Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 151243

April 30, 2008

LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner,

vs.
ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all
surnamed PABALE, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri)
seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision,2 dated 10 April
2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as well as the
Resolution,3 dated 19 December 2001 of the same court denying
reconsideration of its aforementioned Decision. The Court of Appeals,
in its assailed Decision, upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, dated 20 February 1984, executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in
favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roiler and Amanda, all
surnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece of land (subject
property) in Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus, reversed and set aside the
Decision,4 dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.5 The 2 December
1997 Decision of the RTC declared null and void the two sales
agreements involving the subject property entered into by Nave with
different parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the
Pabale siblings; and ordered the reconveyance of the subject property
to Alamayri, as Naves successor-in-interest.
There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present
Petition, determined by the Court of Appeals to be as follows:

This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages

filed by Sesinando M. Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando
Realty Corporation [Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided over by
Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No.
675-84-C against Nelly S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of
land located in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317
(27604). [Fernando] alleged that on January 3, 1984, a
handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell)
was entered into by and between him and [Nave] involving
said parcel of land. However, [Nave] reneged on their
agreement when the latter refused to accept the partial down
payment he tendered to her as previously agreed because she
did not want to sell her property to him anymore. [Fernando]
prayed that after trial on the merits, [Nave] be ordered to
execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in his favor, and to pay
attorneys fees, litigation expenses and damages.
[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be
ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of
[Fernando] based on the following grounds: (1) she was not
fully apprised of the nature of the piece of paper [Fernando]
handed to her for her signature on January 3, 1984. When she
was informed that it was for the sale of her property in
Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she
immediately returned to [Fernando] the said piece of paper
and at the same time repudiating the same. Her repudiation
was further bolstered by the fact that when [Fernando]
tendered the partial down payment to her, she refused to
receive the same; and (2) she already sold the property in good
faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all
surnamed Pabale [the Pabale siblings] on February 20, 1984
after the complaint was filed against her but before she
received a copy thereof. Moreover, she alleged that [Fernando]
has no cause of action against her as he is suing for and in
behalf of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation who is not a party
to the alleged Contract to Sell. Even assuming that said entity
is the real party in interest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in
representation of the corporation there being no evidence to
show that he was duly authorized to do so.

Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene

alleging that they are now the land owners of the subject
property. Thus, the complaint was amended to include [the
Pabale siblings] as party defendants. In an Order dated April
24, 1984, the trial court denied [Naves] Motion to Dismiss
prompting her to file a Manifestation and Motion stating that
she was adopting the allegations in her Motion to Dismiss in
answer to [Fernandos] amended complaint.

Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the

proceedings in this case was suspended sometime in 1987 in
view of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna,
docketed as SP No. 146-86-C with Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as
the petitioner. On June 22, 1988, a Decision was rendered in
the said guardianship proceedings, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended

Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim praying that her
husband, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo be impleaded as her codefendant, and including as her defense undue influence and
fraud by reason of the fact that she was made to appear as
widow when in fact she was very much married at the time of
the transaction in issue. Despite the opposition of [Fernando]
and [the Pabale siblings], the trial court admitted the aforesaid
Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim.

"Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S. Nave

who now resides with the Brosas spouses has
categorically refused to be examined again at the
National Mental Hospital, the Court is constrained to
accept the Neuro-Psychiatric Evaluation report dated
April 14, 1986 submitted by Dra. Nona Jean AlvisoRamos and the supporting report dated April 20, 1987
submitted by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, both of the
National Mental Hospital and hereby finds Nelly S.
Nave an incompetent within the purview of Rule 92 of
the Revised Rules of Court, a person who, by reason of
age, disease, weak mind and deteriorating mental
processes cannot without outside aid take care of
herself and manage her properties, becoming thereby
an easy prey for deceit and exploitation, said condition
having become severe since the year 1980. She and her
estate are hereby placed under guardianship. Atty.
Leonardo C. Paner is hereby appointed as her regular
guardian without need of bond, until further orders
from this Court. Upon his taking his oath of office as
regular guardian, Atty. Paner is ordered to participate
actively in the pending cases of Nelly S. Nave with the
end in view of protecting her interests from the
prejudicial sales of her real properties, from the
overpayment in the foreclosure made by Ms. Gilda
Mendoza-Ong, and in recovering her lost jewelries and
monies and other personal effects.

Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty. Vedasto

Gesmundo filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended Answer
and Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale
siblings], this time including the fact of her incapacity to
contract for being mentally deficient based on the
psychological evaluation report conducted on December 2,
1985 by Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical
psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, the same was
denied by the court a quo.
[Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating
that in Criminal Case No. 1308-85-C entitled "People vs. Nelly
S. Nave" she raised therein as a defense her mental deficiency.
This being a decisive factor to determine once and for all
whether the contract entered into by [Nave] with respect to the
subject property is null and void, the Second Amended Answer
and Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale
siblings] should be admitted.

SO ORDERED."

Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal

therefrom, while the appeal interposed by spouses Juliano and
Evangelina Brosas was dismissed by this Court for failure to
pay the required docketing fees within the reglementary
period.
In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On
September 20, 1993, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, [Naves] sole
heir, she being an orphan and childless, executed an Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication pertaining to his inherited properties from
[Nave].
On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of
the instant case and for the issuance of a writ of execution of
the Decision dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C (petition
for guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on
February 14, 1996 with the court a quo. [The Pabale siblings]
filed their Opposition to the motion on grounds that (1) they
were not made a party to the guardianship proceedings and
thus cannot be bound by the Decision therein; and (2) that the
validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the late
[Nave] in their favor was never raised in the guardianship case.
The case was then set for an annual conference. On January 9,
1997, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a motion seeking the
courts permission for his substitution for the late defendant
Nelly in the instant case. Not long after the parties submitted
their respective pre-trial briefs, a motion for substitution was
filed by Lolita R. Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri] alleging that since
the subject property was sold to her by Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, she should
be substituted in his stead. In refutation, Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo filed a Manifestation stating that what he executed
is a Deed of Donation and not a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of [Alamayri] and that the same was already revoked by him
on March 5, 1997. Thus, the motion for substitution should be
denied.

On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring

that it cannot make a ruling as to the conflicting claims of
[Alamayri] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo. After the case was
heard on the merits, the trial court rendered its Decision on
December 2, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated
January 3, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave and
Sesinando Fernando null and void and of no force and
effect;
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February
20, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave in favor of the
[Pabale siblings] similarly null and void and of no force
and effect;
3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of
the property covered by TCT No. 111249 of the land
records of Calamba, Laguna;
4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer
of title over the property in favor of Ms. Lolita P.
[Alamayri] in the concept of reconveyance because the
sale in their favor has been declared null and void;
5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender
possession over the property to Ms. [Alamayri] and to
account for its income from the time they took over
possession to the time the same is turned over to Ms.
Lolita [Alamayri], and thereafter pay the said income to
the latter;
6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings],
jointly and severally, to pay Ms. [Alamayri]:
a. attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and

b. the costs.6
S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by Fernando,
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
58133, solely to question the portion of the 2 December 1997 Decision
of the RTC ordering him and the Pabale siblings to jointly and
severally pay Alamayri the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.
The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133
averring that the RTC erred in declaring in its 2 December 1997
Decision that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 February 1984
executed by Nave in their favor was null and void on the ground that
Nave was found incompetent since the year 1980.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the
appeals of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings.
It ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M.
Fernando Realty Corporation, represented by its President,
Sesinando M. Fernando as well as the appeal interposed by
Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed
Pabale, are hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84C is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
rendered upholding the VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated February 20, 1984.
No pronouncements as to costs.7
Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the
appellate court, invoking the Decision,8 dated 22 June 1988, of the
RTC in the guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP. PROC. No. 14686-C, which found Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe
since 1980; and thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her
guardian. Said Decision already became final and executory when no
one appealed therefrom. Alamayri argued that since Nave was already
judicially determined to be an incompetent since 1980, then all
contracts she subsequently entered into should be declared null and

void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20 February 1984, which she
executed over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the
findings of the RTC in its 22 June 1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C, having participated in the said guardianship proceedings
through their father Jose Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC
explicitly named in its orders Jose Pabale as among those present
during the hearings held on 30 October 1987 and 19 November 1987
in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus filed on 21 November 2001
a Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence so she
could mark and submit as evidence certain documents to establish
that the Pabale siblings are indeed the children of Jose Pabale.
Atty. Gesmundo, Naves surviving spouse, likewise filed his own
Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 April 2001 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting Naves incompetence
since 1980 as found by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his
right to the subject property as owner upon Naves death in
accordance with the laws of succession. It must be remembered that
Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the RTC the supposed transfer of his
rights to the subject property to Alamayri, but the court a
quo refrained from ruling thereon.
In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied
for lack of merit the Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and
Atty. Gesmundo.
Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the
following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
FINDING THAT NELLY S. NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN
SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C ON JUNE 22, 1988
CANNOT RETROACT TO AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE

DEED OF SALE SHE EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984

IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DECISION IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C DATED
JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT BINDING ON RESPONDENTS
PABALES.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONERS MOTION TO SCHEDULE HEARING TO
MARK DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF JOSE PABALE AS THE
FATHER OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.9
It is Alamayris position that given the final and executory Decision,
dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding
Nave incompetent since 1980, then the same fact may no longer be relitigated in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res
judicata, more particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.
This Court is not persuaded.
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially
acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." Res
judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other
actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first
suit.10
It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of
Section 47, Rule 39, which read:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a

judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order,
may be as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect
to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between
the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears
upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually
and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may
be stated as follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their
privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other
tribunal; and (2) Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated
or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot
again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not
the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits
are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between the
principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may
operate as evidence.11In speaking of these cases, the first general rule
above stated, and which corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph
(b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as "bar
by former judgment"; while the second general rule, which is

embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known as

"conclusiveness of judgment."
The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds provides
the following enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different
concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of
judgment.
The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states
that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and
was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in
privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated
in any future action between such parties or their privies, in
the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on
either the same or different cause of action, while the
judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been
held that in order that a judgment in one action can be
conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between
the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be
identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the
second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former
judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final
and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was
in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of
Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is
not required but merely identity of issues.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez
vs. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction
between bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of
a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of
action, and conclusiveness of judgment which bars the
relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation

between the same parties on a different claim or cause of

action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material
facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated
in former action are commonly applied to all matters
essentially connected with the subject matter of the
litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily
implied in the final judgment, although no specific
finding may have been made in reference thereto and
although such matters were directly referred to in the
pleadings and were not actually or formally presented.
Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows
that the judgment could not have been rendered
without deciding the particular matter, it will be
considered as having settled that matter as to all future
actions between the parties and if a judgment
necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as
conclusive as the judgment itself.12
Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking
Corporation, further differentiated between the two rules of res
judicata, as follows:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the
first case where the judgment was rendered and the second
case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the
judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the
court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the
litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and
second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first
judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and
directly controverted and determined and not as to matters

merely involved therein. This is the concept of res

judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated
differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered
on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein
and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their
privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject
matter of the two actions is the same.13
In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second
case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case. The second
case, however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch
on the same fact or question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness
of judgment requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of
causes of action.
Contrary to Alamayris assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no
application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties
and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 67584-C.

Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the

appointment of a guardian, to wit:
Rule 93
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian
for resident. Any relative, friend, or other person on behalf
of a resident minor or incompetent who has no parent or
lawful guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age
or over, may petition the court having jurisdiction for the
appointment of a general guardian for the person or estate, or
both, of such minor or incompetent. An officer of the Federal
Administration of the United States in the Philippines may
also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the Director
of Health, in favor of an insane person who should be
hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated leper.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for the appointment
of a general guardian must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:

No identity of parties
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty.
Gesmundo for the appointment of a guardian over the person and
estate of his late wife Nave alleging her incompetence.
A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of
a minor or an incompetent, the latter being described as a person
"suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized
lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write,
those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals,
and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease,
weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take
care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation."14

(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the

appointment necessary or convenient;
(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of
the minor or incompetent, and of the persons having
him in their care;
(d) The probable value and character of his estate;
(e) The name of the person for whom letters of
guardianship are prayed.

The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or

verification shall render void the issuance of letters of
guardianship.
SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When
a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed,
the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and
shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including
the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself,
and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be
given.
SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. Any interested person may,
by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the
ground of majority of the alleged minor, competency of the
alleged incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for
whom letters are prayed, and may pray that the petition be
dismissed, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to
any suitable person named in the opposition.
SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the
hearing of the petition the alleged incompetent must be
present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the
required notice has been given. Thereupon the court shall hear
the evidence of the parties in support of their respective
allegations, and, if the person in question is a minor or
incompetent it shall appoint a suitable guardian of his person
or estate, or both, with the powers and duties hereinafter
specified.
xxxx
SEC. 8. Service of judgment. Final orders or judgments
under this rule shall be served upon the civil registrar of the
municipality or city where the minor or incompetent person
resides or where his property or part thereof is situated.

A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding,

without the usual parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an
ordinary civil case. Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the
title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency,
Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo, petitioner, with no named
respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that
the petition contain the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the
supposed minor or incompetent and those having him in their care, so
that those residing within the same province as the minor or
incompetent can be notified of the time and place of the hearing on
the petition.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a
guardian under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first,
whether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no
capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and, second, who is
most qualified to be appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably
assume that the people who best could help the trial court settle such
issues would be those who are closest to and most familiar with the
supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives living within
the same province and/or the persons caring for him.
It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors
of the minor or incompetent be likewise identified and notified. The
reason is simple: because their presence is not essential to the
proceedings for appointment of a guardian. It is almost a given, and
understandably so, that they will only insist that the supposed minor
or incompetent is actually capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to
preserve the validity of said contracts and keep the supposed minor or
incompetent obligated to comply therewith.
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given
notice and actually took part in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not
Naves relatives, nor are they the ones caring for her. Although the
rules allow the RTC to direct the giving of other general or special
notices of the hearings on the petition for appointment of a guardian,

it was not established that the RTC actually did so in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C.
Alamayris allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C rests on two Orders, dated 30 October 198715 and
19 November 1987,16 issued by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C,
expressly mentioning the presence of a Jose Pabale, who was
supposedly the father of the Pabale siblings, during the hearings held
on the same dates. However, the said Orders by themselves cannot
confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed the father of the Pabale siblings
and that he was authorized by his children to appear in the said
hearings on their behalf.
Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to
submit and mark additional evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was
the father of the Pabale siblings.
It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings. In general, however, the
Court of Appeals conducts hearings and receives evidence prior to the
submission of the case for judgment. 17 It must be pointed out that, in
this case, Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark
Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November 2001. She thus sought to
submit additional evidence as to the identity of Jose Pabale, not only
after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had been submitted for judgment,
but after the Court of Appeals had already promulgated its Decision
in said case on 10 April 2001.
The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments
and available evidences in support of their respective positions to the
court before the case is deemed submitted for judgment. Only under
exceptional circumstances may the court receive new evidence after
having rendered judgment;18 otherwise, its judgment may never attain
finality since the parties may continually refute the findings therein
with further evidence. Alamayri failed to provide any explanation why
she did not present her evidence earlier. Merely invoking that the ends

of justice would have been best served if she was allowed to present
additional evidence is not sufficient to justify deviation from the
general rules of procedure. Obedience to the requirements of
procedural rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair results
therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction.19 Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to
abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances,
allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was
never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the
rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules applies only to proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is
not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice.20
Moreover, contrary to Alamayris assertion, the Court of Appeals did
not deny her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in
Evidence merely for being late. In its Resolution, dated 19 December
2001, the Court of Appeals also denied the said motion on the
following grounds:
While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein
respondents Pabale siblings] participated in the guardianship
proceedings considering that the Jose Pabale mentioned
therein is their late father, [herein petitioner Alamayri]
submitting herein documentary evidence to prove their
filiation, even though admitted in evidence at this late stage,
cannot bind [the Pabale siblings] as verily, notice to their
father is not notice to them there being no allegation to the
effect that he represented them before the Calamba Court.21
As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted
to submit do prove that the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC
hearings on 30 October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C was the father of the Pabale siblings, they would still not
confirm his authority to represent his children in the said proceedings.

Worth stressing is the fact that Jose Pabale was not at all a party to the
Deed of Sale dated 20 February 1984 over the subject property, which
was executed by Nave in favor of the Pabale siblings. Without proper
authority, Jose Pabales presence at the hearings in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C should not bind his children to the outcome of said
proceedings or affect their right to the subject property.
Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C, then any finding therein should not bind them
in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of issues
Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C
and Civil Case No. 675-84-C that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness
of judgment, from ruling on Naves competency in 1984, when she
executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor the Pabale
siblings.
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was
incompetent at the time of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986,
thus, requiring the appointment of a guardian over her person and
estate.
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale
siblings in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was
an incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject
property in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence,
rendering the said sale void.
While both cases involve a determination of Naves incompetency, it
must be established at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other
in 1986. A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not
automatically mean that she was so in 1984. In Carillo v.
Jaojoco,22 the Court ruled that despite the fact that the seller was
declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court only nine days after
the execution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that she was so
when she executed the contract. Hence, the significance of the two-

year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since Naves mental condition in

1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the intervening period.
Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not
previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to
continue so long as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the
moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his
mind.23 The burden of proving incapacity to enter into contractual
relations rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to
this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed. 24
Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally
incapacitated only in 1986, when the RTC started hearing SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C; and she was not judicially declared an incompetent
until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the
RTC, resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her
guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated
and competent to enter into contracts such as the Deed of Sale over
the subject property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale siblings
on 20 February 1984. The burden of proving otherwise falls upon
Alamayri, which she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on the
22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision
dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C on Naves condition
"having become severe since the year 1980."25 But there is no basis
for such a declaration. The medical reports extensively quoted in
said Decision, prepared by: (1) Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos, dated 14
April 1986,26 and (2) by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, dated 20 April
1987,27 both stated that upon their examination, Nave was suffering
from "organic brain syndrome secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis
with psychotic episodes," which impaired her judgment. There was
nothing in the said medical reports, however, which may shed light on
when Nave began to suffer from said mental condition. All they said
was that it existed at the time Nave was examined in 1986, and again
in 1987. Even the RTC judge was only able to observe Nave, which
made him realize that her mind was very impressionable and capable
of being manipulated, on the occasions when Nave visited the court

from 1987 to 1988. Hence, for this Court, the RTC Decision dated 22
June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Naves
incompetency from 1986 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in
1984. And other than invoking the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC
in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, Alamayri did not bother to establish with
her own evidence that Nave was mentally incapacitated when she
executed the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale over the subject property
in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render the said deed void.
All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988
Decision in the former on Naves incompetency by the year 1986
should not bar, by conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter
case that Nave still had capacity and was competent when she
executed on 20 February 1984 the Deed of Sale over the subject
property in favor of the Pabale siblings. Therefore, the Court of
Appeals did not commit any error when it upheld the validity of the 20
February 1984 Deed of Sale.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review
is hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145370

March 4, 2004

MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,

vs.
RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 which dismissed

the petitioners petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure to annul the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No. NC-662
nullifying the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent
Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and of the resolution of the appellate court
denying the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.
This case arose from the following facts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the
respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had
eight children during their coverture, whose names and dates of
births are as follows:
a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA born October 6, 1959
b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. born March 7, 1961
c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA born May 18, 1962
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA born April 8, 1963
e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA born October 29, 1965
f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA born March 6, 1967
g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA born November 19,
19703
On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home
and abandoned the petitioner and their children. On January
25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 40, against the
respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and
judicial separation of property with a plea for support and

support pendente lite. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
M-3735. At that time, the petitioner was renting a house at No.
72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las
Pias, Metro Manila.4
On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise
Agreement5 where some of the conjugal properties were
adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including
the following:
b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos.
120082 and TCT No. 120083-Cavite) located at Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta.
Biofood Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together with the
resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building,
pavilion, swimming pool and all improvements. All of the shares
of stocks of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were distributed onethird (1/3) to the petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth
(1/12) each.6
The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise
agreement. Conformably thereto, the respondent vacated, on
June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings
and improvements thereon. The petitioner, with the knowledge
of the respondent, thenceforth resided in the said property.
In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On
June 5, 1995, he filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662.
Although the respondent knew that the petitioner was already
residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the
petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM
Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, "where

she may be served with summons."7 The clerk of court issued

summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the
petition.8 The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the
petition by substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the
petitioners son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his
residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.9

clerk of court issued a Certificate of Finality of the Order of the

court on July 16, 1996.12

On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a

Return of Service to the court stating that the summons and a
copy of the petition were served on the petitioner through her
son Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995:

On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against

the respondent with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of
the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings No. NC-662. The case
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner alleged,
inter alia, that the respondent committed gross
misrepresentations by making it appear in his petition in Sp.
Proc. No. NC-662 that she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue
cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro
Manila, when in truth and in fact, the respondent knew very well
that she was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite. According to the petitioner, the respondent did so to
deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, and
ultimately secure a favorable judgment without any opposition
thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the respondent caused
the service of the petition and summons on her by substituted
service through her married son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta
III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the respondent
was a resident. Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta III failed
to deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons. Thus,
according to the petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of
the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over
her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the
respondent. She further contended that there was no factual
basis for the trial courts finding that she was suffering from
psychological incapacity. Finally, the petitioner averred that she
learned of the Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000.
Appended to the petition, inter alia, were the affidavits of the
petitioner and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.

RETURN OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the
complaint and its annexes was received by the herein defendant
thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the
signature appearing on the summons. Service was made on June
6, 1995.
June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.
Sheriff10
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June
22, 1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare
Defendant as in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995
at 8:30 a.m. During the hearing on the said date, there was no
appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared
for the State and offered no objection to the motion of the
respondent who appeared with counsel. The trial court granted
the motion and declared the petitioner in default, and allowed
the respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent
testified in his behalf and adduced documentary evidence. On
July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition
and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio.11 The

On February 14, 1998, Valentines Day, the respondent and

Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil rights before the
municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite.13

The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be

rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable
Court to render Judgment granting the Petition.
1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Naic, Cavite).

The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said

resolution, appending thereto an amended petition in which she
alleged, inter alia, that:
4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction.
5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the fouryear period after discovery of the extrinsic fraud.

2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner

a. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
b. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P200,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for
every hearing;
d. P100,000.00 as litigation expenses;
e. Costs of suit.14
On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the
petition on the following ground:
We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or
in the absence of any clear and specific averment by petitioner
that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through
no fault of petitioner. Neither is there any averment or
allegation that the present petition is based only on the grounds
of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the
assumption that extrinsic fraud can be a valid ground therefor,
that it was not availed of, or could not have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial, or petition for relief.15

6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could
not have been availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief.
7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches
and/or estoppel.
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies were no longer available through
no fault of petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said
remedies. This petition is the only available remedy to her. 16
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial
court nullifying her and the respondents marriage was null and
void for the court a quos failure to order the public prosecutor
to conduct an investigation on whether there was collusion
between the parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear
for the State.
On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the
said motion.
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court alleging that the CA erred as follows:
1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which
was sought to be annulled.

2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.

3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with
the requirements of the Rules of Court.
4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.
5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioners Motion to
Admit the Amended Petition; and in not admitting the Amended
Petition.
6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality.17
The petition is meritorious.
An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, to annul a judgment or final order
or resolution in civil actions of the RTC may be based on two
grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction. If based
on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition
precedent, namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner.18 The petitioner
must allege in the petition that the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court are no longer available through no fault of
hers; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner
fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from
judgment through her own fault or negligence before filing her
petition with the Court of Appeals, she cannot resort to the
remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit
from her inaction or negligence.19
It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies
were no longer available through no fault of her own. The
petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to avail of
such remedies. The safeguard was incorporated in the rule

precisely to avoid abuse of the remedy.20 Access to the courts is

guaranteed. But there must be limits thereto. Once a litigants
rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a
competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license
to sue anew. The prevailing party should not be vexed by
subsequent suits.21
In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the
CA that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, and petition
for relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own.
She merely alleged therein that she received the assailed order
of the trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioners amended
petition did not cure the fatal defect in her original petition,
because although she admitted therein that she did not avail of
the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from
judgment, she did not explain why she failed to do so.
We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
the original petition and denying admission of the amended
petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals
failed to take note from the material allegations of the petition,
that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also
on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on her
claim that the summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp.
Proc. No. NC-662 were not served on her. While the original
petition and amended petition did not state a cause of action for
the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic
fraud, we rule, however, that it states a sufficient cause of action
for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of the petitioner,
notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the
ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration, or appeal are
no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or
final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court

is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the

defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the
action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the
ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final
order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available
through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment
rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is
null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or
in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in
any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred
by laches.23

court null and void.25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the

court on the person of the defendant even if he knows of the case
against him unless he is validly served with summons. 26

In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in

the Court of Appeals, in light of the material averments therein,
were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the petitioner
because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons
and a copy of the complaint. She claimed that the summons and
complaint were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta
III, who, however, failed to give her the said summons and
complaint.

SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the

defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
or (b) by leaving the copies of defendants office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.28

Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original

petition and its annexes will show that it is, prima facie
meritorious; hence, it should have been given due course by the
Court of Appeals.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that
jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the person of the
defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority or by service of summons. The
service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to
inform him that a case has been filed against him and, thus,
enable him to defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the
demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such service
in the absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the

Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either

by handing a copy thereof to him in person, or, if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to her.27 However, if there
is impossibility of prompt service of the summons personally on
the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the
summons may be effected by substituted service as provided in
Section 7, Rule 14 of the said Rules:

In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of

service should be strictly followed in order that the court may
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, it is
only when a defendant cannot be served personally within a
reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating
the efforts made to find him and personally serve on him the
summons and complaint and the fact that such effort
failed.30 This statement should be made in the proof of service to
be accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is
necessary because substituted service is a derogation of the
usual method of service. It has been held that substituted service
of summons is a method extraordinary in character; hence, may
be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances categorized
by statutes.31

As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA

and the annexes thereof, the summons in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662
was issued on June 6, 1995.32 On the same day, the summons
was served on and received by Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta
III,33 the petitioners son. When the return of summons was
submitted to the court by the sheriff on June 21, 1995, no
statement was made on the impossibility of locating the
defendant therein within a reasonable time, or that any effort
was made by the sheriff to locate the defendant. There was no
mention therein that Venancio Mariano Ancheta III was
residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes,
Almanza, Las Pias, where the petitioner (defendant therein)
was allegedly residing. It turned out that Venancio Mariano B.
Ancheta III had been residing at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and
that his father merely showed him the summons and the
complaint and was made to affix his signature on the face of the
summons; he was not furnished with a copy of the said
summons and complaint.
4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso,
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, I have been residing on the adjoining
land consisting of two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as
his share of the conjugal partnership. Since then, I have been
residing therein up to the present.
5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence
situated on my fathers lot), my father came to see me and then
asked me to sign and I did sign papers which he (my father) and
the Sheriff did not allow me to read. Apparently, these papers
are for the Summons to my mother in the case for annulment of
marriage filed by my father against her. I was not given any copy
of the Summons and/or copy of the complaint/petition.34
We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in
dismissing the original petition of the petitioner and the

amended petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded

on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the
merits of the final order of the trial court. However, we cannot
but express alarm at what transpired in the court a quo as shown
by the records. The records show that for the petitioners failure
to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court granted the
motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default. The
public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he
interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent. The
trial court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent exparte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a
whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. The actuations
of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of
Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment
shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of
judgment.35
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18,
Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation. If the defendant in an action for annulment
of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion,

to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence

submitted is not fabricated.36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid
down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.38
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals,40regarding the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State.41 The trial court,
abetted by the ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the public
prosecutor, waylaid the Rules of Court and the Family Code, as
well as the rulings of this Court.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social
institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not
mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.42
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default
is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for

annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal

separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to
appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any
collusion between the parties and to take care that their
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendantspouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare
him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting
attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The
prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for
legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his
own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious
and fabricated.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the
family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on
the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can
find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families.
The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric;
hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family
members alone.43Whether or not a marriage should continue to
exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the
whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other
suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to
fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July
13, 2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are
hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-G.R.
SP No. 59550 be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings conformably with the Decision of this Court and
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
SO ORDERED.

acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant

voluntarily submits to it. The defendant must be properly
apprised of a pending action against him and assured of the
opportunity to present his defenses to the suit. Proper service of
summons is used to protect ones right to due process.
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 presents
the core issue whether there was a valid substituted service of
summons on petitioner for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction.
Petitioner Manotoc claims the court a quo should have annulled
the proceedings in the trial court for want of jurisdiction due to
irregular and ineffective service of summons.
The Facts
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006
MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITA
TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES
TRAJANO, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The courts jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid
service of summons. Without a valid service, the court cannot

Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case No. 63337 entitled

Agapita Trajano, pro se, and on behalf of the Estate of
Archimedes Trajano v. Imelda Imee R. Marcos-Manotoc 2 for
Filing, Recognition and/or Enforcement of Foreign Judgment.
Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign courts
judgment rendered on May 1, 1991 by the United States District
Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America, in a case
entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a.
Imee Marcos, Civil Case No. 86-0207 for wrongful death of
deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military
intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly under the
command, direction, authority, supervision, tolerance,
sufferance and/or influence of defendant Manotoc, pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of Court.
Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued
a Summons 3 on July 6, 1993 addressed to petitioner at
Alexandra Condominium Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2
Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City.

On July 15, 1993, the Summons and a copy of the Complaint

were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged
caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit mentioned
earlier. 4 When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial court
declared her in default through an Order 5 dated October 13,
1993.
On October 19, 1993, petitioner, by special appearance of
counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid
substituted service of summons. The grounds to support the
motion were: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the
Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her dwelling, residence,
or regular place of business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in
the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a resident
of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on
personal and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4)
defendant was a resident of Singapore; and (5) whatever
judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.
During the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner
Manotoc presented Carlos Gonzales, who testified that he saw
defendant Manotoc as a visitor in Alexandra Homes only two
times. He also identified the Certification of Renato A. de Leon,
which stated that Unit E-2104 was owned by Queens Park
Realty, Inc.; and at the time the Certification was issued, the
unit was not being leased by anyone. Petitioner also presented
her Philippine passport and the Disembarkation/Embarkation
Card 7 issued by the Immigration Service of Singapore to show
that she was a resident of Singapore. She claimed that the
person referred to in plaintiffs Exhibits "A" to "EEEE" as "Mrs.
Manotoc" may not even be her, but the mother of Tommy
Manotoc, and granting that she was the one referred to in said
exhibits, only 27 out of 109 entries referred to Mrs. Manotoc.
Hence, the infrequent number of times she allegedly entered

Alexandra Homes did not at all establish plaintiffs position that

she was a resident of said place.
On the other hand, Agapita Trajano, for plaintiffs estate,
presented Robert Swift, lead counsel for plaintiffs in the Estate
of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, who testified
that he participated in the deposition taking of Ferdinand R.
Marcos, Jr.; and he confirmed that Mr. Marcos, Jr. testified that
petitioners residence was at the Alexandra Apartment,
Greenhills. 8 In addition, the entries 9 in the logbook of
Alexandra Homes from August 4, 1992 to August 2, 1993, listing
the name of petitioner Manotoc and the Sheriffs Return, 10 were
adduced in evidence.
On October 11, 1994, the trial court rejected Manotocs Motion
to Dismiss on the strength of its findings that her residence, for
purposes of the Complaint, was Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104,
No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based on the
documentary evidence of respondent Trajano. The trial court
relied on the presumption that the sheriffs substituted service
was made in the regular performance of official duty, and such
presumption stood in the absence of proof to the contrary. 11
On December 21, 1994, the trial court discarded Manotocs plea
for reconsideration for lack of merit. 12
Undaunted, Manotoc filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition 13 before the Court of Appeals (CA) on January 20,
1995, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36214 seeking the annulment
of the October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994 Orders of Judge
Aurelio C. Trampe.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 17, 1997, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision, 14 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. The court a quo adopted the findings of the trial

court that petitioners residence was at Alexandra Homes, Unit

E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, which
was also the residence of her husband, as shown by the
testimony of Atty. Robert Swift and the Returns of the registered
mails sent to petitioner. It ruled that the
Disembarkation/Embarkation Card and the Certification dated
September 17, 1993 issued by Renato A. De Leon, Assistant
Property Administrator of Alexandra Homes, were hearsay, and
that said Certification did not refer to July 1993the month
when the substituted service was effected.
In the same Decision, the CA also rejected petitioners
Philippine passport as proof of her residency in Singapore as it
merely showed the dates of her departure from and arrival in the
Philippines without presenting the boilerplates last two (2)
inside pages where petitioners residence was indicated. The CA
considered the withholding of those pages as suppression of
evidence. Thus, according to the CA, the trial court had acquired
jurisdiction over petitioner as there was a valid substituted
service pursuant to Section 8, Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of
Court.
On April 2, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration 15 which was denied by the CA in its
Resolution 16dated October 8, 1997.
Hence, petitioner has come before the Court for review on
certiorari.

DEFIANCE OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN RULING

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER
THE PERSON OF THE PETITIONER THROUGH A
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SECTION 8, RULE 14 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A]
SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS A
VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON AN ALLEGED
CARETAKER OF PETITIONERS RESIDENCE IN COMPLETE
DEFIANCE OF THE RULING IN CASTILLO VS. CFI OF
BULACAN, BR. IV, G.R. NO. L-55869, FEBRUARY 20, 1984,
127 SCRA 632 WHICH DEFINES THE PROPRIETY OF SUCH
SERVICE UPON MERE OVERSEERS OF PREMISES WHERE
A PARTY SUPPOSEDLY RESIDES.
III. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A]
SERIOUS ERROR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE RESIDENCE
OF THE HUSBAND IS ALSO THE RESIDENCE OF HIS WIFE
CONTRARY TO THE RULING IN THE BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. DE COSTER, G.R. NO. 23181,
MARCH 16, 1925, 47 PHIL. 594.
IV. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A]
SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE ON
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS UNDER
SECTIONS 17 AND 18, RULE 14 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT. 17

The Issues
Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors for the
Courts consideration:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A]
SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE DECISION AND
RESOLUTION IN QUESTION (ANNEXES A AND B) IN

The assigned errors bring to the fore the crux of the

disagreementthe validity of the substituted service of
summons for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over
petitioner.
The Courts Ruling

We GRANT the petition.

We can break down this section into the following requirements

to effect a valid substituted service:

Acquisition of Jurisdiction
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid
service of summons or the defendants voluntary appearance in
court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the
courts jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of
summons, "any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is null and void." 18 In an action
strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the
preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the
summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable
reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a
reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to.
While substituted service of summons is permitted, "it is
extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual
method of service." 19 Hence, it must faithfully and strictly
comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances
authorized by the rules. Indeed, "compliance with the rules
regarding the service of summons is as much important as the
issue of due process as of jurisdiction." 20
Requirements for Substituted Service
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which
applies to this case provides:
SEC. 8. 21 Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office
or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.

The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show

that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is
impossibility of prompt service. 22 Section 8, Rule 14 provides
that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to
serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no specific
time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so
much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a
reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what
the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a
regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other
party." 23 Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set
period. However, when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff
asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the
latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the
summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias
summons if the service of summons has failed. 24 What then is a
reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in
order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the
plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days
since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff
wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days
because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch
clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the
summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return
provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the
Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the
Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the
succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of
summons can be considered "reasonable time" with regard to
personal service on the defendant.

Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of

summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable
promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious
dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best
efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the
other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and
evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful,
persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the
defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available,
there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve
the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt
service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff
must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts

and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal
service. 25 The efforts made to find the defendant and the
reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in
the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal
service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s
of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant
and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on
defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted
service. The form on Sheriffs Return of Summons on
Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs
published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a
narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally
and the fact of failure. 26 Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires that "impossibility of
prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to
find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts,"
which should be made in the proof of service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or
residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age and
discretion then residing therein." 27 A person of suitable age and
discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity
(18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to
understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is
defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a
responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is
lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". 28 Thus, to be of
sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and
understand English to comprehend the import of the summons,
and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint
to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to
take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the
"relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the

latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the

summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person
found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of
legal age, what the recipients relationship with the defendant is,
and whether said person comprehends the significance of the
receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to
the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of
summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically
described in the Return of Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendants office or
regular place of business, then it should be served on a
competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on
whom the substituted service will be made must be the one
managing the office or business of defendant, such as the
president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient
knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising
from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be
contained in the Return.
Invalid Substituted Service in the Case at Bar
Let us examine the full text of the Sheriffs Return, which reads:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many occasions several
attempts were made to serve the summons with complaint and
annexes issued by this Honorable Court in the above entitled
case, personally upon the defendant IMELDA IMEE MARCOSMANOTOC located at Alexandra Condominium Corpration [sic]
or Alexandra Homes E-2 Room 104 No. 29 Merlaco [sic] Ave.,
Pasig, Metro-Manila at reasonable hours of the day but to no
avail for the reason that said defendant is usually out of her
place and/or residence or premises. That on the 15th day of July,
1993, substituted service of summons was resorted to in

accordance with the Rules of Court in the Philippines leaving

copy of said summons with complaint and annexes thru [sic]
(Mr) Macky de la Cruz, caretaker of the said defendant,
according to (Ms) Lyn Jacinto, Receptionist and Telephone
Operator of the said building, a person of suitable age and
discretion, living with the said defendant at the given address
who acknowledged the receipt thereof of said processes but he
refused to sign (emphases supplied).
WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to this
Honorable Court of origin, duly served for its record and
information.
Pasig, Metro-Manila July 15, 1993. 29
A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily
reveals the absence of material data on the serious efforts to
serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is
no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those efforts
proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service
has become impossible or unattainable outside the generally
couched phrases of "on many occasions several attempts were
made to serve the summons x x x personally," "at reasonable
hours during the day," and "to no avail for the reason that the
said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or
premises." Wanting in detailed information, the Return deviates
from the rulingin Domagas v. Jensen 30 and other related
cases 31that the pertinent facts and circumstances on the
efforts exerted to serve the summons personally must be
narrated in the Return. It cannot be determined how many
times, on what specific dates, and at what hours of the day the
attempts were made. Given the fact that the substituted service
of summons may be assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion
to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent facts and
circumstances surrounding the service of summons be described
with more particularity in the Return or Certificate of Service.

Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioners address in the

Complaint, it has not been shown that respondent Trajano or
Sheriff Caelas, who served such summons, exerted
extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner. Certainly, the second
paragraph of the Complaint only states that respondents were
"informed, and so [they] allege" about the address and
whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted
service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to
locate the defendant through more direct means. 32 More so, in
the case in hand, when the alleged petitioners residence or
house is doubtful or has not been clearly ascertained, it would
have been better for personal service to have been pursued
persistently.
In the case Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 33 it may be true that the
Court held that a Sheriffs Return, which states that "despite
efforts exerted to serve said process personally upon the
defendant on several occasions the same proved futile,"
conforms to the requirements of valid substituted service.
However, in view of the numerous claims of irregularities in
substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great
number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and
appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and
wasteful legal expenses, the Court rules in the case at bar that
the narration of the efforts made to find the defendant and the
fact of failure written in broad and imprecise words will not
suffice. The facts and circumstances should be stated with more
particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at
personal service, dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to
locate defendant, names of occupants of the alleged residence,
and the reasons for failure should be included in the Return to
satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such efforts
were made to personally serve summons on defendant, and
those resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt
personal service.

Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and

circumstances in inexact terms would encourage routine
performance of their precise duties relating to substituted
servicefor it would be quite easy to shroud or conceal
carelessness or laxity in such broad terms. Lastly, considering
that monies and properties worth millions may be lost by a
defendant because of an irregular or void substituted service, it
is but only fair that the Sheriffs Return should clearly and
convincingly show the impracticability or hopelessness of
personal service.
Granting that such a general description be considered
adequate, there is still a serious nonconformity from the
requirement that the summons must be left with a "person of
suitable age and discretion" residing in defendants house or
residence. Thus, there are two (2) requirements under the
Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and
discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or
residence of defendant. Both requirements were not met. In this
case, the Sheriffs Return lacks information as to residence, age,
and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriffs
general assertion that de la Cruz is the "resident caretaker" of
petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged
receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It is
doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in
the condominium unit considering that a married woman of her
stature in society would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside
in her dwelling. With the petitioners allegation that Macky de la
Cruz is not her employee, servant, or representative, it is
necessary to have additional information in the Return of
Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruzs refusal to sign the
Receipt for the summons is a strong indication that he did not
have the necessary "relation of confidence" with petitioner. To
protect petitioners right to due process by being accorded
proper notice of a case against her, the substituted service of
summons must be shown to clearly comply with the rules.

It has been stated and restated that substituted service of

summons must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed
requirements and in the circumstances authorized by the
rules. 34
Even American case law likewise stresses the principle of strict
compliance with statute or rule on substituted service, thus:
The procedure prescribed by a statute or rule for substituted or
constructive service must be strictly pursued. 35There must be
strict compliance with the requirements of statutes authorizing
substituted or constructive service. 36
Where, by the local law, substituted or constructive service is in
certain situations authorized in the place of personal service
when the latter is inconvenient or impossible, a strict and literal
compliance with the provisions of the law must be shown in
order to support the judgment based on such substituted or
constructive service. 37 Jurisdiction is not to be assumed and
exercised on the general ground that the subject matter of the
suit is within the power of the court. The inquiry must be as to
whether the requisites of the statute have been complied with,
and such compliance must appear on the record. 38 The fact that
the defendant had actual knowledge of attempted service does
not render the service effectual if in fact the process was not
served in accordance with the requirements of the statute. 39
Based on the above principles, respondent Trajano failed to
demonstrate that there was strict compliance with the
requirements of the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7, Rule
14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid
substituted service, the proceedings held before the trial court
perforce must be annulled.

The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity

in the performance of official duty. It reasons out that "[t]he
certificate of service by the proper officer is prima facie evidence
of the facts set out herein, and to overcome the presumption
arising from said certificate, the evidence must be clear and
convincing." 40
The Court acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid doctrine.
However, for the presumption to apply, the Sheriffs Return
must show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to
personally serve the summons and that said efforts failed. These
facts must be specifically narrated in the Return. To reiterate, it
must clearly show that the substituted service must be made on
a person of suitable age and discretion living in the dwelling or
residence of defendant. Otherwise, the Return is flawed and the
presumption cannot be availed of. As previously explained, the
Return of Sheriff Caelas did not comply with the stringent
requirements of Rule 14, Section 8 on substituted service.
In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, 41 it was held that
"x x x the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this case
where it is patent that the sheriffs return is defective (emphasis
supplied)." While the Sheriffs Return in the Venturanza case
had no statement on the effort or attempt to personally serve the
summons, the Return of Sheriff Caelas in the case at bar
merely described the efforts or attempts in general terms lacking
in details as required by the ruling in the case of Domagas v.
Jensen and other cases. It is as if Caelas Return did not
mention any effort to accomplish personal service. Thus, the
substituted service is void.
On the issue whether petitioner Manotoc is a resident of
Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue,
Pasig City, our findings that the substituted service is void has
rendered the matter moot and academic. Even assuming that

Alexandra Homes Room 104 is her actual residence, such fact

would not make an irregular and void substituted service valid
and effective.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Petition for Review is
hereby GRANTED and the assailed March 17, 1997 Decision and
October 8, 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals and the
October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig City, Branch
163 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., G.R. No. 170943

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
PNOC EXPLORATION
CORPORATION,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 23, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review1 of the September 22, 2005
decision2 and December 29, 2005 resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82482.
On December 23, 2002, respondent PNOC Exploration
Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money against
petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 167. The complaint, docketed as

Civil Case No. 69262, sought to collect the amount

of P698,502.10 representing petitioners unpaid balance
of the car loan4 advanced to him by respondent when he
was still a member of its board of directors.
Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because
he could not be located in his last known address despite
earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondents
motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by
publication.
Respondent caused the publication of the summons in
Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, on May 20, 2003. Thereafter, respondent
submitted the affidavit of publication of the advertising
manager of Remate5 and an affidavit of service of
respondents employee6 to the effect that he sent a copy of
the summons by registered mail to petitioners last
known address.
When petitioner failed to file his answer within the
prescribed period, respondent moved that the case be set
for the reception of its evidence ex parte. The trial court
granted the motion in an order dated September 11,
2003.
Respondent proceeded with the ex parte presentation
and formal offer of its evidence. Thereafter, the case was
deemed submitted for decision on October 15, 2003.
On October 28, 2003, petitioner filed an "Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached
Answer." He sought reconsideration of the September 11,
2003 order, alleging that the affidavit of service
submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section
19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by

the clerk of court. He also claimed that he was denied due

process as he was not notified of the September 11, 2003
order. He prayed that respondents evidence ex parte be
stricken off the records and that his answer be admitted.
Respondent naturally opposed the motion. It insisted that
it complied with the rules on service by publication.
Moreover, pursuant to the September 11, 2003 order,
petitioner was already deemed in default for failure to file
an answer within the prescribed period.
In an order dated February 6, 2004, the trial court denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the September
11, 2003 order. It held that the rules did not require the
affidavit of complementary service by registered mail to
be executed by the clerk of court. It also ruled that due
process was observed as a copy of the September 11, 2003
order was actually mailed to petitioner at his last known
address. It also denied the motion to admit petitioners
answer because the same was filed way beyond the
reglementary period.
Aggrieved, petitioner assailed the September 11, 2003
and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial court in the
Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. He
contended that the orders were issued with grave abuse of
discretion. He imputed the following errors to the trial
court: taking cognizance of the case despite lack of
jurisdiction due to improper service of summons; failing
to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes,
particularly the September 11, 2003 order, and upholding
technicality over equity and justice.
During the pendency of the petition in the Court of
Appeals, the trial court rendered its decision in Civil Case
No. 69262. It ordered petitioner to pay P698,502.10 plus

legal interest and costs of suit.7

Meanwhile, on September 22, 2005, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision8 sustaining the September 11, 2003
and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial court and
dismissing the petition. It denied reconsideration.9 Thus,
this petition.
Petitioner essentially reiterates the grounds he raised in
the Court of Appeals, namely, lack of jurisdiction over his
person due to improper service of summons, failure of the
trial court to furnish him with copies of its orders and
processes including the September 11, 2003 order and
preference for technicality rather than justice and equity.
In particular, he claims that the rule on service by
publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in
personam like a complaint for a sum of money. He also
contends that the affidavit of service of a copy of the
summons should have been prepared by the clerk of
court, not respondents messenger.
The petition lacks merit.
ProprietyOf
Service By Publication
Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or
whereabouts are unknown. In any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the
like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry,
service may, by leave of court, be effected upon

him by publication in a newspaper of general

circulation and in such places and for such times as the
court may order. (emphasis supplied)
Since petitioner could not be personally served with
summons despite diligent efforts to locate his
whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of
court to effect service of summons upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus,
petitioner was properly served with summons by
publication.
Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in
rem and an action in personam and claims that
substituted service may be availed of only in an action in
rem. Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in
personam distinction was significant under the old rule
because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the
rule was applicable.10 Because of this silence, the Court
limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions
only.11
This has been changed. The present rule expressly states
that it applies "[i]n any action where the defendant is
designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now applies
to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in
rem.12
Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the
relevant portion of Section 19,13 Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court simply speaks of the following:
an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the
summons and order for publication in the post office,

postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered

mail to his last known address.
Service of summons by publication is proved by the
affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or
of the editor, business or advertising manager of the
newspaper which published the summons. The service of
summons by publication is complemented by service of
summons by registered mail to the defendants last
known address. This complementary service is evidenced
by an affidavit "showing the deposit of a copy of the
summons and order for publication in the post office,
postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered
mail to his last known address."
The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of
complementary service be executed by the clerk of court.
While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies
of its orders and processes, the duty to make the
complementary service by registered mail is imposed on
the party who resorts to service by publication.
Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons
was defective, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner by his own
voluntary appearance in the action against him. In
this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
states:
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants
voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he

filed the "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to
Admit Attached Answer."14 This was equivalent to service
of summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner.
EntitlementTo
Notice Of Proceedings
The trial court allowed respondent to present its
evidence ex parte on account of petitioners failure to file
his answer within the prescribed period. Petitioner assails
this action on the part of the trial court as well as the said
courts failure to furnish him with copies of orders and
processes issued in the course of the proceedings.
The effects of a defendants failure to file an answer
within the time allowed therefor are governed by Sections
3 and 4, Rule 9 (on Effect of Failure to Plead) of the Rules
of Court:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending
party fails to answer within the time allowed
therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the
claiming party with notice to the defending party,
and proof of such failure, declare the defending
party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to
render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his
pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion
requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception
of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.
SEC. 4. Effect of order of default. A party in default
shall be entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings but not to take part in the trial. (emphasis

supplied)
If the defendant fails to file his answer on time, he may be
declared in default upon motion of the plaintiff with
notice to the said defendant. In case he is declared in
default, the court shall proceed to render judgment
granting the plaintiff such relief as his pleading may
warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the
plaintiff to submit evidence. The defaulting defendant
may not take part in the trial but shall be entitled to
notice of subsequent proceedings.
In this case, even petitioner himself does not dispute that
he failed to file his answer on time. That was in fact why
he had to file an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and to Admit Attached Answer." But respondent
moved only for the ex parte presentation of evidence, not
for the declaration of petitioner in default. In its February
6, 2004 order, the trial court stated:
The disputed Order of September 11, 2003 allowing the
presentation of evidence ex-parte precisely ordered that
"despite and notwithstanding service of summons by
publication, no answer has been filed with the Court
within the required period and/or forthcoming.
["] Effectively[,] that was a finding that the
defendant [that is, herein petitioner] was in
default for failure to file an answer or any
responsive pleading within the period fixed in the
publication as precisely the defendant [could not] be
found and for which reason, service of summons by
publication was ordered. It is simply illogical to notify the
defendant of the Order of September 11, 2003 simply on
account of the reality that he was no longer residing
and/or found on his last known address and his
whereabouts unknown thus the publication of the

summons. In other words, it was reasonable to expect

that the defendant will not receive any notice or order in
his last known address. Hence, [it was] impractical to
send any notice or order to him. Nonetheless, the
record[s] will bear out that a copy of the order of
September 11, 2003 was mailed to the defendant
at his last known address but it was not claimed.
(emphasis supplied)
As is readily apparent, the September 11, 2003 order did
not limit itself to permitting respondent to present its
evidence ex parte but in effect issued an order of default.
But the trial court could not validly do that as an order of
default can be made only upon motion of the claiming
party.15 Since no motion to declare petitioner in default
was filed, no default order should have been issued.
To pursue the matter to its logical conclusion, if a party
declared in default is entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings, all the more should a party who has not
been declared in default be entitled to such notice. But
what happens if the residence or whereabouts of the
defending party is not known or he cannot be located? In
such a case, there is obviously no way notice can be sent
to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him.
The law does not require that the impossible be
done.16 Nemo tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no
one to perform an impossibility.17 Laws and rules must be
interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with
logic, common sense, reason and practicality.18
Hence, even if petitioner was not validly declared in
default, he could not reasonably demand that copies of
orders and processes be furnished him. Be that as it may,
a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was nonetheless
still mailed to petitioner at his last known address but it

was unclaimed.
CorrectnessOf
Non-Admission Of Answer
Petitioner failed to file his answer within the required
period. Indeed, he would not have moved for the
admission of his answer had he filed it on time.
Considering that the answer was belatedly filed, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying its
admission.
Petitioners plea for equity must fail in the face of the
clear and express language of the rules of procedure and
of the September 11, 2003 order regarding the period for
filing the answer. Equity is available only in the absence
of law, not as its replacement.19Equity may be applied
only in the absence of rules of procedure, never in
contravention thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168809

March 10, 2006

EDWARD ROCO TAN and EDWIN ROCO

TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO DE LA VEGA, ANGELA TUASON STALEY
and ANTONIO PEREZ Y TUASON, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the February 3, 2005
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79957,
which affirmed the March 21, 2003 Order2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 264, granting the motion for
judgment on the pleadings filed by respondents in Civil Case No.
62269. Likewise questioned is the appellate courts July 6, 2005
Resolution3 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The undisputed facts show that on August 3, 1992, respondents
filed a complaint for quieting of title and for declaration of
nullity of Free Patent No. 495269, Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 711 and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.

186516, against the heirs of Macario Mencias (defendant heirs),

namely, Aquilina Mencias, Aurora M. Gabat, Merlyn M. Cadete,
Myrna M. Quirante; and the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, the Director of the Land
Management Bureau and the Register of Deeds of Marikina. The
complaint was later amended to implead herein petitioner
purchasers of the disputed lot and to nullify TCT No. 272191
issued in their name.
The Amended Complaint averred that respondents are the coowners of a 159,576 square meter parcel of land located in
Marikina, Rizal, Metro Manila and covered by TCT No. 257152,
issued on June 20, 1969. Said title was a transfer from TCT No.
22395 in the name of J. Antonio Araneta as trustee of the
children of Angela I. Tuason. Among the lots covered by TCT
No. 257152 is the controverted Lot 89 containing an area of
54,197 square meters.4
Sometime in April 1992, respondents learned that the defendant
heirs are causing the ejectment of the occupants of a 29,945
square meter portion of Lot 89; and that Macario Mencias was
able to obtain Free Patent No. 495269 on July 31, 1971, and OCT
No. 711 on August 11, 1971, over said portion. Upon Macario's
death, OCT No. 711 was canceled and TCT No. 186516 was
issued to the defendant heirs on July 5, 1990.5 By virtue of a
Deed of Sale inscribed on November 14, 1994, TCT No. 186516
was further cancelled and TCT No. 271604 was issued on the
same date in favor of New Atlantis Real Estate & Development,
Inc., (Corporation) represented by its President, Victor C.
Salvador, Jr. The questioned lot was thereafter sold by the
Corporation to petitioners. TCT No. 271604 was thus cancelled
and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 272191 was issued to petitioners on
November 17, 1994.6
Respondents contended that Macarios OCT No. 711 and its
derivative titles-TCT No. 186516, in the name of defendant heirs

and petitioners TCT NO. 272191, are void because the area they
cover is entirely within their (respondents) land, specifically, Lot
89, as shown by the notation in the said titles, i.e., "This survey
is covered by F.P.A. No. (III-1) 4496; and "This survey is entirely
inside No. 89, II-4755."7 Respondents further averred that since
the controverted lot is already a private land, the Director of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
had no jurisdiction to approve Macarios application and to issue
Free Patent No. 495269. The pendency of this action was
allegedly inscribed in the defendant heirs title (TCT No. 186516)
on August 4, 1992 and carried over to the petitioners' TCT No.
272191.8
In their Answer,9 the defendant heirs contended that Lot 89 was
never part of respondents TCT No. 257152 which originated
from OCT No. 730. Respondents own exhibits, i.e., the
documents purportedly issued by the Bureau of Lands (Exhibits
"E" and "F"), show that Lot 89 was covered by OCT No.
734 and not OCT No. 730. Defendant heirs further stated that
respondents TCT No. 257152 was issued in lieu of TCT No.
22395 which is a mere reconstitution of TCT No. 45046. Upon
verification with the Register of Deeds of Rizal, TCT No. 45046,
covers a different parcel of land situated in San Juan, Rizal, and
measuring about 356 square meters only. The defendant heirs
also raised the defenses of laches and prescription.
On the other hand, petitioners asserted, inter alia, that they are
purchasers in good faith and for value and that they have no
knowledge of any defect in the title of the Corporation from
whom they purchased the controverted lot. The notice of lis
pendens alleged to have been inscribed in TCT No. 186516 on
August 4, 1992 does not appear in the Corporations title, TCT
No. 271604 nor in their title, TCT No. 272191. Absent said
notice, petitioners claim that they cannot be charged with
knowledge of any defect in the Corporation's title. Neither does
the note "This survey is covered by F.P.A. No. (III-1) 4496;" and

"This survey is entirely inside No. 89, II-4755," serve as

sufficient warning to third persons because said notes do not
indicate that the property is covered by another title.10
For failure to file their Answer, defendant Aurora M.
Gabat,11 public defendants Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Director of Land
Management Bureau and the Register of Deeds of
Marikina,12 were declared in default.
On March 4, 2003, respondents filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings which was granted by the trial court. It was held
that the disputed lot is within Lot 89 covered by respondents
TCT No. 257152, issued on June 20, 1969. Said lot therefore
became a private land long before the Free Patent was issued to
Macario on July 31, 1971. Hence, the titles derived or issued on
the basis of said Free Patent are void because Public Land Act
applies only to public lands and not private lands. On the theory
that the spring cannot rise higher than its source, the trial court
concluded that petitioners cannot be purchasers in good faith
considering that their title was derived from Macario who
acquired the property by virtue of a void title. It further ruled
that petitioners defense of good faith must fail because they
were forewarned of the notice indicating that the questioned lot
is inside Lot 89. The dispositive portion of the March 21, 2003
order, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiffs [respondents
herein] Motion is hereby Granted and judgment rendered as
follows:
1. Plaintiffs Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 257152 is
declared valid and superior to defendants [petitioners] TCT No.
272191;

2. Free Patent No. 495269 issued by then Secretary of

Environment and Natural Resources to Macario Mencias on
July 21, 1971 is declared null and void;
3. Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 711, Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 271604/T-1358 and Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 272191, TCT No. 186516 and TCT No. 272191, all
derivatives [sic] title of Free Patent 495269 issued by Registry of
Deeds of Marikina, are also declared null and void;
4. The Bureau of Lands and Land Registration Administration
are directed to enter into their technical files the findings in this
order;
5. The Registry of Deeds of Marikina is directed to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) NO. 272191 in the names of
Edward and Edwin Roco Tan.

Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the

essential question is whether there are issues generated by the
pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there
is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the
defending partys answer to raise an issue.14 The answer would
fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not deny the material
allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations
of the adverse partys pleadings by confessing the truthfulness
thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all. Now, if an
answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of
the complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of
new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of
the complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless
prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff), a judgment on the
pleadings would naturally be improper.15

Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, states:

In this case, we find that the trial court erred in rendering

judgment on the pleadings because the pleadings filed by the
parties generated ostensible issues that necessitate the
presentation of evidence. Respondents action for declaration of
nullity of Free Patent No. 495269 and the titles derived
therefrom is based on their claim that the lot titled in the name
of petitioners, is a portion of a bigger tract of land previously
titled in the name of their (respondents) predecessors-ininterest. The documents presented in support thereof were the
photocopy of respondents TCT No. 257152 which shows that the
land it covers, including lot 89, originated from OCT No. 730;
and photocopies of the documents alleged to have been issued
by the Bureau of Lands and confirming that the disputed lot is a
portion of respondents Lot 89. Pertinent portions of the
Amended Complaint, state:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer

fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. x x x.

5. Sometime in early April, 1992, plaintiff de la Vega was

informed by one of the occupants of the above-described lot No.
89 that the heirs of Macario Mencias, the defendants herein,
were causing the ejectment of said occupants and claiming to be

SO ORDERED.13
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
assailed order of the trial court. They filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied in a resolution dated July 6,
2005.
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue for resolution is whether a judgment on the
pleadings is proper in the instant case.

the owners of an area of 29,945 sq. ms. (sic) which is within, or

part of, Lot No. 89 covered by plaintiffs T.C.T. No. 257152. It
was only then that the plaintiffs heard of Macario Mencias and
of his encroaching into plaintiffs Lot 89.
6. The plaintiffs later learned that, unknown to them, Macario
Mencias had applied with the then Bureau of Lands for, and
obtained on 31 July 1971, Free Patent No. 495269 which was
granted under the signature of the then Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and covering an area of 29,945 sq. ms.
(sic) as described in Plan F (III-1) 4496-D. On 11 August 1971,
Original Certificate of Title No. 711 (Rizal) was issued to him
based on the said Free Patent, and upon his death, said OCT No.
711 was cancelled and transferred to his heirs, the defendants
herein, to whom T.C.T. No. 186516 (Marikina) was issued on 5
July 1990. The plaintiffs were never notified of said application
of Mencias for free patent nor of the issuance of Free Patent No.
495269 and OCT No. 711 to him and T.C.T. No. 186515 to his
heirs, the defendants herein. Photocopies of OCT No. 711, which
incorporated Free Patent No. 495269, and T.C.T. No. 186516 are
hereto appended as Annexes "B" and "C", respectively.
xxxx
8. A letter dated 29 October 1971 of Mr. Amando A. Salvador as
Chief of the Survey Division of the then Bureau of Lands and
addressed to Macario Mencias, 1st Indorsement, dated 15
February 1974, signed by Mr. Daniel C. Florida as Acting Chief
of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Lands, a report dated 17
December 1976 by Mr. Jose B. Isidro as Hearing Officer
addressed to the Director of Lands, and the 1st Indorsement,
dated 3 January 1977, also addressed to the Director of Lands by
Mr. Claudio C. Batiles as the District Land Officer, photocopies
of which are appended hereto as Annexes "D", "E", "F" and "G",
respectively, unequivocally confirmed that the area of 29,945 sq.
ms. (sic) covered by the Free Patent based on Plan F (III-1)

4496-D and issued to Macario Mencias was entirely inside Lot

89 of Plan II-4755, which was covered by T.C.T. No. 22395 in
the name of "J Antonio Araneta, Trustee of the children Angela
I. Tauson", and since 20 June 1969, by T.C.T. No. 257152 in the
plaintiffs names.
9. There can be no doubt that the area of 29,945 sq. ms. (sic)
covered by Free Patent No. 495269, which was incorporated in
OCT No. 711 issued to Macario Mencias, was within Lot 89 of
Plan II-4755 covered by T.C.T. No. 22395 and, since 20 June
1969, by T.C.T. No. 2597152 (sic) in the plaintiffs names,
because the technical description of said area embodied in the
said Free Patent itself and in OCT No. 711 disclosed the
following information:
"NOTE: This survey is covered by F.P.A. No. (III-1) 4496.
This survey is entirely inside No. 89, II-4755" (See Annex "B"
hereof). (See Annex "B" hereof).
10. In fact the very same notes were carried over in T.C.T. No.
186516 issued to the heirs of Mencias, the defendants herein,
thus forewarning all those who dealt or may have dealt with the
private defendants regarding the area therein described that
there was something anomalous in said title (See Annex "C"
hereof).
xxxx
14. The records of the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Metro
Manila, disclosed that TCT No. 186516, Annex "C", was
cancelled and T.C.T. No. 271604, covering the same parcel of
land covered by T.C.T. No. 186516, was issued on November 14,
1994 by the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Mr. Artemio B. Caa,
to the New Atlantis Real Eastate & Dev., Inc. represented by its
President, Victor C. Salvador, Jr., based on a sale in its favor
inscribed on the same date; and that T.C.T. No. 271604 was

thereupon cancelled and in lieu thereof T.C.T. No. 272191 was

issued by the said Register of Deeds to private defendants
Edward and Edwin Roco Tan on November 17, 1994 based on a
sale in their favor inscribed on the same date. A photocopy of
T.C.T. No. 272191 is hereto attached as Annex "H".
xxxx
16. Neither New Atlantis Real Estate & Dev. Inc., nor Edward
Roco Tan and Edwin Roco Tan could claim to be purchasers in
good faith not only because their titles are void and inexistent
and could not possibly have any legal effect whatsoever but also
because the "NOTE" cited in paragraphs 9 and 10 above, which
likewise appears on T.C.T. No. 272191 itself, discloses the very
basis for its nullity.
17. The notice of the pendency of this action (Notice of Lis
Pendens) was duly inscribed on T.C.T. No. 186516 on August 4,
1992 under Entry No. 274711, which notice has been carried
over to T.C.T. No. 272191, a photocopy of which is hereto
appended as Annex "H".

Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. 730 from which plaintiffs

alleged title was derived (T.C.T. No. 257152, Annex "A"). In
Annexes "E" and "F", Lot No. 89 of II-4755 is covered by O.C.T.
No. 734 and not 730;
13. T.C. T. No. 257152 is spurious, falsified, hence, null and void.
This certificate of title was issued in lieu of T.C.T. No. 22395/T
389 as per Annex "A" of the Complaint. T.C.T. No. 22395/T 389
was in turn issued in lieu of T.C.T. No. 45046 as shown in a
document (T.C.T. No. 22395) hereto attached as Annex "2";
14. It also appears that T.C.T. No. 22395 is a mere reconstitution
of a lost/destroyed T.C.T. No. 45046 as shown on page 3 of
T.C.T. No. 257152;
15. Upon verification with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, T.C.T. No. 45046 covered a different parcel of land
situated in San Juan, Rizal and measuring about 356 square
meters only, photo copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "3"
hereof;
x x x x.17

x x x x.

16

The foregoing averments were specifically denied by defendant

heirs who raised, among others, the affirmative defense that
respondents TCT No. 22395 is void and that lot 89 is not found
inside respondents land. Thus

Petitioners asserted, inter alia, the affirmative defense of good

faith and denied the material allegations of the complaint
relating to the origin of the title of respondents; and the latters
claim that Lot 89 is covered by TCT No. 257152. Pertinent
portions of the Answer state:

11. Lot 89 was never a part of the Mariquina Estate as shown in

subdivision plan PSD 29965 as surveyed in December, 1950 up
to June, 1951. This fact is also certified by the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal as early as 1967, a photo copy of said
certification is hereto attached as Annex "1";

In further support of the Specific Denials and Affirmative

Allegations herein set forth, and by way of Affirmative Defenses,
defendants allege:

12. Plaintiffs own exhibits (Annexes "E", "F", in relation to

Annex "A") show that lot 89 was never part of Original

4.2 Defendants are innocent purchasers for value of the subject

property. They had no knowledge, actual or constructive, of the

xxxx

alleged defect in their title, Transfer Certificate of Title No.

272191, or of the title of their predecessor-in-interest, the
Corporation.
4.2.1 Plaintiff's (sic) notice of lis pendens alleged to have been
duly inscribed on TCT No. 186516 on August 4, 1992 under
Entry No, 274711 did not appear or was not annotated on the
corporations title, TCT No. 271604, which was issued on
November 14, 1994 or long after the alleged inscription was
made on the said title. Attached and made integral part hereof
as Annex "A" is a copy of Corporation's title, TCT No. 271604.
4.2.2 Neither did said inscription appear or annotated on
defendants title, TCT No. 272191, which was issued on 17
November 1994. Attached and made integral part hereof as
Annex "B" is a copy of TCT No. 272191.
4.2.3 It bears stressing that if the said inscription was duly made
on 4 August 1992 as plaintiffs alleged, the same would have been
annotated on TCT Nos. 271604 and 272191 which were issued
long after the said entry was allegedly made. Obviously, if said
entry does appear today on TCT No. 272191, it was made only
recently or at the earliest, after the latter title was issued on 17
November 1994. But certainly said entry could not have been
possibly made on 4 August 1992.
4.2.4 With the absence of the notice of lis pendens, defendants
could not be charged with notice of any defect in their title No.
272191 nor their status as innocent purchasers for value be
adversely affected by the same.
4.2.5 Neither does the note, "this survey is covered by F.P.A. No.
(III-1) 4496; This survey is entirely inside No. 89 II-4755." serve
as sufficient notice to defendants of any defect in their title. Said
note does not indicate or disclose that the subject property is
covered by another title.

4.2.6 Moreover, the fact that the subject property was covered
by TCT No. 271604 duly issued by the Registry of Deeds in the
name of the corporation without any encumbrance, liens or
adverse claims annotated thereon negates any possibility that
the subject property belongs to any person other than the
corporation.18
It is clear from the foregoing that the pleadings filed in the
instant case generated the following issues: (1) whether
respondents TCT No. 257152 is valid; (2) whether Lot 89 is
covered by TCT No. 257152; and (3) whether petitioners are
purchasers in good faith. This is clearly not a proper case for
judgment on the pleadings considering that the Answers
tendered factual issues. The trial court rendered a summary
judgment on March 21, 2003 and not a judgment on the
pleadings.
In Narra Integrated Corporation v. Court of Appeals,19 the
Court explained the distinction between a proper case of
summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings, in this wise:
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the
pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious
character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for
summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings.
In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no
ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending
partys answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case of
a summary judgment, issues apparently exist i.e. facts are
asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no
admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or
affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answerbut the
issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not
genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions. x x
x.

In any case, a summary judgment is likewise not warranted in

this case as there are genuine issues which call for a full blown
trial. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded
appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or
genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary
judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary
judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence
of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to
render summary judgments and may do so only when there is
clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts
as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings
for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.20
In the instant case, presentation of evidence is necessary to
determine the validity of TCT No. 22395 from which
respondents title (TCT No. 257152) was derived. As alleged by
defendant heirs, TCT No. 22395 was a mere reconstitution of
TCT No. 45046, which per verification from the Register of
Deeds of Rizal pertain to a different piece of land measuring
only about 356 square meters and located in San Juan, Rizal.
These allegations were never refuted by respondents, hence,
they cannot be simply brushed aside by the trial court.
Moreover, even assuming that the title of respondents
predecessors-in-interest (TCT No. 22395) is valid, the evidence
at this stage is still insufficient to sustain the conclusion of the
trial court that Lot 89 is inside respondents land now covered
by TCT No. 257152. The title appended by respondents in their
complaint is a mere photocopy. Likewise, the document
allegedly issued by the Bureau of Lands and presented by
respondents to prove that Lot 89 is inside their land are also
mere photocopies and not authenticated by said office.

Furthermore, the title referred in the said documents as the

origin of TCT No. 257152, is a different title, that is OCT No. 734
and not OCT No. 730. There is thus a need to present evidence
to settle the issues in a full blown trial.
If the evidence show that the Free Patent and the OCT issued to
petitioners predecessors-in-interest is valid and or Lot 89 is not
inside TCT No. 257152, then judgment should be rendered in
favor of petitioners; and whether the latter acted in good or bad
faith will no longer be a decisive issue in this case. On the other
hand, if the title of petitioners predecessors-in-interest is
declared void, the defense of good faith maystill be available to
petitioners who claim to be purchasers in good faith and for
value. The rule is that a void title may be the source of a valid
title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. 21 An
innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of
another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or
interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the
same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the
claims or interest of some other person in the property. 22
Since good faith is always presumed,23 it was premature for the
trial court to conclude that petitioners are not purchasers in
good faith. Note that the complaint did not state that the notice
of the pendency of this action was inscribed in the title of the
Corporation from whom petitioners purchased the property.
Petitioners even denied the presence of said inscription in their
own title and in the title of the Corporation.24 Neither the
presence of the notation "This survey is covered by F.P.A. No.
(III-1) 4496; and This survey is entirely inside No. 89, II-4755,"
in the title of the Corporation automatically make petitioners
purchasers in bad faith. In the absence of other evidence to
explain said notation, bad faith, which is never presumed,
cannot be charged against petitioners. The notation that the
disputed lot is covered by Free Patent Application No. (III-1)
4496, will not place the title in dubious light because the same is

the number of the application for Free Patent of Macario

Mencias,25 petitioners predecessor-in-interest. The same is true
with respect to the notation in the title that the questioned lot is
inside Lot 89. Considering that the title presented is a mere
photocopy and that the notes appearing thereon do not indicate
that the subject property is covered by any title, the trial court
should have directed the parties to substantiate their respective
allegations instead of rendering judgment. Indeed, in
determining the propriety of rendering a motion for summary
judgment, the lower court should take that view of the evidence
most favorable to the party against whom it is directed, giving
such party the benefit of all favorable inferences.26
In sum, we find that respondents failed to prove that
presentation of evidence may be dispensed with in the present
controversy. The instant case is neither a proper case for
rendition of judgment on the pleadings nor of summary
judgment. A full blown trial should therefore be conducted to
resolve the issues raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition
is GRANTED and the February 3, 2005 Decision and the July
6, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
79957 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of
this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 264 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 206653

February 25, 2015

YUK LING ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN T. CO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
In court proceedings, there is no right more cherished than the
right of every litigant to be given an opportunity to be heard.
This right begins at the very moment that summons is served on
the defendant. The Rules of Court places utmost importance in
ensuring that the defendant personally grasp the weight of
responsibility that will befall him. Thus, it is only in exceptional
circumstances that constructive notification, or substituted
service of summons, is allowed. If the server falls short of the
rigorous requirements for substituted service of summons, then
the Court has no other option but to strike down a void
judgment, regardless of the consequences. This is a petition for
review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the June 27,
2012 Decision1 and the March 26, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA)in CA-G.R. SP No. 106271, which denied the
petition for annulment of judgment.

The Facts
Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (petitioner), a British-Hong Kong
national, and respondent Benjamin Co (respondent), a Filipino
citizen, were married on October 3, 1982 at Ellinwood-Malate
Church.3
Sometime in November 2008, petitioner received a subpoena
from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID)directing
her to appear before the said agency because her permanent
residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings.
Reportedly, her marriage with respondent was nullified by the
court.
When petitioner appeared before the BID, she was furnished
with the copies of the following documents: (1) petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed as Civil Case No. CV-010177; (2) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage docketed
as Civil Case No. 02-0306; (3) Decision,4 dated December 11,
2002, in Civil Case No. 02-0306 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 260 (RTC), Paraaque City, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent as void ab initio; and (4)
their marriage contract5 with the subject decision annotated
thereon. Petitioner was perplexed that her marriage with
respondent had been declared void ab initio. The above
documents showed that on April 26, 2001, respondent filed a
petition for declaration of nullity6 on the ground of psychological
incapacity before the RTC, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
CV-01-0177. Respondent stated that petitioners address was
600 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila. There was no showing of its
status, whether pending, withdrawn or terminated. On July 19,
2002, respondent filed another petition for declaration of
Nullity7 on the ground of psychological incapacity before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-0306. Respondent indicated
that petitioners address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2
Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the

RTC issued summons.8 In his Servers Return,9 process server

Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that, on August 1, 2002, substituted
service of summons with the copy of the petition was effected
after several futile attempts to serve the same personally on
petitioner. The said documents were received by Mr. Roly
Espinosa, a security officer.
On December 11, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision10 in Civil
Case No. 02-0306 finding respondents marriage with petitioner
as void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that summons was
served on petitioner on August 1, 2002, but she failed to file her
responsive pleading within the reglementary period. The public
prosecutor also stated that there were no indicative facts to
manifest collusion. Thus, the RTC concluded that petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for annulment of
judgment11 under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court before the CA on
November 24, 2008, claiming that she was never notified of the
cases filed against her. She prayed that the RTC decision, dated
December 11, 2002, in Civil Case No. 02-0306, be nullified on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner
alleged that first, respondent committed extrinsic fraud because,
as seen in Civil Case No. CV-01-0177, he deliberately indicated a
wrong address to prevent her from participating in the trial;
second, jurisdiction over her person was not acquired in Civil
Case No. 02-0306 because of an invalid substituted service of
summons as no sufficient explanation, showing impossibility of
personal service, was stated before resorting to substituted
service of summons; third, the alleged substituted service was
made on a security guard of their townhouse and not on a
member of her household; and fourth, she was not
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
obligations.12

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 27, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed decision finding
the petition for annulment of judgment to be devoid of merit. It
held that there was no sufficient proof to establish that
respondent employed fraud to insure petitioners nonparticipation in the trial of Civil Case No. CV-01-0177.
Relying on Robinson v. Miralles,13 the CA further ruled that the
substituted service of summons in Civil Case No. 02-0306 was
valid. It found that there was a customary practice in petitioners
townhouse that the security guard would first entertain any
visitors and receive any communication in behalf of the
homeowners. With this set-up, it was obviously impossible for
the process server to personally serve the summons upon
petitioner. It also declared that the process servers return
carries with it the presumption of regularity in the discharge of a
public officers duties and functions.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was
denied by the CA in its Resolution,14 dated March 26, 2013.
Hence, this petition, anchored on the following
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Trial Court in Civil Case No. 02-0306
validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the facts proven by the petitioner constitute
extrinsic fraud within the purview of Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court.15
Petitioner argues that there was an invalid substituted service of
summons.1wphi1 The process servers return only contained a
general statement that substituted service was resorted to "after
several futile attempts to serve the same personally,"16 without

stating the dates and reasons of the failed attempts. Petitioner

also reiterates her argument that extrinsic fraud was employed.
In his Comment,17 filed on July 9, 2014, respondent contended
that the servers return satisfactorily stated the reason for the
resort to a substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002;
and it was improbable that petitioner failed to receive the
summons because it was sent to the same address which she
declared in this present petition.
Petitioner filed her Reply18 on October 8, 2014 reiterating her
previous arguments.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character,
allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available
or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, governs actions for annulment of
judgments or final orders and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof
explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment,
that is, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.19 Annulment of
judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a partylitigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long
lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged
from the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an
absolute nullity to begin with.20
Petitioner raises two grounds to support her claim for
annulment of judgment: (1) extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of
jurisdiction. Her contention on the existence of extrinsic fraud,
however, is too unsubstantial to warrant consideration. The
discussion shall then focus on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the

judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner. The former is a matter of
substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of
the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The
latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of
summons or other processes on the petitioner.21
In the present case, petitioner contends that there was lack of
jurisdiction over her person because there was an invalid
substituted service of summons. Jurisdiction over the defendant
is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendant's voluntary appearance in court.22 If the defendant
does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be
acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid
out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
which state:
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable,
the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it,
by tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted Service. - If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc)23 thoroughly
discussed the rigorous requirements of a substituted service of
summons, to wit: xxx
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

xxx
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must
be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period of one month which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt
service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff
must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts
and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.
The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind
the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The
date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries
made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the
alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done,
though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
xxx
The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the
alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what
the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether
said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the
defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of
summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically
described in the Return of Summons. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

The pronouncements of the Court in Manotoc have been applied

to several succeeding cases. In Pascual v. Pascual, 24 the return of
summons did not show or indicate the actual exertion or
positive steps taken by the officer or process server in serving
the summons personally to the defendant. Similarly, in Spouses
Afdal v. Carlos,25 the process servers indorsements therein
failed to state that the personal service on the defendants was
rendered impossible and that efforts were made to find them
personally. In both those cases, the Court ruled that the
meticulous requirements for substituted service of summons
were not met.

respondent, Yuk Ling H. Ong, at the Unit B-2, No. 23 Sta. Rosa
St., Manresa Garden Homes, Manresa Garden City, Quezon
City, after several futile attempts to serve the same personally.
The said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of
sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat.

There are cases, however, in which Manotoc was applied, but,

nevertheless, it was ruled that there was no lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant. In Sagana v. Francisco,26 the
diligent efforts exerted by the sheriff to locate the respondent
were determined, not only based on the sheriff's return, but also
on the process server's notation and case records. In the case of
Wong v. Factor-Koyama,27 on the other hand, even if the sheriff
performed an invalid substituted service of summons,
jurisdiction over the person of defendant was obtained because
the latter had actively participated in trial, amounting to a
voluntary appearance under Section 20 of Rule 14.28

(Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bench, the summons in Civil Case No. 02030629 was issued on July 29, 2002. In his servers return,30 the
process server resorted to substituted service of summons on
August 1, 2002. Surprisingly, the process server immediately
opted for substituted service of summons after only two (2) days
from the issuance of the summons. The servers return stated
the following:
SERVERS RETURN
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on August 1, 2002, substituted
service of summons with copy of petition, were effected to

Therefore, respectfully returning to Court, original copy of

summons, Duly Served, this 2nd day of August, 2002.
RODOLFO P. TORRES, JR.
Process Server

The servers return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts

undertaken by the process server to personally serve the
summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general
statement that summons was effected after several futile
attempts to serve the same personally. The server did not state
the specific number of attempts made to perform the personal
service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the
attempts were made; and the underlying reason for each
unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there were
inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant
in the case. These important acts to serve the summons on
petitioner, though futile, must be specified in the return to
justify substituted service.
The servers return did not describe in detail the person who
received the summons, on behalf of petitioner. It simply stated
that the summons was received "by Mr. Roly Espinosa of
sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat." It did
not expound on the competence of the security officer to receive
the summons.
Also, aside from the servers return, respondent failed to
indicate any portion of the records which would describe the

specific attempts to personally serve the summons. Respondent

did not even claim that petitioner made any voluntary
appearance and actively participated in Civil Case No. 02-0306.
The case of Robinson v. Miralles, cited by the CA, is not
applicable. In that case, the return described in thorough detail
how the security guard refused the sheriffs entry despite several
attempts. The defendant in the said case specifically instructed
the guard to prevent anybody to proceed to her residence. In the
present case, the attempts made by the process server were
stated in a broad and ambiguous statement.
The CA likewise erred in ruling that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty could be applied in
the case at bench. This p resumption of regularity, however, was
never intended to be applied even in cases where there are no
showing of substantial compliance with the requirements of the
rules of procedure. Such presumption does not apply where it is
patent that the sheriff's or server's return is defective.31 As
earlier explained, the server's return did not comply with the
stringent requirements of substituted service of summons.
Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not
met, the Court is not inclined to uphold the CA's denial of the
petition for annulment of judgment for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of petitioner because there was an invalid substituted
service of summons. Accordingly, the decision in Civil Case No.
02-0306 must be declared null and void.

The stricter rule in substituted service of summons was meant to

address "[t]he numerous claims of irregularities in substituted
service which have spawned the filing of a great number of
unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to
higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful
legal expenses."32
Although the decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 was
promulgated as early as December 11, 2002, the Court must
strike it down for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner. The favorable judgment enjoyed by respondent
cannot be categorized as a genuine victory because it was fought
against an adversary, who was ignorant of the existing dispute.
Whatever prize bestowed upon the victor in such a void decision
must also be undone. Respondent, if he wishes to pursue, must
start from scratch and institute his action for declaration of
nullity again; this time with petitioner fully aware and ready for
litigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 27, 2012
Decision and the March 26, 2013 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 106271 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2002 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 260, Paraaque City is hereby declared
VOID.
SO ORDERED.