(c) crown copyright

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T H I S D O C U M E N T I S T H E P R O P E R T Y OP H I S BRITANNIC M A J E S T V S G O V E R N M E N T

Printed

for the Cabinet.

January 1939.

SECRET.

Copy No.

C P . 4 (39).

CABINET.

PALESTINE.

Memorandum

by the Secretary

of State for the

Colonies.

I A P O L O G I S E sincerely for t h e g r e a t l e n g t h of t h e f o l l o w i n g m e m o r a n d u m .
B u t t h e decisions w h i c h w e h a v e t o t a k e o n t h e P a l e s t i n e q u e s t i o n w i l l be so
i m p o r t a n t a n d a r e likely t o a r o u s e so m u c h c o n t r o v e r s y t h a t I feel m y colleagues
w i l l e x p e c t me t o set o u t t h e p r o b l e m a t t h e m i n i m u m l e n g t h w h i c h is c o m p a t i b l e
w i t h s t a t i n g t h e m a i n issues, a n d I h a v e f o u n d i t impossible t o m a k e t h e s t a t e m e n t
s h o r t e r . B u t I h a v e i n s e r t e d a n u m b e r of cross h e a d i n g s w h i c h w i l l e n a b l e m y
colleagues to o m i t f r o m t h e i r r e a d i n g sections d e a l i n g w i t h m a t t e r s w i t h w h i c h
t h e y a r e a l r e a d y f a m i l i a r . F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e e a r l i e r sections m e r e l y c o n t a i n a n
a c c o u n t of t h e p r o m i s e s w h i c h B r i t i s h a n d o t h e r G o v e r n m e n t s h a v e m a d e t o J e w s
a n d A r a b s respectively, a n d of t h e c l a i m s w h i c h these t w o p a r t i e s base u p o n those
p r o m i s e s . T h e r e a l d i s c u s s i o n of t h e issues o n w h i c h w e h a v e to r e a c h decisions
does n o t b e g i n u n t i l t h e section h e a d e d " F u t u r e P o l i c y . "
I should like t o a d d one o t h e r p o i n t t o those m a d e i n t h e m e m o r a n d u m
itself. I t r e l a t e s to t h e p e r s o n n e l of t h e B r i t i s h A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h e A d m i n i s
t r a t i o n c o n t a i n s m a n y good officers, b u t i t also c o n t a i n s o t h e r s w h o o u g h t t o be
t r a n s f e r r e d a s soon a s possible f r o m P a l e s t i n e t o w o r k i n o t h e r p a r t s of t h e
C o l o n i a l E m p i r e w h e r e t h e p r o b l e m is s i m p l e r . I n d e e d , t h i s is e s s e n t i a l if f u t u r e
policy i n P a l e s t i n e is t o be successfully a d m i n i s t e r e d . T h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r
a n d I h a v e a l r e a d y g i v e n some c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h i s question, a n d h e is i n a g r e e
m e n t w i t h me u p o n it. A m e m b e r of t h e P e r s o n n e l D i v i s i o n i n t h e C o l o n i a l Office
is v i s i t i n g J e r u s a l e m s h o r t l y to discuss t h e m a t t e r i n d e t a i l , a n d , w i t h t h e a d v i c e
of S i r H a r o l d M a c M i c h a e l , whose e x p e r i e n c e of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n is i n v a l u a b l e , I
h o p e t o i m p r o v e c o n s i d e r a b l y t h e B r i t i s h p e r s o n n e l i n P a l e s t i n e over t h e n e x t
few m o n t h s .
T h o u g h I a m c i r c u l a t i n g t h i s p a p e r a t once t o t h e w h o l e C a b i n e t for t h e i r
i n f o r m a t i o n , i t w i l l be discussed, i n t h e first i n s t a n c e , by t h e C a b i n e t C o m m i t t e e
on P a l e s t i n e .
T h e C o m m i t t e e w i l l r e p o r t u p o n i t to t h e C a b i n e t a s soon a s
possible.
M. M.

Colonial Of/ice, January

[18502]

18, 1939.

49

MEMORANDUM.
I T m u s t be o u r h o p e t h a t i n t h e f o r t h c o m i n g discussions i n L o n d o n t h e
conflicting claims of A r a b s a n d J e w s i n P a l e s t i n e m a y be resolved by a g r e e m e n t ,
b u t I h a v e to a d m i t t h a t t h e omens a r e n o t good. M a n y y e a r s of i n c r e a s i n g l y
b i t t e r p o l i t i c a l conflict, p u n c t u a t e d a t i n t e r v a l s by m u r d e r o u s o u t b r e a k s by t h e
A r a b s a g a i n s t the J e w s , a n d finishing u p w i t h t w o y e a r s of s u s t a i n e d A r a b
rebellion a g a i n s t t h e G o v e r n m e n t , h a v e left t e m p e r s on b o t h sides sullen, h a r d a n d
u n c o m p r o m i s i n g . T h e p r o s p e c t of a g r e e m e n t is n o t h o p e l e s s ; c e r t a i n f a c t o r s such
a s a g r o w i n g r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n is absolutely i n t o l e r a b l e for all
concerned, a n d the p r e s e n c e a t t h e L o n d o n discussions of m o d e r a t i n g influences
o n b o t h sides (i.e., t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of n e i g h b o u r i n g A r a b c o u n t r i e s o n t h e one
side, a n d of n o n - Z i o n i s t s on t h e other), c a n p e r h a p s be e x p l o i t e d to achieve some
sort of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B u t i t is e s s e n t i a l t h a t H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t should
be r e a d y w i t h t h e b r o a d l i n e s of a s e t t l e m e n t w h i c h t h e y w o u l d a n n o u n c e a n d
be p r e p a r e d to p u t i n t o effect f o r t h w i t h i n t h e e v e n t of a b r e a k d o w n of the
discussions. T h i s s e t t l e m e n t should r e p r e s e n t a c o m p r o m i s e w h i c h w o u l d a p p e a l
i n c r e a s i n g l y t o r e a s o n a b l e elements on b o t h sides, a n d w h i c h w o u l d be likely a t
once t o commend itself t o p u b l i c a n d p a r l i a m e n t a r y o p i n i o n in t h i s c o u n t r y , a n d
t o w o r l d o p i n i o n , as on t h e whole j u s t a n d p r a c t i c a b l e i n t h e l i g h t of o u r p l e d g e s
a n d of the c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t h a v e a r i s e n since those p l e d g e s w e r e given.
2. I n t h i s m e m o r a n d u m , a f t e r a n a l y s i n g t h e r i g h t s a n d c l a i m s of J e w s a n d
A r a b s , I h a v e sketched i n b r o a d o u t l i n e t h e k i n d of s e t t l e m e n t w h i c h , t h o u g h i t
i s u n l i k e l y t o s a t i s f y e i t h e r p a r t y , a p p e a r s to me to do j u s t i c e t o t h e r e a l i t i e s of
t h e s i t u a t i o n , a n d to be defensible i n t h e l i g h t of o u r o b l i g a t i o n s a n d of t h e
r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s of A r a b s a n d J e w s . Moreover, I w o u l d v e n t u r e to h o p e
t h a t a settlement on these lines m i g h t p r o v i d e a basis u p o n w h i c h , w h e n t e m p e r s
h a v e cooled, c o - o p e r a t i o n between A r a b s a n d J e w s i n P a l e s t i n e m i g h t be f o u n d e d .
3. T h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r for P a l e s t i n e h a s been consulted, a n d h a s
e x p r e s s e d t h e g e n e r a l c o n c u r r e n c e of himself and. h i s a d v i s e r s i n these p r o p o s a l s .
B u t I should a d d t h a t h e h a s let m e k n o w t h a t , i n t h e e v e n t of t h e A r a b
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s n o t a g r e e i n g to the p r o p o s a l s r e g a r d i n g J e w i s h i m m i g r a t i o n
w h i c h I m a k e i n p a r a g r a p h 52 (B), h e w o u l d f a v o u r g o i n g m u c h f u r t h e r i n t h e
d i r e c t i o n of r e d u c i n g i m m i g r a t i o n .
PROMISES TO JEWS AND AKABS.
4. T h e a r g u m e n t s e s t i m a t i n g t h e e x a c t w e i g h t
p r o m i s e s to J e w s a n d A r a b s respectively h a v e been
f a i r n e s s by t h e P e e l Commission, a n d I need n o t r e p e a t
B u t i t is necessary t o r e c a p i t u l a t e t h e m a i n p r o m i s e s
riients h a v e m a d e t o t h e J e w s a n d A r a b s .

to be a t t a c h e d t o o u r
set f o r t h w i t h e m i n e n t
m u c h of w h a t t h e y say.
which B r i t i s h Govern

5. O u r u n d e r t a k i n g s to t h e J e w s a r e f o u n d e d u p o n t h e B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n ,
w h i c h w a s conveyed i n 1917 to L o r d R o t h s c h i l d as h e a d of t h e Z i o n i s t O r g a n i s a
t i o n i n a l e t t e r w h i c h c o n t a i n e d t h e following :
" I h a v e m u c h p l e a s u r e i n c o n v e y i n g to y o u on behalf of H i s M a j e s t y ' s
G o v e r n m e n t t h e f o l l o w i n g d e c l a r a t i o n of s y m p a t h y w i t h J e w i s h Z i o n i s t
a s p i r a t i o n s , w h i c h h a s been s u b m i t t e d to a n d a p p r o v e d by t h e C a b i n e t :
' H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t view w i t h f a v o u r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t i n
P a l e s t i n e of a N a t i o n a l H o m e for the J e w i s h people, a n d w i l l use t h e i r
best e n d e a v o u r s t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of t h i s object, i t being
clear ly u n d e r s t o o d t h a t n o t h i n g s h a l l be done w h i c h m a y p r e j u d i c e t h e
civil a n d r e l i g i o u s r i g h t s of e x i s t i n g n o n - J e w i s h c o m m u n i t i e s i n
P a l e s t i n e , o r t h e r i g h t s a n d p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s enjoyed by J e w s i n a n y o t h e r
country.' "
6. T h i s D e c l a r a t i o n w a s a p p r o v e d before i t s issue by t h e A m e r i c a n G o v e r n
m e n t , a n d l a t e r by t h e F r e n c h a n d I t a l i a n G o v e r n m e n t s .

7. A f t e r t h e W a r t h i s p r o m i s e to t h e J e w s w a s embodied i n t h e P a l e s t i n e
M a n d a t e . A f t e r r e p e a t i n g t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n t h e P r e a m b l e
to t h e M a n d a t e c o n t i n u e s :
" W h e r e a s r e c o g n i t i o n h a s t h e r e b y been given t o t h e h i s t o r i c a l connection
of t h e J e w i s h p e o p l e w i t h P a l e s t i n e a n d to t h e g r o u n d s for r e c o n s t i t u t i n g
t h e i r n a t i o n a l home i n t h a t c o u n t r y
"
a n d in d u e course come t h e following A r t i c l e s :

Article

2.

" T h e M a n d a t o r y shall be r e s p o n s i b l e for p l a c i n g t h e c o u n t r y u n d e r

s u c h p o l i t i c a l , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d economic c o n d i t i o n s a s w i l l secure t h e
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e J e w i s h n a t i o n a l home, a s l a i d d o w n i n t h e p r e a m b l e ,
a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of s e l f - g o v e r n i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d also for s a f e g u a r d i n g
t h e civil a n d r e l i g i o u s r i g h t s of a l l t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of P a l e s t i n e , i r r e s p e c t i v e
of r a c e a n d r e l i g i o n . "

Article

6.

" T h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of P a l e s t i n e , w h i l e e n s u r i n g t h a t t h e r i g h t s a n d
p o s i t i o n of o t h e r sections of t h e p o p u l a t i o n a r e n o t p r e j u d i c e d , shall f a c i l i t a t e
J e w i s h i m m i g r a t i o n u n d e r s u i t a b l e c o n d i t i o n s a n d shall e n c o u r a g e , i n
c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e J e w i s h a g e n c y r e f e r r e d t o in A r t i c l e 4, close s e t t l e m e n t
by J e w s on t h e l a n d , i n c l u d i n g S t a t e l a n d s a n d w a s t e l a n d s not r e q u i r e d for
public purposes."
8. T h e r e a r e v a r i o u s o t h e r A r t i c l e s "which t o u c h u p o n different a s p e c t s of
t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e J e w i s h N a t i o n a l H o m e , b u t t h e P r e a m b l e a n d A r t i c l e s 2
a n d 6 c o n t a i n t h e m a i n p l e d g e s . I a t t a c h a copy of t h e whole M a n d a t e t o t h i s
memorandum.
9. W e m u s t r e m e m b e r t h a t t h i s M a n d a t e w a s e n d o r s e d by m o r e t h a n
50 n a t i o n s a t G e n e v a a n d blessed by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s of A m e r i c a . I n t h e o r y
a t least we a r e t h e a g e n t of t h i s f o r m i d a b l e body of w o r l d o p i n i o n f o r c a r r y i n g
o u t t h e M a n d a t e d t e r m s , a n d Z i o n i s t influence h a s succeeded u p t o n o w i n
m a k i n g these n a t i o n s p l a c e p a r t i c u l a r e m p h a s i s on o u r o b l i g a t i o n s to t h e J e w s
as d i s t i n c t f r o m o u r o b l i g a t i o n s to t h e A r a b s . T h i s is o n e of t h e m a n y f a c t o r s
t h a t w e h a v e to k e e p i n m i n d i n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e P a l e s t i n e p r o b l e m , for t h e
a d o p t i o n by u s of a n y policy w h i c h w a s r e g a r d e d by t h e r e s t of t h e i n t e r e s t e d
w o r l d a s a b r e a c h of o u r ( a n d t h e i r ) p r o m i s e s to t h e J e w s w o u l d u n d o u b t e d l y
l e a d to i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t i n g s a n d to c h a r g e s of w e a k n e s s a g a i n s t u s a n d s e r i o u s
loss of confidence i n o u r good w o r d .
10. I f t h e p r o m i s e s t h a t w e m a d e to t h e J e w s w e r e r a t h e r loosely w o r d e d
(for e x a m p l e , w h a t does a " J e w i s h N a t i o n a l H o m e " m e a n ? ) o u r w a r - t i m e
p r o m i s e s t o t h e A r a b s r e g a r d i n g P a l e s t i n e w e r e also o p e n to different i n t e r p r e
t a t i o n s , a n d h a v e led t o c o n t r o v e r s y ever since. I do n o t p r o p o s e to p r e s e n t h e r e
t h e r i v a l a r g u m e n t s a b o u t t h e e x a c t significance of p h r a s e s w h i c h w e r e u s e d i n
t h e M c M a h o n c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h K i n g H u s s e i n . Suffice i t t o say. t h a t i n those
official d o c u m e n t s t h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t p r o m i s e d t h e A r a b s t h a t t h e y w o u l d
recognise a n d s u p p o r t A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e over a v a s t p a r t of A r a b i a a p r o m i s e
w h i c h h a s been h a n d s o m e l y c a r r i e d o u t since t h e W a r i n I r a q a n d e l s e w h e r e .
B u t a c e r t a i n a r e a , defined a s " t h e d i s t r i c t s of M e r s i n a a n d A l e x a n d r e t t a a n d
t h e p o r t i o n s of S y r i a l y i n g to t h e w e s t of t h e d i s t r i c t s of D a m a s c u s , Horns, H a m a
a n d A l e p p o , " w a s described in S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n ' s l e t t e r a s n o t b e i n g p u r e l y
A r a b a n d w a s specifically e x c e p t e d f r o m t h e p l e d g e . ( M a p N o . 1 i n t h e P e e l
R e p o r t shows these d i s t r i c t s i n r e l a t i o n to P a l e s t i n e . ) T h e A r a b s i n P a l e s t i n e ,
w i t h t h e s u p p o r t of t h e i r fellows i n n e i g h b o u r i n g c o u n t r i e s , h a v e a l w a y s held t h a t
P a l e s t i n e w a s n o t i n t h i s e x c l u d e d a r e a , a n d t h a t o u r r e f u s a l t o allow t h e A r a b s
self-government i n P a l e s t i n e is a b r e a c h of o u r solemn p r o m i s e to t h e A r a b
peoples.
W e h a v e c o n s i s t e n t l y a r g u e d t h a t P a l e s t i n e w a s covered by t h e
p h r a s e o l o g y q u o t e d above. So f a r a s p u r e l y legal a r g u m e n t s a r e concerned, t h i s
s e r i o u s difference of o p i n i o n lies a t t h e root of t h e controversy b e t w e e n t h e Arabs
a n d ourselves, a n d i s t h e b a s i s of A r a b o p p o s i t i o n to t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a J e w i s h
N a t i o n a l H o m e in Palestine.
11. N o d o u b t t h e r e is room for c o n s i d e r a b l e a r g u m e n t a s t o w h e t h e r
P a l e s t i n e w a s or w a s n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e a r e a from w h i c h self-government w a s t o
[18502]
B 2

be withheld. The phrase used was, unfortunately, vague, and it is a thousand

pities that, perhaps owing to the exigencies of war, the authors of the McMahon
correspondence did not make it clear to the Arabs beyond any reasonable doubt
that Palestine was not to be theirs. Certainly, the Arab belief that we intended
Palestine to belong to them, and that its withholding was an after-thought, is
genuine, and they regard their ownership of it as one of our commitments. On
the other hand, I believe that it is perfectly true that the British Government of
the time did intend to exclude Palestine. "Responsible statesmen of the day have
been unanimous in saying so, and Sir Henry McMahon has said so. As the matter
will certainly form a subject of discussion when the Arab representatives come to
London, the Foreign Office are circulating separately some notes upon it as well
as upon other legal aspects of the Arab case.
12. But we have some obligations to the Arabs of Palestine which are not in
dispute. The Balfour Declaration -itself provides that nothing is to be done
" w h i c h might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine." Under the terms of the Mandate we have undertaken
to develop "self-governing i n s t i t u t i o n s " and to " s a f e g u a r d the civil and
religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and
r e l i g i o n " (Article 2); and to ensure that " t h e rights and position of other
(i.e., non-Jewish) sections of the population are not prejudiced " by Jewish
immigration or land settlement (Article 6).
13. On these various undertakings, or on interpretations of them which have
been made from time to time, the Jews and the Arabs base their rival claims and
demands.
JEWISH CLAIMS.

14. On the one hand, the Jews demand the complete fulfilment of the
Balfour Declaration, and claim that this involves :-
(a) Acceptance of the principle that all Jews enter Palestine as of right.
This claim is based on a passage in the Preamble to the Mandate which
reads
" Whereas recognition has thereby \_i.e., by the Balfour Declaration]
been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people w i t h Palestine
and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country,"
and on the following passage in Mr. Winston ChurchilFs Statement of Policv
of June, 1922 :
" B u t in order that this community [i.e., the Jewish community in
Palestine] should have the best prospect of free development and provide
a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is
essential that it should know t h a t it is in Palestine as of right and not
on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence
of a Jewish national home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed
and that it should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic
connection."
W e cannot accept the contention that all Jews as such have a right to enter
Palestine. Such a principle is not a corollary of recognition of the historical
connection of the Jews with Palestine, and the passage quoted from Mr. Churchill's
Statement of Policy implies no more than that the Jews who have already entered,
or might be allowed to enter, Palestine are or would be in that country as of
r i g h t ; that is to say, t h a t they are the equals in national status of the indigenous
inhabitants. I t would clearly be absurd to admit that all the millions of Jews
in the world have a right, which they should be allowed to exert if they wished,
to settle in Palestine.
(b) A n obligation on our p a r t to facilitate Jewish immigration and the settle
ment of Jews on the land u p to the limit of the economic
absorptive
capacity of the country, regardless of other considerations.
This claim is based on the Churchill White Paper of 1922 and on the letter
which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald sent when he was Prime Minister to Dr. Weizmann
in February, 1931. Actually Mr. Churchill only laid down that " i m m i g r a t i o n

cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity

of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals." But it is a fact t h a t since
1922 Jewish immigration has been regulated by the economic criterion alone
(the Immigration Ordinance and Regulations being so framed as to give effect
to that principle), and that in his letter to Dr. Weizmann Mr. Ramsay
MacDonald observed that ' ' the considerations relevant to the limits of absorp
tive capacity are purely economic considerations." Therefore, though the Mandate
itself only obliged us to facilitate Jewish immigration " u n d e r suitable con
ditions," v/e have since officially interpreted the obligation as one to facilitate
immigration up to the economic absorptive capacity of the country. The Jews
would regard any permanent departure from this principle as a repudiation of
an interpretation of our obligations under the Mandate which had been
sanctioned by the long practice and formal pronouncement of previous Govern
ments; and the members of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League
of Nations have shown t h a t they sympathise with this Jewish view. The present
special restrictions on Jewish immigration involve a departure from the accepted
principle of economic absorptive capacity and we have defended them in Parlia
ment and at Geneva as being of a temporary nature only. The Jews maintain
t h a t if this established principle of economic absorptive capacity were firmly
adhered to at least another million Jews could settle in Palestine over a period
of years, and they claim that the country could rescue almost at once 100,000
Jewish refugees from the horror of Central Europe.
The firm Jewish belief that at least another 1,000,000 Jews can be settled
in Palestine over a period of years leads them to look forward to a time when
they will be the dominant power in the land. They therefore attach great
importance to their final claim which i s
(c) The rejection of any constitutional change which would place the Jews in
Palestine in the position of a minority (whatever minority rights might
be guaranteed) under an independent A r a b Government. The Zionist
Jews would claim in addition that the fulfilment of the Balfour Declara
tion involves eventually the actual creation of an independent Jewish State
covering the whole of Palestine.
This claim is based on (i) the use of the word ' ' N a t i o n a l ' ' in the expression
" Jewish National Home," (ii) the fact that the Balfour Declaration purported
to be a " declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations," and that the
British Government of the day were well aware t h a t Zionist aspirations were
fundamentally " nationalistic," (iii) the wording of the Preamble of the Mandate,
which recognizes " the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine
and the ground for reconstituting their national home in t h a t country," and (iv)
the evidence given to the Peel Commission by Mr. Lloyd George and statements
made by President Wilson, General Smuts, Lord Robert Cecil, Lord Samuel and
Mr. Churchill between 1917 and 1920, which indicated t h a t His Majesty's
Government definitely contemplated the possibility of the eventual establishment
of a Jewish majority in Palestine and of a Jewish State there. The following
quotations will give an indication of the strength of this latter claim. Mr. Lloyd
George, giving evidence before the Royal Commission, said :
" The idea was, and this was the interpretation p u t upon it a t the time,
t h a t a Jewish State was not to be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty
without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants. On the
other hand, it was contemplated t h a t when the time arrived for according
representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded
to the opportunity afforded them by the idea of a national home and had
become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus
become a Jewish Commonwealth."
President Wilson, on the 3rd March, 1919, said :
" I am persuaded that the Allied nations, with the fullest concurrence
of our own Government and people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid
the foundations of a Jewish commonwealth."
General Smuts, speaking a t Johannesburg on the 3rd November, 1919,
foretold an increasing stream of Jewish immigration into Palestine and " in
generations to come a great Jewish State rising there once more."

ARAB CLAIMS.

15. The Arabs, on the other hand, put forward equally far-reaching claims
which are in flat contradiction to these Jewish claims. Although there are
different factions within the A r a b movement in Palestine, these divisions are
chiefly to be explained by family rivalries, and they do not represent any
fundamental differences amongst the Arabs regarding political policy. The
Nashashibi faction is perhaps more moderate in some ways than the Husseini
faction (at the head of which is the Mufti of Jerusalem); but they are equally
vehement with the others in their opposition to the whole of our policy of
introducing the Jews, and it would be a mistake to suppose that, at any rate a t
present, it would be possible for ' ' moderate ' ' Palestinian A r a b leaders to take
a less uncompromising line than t h a t adopted by the more extreme leaders. The
Arabs generally have been consistent throughout the last twenty years in urging
the following claims :
(a) The right of the Arabs to complete independence in their own land.
They base this claim on their interpretation of the McMahon correspondence
of 1915, which came earlier than the Balfour Declaration of 1917, and, in their
view, cannot be replaced by it. They support the claim by quoting various authori
tative statements made on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers during and
after the W a r . For instance, they refer to one of President Wilson's Fourteen
Points which declared " The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire
should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now
under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an
absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development," and to the AngloFrench Declaration of the 7th November, 1918, which stated " The object aimed at
by France and Great Britain . . . . is the complete and definite emancipation of the
peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national govern
ments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free
choice of the indigenous populations. I n order to carry out these intentions
France and Great Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establish
ment of indigenous governments and administrations in Syria* and
Mesopotamia." Another example of this form of A r a b argument is that
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations contemplates the
grant of independence to the A r a b people of Palestine as comprising one of the
"communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire which have reached a
stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be
provisionally recognised," and t h a t the Mandate for Palestine, which is of the
" B " type, conferring full powers of administration on the Mandatory, is
ultra vires this Article of the Covenant.
The Arab, representatives in London will press this claim as hard as they
can. They will ask that the Mandate should be brought to an end,-ajid a treaty
negotiated between Great Britain and the Palestinian Arabs on the lines of our
treaty with Iraq, establishing a sovereign Arab State in Palestine, with safe
guards for British interests and guarantees for the minority rights of the Jews.
(b) The experiment of establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine
should be brought to an end.
W h a t the Arabs in Palestine are afraid of is that Jewish immigration (which
has already established in the country a Jewish population of some 411,000, as
compared with an A r a b population of 1,004,000) will continue until the Jews are
so numerous and powerful that, with their superior industry, ability and wealth,
they do in effect rule the land, either through the definite creation of a Jewish
State or else simply by the fact of their influence. They are anxious that any
further growth of the Jewish National Home should be checked. In general they
are now reconciled to the 411,000 Jews who are already settled in Palestine
remaining there. Those of them who realise that it is no longer practical politics
to expect the abolition of the idea of a Jewish National Home will plead that the
Home should not be a Jewish State or a political entity of any kind, but that its
significance for the Jewish people of the world should be cultural and spiritual.
They will argue that in Palestine there would be a considerable Jewish popula
tion enjoying the full rights of a "civilised minority, keeping alive through the
* Syria was t h e n generally understood to include Palestine.

Hebrew University and other institutions Hebrew literature and arts, speaking
the Hebrew tongue, and practising around their own Holy Places the Jewish
religion. I t would be a centre of Jewish inspiration in which Jews all over the
world could feel a pride and to which they could pay visits.
- There follows from this conception the next A r a b claim, which is that
(c) Jewish immigration and land-sales to Jews should be stopped completely
pending the negotiation of the treaty referred to in (a) above.
I n effect this means t h a t Jewish immigration and land-sales would be stopped
completely for an indefinite period, for it is impossible to suppose t h a t if the
Arabs gained control of policy in Palestine they would give the slightest
encouragement to a Jewish penetration to which they are so bitterly opposed,
and of which they are mortally afraid..

THE CONFLICT.

16. Thus the conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine is direct. I t is
in the nature of a head-on collision; and no one who studies the problem
impartially and with understanding can fail to feel considerable sympathy with
both sides. This is not a controversy in which one side is largely right and the
other side largely wrong. Each party has a great deal of right on its side. The
Peel Commission described the situation between Jews and Arabs as " a conflict
of right with r i g h t . " The Jews were undoubtedly led by British statesmen in
1917 and the immediately following years to believe that the Government would
facilitate their developing Palestine until, if they could secure a majority of the
population, this people without a country would at last have a sovereign state of'
their own. The immigration and development which have in fact taken place
have done no economic harm to the Arabs in Palestine; on the contrary, the A r a b
population has increased in numbers and well-being. By all Jewish calculations
(with which we are bound u p to a point, I think, to agree) there is still considerable
room for further Jewish immigration; and a t the present moment the need for an
early refuge for large numbers of Jews from persecution in other countries is more
urgent than it has been for generations past.
17. On the other hand, the Arabs of Palestine and beyond believe that a
promise of self-government in Palestine was made to them by the British Govern
ment during the war. They urge that Palestine was not ours to give away to
any foreign people. They were not parties to the international pledge that a
Jewish National Home should be established there, and the unwilling Palestinian
Arabs now see the country in which they have lived for countless generations
invaded by a more or less alien people who are far more industrious and wealthy
than themselves, and who threaten to dominate them economically, socially and
politically. A t the same time as this fate of falling gradually under Jewish
domination seems to stare them in the face they see their fellow-Arabs in
neighbouring countries (whom they do not regard as in any way superior to
themselves) enjoying an ever greater measure of t h a t self-government to which
they think themselves entitled.
18. All this is very unsatisfactory, and we cannot avoid blame for the
situation which has arisen. I t is impossible to escape the conclusion that the
authors of the various declarations made to Jews and Arabs during the war,
which are really very difficult to reconcile, were rather confused about the whole
business. T doubt whether they realised fully how many Arabs were already
living in Palestine at the time when they made their promise to the J e w s ; they
certainly cannot have foreseen how formidably that. A r a b population would
increase after the arrival of Jewish capital and development and British
administration; and they must have assumed in any case that these Arabs could
be persuaded to acquiesce in the policy of the Jewish National Home. I n
mitigation of this last error of judgment it must be remembered that; at one. time
there did appear a prospect of accord between Jews and Arabs, for early in 1919
a n Agreement was reached between Dr. Weizmann and the Emir (afterwards
King) Feisal on the basis of the Balfour Declaration. But the conditions on which
the Emir accepted this were not carried out (through no fault of the Jews), and
the Agreement was never confirmed by Feisal or accepted by the Arab world.'

s
19. I t is idle to consider whether a more gradual carrying out of the Balfour
Declaration policy in the past could have avoided the present disastrous and
extremely baffling situation. I very much doubt whether any differences of
administration within the terms of the Mandate would have avoided an eventual
clash between the forces of a persecuted, desperate, brilliantly constructiveJewry in Palestine and of the widespread Pan-Arab Movement which is rallying
to the defence of its weakest brethren, the Arabs of Palestine.
FUTURE POLICY.

20. If the discussions in London result in some basis of agreement, the terms
of which would be satisfactory to us, the Jews and the Arabs, well and good.
But the odds are a t present very heavily against that. However, failure to find
such an agreement in these discussions would not mean that the discussions were
useless and had achieved nothing. They would represent an attempt to settle the
major Palestine problems by the consent of both parties; and, even if that attempt
fails, it may have paved the way for further attempts later on. I n the end, by
tactful perseverance in this policy, we should succeed in getting the two parties
together. The logic of events in Palestine demands that they should co-operate.
I hope that the discussions in London will at least achieve some informal meetings
between Jewish and A r a b leaders which will be the beginning of somewhat better
relations between the two peoples.
21. But after the discussions we shall probably have to settle policy on our
own responsibility, and to make an early announcement of that policy so that the
present uncertainty is brought to an end and our future objectives are more
clearly defined. No doubt our final decision will be considerably influenced by
what transpires in the discussions themselves, and by the degree to which we may
discover that the Jews and Arabs themselves are prepared to compromise. But
at the outset of the discussions we should have our own clear idea of what would
be a just and workable solution to the present problem, and endeavour to lead the
discussions in its direction. I n determining this solution we must exercise a
perfectly i m p a r t i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the case for each side in the dispute, and be
as fair as possible to each; w^e must keep in mind and endeavour to fulfil the
British Governments and the League of Nations' promises to both parties; and
we cannot forget our own British interests in the Near and Middle East, for these
are of great importance in world politics to-day.
.. .
22. W i t h regard to the solution, I would make the following observations
and suggestions :
A.Constitutional Status

of

Palestine.

First, neither the Jewish claim for the creation at some future date of a
Jewish State covering the whole of Palestine nor the Arab claim that the country
should become an Arab State can be admitted.
23. I will deal with the Jewish claim first. Personally, I have for some years
past felt considerable sympathy with the Zionist desire to found a Jewish State
in Palestine. No one who contemplates the misfortunes of the Jews scattered
over a score of countries to-day can fail to wish that this people could once more
have a State of their own, and in some ways Palestine is the obvious place for
them. The Arab peoples generally have been treated generously since the w a r ;
over the greater p a r t of A r a b i a they enjoy self-government; Palestine was a small
strip of undeveloped country whichgiven guarantees of the sanctity of the
Moslem Holy Placesthey could well spare; and the Palestinian Arabs are really
rather a poor lot of people. The conception of a modern civilisation under Jewish
inspiration blossoming on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean is a fine one.
Moreover, if one could assume t h a t this small Jewish State could be created with
the acquiescence of the A r a b world, it would be a much needed reinforcement to
the protection of our own interests in the Mediterranean and beyond. I cannot
conceive of any time in the next few generations when a Jewish Statesprung
from our Balfour Declarationwould not be on our side in case of trouble. I t
can be argued that a considerable Jewish population in Palestine would produce
a disciplined army and be provided with wealth and industrial capacity for war
production in that strategic corner of the world which would be an added source
of strength to us in case of war.

24. But the present situation is such that we should, in my opinion, make it
clear that we do not contemplate now or in the future turning Palestine into a
Jewish Stateunless at some future date both the A r a b and the Jewish peoples
in Palestine wish this change to take place. Such a declaration would be
eminently just. A r a b detestation of the Jewish invasion into Palestine being
what it is, it would be wholly wrong to suggest that this large Arab population
should one day in their own native land and against their will come under the
rule of the newly-arrived Jews. Such Jewish anger as might be roused by a
public declaration of this nature would not upset its essential justice; and the
declaration would have a reassuring effect on the Arabs, whose chief fear is
domination by the Jews.
25. Nor would such a declaration conflict with any promise that British
Governments have made to the Jews. The Balfour Declaration speaks of the
establishment of a " Jewish National Home,'"' and the Mandate repeats the same
phrase. Subsequent official statements of policy have all employed t h a t term, and
never gone beyond it. The term does not involve the eventual establishment of a
Jewish State, though it also does not preclude it. If we now make an official
statement in the sense suggested, there would be no contradiction of the Balfour
Declaration, but a modification of it to the extent that something which was not
precluded in it before was now being made dependent on A r a b consent. W e
would be giving closer definition, as a result of twenty years' practical experience,
to what we mean by a " Jewish National Home " a n d it is high time that this
vague and dangerous term did receive further definition.
26. I t is true t h a t statesmen who shared responsibility for the Balfour
Declaration have made public statements to the effect that they looked forward
to the creation, in certain circumstances, of a Jewish State in Palestine, and that
the Jewish leaders of the time understood that this was a possibility.
But,
important though these statements are, it seems clear that they were based on
assumptions which so far, at any rate, have proved to be incorrect, and which look
like remaining incorrect for as far as we can see into the future. For example,
they must have assumed that the Arab population of Palestinenot to mention
the Arab peoples of surrounding countrieswould become reconciled W- and
acquiesce in, the policy of the Balfour Declaration. T h a t expectation has been
falsified in the grimmest manner. Again, they clearly intended t h a t a Jewish
State should only be established if and when, as a result of Jewish immigration,
the Jews in Palestine formed a majority of the population of the whole country.
Mr. Lloyd George's statement quoted in p a r a g r a p h 14 (c) says this in so many
words. Some of them even seem to have anticipated that this might happen in
the not too distant future. But, in fact, although well over 300,000 Jews have
settled in Palestine since 1920, increasing the total Jewish population to some
411,000 souls, the Arab population in the same time has increased by a still
greater total, from a little over 600,000 to 1,004,000, and this enlargement has
been achieved almost entirely by natural increase and not by the immigration of
new Arabs.
27. B u t I think it is also necessary to reject the Arab claim that Palestine
should become a sovereign A r a b State, like Iraq, in which the Jews would be
guaranteed minority rights. I will deal first with the position which the Arabs
seek to establish by quoting various pledges given by Allied statesmen during or
immediately after the W a r . These have been set forth in p a r a g r a p h 15 (a)
above. W i t h regard to the quotation from President Wilson" s Fourteen Points
published in J a n u a r y 1918 and the reference to the Anglo-French declaration of
November 1918, i t must be remembered that the American, French and British
Governments had already endorsed the Balfour Declaration, so that these general
statements must be read as qualified by that particular Declaration. W i t h
regard to the A r a b claim that Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations contemplates the grant of independence to the Arab people of Palestine
as comprising one of the " communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire
which have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent
nations can be provisionally recognised," and that the Mandate for Palestine,
which is of the " B " type, conferring full powers of administration on the
Mandatory, is ultra vires this Article of the Covenant, it must be remembered
that the Covenant of the League was drawn up by these same Allied Powers (and
others) who had associated themselves in 1917 with the Balfour Declaration.
[18502]
c

Therefore any interpretation of Article 22 which would preclude the fulfilment of

the Balfour Declaration must also be ruled out. W i t h regard to this aspect of
the situation, the Peel Commission have summed up the position as follows :
(a) The provisional recognition of " certain communities formerly belonging
to the Turkish E m p i r e " as-independent nations is permissive; the
words are '' can be provisionally recognised,'' not '' will '' or
"shall";
(&) the penultimate p a r a g r a p h of Article 22 prescribes that the degree of
authority to be exercised by the Mandatory shall be defined, at need
by the Council of the League; and
(c) the acceptance by the Allied Powers and the United States of the policy
of the Balfour Declaration made it clear from the beginning that
Palestine would have to be treated differently from Syria and Iraq,
and this difference of treatment was confirmed by the Supreme
Council of the League in sanctioning the Mandate.
Annoying though it may be to the Arabs of Palestine to find themselves treated
differently from their fellows in neighbouring countries, it must be concluded
therefore that their unqualified claim to independence cannot be accepted on the
arguments which they base on the above quotations.
28. In addition, there are various practical reasons why it is impossible to
contemplate the establishment of an Arab State as the solution of the problem.
The Palestinian Arabs themselves have scarcely the capacity to assume responsi
bility for the government of a country where such difficult problems would arise,
and their willingness to accord in practice to a large Jewish minority whom they
dislike so intensely proper minority rights must be doubted. The Jews would
strenuously resist being put in any such position. The tragedy of the Jews is
t h a t they have no country of their own; they are a minority in every territory
in which they live. They have been going to Palestine with the hope that there
at least they would enjoy equal rights with other members of the community, that
they would get away from the whole atmosphere of minority status, and that they
would one day even become a majority of the population and enjoy a status equal
to that of any other free people on Earth. T h a t the Jewish National Home in
Palestine should now become a place where they were a formal minority
guaranteed certain rights, and in which they were ruled over by an inferior people,
would be intolerable to them, and contrary to the spirit of the Balfour
Declaration. I t would be the more intolerable to the Jews because of their
knowledge that their arrival in Palestine, their importation of capital and their
progressive activities there have been the main stimulus to the greater prosperity
of Arabs as well as of Jews in the country. I n fact, the large Jewish minority
in Palestine would not consent to be ruled by an A r a b minority. They would
adopt, I believe, a policy of non-co-operation; they would refuse to pay taxes to
the central authority, and government without their willing support would be
embarrassed in the extreme.
29. I feel certain, moreover, that a policy of handing the Jews over, to be
governed as a minority in an A r a b State would be strongly opposed by the
Permanent Mandates Commission at Geneva, as well as by very influential opinion
which is in a position to p u t strong pressure on the Government in the United
States of America. I n fact, a p a r t from other considerations, this A r a b proposal
is not practical politics.
30. The rejection of their claim to independence will be very disappointing
to the Arabs. But they must be already expecting this rejection, at any rate
as an immediate prospect, for in our Statement on Palestine, published on the
9th November, we declared that, following the breakdown of the scheme for
Partition, " H i s Majesty's Government will . . . . continue their responsibility
for the government of the-whole of Palestine." A n d A r a b disappointment will
be tempered by relief at our assurance that we do not contemplate making
Palestine a Jewish State, j u s t as Jewish disappointment a t the latter declaration
will be offset to some extent by the assurance that they are not to come under
the rule of an Arab majority. Of" course, we should keep the door open to the
possibility that in totally different circumstances at some future time either
the Arabs or the Jews in Palestine would become reconciled to being citizens in a

State in which the other party were the predominant partner, and our declaration
against the establishment of either a Jewish or an Arab State should include
some qualifying phrase to cover this possibility.
31. If we thus reject the proposals that either the Jews or the Arabs should
govern,Palestine, we do not thereby exhaust the question of what part the Jews
and the Arabs in Palestine should take, under our superior Mandatory authority,
in the government of their country. Article 2 of the Mandate imposes on us the
obligation to develop " self-governing institutions." Hitherto, whenever we
have tried to carry out this. obligation by proposing a Legislative Council on
which Jewish and Arab representatives should sit together, we have been
thwarted either by A r a b opposition because Jewish representation was too large
or by Jewish opposition because it was too small. But we must do something
as soon as possible to carry out this obligation, and to satisfy the desire of the
Arabs and the Jews for some measure of self-government. Before I consider
and make proposals on this point, I will, however, discuss certain other matters,
and especially the question of Jewish immigration, which lies at the root of the
troubles and difficulties in Palestine, and on which it is necessary to make u p
our minds before proceeding to consider other aspects.
B.Immigration.
32. The problem of Jewish immigration lies at the root of the difficulties
in Palestine. The Jews urge that the only limit to it should be the economic
absorptive capacity of the country, irrespective of political or other considera
tions; and their view of Palestine's power to absorb new workers in fields and
towns is a rosy one. I n fact, they are firmly convinced that at least a million
additional Jews could settle in Palestine during the next few years
without any harm to, a n d indeed to the advantage of, the existing Jewish
and Arab populations. They urge that any reduction from this sort of figure is
by so much a modification of our solemn obligation under the Balfour Declaration
and subsequent official undertakings.
33. The Arabs, on the other hand, have been consistently opposed to Jewish
immigration, and their main demand now is that immigration should be
completely stopped.
34. The Jews argue, and firmly believe that they are right in arguing, t h a t
this Arab opposition to immigration is largely fostered by interested A r a b
politicians, that it is not really felt by the great majority of Arab fellahin, who
have benefited from the development which has come in the wake of the Jewish
penetration into Palestine, and that the apparently widespread Arab hostility
is to a large extent bluff. If the British Government would only be firm in
carrying out the Mandate (say the Jews) A r a b hostility would collapse. Whilst
the Government remains uncertain, whilst it hesitates, the Arabs naturally con
tinue their game of bluff; but face these Asiatics with a decision, and they will
accept it with as good grace as may be.
35. This view is shared by a great many people in this country, including
many members of Parliament who are vocal in debates on Palestine in
Parliament.
I can only say that I think this argument is now
profoundly untrue, that anyone who does continue to believe in it is guilty
of a major error of judgment, and t h a t to frame policy on any such
assumption would be disastrous to all prospect of peace in Palestine for
a long time to come. The hostility of the Arabs inside Palestine against the Jews
has become deep and widespread; for instance, rebellious activity in Palestine is
now being sustained very largely by the Palestinians themselves without outside
help. We may crush this opposition by force, but afterwards we shall only be able
to keep it down by force. T h a t will not be good for our reputation. Nor can I
bring myself to believe t h a t it would be right. Indeed, I think it would be
contrary to the spirit and the intention of the Mandate system itself and to
Articles 2 a n d 6 of the Palestine Mandate in particular, which bind us to have
proper regard to the '' civil and religious rights ' ' and to the '' rights and
position" of the non-Jewish population of Palestine. W e cannot treat a
million Arabs in their own country as though they did not exist; we cannot adopt
the attitude that the opinions of this particular set of human beings, unlike those
[18502]
c 2

of any other set, count for exactly nothing a t all. If they have any " r i g h t s , "
one of them surely is that, on a matter touching them so closely and regarding
which they have such strong views, their opinions should be treated with respect.
36. So much for the Arabs in Palestine. But that is not the whole of the
story. A s my colleagues are fully aware, our present policy regarding Jewish
immigration into Palestine has enlisted support for the Palestinian Arabs from
the Governments and peoples of Egypt and of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Trans-Jordan
and other Arab countries. I think that some people exaggerate the extent to which
this is at present likely to place these countries amongst our enemies instead
of amongst our friends in case of war. - I t was remarkable that during the inter
national crisis last September, when the unpopularity of our Palestine policy was
at its height, the Governments of Egypt and I r a q did not hesitate to assure us
of their full support in case of trouble, with scarcely any mention of the
embarrassing situation in Palestine. King Ibn Saud also has shown over and
over again how suspicious he is of German and Italian ambitions in the Near and
Middle East, and how firmly he recognises that his interests are best served by
friendship with Britain
I t would take a lot to make these countries adopt any
other attitude. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the repeated warnings of our
representatives in that p a r t of the world, and the strength of feeling of the A r a b
public generally against our Palestine policy is making it more and more
impossible for their rulers to maintain a pro-British attitude. Certainly if we
continue a policy in Palestine which arouses the strong resentment of the sur
rounding countries our position in that important p a r t of the world will become
more precarious. We shall be playing into the hands of those Egyptian and A r a b
politicians who are our enemies; the situation will be cunningly exploited to our
grave disadvantage by the propaganda of those in Europe who are hostile to u s ;
and, the relationship between Jews and Moslems being what it is, the issue might
easily become one in which in a crisis good Moslems were successfully called upon
to wage a Holy W a r against us. The Arabs showed in the last war that they are
not a people to be ignored.
37. But in any case, a p a r t from the possibility of this trouble in an inter
national crisis, if our future policy in Palestine causes continued resentment in
the surrounding countries, the authorities in these countries will find it more and
more difficult and distasteful to restrain their nationals from giving financial and
physical help to the rebellion (which w ould presumably continue) in Palestine;
and our task in suppressing violence would become much more formidable.
r

38. I t would be hard to conceive of anything more damaging to our prestige

than the loss of the sympathy and friendship of the Moslem world, which we
now enjoy. Amongst other considerations, it would seriously complicate matters
for us in India. This genuine, widespread A r a b opposition to our policy in
Palestine is a fact to which we must pay most careful heed, and it seems to me
that the time has come when we should alter radically our outlook on the Palestine
problem.
39. Hitherto British Governments and Parliaments have tended to be
carried away, not simply by the tireless and clever propaganda of the Jews in
favour of their great experiment in Palestine, but also by genuine enthusiasm
for the conception of a new Jewish civilisation in Palestine and by admiration
for the astonishing achievements of Jewish money and settlers during the last
fifteen years in that rather barren land. I share that enthusiasm and that
admiration. I do not write as an opponent of Zionism, but as a friend, and I
say deliberately that we have paid too little heed to the rights of the Arabs of
Palestine. We have been inclined to ignore them as a poor, weak people of whom
we need not take very much notice. Let us be fair to the Jews, but let us also
give these Arabs fair treatment. I would regard the wishes and claims of the
Jews and Arabs as the wishes and claims of two peoples equal in status, neither
of whom is subordinate to the other in right.
40. From the point of view of proper political morality, as well as of our
own interests in the Near and Middle East, it is necessary to respect the deep
and genuine feelings of the Arabs, and to make concessions to them, perhaps
considerable concessions. This question cannot be considered, as the Jews urge,
as one of pure economics; very important political considerations are involved.

I think we have got to "try to find some arrangements about Jewish immigration
to which the Arabs will agree. But I. would not go the whole way to meet the
Arabs. I do not favour agreement with them at any price. If they will not move
from their extreme demand for a complete stoppage of Jewish immigration and
of land sales to Jews, I think we must tell them we cannot consent to that.
41. I do not think it would be right to consent to it. Though we may be
sceptical about the Zionists' figures of the amount of further immigration which
is practicable, the Jews are undoubtedly right in saying that some considerable
further immigration is possible on the strict economic merits of the case. The
A r a b plea for a stoppage of immigration and land-sales has sometimes been
argued on economic grounds. I t is alleged that as the result of Jewish immigra
tion and acquisition of land large numbers of Arabs have been driven out of
employment and rendered landless. Neither of these assertions can be
substantiated. There is no evidence of any departure from the criterion of
economic capacity under which Jewish immigration has been regulated since 1922.
The final answer to Arab complaints on this score is that the Arab population of
Palestine has increased since 1922 from something over 000,000 to 1,004,000, a
phenomenal rise which has, in fact, been made possible largely by the introduc
tion of Jewish capital and the developments carried out by Jewish immigrants.
I t seems clear also from the researches of the Peel and the Woodhead Commissions
that the standard of living of A r a b workers is a t least as high now as it was
before the Balfour Declaration policy had wrought such changes in Palestine.
A s regards the land, official and Jewish experts have produced widely varying
estimates of the amount of land available for intensive and extensive cultivation,
and of the possibilities of making further land available for agriculture by means
of irrigation. I n the view of the H i g h Commissioner and his advisers, if due
allowance is made for the probable increase of the A r a b population, no further
land is available for Jewish agricultural settlement outside existing Jewish
colonies. This conclusion is supported by statistics collected in the course of the
numerous enquiries which have recently been carried out in Palestine, but these
statistics would be vigorously repudiated by Jewish experts, and we have to keep
in mind t h a t in the past the Jews in Palestine have often confounded critics and
experts, and achieved what appeared to be the impossible. In any case, some of
the existing Jewish agricultural settlements are not yet fully developed, and our
own advisers in Palestine agree that as they develop they will be able to support
many thousands of additional settlers. A n d beyond what may be possible in the
way of further agricultural settlement, the Jews would urge that proper
industrial development in Palestine could provide for a very large additional
Jewish population.
42. There is room therefore for further agricultural and industrial
development. Moreover, a sudden and complete stoppage of Jewish immigration
would have a very damaging effect on the economy of the Jewish National Home,
and this would have an immediate reaction on the finances of the country. The
Arabs as well as the Jews would suffer from a consequent increase of unemploy
ment and reduction of social services. I n view of these considerations it would
surely be wrong, especially in the present terrible circumstances of Jewish
persecution in Central Europe, to close and bar the door of Palestine to the
Jews. World opinion would be quick to sympathise with the Jews, and to
criticise us, if it could be said that the one land which refused to help the Jews
in their present plight was the country in which we had promised them that
they could build their National Home. Although we have consistently adopted
the a t t i t u d e t h a t Palestine cannot provide the whole solution to the refugee
problem, we are bound to agree t h a t Palestine should continue to make a fair
contribution towards its solution.
43. I t may be urged by the Arabs with considerable force that it is unfair
that their country should be picked out to give special assistance to the unhappy
Jews. Our answer to this will be weak unless we can show that both in this
country and in the Colonial Empire we are doing something very substantial in
the way of giving refuge to Jews from Central Europe. So far as the United
Kingdom is concerned the figures for admissions of Jewish refugees are very
satisfactory. So far as the Colonial Empire is concerned, we can saj t h a t in some
half-dozen Colonies special measures are being taken to promote Jewish settle
ment, and that in three of them the schemes may be very considerable in scope.
r

Unfortunately, these territories have not reached a stage of development, such as

is the case in Palestine, where immediate large-scale settlement is possible; but
we are pressing ahead with our plans as rapidly as possible. From the point of
view of helping us out of our embarrassment in Palestine, it is of high importance
that these schemes should materialise as soon as may be, for it will assist us in
resisting Jewish pressure for much greater immigration into Palestine, and also
in meeting possible criticism at Geneva and elsewhere, if we have provided other
outlets for the refugees.
44. But here again we must keep a clear eye on British interests. We cannot
afford to lose the friendship of the Arab peoples, especially if that also involves
alienating the sympathy of the Moslem world in general. But also we cannot
afford to stir up any strong anti-British movement in the United States of
America. If it comes to war, the sympathy and support of the United States will
be more important in the long run than any support that the Arab countries
will give us. A n d the Jews, who are capable of influencing to some extent the
policies of various Governments, can exert particular pressure on the adminis
tration in Washington. President Roosevelt has shown a consistent interest in
the Palestine question, with a view to influencing us in the direction of admitting
large numbers of Jews to settlement there. The American Ambassador had
several talks with me about it during the autumn, and said that the agitation
in the United States at the time when we were rumoured to be contemplating a
complete stoppage of Jewish immigration was the most sustained and
embarrassing agitation that the President has had to face since his first few
months of office. I do not wish to exaggerate the importance of Jewish influence
in America. Many people have told me that a Jewish agitation there about
Palestine would be very hot and disturbing for a while, but would not last
effectively for very long. No doubt this would be true if our proposals, though
disappointing to the Jews, were such that they were generally considered fair
as between the Jews and the Arabs. But I do not think it would be true if our
decision were in favour of the complete closing of the door to further Jewish
immigration. T h a t would be a shock to the American Government and public
(who supported the Balfour Declaration and are therefore also committed by this
promise to the Jews), which it would be difficult to eradicate for a long time.
45. The effect of any such proposal on various of the States who are members
of the League of Nations, and who therefore have some standing in this matter,
would be similar to its effect in the United States. Such a policy, if brought - /
forward by us, would have a very stormy passage through the League at Geneva,
and it is even possible that we should not succeed in carrying it there.
46. Though I think that the majority in the House of Commons are now
in a frame of mind to support whatever policy the Government may b r i n g /
forward, provided that the case for it is carefully and firmly presented, there
would undoubtedly be a large minority, even amongst the Governments own
supporters, who would oppose the complete stoppage of Jewish immigration.
47. There is one other factor which we cannot ignore. The Jews are,
naturally, in a desperate frame of mind. The events of the last few months
have strengthened the extremist Zionist elements as against the moderates like
Dr. Weizmann. Jewish feeling inside Palestine is tense and bitter just now;
it has been deeply stirred by our refusal to allow the immediate immigration of
10,000 Jewish refugee children from Germany to homes which are waiting for
them in Palestine, and by our rigid restrictions on the immigration of many
of their own relations and friends whom they declare that they could support
in Palestine, but who, owing to our refusal to increase the number of immigration
certificates, must face almost intolerable misery, perhaps in concentration camps,
in Germany. If immigration is now stopped completely, or if it is reduced to
a very low level, I think the patience of many Jews in Palestine and outside will
be exhausted. Many of the Jews in Palestine can secure arms. They have seen
the Arabs force us by rebellion to pay heed to their case. They are being told
on all hands t h a t the British Government in these days will only give way to
force. If they are too much provoked I think there would be a serious risk of
a violent outbreak of Jewish extremists in Palestine, and our troops would only
stop shooting Arabs to start shooting Jews. T h a t would be the death-blow to
our reputation as administrators in Palestine.

48. Nevertheless, we should be prepared to go a long way to meet the Arab

representatives. W e should be prepared to go as far as we reasonably can with
a view either to reaching actual agreement, with them, or, failing agreement,
to so reducing their hostility that there is no longer a formidable risk of their
joining our enemies in case of trouble. In weighing the prospects of this perhaps
we should anticipate that there will be a distinction between the Palestinian Arab
representatives and the representatives of neighbouring States. I t is probable
that the former will be more tenacious of extreme demands than the latter, and we
may find ourselves in a position, therefore, in which, though
nowhere
near agreement with the Palestinians, we have got some sort of informal under
standing with the others. In that case the others will not, I think, enter into
any agreement with u s ; they will wish to avoid any responsibility for a solution
which may be unpopular in Palestine; but we shall have the satisfaction of
knowing that the sting is out of the opposition of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
I t is more important that we should regain the full sympathy of these neigh
bouring Governments than that we should secure the friendship of the Palestinian
A r a b s ; they are the countries whose lukewarm support or actual hostility in case
of war would have most unfortunate results. Nevertheless, we must keep it in
mind that, if we do not succeed in taking the sting also out of the Palestinian
Arabs' opposition to our policy, the rebellion in Palestine will be maintained
for as long as possible; it will continue to receive encouragement from Germany;
and we shall be compelled to keep in Palestine larger military forces than we
can properly afford.
49. Therefore, with tJhe qualifications expressed in p a r a g r a p h s 41-47
above, our main aim during the London discussions should be to reach agreement,
either expressed or tacit, with the A r a b delegations'. I feel all the more strongly
that this is the right course because I am convinced t h a t in the long run it is
the wisest policy from the point of view of the Jews themselves. I t is not simply
that Great Britain is the best friend of this sorely tried and jDersecuted people,
and t h a t it is against their interests that she should be weakened by losing the
sympathy of much of the Moslens. world. I t is also important from the point
of view of the Jewish National Home itself t h a t a bold attempt should now be
made to gain for its future development, even at the expense of reducing the
pace of that development, the consent instead of the hostility of the Arabs in
whose midst it exists. If the expansion of the Jewish National Home continues
in the face of strong A r a b opposition, the prospect of goodwill between the two
peoples will be for ever destroyed; the Jewish community will be a comparatively
small island set in a sea of enemies over whom they will only be able to prevail
by force; a permanent relationship of hatred and force is really unthinkable.
Our obligation to the Jews would presumably continue; we could not leave them
to their fate; our armed forces would have to be available to come to their aid
against their A r a b foes.
50. I think the position of the Jewish National Home will be stronger if
we can inaugurate a period in which Arab tempers cool; in which some practical
co-operation between Jews and Arabs might grow from the force of circumstances;
in which the Arabs, their fear of domination by the Jews removed, might begin
to appreciate the benefits which the Jews have brought to the whole population of
Palestine; and in which, even, one or two neighbouring A r a b countries, wishing
to share in those benefits, might be able to open their doors to some Jewish settle
ment in their undeveloped lands. The last consideration is one of particular
importance from the Jewish point of view. The Jews have always been anxious
to be allowed to expand their settlement beyond the J o r d a n into Trans-Jordan. In
certain circumstances the Emir Abdullah would not be averse to t h i s ; it would
contribute to the wealth and well-being of his country.
B u t it is politically
impossible for him to agree to it whilst A r a b hostility against the Jews in
Palestine is so intense, and whilst fear of the unlimited expansion of the Jewish
National Home and of political and economic domination by the Jews persists
amongst the Arabs beyond Palestine. If the Arabs were given guarantees that
definite limits were set to the expansion of the Jewish National Home without
their consent, if their fear of domination were definitely and finally removed, then
their attitude might begin to change. In time they might well be ready to permit
Jewish settlements in other p a r t s of the Near and Middle East.

51. T h a t Arab fear of domination by the Jews is the knot that we have to
cut to secure goodwill, eventually, in Palestine. I t exists because a t present
no limit has been set to the expansion of the Jewish National Home. This knot
can only be cut by setting some limit which is reassuring to the Arabs.
52. Taking a l l these considerations into account, I suggest that we should be
prepared with the following two alternative proposals regarding future Jewish
immigration into Palestine. We should not bring either of them forward at the
beginning of the discussions, but listen to the Arabs and Jewish arguments, and
by judicious soundings during the course of the discussions form our conclusion
as to which of them we should suggest for adoption :
(A) (i) D u r i n g the next ten years the principle of the economic absorptive
capacity of Palestine to continue to govern the rate of immigration,
subject to a proviso that in any case the number of immigrants should
not exceed a certain level. This level would be such as to ensure t h a t
by the end of a ten-year period the Jewish population would not exceed
40 per cent, of the total population of Palestine; (at present it forms
29 per cent.). I t might be possible to work out a set of figures of
percentages which the Jewish population should not exceed in
successive years during the ten-year period, but this would provide
too much of a temptation to both Jews and Arabs to '' cook ' ' their
figures of births and deaths. I t would be better to work out now the
total figure of Jewish immigration in successive years which might be
allowed so as to provide t h a t at the end of the tenth year the Jewish
population didif the economic absorptive capacity of the country
allowed itreach the 40 per cent. mark. These figures would then
become the quotas of immigration which would be allowed. If in
ione year the economic absorptive capacity did not permit of the full
quota of immigrants for that year being admitted, and in the next
year the economic absorptive capacity allowed more than the quota
fixed for t h a t second year, then I think t h a t some of the surplus owing
from the earlier year should be added to the second year's quota.
We might be prepared to yield something from the 40 per cent,
figure. If the Arabs would not agree to that, perhaps they would
agree to some figure like 35 per cent. I understand that, if the figure
were 40 per cent., the average Jewish immigration which would be
possible per annum during the ten years would amount to 29,840
individuals. If the figure were 35 per cent., it would amount to
15,300.
(ii) A t the end of the ten-year period the whole question of the principles
to govern future immigration to be the subject of discussion between
Arab representatives, Jewish representatives, and the Government.
(B) The same proposal as in (A) above, but with the
difference
that, instead of saying that at the end of the ten-year period the
question of future immigration would be the subject of discussion
between Arabs, J e w s and the Government, we should state that
after the ten-year period there could be no further Jewish immigra
tion except by agreement between A r a b and Jewish representatives
and the Government. This would give the Arabs an actual veto on
any further expansion of the Jewish National Home after ten years.
If we adopt this proposal I am strongly inclined to think that
we should not reduce the percentage which is to be allowed to the
Jewsif the economic absorptive capacity of the country permits it
much below the figure of 40 per cent.
, Immigration should be controlled by the H i g h Commissioner with a strongly
staffed Immigration Department, and a permanent identity card system would
seem to be inevitable in order to check illegal immigration.
53. I doubt whether proposal (A) would in the least degree satisfy the
A r a b representatives. Though it gives certain guarantees regarding the next ten
years, it leaves the question of future immigration at the end of that period open,
and, therefore, would not sufficiently remove the Arab fear of domination by the
Jews. Though I p u t it forward as an idea that we should keep in mind, and secure
agreement to, if possible, I do not really think t h a t it will prove feasible. We are
almost certain to have to move to proposal (B), which has got the merit from the

A r a b point of view of setting a limit beyond which the Jewish National Home
cannot expand without their consent. I believe that assurance will carry great
weight with reasonable Arabs.
54. I t is possible that the A r a b representatives will prove completely
unreasonable and adamant on this question of immigration, and that they will
unitedly stand firm on their demand t h a t Jewish immigration should be com
pletely stopped. I do not think t h a t they will, especially if we are firm in our
opposition to such a demand. Individual Egyptian and I r a q i representatives
(like the present Egyptian P r i m e Minister and the late Iraqi Foreign Minister)
have often showed a willingness to consider and recommend some such proposals
as those outlined in (B) above. But they may not now be willing to do so. Arab
feeling has been inclined to harden of late. In that case we shall have to consider
whether it is so important that we should regain unqualified Arab goodwill and
bring the A r a b rebellion in Palestine to an immediate end that we should accede to
their demand. I have stated the arguments against our doing so in paragraphs
41-47 of this memorandum, and at present I believe that they are over
whelmingly weighty. But I understand t h a t the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs and his advisers are inclined to take a different view, based on the
great danger to our interests which they apprehend from any continuance of
A r a b hostility, which might spread throughout the Moslem world. I agree that,
if any widespread hostility to us in the Moslem world is really involved, we
cannot afford that, and must yield to the degree that may be necessary to avoid
it. "We shall be able to estimate the prospects more accurately during the
forthcoming discussions in London, and I do not therefore press for a decision
on the point now.
55. I n the meantime I should advise my colleagues that, though the Jews
might accept the proposal in (A) above, they will certainly regard as quite
unacceptable proposal (B). Even Jews of great moderation like Lord Samuel
would be likely to criticise it as putting too great an obstacle in the way of the
development of the Jewish National Home after ten more years. If we adopted
the proposal, we should have to put it through in the face of very strong
opposition from the Jews and their friends. Though criticism would be very
heavy in Parliament and a t Geneva, we could defend the policy as one which is
consistent with our obligations under the Mandate. I t is not consistent with our
interpretation of the Mandate as practised over many years and defined in
Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's letter of 1931, where the economic absorptive capacity
of Palestine is declared to be the sole criterion governing immigration. We
should have to admit frankly that our new policy was a departure from that
interpretation, and appeal back to the governing instrument, the Mandate itself.
Under the Mandate we are obliged to facilitate Jewish immigration ' ' under
suitable conditions." W e can properly argue that between 1922 and recent
times conditions were such that it was ' ' suitable '' that the economic criterion
should alone prevail, but t h a t circumstances have now altered and other con
siderations, i.e., that it is now clear beyond a shadow of doubt that the Arab
population (whose '' rights and position ' ' we are pledged to safeguard) will not
be reconciled to an indefinite continuation of Jewish immigration, must also now
be taken into account.
C.Land

Sales.

56. Article 6 of the Mandate requires that the Administration, " w h i l e

ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not
prejudiced, . . . . shall encourage . . . . close settlement by Jews on the land."
The fulfilment of this dual obligation has proved one of the most difficult problems
of the Palestine Government. The protection of tenants has been secured by a
series of Ordinances, but nothing has yet been done to prevent an Arab landowner
from p a r t i n g with the whole of his land to the Jews.
57. The Arabs are demanding the complete cessation of sales of land to
Jews. I do not think this would be justified, but in the light of the findings of
Sir J o h n Hope Simpson, the Peel Commission and the Woodhead Commission,
some restriction on the sale of land from Arabs to Jews is clearly necessary in
order to prevent existing landowners becoming completely landless and to provide
[18502]
D

for the needs 6f the growing Arab population. Such legislation presents certain
practical difficulties, and the details will need careful consideration, but I recom
mend that action on these lines should form a p a r t of any future settlement.
58. Successive Commissions have recommended that the Government should
assist in such specific schemes of land development (with a view, for example, to
changing extensive Arab cultivation into intensive cultivation) as may appear,
after proper investigation, to be practicable, and that H i s Majesty's Government
should consider favourably helping any such schemes by loans or otherwise.
Expert enquiries indicate that the scope for such schemes is limited, but I hope
t h a t it may be possible to achieve something in this direction.
D.The Part of Jews and Arabs in

Government.

59. If we are to continue our responsibility as Mandatory Power for the

government of the whole of Palestine, and if we are contemplating a restriction
of Jewish immigration such as is suggested in paragraphs 52-54 above, then
what steps should we take to give Jews and Arabs a share in the business of
the Government, to carry out our obligation to secure the development of " self
governing institutions ' ' ?
60. I n the first place, we should encourage the development of local govem
ment as far as possible. There are urban and rural areas where the population
is almost entirely A r a b and others where the population is almost entirely Jewish
(for example, the city of Jaffa and the Galilee highlands, and the city of Tel Aviv
and plain of Esdraelon, respectively). I n local government Arabs and Jews alike
already have a considerable control over their own affairs. But there is room
for further development in this direction. I n particular there is complaint that
the central Government keeps too tight a control over the finances of the larger
local authorities such as that of Tel Aviv, and that the local administration has
not sufficient freedom in making up its budget and spending its own revenues.
I recommend that the powers of municipal bodies under the Municipal Corpora
tions Ordinance should be re-examined, and extended as far as possible, and that
the revenues of the larger municipalities should be increased, perhaps by allotting
to them a portion of the urban property tax collected in their areas.
61. Greater difficulty arises when we consider w h a t should be the form of
Government at the centre. Our answer to the question must depend partly on
what is the ultimate objective that we are aiming at in Palestine. W h a t is the
form of the constitution in Palestine which we think will eventually bring peace
between the two peoples who at present share the land ?
62. I think there are two alternatives :
(i) The preservation of Palestine with its present boundaries as a
'' bi-national '' state, in which the two races are regarded, and come
to regard each other, as equals in status, with equal rights in the
government of their country. This would involve a considerable
period of British Mandatory Government whilst the Jews and Arabs
were learning to co-operate with each other in the management of
their common affairs. The idea of a state in which two peoples live
side by side and enjoy equality of status implies that in the central
organs of Government (e.g., the Legislature) -each of them has equal
numerical representation, whichever may from time to time comprise
a majority of the total population of the country.
Perhaps this would be possible in Palestine. Some people who
have lived long in the country advocate this proposal. I n many ways
it would be the best thing that could happen there. But I doubt
whether it is practicable.
I doubt whether, however much
we may be able to improve relations between Jews and
Arabs, they will ever be able to co-operate to this extent in an
equal partnership. Though they do, in fact, belong to the same race,
mixing them is like trying to mix oil and water. Their civilisations
' are different - their religions are different; their temperaments are
different; their interests would clash at many points; they do not like
each other; each of them wants to be the master.

Therefore, I am inclined to lean towards the second ultimate

solution to the Palestine problem, which would involve-
(ii) A n eventual return to some form of partition between a Jewish and an
Arab area in Palestine. I doubt whether the difficulties of the
Palestine problem can be overcome, unless Palestine is treated as
p a r t of a larger whole. Many people regard the union in some form
or other of the Lebanon, Syria, Trans-Jordan and Palestine as
ultimately inevitable. This association might take the form of the
abolition'of alb Mandates in the area and the establishment of an
independent federation between different units, i.e., an Arab Lebanon,
an A r a b Syria, another A r a b territory comprising most of TransJ o r d a n and" the p a r t of Palestine which remained predominantly Arab,
and a Jewish territory composed of the p a r t of Palestine which is pre
dominantly Jewish and to which might be added an area of TransJ o r d a n if Jewish settlement is in due course permitted there. The
Arab or Jewish Governments of each territory would, of course, enjoy
wide powers within their own territories respectively, but the federal
authority would have certain reserved powers in matters of common
concern.
This solution would satisfy a number of conditions which seem
to require satisfaction if permanent peace between Arabs and Jews in
the Near East is to be established. I t would to a large extent separate
into their respective spheres the Arabs and Jews in Palestine, and
prevent them from getting at each other's throats; it would meet the
Jews' desire to have a considerable territory in which they are free to
develop their own life; and at the same time, by making this Jewish
territory only one out of three or four units in a federation in which
the other equal units were Arab territories, it would afford the Arabs
in t h a t p a r t of the world a guarantee against domination by the Jews.
63. There are certain forces now working in the direction of this latter
solution, and if we are agreed as to its advantages we should deliberately from
now onwards endeavour to avoid an)' policy in Palestine or the Near East which
might prejudice its ultimate attainment. But there are many difficulties in
the way. For instance, tJhe French Government are opposed to this solution,
since they are afraid that one of its consequences might be that the French
were elbowed out of the Eastern Mediterranean altogether. I n order to avoid
offending the French our representatives in the forthcoming London discussions
should not be led into any discussion of this proposal for federation. In any
case, it is bound to be a long time before affairs evolve into a federation of
territories in that p a r t of the world, and it does not seem to be practical politics
at present to take any actual step in the direction either of partition in Palestine,
or of a union of larger areas. Certain suggestions in the direction of partition
in Palestine may be p u t forward by the Jews during the forthcoming Palestine
discussions; they may attempt to secure from the Arabs that a p a r t of Palestine
should be handed over to them for undisturbed development, in return for their
raising money to help both Jewish and Arab development elsewhere. I do
not think that in their present tempers the Arabs will accept such a proposal;
for the time being, they have been frightened off partition in any form. But
if they do show any inclination to favour it, we should encourage them.
64. Though I suggest therefore t h a t the second of these plans should be
our ultimate objective, I think that we should frame our immediate constitutional
proposals on the assumption t h a t international difficulties may delay for a long
time, or even prevent altogether, a federation of territories in the Near East.
For this reason I would propose t h a t in the meantime any constitutional develop
inent which has the object of giving the Jews and the Arabs a part in the central
government of Palestine should be based on the principles laid down in the
first plan above, i,e., that Palestine is a " bi-national " State in which the two
peoples are equal in status. A beginning in the direction of this plan would
not be an obstacle to progress later on in the direction of the second plan. Indeed,
if we can get A r a b and Jewish representatives meeting and working together
on Government bodies, this may improve relations between them and enable
discussions on the partition-witih-federation plan to take place in a less prejudiced
atmosphere.
[18502]

65. As a first step I suggest that the High Commissioner, representing the
Mandatory Power, should be assisted in his task not only by an official Executive
Council (such as exists to-day) but also by an Advisory Council which would
include, in addition to an official bloc, Jewish and Arab representatives in equal
numbers. The Jewish and Arab members would be elected on communalregisters.
The constitution, which would be embodied in a new Order-in-Council, should
provide that the H i g h Commissioner must consult the Advisory Council on all
important matters such as immigration, finance and tariffs. I suggest also that
it should provide that, if a majority of the members of the Advisory Council
which included a majority both of the Arab and of the Jewish representatives
passed a resolution asking that the Advisory Council should be superseded by a
Legislative Council on the basis of parity between the two peoples, then such
a Legislative Council should be established.
66. Our ability to establish an Advisory Council on the lines proposed above
must, of course, depend upon the willingness of the Jews and Arabs to elect
representatives to it and to co-operate upon it. I think t h a t the Jews would
agree to do so, The attitude of the Arabs is likely to be less friendly. They will
object to the principle of equal representation, and the odds are in favour of
their definitely refusing, at present, to take p a r t in any body so composed. On
the other hand, if we accept the principle now that the Jews should be repre
sented only in proportion to their numbers, we shall be creating a precedent which
will condemn them to a position of a permanent minority in the governmental
bodies of the country. For the reasons stated elsewhere in this memorandum, and
especially because this would be a breach of the spirit of the Balfour Declaration
and Mandate, I do not think it either expedient or right to do this. We should
sound the Jewish and Arab representatives on the matter during the forthcoming
discussions. I t is possible that, although the Arabs would at present refuse to
co-operate on a Legislative Council composed on the principle of parity, they
might agree to serve on an Advisory Council so composed.
E.The Jewish

Agency.

67. Under Article 4 of the Palestine Mandate the Jewish Agency has to
be recognized " a s a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating
with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters
as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of
the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the
Administration, to assist and take p a r t in the development of the country." The
Agency is composed of representatives from various countries (including the
United States of America), which means that the Jews of the world are able,
through this instrument, to intervene in the affairs of Palestine. I n accordance
with Article 4 of the Mandate, the Government of Palestine has hitherto taken
the Palestine Executive of the Jewish Agency into consultation in connection
with the drafting of legislation (e.g., immigration, land and local government
legislation), tariffs, social services, and all matters affecting the interests of the
Jewish population. The officers of the Agency in London have also had ready
access to the Colonial Office. The Arabs have always objected to this power of
world Jewry, which has frequently been exercised to what they regard as their
detriment. I t may be that the Arab representatives in the London discussions
will press for the abolition of the Jewish Agency's special rights in this matter.
68. If an Advisory Council, as proposed above, is estabished in Palestine,
there will be less reason for the Jewish Agency's right to approach the Govern
ment. The Jews will have their elected representatives on the Council, and the
H i g h Commissioner will be obliged to consult the members of the Council on all
matters of importance, such as immigration. I t would, indeed, be anomalous to
have an additional body, the Agency, also approaching and discussing these
matters with the H i g h Commissioner in Palestine and the Colonial Secretary in
London. The Arabs might well suspect that the Government and the Jewish
Agency were conspiring behind the scenes to counteract any advice which the
Advisory Council, with its Arab members^ gave to the H i g h Commissioner. I t
would be a good thing if, in these circumstances, we could reduce the rights and
powers of the Jewish Agency. Such a step would impress the Arabs with the
genuineness of our intention to treat the Arabs and Jews on an equal footing.

69. On the other hand, the proposals contained in this paper are already
going to be a very bitter pill for the Jews to swallow. They may provoke them
almost to the extreme. The curtailment of the rights of the Jewish Agency
would be an additional blow which might just drive the Jews and their friends
into really damaging opposition.
They will claim that there is a distinction
between the Jewish representation on the Advisory Council and the Jewish
representation in the Jewish Agency. The former will be confined to citizens
of Palestine, whereas the other represents the Jews of the world; and they will
point out that the promise of a National Home was made to the Jews of the
world, and t h a t it was also promised that representatives of this wide
constituency would be enabled to co-operate with the Government in the work
of establishing a National Home in Palestine. I n fact, any curtailment of the
right of the Jewish Agency in the direction suggested would involve a modifica
tion of our promises to the Jews and an amendment of Article 4 of the
Mandate. As I have said above, American Jewry is represented on the Jewish
Agency, and the " disestablishment " of that organ would be a matter of direct
concern to a powerful body of opinion in the United States. There is a danger
t h a t this proposal, coming on the top of many others which will be grievously
disappointing to the Jews, would provoke such a reaction in the United States
t h a t a really awkward situation arose between the American Government and
ourselves. We might in the end find t h a t we should have to give way to strong
protests from the American Government.
70. Therefore, we must be cautious on this matter. Let us wait and see
whether the Arabs raise it, and, if they do, how strongly they press it. If they
press it strongly, let us try to gauge what the effect-of this additional proposal
would be on the temper of the Jews. I t may be that they will be so bitter in any
case that this additional disappointment will make little difference to their mood.
71. I n any case, I do not propose that we should take a decision on the
matter now, and only draw my colleagues' attention to it because it may arise.
72. If i t is not raised by the Arabs, I would be in favour of leaving the
position as it is at present. If an Advisory Council were established, we could
then gradually in practice reduce our contacts with the Jewish Agency, on the
grounds that the Advisory Council was performing the function of contact with
the H i g h Commissioner on the subjects which the Jewish Agency used to discuss
with him and the Government. I n time the position might have been so adjusted
t h a t we could make the change, even to the extent of amending Article 4 of the
Mandate, without any trouble.
73. Proposals have been mooted in the past (and they were supported by
the Peel Commission) for the creation of an Arab Agency to counterbalance the
Jewish Agency. I t is, however, difficult to conceive of any A r a b organisation
which would be equivalent in functions and influence to the Jewish Agency, and
the permanent association with Palestine politics of representatives of other Arab
countries, a p a r t from its practical difficulties, might well prove seriously
embarrassing in the international sphere.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

74. The following is therefore a summary of my recommendations. But

I would repeat that we should not reach an absolutely final decision on any of
these points until the discussions with Jews and Arabs have proceeded some way.
The attitude of either party might lead us to the conclusion that it would be wise
to modify one or other of these proposals in some way :
I.Future

Constitution.

(1) Neither the Jewish claim for the creation at some future date of a Jewish
state covering the whole of Palestine nor the Arab claim that the country should
become an A r a b state can be admitted. We should make a clear statement that
this is so, unless at any time in the future conditions so change that either the
A r a b or the Jewish population in Palestine are ready to acquiesce in the creation
of an independent state in which the other party predominates (paragraph 22
et seq).

(2) We should offer to establish, in addition to the existing official

Executive Council, an Advisory Council, which would include, besides an
official bloc, Jewish and A r a b representatives in equal numbers. Jewish and
A r a b members would be elected on communal registers. The constitution should
provide that the H i g h Commissioner must consult the Advisory Council on all
important matters such as immigration, finance and tariffs. I t should also provide
that, if a majority of the members of the Advisory Council, which included a
majority both of the Arab and Jewish representatives, passed a resolution asking
that the Advisory Council should be superseded by a Legislative Council on the
basis of parity between the two peoples, then such a Legislative Council should
be established (paragraph 65).
(3) The powers of municipal bodies under the Municipal Corpoi'ation's
Ordinance should be re-examined and extended as far as possible and the revenues
of the larger municipalities should be increased, perhaps by allotting to them a
portion of the urban property tax collected in their areas (paragraph 60).
II.Immigration.
We should listen to the Arab and Jewish arguments and by judicious
soundings during the course of the discussions form our conclusion as to which
of the following two alternative proposals should be suggested for adoption
(paragraph 52) :
A. (i) Jewish immigration into Palestine should continue to be regulated
by the criterion of economic absorptive capacity subject to the proviso that,
in any case, the number of immigrants should not exceed such a level as would
increase the Jewish population to the figure of 40 per cent, of the total population
by the end of ten years. If the Arabs would not agree to the figure of 40 per cent,
we should endeavour to persuade them to agree to some such figure as 35 per cent.
(ii) A t the end of the ten-year period the question of the principles to
govern further Jewish immigration should be the subject of discussion between
Arabs, Jews and H i s Majesty's Government.
B . A s in A. above, but with the difference that, instead of making the
future control of immigration the subject of discussion at the end of the ten-year
period, we should state that after the ten-year period further Jewish immigration
must be dependent on agreement between Arab and Jewish representatives
and the Government, i.e., the Arabs would be given a veto on any further expan
sion of the Jewish National Home after ten years. If we adopt this proposal
I am strongly inclined to think that we should not agree to a reduction of the
prospective Jewish percentage (subject to economic absorptive capacity) much
below 40 per cent.
[N.B.The above proposals are subject to the reservation in p a r a g r a p h 54,
which indicates that in certain circumstances we may have to make
greater concessions to the Arabs than is suggested in B. above.]
III.Land.
Legislative steps should be taken to restrict the sale of land by Arabs to Jews
(paragraph 57).
M. M.
Colonial Office, January

18, 1939.

LEAGUE

OF

MANDATE

NATIONS.

FOR

TOGETHER

PALESTINE,
WITH

N O T E BY T H E S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L
RELATING TO ITS APPLICATION
TO THE

TERRITORY

KNOWN

AS. TRANS-JORDAN,

u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s of A r t i c l e 25.

Presented

to Parliament

by Command

December,

of His

Majesty,

1922.

LONDON:

PUBLISHED

BY H I S

MAJKSTrS

STATIONERY

OFFICE.

To bo ourohMoa through any Bookseller pr directly from

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MDIXI.UUOH.

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Cmd. 1785.

MANDATE FOR PALESTINE, together with a

N o t e b y t h e S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l r e l a t i n g to i t s
a p p l i c a t i o n to t h e T e r r i t o r y k n o w n a s T r a n s J o r d a n , u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s of A r t i c l e 25.
M A N D A T E FOR

PALESTINE.

The Council of tlie League of Nations :

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the. purpose
of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of t h e
League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said
Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly
belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may b e
fixed by them ; and
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed t h a t the
Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration
originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His
Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,
it being clearly understood t h a t nothing should be done which might
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish com
munities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed b y
Jews in any other country ; and
Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical con
nection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for
reconstituting their national home in t h a t country ; and
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic
Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine ; and
Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated
in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for
approval; and
Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in
respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the
League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions ; and
Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is
provided t h a t the degree of authority, control or administration to be
exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon
by the Members of the l e a g u e , shall be explicitly defined b y the Council
of the League of Nations ;
Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows :
Article 1.
The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of admini
stration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

Article 2.
The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under
such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure
the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the
preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also
for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of
Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.
Article 3.
The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage
local autonomy.
Article 4.'
An appropriate Jewish agency shall bo recognised as a public body
for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration
of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as m a y affect
the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the
Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of
the Administration, to assist and take p a r t in the development of the
country.
The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitu
tion are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised
as such agency. I t shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic
Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who arc
willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.
Article 5.
The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing t h a t no Palestine
territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the
control of, the Government of any foreign Power.
Article 6.
The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring t h a t the rights and
position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall
facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall
encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in
Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands
and waste lands not required for public purposes.
Article 1.
The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting
a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions
framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship b y
Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.
;

Article 8,
The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits
of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed b y Capitu
lation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in
Palestine.
(B 3/367)x
A 2

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned

privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously
renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to
their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and
immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately
re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as m a y have
been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.
Article 9.
The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing t h a t the judicial
system established in' Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to
natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.
Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and com
munities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. I n
particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised
in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.
Article 10.
Pending the making of special extraditio2i agreements relating to
Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and
other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.
Article 11.
The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures
to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the
development of the country, and, subject to any international obliga
tions accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for
public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of t h e
country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to
be established therein. I t shall introduce a land system appropriate
to the needs of the country, having regard, among other tilings, to the
desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation
of the land.
The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned
in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms,
any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the
natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not
directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements
shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or
indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital,
and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the
country in a manner approved by the Administration.
Article 12.
The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign
relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls'
appointed by foreign Powers. JTe shall also be entitled to afford
diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when
outside its territorial limits.

Article 13.
All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious
buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing
rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings
and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the require
ments of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory,
who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters
connected herewith, provided t h a t nothing in this article shall prevent
the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem
reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the
provisions of this article into effect; and provided also t h a t nothing
in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory
authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely
Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.
Article 14.
A special Commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to
study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with
the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different
religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the
composition and t h e functions of this Commission shall be submitted
to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission
shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without ^the approval
of the Council.
Article 15.
The Mandatory shall see t h a t complete freedom of conscience and
the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the main
tenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimina
tion of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine
on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be
excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for
the education of its own members in its own language, while con
forming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the
Administration m a y impose, shall not be denied or impaired.
Article 16.
The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision
over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may
be required for the maintenance of public order and good government.
Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine
to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to
discriminate against any representative or member of them on the
ground of his religion or nationality.
Article 17.
The Administration of Palestine may organise on a voluntary basis
the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and

also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the super
vision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other
t h a n those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory.
Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be
raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.
Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine
from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the
Mandatory in Palestine.
The Mandatory shall be entitled a t all times to use the roads,
railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces
and the carriage of fuel and supplies.
Article 18.
The Mandatory shall see t h a t there is no discrimination in Palestine
against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations
(including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with
those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning
taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or pro
fessions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft.
Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods
originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall
be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated
area.
Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate,
the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory,
impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary,
and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development
of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests
of the population. I t m a y also, on the advice of the Mandatory,
conclude a special customs agreement with any State t h e territory
of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.
Article 19.
The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of
Palestine to any general international conventions already existing,
or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League
of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammuni
tion, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom
of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic
and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property.
Article 20.
The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration
of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit,
in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of
Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of
plants and animals.
Article 21.
The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months
from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities

based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treat
ment in the matter of excavations and archseological research to the
nations of all States Members of the League of Nations.
(1)
" Antiquity " means any construction or any product of human
activity earlier t h a n the year A.D. 1700.
(2)
The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encourage
ment rather than by threat.
Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being
furnished with the authorisation referred to in paragraph 5, reports the
same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded
according to the value of the discovery.
(3)
No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Depart
ment, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such
antiquity.
No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from
the said Department.
(4)
Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an
antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

()
5

. :

No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities

shall be permitted, under penaltj^ of fine, except t o persons authorised
b y t h e competent Department.
(6)
Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or
permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological
interest.

CO
Authorisation to excavate shall only be granted to persons who
show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The Admini
stration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorisations, act in
such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.
(8)
The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator
and t h e competent Department in a proportion fixed by t h a t Depart
ment. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator
shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a p a r t of the find.

Article 22.
English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of
Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or
money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement
or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.
Article 23.
The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the
respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members
of such communities.
Article 24.
The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations
an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures
taken during the year t o carry out the provisions of the mandate.
Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the
year shall be communicated with the report.
Article 25.
In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary
of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled,
with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone
or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may
consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such
provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider
suitable to those conditions, provided t h a t no action shall be taken
which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.
Article 26.
The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise
between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations
relating to the interpretation or t h e application of t h e provisions of
the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall
be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided
for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
Article 27.
The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is recpiired for
any modification of the terms of this mandate.
Article 28.
I n the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred
upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make
such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for. safeguarding in
perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured b y
Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the

guarantee of the League, t h a t the Government of Palestine will fully

honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Admini
stration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the
rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.
The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives
of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded b y the
Secretary-General of t h e League of Nations to all Members of the
League.
Done at London the twenty-fourth day of-July, one thousand nine
hundred and twenty-two.
Certified true cup;] :

FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,

RAPPARD,
Director of the Mandates

Section.

NOTE.

GENEVA,

September 23rd, 1922.

ARTICLE 25 OF T H E P A L E S T I N E MANDATE.
Territory known as

Trans-Jordan.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

The Secretary-General' has the honour to communicate for the

information of the Members of the League, a memorandum relating to
Article 25 of the Palestine Mandate presented by the British Govern
ment to the Council of the League on September 16th, 1922.
The memorandum was approved b y the Council subject to the
decision taken a t its meeting in London on July 24th, 1922, with
regard to the coming into force of the Palestine and Syrian mandates.

MEMORANDUM BY THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE.

1. Article 25 of the Mandate for Palestine provides as follows :

" In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern
boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory
shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League
of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions
of this Mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing
local conditions, and to make such provision for the administra
tion of the territories as he may consider suitable to those condi
tions, provided no action shall be taken whicli is inconsistent with
the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18."
2. In pursuance of the provisions of this Article, His Majesty's
Government invite the Council to pass the following resolution :
" The following provisions of the Mandate for Palestine are
not applicable to the territory known as Trans-Jordan, which
comprises all territory lying to the east of a line drawn from a
point two miles west of the town of Akaba on the Gulf of t h a t
name up the centre of the Wady Araba, Dead Sea and River
Jordan to its junction with the River Yarmuk ; thence up the
centre of t h a t river to the Syrian Frontier."
Preamble.Recitals

2 and 3.

Article 2.The words " placing the country under such political
administration and economic conditions as will secure t h e
establishment of t h e Jewish national home, as laid down
in t h e preamble, and " .
Article 4.
Article 6.
Article 7.The sentence " There shall be included in this law
provisions framed so as t o facilitate t h e acquisition of
Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent
residence in Palestine."
Article 11.The second sentence of t h e first paragraph and t h e
second paragraph.
Article 13.'
Article 14.
Article 22.
Article 23.
In t h e application of the Mandate to Trans-Jordan, the action
which, in Palestine, is taken b y t h e Administration of the latter
country, will b e taken b y the Administration of Trans-Jordan under
the general supervision of the Mandatory.
3. H i s Majesty's Government accept full responsibility as Man
datoiy for Trans-Jordan, and undertake t h a t such provision as m a y
be made for t h e administration of t h a t territory in accordance with
Article 25 of t h e Mandate shall be in no way inconsistent with those
provisions of t h e Mandate which are not b y this resolution declared
inapplicable.

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