Survivalist and Irrepressible: The Two

Faces of the Sri Lankan Media

GEHAN GUNATILLEKE-on 01/05/2017

Introduction
The past decade produced two critical moments of transition in Sri
Lanka. On 19 May 2009, a 30-year war came to a brutal end with
the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). On 9
January 2015, the regime responsible for ending the war was
ousted from power after ten years of autocratic rule. The media is
often expected to play a pivotal role in these moments of
transition. Yet the past decade witnessed one of the darkest eras
in the history of Sri Lankas mainstream media. During this period,
it was reduced to self-censorship, self-doubt and servility.
Meanwhile, an unpredictable yet dynamic alternative emerged

outside the mainstream. By 2014, this alternative media

blossomed into a radical force capable of influencing and
consolidating opinion.
This article reflects on the evolution of media freedom over the
past decade and analyses the two faces of the Sri Lankan media
during this period. It explores the survivalist character of the
mainstream media alongside the irrepressible character of the
alternative media. It also examines the distinct role social media
and digital activism played in the democratic transition of January
2015. This article accordingly argues that the desire for
information and expression endures even under the most difficult
circumstances; where the mainstream fails to create the
necessary space, an alternative eventually emerges. For this
reason alone and despite its chaos, indeterminacy and potential
for harm that alternative must be preserved.
The Mainstream Media: From Suppression to Selfcensorship
During Sri Lankas civil war, journalists working in the war zone
endured a major share of the states repression. Editors of a
number of newspapers based in the Northern and Eastern
provinces were instructed to regularly report to military camps,
while unidentified armed men often raided their offices.[i] A
pattern of persecution emerged throughout the country, with
journalists including Poddala Jayantha,[ii] Nadesapillai
Vithyatharan[iii] and J.S. Tissainayagam[iv] targeted for their
activism, editorial decisions and writing. The assassination of the
chief editor of The Sunday Leader Lasantha Wickrematunge on 2
January 2009 thereafter devastated the media industry. His death
reflected the total disintegration of media freedom and marked
the unabashed impunity with which the state acted.

Apart from physical violence, state actors used financial

strategies to undermine the media first through litigation, and
then by prompting allies to takeover the management of
independent media institutions. For example, even after
Wickrematunges death, Gotabaya Rajapaksa pursued defamation
litigation against The Sunday Leader for publishing details about
his Ministrys corrupt arms deals. Such litigation was abandoned
only after a party reportedly sympathetic to the government
bought a majority stake in the newspaper.[v] The hostile takeover
of independent media institutions by political actors removed any
semblance of impartiality left in an already politicised industry.
The beleaguered mainstream media, decimated by the loss of
prominent journalists, motivated by political and economic
interests, and engulfed in a culture of fear, eventually surrendered
to the state.
Once the culture of fear became entrenched, media reportage on
human rights abuses rapidly declined. In fact, the reporting of
human rights abuses in the local press came to a near standstill
during the first three years of the post-war period. For instance,
the media failed to report on the widespread enforced
disappearances that took place during this period. [vi] It also failed
to offer much coverage to post-war attacks on journalists such as
Prageeth Eknaligoda, who disappeared on 24 January 2010 while
working for the anti-government news website Lanka e-News.[vii]
Of course journalists such as Eknaligoda belonged to a new breed
of journalists who worked predominantly in the digital domain.
The state had succeeded in immersing the mainstream in a
culture of fear and self-censorship. However, as discussed in the
next section, it became apparent that this culture was yet to take
hold of a new and more vibrant space propelled by social media
and digital activism.

Social Media and Digital Activism: From Chaos to Catalyst

Social media usage and activism via the Internet (i.e. digital
activism) in Sri Lanka has risen during the last decade.[viii] By
2015, mobile phone penetration had risen to above 100 percent.
[ix] The low costs and easy accessibility of smartphones in this
context have increased social media usage. The number of
Facebook users alone was recently estimated to exceed 4.2
million in Sri Lanka.[x] This important development has had a
significant impact on the media landscape in the country.
Social media is defined as online technologies that people use for
the creation and exchange of user-generated content.[xi] It is
thus definitively interactive and user-driven. Certain digital
platforms outside the mainstream, such as curated websites, do
not neatly fit into this definition. These are better described as
alternative media.[xii] However, these platforms often become
part of the broader domain of digital activism. Therefore, curated
platforms, such as Groundviews, need to be included when
discussing digital activism. Bearing these definitional limitations
in mind, two major factors appear to have contributed to the rise
in social media usage and digital activism in Sri Lanka.
First, a global trend in digital journalism has emerged,
[xiii] whereby the digital domain has been transformed into a
space for discourse and activism. Digital activism demonstrated
its potential to bring about tangible change during the Arab
Spring a series of regime changes experienced in the Middle
East and North Africa. The role played by social media networks
and digital activism in the uprising in Egypt is well documented.
David Faris, for example, in his seminal book Dissent and
Revolution in a Digital Age: Social Media, Blogging and Activism in
Egypt,[xiv] explains the manner in which social media networks
succeeded in altering power dynamics. Through such networks,

citizens were able to share information about issues despite strict

state control over the mainstream media,[xv] and eventually
mobilise for protests and demonstrations.[xvi]
This global phenomenon has influenced Sri Lankas social media
usage and has arguably contributed to an increase in digital
activism in Sri Lanka. This contribution could be explained
through the theory of diffusion, which refers to the phenomenon
through which innovations over time are communicated across a
social system.[xvii] Social media networks are good examples of
diffusion theory at work. They not only function as a means to
diffuse ideas, but also promote themselves as mediums of
change. Hence digital activism is now globally accepted as a vital
driver of change around the world, particularly in societies that
lack political rights and press freedom.[xviii] According to
Freedom Houses 2015 report on the Freedom on the Net, this
global recognition of digital activism has penetrated thinking in
Sri Lanka, and has resulted in robust digital activism and
engagement on political issues.[xix]
Second, local dynamics involving the suppression of the
mainstream media in Sri Lanka prompted users to opt for
alternative sources of credible information, news and analysis. As
state induced self-censorship rendered the mainstream media
less reliable as a source of truth, Sri Lankans began to use
alternative media and social media platforms to trade information
and ideas. Many turned to Groundviews, which invited
independent public commentary on governance, policy and rights
issues. For example, following the conclusion of the war, there
was no public conversation via the mainstream media on the
crimes that allegedly took place during the war. Despite such
absence in the mainstream, vibrant debates on the subject took
place on Groundviews.

The influence of the digital domain steadily grew during Sri

Lankas post-war years. Its true potency, however, was observed
during the Aluthgama riots that took place on 15 June 2014. The
states inaction during the riots is widely accepted, as law
enforcement officials simply failed to contain the violence.
[xx]
Some claim the state had actually instigated the violence.
[xxi]
The mainstream media meanwhile failed to report the details of
the riots. It instead presented a distorted version that was in line
with the states position. On 17 June 2014, the editorial of
the Daily News claimed that saboteurs who wished to damage
the reputation of the country were exaggerating the significance
of the riots.[xxii] Meanwhile, private newspapers
including TheIsland presented the riots as minor clashes and
provided no further details.[xxiii]
Yet an alternative channel of information via social media
emerged in response to the riots and the mainstreams silence. A
number of independent journalists visited the scene of the riots
and began to report events in real time via social media platforms
such as Facebook and Twitter. It became apparent that the control
that the government exercised over the mainstream media did
not extend to these platforms. Independent journalists and social
media activists freely shared information and updates with no
editorial oversight or control. This free flow of information
produced an unadulterated version of the riots, which shocked the
public conscience. Public opinion began to shift sharply, as
independent journalists such as Dharisha Bastians[xxiv] openly
criticised the governments inaction and drew the connection
between the state and violent groups.
The state soon realised that it no longer monopolised the flow of
information and that social media-propelled independent
journalism posed a genuine threat to the regime. The defence
establishment accordingly began a campaign to intimidate
independent journalists, characterise social media as a threat to

national security, and prevent the training of journalists in digital

activism.[xxv] In August 2014, a statement by Defence Secretary
Gotabaya Rajapaksa was widely circulated over state media.
[xxvi] Rajapaksa argued: The final threat to Sri Lankas national
security is the emergence of new technology-driven media,
including social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter and other
websites[xxvii] The Defence Ministry also issued a circular
instructing civil society organisations to refrain from holding press
conferences and conducting training workshops for journalists.
[xxviii] Despite this campaign, the digital space in Sri Lanka
proved to be irrepressible.
Social media is a chaotic realm of much frivolity. Although it has
the potential for substantive opinion formation, the rate and
extent of contradictions, contestation and vitriol often undermines
the value of this space. Hence it is important not to romanticise
the value of social media. Its potential to resist control and
advance critical voices is often tempered by its potential to inflict
tremendous harm. Despite these contradictions, social media in
Sri Lanka has reached its potential as a means to resist the states
monopoly over information and promote civic engagement. In this
context, digital activism has seriously undermined the states
agenda to control information and expression. While the agents of
the state attempted to convince the public that they needed
Mahinda Rajapaksas government to maintain security and
stability, social media voices counterclaimed that it was his
government that created the insecurity and instability in the first
place. As discussed in the final section of this article, it was the
chaotic and uncontrollable force of social media that became
instrumental in catalysing this shift.
Conclusion

Sri Lankas post-war years have shown social media to be

irrepressible in the face of suppression and effective in influencing
political outcomes. This article concludes by briefly analysing an
extraordinary illustration of such resilience and influence: the
democratic transition of January 2015.
Two important factors featured in this transition, both of which are
closely related to social media and digital activism. First, the
Aluthgama riots highlighted the nexus between the state and
certain forces of instability such as Bodu Bala Sena (BBS). Digital
activism was instrumental in highlighting this nexus. It is thus
plausible that moderate voters who were previously grateful to
the Rajapaksa administration for defeating the LTTE no longer
perceived it as genuinely committed to peace and stability.
Meanwhile, the Muslim and Christian communities that bore the
brunt of ethno-nationalist violence abandoned the Rajapaksas.
Thus, by the time the election in January 2015 took place,
Mahinda Rajapaksa had alienated a large portion of his previous
voter base.
Second, social media had reached a critical mass and had
become capable of genuinely influencing political outcomes.
Nalaka Gunawardene accordingly called the 2015 presidential
election Sri Lankas first cyber election.[xxix] He argued that
information and communications technologies[were] no longer
the exclusive domain of a privileged class.[xxx] Digital activism
was now transformative if not revolutionary,[xxxi] as it
resonated with ordinary Sri Lankans who desired an end to
repression, corruption and impunity. In this context, social media
and digital activism played an important role in Rajapaksas
defeat.
Throughout the period of the war and during its aftermath, the
media was seen as a major threat to the states agendas of power

retention and self-enrichment. The state thus embarked on a

project to decimate, subdue and eventually enslave the media.
During this project, the media revealed two sides. On the one
hand, the mainstream media, which suffered tremendously during
the first part of the states repressive project, reluctantly
relinquished its autonomy in exchange for survival. This is the
survivalist side to the Sri Lankan media that some might ridicule,
while others sympathise with. On the other hand, an alternative
force emerged to defy the state and resist its project. Social
media thus became a catalyst for change, first as a space for
critical discourse, and eventually, as a medium for public
mobilisation. This is the irrepressible side to the media that some
may celebrate, while others caution against. From the perspective
of media freedom, the story of Sri Lankas two recent transitions
is perhaps a tale of great tribulation eventuating in some measure
of triumph. It is a story that teaches us that the human desire for
information, expression and dialogue cannot be sustainably
suppressed.
The present government has articulated a commitment to
restoring and maintaining media freedom. Yet there is no doubt
that this government too will look to control the mainstream
media. It will also be wary of the power of the alternative media.
Statements such as the Justice Ministers recent announcement of
plans to regulate social media betray this governments continued
anxieties over the digital domain. They confirm that the state
whoever is at its helm will look to control all aspects of the
media. And yet, as the transition of 2015 proves, the essence of
our democratic freedom hinges on a truly free media. This is
precisely why the battle for media freedom in Sri Lanka can never
cease.
[i] Amnesty International, Sri Lanka: Silencing Dissent (2008), at
22.

[ii] Ibid.
[iii] See Sudar Oli Editor arrested, BBC Sinhala.com, 26 Feb
2009,
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2009/02/090226_suda
roli.shtml [Last accessed 12 March 2016].
[iv] Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena, Jayantha de Almeida Gunaratne &
Gehan Gunatilleke, The Judicial Mind: Responding to the
Protection of Minority Rights (Law & Society Trust: 2014), at 243.
[v] Ben Doherty, Australia denies asylum to Sri Lankan editor
facing government death threats, The Age.com, 6 October 2012,
at http://www.theage.com.au/world/australia-denies-asylum-to-srilankan-editor-facing-government-death-threats-20121005274n6.html [Last accessed on 15 March 2016].
[vi] According to some estimates, nearly 60 disappearances took
place during the ten-month period between October 2011 and
August 2012. See A disappearance every five days in post-war Sri
Lanka, Groundviews, 30 August 2012, at:
http://groundviews.org/2012/08/30/a-disappearance-every-fivedays-in-post-war-sri-lanka/#_ftn1 [Last accessed on 10 March
2016].
[vii] Concern over missing journalist, BBC Sinhala, 25 January
2010, available
at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2010/01/100125_prag
eeth_missing.shtml [Last accessed on 10 March 2016].
[viii] Selvarajah Thuseethan & Shanmuganatha Vasanthapriyan,
Social Media as a New Trend in Sri Lankan Digital Journalism: A
Surveillance (2015) 11(10) Asian Social Science 86, at 92.
[ix] Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2015: Privatizing
Censorship, Eroding Privacy (October 2015), at 729.
[x] See Internet World Stats: Sri Lanka
in http://www.internetworldstats.com/asia.htm#lk [Last accessed
on 16 March 2016].

[xi] Andreas M. Kaplan & Michael Haenlein, Users of the world,

unite! The challenges and opportunities of Social Media (2010)
53 Business Horizons 59, at 61.
[xii] See Chris Atton, Alternative Media (Sage Publications: 2002).
[xiii] Ibid. at 89. Also see Roja Bandari, Sitaram Asur, & Bernardo
Huberman, The Pulse of News in Social Media: Forecasting
Popularity in ICWSM (The AAAI Press: February 2012).
[xiv] See David Faris, Dissent and Revolution in a Digital Age:
Social Media, Blogging and Activism in Egypt (IB Tauris: 2013).
[xv] Marc Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera,
and Middle East Politics Today (Columbia University Press: 2007),
at 85.
[xvi] Faris, op. cit. See chapter six We Are All Revolutionaries
Now: Social Media Networks and the Egyptian Revolution of 2011.
[xvii] Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (5th Ed.) (Simon
and Schuster: 2003).
[xviii] Freedom House, op. cit. at 13.
[xix] Ibid. at 736.
[xx] Farzana Haniffa, Harini Amarasuriya & Vishakha
Wijenayake, Where Have All the Neighbours Gone? Aluthgama
Riots and its Aftermath: A Fact Finding Mission to Aluthgama,
Dharga Town, Valipanna and Beruwela (Law & Society Trust:
2015), at 1.
[xxi] Ibid. at 31-32.
[xxii] See They Try in Vain, The Daily News, 17 June 2014,
at http://www.dailynews.lk/?q=editorial/they-try-vain [Last
accessed on 16 March 2016].
[xxiii] See Police curfew clamped in Alutgama, Beruwala, The
Island, 16 June 2014 http://www.island.lk/index.php?
page_cat=article-details&page=articledetails&code_title=105187 [Last accessed on 16 March 2016].

[xxiv] See Dharisha Bastians, Alas Aluthgama!, The DailyFT, 16

June 2014, at http://www.ft.lk/2014/06/16/alas-aluthgama/ [Last
accessed on 16 March 2016]; Dharisha Bastians, Striking the
Match, The DailyFT, 26 June 2014,
at http://www.ft.lk/article/313452/Striking-thematch#sthash.kg9F0kFc.dpuf [Last accessed on 16 March 2016].
[xxv] Gehan Gunatilleke, The Chronic and the Acute: Post-War
Religious Violence in Sri Lanka (International Centre for Ethnic
Studies & Equitas: 2015), at 48.
[xxvi] Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Reconciliation will enhance national
security, The Sunday Observer, 31 August
2014, http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2014/08/31/fea02.asp [Last
accessed on 16 March 2016].
[xxvii] Ibid.
[xxviii] K. Ratnayake, Sri Lankan government imposes political
gag on NGOs, The World Socialist Website, 10 July 2014,
at https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/07/10/sril-j10.html [Last
accessed on 16 March 2016].
[xxix] Nalaka Gunawardene, Was #PresPollSL 2015 Sri Lankas
first Cyber Election?, Groundviews, 13 January
2015, http://groundviews.org/2015/01/13/was-prespollsl-2015-srilankas-first-cyber-election/ [Last accessed on 16 March 2016].
[xxx] Ibid.
[xxxi] Ibid.
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