13sept2016 Digests v2

Case Title:
FELIPE CABAGUE and GERONIMO CABAGUE,

plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MATIAS AUXILIO
and
SOCORRO
AUXILIO,
defendantsappellees.
Date: November 26, 1952

G.R. No.: G.R. No. L-5028
Nature of Action: Appeal to the decision of CFI
Ponente: Bengzon,J. (En Banc)
Topic: Breach of Promise to Marry
Facts:
In the justice of the peace court of Basud, Camarines Norte, Felipe Cabague and his son Geronimo sued
the defendant Matias Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to recover damages resulting from defendants'
refusal to carry out the previously agreed marriage between Socorro and Geronimo.
The complaint alleged, in short: (a) that defendants promised such marriage to plaintiffs, provided the
latter would improve the defendants' house in Basud and spend for the wedding feast and the needs of
the bride; (b) that relying upon such promises plaintiffs made the improvement and spent P700; and (c)
that without cause defendants refused to honor their pledged word.
The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the contract was oral, unenforceable under the rule of
evidence hereinbefore mentioned. And the court dismissed the case. On appeal to the Court of First
Instance, the plaintiffs reproduced their complaint and defendants reiterated their motion to dismiss.
From an order of dismissal this appeal was perfected in due time and form.
Issue: Can Felipe Cabague & his son Geronimo recover damages and sue Soccorro and his father for
Breech of a mutal promise to marry?
Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)
1. YES. For the breach of the mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Soccorro for damages.
2. NO. For the case of Felipe Cabagues action, such may not prosper because it is to enforce an
agreement in consideration of marriage, such cannot be maintain under the theory of mutual promise
to marry. Neither can Felipe cause an action against Soccoro for failure to marry his son.
Ratio:
It should be observed preliminarily that, under the former rules of procedure, when the complaint did
not state whether the contract sued on was in writing or not, the statute of frauds could be no ground
for demurrer. Under the new Rules "defendant may now present a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the contract was not in writing, even if such fact is not apparent on the face of the complaint. The fact
may be proved by him."
There is no question here that the transaction was not in writing. The only issue is whether it may be
proved in court.
The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the defendants on the other, really involves
two kinds of agreement. One, the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in
consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another, the agreement between the two
lovers, as "a mutual promise to marry". For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue
Socorro for damages. This is such action, and evidence of such mutual promise is admissible. However
Felipe Cabague's action may not prosper, because it is to enforce an agreement in consideration of
marriage. Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio this action could not be maintained on the
theory of "mutual promise to marry". Neither may it be regarded as action by Felipe against Socorro "on
a mutual promise to marry."
Consequently, we declare that Geronimo may continue his action against Socorro for such damages as
may have resulted from her failure to carry out their mutual matrimonial promises.
Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes: N/A
Case Title: JORGE DOMALAGAN,

appellee,
vs.
CARLOS BOLIFER, defendant-appellant.
plaintiff-
Date: February 8, 1916

G.R. No.: L-8166
Nature of Action:
Ponente: JOHNSON, J
Topic: Breach of promise to marry
Facts:
Plaintiff, Jorge Domalagan, entered into a verbal contract with Defendant Carlos Bolifer by virtue of
such contract, Plaintiff was to pay Defendant P500 upon the marriage of his son Cipriano Domalagan
with the daughter of the defendant, Bonifacia Bolifer. The plaintiff paid the P500 later in the month of
August 1910, with an additional P16 he said to be a token of future marriage. Despite the agreement,
Bonificia Bolifer married a certain Laureano Sisi. Upon immediately learning of Bonificias marriage to
another, Plaintiff demanded Defendant to return the said sum of P516 together with the interest and
damages; that the damages which he suffered resulted from the fact that he, in order to raise said sum
of P500, was obliged to sell certain real property belonging to him, located in the Province of Bohol, at a
great sacrifice.
The trial court held in favor of Plaintiff; hence the appeal of Defendant.
Defendant argues that under paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Action, the
Plaintiff cannot recover on the basis of the contract due to it not being reduced in writing, which
Defendant argues to mean that the contract is invalid.
The provision states that: In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable
by action unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the
party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the
writing or secondary evidence of its contents: xxx 3. An agreement made upon the consideration of
marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry.
Issue: W/N the Plaintiff may still recover by virtue of a verbal contract that was made in consideration
of marriage.
Ruling: Yes, Plaintiff may still recover since verbal contracts are still valid contracts, and Plaintiff was
able to prove that the verbal contract between both parties existed.
Ratio:
Section (335) does not render oral contracts invalid. Said section simply provides the method by which
the contract mentioned therein may be proved. It does not declare that said contract are invalid, which
have not been reduced to writing. A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not
clothed with the necessary form. If it is not made in confirmity with said section of course it cannot be
proved, if proper objection is made. But a failure to except to evidence presented in order to prove the
contract, because it does not conform to the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law. If the
parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral
evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved, by
evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to
writing.
The Court has examined the record in vain to find that the defendant during the trial of the cause
objected to any proof or any part thereof, presented by the plaintiff which showed or tended to show
the existence of the alleged contract.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court found nothing in the record to justify a reversal or modification of
the judgment of the lower court based upon the assignment of error. Therefore the judgment of the
lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:
*Missing: Hermosisima v CA
Case Title: Wassmer v. Velez
Date: December 26, 1964

G.R. No.: L - 20089
Nature of Action: Action for Damages

Nature of Action:
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a Marriage License on August 23, 1954. The
wedding was to take place on September 4, 1954. All the necessary preparations were undertaken
for the said event. However, two days before the wedding, Francisco left a note for Beatriz informing
her that the wedding will not push through because his mother opposed the union. The following day,
he sent her a telegram stating that he will be returning very soon. Francisco never showed up and
has not been heard since then. Beatriz subsequently sued Francisco for damages. The trial court
ordered Francisco to pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Francisco filed a petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial
and reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Francisco appealed to the Supreme Court,
asserting that the judgment is contrary to law as there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an
action for breach of promise to marry.
Issue: Whether or not Francisco can be held liable to pay Beatriz damages for breach of promise to
marry?
Yes.
Ratio:
Francisco may be held liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, which provides: "Any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. This is
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21.
*Missing: Estremos v. Ephan

Case Title:
Apolonio Tanjanco v. Hon. Court of
Appeals and Araceli Santos
Date: 17 December 1966

G.R. No.: G.R. No. L-18630
Nature of Action: Appeal from a
decision of the CA revoking an order of
the CFI of Rizal
Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L.
Facts:
From December 1957, Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos, both being of adult
age. Tanjanco expressed and professed his undying love and affection for Santos
who reciprocated the feeling. In consideration of Tanjancos promise of marriage,
Santos consented and acceded to his pleas for carnal knowledge.
That regularly until December 1959, through Tanjancos protestations of love and
promises of marriage, he succeeded in having carnal access to Santos, as a result of
which she conceived a child. Due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment
and social humiliation, Santos had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines,
Inc., where she was receiving P230 a month.
Because Santos was unable to support herself and her baby and due to Tanjancos
refusal to marry her as promised, Santos suffered mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation.
The prayer was for a decree compelling Tanjanco to recognize the unborn child that
Santos was bearing; to pay her not less than P430 a month for her support and that of
her baby, plus P100,000 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000 attorney's
fees.
Upon Tanjancos motion to dismiss, the CFI dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action.
Santos appealed to the CA. The CA held that Santos had a cause of action premised
on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; hence, they set aside the dismissal
and directed the CFI to proceed with the case.
Tanjanco then appealed to the SC, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to
marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether Tanjanco is liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code for his alleged breach of
promise to marry.
Ruling:
No. The SC ruled that Tanjanco is not liable for his alleged breach of promise to marry.
Ratio:
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21,
the CA relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code
Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code.
Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they
have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule:
ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or
can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no
crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for
breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong
has been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable
moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under
the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
The CA seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential
feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a
promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded.
The SC had cited the Buenaventura case that:
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If
she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there
is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart
from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles,
which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her
ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
In an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of
the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.
In this case, and based from the complaint, it stated that for one whole year, Santos
maintained intimate sexual relations with Tanjanco, with repeated acts of intercourse.
Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion, for had Santos been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of Tanjanco, she would
not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual
relations upon finding that Tanjanco did not intend to fulfill his promises.
The SC concluded that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other
cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the CFI in dismissing the
complaint.
The dismissal is without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child of
Santos against Tanjanco, if any.
Case Title: GASHEM SHOOKAT

BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents.

G.R. No.: G.R. No. 97336
Nature of Action: Review and set aside
decision of CA affirming in toto the decision of
RTC favoring private respondent and granting
damages.
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.
Topic: Marriage Breach of Promise to Marr
FACTS:
1. Private respondent filed a complaint for damages against the Petitioner for
allegedly violating their agreement to get married. In the complaint, she posits
the following facts:
She is 22 years old, single, with good moral character and reputation
duly respected in their community.
Petitioner is 29 years old, Iranian citizen, and and exchange student in
Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan.
Before August 20, 1987, Petitioner courted the Private Respondent and
proposed to marry after the end of the school semester. She agreed.
Petitioner then visited the Private Respondent's parents to secure their
approval to the marriage. Thereafter, she was forced to live in with him -she was a virgin before. Weeks after living in together, Petitioner
"started to change" (i.e. maltreated her and threatened to kill her). She
sustained injuries.
During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain in
Guiling, Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and kicked her
out of his house. He also said he was already married to someone in
Bacolod City.
2. TC: Applied Article 21 and rendered a decision favorable to the Private
Respondent. Basis of the decision:
[T]rial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose
morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances,
(c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive
promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e)
by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents
in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions made some
preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October
1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and
contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her
and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has
abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good
customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the
private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have
had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor
and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.
3. CA: Affirmed in toto. Basis of the decision:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who
was already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of
loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her

unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is,
as described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed
to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have
allowed "herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no
persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we
agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been
sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the
deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed
herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and
tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We
cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a
nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate.
Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of
Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on
February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party
together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette
on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly
talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 5556, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was
involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in
Baaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special
relationship between them? And this special relationship must indeed
have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites
Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and
where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love
affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she
declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the
restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn
March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good
moral character and must think so low and have so little respect and
regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied
in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology
before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a commonlaw wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another
woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he
did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction
or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a
young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her.
Xxx
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendantappellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and
promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief
that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud
and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to
their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly
against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely
and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do
from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and
taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of
learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages
and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to
do in its decision in this case.
4. Petitioner argues:
As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways.
He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the
subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of
his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which
purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on
the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses
good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is
now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil
ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with
the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could
be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent
should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally,
petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that
he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also
promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the
special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not
actionable.
Issue: Under the circumstances surrounding this case, is Article 21 correctly
applied?
Ruling: YES.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition
is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
Ratio: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil
Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the
report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to
marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De
Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United
States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more
readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the socalled Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed
to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
Xxx
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so
hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and
sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina,
not because of lust but because of moral seduction the kind illustrated by the Code
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable
for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised
Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach
of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.
Topic: Marriage, not subject to stipulation
Case: Panganiban vs. Borromeo
Nature: These proceedings looking to the disbarment of the respondent attorney. The
respondent admits that, in his capacity as notary public he legalized the document,
which is the basis of the complaint against him, and that the document contains
provisions contrary to law, morals and good customs, but by way of defense disclaims
any previous knowledge of the illegal character of the document.
Facts: Husband and wife Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala signed a contract before the
notary public of Elias Borromeo who was at that time a regularly admitted member of the
Philippine Bar. The municipal secretary of Naguilian, Isabela, had prepared the contract.
Atty. Borromeo cooperated in the execution of the document. He was quite
knowledgeable about its contents although he did not know it fully because of a
difference in dialect. The contract is an agreement between the husband and the wife,
which permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in
adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from either one of them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract between husband and wife for the former to keep a
concubine is valid?
HELD: No. Although RPC allowed the offended party to give pardon to his or her offender
spouse, this doesnt mean that the purpose of the legislature is to legalize adultery and
concubinage. In this instance, if the spouses should retain their present frame of mind,
no prosecution of either one by the other could be expected. Nevertheless, we think it far
from the purpose of the Legislature to legalize adultery and concubinage. They still
remain crimes, with the qualification that prosecution cannot be instituted if the offended
party consent to the act or pardon the offender. This is a matter of future contingency
and is not matter for legalization in wanton disregard of good morals. We hold the
contract to contain provisions contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a
consequence not judicially recognizable.
A notarized contract that permits concubinage and adultery is not judicially recognizable.
Although the consent of a party is a bar to the prosecution of the said crimes, the acts
are still contrary to customs, good morals and against the sanctity of marriage, which is
constitutionally provided for.
10
Case Title:
A.C. No. 932
June 21, 1940
In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent,
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta
petitioner-complainant.
LAUREL, J.:
Date:
as
G.R. No.:
Nature of Action:
Nature of Action:
Topic: Marriage Not Subject to Stipulation
Facts:
In this administrative case, the Solicitor General charged the respondent Atty. Roque
Santiago with malpractice and prayed that disciplinary action be taken against him.
The respondent gave legal advice to one Ernesto Baniquit who was living separately from his
wife for some nine consecutive years and seeking to contract a second marriage. The
respondent assured Baniquit that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry
again. The lawyer prepared a document (Exhibit A) stating that the contracting
parties, husband and wife, were authorized to marry again and at the same time giving
the authorization to renounce or waive each members right against the party marrying.
The notary let the husband and wife execute and acknowledge the document and declared
that they were again single and as such could contract another marriage. Relying on this
document, Baniquit contracted a second marriage.
Baniquit then remarked, "Would there be no trouble?" Upon hearing it the respondent stood
up and, pointing to his diploma hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if this
document turns out not to be valid."
The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense that he had the
idea that seven years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract
a second marriage and for that reason prepared Exhibit A, but immediately after the
execution of said document he realized that he had made a mistake and for that reason
immediately sent for the contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office and
signed the deed of cancellation Exhibit A.
Issue:
1.) Is Roque guilty of malpractice? - YES
2.) Controlling: Is Exhibit A, the document that decreed the separation of the Spouses
Baniquit valid? - NO
1.) Yes. The advice given by the respondent and his preparation and acknowledgment by
of the contract constitutemalpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of
law.
2.) No. Marriage separation should have should be sanctioned in the proper court and
before the separation. Apart from this, the document subverts the vital foundation of
the family, marriage, and is contrary to law, morals and public policy.
Ratio:
There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the spouses Ernesto
Baniquit and Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter
as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to law, moral, and tends
to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The advice given by the respondent, the
preparation and acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute malpractice which
justifies disbarment from the practice of law. The admission of a lawyer to the practice of law
is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred is
11
dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to society. When it appears that he, by
recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the
responsibilities and obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this
professional privilege should be declared terminated. In the present case, respondent was
either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving the
complainant legal advice. Drastic action should lead to his disbarment and this is the opinion
of some members of the court. The majority, however, have inclined to follow the
recommendation of the investigator, the Honorable Sotero Rodas, in view of the
circumstances stated in the report of said investigator and the fact that immediately after
discovering his mistakes, respondent endeavored to correct it by making the parties sign
another document cancelling the previous one.
The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from
the practice of law for a period of one year. So ordered.
12
Case Title:
SATURNINO SELANOVA, complainant, vs.
ALEJANDRO E. MENDOZA, City Judge
Mandaue City, respondent.
Date: May 19, 1975.

G.R. No.: A.M. No. 804-CJ.
Nature of Action: Complaint for gross ignorance of the
law.
Ponente: AQUINO, J (2nd Division)
Topic: Marriage; Concept and Nature; Not subject to
stipulation.
Facts:
COMPLAINANT SELANOVA:
1. Complainant Selavona charged respondent Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law for
having prepared and ratified a document dated November 21, 1972, extrajudicially liquidating
the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza.
2. One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse (as the case may be) would withdraw
the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the other and that they
waived their "right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity" either one would
commit against the other.
RESPONDENT MENDOZA:
3. He relied on the provision that "the husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval" (Par. 4, Art. 191,
Civil Code).
4. To give the prohibition against an extrajudicial liquidation of the conjugal partnership during
the marriage "an unqualified and literal legal construction" would render nugatory the
aforequoted provisions of article 191.
5. He cites Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson, L-23482, L-23767 and L-24259, August 30, 1968, 24
SCRA 837 as authority for the propriety of an extrajudicial agreement for the dissolution during
the marriage of the conjugal partnership as long as the agreement is subsequently approved
by the court.
However, the respondent overlooks the unmistakable ruling of this Court in the Lacson case
that judicial sanction for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage should
be "secured beforehand".
6. Respondent Judge admitted that he was responsible for the execution of the questioned
document, an extrajudicial "Liquidation of Conjugal Properties", which he caused complainant
Saturnino Selanova and his wife, Avelina Ceniza, to sign.
7. In that instrument Judge Mendoza divided the two pieces of conjugal assets of the spouses by
allocating to the husband a 13-hectare riceland and to the wife the residential house and lot.
8. The last paragraph of the instrument, which licensed either spouse to commit any act of
infidelity, was in effect a ratification of their personal separation.
Issue: WoN the extrajudicial "Liquidation of Conjugal Properties" signed by the parties without judicial
declaration for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership was valid.
Ruling: NO. Contracts for personal separation of spouses and extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal
partnership are void.
13
Ratio:
A document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the spouses and licensing
either one of them to commit any act of infidelity is a void instrument because it
contravenes the provisions of Article 221 of the Civil Code declaring the nullity of contracts
for the personal separation of husband and wife and for extrajudicial dissolution of their
conjugal partnership.
The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the following provisions of the Civil
Code:
"ART. 221. T he following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and
wife;
xxx xxx xxx."
Even before the enactment of the new Civil Code, this Court held that the extrajudicial
dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval was void (Quintana vs. Lerma,
24 Phil. 285; De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15, De La Rosa vs. Barruga, L-2368, June 30, 1950, 4
ROP Digest 171, sec. 29).
Notes:
The Supreme Court noted that the judge was unaware of the legal prohibition against the questioned
contracts because he was admitted to the bar in 1948 and, consequently, he did not study the New
Civil Code in law school. It also took into account the respondent's apparent good faith and honest
desire to terminate the marital conflict between the complainant and his wife. Because of these
circumstances, no drastic penalty was imposed on the judge but he was severely censured for his
mistake. The Court stated that the severe reprimand should not be an obstacle to respondent's
enjoyment of retirement privileges.
14
*Missing: Lichauco-De Leon v CA

Case Title:
Date: March 31, 1962
FABIAN PUGEDA, plaintiff-appellee,
G.R. No.: L-16925
vs.
Ponente: LABRADOR, J.
RAPAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD
TRIAS, assisted by her husband Angel
Nature of Action:
Sanchez, CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her
Topic: marriage; proof of marriage
husband Victoriano Salvanera, GABRIEL
TRIAS, minors ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA
VINIEGRA and FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR.,
assisted by guardian-ad-litem, Rafael Trias,
TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA PUGEDA,
assisted by her husband Ramon Portugal,
defendants-appellants.
Facts:
Parties:
o Plaintiff 2nd husband of the deceased Maria Ferrer
o Defendants
Rapael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Gabriel, minors Romulo et. al.
children of Maria Ferrer in 1st marriage with Mariano Trias
Teofilo and Virginia children of 2nd marriage of Maria with
Fabian Pugeda, plaintiff
Disputed properties:
o 23 lots in the San Francisco de Malabon estate in General Trias, Cavite
o house of strong materials
o barn/camarin of strong materials
o sets of household furniture
Fabian claims that during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with conjugal partnership funds lots
Nos. 273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate
with the following interest therein; 71% in lot No. 273, 82% in lot No. 2650,
77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in lot No. 2080, 64% in lot No. 2718 and 76% in lot
No. 2764; that plaintiff is the owner of one-half of the said interest in the lots
above-mentioned; that upon the death of Maria C. Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and
defendants became co-owners of said properties and defendants managed the
properties in trust as co-owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties
above described, acquired as conjugal properties by the plaintiff and deceased
Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -and one-half thereof be given as share therein
of plaintiff.
Defendants Trias denied existend of the 2nd marriage with Fabian Pugeda,
claiming that theres no record of marriage existed in the municipality of
Rosario, Cavite, thru a photostatic copy of said records.
CFI decision
o
Valid 2nd marriage
After a review of the testimonial and documental evidence, it is
concluded that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to
Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916, this conclusion being borne
out not only by the chain of circumstances but also by the
testimonies of the witnesses to the celebration of the marriage,
who appeared to be truthful, as well as by the fact that plaintiff
and deceased Maria C. Ferrer lived together as husband and wife
for eighteen years (1916-1934) and there is a strong presumption
that they were actually married.
o lots in question were conjugal properties of the 1 st marriage between
15
Mariano and Maria

The evidence introduced at the trial shows that the lands subject
of the action were formerly Friar Lands included in the San
Francisco de Malabon Estate, province of Cavite, which were
acquired under certificates of sale in the name of Mariano Trias in
the year 1910 and later assigned to his widow Maria C. Ferrer in
the year 1916.
CA remanded the case to CFI after defendants filed a motion for new trial
after discovering several documents that shows an approved project of partition
in the Intestate case of Mariano Trias.
CFI new decision the 2 marriages should participate in the ownership of the
lands, according to the actual contributions made by each marriage in the
installments in payment of the lands.
Issues:
1. W/N the absence of the marriage certificate in the civil registrar invalidates the
2nd marriage of Maria with Fabian?
2. W/N the disputed properties, which were acquired during the first marriage but
were paid in full during the 2nd marriage are conjugal properties of the latter?
1. NO
2. NO
Ratio:
1. Marriage requisites
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural
father and mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a
copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not
invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration
thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, and the forwarding of
a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of said requisites.
(Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1) .
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses

to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of
marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent
to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage. (55 C.J.S., p. 900).
2. Conjugal properties
SC ordered the case dismissed; modified the CFI decision wherein the
disputed properties where to be divided equally to the children of Maria, 1/8
per child.
In the case of friar lands the purchaser becomes the owner upon issuance of
the certificate of sale in his favor, subject only to cancellation thereof in
case the price agreed upon is not paid. In case of sale of public lands if the
applicant dies and his widow remarries both she and the second husband
are entitled to the land; the new husband has the same right as his wife.
Such is not the case with friar lands. As indicated in Section 16 of Act 1120,
if a holder of a certificate dies before the payment of the price in full, the
sale certificate is assigned to the widow, but if the buyer does not leave a
widow, the right to the friar lands is transmitted to his heirs at law.
16
It is true that the evidence shows that of the various parcels of land now
subject of the action none was paid for in full during the marriage of Mariano
Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that payments in installments continued to be
made even after the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer on January 5,
1916. But it is also true that even after said marriage the certificates of sale
were assigned to Maria C. Ferrer and installments for the lots after said
marriage continued in the name of Maria C. Ferrer; also all the amounts paid
as installments for the lots were taken from the fruits of the properties
themselves, according to the admission of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda himself.
There is another reason why the above conclusion must be upheld in the
case at bar, and that is the fact that in the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased Mariano Trias, which was instituted in August
1915, the inventory of the estate left by said deceased included the lots
purchased from the Friar Lands Estates (Exh. 2, Trias) and the project of
partition in said special proceedings submitted to the court as Exh. 3-Trias
adjudicated 1/2 of said lands as the share of Mariano Trias in the conjugal
properties, the other 1/2 being awarded to Maria C. Ferrer.
The above considerations, factual and legal, lead us to the inevitable

conclusion that the friar lands purchased as above described and paid for,
had the character of conjugal properties of the spouses Mariano Trias and
Maria C. Ferrer. But another compelling legal reason for this conclusion as
against plaintiff, is the judicial pronouncement on said nature of the lands in
question. In the year 1915, even before the marriage of plaintiff and Maria
C. Ferrer took place, the latter was appointed administratrix of the estate of
her deceased husband Mariano Trias in Civil Case No. 860 of the Court of
First Instance of Cavite (Exh. "1" Trias). An inventory of the estate left by the
deceased Mariano Trias, dated January 15, 1929, was submitted by her and
on April 10, 1929, the project of partition of the properties was submitted.
The project includes the friar lands subject of the action, and in accordance
with it one-half of the properties listed in the inventory was adjudicated to
the deceased Mariano Trias as his share and the other half adjudicated to
Maria C. Ferrer also as her share. The share of Mariano Trias was decreed in
favor of his children and heirs. This project of partition was approved by
Judge Manuel V. Moran in an order dated February 11, 1929, submitted to
the Court of Appeals as Annex "E", pp. 114-115 of the record on appeal.
The pendency of the above intestate proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of Mariano Trias must have been known to plaintiff Fabian Pugeda,
who is a lawyer. It does not appear, and neither does he claim or allege, that
he ever appeared in said proceedings to claim participation in the properties
subject of the proceedings. His failure to intervene in the proceedings to
claim that the friar lands or some of them belonged to himself and his wife
Maria C. Ferrer, shows a conviction on his part that the said friar lands
actually belonged to the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that
he had no interest therein. The project of partition was approved as late as
1929, by which time plaintiff and defendant had already been married for a
period of 13 years. Plaintiff's failure to assert any claim to the properties in
the said intestate proceedings during its pendency now bars him absolutely
from asserting the claim that he now pretends to have to said properties.
17
Case Title:
JUANITA SISON, petitioner,
vs.
TE LAY LI, defendant and appellant.
Date: May 7, 1952

CA No.: 7937-R [CA 49 OG 3909]
Nature of Action: Appeal from the
decision of the CFI Davao declaring 2
marriages celebrated one after another on
April 28, 1949 between plaintiff Juanita
Sison and defendant Te Lay Li, null and
void, on the ground that plaintiff's consent
was
obtained
through
force
and
intimidation employed upon her by her
father.
Ponente: REYES, J.B.L.,
Topic: Requites Legal Capacity
Parental Consent
FACTS:
1. Plaintiff and defendant married in the morning of April 28, 1949 before Judge
Delfin Holifena of Municipal Court of Davao City, and in the afternoon of the
same day were remarried in accordance with the rites of the Republic of China
before Chinese Consul S. T. Mih in his office in Davao City.
2. In relation to the topic, the following is an excerpt of the plaintiffs testimony as
corroborated by her mother:
o Defendant never wooed her because her marriage was arranged by her
father. Her father brought up the topic 2 weeks after the marriage.
Whenever she opposed the idea of marriage, her father would whip her
often. One time, the whipping resulted to her falling on galvanized iron
roofing sheet resulted in a wound on her right leg around 6 inches long.
o Two days before her marriage, she ran away from home to live with her
teacher Miss Andrea Go. Miss Go took her to one Judge Hofilena who
advised her to not marry a man she did not like. On the same day, she
slept in Miss Gos house and the next morning, both the plaintiff and
Miss Go went to a house of Judge Fernande to seek his advise. In turn,
the Judge referred them to the Fiscal Aida Gil- Damaso. The plaintiff was
picked up from the house of the Fiscal by her father who promised her
that she would no longer be forced to marry against her will.
o This promise was not made good as her father renewed the topic of
marriage to the defendant, guarded his daughter throughout the night,
and the next morning, handed her a knife telling her to choose between
her life or his if she did not want to marry the defendant. It was at this
point that the plaintiff feared her father and then consented to the
marriage twice on the same day.
3. Throughout their marriage, plaintiff considered the defendant a stranger. During

her stay with the defendant, she was kept as a prisoner, preventing her to run
away. They do sleep in the same room him in bed and her in a chair. They do
not have sexual intercourse except for that one time defendant forced her with
a knife to submit to his wishes. It was after that event that she had the courage
to escape his house.
4. Defendant avers: their marriage is regular and legal stressing the fact that
when the plaintiff was asked if she was willing to take defendant as her lawful
18
wedded husband, she answered in the affirmative. This act indicated that she
entered into the marriage freely and voluntarily.
5. TC Ruled: plaintiffs marriage was consummated only by intimidation and force
and that plaintiff never for a moment acquiesced to the status of a wife to the
defendant and declared the marriages between them, null and void.
Issue: Whether the affirmative answer to the wedding vows indicate free and
voluntary consent to marriage?
Ruling: NO.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the sole
modification that the amount ordered returned to the plaintiff should be P1,248,
according to the evidence, and not P1,200. Costs against appellant.
Ratio: It is urged for appellant that the marriage ceremony being in all respects
regular and legal and in strict compliance with all the formal requisites of law,
plaintiffs voluntary consent may thus be inferred from the circumstances of the
ceremony; it having been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that it is necessary for
the order of society and for prevention of constant violation of decency and law to aid
acts intended to validate marriages and retard acts to invalidate them. Although as a
general rule, the law will not look behind the appearance of consent which was clearly
manifested to determine its reality, the rule has been announced, however, that mere
words without any corresponding intention will not create the marriage relation, and
that notwithstanding the formalities indicating consent have been complied with, there
not a valid marriage where the parties do not intend to enter into the marriage. And
while it is true that it is the policy of the law to maintain the marriage ties, when it is
amply proved that the marriage is effected through duress and intimidation and
without consent and against the will of one of the parties, there are no ties to be
preserved and the marriage should consequently be annulled. xxx
While a marriage effected by force or intimidation may be ratified and confirmed by
cohabitation, such cohabitation must be voluntary and must be something more than
merely living together in the same house or even occupying the same bed, but is the
living together of the parties as husband and wife, and including sexual relations.
19
Case Title:
PEDRO V. VILAR, petitioner-appellant,
vs. GAUDENCIO V. PARAISO, respondentappellant.

G.R. No.:
G.R. No. L-8014
Ponente: Bautista Angelo, J. EN BANC

Nature of Action:
Topic: Solemnizing Officer; How Authorized
Facts:
In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were
among the candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija.
After the canvass was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso garnered 1,509, and as a
result the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed the latter as the mayor duly elected with a
plurality of 41 votes.
However, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was then a
minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a
candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, Vilar instituted the present
quo warranto proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office
and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be declared null and void. He also prayed that he
be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of respondent Paraiso.
Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines on August 21, 1951, that his resignation was accepted by
the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951, and that
even if respondent was not eligible to the office, petitioner could not be declared elected to take his
place.
After due trial, the court found respondent to be ineligible for the office of mayor, being an
ecclesiastic, and, consequently, it declared his proclamation as mayor null and void, but refrained
from declaring petitioner as mayor-elect for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so.
From this decision both parties have appealed, respondent from that portion finding him ineligible,
and petitioner from that portion holding he cannot be declared elected as mayor for lack of
sufficient legal grounds to do so.
Issue: W/N respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office under section 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
Ruling: Yes. That respondent never ceased as minister of the order to which he belonged and that the
resignation he claims to have filed months before the date of the elections is but a mere scheme to
circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office.
Ratio:
If respondent really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of the religious organization to which
he belonged for the purpose of launching his candidacy why did he not resign in due form and have the
acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries. The importance of
resignation cannot be underestimated.
The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the
minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his
religious status. This information is necessary for the protection of the public. This is especially
so with regard to the authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the
law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code).
It is no argument to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the requisite resignation
devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his organization or upon the official in
charge of such registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because
the law likewise imposes upon the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who
in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to do.
And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged
resignation as minister knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a
municipal office
20
We are therefore constrained to hold that respondent is disqualified to hold the office of
mayor as found by the trial court.
As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible, petitioner can be declared elected, having
obtained second place in the elections, our answer is simple: this Court has already declared that this
cannot be done in the absence of an express provision authorizing such declaration. Our
law not only does not contain any such provision but apparently seems to prohibit it.
1. The evidence for petitioner tends to show that respondent was ordained as minister of the
Evangelical Church of the Philippines in 1944 and as such was given license to solemnize
marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries;
2. That since 1944 up to 1950 he acted as minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, continuously
and without interruption and has been renewing his license to solemnize marriages as
prescribed by the regulations of the Bureau of Public Libraries;
3. that on April 19, 1950, respondent transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines,
having been assigned to work in the same place and chapel during the years 1944-1950; that on
April 7, 1951, respondent applied for, and was issued, a license to solemnize marriages by the
Bureau of Public Libraries as minister of the new church up to the end of April, 1952; t
4. hat said license has never been cancelled, as neither the head of the united church nor
respondent has requested for its cancellation; and that respondent has been publicly known as
minister of the United Church of Christ, but he has not attached to his certificate of candidacy a
copy of his alleged resignation as minister.
21
*Missing: Araes v Occiano

Case Title:
ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiffappellant,
vs.
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-4904
Nature of Action: Petition for
Cancellation of Certificate Marriage
and for damages
Ponente: WILLARD, J.
Topic: Marriage Ceremony (Form)
Facts:
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de matrimonio
civil. It is written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of
the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff and the
defendant, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract
of marriage before the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the
marriage.
Plaintiff claimed that what took place before the justice of the peace did not constitute
a legal marriage. She alleged that she never appeared before the justice of the peace
and never was married to the defendant. She admits that she signed the document in
question, but says that she signed it in her own home, without reading it, and at the
request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to ask the
consent of her parents to the marriage.
The plaintiff likewise testified that she and the defendant never lived together as
husband and wife, and upon her arrival in Ormoc, after consulting with her family, she
went to Cebu and commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose of
procuring the cancellation of the certificate of marriage and for damages.
Issue: W/N Martinez and Tan were validly married on Sept. 25, 1907, before the
justice of the peace, Jose Ballori.
Yes. They were married since there was an expression of mutual consent and both of
them appeared before the justice of the peace. They both understood Spanish thus
they knew the contents of the document they were signing.
Ratio:
General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:
No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must
declare in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each
other as husband and wife.
The petition signed by the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that
they had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to
solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the
justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the
contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced.
22
A marriage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by
both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the
officer authorized the marriage in due form. It was proven that both the plaintiff and
the defendant were able to read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew
the contents of the document which they signed; and under the circumstances, what
took place before the justice of the peace amounted to a legal marriage.
23
MELECIO MADRIDEJO, assisted by his

guardian ad litem, Pedro
Madridejo, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GONZALO DE LEON, ET AL., defendantsappellants.
October 6, 1930
G.R. No.: L-32473
Nature of Action: Appeal
Ponente: Villareal, J.
Topic: Marriage Ceremony
Facts:
Eugenio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had one child, Domingo de
Leon.
Flaviana and Domingo survived Eugenio who died in 1915.
Flaviana then lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor.
On 8 July 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at deaths door, was married to Pedro
Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by virtue of articulo mortis, by the parish
priest of Siniloan.
She died the following day.
The parish priest failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal
secretary.
[facts re: legitimation of child not included]
Issue: WON the marriage is valid.
Ruling: Yes, valid.
Ratio:
The mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to
the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not
appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking
in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not
one of said essential requisites.
24
Case Title:
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE
Petitioner, vs. TECLA HOYBIA
Respondent.
Date: January 22, 2014

AVENIDO,
AVENIDO,
G.R. No.: G.R. No. 173540

Nature of Action: Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the ROC
Ponente: Perez,J. (Second Division)
Topic: Marriage Certificate
Review
on
Facts:
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she
(Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla
alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites
officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced
by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol.
However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification 3 was issued by the
LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquios union, they begot four (4) children. Sometime in 1954,
Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were
informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura
Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of
Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous an action
she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim, essentially averring
that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their
marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also
contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and
as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:
1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla
herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were actually
filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932;
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the
liberation of Manila;
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of
25
Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second World War
issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as
requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido;
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses
Eustaquio and Tecla;
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place in
Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he already
had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a common law
wife of Eustaquio. Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to substantiate her allegations
and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:
1) Marriage Contract between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage
on 3 March 1979;
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he
contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with one
Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and
Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte; and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil
Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.
RTC: denied both Teclas complaint and Peregrinas counterclaim.
CA: ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on
the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous
Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by Tecla during the trial proves the existence of her
marriage to Eustaquio even in the absence of their marriage certificate.
YES.
Ratio:
The trial court, in ruling against Teclas claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Teclas
failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court
considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no
more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards the
Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila.
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla
and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was
given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying
on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed
to prove the existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla
and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such
presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by
the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created,
according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the CA
found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130
26
of the Rules of Court.

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Aonuevo v.
Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, we said, citing precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital
union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can
be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals. Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its
contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus
confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the
marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution
of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the
document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when
the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the
existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the
contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction
of secondary evidence of the contents.
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It
generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents
but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its
execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim
Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent
evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer,
by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the
parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be
shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment
of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar
character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been
unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that
the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present
during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss
was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract
were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidencetestimonial and documentarymay
be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
27
As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by
the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage
ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the
certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown
by the evidence presented, secondary evidence testimonial and documentary may be admitted to
prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven
by any competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by
one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The
person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage."
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the
sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older
brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of
EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO,
and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed
that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua
non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the
trial court has disregarded.
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind
the presumption:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and
if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in
the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always
presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of
Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of
the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.
Case Title: SYED AZHAR ABBAS,
Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

G.R. No.: 183896
Nature of Action:
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.
Topic: Formal Requisites: Marriage
License
Facts:
28
Petitioner, Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) a Pakistani citizen, filed a case for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license as the ground for annulment under the Family Code.
In the Marriage Contract of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No.
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the
solemnizing officer. Syed argues that this information is false, as he did not go to
Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that
area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to
check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage
contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. The Municipal Civil
Registrar issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license
number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. No Marriage License appears to have been issued to
MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
In her defense, Gloria presented in court the marriage contract, as well as witnesses to
the wedding for their testimonies to prove their marriage.
The RTC held in favor of Syed and annulled the marriage. However, The CA gave
credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
certification could not be accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly
married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Hence,
the petition for certiorari of Syed with the Supreme Court.
Issue: W/N there was a valid marriage license obtained to fulfill one of the
formal
requisites
of
marriage.
Ruling: No, there was no valid marriage license obtained; therefore, there is
a ground for annulment under the Family Code.
Ratio:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;
and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45.
29
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding
Chapter.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and
relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the
existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the
office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued
said license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was
issued.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement
signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of
his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence
that the records of his office contain no such record or entry
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such
marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the
marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was
issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in
the document.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the
court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite,
a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the
license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said
license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the
marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having
admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom
Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted
not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was
delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was
secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as
the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a
copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office
and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further
weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
30
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and
a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid
marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34 of the Family Code. Again,
this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having
been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that
his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may,
the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a
valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack
of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps
to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal
requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
*Missing: BORJA-MANZANO v. SANCHEZ

Case Title: Engrace Nial v. Norma Bayadog

G.R. No.: 133778
Nature of Action: Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of MArriage
Nature of Action:
Topic: Marriage license
Facts:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely
Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died
on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months
later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit
stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license.
Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack
of marriage license.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void for lack of marriage license?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of
Pepitos marriage after his death?
Both Yes.
Ratio:
31
1. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not
the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid
under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had
a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial
that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife". Having determined that the second marriage
involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it
is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
2. Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can
be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage.
32
G.R. No. 198780

October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.
Topic: Marriage License; Marriage Exempt from License
DOCTRINE: A marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship is not void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent.
FACTS:
1.
Oct 22, 2004 - Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married, as evidenced
by a Certificate of Marriage.
2.
Dec 6, 2006 - Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
3.
Fringer did not file his answer.
4.
Sept 13, 2007 - Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pretrial brief. After the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared.
Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.
5.
RTC - declared the marriage void ab initio.

a.
b.
opined that the parties married each other for convenience only.
Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable
her to acquire American citizenship and that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer
$2,000.00 because the latter never processed her petition for citizenship
6.
CA - affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking.
ISSUE: WON the marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
1.
Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1975) - established the principal
test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
arriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the
time they were married. This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead
demonstrate that the marriage was not ntered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States.The focus, thus, shifted from determining the
intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration
laws. It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a
marriage.
2.
Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines (1969) - declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for
the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be
33
avoided merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose. The 1980
immigration case of Matter of McKee, further recognized that a fraudulent or sham
marriage was intrinsically different from a non-subsisting one.
3.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely
given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A freely given consent
requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of
the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that
the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
4.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature
and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired
their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a
clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
DISPOSITION: GRANTED.
34
Case Title:
Leonora Perido, et al. v. Maria Perido, et al.
Date: 12 March 1975

G.R. No.: G.R. No. L-28248
Nature of Action: Appeal by Certiorari
Ponente: Makalintal, C.J.
Topic: Presumption of Marriage
Facts:
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was
Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died
Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and
Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still living. Her
deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia,
Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido. Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased,
but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely: Consolacion,
Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but survived by his own
son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely: Eusebio and Juan.
Eusebio is survived by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe
Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.
On 15 August 1960, the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio Perido
executed a document denominated as Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition, whereby
they partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the
Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.
The children belonging to the first marriage (petitioners) of Lucio Perido had second thoughts about the
partition.
On 8 March 1962, they filed a complaint in the CFI of Negros Occidental, in which it was later amended
on 22 February 1963, against the children of the second marriage (defendants). They prayed for the
annulment of the so-called Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition and for another
partition of the lots among themselves alone.
The petitioners alleged that they had been induced by the defendants to execute the document in
question through misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means. They claim that the lots
which were partitioned belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong. They also claim that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all
illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942.
After trial, the CFI rendered its decision (dated 31 July 1865) annulling the Declaration of Heirship and
Extra-judicial Partition. However, it did not order the partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs
exclusively in view of its findings that the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat, were legitimate. The CFI stated that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive
properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of Lucio
Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat.
35
The petitioners appealed to the CA. But the CA, finding no reversible error in the CFIs decision, had
affirmed it.
Issue:
Whether the children and grandchildren of the second marriage of Lucio Perido were legitimate.
Ruling:
Yes.
Ratio:
The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three were born out
of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of
wedlock and were not recognised by their parents before or after their marriage.
In support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three children
were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido;
that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on the face of the certificates of title
issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925,
as allegedly established through the testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido.
The SC had ruled that their (the petitioners) petition cannot be sustained. The CA found that there was
evidence to show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. Under the
circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of
their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him in 1923,
the CA correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not actually married to
Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons
living together husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption, especially where
legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of
those who allege the illegitimacy.
In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, this Court explained the rationale behind this presumption,
thus:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed,
in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man
and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume
marriage.
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the presumption of marriage
arising from previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that both the trial court and the appellate court did
not even pass upon the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on the matter. The
reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she knew that Marcelina Baliguat was married to
Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it because during the celebration of the
marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from (their) garden and placed in the altar.
Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the ceremony.
36
In view of the foregoing the CA did not err in concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.
For this case, I only focused on the issue regarding the legitimacy of the children and grandchildren of
the second marriage since it is related to the topic (i.e., Presumption of Marriage).
37
Case Title:
Dominga Fiel
vs.
Julio Banawa, et al.
Date:
26 March 1979
G.R. No.: 56284-R
Nature of Action:
Ponente: Gutierrez, H.E.
Topic: Presumption of Marriage
Facts:
Dominga Fiel, who lived in a common law relationship with Natalio Banawa for twenty
five years, filed a complaint on March 3, 1971 for the annulment of a partition of the
properties allegedly owned in common by her and the latter.
Natalio Banawa was a widower, before living with Dominga.
Natalio Banawa died on June 29, 1970, after living with Dominga since 1945. On Oct.
22, 1970, one of the nephews of Natalio brought Atty. Catane to Dominga for the
execution of a document of partition of the properties.
Dominga received 1/3 while 2/3 were given to the brothers and nephews of Natalio.
Upon realization that she received less than what she was supposed to, she filed this
complaint. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Dominga (awarding her half).
Appeal was taken by the defendants.
Issue:
WON the parties relationship should entitle Dominga to receive half of the properties
Ruling:
YES. Though Article 144 was not fully satisfied, on legal and equitable considerations,
she should receive half.
Ratio:
Philippine law does not recognize common-law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who co-habit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and
wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common
law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
In the Philippines, the property of such common-law relationships are governed by
Art. 144 of the Civil Code:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
For Art. 144 to apply, two requisites must be satisfied:
1) The couple must not be incapacitated to contract marriage; and
2) That the properties must have been acquired through the work or industry of both
or either of them.
As to the second requisite, the records show that Natalio set up a sari-sari store
with Dominga, after disposing of his properties from his previous marriage and became
a widower.
As to the first requisite, Dominga admits that she was legally married to Eusebio
Potestas and that Eusebio Potestas was still alive when she testified in the trial court.
38
However, despite such failure to satisfy a requisite, the Court finds that On the
combined strength of legal and equitable considerations, we rule that the co-ownership
rules provided by Article 144 of the Civil Code are applicable. Dominga should receive
of the fruits and earnings of her joint efforts with Natalio. The properties in part came
from her own sweat, brains and efforts.
As to the donations made by Natalio to Dominga during his lifetime, the same should
be declared void. Art. 739 of the Civil Code expressly provides that donations made
between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation are void.
Adultery or concubinage need not be proved in a criminal action, mere preponderance of
evidence is required. Furthermore, as stated in the ruling of Buenaventura v Bautista, the
donations are contrary to public policy as well since legally married spouses cannot
donate to each other so should those not married.
Provision of law applicable to the topic:

Article 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus,
every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility
of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during
marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any
member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
39
Topic: Void Marriages; Bigamous Marriages

Case: People vs. Mendoza
Nature: The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, finding him guilty of the crime of bigamy.
Facts:
On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On
May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to
Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19,
1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba,
Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of
bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and
void and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with
Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita
Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took
place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even
assuming that appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from
criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of said bigamous
marriage.
Issue: Whether the appellant is exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a
previous judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage?
HELD: Yes. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or
the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted
being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person
during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere
annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with
Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been
absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said
marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.
Notes:
(Separate Opinion; Dissent; J Reyes)
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prision mayor "any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved".
40
Though the logical may say that where the former marriage was void there would be
nothing to dissolve still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void
or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts.
41
Case Title:
G.R. No. L-10016
February 28,
1957
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendantappellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
Date:
G.R. No.:
Nature of Action: Appeal from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy.
Nature of Action:
Topic: Void Marriages Bigamous &
Polygamous
Facts:
Herein accused under the name Proceso Rosima contracted a marriage to one Maria
Gorrea(No. 1) in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu. While he is still married to
Maria Gorrea, the accused now under the name of Proceso Aragon contracted another
marriage with Maria Faicol in Iloilo (No. 2).
He was able to maintain both relationships because the accused was then a traveling
sales man. When No.1 died, and seeing that the coast was clear in Cebu, Aragon brought
No. 2 to Cebu from Iloilo, where she became a teacher-nurse. Maria Faicol however,
suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment brought to her by Aragon.
Due to the injuries she was sent back to Iloilo to undergo treatment, in her absence the
accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang (No. 3).
No. 2 filed a case for bigamy against the defendant. He then categorically denied in the
court his marriage to No. 2 but affirmed his marriage to No. 3.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision
in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a
marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C.
Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of
the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of
the latter.
Issue:
Should the defendant be held guilty for the crime of bigamy despite the fact
that his marriage to the complainant(No. 2) was void ab initio?
No
Ratio:
Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off.
Gaz., [10] 4767). In this case the majority of this Court declared:
42
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly
makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his
first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable
marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's second marriage with Olga
Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been
absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to
render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court.
We are of the very weighty reasons by Justice Alex Reyes in the dissent in the case abovequoted But this weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of strict
construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may not ignore,
seems to justify our stand in the above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised
Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America
requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the
contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have
been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation
already adverted to.
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose
marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before
the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and
appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the
defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution
for having contracted the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.
REYES, A.J., dissenting:
I dissent.
Dissenting in the case of People vs. Mendoza, replied on by the majority, I there said:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prision mayor "any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage
has been legally dissolved."
Though the logician may say that there were the former marriage was void there
would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that
marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. As Viada says,
'La satidad e importancia del matrimonio no permite que los casados juzguen por
si mosmos de su nulidad; esta ha de someterse [precisamente al juicio del
Tribunalcompetente, y cuando este declare la nulidad del matrimonio, y solo
entonces, se tendra por nulo; mientras no exista esta declaracion, la presuncion
esta siempre a favor de la validez del matrimonio, yde consiguiente, el que
contrae otro segundo antes de dicha declaracio de nulidad, no puede menos de
incurrir la pena de este articulo. (3 Viada, Codigo Penal, p. 275.)
"This is a sound opinion," says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of People vs. Jose
Cotas, (CA), 40 Off. Gaz. 3145, "and is in line with the well-known rule established
43
in cases of adultery, that "until by competent authority in a final judgment the

marriage contract is set aside, the offense to the vows taken and the attack on the
family exists."
I may add that the construction placed by the majority upon the law penalizing bigamy
would frustrate the legislative intent rather than give effect thereto.
44
Case Title:
SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs.
HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA
CLEMENTE
and
THE
LOCAL
CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PAOMBONG, BULACAN,
respondents.
Date: May 30, 1983.

G.R. No.: G.R. No. L-43905
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari
Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J (1st Division)
Topic: Void marriages.
Facts:
1. Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria
Clemente on November 1, 1948, while his marriage with petitioner Tolentino, celebrated on
July 31, 1943, was still subsisting.
2. Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy.
3. Upon Amado's plea of guilty, he was sentenced to suffer the corresponding penalty.
4. After Amado had served the prison sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with private
respondent until his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate carried the entry "Name of
Surviving Spouse Maria Clemente.".
5. In a Special Proceedings for Correction of Entry, petitioner sought to correct the name of the
surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her
name.
6. The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law"
and indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding.
7. Conformably thereto, petitioner filed the case below against private respondent and the Local
Civil Registrar for her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of the
death certificate of Amado.
8. In an Order, dated October 21, 1975, respondent Court, upon private respondent's instance,
dismissed the case for the following reasons:
a. the correction of the entry in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the proper
remedy because the issue involved is marital relationship;
b. the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed under Art. 108,
read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code publication is needed in a case like this,
and up to now, there has been no such publication; and
c. in a sense, the subject matter of this case has been aptly discussed in the Special
Proceeding, which this Court has already dismissed, also for lack of the proper
requisites under the law.
9. Thus, petitioner's present recourse mainly challenging the grounds relied upon by respondent
Court in ordering dismissal.
Issue: WoN a judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity the second marriage between
Amado and Maria Clemente.
Ruling: NO. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage.
Ratio:
For the merits. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that
sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased.
There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence of
such marriage. The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the
45
lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. It can be
safely concluded, then, without need of further proof nor remand to the Court below, that
private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado, but petitioner.
Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore,
be validly made.
Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, the other issues raised need no longer be
discussed. In fine, since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's
second marriage with private respondent and that the entry made in the
corresponding local register is thereby rendered false, it may be corrected. While
documents, such as death and birth certificates, are public and entries therein are presumed
to be correct, such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive
evidence establishing their inaccuracy.
Notes:
For the remedy. Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the collection of entry contemplated
in Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial
declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the
basis for the correction of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased. The suit below is
a proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding.
A claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. Private
respondent, as the individual most affected; is a party defendant, and has appeared to contest
the petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant. The
publication required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not
absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved. After all, publication is required to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought
to be established. Besides, even assuming that this is a proceeding under Rule 108, it was the
Court that was called upon to order the publication, but it did not. In the ultimate analysis,
Courts are not concerned so much with the form of actions as with their substance.
46
Case Title:
Date: August 19, 1986
LILIA
OLIVA
WIEGEL, petitioner,
G.R. No. L-53703
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as Nature of Action: Petition for Certiorari
presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic
Ponente: Paras, J. ; Second Division
Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL
Topic: Void Marriages
HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
Facts:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City, respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage
(celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro
Manila) with petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one
Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes
Church in Quezon City.
Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was
null and void. Lilia and Eduardo were forced to enter said marital union.
In the pre-trial, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage Was
said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?
Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to
present evidenceo that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband;
and
o that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone
else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force
exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of the respondent Judge.
Issue:
Is first marriage of petitioner void or voidable?
Petitioners first marriage is voidable and therefore, valid until annulled.
Ratio:
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely
viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled.
Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still
validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil
Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel.
Accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
47
Case Title:
Leonilo C. Donato
vs.
Artemon Luna, Presiding Judge of the Manila CFI;
Jose Flaminiano, City Fiscal of Manila; Paz Abayan
Date: 15 April 1988

G.R. No. 53642
Nature of Action: Certiorari and Prohibition
Ponente:
Topic: Void Marriages
Facts:
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila
acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein
petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The information was filed based
on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, based on the ground that private respondent consented
to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous
knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978.
Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage
was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and
undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage.
Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had
lived together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a
period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978,
for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New
Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion
to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the
annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question
which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the
case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can
proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds for
suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs.
Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14, 1980,
for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the pending civil case for annulment raises a prejudicial question to merit the
suspension of the criminal case for bigamy.
2. Whether or not the second marriage could be considered void due to the presence of force,
intimidation, and violence as alleged
1. No, it does not
Ratio:
1.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of
which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. 3 It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
48
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually
comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be
noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity
of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the
crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz
B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her
consent was obtained through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null
and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by
private respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for
anulment of the second marriage. In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown
that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and
intimidation.
Petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for
annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy
case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such
marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to
establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such
the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in
the case at bar.
2. Donato has not sufficiently shown evidence that there was lack of consent to the second
marriage and that such consent was obtained through use of force and intimidation.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of
the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September
26, 1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for
more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that his
consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue
influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belied by the fact that both petitioner and private
respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife
without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital union was
formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was private respondent who eventually filed
the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact that it was only when
Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year
from the solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his
consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation and undue
influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978, when
the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the
respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
49
Case Title:
DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant, vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.
Date: July 3, 1992

G.R. No.: A.M. 2349
Ponente: Per Curiam
Nature of Action: disbarment
Topic: void marriages; bigamous
Facts:
Dorothy and Jordan Terre met for the first time in 1979 as 4th yr high school
classmates
o At that time, Dorothy was already married to Merlito Bercenilla
o Jordan was aware of the existence of said marriage, yet, he still pursued
Dorothy
Dorothy and Jordan pursued their education in Manila, where Jordan studied law
at Lyceum University.
Jordan continued courting Dorothy , this time with more persistence; she
decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he explained to
her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her first
husband were first cousins; convinced by his explanation and having
secured favorable advice from her mother and ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry
him.
o In their marriage license, despite her objection, Jordan wrote "single" as
her status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there
was no need to go to court to declare it as such
o They were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of
Manila on June 14, 1977
Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981
In the same year, Jordan disappeared.
Dorothy was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out
later that Jordan married a certain Vilma Malicdem
As a result, Dorothy filed the following cases:
o A criminal case for abandonment of minor
o A criminal case for bigamy
o An administrative case before Commission on Audit, where Jordan was
employed this case was dismissed for being moot since Jordan was
automatically separated from his employment due to AWOL.
o This present case for disbarment for gross immoral conduct, for
contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other
than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained
subsisting.
Jordan successfully evaded 5 attempts of service of the Courts Resolution
before he filed an Answer in this disbarment case.
o Jordan claims that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage
with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no
action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
o He further claimed that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre)
was the son of Bercenilla
In Dorothys Reply, she said that Jason Terre was the child of
Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason was the child of
respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate
and physical resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further
explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the
PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had
done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or
injury to the fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech
position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been
abandoned by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and
without means to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising by
50
reason of her pregnancy.

Issue: WON the marriage of Dorothy with Jordan is void for being bigamous?
Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue) NO
Ratio:
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a
spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's
evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of respondent
Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by
which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to
Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito
being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second
marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew
or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case
law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person
is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume,
arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the
same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument,
his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the
result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as
bigamous and criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown
by other circumstances. As noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior
marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally
single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had
contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being
supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents.
After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant,
respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without the
wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling
complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in
abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and
supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe
delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina
Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was
subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of
respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first
place. The Court will correct this error forthwith.
51
CASE NAME: REPUBLIC

RANADA, Respondent.
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
YOLANDA
CADACIO
CASE NUMBER/ DATE: G.R. No. 187512 dated June 13, 2012
PONENTE: SERENO, J.
NATURE OF THE ACTION: Petition to have Cyrus (husband) declared presumptively
dead.
FACTS:
1. In May 1991, Yolanda Granada (respondent) met Cyrus Granada at Sumida
Electric Philippines where both were then working.
2. They got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993 and they begotten a
son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
3. Three years after they met (May 1994), Sumida Electric Philippines closed down.
Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment.
4. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received any communication
from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that
he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no
avail.
5. After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead. The Petition was raffled to Presiding Judge Avelino Demetria
of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City.
6. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as
presumptively dead.
7. On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this
Decision.
a. Petitioner argued: Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to
locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that
he was already dead.
b. RTC denied the motion.
8. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably under
Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court.
a. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no
jurisdiction over the appeal.
She argued: her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on
Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which
the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
b. Ruling of the appellate court: granted Yolandas Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
i. Ground for dismissal: Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino
52
[A] petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of

the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon
is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.
c. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The motion was denied.
9. The case is elevated on with the supreme Court based on Rule 45 Petition seeking
the reversal of the Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed
the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not a ruling on the presumption of death is indeed a summary
proceeding, hence immediately final and executory; and 2. Whether or not the CA, in
affirming the decision of the RTC, erred in ruling for the declaration of Cyrus Grandas
presumptive death.
RULING: YES/ YES.
1. [A] petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code
is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the Family Code.
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that
since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding,
the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
2. The Republics arguments are well-taken (see point highlighted in the facts).
Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "wellfounded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the
Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be
modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a
judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."
RATIO:
1. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no
appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance
with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of
Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court
may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which
are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for
certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From
the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
53
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republics
Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondents spouse was immediately final
and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.
2. The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that the
absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is generally considered to be dead and
is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles
390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision
prescribes a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As noted by the
Court in that case, the four requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death under the Family Code are as follows:
a. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger
of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
b. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
c. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and
d. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
xxx
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent
and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead
before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not
define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es
menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales."
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt
act.1wphi1 It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which
may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a
determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the
character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which
usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so
far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on
their intentions, competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse
and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the
spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature
and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted,
underscoring supplied.)
54
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband.
While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the
whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives were not
presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly
not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she
would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance
from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also
utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain
these omissions.
The Republics arguments are well-taken (see point highlighted in the facts).
Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "wellfounded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the
Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be
modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a
judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165
are AFFIRMED.
55
*Missing: Republic v Cantor

*Missing: Jones v Hortiluega
Case Title:
Petition for the presumption of death
of Nicolai Szatraw. CONSUELO SORS,
petitioner-appellant.
Date: August 31, 1948

G.R. No. L-1780
Nature of Action: Petition for the
presumption of death
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
Topic: Reappearance of Absent
Spouse
Facts:
Consuelo Sors is the lawful wife of Nicolas Szatraw, a Polish citizen, to whom she was
married in Manila on November, 1936, and whom she bore a child named Alexis
Szatraw. She alleged that on February, 1940, her husband departed from the conjugal
abode carrying the child along with him and never returned.
She made inquiries and and learned that her husband and child had left for Shanghai,
however, upon information from some Polish citizens who lived there, Szatraw had not
been seen there. Thereafter, all her efforts to know the whereabouts of her husband
and child were put in vain.
Because of her husband's absence for more than seven years during which she has not
heard any news from him and about her child, she believes that he is dead, Consuelo
Sors prays that her husband be declared dead and that her parental authority over her
child, should the latter be alive and later on appear, be preserved.
The evidence shows that she and her husband did not acquire any property during
their marriage and that his life was not insured.
Issue: W/N the petition for declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively
dead should be allowed.
No. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not
been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the
lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for
such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the
petitioner. The Court should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a
superfluous and meaningless act.
Ratio:
In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the
petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final
determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact for the
petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but
merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard
from in seven years.
This declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation,
because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to
that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It
is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
56
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or

upon which a competent court has to pass.
The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally
the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain
rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a
final judgement, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact established,
by a final decree, then the judgement on the subject of the controversy, or the decree
upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes
res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially
provided by law.
066
REPUBLIC
OF
THE Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor
physical) incapacity and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment
PHILIPPINES, vs. COURT OF of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to
APPEALS
and
RORIDEL the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents. utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage
G.R. No. 108763
February
13, is celebrated.
1997
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
TOPIC: Psychological Incapacity
antecedence, and (c) incurability.
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
August 16, 1990: Respondent Roridel O. Molina filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity
of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. The petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married
on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born;
that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a
husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest
with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime
in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the
sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job
in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he
was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and
that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to
free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and
wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2)
Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's
failure to run the household and handle their finances.
Stipulations during pre-trial:
1.
That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2.
That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July
29, 1986;
3.
That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4.
That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
57
5.
6.
That the respondent is not asking for damages;

That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of
Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She
also submitted documents. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the
pre-trial conference.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present
recourse.
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists, "the CA made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation
of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made
an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended
"to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to
our culture."
Petitioner Republic argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to
the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
ISSUE: WON the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina is void on the ground of
psychological incapacity?
HELD: No. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. In
the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made
to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. The
evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with
each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
RATIO: The petition is meritorious. In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Justice Vitug wrote
that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
58
In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough
to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of
the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr.
Sison testified:
Q
It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings
that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A
Yes, Your Honor.
Q
There is no hope for the marriage?
A
There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q
Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit
for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A
Yes, Your Honor.
Q
Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A
Yes, Your Honor.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration.
While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being
"conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely
shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted
in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as
legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
59
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not
physical. Although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be
given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation
of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts"
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential
to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
60
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage
and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the
petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing
guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains
valid.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: see guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code
61
Case Title:
LENI O. CHOA, petitioner, vs.
ALFONSO C. CHOA, respondent.
Date: November 26, 2002

G.R. No.: G.R. No. 143376
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Ponente: Panganiban,J. (Third Division)
Topic: Psychological Incapacity
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two
children were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental a Complaint for the
annulment of his marriage to petitioner. Afterwards he filed an Amended Complaint
dated November 8, 1993 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner
based on her alleged psychological incapacity.
The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last
witness testified, he submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits dated February 20, 1998.
Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to
Evidence) dated May 11, 1998. The lower court then allowed a number of pleadings to
be filed thereafter.
Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order denying petitioners Demurrer to
Evidence. It held that "[respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the
[petitioner] must controvert." After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the
March 22, 1999 Order, petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for
Certiorari.
The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not available. The proper remedy was for the
defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was handed down later, to
take an appeal therefrom. In any event, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent judge in issuing the assailed Orders.
The CA also ruled that "the propriety of granting or denying a demurrer to evidence
rests on the sound exercise of the [trial] courts discretion." Further, the "[p]etitioner
failed to show that the issues in the court below [had] been resolved arbitrarily or
without basis."
Hence, this Petition.
Issue: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity.
NO.
Ratio:
A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or exception by one of the parties in
an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the
issue." The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a
verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court
is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain
the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are convinced
62
that the evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to

support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of
nullity of the parties marriage.
First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him
are proof of the latters psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for perjury, false
testimony, concubinage and deportation. According to him, the filing and the
prosecution of these cases clearly showed that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted not
only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from the country. He contends that
this "is very abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of
her husband as the father of her children, had acted to the contrary.
We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in
any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of
absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence
presented, even if taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the cases
against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological
incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on
absurdity.
Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with
his documentary offerings, sufficient to prove petitioners alleged psychological
incapacity.
Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three
aspects of petitioners personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their
children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an "intention of procreative sexuality." None of
these three, singly or collectively, constitutes "psychological incapacity." Far from it.
In Santos v. CA, this Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability." Said the
Court:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,
and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family
Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting from the Diagnostic
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases).
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
63
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated."
Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina, we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be
more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his
wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the
gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital
union.
Sorely lacking in respondents evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was
grave enough to bring about the disability of a party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes of psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage."
Respondents pious peroration that petitioner "lacked the intention of procreative
sexuality" is easily belied by the fact that two children were born during their union.
Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged "defect" was already existing
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert
testimony presented by respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed
to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity.
Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
His testimony established merely that the spouses had an "incompatibility," a "defect"
that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. We need not
expound further on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to establish the
psychological incapacity of petitioner.
Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on
descriptions communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never conducted any
psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so. In fact, his
Professional Opinion began with the statement "[I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his
wife Leni is true.
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these
64
had merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure
suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his
testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess
petitioners character, not only through the descriptions given by respondent, but also
through the formers at least fifteen hours of study of the voluminous transcript of
records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to
examine the records of this case, we still find his assessment of petitioners
psychological state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.
As to respondents argument -- that because Dr. Gauzons testimony had never been
objected to, the objection raised thereafter was deemed waived -- the Supreme Court
has already ruled on the matter. It held that although the question of admissibility of
evidence could not be raised for the first time on appeal, hearsay or unreliable
evidence should be disregarded whether objected to or not, because it has no
probative value.
We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not a conditio
sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence
presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately. Here, however, the totality
of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination.
The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by
respondent and taken into account the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could
then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was useless to proceed further
with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof. His evidence was obviously,
grossly and clearly insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny
the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Courts rulings in point. Indeed, continuing
the process of litigation would have been a total waste of time and money for the
parties and an unwelcome imposition on the trial courts docket.
We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or
tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. 53
Any decision, order or resolution of a lower court tantamount to overruling a judicial
pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion.
There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy or
65
adequate remedy in the case at bar. An appeal would not promptly relieve petitioner
from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken Orders maintaining the baseless
action of respondent. It would only compel her to go needlessly through a protracted
trial, which would further clog the court dockets with another futile case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Respondents Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged psychological incapacity of
petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
66
Case Title: DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON,
respondents.
Date: September 24, 2003

G.R. No.: 130087
Nature of Action:
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
Facts:
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for
Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). However, on 9 May
1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court granted in its Order
dated 7 June 1995.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner
Diana. Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the second
petition fails to state a cause of action. Second, it violates SC Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping (see
Notes below for short discussion on the procedural aspect of the case, just in case).
The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an Order (first order)
deferring resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner
Diana filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the trial court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L.
Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an Order (second order) denying the motion. In denying the
motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison explained that when the ground for dismissal is the complaints
failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself.
Judge Pison held that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a perusal of the allegations in the petition
shows that petitioner Diana has violated respondent Tadeos right, thus giving rise to a cause of action.
Judge Pison also rejected petitioner Dianas claim that respondent Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in
filing the second petition. Judge Pison explained that when respondent Tadeo filed the second petition,
the first petition was no longer pending as it had been earlier dismissed without prejudice.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the allegations in the second petition state a cause
of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true. Hence, the petition for review with
the Supreme Court.
Petitioner argues that following the rulings of Santos v. Court of Appeals, and Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina, the SC adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. She cites Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules, which
provide:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete
facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in Santos and
Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective because it fails to allege the root
67
cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The second petition also fails to state that the alleged
psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or
incurable. Further, the second petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to
bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the
second petition did not even state the marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to
comply due to psychological incapacity.
Respondent Tadeo argues that his petition does have a cause of action since his complaint contains the
three essential elements for a cause of action: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the
act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.
Respondent Tadeo alleged that he and petitioner Diana were legally married at the Holy Cross Parish
after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached to the petition. He further
alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their
marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the
present time.
Issue: W/N the complaint filed by Respondent Tadeo was able to provide a cause of action
Ruling: Yes, the complaint contained a valid cause of action
Ratio:
The petition of Respondent Tadeo states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent
Tadeo, the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in
violation of the legal right.
Respondent Tadeos petition alleged the non-complied marital obligations in this manner:
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent,
coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She
would go to her sisters house or would play tennis the whole day.
6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a
child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.
7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the
pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their
conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she wanted to feel a little freedom from petitioners marital
authority and influences. The petitioner argued that he could occupy another room in their conjugal
dwelling to accommodate respondents desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could dissuade
her from demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner
was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium located in Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the respondent. The
petitioner waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondents favor through an extrajudicial
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. The separation in fact between the petitioner and the
respondent still subsists to the present time.
10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The extrajudicial dissolution
68
of conjugal partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex C and taken as an integral part hereof.
11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the
present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the psychological examination conducted on
the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent.
12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is
void ab initio and needs to be annulled. This petition is in accordance with Article 39 thereof.
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it
must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the
existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the
case. If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the
defendants. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must
show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively
stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Emphasis supplied)
A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically
admits all the factual averments in the complaint. Given the hypothetically admitted facts in the
second petition, the trial court could render judgment over the case
The case was written focusing on the remedial law aspect since that was the issue raised by Petitioner
Diana. Hence the issue and ratio.
69
*Missing:RP v Quinter-Hamano
Case Title: Republic v. Cesar Encelan

G.R. No.: 170022
Nature of Action: Petition for review
on Certiorari
Nature of Action:
Facts:
Cesar and Lolita Encelan married each other on August 25, 1979. Out of their union,
two children were born, Maricar and Manny. To support his family, Cesar went to work
in Saudi Arabia. While there, he learned that Lolita had been having an affair with a
certain Alvin. Lolita eventually left the conjugal home and went to live with Alvin. On
June 16, 1995, Cesar filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita
on the ground of psychological incapacity. During trial, Cesar testified on Lolitas
alleged psychological incapacity and abandonment; and narrated that he continued to
support Lolita and their children even after he learned of her infidelity. Lolita denied
begin psychologically incapacitated, and averred that her break up with Cesar was due
to irreconcilable differences. To support his allegation of psychological incapacity on
the part of Lolita, Cesar presented Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for
Mental Health who testified that Lolita was not suffering from any form of major
psychiatric illness[,] but had been unable to provide the expectations expected of
her for a good and lasting marital relationship; her transferring from one job to the
other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience
in attaining her ambitions; and her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies
her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship.
After trial, the RTC granted Cesars petition and declared the marriage between them
null and void on the basis of Lolitas psychological incapacity. The Office of the
Solicitor General seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals, which initially granted
OSGs appeal, but later on reversed itself and affirmed the RTC ruling, on the basis of
two circumstances:(1) Lolitas unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations
to Cesar; and (2) Lolitas wilfull and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
The OSG appealed to the Supreme Court. It argues that Dr. Flores psychological
evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a psychological
illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity
and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds
for legal separation.
Issue: Whether or not sufficient basis exists to nullify Cesars marriage to Lolita on the
ground of psychological incapacity
NO.
Ratio:
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that [a] marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological
incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty,
70
much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of
marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.
In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged psychological incapacity.
Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolitas alleged affair and her
subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his continued financial support to
her and their children even after he learned of the affair, but he merely mentioned in
passing Lolitas alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true,
do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for
legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital
obligations. No evidence on record exists to support Cesars allegation that Lolitas
infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove
her alleged psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established
that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness. Dr. Flores observation on
Lolitas interpersonal problems with co-workers, to our mind, does not suffice as a
consideration for the conclusion that she was at the time of her marriage
psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the
time element involved, a wifes psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be
equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and
responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from
human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully
established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one
another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot
serve this purpose. Dr. Flores further belief that Lolitas refusal to go with Cesar
abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere
generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court
cannot support.
71
Yaptinchay v. Torres
Topic: Effect of Nullity
FACTS:
Teresita Yaptinchay (petitioner) asked the Pasay City, Rizal, CFI to appoint her, first, as
Special Administratrix and then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong on July 7, 1965 alleging that Isidro had lived with her
continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for 19 yrs (46-64Taft Ave.,
Pasay City, and 64-65Russel Ave., Pasay City).
Isidro died without a will and left an estate in Philippines, HK and other places with
estimated value of about P500K; and left 3 daughters: Virginia, Mary and Asuncion. On
July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away from the residences aforesaid
personal properties belonging to Isidro together with others exclusively owned by
Teresita. CFI granted such appointment while Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged
legitimate wife, and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased opposed
saying that Teresita, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the
proceeding for the settlement of the latter's estate, much less to procure appointment as
administratrix thereof; and that having admittedly cohabited with the deceased for a
number of years said petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want of
integrity. Also, oppositors counter-petitioned for the appointment of Virginia, as special
administratrix and of Josefina, as regular administratrix.
HELD:
"When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership."
But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship envisaged in
Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of which must first be shown
before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. 13 One such condition is
that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really
contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-ownership is
duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in controversy cannot be
considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid
afforded by a writ of injunction. 14 For, the existence of a clear positive right especially
calling for judicial protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or
future rights; 15 nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right.
At any rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the parties would be better
safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes Park property be in the hands of the
bonded administratrix in the estate proceedings. For then, her acts would be subject to
the control of the probate court.
having been constructed on the lot of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay (or of the conjugal partnership)
at his instance, and during the existence of his marriage with respondent Josefina Y.
Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that should be under the control of the special
administratrix.
72
Case Title:
Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay,
Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City, and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the National
Statistics Office
Date: 26 June 2013

G.R. No.: G.R. No. 196049
Nature of Action: Petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Topic: Void Marriages - Who Can Invoke
Nullity?
Facts:
Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
Fujikis parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to re-establish their relationship.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). Fujiki prayed that (1)
the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognised; (2) that the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of
the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office
of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO)
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition. Citing from the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; Secs. 2 and 4),
the RTC had based its ruling on improper venue (Sec. 4) and the lack of personality of
Fujiki to file the petition (Sec. 2).
Apparently, the RTC took the view that only the husband or the wife, in this case
either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not
Fujiki.
Issue:
Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognise a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.
Ruling:
Yes.
Ratio:
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment,
it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of
73
Court provides that [a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the
State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public
consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in
recording.
As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that
[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
The SC had ruled that Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognise the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. vFor the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108
to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on
the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record
of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only
to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but
also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported in keeping with the financial capacity of the family and preserving the
property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a
spouses right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title
III (Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife) of the Family Code.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot diminish, increase, or modify the substantive right of
the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to
the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy.
On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that [a] petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife - it refers to the
74
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage.

Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the
wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one
who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalises
bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If
anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife
of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly
an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave
ruled that the prior spouse is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage
not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. Being a
real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous
marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognise a foreign
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more
impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
Case Title:
Date: 31 July 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH
G.R. No.: 189121
QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
Nature of Action: Petition for review on
QUIAZON, Petitioners,
certiorari under Rule 45
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf Ponente: Perez, J.
Topic: Void Marriages - Who Can Invoke
of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
Nullity?
QUIAZON, Respondent.
Facts:
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo
Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and
daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon
(Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth
Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her
mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. 3 In her Petition docketed as SP
Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each
other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned
75
the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having
been contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito
Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached
to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth 4 signed by
Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties
worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to
preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought
her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the
findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo
and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence
in Las Pinas from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in declaring that Amelia was not
legally married to Eliseo on the grounds of a preexisting marriage?
Ruling:
The
Ratio:
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes,
deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in
1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for
judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. That Eliseo went to
the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders
untenable petitioners position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with
Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners submission that
the lower courts findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on
record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must
be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was
though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can
be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It must be
pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in
Nial v. Bayadog applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father,
by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party
but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not
after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties
to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.
76
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it
cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
77
Case: Republic vs. Olaybar (February 10, 2014)

Topic: Procedure in action for declaration for nullity
Nature: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the Regional Trial. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L.
Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the
assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
FACTS:
Respondent Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of
No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend
of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a
certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and
claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the
solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not
hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract,
especially the entries in the wife portion. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar
of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case. The RTC granted
Olaybars petition and directed the Local Civil Registrar to cancel all the entries in the
wife portion of the alleged marriage contract. Petitioner, however, moved for the
reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall
within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation
of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect,
declaring the marriage void ab initio. The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence
this Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract, which, in effect,
nullifies the marriage, may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding? /
HELD:
YES. Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no
marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The
testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only evidence of
marriage, which is the marriage certificate, was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule
108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to
contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence
of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not
the nullification of marriage, as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of
the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise
stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the
wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as
there was no marriage to speak of.
78
Case Title:
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:

G.R. No.: 145226
Nature of Action: This petition for review
on certiorari seeks to reverse the
decision of the CA, which affirmed the
judgment of the RTC that found Morigo
guilty of bigamy.
Topic: Requisite of valid remarriage
Facts:
Lucio (Morigo) and Lucia (Barrete) were board mates at Tagbilaran City, Bohol for four
years. They re-established contact in 1984 and became sweethearts. In 1990, Lucia
came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition Lucio to join her in Canada. They
both agreed to get married and were thus married on August 30, 1990. Lucia returned to
Canada but left behind Lucio. She filed a petition for divorce against Lucio in Ontario,
Canada which was granted and took effect on February 17, 1992. Lucio then married
Maria Jececha (Lumbago) at Tagbilaran. On September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a civil case
for judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage to Lucia, docketed as Civil Case No.
6020, alleging that no marriage ceremony took place.
On October 19, 1993, Lucio was charged with bigamy before the RTC of Bohol. Initially,
his motion for suspension of arraignment on the ground of existence of a prejudicial
question (Civil Case No. 6020) was granted, but it was later reversed, and trial proceeded
against him. After trial, the court convicted him as charged, ruling that want of a
marriage ceremony is not a defense in bigamy and the parties in the marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first
secure a judicial declaration of nullity of said marriage. Lucio also cannot rely on the
divorce decree, as the same is without force and effect when both parties are not
domiciled in the country which granted it and was merely resorted to for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. During the pendency of his appeal, Civil
Case No. 6020 was decided in his favour. In that case, the RTC ruled that there was no
valid marriage ceremony that took place since the parties merely signed the marriage
contract without the presence of the solemnising officer. The trial court held that the
marriage was therefore void, in accordance with Articles 3 and 15 of the Family Code. His
motion for reconsideration denied by the CA, he elevated his case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucio is liable for Bigamy, in view of the finding in Civil Case No. 6020
(judicial declaration of nullity of marriage) that his first marriage was void for having been
no valid marriage ceremony.
No, he is not liable.
Ratio:
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of
the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial
court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 35 and 46 of
the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it,
This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration
of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab
initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes
79
of the law, never married.7 The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision
of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and
executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of
a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the
beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument
to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the
time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the
first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak
of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.8 In the
latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent
one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statutes as void.9
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not
just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and
then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first
marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption
of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case,
we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.
Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of
good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
80
Case Title:
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
respondent.
Date: February 18, 2004.

G.R. No.: G.R. No. 150758
Nature of Action: Petition for Review
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: (EN BANC)
Topic: Requisite of valid marriage.
Facts:
1. Petitioner Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10,
1990. They lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991,
when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
2. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
3. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he
shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
4. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the
latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that
petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
5. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
6. During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with
whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to
each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.
He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from
his office in connection with his work as a seaman. He further testified that he requested his
brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all
between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.
7. The lower court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
8. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court that herein petitioner Veronico
Tenebro was guilty of the crime of bigamy for contracting second marriage to Leticia Ancajas
while his marriage to Hilda Villareyes was still subsisting and sentence to an indeterminate
prison term.
9. Thus, petitioner interposed this petition for review by denying the existence of his first
marriage to Villareyes and by arguing that since his second marriage with Ancajas has
ultimately been declared void ab initio on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity,
he should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
10. Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas
was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.
Issues:
1) WoN the mere fact that no record of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes (1 st) exists
invalidates their marriage. - NO
2) WoN the declaration of the nullity of Tenebro's marriage to Ancajas (2 nd) on the
ground of psychological incapacity is an indicator that their marriage lacks the
essential requisites for validity. - NO
3) WoN Tenebro may still be held liable for bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Ancajas (2nd) on the ground of psychological incapacity. YES
Ruling:
1) NO. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present. There was no evidence presented by the
defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any
requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself.
2) NO. All the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied
by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over 18 years of age, and they voluntarily
contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B.
Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two
81
witnesses.
3) YES. There is a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy.
Ratio:
1) In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the marriage contract
presented by the prosecution served as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes (1st), which should be given greater credence than
documents testifying merely as to the absence of any record of the marriage, especially
considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs
to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage.
The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present. There was no evidence presented by
the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any
requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself.
2) The declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
is not an indicator that petitioner's marriage to Ancajas (2nd) lacks the essential requisites for
validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into
essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the
presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage
license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to
marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). Under Article 5
of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any
of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 25 and 38 26 may contract marriage. In this case,
all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by
petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted
the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial
Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
3) Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that the said marriage is not without
legal effects. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. There is
a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore,
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
Absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage prior to its judicial
declaration as being void constitute a valid defense. Would the absolute nullity of
either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute
a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy? I believe that, except for a void marriage on
account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained), the answer must be in the affirmative.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to
establish their nullity. As early as the case of People vs. Aragon, this Court has underscored the
fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain,
require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by way
82
of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the
Court, "an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law, (but
that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal
statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and,
therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted prior to
the decree of annulment), the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage,
being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be a defense in an indictment for
bigamy.
CARPIO, J., dissenting opinion:
Void marriage due to psychological incapacity cannot constitute a second marriage
to sustain a conviction therefor. If the second marriage is void ab initio on grounds other
than the existence of the first marriage, then legally there exists no second marriage. Article
35 of the Family Code enumerates the marriages that are "void from the beginning." The
succeeding article, Article 36, declares that a marriage contracted by one psychologically
incapacitated "shall likewise be void." Article 1409 of the Civil Code declares "inexistent and
void from the beginning" contracts "expressly . . . declared void by law." Thus, a marriage
contracted by one psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage is legally
inexistent and void from the beginning. Such void marriage cannot constitute a second
marriage to sustain a conviction for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
CALLEJO, SR., J., separate dissenting opinion:
Bigamy does not exist if the second marriage is null and void ab initio. The
prosecution was burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt the corpus delicti, namely, all the
elements of the crime. In this case, the prosecution adduced evidence that the petitioner
contracted marriage with Hilda and during the subsistence of said marriage, he contracted a
second marriage with the private respondent. However, the petitioner adduced in evidence the
decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. AU-885 before the court a quo rendered
judgment convicting the petitioner of bigamy declaring null and void ab initio the petitioner's
marriage with the private respondent on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity.
Since the second marriage is null and void ab initio, such marriage in contemplation of criminal
law never existed and for that reason, one of the essential elements of bigamy has
disappeared.
83
Case Title:
JAMES
WALTER
P.
CAPILI, PETITIONER,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY
TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS
Date: July 3, 2013

G.R. No. 183805
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45
Ponente: Peralta, J. ;Third Division
Topic: Requisite for Valid Remarriage
Facts:
June 28, 2004 - Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City in an
Information which reads: On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. MedinaCapili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter. Contrary to law.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that:
o there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC
of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili;
o in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the
charge of bigamy; and
o the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as
a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
The arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion
to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
The RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the
second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent
marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
The petitioner-accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of
the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him
and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
July 7, 2006 - The RTC of Pasig City granted petitioners Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss.
The private prosecutor opposed said Motion to Dismiss; the Motion stated, among others, that the
issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this abovecaptioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
The RTC ruled that there is merit on the Motion to Dismiss and submitted that there is no more
bigamy to speak of.
Private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
February 1, 2008 - the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision; remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of
the criminal case for bigamy
No. The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second
marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners
second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
Ratio:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows: Art.
349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
84
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2)
the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the
Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted
on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla
Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999.
The RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between
petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage
for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jarillo v. People - The Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of
bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already
been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy
cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void
and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. The outcome
of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing
upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because
all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the
time the second marriage is contracted. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is
void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage
was annulled.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration
of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
It is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the
offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
85
Case Title
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.
Date: July 17, 2013

G.R. No.: 191566
Ponente: Peralta
Nature of Action: certiorari 45
Topic: void marriages; bigamous
Facts:
2 July 1980 - Edgardo Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina

28 October 1993 Odtuhan married Eleanor Alagon
August 1994 Odtuhan filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina
23 February 1999 RTC granted Odtuhans petition and declared his marriage
with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license
10 November 2003 Alagon died.
In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon
learned of respondents previous marriage with Modina. She thus filed a
Complaint-Affidavit charging Odtuhan with Bigamy.
Odtuhan filed a motion to quash on 2 grounds: (1) that the facts do not charge the
offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished.
RTC denied the motion to quash
On appeal, CA REVERSED RTCs denial and ordered that the information in the
bigamy case be quashed
Issue: WON the bigamy case should prosper despite the declaration of nullity of the 1 st
marriage?
Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue) YES; SC remanded the case for further proceedings
Ratio:
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. It has been held in a
number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity
of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. If we allow
respondents line of defense and the CAs ratiocination, a person who commits
bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is
rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information
against him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the
filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such
contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal
culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and from
that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and
that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for
determining prescription.
Thus, as held in Antone v. Beronilla:
o To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the
subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of
86
establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not
constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such
defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of
exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in
the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during
the presentation of evidence.
CASE NAME: SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN,

JR., Respondent.
CASE NUMBER/ DATE: G.R. No. 201061 dated July 3, 2013
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.:
NATURE OF THE ACTION: Petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage (based on lacking formal requisites to a valid marriage)
with a prayer for partition of properties (in accordance to Article 148, FC), his
appointment as Administrator of Properties during the pendency of the case, and
declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children.
FACTS:
1. Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. alleged in his petition that he married Azucena Alegre in
Caloocan City. They had three (3) children: Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
2. In 1979 Benjamin developed a relationship with Sally Go Bangayan. She was his
customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family.
3. In 1981 Azucena left for the US. By February of 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived
together as husband and wife.
Sallys father was against the relationship.
To appease Sallys father, she brought Benjamin to Pasig where they

signed a purported marriage contract.
Benjamins marriage to Azucena was known to Sally. She assured Benjamin

that the marriage contract would not be registered.
4. Benjamin and Sallys marriage produced two (2) children: Bernice and Bentley.
They also acquired four (4) real properties throughout their co-habitation.
5. Their relationship ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada bringing their 2
children with her.
6. Sally filed a CRIMINAL COMPLAINT for Bigamy and Falsification of Public
Documents against Benjamin using their simulated marriage contract as
evidence.
7. In turn, Benjamin filed a PETITION for declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that
his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a
valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the
properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family
Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency
of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children.
87
A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition

before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by
Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
8. TC decision: in favor of Benjamin.
The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous because of
the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this
case.
No ruling on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley

because they were not parties to the case.
Denied Sallys claim for spousal support because she was not married to
Benjamin.
The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were
both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition: Sally could not claim the 37 properties she
named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin.
i.
Sally was not legally married to Benjamin.
ii. The 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by

Benjamins parents who gave the properties to their children,
including Benjamin, as advance inheritance.
iii. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and
the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of
Benjamins civil status in the title.
iv. Two lots were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that
Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or
industry in their purchase; and the two condominium units (where
Sally was a co- owner) were purchased from the earnings of
Benjamin alone.
v. Other properties were part of the conjugal partnership of Bejamin
with Azucena without prejudice to Benjamins right to dispute his
conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
vi. Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was
married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the
trial court forfeited Sallys share in the properties in favor of Bernice
and Bentley while Benjamins share reverted to his conjugal
ownership with Azucena.
9. CA Decision: partly granted the appeal.
Sally still failed to present her evidence even after six (6) resetting of
hearings.
Benjamins action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there
was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before
88
Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. Hence, trial court
committed no error in declaring Benjamins marriage to Sally null and void.
The property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148
of the Family Code. Hence, only the properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution
and the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin
and his siblings.
As to the 7 properties claimed by both parties, 2 properties belong solely

to Benjamin; and the 4 properties belong solely to Sally; and 1 property is
owned by them in common and shall be shared equally. The share of
Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing
marriage with Azucena while Sallys share shall accrue to her in the
absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Benjamin and Sallys marriage is valid under the Section 35
of the Family Code. (2) Whether or not the property relations of Benjamin and Sally in
relation to the 7 properties both claimed by them to have acquired during their
relationship, would fall under Section 148 of the Family Code.
RULING: NO/ YES.
RATIO: ON THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE:We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except
those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the
beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized
without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them
and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers
issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case
clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 20 which made their marriage void ab initio. The
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules
on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning." 21 Thus, the
Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed
in all aspects the trial courts decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision
stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did not discuss bigamous marriages, it can be
gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the
decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial courts discussion that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous. The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that
the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the
petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no
evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the
face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of
license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51
O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage
against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised
Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous
89
because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of
respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be
sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet
the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a
prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. 24 In this case, there
was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage
contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
ON THE PROPERTY RELATIONS: The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property
relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which
states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being
claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamins father to his children as advance
inheritance.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the
14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
90
Case Title:
GLORIA G. JOCSON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. RICARDO R. ROBLES, defendantappellant.

G.R. No.: G.R. No. L-23433
Ponente: REYES, J.B.L., J, EN BANC
Nature of Action:
Topic: Procedure in action for Declaration of
Nullity; No Confession of Judgment
Facts:
On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court an action for the annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles, on
the ground that it was bigamous.
It was alleged in the amended complaint that previous to his marriage to plaintiff on
May 27, 1958, defendant Robles had contracted a first marriage with Josefina Fausto,
who had instituted a criminal action for Bigamy against the same defendant.
Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys' fees, and costs, claiming that during their cohabitation, she was subjected
to physical maltreatment by her husband, resulting in the premature birth of their
first child, who died three days later.
In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage. But he charged
plaintiffs' parents with having compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to
contract that marriage with her, notwithstanding their knowledge that he is a married
man; and that said threat and intimidation allegedly persisted until January, 1963
when he was finally able to get away and live apart from the plaintiff.
On December 23, 1963, defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, the
court ruling that before it can pass upon plaintiff's prayer for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage to defendant, there is necessity for proof that when he contracted
marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a previous and subsisting valid
marriage.
The evidentiary requirement to establish these facts, according to the court, was not
met in the motion for summary judgment. Defendant's plea to have his marriage
declared as having been brought about by force and intimidation, was also denied,
the court finding indications of collusion between the parties in their attempt to
secure the nullification of said marriage.
Reconsideration of this order, sought by defendant, was denied on January 18, 1964.
And, when both parties failed to appear at the scheduled hearing on March 9, 1964,
the court directed the dismissal of the action.
On April 17, 1964, defendant notified the court below of his intention to appeal. The
appeal bond and amended record on appeal, dated April 15, 1964, were thereafter
approved.
Issue: W/N a decree of declaration of nullity of marriage of Jocson and Robles
may be made based on a confession of judgment by Robles
Ruling: No. (Dismissed)
Ratio:
It is noted that, as specified in the notice of appeal, defendant is taking exception from
the lower court's orders; however, there is no indication or certification or proof that the
filing of the appeal notice, bond and record on appeal on April 17, 1964 were made
within the reglementary period, as required by the provisions of Section 6, Revised Rule
41 of the Rules of Court.
There is here no showing that the present appeal was perfected within the reglementary
period, which datum should have appeared in the record on appeal.
91
On the merits, we are satisfied that the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the
motion for summary judgment in view of the first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of
annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The
affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these
methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.
This proceeding is hereby dismissed, conformable to Section (a) of Revised Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court.
Case Title:
ROMULO TOLENTINO, petitioner,
G.R. No.: L-23264
vs.
Nature of Action: Suit for annulment of
HELEN VILLANUEVA and HONORABLE
marriage (trial court)
CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the
Ponente: MAKASIAR, J
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
Topic: Procedure in action for declaration
respondents.
of Nullity No confession of judgment
Facts:
Petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to private
respondent Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained through fraud
because immediately after the marriage celebration, he discovered that private
respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior
to the marriage ceremony. Petitioner also alleges that they did not live as husband and
wife as immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva left his house and
her whereabouts remained unknown to him until he discovered that she is residing in San
Francisco, Cebu. Said marriage was solemnized by Quezon City Judge Mariano R. Virtucio
on September 28, 1959.
Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen
failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a
motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of his evidence.
In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in
default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation to determine
whether collusion exists between the parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his report
within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof, and, in the event of a negative finding, to
represent the State at the trial of the case to prevent fabrication of evidence; and
likewise directed herein petitioner to furnish the City Fiscal with copies of the complaint
and such other documents necessary for the City Fiscal's information and guidance.
On July 3, 1962, Petitioner submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint. Thus,
the Assistant City Fiscal assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to petitioner's counsel
requiring him to bring petitioner with him as well as copies of other documents in
connection with the annulment case. Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter, informed Assistant
City Fiscal Jose that he could not comply with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily
expose his evidence.
In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner, thru counsel, prayed the
respondent Judge to set the date for the reception of his evidence on the ground that the
City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse of sixty (60) days
from July 10, 1962 when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the complaint.
92
Respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of petitioner unless he submits himself for
interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable the latter to report whether or not there is
collusion between the parties. Ultimately, Respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in
view of the fact that petitioner is not willing to submit himself for interrogation by the
City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101 of the New
Civil Code.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed with the
Supreme Court a prayer for nullity of judgment and for the Court to order Respondent
Judge to receive his evidence.
Issue: W/N an annulment of marriage may be decided based upon a stipulation
of facts or by confession of judgment
No, Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the
rendition of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of nonappearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff.
Ratio:
ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101, paragraph 2,
shall be observed.
ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts
or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that
the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that
the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the
concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital
interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition
against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more
than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails
to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the
State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds
Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is without merit.
WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION
93
IS HEREBY DISMISSED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.

94
Case Title:
GODOFREDO BUCCAT, demandanteapelante,
vs.
LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT,
demandada-apelada.
Date: April 25, 1941

G.R. No. 47101
Nature of Action: Appeal from
Decision of Court of First Instance,
Baguio
Ponente: HORRILLENO, J.
Topic: Grounds for Annulment
Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938; became engaged
in September 19, 1938, and got married in Nov 26, 1938. Godofredo claims that he
agreed to the marriage because of the promise based on Luidas assurance that she was
a virgin.
On Feb 23, 1939, (89 days after marriage) Luida gave birth to a son. After knowing this,
Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her.
On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that there
had been fraud.
Issue: W/N Luidas concealment of her pregnancy constituted a ground for annulment of
marriage which is fraud.
No. There is no fraud. It is unlikely that the plaintiff Godofredo had not suspected
anything about Luidas condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of
pregnancy. As she gave birth less than 3 months after they got married, she must have
looked very pregnant even before they were married. Since Godofredo must have known
that she was not a virgin, the marriage cannot be annulled.
Ratio:
Marriage is a most sacred institution. It is the foundation upon which society rests. To
nullify it would need clear and authentic proof. In this case no such proof exists.
95
FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.
July 27, 1960

G.R. No.: L-15853
Petition for Certiorari to review
decision of the CA
Ponente: Gutierrez David, J.
Topic: Fraud
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for
annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo.
The dismissed complaint was based on the ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that
at the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that
she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after
their marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco
represent the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the
only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties.
Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed
by CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.
Issue: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not
constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage.
Ruling: Concealment constitutes fraud. (relate with Art. 46(2) of FC)
Ratio:
The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for
annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant
at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her pregnancy was
readily apparent especially since she was naturally plump. It is only on the 6th month
of pregnancy that the enlargement of the womans abdomen reaches a height above the
umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
The court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is set aside.
96

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Case Title:

FELIPE CABAGUE and GERONIMO CABAGUE,

Date: November 26, 1952

Case Title: JORGE DOMALAGAN,

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