impact which varies according to strategic orientation. Based on such orientation
David Korten [1989] devised a schema of four generations of NGOs. The first generation is
relief and rehabilitation; the second, local self-reliance; the third, sustainable systems
development; and the fourth, mass/social movements for system change6. This may imply that
the first generation CSOs would have mainly local impact while the fourth generation CSOs
would impact on the whole society. This model may be criticized for being so neat and linear.
The reality of CSOs in the Philippines is more like a mosaic. Some CSOs might easily fit
in one or other generational category, others might be hard to pigeonhole. As well, the model
suggests a kind of progression in consciousness and level of activity. Indeed some CSOs might
start off with relief and rehabilitation and then graduate into other orientation through time. Yet
some CSOs partake of more than one strategic orientation all at once, sometimes all four
strategic orientations rolled into one cohesive whole. Revolutionary organizations in the
Philippines do all these. Gerard Clarke [1998] argues that the impact of Philippine NGOs is not
in the micro but in the shaping of macro politics. To prove his point he studied the cases of two
of the largest primary NGOs in the country. One is the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines
(TFDP), a human rights organization set up by church activists in 1974 during martial law. The
other is the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), considered one of the first rural
development NGOs organized 1952 by a group of prominent Filipino leaders in education,
industry, business and finance. These two organizations are archetypes of CSOs in the
Philippines. Although they had different beginnings, motivation, focus of attention, style of
work, among other differences, the TFDP and PRRM chose to confront in their own ways the
same challenges of human rights and development from the perspective of the oppressed classes
and sectors of Philippine society.
Many other CSOs in the Philippines, especially the activist kind, belong in this class.
Take PRRM for an illustration. Its roots trace back to what Korten [1990] described as a
legendary development movement organized by Dr. Y. C. James Yen first in the European

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warfront in 1916-1918 and then later in China. Founded in 1952, PRRM is a civic movement that
envisions a society of equity and sustainability.
The long future is one where ignorance, poverty, disease, and powerlessness shall have
been eradicated and development takes place within the carrying capacity of the environment.
PRRMs basic strategy addresses the interlocking problems of poverty, environmental
degradation, and social conflicts rooted in what it considers a flawed development model. Like
many other CSOs, PRRM is rooted in local action around very specific issues concerning social
and environmental justice. Its core field program, called Sustainable Rural District Development
Program (SRDDP), seeks to affect through a coalition of efforts some structural change at a
certain scale of sustainability at the sub-national level. The central element of this program is
community empowerment, a long and complex process designed to bring about the eventual shift
of power to the people and their communities. At every step, this process translates into
increasing the capacity of communities and local authorities for self-governance and communitybased management of resources. The hope is to be able to install a mode of governance that is
accountable to the citizens, can bring about eradication of poverty on site, and improve the living
and natural environments. Like TFDP and many other CSOs, PRRM also engages in shaping
public policy around the themes of agrarian reform, sustainable agriculture and rural
development, foreign debt, trade and ODA, human rights, peace, and environment. Through
research they are able to fill in information and knowledge gaps between decision-makers and
the local communities (Miclat-Teves 2000). The targets for advocacy and lobbying are the
national government, bilateral and multilateral agencies, and the corporate sector. PRRM helps
build networks and coalitions within the country, in the Asian region, and at the global level. The
impact of CSOs is indicated by a plethora of policies and legislation.
Tables 1 and 2 list some of the significant social and environmental policies and
legislations where the impact of CSOs may be reflected. [[Not included in the lists are several
other policies and legislations on women, children, human rights which certainly reflect the
influence of social movements. Table 1 lists those that were formulated during the Marcos era
and though they may not be attributed directly to any CSO lobby, given the climate of
suppression for much of that period, they nonetheless could be taken as part of a regimes
response to popular pressure. The citizens anti-pollution movement in Bataan, for example, had

17

emerged even prior to the imposition of martial law. Likewise, the 1972 Stockholm Conference,
which inspired the environmental legislations of the Marcos regime, was certainly a response not
only to mounting scientific evidence of environmental decay but also to a growing
environmental movement worldwide.]]

Table 1. Key Policies, Legislations and Programs during the Marcos Era
Marcos Era
(1975) Presidential Decree 705 - Forestry Code
(1975) Presidential Decree 704 - Fisheries Code Revised and consolidated all laws and decrees
affecting fishing and fisheries in the country
(1976) Presidential Decree 1067 - Water Code
(1976) Presidential Decree 984 - Pollution Control Law Provides guidelines for the
prevention, abatement and control of pollution of water, air and land
(1977) Presidential Decree 1219 - Coral Reefs Conservation
(1977) Presidential Decree 1181 - Vehicular Emissions Control Law Prevention, control and
abatement of air pollution from motor vehicles
(1977) Presidential Decree 1151 - Philippine Environmental Policy First mention of concept
of environmental impact system
(1977) Presidential Decree 1151 - Philippine Environmental Code Provides guidelines on
land use, air quality, water quality, waste management, and natural resources management
(1977) Presidential Decree 856 - Sanitation Code
(1978) Presidential Decree 1586 - Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System
Mandates EIS for government and private sector projects affecting the quality of the environment

18

(1979) Presidential Proclamation 2146 - Environmentally critical projects and environmentally

critical areas
(1980) Presidential Decree 600 - Marine Pollution (1976-as amended by PD 1698)
(Philippines Environment Monitor 2000, The World Bank, July 2000 Rio in Retrospect: The
Philippines and Global Agenda 21 1992 1996, PCSD, 1997)

Table 2. Key Policies, Legislations and Programs in Post Marcos Era

Post-Marcos Era
(1986) Philippine Constitution This contains the States obligation to protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. (Article 2, section 15 and 16)
(1987) Executive Order 192 Creation of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources
(1987) Republic Act 6657 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Exempts lands devoted to
reforestation, wildlife, etc. from land conversion
(1991) Republic Act 7076 Peoples Small Scale Mining Program
(1991) Republic Act 7160 Local Government Code Strengthens the role of LGUs in the
country
(1991) Ratification of the Montreal Protocol
(1991) Inter Agency Committee on Climate Change
(1992) Republic Act 7279- Urban Development and Housing Act
(1992) Executive Order 15 - Philippine Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD)
(1992) Republic Act 6969 - Toxic Substances, Hazardous and Nuclear Waste
(1992) Republic Act 7586 National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS)

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(1993) Philippine Population Management Program (PPMP)

(1993) Power Crisis
(1994) Ratification of Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)
(1994) Philippine Strategy for Biodiversity Conservation
(1995) Water Crisis
(1995) Republic Act 7942 Mineral Exploration, Development and Conservation
(1995) Republic Act 8172 Act for Salt Iodization Nationwide or ASIN
(1995) Social Reform Agenda
(1995) Gathering for Human and Ecological Security (GHES)
(1995) Executive Order 247 Bioprospecting
(1995) Executive Order 263 Community-Based Forestry Management Strategy
(1995) Philippine Action Plan for HABITAT II
(1996) Philippine Agenda 21
(1996) Executive Order 291 Improving the EIS System established in 1978
(1997) Republic Act 8371 - Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(1997) Republic Act 8435 Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization
(1998) Republic Act 8550 Fisheries Code
(1999) Republic Act 8749 Comprehensive Air Pollution Control Policy (otherwise known as
the Clean Air Act)
(2001) Solid Waste Management Act
(Philippines Environment Monitor 2000, The World Bank, July 2000 Rio in Retrospect: The
Philippines and Global Agenda 21 1992 1996, PCSD, 1997)

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Theres no shortage of policy and legislation on sustainable development in the

Philippines. If nothing else, this country would never miss making a law or creating a committee
for every problem. Discourses and debates on sustainable development in the Philippines, though
seemingly endless and paralyzing at times, almost always resolve in some policy or a piece of
legislation. This is true from the national level down to the barangay. And if its all there is to
sustainable development, the country should have been well on its way to sustainability which
doesnt seem to be the case. (Clarke, 1998)

IV. Civil Society and the Response to Globalization

The discourse on globalization among civil society groups goes beyond the identification
and analyses of policy issues in the new world order. Perhaps the most interesting and most
crucial is how civil society has mapped out strategies and explored avenues for action and
change. The diverse nature and dynamics of civil societys relations with the state, as well as
collaboration with other nongovernment/nonprofit actors is in itself suggestive of the breadth of
strategies and options. Likewise, the role of civil society in the debate is not limited to the mere
recognition of the ills and critique of the present system of globalization. But more significantly,
as a transformative unit in society with broad constituency and an actor in governance and
democratization, it has played a central function in advancing a people-centered agenda on
globalization. It should be recalled that during the deliberations on the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade-Uruguay Round (GATT-UR) Agreement for the Philippines membership in the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, civil society already figured considerably in
advocating for its non-ratification to safeguard the interests of the majority.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) utilized different mechanisms of engagement in the
debate, which catalyzed and further enhanced its participation in policy-making. Shared and
divergent perspectives on globalization have led to a variety of concrete actions employed,
reflecting certain dynamics and processes of engaging institutions of global governance,
including the Philippine government. (Cajiuat and Regalado, 1999)
Civil society has taken center stage in the current debates on globalization. Perhaps this
can be attributed to the long history of anti-globalization struggles in the developing world which

21

were largely initiated by non-state actors, particularly those which trace their roots to older
political and social movements. At the global level, the WTO flasco in 1999 that has now come
to be known as the Battle in Seattle set off alarm bells among global managers on the leverage
and capacities of civil society in challenging the conduct of multilateralism. In the Philippines,
peoples participation during the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Uruguay Round
(GATT-UR) ratification and the Manila Peoples Forum on the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1996 were just some of the concrete illustrations of the potentials
and limitations of civil society in the globalization debate.
Like the concepts civil society and globalization, civil societys role in the
globalization conundrum has been contentious. Studies tackling the interrelatedness of
globalization and civil society almost always portray the former as a factor that affects the latter
in various ways. Often, civil society is regarded as a counterweight to globalization, as it has
been countervailing power on authoritarian states and market power. There is also a prevalent
assertion that when civil society organizes itself globally, it emerges as a social force to resist an
assault by institutions of corporate globalizations (Korten, et al., 2002). On the other hand, civil
society in neoliberal theory and practice, may be an essential condition for the reproduction of
of liberal capitalism (Richards, 2000: 114). Civil society takes up diverse positions of the issue
which determines their roles in response to globalization. In analogous ways to the typology
offered by Held, et al., civil society can be categorized from those who maintain globalization, in
whatever form, is beneficial (supporters) to those who oppose any form of intrusion to national
sovereignty (rejectionists). There is also a middle position of reformists in which a large part of
global civil society resides (Anheier, et al, 2001:9) and who accept the realities of the spread of
global capitalism and interconnectedness but understand the necessity to ameliorate it, whether
through incremental or transformative changes, so that the distribution of its benefits will be
more equal. Outside this spectrum of strong support and opposition are groups who wish to get
out of the globalization process and to pursue their own strategy of development, through selfgoverning mechanisms the alternatives (Anheier, et al., 2001:7-11).
In addition to responding to particular policies associated with globalization, civil society
is seen as being able to contribute to basic principles of democracy and governance, transposed
to a global level. Perhaps the most common argument for civil societys apparent niche in the

22

globalization process is that contemporary civil society responds to the democratic deficits in the
present blueprint of globalization (Scholte, 2002; Bello 2001). Alongside this claim emerge other
promises (and possibly challenges) of civil society in the conduct of global governance
increasing public transparency and accountability of key actors. Building on the premise that
global civil society can be posed as a counterweight to globalization, Anheier, et al. (2001:16)
argue that if democracy remains confined to the level of the state, while various economic,
political and cultural activities are indeed going global, then only a global civil society can call
the into account. Bello (2001:228) further points out that civil society organizations, as major
international actors, underpin an effective internationalism that can check the power o political
hegenomic forces like the US government and transnational corporations. The principle of
legitimacy, often heralded as the most pivotal foundation of civil society participation on the
issue of globalization, is a confluence of the democracy and governance functions. Civil society
serves not only as a means of empowerment, but also as a democratic legitimation of the
governance of globalization where stakeholders are involved in the arena of global politics.
Scholte (2000:279) reasons that a global trade regime that is legitimated through civil society
would have better chances of achieving its aims than a regime that is produced solely by
technocrats. Furthermore, the cultural power and identity of civil society serves as a moral
ascendancy bestowing societal legitimacy on any corporate or government action (Perlas,
1999)

V. Social Movements
Social movements are purposeful, organized groups striving to work toward a common
social goal. While most of us learned about social movements in history classes, we tend to take
for granted the fundamental changes they caused and we may be completely unfamiliar with
the trend toward global social movement. But from the anti-tobacco movement that has worked
to outlaw smoking in public buildings and raise the cost of cigarettes, to uprisings throughout the
Arab world, contemporary movements create social change on a global scale.
Movements happen in our towns, in our nation, and around the world. The following
examples of social movements range from local to global. No doubt you can think of others on

23

all of these levels, especially since modern technology has allowed us a near-constant stream of
information about the quest for social change around the world.

A. Types of Social Movements

We know that social movements can occur on the local, national, or even global stage.
Are there other patterns or classifications that can help us understand them? Sociologist David
Aberle (1966) addresses this question, developing categories that distinguish among social
movements based on what they want to change and how much change they want. Reform
movements seek to change something specific about the social structure. Examples include antinuclear groups, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), and the National Action Committee
on the Status of Women (NAC). Revolutionary movements seek to completely change every
aspect of society. These would include Cuban 26th of July Movement (under Fidel Castro), the
1960s counterculture movement, as well as anarchist collectives. Redemptive movements are
meaning seeking, and their goal is to provoke inner change or spiritual growth in individuals.
Organizations pushing these movements might include Alcoholics Anynymous, New Age, or
Christian fundamentalist groups. Alternative movements are focused on self-improvement and
limited, specific changes to individual beliefs and behaviour. These include groups like the Slow
Food movement, Planned Parenthood, and barefoot jogging advocates. Resistance movements
seek to prevent or undo change to the social structure. The Ku Klux Klan and pro-life
movements fall into this category.
B. Stages of Social Movements
Later sociologists studied the life cycle of social movementshow they emerge, grow,
and in some cases, die out. Blumer (1969) and Tilly (1978) outline a four-stage process. In the
preliminary stage, people become aware of an issue and leaders emerge. This is followed by the
coalescence stage when people join together and organize in order to publicize the issue and raise
awareness. In the institutionalization stage, the movement no longer requires grassroots
volunteerism: it is an established organization, typically peopled with a paid staff. When people
fall away, adopt a new movement, the movement successfully brings about the change it sought,

24

or people no longer take the issue seriously, the movement falls into the decline stage. Each
social movement discussed earlier belongs in one of these four stages.
C. Theoretical Perspectives on Social Movements
Most theories of social movements are called collective action theories, indicating the
purposeful nature of this form of collective behaviour. The following three theories are but a few
of the many classic and modern theories developed by social scientists. Resource mobilization
theory focuses on the purposive, organizational strategies that social movements need to engage
in to successfully mobilize support, compete with other social movements and opponents, and
present political claims and grievances to the state. Framing theory focuses on the way social
movements make appeals to potential supporters by framing or presenting their issues in a way
that aligns with commonly held values, beliefs, and commonsense attitudes. New social
movement theory focuses on the unique qualities that define the newness of postmaterialist
social movements like the Green, feminist, and peace movements.
1. Resource Mobilization
Social movements will always be a part of society as long as there are aggrieved
populations whose needs and interests are not being satisfied. However, grievances do not
become social movements unless social movement actors are able to create viable organizations,
mobilize resources, and attract large-scale followings. As people will always weigh their options
and make rational choices about which movements to follow, social movements necessarily form
under finite competitive conditions: competition for attention, financing, commitment,
organizational skills, etc. Not only will social movements compete for our attention with many
other concernsfrom the basic (our jobs or our need to feed ourselves) to the broad (video
games, sports, or television), but they also compete with each other. For any individual, it may be
a simple matter to decide you want to spend your time and money on animal shelters and
Conservative Party politics versus homeless shelters and the New Democratic Party. The
question is, however, which animal shelter or which Conservative candidate? To be successful,
social movements must develop the organizational capacity to mobilize resources (money,
people, and skills) and compete with other organizations to reach their goals.

25

McCarthy and Zald (1977) conceptualize resource mobilization theory as a way to

explain a movements success in terms of its ability to acquire resources and mobilize individuals
to achieve goals and take advantage of political opportunities. For example, PETA, a social
movement organization, is in competition with Greenpeace and the Animal Liberation Front
(ALF), two other social movement organizations. Taken together, along with all other social
movement organizations working on animals rights issues, these similar organizations constitute
a social movement industry. Multiple social movement industries in a society, though they may
have widely different constituencies and goals, constitute a societys social movement sector.
Every social movement organization (a single social movement group) within the social
movement sector is competing for your attention, your time, and your resources. The chart in
Figure 21.9 shows the relationship between these components.

2. Framing/Frame Analysis
The sudden emergence of social movements that have not had time to mobilize resources,
or vice versa, the failure of well-funded groups to achieve effective collective action, calls into
question the emphasis on resource mobilization as an adequate explanation for the formation of
social movements. Over the past several decades, sociologists have developed the concept of
frames to explain how individuals identify and understand social events and which norms they

26

should follow in any given situation (Benford and Snow 2000; Goffman 1974; Snow et al. 1986).
A frame is a way in which experience is organized conceptually. Imagine entering a restaurant.
Your frame immediately provides you with a behaviour template. It probably does not occur to
you to wear pajamas to a fine dining establishment, throw food at other patrons, or spit your
drink onto the table. However, eating food at a sleepover pizza party provides you with an
entirely different behaviour template. It might be perfectly acceptable to eat in your pajamas, and
maybe even throw popcorn at others or guzzle drinks from cans. Similarly, social movements
must actively engage in realigning collective social frames so that the movements interests,
ideas, values, and goals become congruent with those of potential members. The movements
goals have to make sense to people to draw new recruits into their organizations.
Successful social movements use three kinds of frames (Snow and Benford 1988) to
further their goals. The first type, diagnostic framing, states the social movement problem in a
clear, easily understood way. When applying diagnostic frames, there are no shades of grey:
instead, there is the belief that what they do is wrong and this is how we will fix it. The antigay marriage movement is an example of diagnostic framing with its uncompromising insistence
that marriage is only between a man and a woman. Any other concept of marriage is framed as
sinful or immoral. Prognostic framing, the second type, offers a solution and states how it will be
implemented.
When looking at the issue of pollution as framed by the environmental movement, for
example, prognostic frames would include direct legal sanctions and the enforcement of strict
government regulations or the imposition of carbon taxes or cap-and-trade mechanisms to make
environmental damage more costly. As you can see, there may be many competing prognostic
frames even within social movements adhering to similar diagnostic frames. Finally,
motivational framing is the call to action: what should you do once you agree with the diagnostic
frame and believe in the prognostic frame? These frames are action-oriented. In the aboriginal
justice movement, a call to action might encourage you to join a blockade on contested
aboriginal treaty land or contact your local MP to express your viewpoint that aboriginal treaty
rights be honoured.
With so many similar diagnostic frames, some groups find it best to join together to
maximize their impact. When social movements link their goals to the goals of other social

27

movements and merge into a single group, a frame alignment process (Snow et al. 1986) occurs
an ongoing and intentional means of recruiting a diversity of participants to the movement.
For example, Carroll and Ratner (1996) argue that using a social justice frame makes it possible
for a diverse group of social movementsunion movements, environmental movements,
aboriginal justice movements, gay rights movements, anti-poverty movements, etc.to form
effective coalitions even if their specific goals do not typically align.
This frame alignment process involves four aspects: bridging, amplification, extension,
and transformation. Bridging describes a bridge that connects uninvolved individuals and
unorganized or ineffective groups with social movements that, though structurally unconnected,
nonetheless share similar interests or goals. These organizations join together creating a new,
stronger social movement organization.
In the amplification model, organizations seek to expand their core ideas to gain a wider,
more universal appeal. By expanding their ideas to include a broader range, they can mobilize
more people for their cause. For example, the Slow Food movement extends its arguments in
support of local food to encompass reduced energy consumption and reduced pollution, plus
reduced obesity from eating more healthfully, and other benefits.
In extension, social movements agree to mutually promote each other, even when the two
social movement organizations goals do not necessarily relate to each others immediate goals.
This often occurs when organizations are sympathetic to each others causes, even if they are not
directly aligned, such as womens equal rights and the civil rights movement.
Transformation involves a complete revision of goals. Once a movement has succeeded,
it risks losing relevance. If it wants to remain active, the movement has to change with the
transformation or risk becoming obsolete. For instance, when the womens suffrage movement
gained women the right to vote, they turned their attention to equal rights and campaigning to
elect women. In short, it is an evolution to the existing diagnostic or prognostic frames generally
involving a total conversion of movement.
3. New Social Movement Theory

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New social movement theory emerged in the 1970s to explain the proliferation of
postindustrial, quality-of-life movements that are difficult to analyze using traditional social
movement theories (Melucci 1989). Rather than being based on the grievances of particular
groups striving to influence political outcomes or redistribute material resources, new social
movements (NSMs) like the peace and disarmament, environmental, and feminist movements
focus on goals of autonomy, identity, self-realization, and quality-of-life issues. As the German
Green Party slogan of the 1980s suggestsWe are neither right nor left, but aheadthe appeal
of the new social movements also tends to cut across traditional class, party politics, and
socioeconomic affiliations to politicize aspects of everyday life traditionally seen as outside
politics. Moreover, the movements themselves are more flexible, diverse, shifting, and informal
in participation and membership than the older social movements, often preferring to adopt
nonhierarchical modes of organization and unconventional means of political engagement (such
as direct action).
Melucci (1994) argues that the commonality that designates these diverse social
movements as new is the way in which they respond to systematic encroachments on the
lifeworld, the shared inter-subjective meanings and common understandings that form the
backdrop of our daily existence and communication. The dimensions of existence that were
formally considered private (e.g., the body, sexuality, interpersonal affective relations),
subjective (e.g., desire, motivation, and cognitive or emotional processes), or common (e.g.,
nature, urban spaces, language, information, and communicational resources) are increasingly
subject to social control, manipulation, commodification, and administration. However, as
Melucci (1994) argues, these are precisely the areas where individuals and groups lay claim to
their autonomy, where they conduct their search for identity and construct the meaning of what
they are and what they do.

29

Conclusion
We have identified two basic modalities of the process of change and development. There
are, in effect, two fundamental intellectual and political projects at playanother development
and social transformationboth at odds with the economic model of neoliberal capitalist
development and its associated project of globalization. In the mainstream of development
thought and practice, there is no question about pursuing the path of social transformation.
However, it is possible to identify a number of permutations in the search for an alternative form
of development, including efforts to secure sustainable livelihoods of people in the rural sector.
Despite (or perhaps because of) its reformist orientation as well as its commitment to allay the
negative effects of neoliberal policies and the associated project of globalization and structural
adjustment, the SLA arguably has the greatest potential and prospects for bringing about an
appreciable improvement in the quality of life of the rural poor.
The reason for this is that the political conditions for a revolutionary path toward
development are simply not available and not likely to result from a confrontational political
approach. Protest against the system and policies in place is one thing, even where the capacity
to mobilize oppositional forces in the popular sector into a united front exists. But to bring about
the changes needed to open up a revolutionary path toward development is something altogether
different.

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