SECONDDIVISION

WILSONSY,G.R.No.124518
Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING,J.,
versusChairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIOMORALES,
TINGA,and
COURTOFAPPEALS,VELASCO,JR.,JJ.
RegionalTrialCourtofManila,
Branch48,andMERCEDES
TANUYSY,Promulgated:
Respondents.
December27,2007
xx

DECISION

TINGA,J.:

[1]
InthisPetitionforReviewonCertiorari underRule45ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure,
[2]
petitionerWilsonSyassailstheDecision dated29February1996oftheCourtofAppealsin
[3]
C.A. G.R. SP No. 38936 and its Resolution dated 15 April 1996 denying his motion for
reconsideration.
Thefollowingaretheantecedents:

On19January1994,respondentMercedesTanUySyfiledapetitionforhabeascorpusagainst
petitionerWilsonSybeforetheRegionalTrialCourtofManila,Branch48,docketedasSpecial
Proceeding No. 9469002. Respondent prayed that said writ be issued ordering petitioner to
producetheirminorchildrenVanessaandJeremiahbeforethecourtandthatafterhearing,their
[4]
careandcustodybeawardedtoherastheirmother.

In his answer, petitioner prayed that the custody of the minors be awarded to him instead.
Petitionermaintainedthatrespondentwasunfittotakecustodyoftheminors.Headducedthe

followingreasons:firstly,respondentabandonedherfamilyin1992secondly,sheismentally
[5]
unstableandthirdly,shecannotprovidepropercaretothechildren.

Aftertrial,thetrialcourtcausedtheissuanceofawritofhabeascorpusandawardedcustodyof
thechildrentorespondent,towit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered maintaining to the petitioner the custody of the
minorsVanessaandJeremiah,allsurnamedUySy,without,however,prejudicetothevisitorial
rightsofthefather,hereinrespondent,andthetemporaryarrangementofthecustodymadeby
thepartiesduringpendencyofthisproceedingisherebyrevoked,andwithoutanyfurthereffect.
The Court further orders the respondent to pay by way of monthly support for the minors, the
amountofP50,000.00payabletopetitionerfrom[the]dateofjudgmentforfailureonthepartof
respondenttoshowbypreponderanceofevidencethatthepetitionerisunfittothecustodyofthe
[6]
minorchildrenwhoareonly6and4yearsold.

Petitioner appealed the order of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. Before the appellate
court, he alleged that the trial court erred: (1) in awarding the custody of the minor children
solely to respondent and (2) in ordering him to provide respondent support in the amount of
[7]
P50,000.00permonth.

TheCourtofAppealsfoundnomeritintheappealandaffirmedthedecisionofthetrialcourt.
The Court of Appeals did not find any reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court,
particularlypetitionersfailuretoprovebypreponderanceofevidencethatrespondentwasunfit
totakecustodyovertheminorchildren.

The Court of Appeals held that petitioner was not able to substantiate his contention that
respondentwasunfittohavecustodyofthechildren.Onrespondentssupposedabandonmentof
the family, the appellate court found instead that respondent had been driven away by
petitionersfamilybecauseofreligiousdifferences.RespondentsstayinTaiwanlikewisecould
hardly be called abandonment as she had gone there to earn enough money to reclaim her
children. Neither could respondents act of praying outdoors in the rain be considered as
evidenceofinsanityasitmaysimplybeanexpressionofonesfaith.Regardingtheallegation
thatrespondentwasunabletoprovideforadecentdwellingfortheminors,tothecontrary,the
appellate court was satisfied with respondents proof of her financial ability to provide her
[8]
childrenwiththenecessitiesoflife.

Astothesecondassignmentoferror,theCourtofAppealsheldthatquestionsastocareand
custody of children may be properly raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Moreover,
petitionerwasproperlyheardonthematterrelativetotheissueofsupport.Hewasquestioned
abouthissourcesofincomeforthepurposeofdetermininghisabilitytogivesupport.Astothe

propriety of the amount awarded, the appellate court was unwilling to alter the trial courts
conclusion for petitioner did not forthrightly testify on his actual income. Neither did he
produceincometaxreturnsorothercompetentevidence,althoughwithinhispowertodoso,to
provide a fair indication of his resources. At any rate, the appellate court declared that a
judgment of support is never final and petitioner is not precluded at any time from seeking a
[9]
modificationofthesameandproduceevidenceofhisclaim.
PetitionerfiledamotionforreconsiderationoftheCourtofAppealsdecisionbutthesamewas
[10]
denied.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari wherein petitioner asserts that: (1) the Court of
Appealserredinawardingthecustodyoftheminorchildrensolelytorespondent(2)theCourt
of Appeals had no jurisdiction to award support in a habeas corpus case as: (a) support was
neitherallegednorprayedforinthepetition(b)therewasnoexpressorimpliedconsentonthe
partofthepartiestolitigatetheissueand(c)Section6,Rule99oftheRulesofCourtdoesnot
applybecausethetrialcourtfailedtoconsidertheCivilCodeprovisionsonsupportand(3)the
award of P50,000.00 as support is arbitrary, unjust, unreasonable and tantamount to a clear
[11]
deprivationofpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw.
For her part, respondent claims that petitioner had lost his privilege to raise the first issue,
having failed to raise it before the appellate court. Anent the second issue, respondent takes
refuge in the appellate courts statement that the questions regarding the care and custody of
children may properly be adjudicated in a habeas corpus case. Regarding the third issue,
[12]
respondentmaintainsthattheamountofsupportawardediscorrectandproper.
Thereisnomeritinthepetitionregardingthequestionofcareandcustodyofthechildren.

TheapplicableprovisionisSection213oftheFamilyCodewhichstatesthat:

Section 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the
parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations,
especiallythechoiceofthechildoversevenyearsofage,unlesstheparentisunfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compellingreasonstoorderotherwise.

Incaseoflegalseparationoftheparents,thecustodyoftheminorchildrenshallbeawardedto
theinnocentspouse,unlessotherwisedirectedbythecourtintheinterestoftheminorchildren.
[13]
But when the husband and wife are living separately and apart from each other, without
decreeofthecourt,thecourtshallawardthecare,custody,andcontrolofeachchildaswillbe
forhisbestinterest,permittingthechildtochoosewhichparenthepreferstolivewithifheis
overseven(7)yearsofageunlesstheparentsochosenbeunfittotakechargeofthechildby
[14]
reasonofmoraldepravity,habitualdrunkennessorpoverty.

Inallcontroversiesregardingthecustodyofminors,thesoleandforemostconsiderationisthe
physical,educational,socialandmoralwelfareofthechildconcerned,takingintoaccountthe
[15]
respectiveresourcesandsocialandmoralsituationsofthecontendingparents.
However, the law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper person to have custody of her
children so that they may not only receive her attention, care, supervision but also have the
[16]
advantage and benefit of a mothers love and devotion for which there is no substitute.
Generally,thelove,solicitudeanddevotionofamothercannotbereplacedbyanotherandare
[17]
worth more to a child of tender years than all other things combined.
The Civil Code
Commission,inrecommendingthepreferenceforthemother,explained,thus:

Thegeneralruleisrecommendedinordertoavoidmanyatragedywhereamotherhasseenher
babytornawayfromher.Nomancansoundthedeepsorrowsofamotherwhoisdeprivedof
herchildoftenderage.Theexceptionallowedbytherulehastobeforcompellingreasonsfor
thegoodofthechild:thosecasesmustindeedberare,ifthemothersheartisnottobeunduly
hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative)
divorcedecreewillordinarilybesufficientpunishmentforher.Moreover,hermoraldereliction
[18]
willnothaveanyeffectuponthebabywhoisasyetunabletounderstandthesituation.

ThispreferencefavoringthemotheroverthefatherisevenreiteratedinSection6,Rule99of
theRulesofCourt(theRuleonAdoptionandCustodyofMinors)underscoringitssignificance,
towit:

SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. When husband and
wifearedivorcedorlivingseparatelyandapartfromeachother,andthequestionastothecare,
custody and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Regional Trial
Court by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the
testimonyasmaybepertinent,shall award the care, custody and control of each such child as
willbeforitsbestinterest,permittingthechildtochoosewhichparentitpreferstolivewithifit
beovertenyearsofage,unlesstheparentsochosenbeunfittotakechargeofthechildbyreason
ofmoraldepravity,habitualdrunkenness,incapacity,orpoverty.Ifuponsuchhearing,itappears
that both parents are improper persons to have the care, custody, and control of the child, the
courtmayeitherdesignatethepaternalormaternalgrandparentofthechild,orhisoldestbrother
orsister,orsomereputableanddiscreetpersontotakechargeofsuchchild,orcommitittoany
suitable asylum, childrens home, or benevolent society. The court may in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code order either or both parents to support or help support said child,
irrespective of who may be its custodian, and may make any order that is just and reasonable
permittingtheparentwhoisdeprivedofitscareandcustodytovisitthechildorhavetemporary
custodythereof.Eitherparentmayappealfromanordermadeinaccordancewiththeprovisions
ofthissection.Nochildundersevenyearsofageshallbeseparatedfromitsmother,unless
thecourtfindstherearecompellingreasonstherefor.(Emphasissupplied)

Theabovequotedprovisionexpresslyacknowledgesandauthorizesthatthematterofcareand
custodyofthechildrenmayberaisedandadjudicatedasanincidenttoanyproceeding,suchas
acaseforhabeascorpus.

Evidently,absentanycompellingreasontothecontrary,thetrialcourtwascorrectinrestoring
thecustodyofthechildrentothemother,hereinrespondent,thechildrenbeinglessthanseven
years of age, at least at the time the case was decided. Moreover, petitioners contention that
respondentisunfittohavecustodyovertheminorchildrenhasnotbeensubstantiatedasfound
bybothcourtsbelow.Thus,itisalreadytoolateforpetitionertoreiteratetheassertionforonly
questionsoflawmayberaisedbeforethisCourt.Furthermore,thedeterminationofwhetherthe
mother is fit or unfit to have custody over the children is a matter well within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and unless it is shown that said discretion has been abused the
[19]
selectionwillnotbeinterferedwith.

Consequently,theCourtaffirmstheawardofcustodyinrespondentsfavor.

Now,theissueofsupport.

Article203oftheFamilyCodestatesthattheobligationtogivesupportisdemandablefromthe
timethepersonwhohasarighttoreceivethesameneedsitformaintenance,butitshallnotbe
paidexceptfromthedateofjudicialorextrajudicialdemand.ThecaseofJocsonv.TheEmpire
[20]
Ins.Co.andJocsonLagniton
explainstherationaleforthisrule:

x x x Support does include what is necessary for the education and clothing of the person
entitledthereto(Art.290,NewCivilCode).But support must be demanded and the right to it
establishedbeforeitbecomespayable(Art.298,NewCivilCodeMarcelov.Estacio,70Phil.
215). For the right to support does not arise from the mere fact of relationship, even from the
relationship of parents and children, but from imperative necessity without which it cannot be
demanded,andthelawpresumesthatsuchnecessitydoesnotexistunlesssupportisdemanded
(CivilCodeofthePhilippines,Annotated,Tolentino,Vol.1,p.181,citing8Manresa 685). In
thepresentcase,itdoesnotappearthatsupportfortheminors,beitonlyfortheireducationand
clothing,waseverdemandedfromtheirfatherandtheneedforitdulyestablished.Theneedfor
support, as already stated, cannot be presumed, and especially must this be true in the present
[21]
casewhereitappearsthattheminorshadmeansoftheirown.

[22]
Asintimatedearlier,theCourtagreeswiththecourtsbelowthatSection6,Rule99
ofthe
Rules of Court permits the ventilation of the question regarding the care and custody of the
children as an incident to any proceeding, even a habeas corpus proceeding. Petitioner would
[23]
have us believe, however, that since respondents petition did not include a prayer
for
support of the children in accordance with the abovequoted Family Code provision, the trial
courtwasnotjustifiedinawardingsupportinrespondentsfavor.Inaddition,petitionerclaims
thathedidnotgiveconsenttothetrialandthethreshingoutoftheissueasitwasnotraisedin
[24]
thepleadings.
Heclaimsthatinfact,hetestifiedonhisfinancialstatusonlytoprovethathe

isfinanciallyabletoprovideforhischildrenandnotforthepurposeofdeterminingtheamount
[25]
of support.
Besides, he contends that the trial court did not order the amendment of the
[26]
pleadingstoconformtotheevidencepresentedpursuanttoSection5
Rule 10 of the 1997
RulesofCivilProcedure,anaspectthatsupportshiscontentionthatthepartiesneverconsented,
[27]
expresslyorimpliedly,totrytheissueofsupport.

TheCourtisnotconvinced.Contrarytopetitionersassertions,respondenttestifiedduringtrial,
without any objection on petitioners part, regarding the need for support for the childrens
educationandothernecessities,viz:

ADDLDIRECTEXAMINATIONOFTHEWITNESS
MERCEDESTANUYSY

Q:WiththekindpermissionofthisHonorableCourt.
Q:Ms.Sy,thecustodyofthetwominors[,]ofcourse[,]requiresomeexpensesonyourpart
notwithstandingthatyousaidyouhavesavingsintendedforthem,isitnot?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Andwhatisthenatureoftheseexpensesthatyouexpecttodisburseforthechildren?
A:Forthemedicineorhealthcare.

Q:Whatelse?
A:Foreducation,foremergencyexpenses,forbasicallyforfood.

Q:Inyourestimate,howmuchwouldtheseexpensesbepermonth?
A:Well,Ithink,perhapsP50,000.00,sir.

Q:Whichtherespondentshouldfurnish?
A:Yes,sir.

ATTY.CORTEZ

[28]
Thatisallforthewitness,YourHonor.

Moreover,basedonthetranscriptofstenographicnotes,petitionerwasclearlymadeawarethat
theissueofsupportwasbeingdeliberatedupon,towit:

WITNESS:

[29]
WILSONSY:willbetestifyingunderthesameoath.
xxxx
ATTY.ALBON:
Q: In the hearing of July 23, 1994 as appearing on page 3, Mercedes Sy testified that she
would be needing P50,000.00 a month expenses for her children, what can you say
aboutthat?


[30]
A:Thatisadillusion[sic]onherpart.

Thetrialcourtjudgeevenpropoundedquestionstopetitionerregardinghissourcesofincome
forthepurposeofdeterminingtheamountofsupporttobegiventothechildren:

COURT:

I want to find out how much his income now for the purposes of giving support to the
children.Pleaseanswerthequestion.

WITNESS:

A:Sharesofstocks.

ATTY.CORTEZ:

Q:Ashares[sic]ofstockistheevidenceofyourinvestmentinthecorporation.Myquestion
is: What investment did you put in to enable you to get a share, was it money or
property?
A:Thereisnomoneybutitwasgivenbymyfather.

COURT:

Q:Uponthedeathofyourfatheryoujustinheritedit?
A:Before.

Q:Afterthedeath,didyounotacquiresomeofthesharesofyourfather?
A:No,yourHonor.

Q:Whathappenedtothesharesofyourfather?
A:Itiswithmymother.
xxxx

COURT:

Nevermindtheshareofthemother.Whatismaterialishisshare.

ATTY.CORTEZ:

Q:Howmanysharesdoyouhaveinthecorporation?
A:RightnowIhaveonlyten(10)shares.

Q:Whatisthevalueofthat[sic]shares?
A:I[donot]giveanyimportance.

COURT

Q:Forpurposesofthiscase,theCourtisaskingyouhowmuchisyourshare?
A:I[donot]howtoappraise.

Q:Moreorless,howmuch?Usethewordmoreorless,isthatonemillionmoreorless,2
million,moreorless,10million,moreorless?Anyway,thisisnotaBIRproceeding,
thisisaCourtproceeding?
A:IwanttospeakthetruthbutI[donot]know.Ididnotevenseetheaccount.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY.CORTEZ

xxxx

Q:Atthattimeofyourfathersdeath[,]youwere[sic]alreadyholdingten(10)sharesorwasit
less?
A:More.

Q:Morethanten(10)shares?
A:Yes,sir.

COURT

Q:Whatistheparvalueofthatone(1)share?
A:I[donot]know,yourHonor.

xxxx

COURT:

Letitremainthatheownsten(10)shares.

ATTY.CORTEZ:

xxxx

A:Yes,10shares.TheothersharesIalreadysoldit.

Q:Howmanysharesdidyousell?
A:Ionlyhave10sharesnow.IdontknowhowmanysharesthatIhaveleft.Ionlyknowthe
[31]
20shares.

[32]
Applying Section 5,
Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, since the issue of
supportwastriedwiththeimpliedconsentoftheparties,itshouldbetreatedinallrespectsasif
ithadbeenraisedinthepleadings.Andsincetherewasimpliedconsent,evenifnomotionhad
been filed and no amendment had been ordered, the Court holds that the trial court validly
[33]
renderedajudgmentontheissue.
Significantly,inthecaseofBankofAmericav.American
[34]
RealtyCorporation,
theCourtstated:


There have been instances where the Court has held that even without the necessary
amendment,theamountprovedatthetrialmaybevalidlyawarded,asinTuazonv.Bolanos
(95Phil.106),wherewesaidthatifthefactsshownentitledplaintifftoreliefotherthanthat
asked for, no amendment to the complaint was necessary, especially where defendant had
himself raised the point on which recovery was based. The appellate court could treat the
pleading as amended to conform to the evidence although the pleadings were actually not
amended.Amendmentisalsounnecessarywhenonlyclericalerrorornonsubstantialmatters
are involved, as we held in Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Laguna (48 Phil. 5). In Co
Tiamco v. Diaz (75 Phil. 672), we stressed that the rule on amendment need not be applied
rigidly,particularlywherenosurpriseorprejudiceiscausedtheobjectingparty.Andinthe
recentcaseofNationalPowerCorporationv.CourtofAppeals(113SCRA556),weheldthat
where there is a variance in the defendants pleadings and the evidence adduced by it at the
[35]
trial,theCourtmaytreatthepleadingasamendedtoconformwiththeevidence.

TheCourtlikewiseaffirmstheawardofP50,000.00assupportfortheminorchildren.Asfound
by both courts, petitioners representations regarding his familys wealth and his capability to
provideforhisfamilymorethanprovidedafairindicationofhisfinancialstandingeventhough
[36]
he proved to be less than forthright on the matter.
In any event, this award of support is
merelyprovisionalastheamountmaybemodifiedoralteredinaccordancewiththeincreased
[37]
ordecreasedneedsoftheneedypartyandwiththemeansofthegiver.
WHEREFORE,theDecisiondated29February1996oftheEleventhDivisionoftheCourtof
[38]
Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 38936 and its Resolution
dated 15 April 1996 are
AFFIRMED.Costsagainstpetitioner.

SOORDERED.

DANTEO.TINGA
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING
AssociateJustice
Chairperson

ANTONIOT.CARPIOCONCHITACARPIOMORALES

AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice

ATTESTATION

IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethe
casewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING
AssociateJustice
Chairperson,SecondDivision

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation,itisherebycertifiedthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

[1]
Rollo,pp.2752dated24May1996.

[2]
Id.at720pennedbyAssociateJusticeMinervaP.GonzagaReyeswiththeconcurrenceofAssociateJusticesBuenaventuraJ.

GuerreroandRomeoA.Brawner.

[3]
Id.at7072.

[4]
Id.at8.

[5]
Id.at910,31.
[6]
Id.at7dispositiveportionoftheDecisiondated14December1994pennedbyHon.DemetrioM.Batario,Jr.

[7]
Id.at8

[8]
Id.at1516.

[9]
Id.at1719.

[10]
Id.at2123inaResolutiondated15April1996.

[11]
Id.at37.

[12]
Id.at8890Commentdated7October1996.

[13]
FAMILYCODE,Art.63TOLENTINO,CIVILCODEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,Vol.1,p.609.

[14]
Id.at610.

[15]
UnsonIIIv.Navarro,No.52242,17November1980,101SCRA183,189.

[16]
STA.MARIA,JR.,PERSONSANDFAMILYRELATIONS,p.697,citingPeaveyv.Peavey,85Nev.571,460P2d110.

[17]
Id.at698,citingHorstv.Mclain,466Sw2d187.

[18]
Lacsonv.SanJoseLacson,133Phil.884,894895(1968).

[19]
Pelayov.LavinAedo,40Phil.501,504(1919).

[20]
103Phil.580(1958).

[21]
Id.at582583.
[22]
SEC.6.Proceedingsastochildwhoseparentsareseparated.Appeal.Whenhusbandandwifearedivorcedorliving
separatelyandapartfromeachother,andthequestionastothecare,custodyandcontrolofachildorchildrenoftheirmarriageis
broughtbeforeaRegionalTrialCourtbypetitionorasanincidenttoanyotherproceeding,thecourt,uponhearingthetestimonyas
maybepertinent,shallawardthecare,custodyandcontrolofeachsuchchildaswillbeforitsbestinterest,permittingthechildto
choosewhichparentitpreferstolivewithifitbeovertenyearsofage,unlesstheparentsochosenbeunfittotakechargeofthechild
by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty. If upon such hearing, it appears that both parents are
improper persons to have the care, custody, and control of the child, the court may either designate the paternal or maternal
grandparentofthechild,orhisoldestbrotherorsister,orsomereputableanddiscreetpersontotakechargeofsuchchild,orcommitit
toanysuitableasylum,childrenshome,orbenevolentsociety.ThecourtmayinconformitywiththeprovisionsoftheCivilCode
ordereitherorbothparentstosupportorhelpsupportsaidchild,irrespectiveofwhomaybeitscustodian,andmaymakeanyorder
thatisjustandreasonablepermittingtheparentwhoisdeprivedofitscareandcustodytovisitthechildorhavetemporarycustody
thereof.Eitherparentmayappealfromanordermadeinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthissection.Nochildundersevenyearsof
ageshallbeseparatedfromitsmother,unlessthecourtfindstherearecompellingreasonstherefor.(Emphasissupplied)

[23]
Records,Vol.1,p.3.


WHEREFORE,itismostrespectfullyprayedthata[W]ritofHabeasCorpusbeissuedbythisHonorableCourt,commanding
WilsonL.SytoproducethebodiesofVanessaandJeremiahUySybeforethiscourtatthetimeandplacespecified,andtosummon
therespondentthenandtheretoappearandtoshowcausefortheirdetentionandthat,afterhearing,saidminorsbeturnedovertothe
careandcustodyoftheirmotherMercedesUySy.

[24]
CArollo,pp.1617.

[25]
Id.at19ofPetitionersMemorandum.

[26]
SEC.5.Amendmenttoconformtoorauthorizepresentationofevidence.Whenissuesnotraisedbythepleadings
aretriedwiththeexpressorimpliedconsentoftheparties,theyshallbetreatedinallrespects,asiftheyhadbeenraisedinthe
pleadings.Suchamendmentofthepleadingsasmaybenecessarytocausethemtoconformtotheevidenceandtoraisetheseissues
maybemadeuponmotionofanypartyatanytime,evenafterjudgmentbutfailuretoamenddoesnotaffecttheresultofthetrialof
theseissues.Ifevidenceisobjectedtoatthetrialonthegroundthatitisnotwithintheissuesmadebythepleadings,thecourtmay
allowthepleadingstobeamendedandshalldosowithliberalityifthepresentationofthemeritsoftheactionandtheendsof
substantialjusticewillbesubservedthereby.Thecourtmaygrantacontinuancetoenabletheamendmenttobemade.

[27]
Rollo,p.17.

[28]
Records,Vol.1TSN,dated25July1994,p.3.

[29]
Id.at547TSN,dated4November1994,p.6.

[30]
Id.at552TSN,4November1994,p.11.

[31]
Id.at563566,TSN,4November1994,pp.2225.

[32]
SEC.5.Amendmenttoconformtoorauthorizepresentationofevidence.Whenissuesnotraisedbythepleadingsare
triedwiththeexpressorimpliedconsentoftheparties,theyshallbetreatedinallrespectsasiftheyhadbeenraisedinthepleadings.
Suchamendmentofthepleadingsasmaybenecessarytocausethemtoconformtotheevidenceandtoraisetheseissuesmaybe
madeuponmotionofanypartyatanytime,evenafterjudgmentbutfailuretoamenddoesnotaffecttheresultofthetrialofthese
issues.Ifevidenceisobjectedtoatthetrialonthegroundthatitisnotwithintheissuesmadebythepleadings,thecourtmayallow
thepleadingstobeamendedandshalldosowithliberalityifthepresentationofthemeritsoftheactionandtheendsofsubstantial
justicewillbesubservedthereby.Thecourtmaygrantacontinuancetoenabletheamendmenttobemade.

[33]
HERRERA,REMEDIALLAW,Vol.1,p.598.

[34]
378Phil.1279(1999).

[35]
Id.at13011302.

[36]
Rollo,pp.1819.

[37]
Advinculav.Advincula,119Phil.448,451(1964).

[38]
Supranote3.