Fiscal Autonomy

CSC v Dept of Budget

The CSC via a petition for mandamus seeks to compel DBM to release the balance of its budget for FY
2002. CSC claims that the reason for the withholding was the no report, no release policy. DBM
claims that the failure to release the fund in full is due to shortage of funds.
Issue: W/N the no report, no release policy may be validly enforced against CSC?
Held: No.
The policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy. Being automatic
connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. It means that no condition to fund
releases to it may be imposed. The justification of the DBM does not lie. Shortage of funds is not an
excuse for not releasing the fund in full of offices vested with fiscal autonomy.
Rules of Procedure
Aruelo, Jr. v CA
Aruelo and Gatchalian had an election contest. Aruelo filed a case with the COMELEC and RTC seeking
to annul Gatchalians proclamation. In the case pending in the RTC Aruelo was arguing that the
COMELEC rules should be applied.
Issue: W/N rules promulgated by COMELEC can be applied in election protests pending in the RTC?
Held: No.
Aruelo filed the election protest with the RTC, whose proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings
in regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all
courts is vested in the SC.
Macalintal v COMELEC
Issue: May Congress assume power to review rules promulgated by the Commission?
Held: No.
Congress may not assume power to review rules promulgated by the Commission. By vesting itself
with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the the Implementing Rules for the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress
trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.
How Commissions Decide
Estrella v COMELEC
A status quo ante order was issued by the COMELEC and from the 7 members only 5 participated. From
the 5 participants 1 dissented. According to the Constitution 4 will constitute the majority. However,
Lantion one of the 4 members who agreed to the order was disallowed by the SC to participate
because he had previously inhibited himself on the case. The effect of this is that there are effectively
only 4 participants and from these there is 1 dissent.
Issue: W/N the vote of the 3 participants in the en banc proceeding can be considered a majority vote
following the case of Cua v. COMELEC?
Held: No.
The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the majority vote of all its members and not
only those who participated and took part in the deliberations. Under the rules of statutory
construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained. Since the above-quoted constitutional provision states "all of its
members," without any qualification, it should be interpreted as such.
Even former Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, questions the Cua ruling in light of
Section 7, which says "majority of all the Members." He thus concludes that "three is not the majority
of seven.
Had the framers intended that it should be the majority of the members who participated or
deliberated, it would have clearly phrased it that way as it did with respect to the Supreme Court in
Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution:
SECTION 4(2) x x x all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be
heard en banc, x x x shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the
members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Mateo v CA
An employee of Morong Water District (MOWAD) was fired. He filed a complaint with the RTC. The
board filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the RTC had no jurisdiction because the case is under the

jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission because it involves a government employee. However, the
motion was denied. CA dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Issue: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over cases involving dismissal of an employee of a quasi-public
corp.?
Held: No.
The Civil Service Commission under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the
Civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this Court's certiorari
judgment.
Revised Circular No. 1-91 as amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on
June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable to the Court of
Appeals. In any event, whether under the old rule or present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no
jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil
Service Law.
Ambil v COMELEC
Commissioner Guiani, before his retirement from the COMELEC, might have signed a draft ponencia in
a case. He vacated his office without the final decision or resolution having been promulagated.
Issue: W/N this ponencia has any value?
Held: None.
It does not have any value. Before that resolution or decision is signed and promulgated, there is no
valid resolution or decision to speak of. A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is
promulgated and not before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a members of the Commission at the
time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or
decision. Much less could he be the ponente of the resolution or decision.
CSC
Scope
CSC v Alfonso
PNOC-EDC v Leogardo
PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of the PNOC. On 1978, it filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment a
clearance application to dismiss the services of Ellelina for a commission of a crime. MOLE granted the
clearance but subsequently revoked it. PNOC-EDC appealed on the ground that the Ministry of Labor
and Employment has no jurisdiction over PNOC-EDC since it is a GOCC.
Issue: W/N PNOC-EDC is governed by the Labor Code?
Held: Labor Code.
PNOC-EDC having been incorporated under the general Corporation Law is a GOCC whose employees
are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code. The 1973 Constitution provided: The Civil Service
embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Hence, employees of GOCC, whether created by special
law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil Service
Law and not by the Labor Code. Yet the 1987 Constitution supplanted, providing that the CSC covers
only GOCC with original charter.
The civil service system under the new Constitution covers only government owned and controlled
corporations with original charters. Moreover, even if a case arose under the 1973 Constitution but it is
to be decided under the 1987 Constitution, the applicable rule is that of the 1987 Constitution.
Philippine Fisheries v NLRC
Philippine Fisheries is a GOCC created by P.D. No. 977. It entered a contract with the Odin Security
Agency for security services. Two of the security guards filed with the Office of the Sub-Regional
Arbitrator a complaint for re-adjustment rate under Wage Order No. 6 together with wage salary
differentials.
The Labor Arbiter issued an Order dismissing the complaint since Philippine fisheries is a GOCC, hence
it would place it under the scope and jurisdiction of the CSC and not within the ambit of the NLRC.
Issue: W/N Philippine Fisheries is under the scope of the Civil Service or NLRC?
Held: CSC.
Philippine Fisheries is a GOCC with special charter, which places it under the scope of the Civil Service.
However the contract of services explicitly states that the security guards are not considered
employees of the Philippine Fisheries, hence the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission may not
be invoked in the case.

Appointments
Santiago, Jr. v CSC
Customs Commissioner Tanada extended a permanent promotional appointment, as Customs Collector
III, to Santiago, Jr. That appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission.
Jose, a Customs collector II, filed a protest with the Merit Systems Promotion Board against Santiago's
promotional appointment mainly on the ground that he was next-in-rank to the position of Collector of
Customs III.
Issue: W/N Jose who is next in rank has a vested right to the position?
Held: No.
Santiagos appointment is upheld. One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for
promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be
appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the
appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher position. The power to appoint is a
matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for
the position
Aquino v CSC
Victor Aquino was designated as Property Inspector and In-Charge of the Supply Office performing the
duties and responsibilities of the Supply Officer. Two years after, the Division Superintendent of City
Schools, Tagle, issued a promotional appointment to Leonarda D. de la Paz as Supply Officer. At the
time of her appointment, she was then holding the position of Clerk II, Division of City Schools. The
Civil Service Regional Office IV approved her appointment as permanent.
Aquino filed a protest with the DECS Secretary questioning the qualification and competence of de la
Paz for the position of Supply Officer I. DECS Secretary revoked the appointment of de la Paz.
Issue: W/N the CSC has the authority to revoke an appointment?
Held: None.
Civil Service Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment simply because it believed that
another person is better qualified than the appointee for it would constitute an encroachment on the
discretion solely vested on the appointing authority. It is well-settled that once an appointment is
issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the position), which is protected not
only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation
of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing.
CSC v Salas
Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff member and assigned to the
casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. However, his employment was terminated for loss of confidence.
Salas appealed to the Chairman and the Board of Directors of PAGCOR, requesting reinvestigation of
the case since he was not given an opportunity to be heard, but the same was denied. He appealed to
the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which denied the appeal on the ground that, as a
confidential employee, he was not dismissed from the service but his term of office merely expired. On
appeal, the CSC issued Resolution No. 92-1283 which affirmed the decision of the MSPB.
Issue: W/N Salas is a Confidential Employee?
Held: Yes.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 16(e) of Civil Service Act of 1959, which was then in force when
PD No. 1869 creating PAGCOR was passed, it provided that "upon recommendation of the
Commissioner, the President may declare a position as policy-determining, primarily confidential, or
highly technical in nature." It appears that Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 provides:
All positions in the corporation, whether technical, administrative, professional or
managerial are exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations, and shall be governed only by the personnel management policies set by
the Board of Directors. All employees of the casinos and related services shall be
classified as "confidential" appointees.
Prior to the passage of Civil Service Act of 1959, there were two recognized instances when a position
may be considered primarily confidential:
1st when the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service, has declared the
position to be primarily confidential; and,
2nd in the absence of such declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office there exists
"close intimacy" between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse
without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential
matters of state.

Corollary, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260 states that "the non-competitive or unclassified service
shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified
service or those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature."
Thus, at least since the enactment of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the nature of the position which
determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy- determining or highly technical.
Security of Tenure
Hernandez v Villegas
Issue: W/N persons permanently occupying non-competitive positions are covered by the guarantee of
security of tenure?
Held: The distinction between competitive and non-competitive positions is significant only for
purposes of appointment. However, officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions
continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can
be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office
involves no removal but the expiration of the term of office two different causes for the termination
of the official relations recognized in the Law of Public Officers.
Astraquillo v Manglapus
Issue: W/N appointees to the foreign service who do not belong to the Career Corps enjoy security of
tenure like the Career Corp.?
Held: No.
Those who are non-career enter on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness
utilized for the career service and possess tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or
which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited
to the duration of a particular project for which purposes employment was made. Political appointees
in the foreign service possess tenure which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority.
Gloria v CA
Issue: W/N the transfer of a permanent employee to another permanent position without the consent
of the employee violate security of tenure? How about temporary transfer?
Held: Yes.
The transfer of a permanent employee to another permanent position without the consent of the
employee violate security of tenure. As to temporary transfer: While a temporary transfer or
assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employees prior consent, it cannot be done
when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his
permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a
transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who
are in the Civil Service.
Dimayuga v Benedicto
Issue: Whether one who does not have qualifications for a position acquire security of tenure therein.
Held: No.
Security of tenure in an office is acquired only by one who has the qualifications for that office.
Abolition of Office
Mayor v Macaraig
Issue: W/N Sec. 35 of RA 6715 declaring all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters
and Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission is constitutional?
Held: Unconstitutional.
While abolition by law as a result of reorganization is a recognized cause for termination of a
government employee, it is not the same as a declaration that the office is vacant. RA 6715 has
effected no express abolition of the positions, neither an implied abolition an irrevocable
inconsistency between the nature, duties and functions of the petitioners offices under the old rules
and those under the new law, RA 6715.
Right to Organize
SSS Employees v CA
Issue: W/N employees of the Social Security System have the right to strike?
Held: No.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution points to the understanding that the right
to organize does not include the right to strike. While the right to organize and join unions, associations

or societies cannot be curtailed, government employees may not engage in strikes to demand changes
in the terms and conditions of employment because the terms and conditions of employment are
provided by law.
Double Compensation
Peralta v Mathay
Where an officers pay provided by law was a fixed per diem, additional compensation in the form of
cost of living allowances as well as incentive and Christmas bonuses is not allowed.
While the terms additional ad double compensation are used interchangeably, it is, perhaps, best
to draw a distinction between the two. There is additional compensation when for one and the same
office for which a compensation has been fixed there is added to such fixed compensation an extra
reward in the form, for instance, of a bonus. This is not allowed in the absence of a law specifically
authorizing such extra reward. But when a per diem or an allowance is given as reimbursement for
expenses incident to the discharge of an officers duties, it is not an additional compensation
prohibited by the Constitution.
Santos v CA
Upon optional retirement from the judiciary, petitioner was fully paid of his retirement gratuity. For five
years thereafter, he has been receiving a monthly pension. Thereafter, he was appointed Director III of
the defunct Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA).
Issues:
1) Whether petitioner can continue to receive his pension while receiving his salary as Director; and
2) Whether, upon separation from the MMA, petitioners separation pay includes his years of service in
the judiciary.
Held:
1) Yes. The second paragraph of Section 8 means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can
continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which
another compensation is attached,
2) No. That would be would be double compensation for the same service in the judiciary for which he
has already been paid. The law creating the MMA does not specifically authorize payment of additional
compensation for years of government service outside of the MMA.
Singson v COA

hghlglg
COMELEC
Qualifications and Prohibitions
Brillantes v Yorac
The designation by the President of a commissioner as acting chairman of the COMELEC is invalid
because Art. 9(C) prohibits the appointment of members in a temporary or acting capacity. Moreover,
Art. 11(A,1) provides for the independence of the Commission. The choice of temporary chairman falls
under the discretion of the Commission and not exercised by the President.
Cayetano v Monsod
Sets the liberal and broad definition of the practice of law. Respondent past experiences as lawyereconomist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, lawyer-legislator, constitute practice of law.
Powers and Functions
LDP v COMELEC
The broad power that has been granted to the COMELEC by the Consti includes the ascertainment of
the identity of a political party and its legitimate officers.
SC cancels the COMELECs resolution dividing the LDP into wings, each of which may nominate
candidates for May elective positions and be entitled to a representation in the election committees
that the COMELEC may create.
Cases reviewable by SC: has jurisdiction over intra-party dispurtes i.e. identity of political party & its
officers

Sison v COMELEC
3 instances where a failure of election may be declared (BP 881):
1) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes
2) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes
3) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the ERs or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud
or other analogous causes
Sambarani v COMELEC
The prohibition on conducting special elections after thirty days from the cessation of the cause of the
failure of elections is not absolute. It is directory, not mandatory, and the COMELEC possesses residual
power to conduct special elections even beyond the deadline prescribed by law. The deadline cannot
defeat the right of suffrage of the people as guaranteed by the Constitution.
The COMELEC has broad power or authority to fix other dates for special elections to enable the people
to exercise their right of suffrage. The COMELEC may fix other dates for the conduct of special
elections when the same cannot be reasonably held within the period prescribed by law.
Officials have the right to remain in office as barangay chairmen in a hold-over capacity until their
successors shall have been elected and qualified. The application of the hold-over principle preserves
continuity in the transaction of official business and prevents a hiatus in government pending the
assumption of a successor into office.
Pangilinan v COMELEC
The phrase "including pre-proclamation controversies" used in Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution
should be read in relation to Sec. 2, Article IX-C of the same Constitution. Hence, it should be construed
as referring only to "pre-proclamation controversies" in election cases that fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., election cases pertaining to the election of regional,
provincial and city
Roque, Jr. v COMELEC
Jurisdiction
Sarmiento v COMELEC
Several appeals on pre-proclamation controversies were heard and tried by COMELEC en banc without
being heard first by the subdivision. Petitioners dispute such assumption of jurisdiction saying that
such is invalid.
Held: Invalid.
Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without first referring
them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside.
Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a
Division.
A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisions pursuant to Section 8,
Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be in order.
However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before it shall
be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved. The said section provides as
follows:
All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed
terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved and the rulings of the
boards of canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the
filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party.
However, proceedings may continue when on the basis of the evidence thus far
presented, the Commission determines that the petition appears meritorious and
accordingly issues an order for the proceeding to continue or when an appropriate
order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari.
Flores v COMELEC
Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest number of
votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus

proclaimed punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679.

However, his election was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the election
with one vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora
and installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray
from the latters total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The
judge agreed that the four votes cast for Flores only, without any distinguishing first name or initial,
should all have been considered invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and
Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was correctly
reduced by 2, demoting him to second place.
The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power to
review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest
appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections on questions of fact shall be final
and non-appealable. In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of
the petitioners appeal.
Issue: W/N the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay election contests are subject
to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679?
Held: Yes.
The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more significant ground, to wit,
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall Exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay
election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the aforequoted section. Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been
appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679,
insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election
case should be appealed to the RTC, must be declared unconstitutional.
Ppl v Hon. Delgado
On January 14, 1988 the COMELEC received a report-complaint from the Election Registrar of Toledo
City against private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC
directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case
who eventually recommended the filing of an information against each of the private respondents for
violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information against the private respondents as
recommended in the RTC of Toledo City.
Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with
the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. Later, an order
was issued by respondent court directing the COMELEC through the Regional Election Director of
Region VII to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases. The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration and opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the
Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC. This
was denied by the court.
Issue: W/N the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has the authority to review the actions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in said court.
Held: Yes.
Indeed as provided in Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution, unless otherwise provided by law, any
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
However, in cases of violations of election laws as found under Section 2(6), of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, to wit: the COMELEC may "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and
malpractices," the above rule does not apply. Instead, under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election
Code, it provides that:
"The regional trial courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any
criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the
offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of
the metropolitan or municipal trial courts.
From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."

Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary
investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the
information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently,
all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court.
Ppl v Judge Inting
Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros
Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in
the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or
clearance from COMELEC as required by law. After a preliminary investigation of Barbas complaint,
Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent
trial court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OICMayor. In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against
the accused OIC Mayor.
However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial court
set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine
probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court later on
quashed the information. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election
offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take
cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?
Held: No.
In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute
cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine
probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.
"The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all
laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomittant authority to investigate
and prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident
constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the
free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the
frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred
right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote.
To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses
committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its
effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.
From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the
Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its
prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute and hear
election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office as
contradistinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182 and
184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978
reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate
and prosecute election offenses committed by any person, whether private individual
or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the
offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the
nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as
the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the
COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections." (Corpus v.
Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 [1987])
Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If the
Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation of
election law, it is because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole
authority of his office.
Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial court misconstrued the
constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.
Jaramilla v COMELEC
[Respondent] Antonio Suyat and [petitioner] Alberto J. Jaramilla both ran for the position of Member of

the Sangguniang Bayan in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections.
On May 16, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, proclaimed Jaramilla as one of the
winning candidates for members of the Sangguniang Bayan. He ranked 7th obtaining 4815 votes.
Suyat obtained (4,779) votes and was ranked no. 9.
Upon review by [respondent Suyat], he discovered that [petitioner] was credited with 73 votes instead
of just (23) votes or (50) votes more than what he actually obtained. If the entry were to be corrected,
Suyat would have ranked 8th and should have been one of the winning candidate in the Sangunian.
COMELEC en banc then ordered that a board of canvassers reconvene.
Held:
Before discussing the merits, although not raised in the petition, the Court deems it appropriate to
discuss the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc in election cases. Article IX-C of the Constitution states
in part that:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.
As stated in the provision, and in line with the Courts recent pronouncement in Milla v. Balmores-Laxa,
election cases including pre-proclamation controversies should first be heard and decided by a division
of the COMELEC, and then by the commission en banc if a motion for reconsideration of the division is
filed.
It must be noted however that this provision applies only in cases where the COMELEC exercises its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, and not when it merely exercises purely administrative functions.
This doctrine was laid out in Castromayor v. COMELEC, and reiterated in subsequent cases.
Accordingly, when the case demands only the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative functions,
such as the correction of a manifest mistake in the addition of votes or an erroneous tabulation in the
statement of votes, the COMELEC en banc can directly act on it in the exercise of its constitutional
function to decide questions affecting elections.
The Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors in the case at bar alleges an erroneous copying of figures
from the election return to the Statement of Votes by Precinct. Such an error in the tabulation of the
results, which merely requires a clerical correction without the necessity of opening ballot boxes or
examining ballots, demands only the exercise of the administrative power of the COMELEC. Hence, the
Commission en banc properly assumed original jurisdiction over the aforesaid petition.
Purely administrative functions are heard en banc.
Buac v COMELEC
On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig, Metro Manila on the conversion of
this municipality into a highly urbanized city as mandated by Republic Act No. 8487.The residents of
Taguig were asked this question: "Do you approve the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Taguig, as provided for in Republic Act
No. 8487? "
On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the canvass of sixtyfour (64) other election returns, declared that the "No" votes won, indicating that the people rejected
the conversion of Taguig into a city.
However, upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass of
the plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still prevailed.
Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes, private respondents,
filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the announced results of the plebiscite
with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots. The COMELEC treated the petition as an election
protest, docketed as EPC No. 98-102. It was raffled to the Second Division.
Petitioner intervened in the case. He then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He alleged that a
plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest. COMELEC then dismissed the case. Buac
appealed.
Held: COMELEC has jurisdiction.
Controversy on the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite "is a matter that involves the enforcement and
administration of a law relative to a plebiscite. It falls under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under
Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the Constitution authorizing it to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." Thus,
COMELEC is directed "to reinstate the petition to annul the results of the 1998 Taguig plebiscite and to
decide it without delay.

Ppl v Basilla
As an aftermath of the May 1987 congressional elections iti Masbate, complaints for violations of
Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) were filed with the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Masbate against the private respondents. Provincial prosecutor, thus filed 3 information
against the accused. Judge Basilla, however, dismissed the case on the ground that the COMELEC
failed to investigate the case.
Held:
There is no dispute that the Comelec is vested with power and authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code and to prosecute
such offenses in court. while Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary
investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the Comelec, it at the same time
authorizes the Comelec to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the Government.
Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution clearly envisage that the Comelec would not be
compelled to carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone.
The contention of private respondents that the deputation by the Comelec of the prosecuting arms of
the Government would he warranted only before the elections and only to ensure free, honest, orderly,
peaceful and credible elections, that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack
substance. There is nothing in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a
pinched and niggardly interpretation of the authority of the Comelec to appoint as its' deputies,
officials or employees of other agencies and instrumentalities of the government. The prompt
investigation and prosecution and disposition of election offenses constitute an indispensable part of
the task of securing `iee, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. The investigation and
prosecution of election offenses are, in an important sense, more important than the maintenance of
physical order in election precincts. Without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their
assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt
and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of
nationwide elections would simply not be possible, unless, perhaps, the Comelec had a bureaucracy
many times larger than what it actually has. Moreover, the prosecution officers designated by the
Comelec become deputies or agents of the Comelec and pro tanto subject to the authority, control and
supervision of the Comelec in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts
of such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the
acts of the Comelec itself. The only limitation the Constitution itself places upon the Comelec's
authority over its deputies relates to the enforcement of such authority through administrative
sanctions. Such sanctions-e.g., suspension or removal-may be recommended by the Comelec to the
President (Sec. 2 [8], Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution) rather than directly imposed by the Comelec,
evidently, to pre-empt and avoid potential difficulties with the executive department of the
Government where the prosecution and other officers deputized are ordinarily located.
Tan v COMELEC
On 10 May 1992, petitioner, as incumbent City Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by the
COMELEC as ViceChairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City for the 11th May 1992
synchronized national and local elections. On the basis of the votes canvassed by the Board of
Canvassers, Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a congressional seat to present
the Second District of Davao City in the House of Representatives. Private respondent Alterado, himself
a candidate for the position, filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation of
Manuel Garcia and accusing the members of the City Board of Canvassers of "unlawful, erroneous,
incomplete and irregular canvass. Meanwhile, the electoral protest of private respondent Alterado was
dismissed by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET"). The criminal complaint for
"Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the
Office of the Ombudsman was likewise dismissed on the ground of lack of criminal intent on the part of
therein respondents. Still pending is an administrative charge, the case now before us, instituted in the
COMELEC against the City Board of Canvassers, including herein petitioner, for "Misconduct, Neglect of
Duty, Gross Incompetence and Acts Inimical to the Service."
Petitioner moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against him for alleged lack of jurisdiction of
the COMELEC thereover, he being under the Executive Department of the government. The COMELEC
denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.
Held: Has Jurisdiction
The COMELEC's authority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the Constitution is virtually all
encompassing when it comes to election matters.Additionally, Section 52, Article VII, of the Omnibus
Election Code, provides:

"SEC. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. -In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections, and
shall:
"a. Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local
officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement
agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties
relative to the condo& of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMP Cadets eighteen
years age and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its orders.
Further, the Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding paragraph
from the performance of his duties relating to electoral processes who violates the election law or fails
to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon
recommendation of the Commission, the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from
office any or all of such officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of such
violation or failure."
It should be stressed that the administrative case against petitioner, taken cognizance of by, and still
pending with, the COMELEC, is in relation to the performance of his duties as an election canvasser
and not as a city prosecutor. The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and
immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of
any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law
to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly deputized
officials and employees of government carry out their respective assigned tasks, the law has also
provided that upon the COMELEC's recommendation, the corresponding proper authority (the
Secretary of the Department of Justice in the case at bar) shall take appropriate action, either to
suspend or remove from office the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of
violation of election laws or failure to comply with instruction, orders, decisions or rulings of the
COMELEC.
Unavoidably, the COMELEC, prior to making its recommendation, must first satisfy itself that there
indeed has been an infraction of the law, or of its directives issued conformably therewith, by the
person administratively charged. It also stands to reason that it is the COMELEC, being in the best
position to assess how its deputized officials and employees perform or have performed in their duties,
that should conduet the administrative inquiry. To say that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look
into charges of electionl offenses committed by officials and employees of government outside the
regular employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it proper are sound exercise of such
recommendatory power and perhaps more than that, even a possible denial of due pT ess to the
official or employee concerned.
Observe, nevertheless, that the COMELEC merely may issue a recommendation for disciplinary action
but that it is the executive department to which the charged official or employee belongs which has
the ultimate authority to impose the disciplinary penalty. The law then does not detract from, but is
congruent with, the general administrative authority of the department of government concerned over
its own personnel.
Panlilio v COMELEC

Bedol v COMELEC
COMELEC; contempt. The main thrust of petitioners argument is that the COMELEC exceeded its
jurisdiction in initiating the contempt proceedings when it was performing its administrative and not its
quasi-judicial functions as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators. According to
petitioner, the COMELEC may only punish contemptuous acts while exercising its quasi-judicial
functions.
The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit
of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve
its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned
and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective positions.
To withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a factfinding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the
COMELECs investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure
the conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was

however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer
questions regarding the various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in
his possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious
refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.
COA
Powers and Functions
Dingcong v Guingona, Jr.
Atty. Praxedio P. Dingcong, was the former Acting Regional Director of Regional Office No. VI of the
Bureau of Treasury in Iloilo City. On three occasions, after public bidding, contracted, admittedly on an
"emergency labor basis," the services of a private carpenter and electrician on "pakyao" basis for the
renovation and improvement of the Bureau of Treasury Office, Iloilo City. This contract was disallowed
by the Commission on Audit (COA) as being "excessive and disadvantageous to the government".
Issue: W/N the disallowance of the pakyao contract by COA is invalid for being a usurpation of a
management function and an impairment of contract?
Held: No.
Not only is the Commission on Audit (COA) vested with the power and authority, but it is also charged
with the duty, to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to ... the expenditures or uses of
funds ... owned ... by, or pertaining to, the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities (Article IX [D], Section 2 [1],1987 Constitution). That authority extends to the
accounts of all persons respecting funds or properties received or held by them in an accountable
capacity (Section 26, P. D. No. 1445). In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it determines whether or not the
fiscal responsibility that rests directly with the head of the government agency has been properly and
effectively discharged (Section 25[1], Ibid.), and whether or not there has been loss or wastage of
government resources. It is also empowered to review and evaluate contracts (Section 18 [4], Ibid.).
And, after an audit has been made, its auditors issue a certificate of settlement to each officer whose
account has been audited and settled in whole or in part, stating the balances found due thereon and
certified, and the charges or differences arising from the settlement by reason of disallowances,
charges or suspensions (Section 82, Ibid.).
Viewed in this light, the disallowance made by COA is neither illegal nor a usurpation of a management
function. The authority of the petitioner, as agency head, to enter into a contract is not being curtailed.
What COA maintains is that the "pakyao" contract has proved disadvantageous to the government.
Note: SC set aside the decision of COA of disallowing the pakyao contract. SC ruled that the pakyao
contract is not disadvantageous to the government.
Danville Maritime, Inc. v COA
Danville seeks to set aside the letter-directive of Commission on Audit (COA) disapproving the result of
the public bidding held by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) of the sale of its tanker-vessel
"T/T Andres Bonifacio" on the ground that only one bidder submitted a bid.
Issue: W/N COA has the power to interpret the meaning of public bidding and what constitutes its
failure and ruled that there was a failure of bidding when only one bid was submitted and
subsequently ordered a rebidding?
Held: Yes.
There is no reason to disturb the interpretation given by the COA to the term "public bidding" and what
constitutes its "failure." No less than the Constitution has ordained that the COA shall have exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods
required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for
the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or use of government funds and properties.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion. COA has
clearly shown its position to the PNOC in its questioned letter-directive advising the latter of its
misgivings as to why the award was given to the lone bidder inspite of regulations previously made
known to PNOC and to top it all, why the PNOC perfunctorily rejected a much higher bid which appears
to be more beneficial to the corporation. Rather than condemn the COA as petitioner proposes, the
COA should be commended for its zeal and care in insuring that the disposition of the subject vessel
would be in a manner most advantageous to the government. A rebidding removes any suspicion that
may arise out of the sale of the vessel to petitioner under present circumstances.
Ramos v Aquino
Issue: W/N there is an encroachment on the constitutional prerogatives of the Auditor General if, after
the final approval of certain vouchers by him without an appeal being made, an inquiry by a provincial

fiscal to determine whether criminal liability for malversation through falsification of public, official and
commercial documents based thereon could lawfully be conducted?
Held: No encroachment.
A prosecutor could, without offending the constitutional grant of authority to the Auditor General, do
so. The Auditor General is vested with the power to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to
the revenues and receipts from whatever source, and to audit, in accordance with law and
administrative regulations" all expenditures of funds or property pertaining to or held in trust by the
government as well as the provinces or municipalities thereof. That is one thing. The ascertainment of
whether a crime committed and by whom is definitely another.
It is based on the fundamental postulate that in the division of powers, the control over the purse
remains with the legislative branch. There is the explicit requirement then that there be no expenditure
of public founds except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. There is need, therefore, for an
enactment to permit disbursement from the public treasury. Nor does fidelity to this constitutional
mandated end there. There must be compliance with the terms of the statute. If it were not so to, the
extent that there is a deviation, there is a frustration of the legislative will. It is obvious that Congress
itself is not in a position to oversee and supervise the actual release of each and every appropriation.
That is where the Auditor General comes in. It is the responsibility of his office to exact obedience to
any law that allows the expenditure of public funds. He serves as the necessary check to make certain
that no department of the government, especially its main spending arm, the Executive, exceeds the
statutory limits of the appropriation to which it is entitled. That is the purpose and end calling for the
creation of such an office, certainly not the enforcement of criminal statutes.
Mamaril v Domingo
Narciso Mamaril was formerly an Evaluator/Computer of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) at its San
Pablo City Branch. In the course of the performance of his duties, he committed errors in his evaluation
and computation, resulting in the under collection of registration, license and other miscellaneous fees
and penalties. Petitioner availed of the Early Retirement Program under RA 6683. As a result of the
decision of the COA, holding that the amount of P44,515.90 be withheld from petitioners terminal leave
pay other than his retirement gratuity, he has not received in full the benefits due him from his
retirement. Petitioner contended that he could not be held liable on the audit disallowances because
he was not an accountable officer within the meaning of Section 101 of P.D. No. 1445 (1978) since: (a)
his work was purely clerical; (b) he did not come into possession of any money or property for which he
is now asked to pay; and (c) he did not act in bad faith or with gross negligence.
Issue: Whether or not COA has the power over non accountable officers?
Held: Yes.
The responsibility for state audit is vested by the Constitution on the Commission on Audit. As can be
gleaned from the foregoing provisions of the Constitution, state audit is not limited to the auditing of
the accountable officers and the settlement of accounts, but includes accounting functions and the
adoption in the audited agencies of internal controls to see to it, among other matters, that the correct
fees and penalties due the government are collected. The verification of the correctness of the
evaluation and computation of the fees and penalties collectible under the Land Transportation Law
(R.A. No. 4136) are parts of the functions of the COA, which examines and audits revenue accounts
(The Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, P.D. No. 1445, sec. 60).
When any person is indebted to any government agency, the COA may direct the proper officer to
withhold the payment of any money due such person or his estate to be applied in satisfaction of the
indebtedness (P. D. No. 1445, sec. 37). Likewise, under the Manual on Certificate of Settlement and
Balances, a government auditor is empowered to order the withholding of the payment of any money
due a person determined to be liable for disallowances, suspensions, and other deficiencies in the
accounts audited (Sec. 39)
Osmena v COA
A complaint for medical malpractice was filed against Cebu City Medical Center. The City of Cebu being
the operator of the Medical Center entered into a compromise agreement with the injured party which
was approved by the court and the Sangguniang Panlungsod. However, COA refused to recognize the
compromise agreement arguing that the giving away of public funds to a bereaved family in the form
of financial assistance has definitely no casual relation to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
community.
Issue: W/N the compromise agreement is valid?
Held: Yes!
The Court believes that COAs disallowance of the appropriation is indeed tainted by grave abuse of
discretion and should be correspondingly rectified.

The appropriation of P30,000.00 by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City was considered by COA
out of context; it was construed as intended only to promote the private interests of the de la Cerna
family, as merely a form of financial assistance to a bereaved family without causal relation to the
general welfare of the community. In truth, as COA was well aware, the appropriation was a part of the
package agreed upon by all the parties in Civil Case No. 4275 of the Cebu RTC for the amicable
settlement of the controversy; it may not be considered independently of said amicable settlement; it
would be meaningless unless considered in the context of the compromise of the case.
The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable settlement of a pending litigation and its
eventual execution of a compromise relative thereto, are indubitably within its authority and capacity
as a public corporation; and a compromise of a civil suit in which it is involved as a party, is a perfectly
legitimate transaction, not only recognized but even encouraged by law.
The City of Cebu complied with the relevant formalities contemplated by law can hardly be doubted.
The compromise agreement was submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
which approved it conformably with its established rules and procedure, particularly the stipulation for
the payment of P30,000.00 to the de la Cerna family. Neither may it be disputed that since, as a
municipal corporation, Cebu City has the power to sue and be sued, it has the authority to settle or
compromise suits, as well as the obligation to pay just and valid claims against it.
Note: I think it just says that when an agency follows the necessary legal steps for allocation of funds
such as compromise agreements, COA will also have to respect such agreements.
Bustamante v COA
BUSTAMANTE is the Regional Legal Counsel of the National Power Corporation (NPC). As such he was
issued a government vehicle with plate number SCC 387. In addition to the use of government vehicle,
he claimed his transportation allowance. The Commission on Audit disallowed the claim for
transportation allowance.
Issue: W/N COA has usurped the statutory functions of the NPC to promulgate its own rules?
Held: NO.
It is beyond dispute that the discretion exercised in the disallowance of the transportation allowance is
within the power of the Commission on Audit as it is provided in the Constitution. In the exercise of
such power it promulgated COA Circular No. 75-6 dated November 7, 1975, regulating the use of
government motor vehicles, aircrafts and watercrafts, which, among others, provides:
VI. Prohibition Against Use of Government Vehicles by Officials provided with
transportation allowance. No official which has been furnished motor transportation
allowance by any government corporations or other office shall be allowed to use
mother vehicle transportation operated and maintained from funds appropriated in the
abovecited Decree. (Sec. 14, P.D. 733)
The Commission, in the exercise of its power granted by the Constitution, did not usurped the statutory
functions of the NPC Board of Directors for its leads to the absurd conclusion that a mere Board of
Directors of a government-owned and controlled corporation, by issuing a resolution, can put to naught
a constitutional provision which has been ratified by the majority of the Filipino people. If We will not
sustain the Commission's power and duty to examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to this
particular expenditures or use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this government-owned
and controlled corporation, the NPC, We will be rendering inutile this Constitutional Body which has
been tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and
ultimately, the people's property.
Orocio v COA
An accident happened in one of the plants of NPC were an employee of a contractor was injured. The
management of NPC released funds for the injured party. The COA disallowed it and held liable those
involved in the release of funds. Management insists that their legal team allowed it and that they are
empowered to decide on such cases.
Issues:
(1) Does the legal opinion of petitioner, which was relied upon for the disbursement in question,
preclude or bar the COA from disallowing in post-audit such disbursement?
(2) Has the General Counsel of the COA the authority to decide a motion to reconsider the
disallowance in question?
Held:
The NPC, as a government-owned corporation, is under the COA's audit power. Under the 1973
Constitution, which was the Constitution in force at the time the disallowance in question was made,
the COA had the power to, inter alia, examine, audit, and settle, in accordance with law and
regulations, all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds

and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations; and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for the prevention of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds or property.
Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions conferred upon the COA a more active role and invested it with
broader and more extensive powers. These were not meant to make it a toothless tiger, but a dynamic,
effective, efficient and independent watchdog of the Government. In determining whether an
expenditure of a Government agency or instrumentality such as the NPC is irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable, the COA should not be bound by the opinion of the legal
counsel of said agency or instrumentality which may have been the basis for the questioned
disbursement; otherwise, it would indeed become a toothless tiger and its auditing function would be a
meaningless and futile exercise. Its beacon lights then should be nothing more than the pertinent laws
and its rules and regulations.
DBP v COA
The hiring by the DBP of a private auditor was a condition imposed by the World Bank for the grant to
the Philippine government in early 1987 of a US$310 million Economic Recovery Loan, at a time when
the government desperately needed funds to revive a badly battered economy. One of the salient
objectives of the US$310 million loan was the rehabilitation of the DBP which was then burdened with
enormous bad loans. The rehabilitation of the DBP was important in the overall recovery of the national
economy.
Issue: W/N the constitutional power of the COA to examine and audit the DBP is exclusive and
precludes a concurrent audit of the DBP by a private external auditor?
Held:
The bare language of Section 2, however, shows that the COA's power under the first paragraph is not
declared exclusive, while its authority under the second paragraph is expressly declared "exclusive."
There is a significant reason for this marked difference in language. The clear and unmistakable
conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COA's power to examine and audit is nonexclusive. On the other hand, the COA's authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing
rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.
Moreover, as the constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COA's findings and
conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government agencies
and officials are concerned. The findings and conclusions of the private auditor may guide private
investors or creditors who require such private audit. Government agencies and officials, however,
remain bound by the findings and conclusions of the COA, whether the matter falls under the first or
second paragraph of Section 2, unless of course such findings and conclusions are modified or
reversed by the courts.
The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies, while non-exclusive, cannot be
taken away from the COA. Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution mandates that: "Sec. 3. No law
shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatsoever, or
any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit."
The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the COA of its
power to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored
since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its
findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent private
audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit.
Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to only
one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to examine and audit
government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow
independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when there
is a private investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a government corporation is
privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government borrows money from abroad.
Boys Scouts of the Phils v COA
Hhsjha;s
Local Autonomy
Lina v Pano
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Laguna made a kapasyahan making gambling illegal. On the other
and, PCSO wanted to operate a lotto outlet there. The mayor denied PCSO a permit to operate a lotto
outlet.

Issue: Is the kapasyahan valid?

Held: No.
What the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not
disallow by ordinance or resolution. The basic relationship of the Legislature and the local governments
have not been enfeebled by the new provisions of the Constitution strengthening the policy of local
autonomy. The national legislature is still the principal of LGUs, which cannot defy its will or modify or
violate it. Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state.
Dadole v COA
Issue: Mandaue City used to give higher allowances to judges(compared to other cities). Then, the
DBM and COA reduced this allowance. Can the COA do this?
Held: No, it cannot.
Since the Local Government Code authorizes local governments to give allowances to judges ad to
determine how much such allowances should be, local autonomy prohibits COA from interfering with
the authority of Mandaue by reducing what the local government has already decided.
San Juan v CSC
E.O. 112 states that the minister of the DBM (Dept. of Budget and Management) should appoint a
budget officer from a list to be recommended by the local government head (governor in this case).
However, al of the governors recomendees failed to qualify.
Issue: Can the DBM appoint anyone of its choosing since the ones recommended by the governor do
not qualify?
Held: No.
DBM minister cant appoint just anyone he chooses even if those recommended by the local
government head do not qualify. What the Department Head can do is return the list of
recommendations to the local government head and state why they do not qualify. This is the only way
local autonomy can be given the recognition the Constitution wants it to have. When in doubt, favor
autonomy.
LLDA v CA
Issue: Can the municipalities around Laguna Lake, under the Local Government Code, authorize the
construction or dismantling of fish pens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like in Laguna Lake? (on
the other hand, the LLDA claims these same powers under RA 4850 and PD 813)
Held: No, it is the LLDA that has the power.
The specific power of the LLDA must prevail over the general power of local governments. Besides, the
power given by the LGC to the local governments was a revenue generating power and not a
regulatory power. Hence, although the court denied the regulatory authorities of municipalities, their
authority to impose fees for the purpose of generating revenue was recognized.
Magtajas v Pryce Properties
Issue: Can the city of Cagayan de Oro, under its authority to prohibit gambling, prevent PAGCOR from
operating a Casino in the city? (PD 1869 gave PAGCOR the authority to centralize and regulate all
games of chance in the Philippines)
Held: No. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national law making body.
Local Government Code
Garcia v COMELEC
Section 70 of the 1991 LGC authorized provinces, cities, legislative districts and municipalities to have
a preparatory recall assembly authorized to initiate the recall of an elective official. Governor Garcia
contends that the right to recall does not extend merely to the prerogative of the electorate to
reconfirm or withdraw their confidence on the official sought to be recalled at a special election. Such
prerogative necessarily includes the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall
proceedings or not.
Issue: W/N the preparatory recall assembly adopted by the Code is Constitutional?
Held:
The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, or initiating recall elections.
Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall election. The mandate given
by Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to enact a local government code which
shall provide for a more responsible and accountable local government structure throughout a system
of decentralization with effective mechanisms or recall, initiative, and referendum Congress was

clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall and its discernment dictates.
General Supervision
Ganzon v CA
President suspended Ganzon through the Secretary of Interior.
Issue: W/N the phrase as may be provided by law from the Constitutional provision has stripped the
President and the legislature of the power over local governments?
Held: No.
The power of general supervision of the President includes the power to investigate and remove.
Section 3 provides that the LGC may provide for removal thus indicating that laws on the subject
matter are not out of the compass of the legislature. Autonomy does not transform local governments
into kingdom unto themselves. The important distinction is the power of general supervision that the
President has, and the power of control, which the President does not have.
Sources of Revenue
Manila Electric v Province of Laguna
Held: Where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be deemed to
exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. Basic rationale for this rule is
to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of LGUs by directly granting them general and broad
powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and
unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the LGUs are being
strengthened and made more autonomous, the legislature must see to it that:
a. the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions;
b. each LGU will have its fair share of available resources;
c. the resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and
d. local taxation will be fair, uniform and just.
Yamane v BA Lepanto
Issue: W/N Makati City can impose business taxes on condominium corporations?
Held: No.
The power of LGUs to impose taxes within its territorial jurisdiction is derived from the Constitution
itself, which recognizes the power of these units to create its own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
For Makati to impose a business tax, it must be shown that the Condominium is engaged in business.
The City Treasurer has not posited the claim that the Corporation is engaged in business activities
beyond the statutory purposes of a condominium corporation but based the assessment solely on the
Corporations collection of assessments from unit owners, being utilized to defray necessary expenses
for its project and common areas. Hence, the assailed tax assessment has no basis under the LCG or
the Makati Revenue Code, and the insistence of the void tax constitute an attempt to the deprivation
of property without due process of law.
PFDA v CA
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Share in National Taxes
Pimentel v Aguirre
President Ramos issued AO 372 which provides:
Section 1. All government department and agencies, including state universities and
colleges, GOCCs and LGUs will identify and implement measures in 1998 FY that will
reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services items
Section 4. Pending assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to
10% of the internal revenue allotment to LGUs shall be withheld.
Issue: W/N the AO is unconstitutional for being an attempt to control LGUs and to encroach on their
autonomy?
Held:
Section 1 mere advisory and therefore cannot be proscribed as an attempt to exercise control over
LGUs.

Section 4 Unconstitutional.
It is against Section 286 of the LGC and Section 6, Article X of the Constitution which provides for the
automatic release of each of these units its share in the national internal revenue.
Batangas v Executive Secretary
Under the provisions of the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 20001, P 5 M of the IRA was earmarked for the
LGSEF. It also imposed the condition that such amount shall be released to the LGU subject to the IRR,
including such mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations and distribution of funds
among LGUs subject to the guidelines that may be prescribed by the Oversight Committee on
Devolution. Because of this, the LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs without the Committees
approval.
Issue: W/N Congress may impose conditions on the release of the share of local governments?
Held:
Article X, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that:
1. LGUs shall have just share in the national taxes;
2. the just share shall be determined by law;
3. the just share shall be automatically released to the LGUs.
The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution
and release to the vagaries of the IRR, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed
by the Oversight Committee from time to time makes the release not automatic, which clearly violates
the constitutional and statutory mandate that the just share of the LGUs shall be automatically
released to them.
Term of Office
Borja v COMELEC
Mayor died, vice-mayor succeeds him and serves the remainder of the term. Is he considered to have
served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit?
Sec. 8 embodies two policies: (1) to prevent political dynasties and (2) to enhance the freedom of
choice of the people.
First, historical examination of this provision reveals that two ideas emerge from the ConCom
proceedings: (1) the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of
power as a result of prolonged stay in office; and (2) the idea of election, derived from the concern
that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them to be preserved.
Second, textual analysis of the provision shows that it contemplates service by local official for three
consecutive terms as a result of election.
Thus, the term limit of elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
So, in order that the three-term limit of local elective official except barangay officials to apply, two
conditions must concur (1) the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times; and
(2) he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Socrates v COMELEC
Hagedorn served as Mayor for three full terms. In the first year after the end of his third term, he ran in
a recall election. Qualified?
Yes, because between the end of his third term and the recall election there was an interruption thus
breaking the successiveness.
Rivera v COMELEC
In the May 2004 elections, Boking Morales filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Mabalacat,
Pampanga. This was contested on the ground that he has served three previous consecutive terms as
Mayor of Mabalacat. Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term
commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term),
but he served the second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a caretaker of the office or
as a de facto officer because of the following reasons:
a. He was not validly elected for the second term 1998 to 2001 since his proclamation as
mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an Election Protest Case which
became final and executory on August 6, 2001; and
b. He was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January 16,
1999 to July 15, 1999.

COMELEC ruled for Boking, and he won the election.

Morales argued and the Comelec held that the July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2007 term is not his fourth
because his second term, July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 to which he was elected and which he served,
may not be counted since his proclamation was declared void by the RTC.
SC HELD: Morales is wrong.
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites
must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in
the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
Respondent Morales maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001) only as a caretaker of
the office or as a de facto officer. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose
defeated when an official serves in the same position for three consecutive terms. Morales is now
serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1,
1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12)
continuous years. Whether as caretaker or de facto officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the
prerequisites of the office which enables him to stay on indefinitely. Morales can not be considered a
candidate in the May 2004 elections. His certificate of candidacy is thus deemed cancelled, and, not
being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray
votes. Respondent Morales should be promptly ousted from the position of mayor of Mabalacat.
Aldovino, Jr. v COMELEC
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Creation of Political Units
Tan v COMELEC
All political units affected should participate in the plebiscite. If what is involved is a barangay, the
plebiscite should be municipality- or city-wide; if a municipality or component city, province-wide. If a
portion of province is to be carved out and made into another province, the plebiscite should include
the mother province and the proposed new province. Certainly, the mother province is affected
because it boundary is substantially altered. This decision was made based on the 1973 Constitution
which prescribed that the plebiscite should be in the unit or units affected.
Special Metropolitan Subdivisions
MMDA v Bel-Air Village
Issue: Can MMDA order the Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to open Jupiter Street to the public
considering that Jupiter Street is owned by BAVA?
Held: No.
MMDA is not a local government unit with police power. It is different from the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC) which was the central government of a local government unit.
Neither is it a metropolitan political subdivision under Section 11 because its creation was never
submitted to a plebiscite. MMDA, therefore does not possess police power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in RA 7924 that
empowers the MMDA or its Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is a development authority. It is an
agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, peoples organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious
delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature. It
is not a municipal corporation endowed with police power. Its creation was never submitted to a
plebiscite.
MMDA v Garin
Issue: May MMDA confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any other
legislative enactment?
Held:
Where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom
legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded
and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its
mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all
traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs. Without
such law, the MMDA has no power.

MMDA v Trackworks
Police power; MMDA. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the
billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDAs powers were limited to the
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting
of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power.
Sema v COMELEC
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Creation of Autonomous Region
Abbas v COMELEC
The legality of RA 6734, the Organic Act of Mindanao is challenged and the plebiscite called in the
thirteen provinces of Mindanao for the ratification of the Organic Act is challenged for being illegal in
that aspects of the Organic Act violate the Tripoli Agreement which is a valid internationals agreement.
Issue: What are the effects of this Organic Act?
Held:
Even if the Tripoli Agreement were an international agreement, the fact would not affect the validity of
the Organic Act. International agreements as internal law are on the same legal level as statutes and
whichever as between the two, international agreement or statute, comes later supersedes the other
The approval of the Organic Act does not automatically create the autonomous region. As the
Constitution says, the creation of the autonomous region takes effect only after it is ratified in a
plebiscite.
It is enough for the creation of the autonomous regions that some provinces, cities, and geographic
areas vote favorably. In other words, as an examination of the constitutional text shows, for effective
ratification is not necessary to achieve a double majority.
The political subdivisions which do not vote favorably remain in the administrative region to which they
belong now.
Leonor v Cordillera Bodong Administration
Issue: Can a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration render a valid executor decision in a
land dispute?
Held: No.
In the January 23, 1990 plebiscite, the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected by all
the provinces and the city of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao province, hence, the Cordillera
Autonomous Region did not come to be. Hence, no autonomous region was created. As a logical
consequence of that, the Cordillera Bodong Administration created under EO 220 section 13, as well as
the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region do
not exist. Such tribal courts are not part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme
Court and the lower courts which have been established by law. They do not possess juridical power.
Cordillera Bodong Administration are only advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is
to bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make a peace, settle, and
compromise.
Cordillera Broad Coalition v COA
Petitioners argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers
prior to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted
Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras.

Issue I: W/N EO 220 pre-empted Congress?

No. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and
coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government
in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to
the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely
provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of
an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict
with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later.

Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the
first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent
needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the
autonomous region created.

Issue II: A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the nature of the CAR: whether or not it is a
territorial and political subdivision.
After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new territorial
and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision.
CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate
juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers
that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own
and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc.
As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the covered areas.

Issue III: W/N CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the
provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City)
which compose the CAR?
As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage
for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a
group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative
autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
Organic Act
Pandi v CA
Issue: How may any provision of the Organic Act be amended?
Held:
An ordinary stature, whether general or special, cannot amend an organic act that provides for an
autonomous region which under the Constitution may only be created, and therefore changed, through
a plebiscite called for the purpose.