Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-409

January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition
for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in
the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was
then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute
and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his
government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be
confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in
return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the
government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State
Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works,
526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or
severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases
of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain
vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government
(which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the
state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be
destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the
existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting
the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be
suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the
territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of
the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of
the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the

supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim,
6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44,
45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the
sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance
of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is
no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the
petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in
Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253,
decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan
Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question,
not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de facto therein and its power to
promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the
theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation
of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case,
the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights
of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not
transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or
divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion
or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the
adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present
case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by
Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of
the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them,
such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return
for the protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute
and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own
government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may
be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way
an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason
against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter
by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the
protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign
country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has
enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection
he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would
not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not
receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty
by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because
the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant
(Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights,
duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during
military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason
that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are
inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes
against national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence

with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as
rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political
complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as
crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as
against the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter
(Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to
be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader
for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the
ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order
in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to
treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the
inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during
the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force,
unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and
regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers
of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make
new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is
necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his
army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public
conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land
Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them,
and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those
which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier,
shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and
obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him
a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by
giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding
consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or
compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such
action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the
control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is
tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular
government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were
compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him
aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit
thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to
disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to
the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to
legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their
own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and
even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the resisting
enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive
them all of their own independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the action
of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the

nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and
repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a
political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined
and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime
against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the
United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the
President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth
Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by
authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to
section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section
2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable,
to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though
not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and
incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the
Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the Independence
Law above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration
that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them"
(section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late
President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on
August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the
status as a government of other independent nations in fact all the attributes of complete
and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is
a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in
the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question
of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and
executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides
that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All
citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few
limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these
limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the
people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of
the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be
committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way
treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty
of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and
that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect
the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the
Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same
sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government
established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall
thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines";

This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the
petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to
be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs.
Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in
a separate opinion.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace time. While
there is peace, there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable
acts may actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war has started.
As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense and selfpreservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure. It remains dormant until the emergency
arises. But as soon as war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm attitude in its
enforcement will only be consistent with national harakiri. All war efforts would be of no avail if they
should be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who have sold their country out to
the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly be the case if he law cannot be
enforced under the theory of suspension.
Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy occupation is
advanced in support of the proposition that, since allegiance is identical with obedience to law,
during the enemy occupation, the laws of the Commonwealth were suspended. Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, the law punishing treason, under the theory, was one of the laws obedience to
which was also suspended.
Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to
his government or his sovereign in return for the protection which he receives.
"Allegiance", as the return is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the government of
which the person is either a citizen or subject. Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed., 208.
"Allegiance" was said by Mr. Justice Story to be "nothing more than the tie or duty of
obedience of a subject to the sovereign, under whose protection he is." United
States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 461; 169 U.S., 649; 42 Law. ed., 890.
Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political duty binding on
him who enjoys the protection of the Commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the
federal government. It is that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from
the political relations between the government and the citizen. Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa.
(8 Wright), 492, 501.
By "allegiance" is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to
the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign, in return for the protection which
he receives. It may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and

temporary one. A citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his
government or sovereign, or at least until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces it
and becomes a citizen or subject of another government or sovereign, and an alien while
domiciled in a country owes it a temporary allegiance, which is continuous during his
residence. Carlisle vs. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21 Law ed., 426.
"Allegiance," as defined by Blackstone, "is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to the
King, in return for that protection which the King affords the subject. Allegiance, both
expressed and implied, is of two sorts, the one natural, the other local, the former being
perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within
the King's dominions immediately upon their birth, for immediately upon their birth they are
under the King's protection. Natural allegiance is perpetual, and for this reason, evidently
founded on the nature of government. Allegiance is a debt due from the subject upon an
implied contract with the prince that so long as the one affords protection the other will
demean himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of rights which they
acquire by being born within the King's liegance, which can never be forfeited but by their
own misbehaviour; but the rights of aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired only
by residence, and lost whenever they remove. If an alien could acquire a permanent property
in lands, he must owe an allegiance equally permanent to the King, which would probably be
inconsistent with that which he owes his natural liege lord; besides, that thereby the nation
might, in time, be subject to foreign influence and feel many other inconveniences." Indians
within the state are not aliens, but citizens owing allegiance to the government of a state, for
they receive protection from the government and are subject to its laws. They are born in
allegiance to the government of the state. Jackson vs. Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911. (3
Words and Phrases, Permanent ed., 226-227.)
Allegiance. Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or
subject; the duty which is due from every citizen to the state; a political duty, binding on him
who enjoys the protection of the commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal
government; the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the
government or to the sovereign under which he lives in return for the protection he receives;
that duty is reciprocal to the right of protection he receives; that duty which is reciprocal to
the right of protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the
citizen.
Classification. Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance that which
arises by nature and birth; (2) acquired allegiance that arising through some circumstance
or act other than birth, namely, by denization or naturalization; (3) local allegiance-- that
arising from residence simply within the country, for however short a time; and (4) legal
allegiance that arising from oath, taken usually at the town or leet, for, by the common
law, the oath of allegiance might be tendered to every one upon attaining the age of twelve
years. (3 C.J.S., p.885.)
Allegiance. the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the
government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives.
15 R.C.L., 140. (Ballentine Law Dictionary, p. 68.).
"Allegiance," as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds the citizen to his
state the obligation of obedience and support which he owes to it. The state is the political
person to whom this liege fealty is due. Its substance is the aggregate of persons owing this
allegiance. The machinery through which it operates is its government. The persons who
operate this machinery constitute its magistracy. The rules of conduct which the state utters

or enforces are its law, and manifest its will. This will, viewed as legally supreme, is its
sovereignty. (W.W. Willoughby, Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and International
Law, 1 American Journal of International Law, p. 915.).
The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are reciprocal in
character. This principle had been aptly stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in
its opinion in the case of Luria vs. United States:
Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of
the member and a duty protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations,
one being a compensation for the other. (3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 1942 ed.,
p.6.)
Allegiance. The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the protection
which the government affords him. The duty which the subject owes to the sovereign,
correlative with the protection received.
It is a comparatively modern corruption of ligeance (ligeantia), which is derived from liege
(ligius), meaning absolute or unqualified. It signified originally liege fealty, i. e., absolute and
qualified fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and

temporary one; the citizen or subject owes the former to his government or sovereign, until
by some act he distinctly renounces it, whilst the alien domiciled in the country owes a
temporary and local allegiance continuing during such residence. (Carlisle vs. United States,
16 Wall. [U.S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 426. (1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 179.).
The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine pattern in view of the
revolutionary insertion in our Constitution of the fundamental principle that "sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them." (Section 1, Article II.) The authorities
above quoted, judges and juridical publicists define allegiance with the idea that sovereignty resides
somewhere else, on symbols or subjects other than the people themselves. Although it is possible
that they had already discovered that the people and only the people are the true sovereign, their
minds were not yet free from the shackles of the tradition that the powers of sovereignty have been
exercised by princes and monarchs, by sultans and emperors, by absolute and tyrannical rules
whose ideology was best expressed in the famous words of one of the kings of France: "L'etat c'est
moi," or such other persons or group of persons posing as the government, as an entity different and
in opposition to the people themselves. Although democracy has been known ever since old Greece,
and modern democracies in the people, nowhere is such principle more imperative than in the
pronouncement embodied in the fundamental law of our people.
To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the people, there may
be some plausibility in the proposition that sovereignty was suspended during the enemy
occupation, with the consequence that allegiance must also have been suspended, because our
government stopped to function in the country. But the idea cannot have any place under our
Constitution. If sovereignty is an essential attribute of our people, according to the basic philosophy
of Philippine democracy, it could not have been suspended during the enemy occupation.
Sovereignty is the very life of our people, and there is no such thing as "suspended life." There is no
possible middle situation between life and death. Sovereignty is the very essence of the personality
and existence of our people. Can anyone imagine the possibility of "suspended personality" or

"suspended existence" of a people? In no time during enemy occupation have the Filipino people
ceased to be what they are.
The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our Constitution.
There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a wife's loyalty to her
husband. Because some external and insurmountable force precludes the husband from exercising
his marital powers, functions, and duties and the wife is thereby deprived of the benefits of his
protection, may the wife invoke the theory of suspended loyalty and may she freely share her bed
with the assailant of their home? After giving aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing him to
enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the invaded home, may the wife allege as defense for
her adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity?
Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on July 4, 1946, is
unacceptable. We have already decided in Brodett vs. De la Rosa and Vda. de Escaler (p.
752, ante) that the Constitution of the Republic is the same as that of the Commonwealth. The
advent of independence had the effect of changing the name of our Government and the withdrawal
by the United States of her power to exercise functions of sovereignty in the Philippines. Such facts
did not change the sovereignty of the Filipino people. That sovereignty, following our constitutional
philosophy, has existed ever since our people began to exist. It has been recognized by the United
States of America, at least since 1935, when President Roosevelt approved our Constitution. By
such act, President Roosevelt, as spokesman of the American people, accepted and recognized the
principle that sovereignty resides in the people that is, that Philippine sovereignty resides in the
Filipino people.
The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the proclamation of
independence on July 4, 1946. Since the early part of the Pacific war, President Quezon had been
sitting as representative of a sovereign people in the Allied War Council, and in June, 1945, the
same Filipino people took part outstanding and brilliant, it may be added in the drafting and
adoption of the charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable forerunner of the future democratic
federal constitution of the world government envisioned by all those who adhere to the principle of
unity of all mankind, the early realization of which is anxiously desired by all who want to be spared
the sufferings, misery and disaster of another war.
Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is lodged in Congress.
Sometimes it is delegated to the Chief Executive, such as the power granted by the Election Code to
the President to suspend the election in certain districts and areas for strong reasons, such as when
there is rebellion, or a public calamity, but it has never been exercised by tribunals. The Supreme
Court has the power to declare null and void all laws violative of the Constitution, but it has no
power, authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended any valid law, such as the one on
treason which petitioner wants to be included among the laws of the Commonwealth which, by his
theory of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty, he claims have been suspended during
the Japanese occupation.
Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead of going from Corregidor to Australia, and
later to Washington, had fled to the mountains of Luzon, and a group of Filipino renegades should
have killed them to serve the interests of the Japanese imperial forces. By petitioner's theory, those
renegades cannot be prosecuted for treason or for rebellion or sedition, as the laws punishing them
were suspended. Such absurd result betrays the untenability of the theory.
"The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of that duty all citizens
may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service." Thus, section 2 of Article II of the

Constitution provides: That duty of defense becomes more imperative in time of war and when the
country is invaded by an aggressor nation. How can it be fulfilled if the allegiance of the citizens to
the sovereign people is suspended during enemy occupation? The framers of the Constitution surely
did not entertain even for the moment the absurdity that when the allegiance of the citizens to the
sovereign people is more needed in the defense of the survival of the state, the same should be
suspended, and that upon such suspension those who may be required to render personal, military
or civil service may claim exemption from the indispensable duty of serving their country in distress.
Petitioner advances the theory that protection in the consideration of allegiance. He argues that the
Commonwealth Government having been incapacitated during enemy occupation to protect the
citizens, the latter were relieved of their allegiance to said government. The proposition is untenable.
Allegiance to the sovereign is an indispensable bond for the existence of society. If that bond is
dissolved, society has to disintegrate. Whether or not the existence of the latter is the result of the
social compact mentioned by Roseau, there can be no question that organized society would be
dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive power of the citizen's allegiance. Of course, the citizens
are entitled to the protection of their government, but whether or not that government fulfills that duty,
is immaterial to the need of maintaning the loyalty and fidelity of allegiance, in the same way that the
physical forces of attraction should be kept unhampered if the life of an individual should continue,
irrespective of the ability or inability of his mind to choose the most effective measures of personal
protection.
After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes had during and under the
Japanese regime, whether executed by the Japanese themselves or by Filipino officers of the
puppet government they had set up, are null and void, as we have done in our opinions in Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), in Peralta vs. Director of Prison (75, Phil., 285),
and in several other cases where the same question has been mentioned, we cannot consistently
accept petitioner's theory.
If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and void, and as we
cannot imagine the existence of organized society, such as the one constituted by the Filipino
people, without laws of the Commonwealth were the ones in effect during the occupation and the
only ones that could claim obedience from our citizens.
Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed allegiance to the
enemy. To give way to that paradoxical and disconcerting allegiance, it is suggested that we accept
that our allegiance to our legitimate government was suspended. Petitioner's proposition has to fall
by its own weight, because of its glaring absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms, loyalty and
fidelity, is based on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy, admiration, respect, veneration, gratitude,
amity, understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings or some of the feelings that bind us to our
own people, and are the natural roots of the duty of allegiance we owe them. The enemy only
provokes repelling and repulsive feelings hate, anger, vexation, chagrin, mortification, resentment,
contempt, spitefulness. The natural incompatibility of political, social and ethical ideologies between
our people and the Japanese, making impossible the existence of any feeling of attraction between
them, aside from the initial fact that the Japanese invaded our country as our enemy, was
aggravated by the morbid complexities of haughtiness, braggadocio and beastly brutality of the
Nippon soldiers and officers in their dealings with even the most inoffensive of our citizens.
Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the other to be further
slapped, may appear to be divinely charitable, but to make them a reality, it is necessary to change
human nature. Political actions, legal rules and judicial decisions deal with human relations, taking
man as he is, not as he should be. To love the enemy is not natural. As long as human pyschology

remains as it is, the enemy shall always be hated. Is it possible to conceive an allegiance based on
hatred?
The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing principles of
international law, could not have established in our country any government that can be legally
recognized as de facto. They came as bandits and ruffians, and it is inconceivable that banditry and
ruffianism can claim any duty of allegiance even a temporary one from a decent people.
One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the citizens, in case of
invasion, are free to do anything not forbidden by the Hague Conventions. Anybody will notice
immediately that the result will be the doom of small nations and peoples, by whetting the
covetousness of strong powers prone on imperialistic practices. In the imminence of invasion, weakhearted soldiers of the smaller nations will readily throw away their arms to rally behind the paladium
of the invaders.
Two of the three great departments of our Government have already rejected petitioner's theory
since September 25, 1945, the day when Commonwealth Act No. 682 took effect. By said act,
creating the People's Court to try and decide all cases of crime against national security "committed
between December 8, 1941 and September 2, 1945," (section 2), the legislative and executive
departments have jointly declared that during the period above mentioned, including the time of
Japanese occupation, all laws punishing crimes against national security, including article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, punishing treason, had remained in full effect and should be enforced.
That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said act and that no one, at the time
the act was being considered by the Senate and the House of Representatives, ever dared to
expose the uselessness of creating a People's Court to try crime which, as claimed by petitioner,
could not have been committed as the laws punishing them have been suspended, is a historical
fact of which the Supreme Court may take judicial notice. This fact shows universal and unanimous
agreement of our people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not suspended and that the
theory of suspended allegiance is just an afterthought provoked by a desperate effort to help quash
the pending treason cases at any cost.
Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based on generally accepted
principles of international law, although this argument becomes futile by petitioner's admission that
the theory is advantageous to strong powers but harmful to small and weak nations, thus hinting that
the latter cannot accept it by heart. Suppose we accept at face value the premise that the theories,
urged by petitioner, of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty are based on generally
accepted principles of international law. As the latter forms part of our laws by virtue of the provisions
of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, it seems that there is no alternative but to accept the
theory. But the theory has the effect of suspending the laws, especially those political in nature.
There is no law more political in nature than the Constitution of the Philippines. The result is an
inverted reproduction of the Greek myth of Saturn devouring his own children. Here, under
petitioner's theory, the offspring devours its parent.
Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a moment?
There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy-determining agency of government, even
since the Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated that it would not accept the idea that
our laws should be suspended during enemy occupation. It must be remembered that in the middle
of December, 1941, when Manila and other parts of the archipelago were under constant bombing
by Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the Philippines, the
Second National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, which came into effect on

December 16, 1941. When we approved said act, we started from the premise that all our laws shall
continue in effect during the emergency, and in said act we even went to the extent of authorizing the
President "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative," (section 2, [d]), and also to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary to carry out the national policy," (section 2), that "the existence of war between the United
States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to
invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency." (Section
1.) To give emphasis to the intimation, we provided that the rules and regulations provided "shall be
in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide," foreseeing the
possibility that Congress may not meet as scheduled as a result of the emergency, including
invasion and occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then convinced that we did not have
available the necessary means of repelling effectivity the enemy invasion.
Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of suspended
allegiance will cause a great injustice to those who, although innocent, are now under indictment for
treason and other crimes involving disloyalty to their country, because their cases will be dismissed
without the opportunity for them to revindicate themselves. Having been acquitted upon a mere legal
technicality which appears to us to be wrong, history will indiscriminality classify them with the other
accused who were really traitors to their country. Our conscience revolts against the idea of allowing
the innocent ones to go down in the memory of future generations with the infamous stigma of
having betrayed their own people. They should not be deprived of the opportunity to show through
the due process of law that they are free from all blame and that, if they were really patriots, they
acted as such during the critical period of test.

HILADO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that during the so-called Japanese
occupation of the Philippines (which was nothing more than the occupation of Manila and certain
other specific regions of the Islands which constituted the minor area of the Archipelago) the
allegiance of the citizens of this country to their legitimate government and to the United States was
not suspended, as well as the ruling that during the same period there was no change of sovereignty
here; but my reasons are different and I proceed to set them forth:
I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE.
(a) Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were multiplied more than a hundred-fold in
World War II, the nations had evolved certain rules and principles which came to be known as
International Law, governing their conduct with each other and toward their respective citizens and
inhabitants, in the armed forces or civilian life, in time of peace or in time of war. During the ages
which preceded that first world conflict the civilized governments had no realization of the potential
excesses of which "men's inhumanity to man" could be capable. Up to that time war was, at least
under certain conditions, considered as sufficiently justified, and the nations had not on that account,
proscribed nor renounced it as an instrument of national policy, or as a means of settling
international disputes. It is not for us now to dwell upon the reasons accounting for this historical
fact. Suffice it to recognize its existence in history.
But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually was, employed for
entirely different reasons and from entirely different motives, compared to previous wars, and the
instruments and methods of warfare had been so materially changed as not only to involve the

contending armed forces on well defined battlefields or areas, on land, in the sea, and in the air, but
to spread death and destruction to the innocent civilian populations and to their properties, not only
in the countries engaged in the conflict but also in neutral ones, no less than 61 civilized nations and
governments, among them Japan, had to formulate and solemnly subscribe to the now famous
Briand-Kellogg Pact in the year 1928. As said by Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme
Court, as chief counsel for the United States in the prosecution of "Axis war criminals," in his report
to President Truman of June 7, 1945:
International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no continuously
sitting international legislature. Innovations and revisions in international law are brought
about by the action of governments designed to meet a change circumstances. It grows, as
did the common law, through decisions reached from time to time in adopting settled
principles to new situations.
xxx

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xxx

After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked reversion to the
earlier and sounder doctrines of international law took place. By the time the Nazis came to
power it was thoroughly established that launching an aggressive war or the institution of war
by treachery was illegal and that the defense of legitimate warfare was no longer available to
those who engaged in such an enterprise. It is high time that we act on the juridical principle
that aggressive war-making is illegal and criminal.
The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in many steps. One of the
most significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 by which Germany, Italy, and Japan, in
common with the United States and practically all the nations of the world, renounced war as
an instrument of national policy, bound themselves to seek the settlement of disputes only by
pacific means, and condemned recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies.
Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has no meaning at all and
comes close to being an act of deception. In 1932 Mr. Henry L. Stimson, as United States
Secretary of State, gave voice to the American concept of its effect. He said, "war between
nations was renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means that it
has become illegal throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be the source
and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the principle around which the duties, the conduct,
and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. . . . By that very act we have made
obsolete many legal precedents and have given the legal profession the task of re-examining
many of its Codes and treaties.
This Pact constitutes only one reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has brought
international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind that unjustifiable war is
a crime.
Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva Protocol of 1924
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed by the representatives of fortyeight governments, which declared that "a war of aggression constitutes .. an International
crime. . . .
The Eight Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on unanimous resolution of the
representatives of forty-eight member-nations, including Germany, declared that a war of
aggression constitutes an international crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference of

1928, the twenty-one American Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that "war
of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species."
xxx

xxx

xxx

We therefore propose to change that a war of aggression is a crime, and that modern
international law has abolished the defense that those who incite or wage it are engaged in
legitimate business. Thus may the forces of the law be mobilized on the side of peace.
("U.S.A. An American Review," published by the United States Office of War Information,
Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis supplied.).
When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of
international law" and "the re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war," he has in mind no
other than "the doctrine taught by Grotius, the father of international law, that there is a distinction
between the just and the unjust war the war of defense and the war of aggression" to which he
alludes in an earlier paragraph of the same report.
In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last above mentioned Justice Jackson
says that "international law as taught in the 19th and the early part of the 20th century generally
declared that war-making was not illegal and no crime at law." But, as he says in one of the
paragraphs hereinabove quoted from that report, the Briand-Kellogg Pact constitutes a reversal of
the view-point that all war is legal and has brought international law into harmony with the common
sense of mankind that unjustifiable war is a crime. Then he mentions as other reversals of the
same viewpoint, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; the 8th assembly of the League
of Nations in 1927, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; and the 6th
Pan-American conference of 1928, which unanimously adopted a resolution stating that war of
aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species: which enumeration, he
says, is not an attempt at an exhaustive catalogue.
It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first, against the United States, and
later, in rapid succession, against other allied nations, was a war of aggression and utterly
unjustifiable. More aggressive still, and more unjustifiable, as admitted on all sides, was its attack
against the Philippines and its consequent invasion and occupation of certain areas thereof.
Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited for petitioner herein in
support of his theory of suspended allegiance, have been evolved and accepted during those
periods of the history of nations when all war was considered legal, as stated by Justice Jackson,
and the others have reference to military occupation in the course of really justifiable war.
Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started the aggressive war
which threw the entire Pacific area into a seething cauldron from the last month of 1941 of the first
week of September, 1945, expressly agreed to outlaw, proscribe and renounce war as an instrument
of national policy, and bound herself to seek the settlement of her disputes with other nations only by
pacific means. Thus she expressly gave her consent to that modification of the then existing rules
and principles of international law governing the matter. With the modification, all the signatories to
the pact necessarily accepted and bound themselves to abide by all its implications, among them the
outlawing, prescription and renunciation of military occupation of another nation's territory in the
course of a war thus outlawed, proscribed and renounced. This is only one way of saving that the
rules and principles of international law therefore existing on the subject of military occupation were
automatically abrogated and rendered ineffective in all future cases of war coming under the ban
and condemnation of the pact.

If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; if such a

war is an international crime against the human species: a nation which occupies a foreign territory
in the course of such a war cannot possibly, under any principle of natural or positive law, acquire or
posses any legitimate power or right growing out or incident to such occupation. Concretely, Japan
in criminally invading the Philippines and occupying certain portions of its territory during the Pacific
war, could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense and only this sense should we speak here
with respect to this country and its citizens, any more than could a burglar breaking through a man's
house pretends to have or to exercise any legal power or right within that house with respect either
to the person of the owner or to his property. To recognize in the first instance any legal power or
right on the part of the invader, and in the second any legal power or right on the part of the burglar,
the same as in case of a military occupant in the course of a justifiable war, would be nothing short
of legalizing the crime itself. It would be the most monstrous and unpardonable contradiction to
prosecute, condemn and hang the appropriately called war criminals of Germany, Italy, and Japan,
and at the same time recognize any lawfulness in their occupation invaded. And let it not be
forgotten that the Philippines is a member of the United Nations who have instituted and conducted
the so-called war crimes trials. Neither should we lose sight of the further fact that this government
has a representative in the international commission currently trying the Japanese war criminals in
Tokyo. These facts leave no room for doubt that this government is in entire accord with the other
United Nations in considering the Pacific war started by Japan as a crime. Not only this, but this
country had six years before the outbreak of the Pacific war already renounced war as an instrument
of national policy (Constitution, Article II, section 2), thus in consequence adopting the doctrine of the
Briand-Kellogg Pact.
Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and improper for this Court to apply
to the occupation by Japan of certain areas of the Philippines during that war the rules and principles
of international law which might be applicable to a military occupation occurring in the course of a
justifiable war. How can this Court recognize any lawfulness or validity in that occupation when our
own government has sent a representative to said international commission in Tokyo trying the
Japanese "war criminals" precisely for the "crimes against humanity and peace" committed by them
during World War II of which said occupation was but part and parcel? In such circumstances how
could such occupation produce no less an effect than the suspension of the allegiance of our people
to their country and government?
(b) But even in the hypothesis and not more than a mere hypothesis that when Japan occupied
the City of Manila and certain other areas of the Philippines she was engaged in a justifiable war, still
the theory of suspended allegiance would not hold good. The continuance of the allegiance owed to
a notion by its citizens is one of those high privileges of citizenship which the law of nations denies to
the occupant the power to interfere with.
. . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his power. He is thus
forbidden to take certain measures which he may be able to apply, and that irrespective of
their efficacy. The restrictions imposed upon him are in theory designed to protect the
individual in the enjoyment of some highly important privileges. These concern his allegiance
to the de jure sovereign, his family honor and domestic relations, religious convictions,
personal service, and connection with or residence in the occupied territory.
The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to compel the inhabitants to
swear allegiance to the hostile power. . . . (III Hyde, International Law, 2d revised ed., pp.
1898-1899.)

. . . Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of allegiance. Since
the authority of the occupant is not sovereignty, the inhabitants owe no temporary allegiance
to him. . . . (II Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 341-344.)
The occupant's lack of the authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the inhabitants of the
occupied territory is but a corollary of the continuance of their allegiance to their own lawful
sovereign. This allegiance does not consist merely in obedience to the laws of the lawful sovereign,
but more essentially consists in loyalty or fealty to him. In the same volume and pages of
Oppenheim's work above cited, after the passage to the effect that the inhabitants of the occupied
territory owe no temporary allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On the other hand, he may
compel them to take an oath sometimes called an 'oath of neutrality' . . . willingly to submit to
his 'legitimate commands.' Since, naturally, such "legitimate commands" include the occupant's laws,
it follows that said occupant, where the rule is applicable, has the right to compel the inhabitants to
take an oath of obedience to his laws; and since according to the same rule, he cannot exact from
the inhabitants an oath of obedience to his laws; and since, according to the same rule, he cannot
exact from the inhabitants an oath of allegiance, it follows that obedience to his laws, which he can
exact from them, does not constitute allegiance.
(c) The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last degree. To say that when the one's
country is unable to afford him in its protection, he ceases to be bound to it by the sacred ties of
allegiance, is to advocate the doctrine that precisely when his country is in such distress, and
therefore most needs his loyalty, he is absolved from the loyalty. Love of country should be
something permanent and lasting, ending only in death; loyalty should be its worth offspring. The
outward manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented or thwarted by the irresistible
action of the occupant; but this should not in the least extinguish nor obliterate the invisible feelings,
and promptings of the spirit. And beyond the unavoidable consequences of the enemy's irresistible
pressure, those invisible feelings and promptings of the spirit of the people should never allow them
to act, to speak, nor even to think a whit contrary to their love and loyalty to the Fatherland. For
them, indicted, to face their country and say to it that, because when it was overrun and vanquished
by the barbarous invader and, in consequence was disabled from affording them protection, they
were released from their sacred obligation of allegiance and loyalty, and could therefore freely
adhere to its enemy, giving him aid and comfort, incurring no criminal responsibility therefor, would
only tend to aggravate their crime.
II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY
Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The Filipino people are the self-same people before and
after Philippine Independence, proclaimed on July 4, 1946. During the life of the Commonwealth
sovereignty resided in them under the Constitution; after the proclamation of independence that
sovereignty remained with them under the very same fundamental law. Article XVIII of the said
Constitution stipulates that the government established thereby shall be known as the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, "The
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines."
Under this provision the Government of the Philippines immediately prior to independence was
essentially to be the identical government thereafter only the name of that government was to be
changed.
Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the Philippines were
and are always the plaintiff in all criminal prosecutions, the case being entitled: "The People of the
Philippines vs. (the defendant or defendants)." This was already true in prosecutions under the

Revised Penal Code containing the law of treason. "The Government of the Philippines" spoken of in
article 114 of said Code merely represents the people of the Philippines. Said code was continued,
along with the other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of the Constitution which constitutional provision
further directs that "all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine
Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding
officials under this Constitution" of course, meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines before,
and the Republic of the Philippines after, independence (Article XVIII). Under both governments
sovereignty resided and resides in the people (Article II, section 1). Said sovereignty was never
transferred from that people they are the same people who preserve it to this day. There has
never been any change in its respect.
If one committed treason againsts the People of the Philippines before July 4, 1946, he continues to
be criminally liable for the crime to the same people now. And if, following the literal wording of the
Revised Penal Code, as continued by the Constitution, that accused owed allegiance upon the
commission of the crime to the "Government of the Philippines," in the textual words of the
Constitution (Article XVI, section 2, and XVIII) that was the same government which after
independence became known as the "Republic of the Philippines." The most that can be said is that
the sovereignty of the people became complete and absolute after independence that they
became, politically, fully of age, to use a metaphor. But if the responsibility for a crime against a
minor is not extinguished by the mere fact of his becoming of age, why should the responsibility for
the crime of treason committed against the Filipino people when they were not fully politically
independent be extinguished after they acquire this status? The offended party continues to be the
same only his status has changed.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law
adopted by our Constitution(Article II, section 3) as a part of the law of the Nation. Accordingly, we
have on more than one occasion already stated that "laws of a political nature or affecting political
relations, . . . are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation" (Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124), and that the rule "that laws of political
nature or affecting political relations are considered suspended or in abeyance during the military
occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory."
(Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, 75, Phil., 875, 881.)
The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that the occupant will
naturally suspends all laws of a political nature and all laws which affect the welfare and safety of his
command, such action to be made known to the inhabitants.(United States Rules of Land Welfare,
1940, Article 287.) As allegiance to the United States is an essential element in the crime of treason
under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of its position in our political structure prior
to the independence of the Philippines, the rule as interpreted and practiced in the United States
necessarily has a binding force and effect in the Philippines, to the exclusion of any other
construction followed elsewhere, such as may be inferred, rightly or wrongly, from the isolated
cases 1 brought to our attention, which, moreover, have entirely different factual bases.
Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first, in the proclamation of its
Commander in chief of January 2, 1942, to the effect that as a "result of the Japanese Military
operations, the sovereignty of the United States of America over the Philippines has completely

disappeared and the Army hereby proclaims the Military Administration under martial law over the
district occupied by the Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said Commander in Chief of February
20, 1942, providing that "activities of the administrative organs and judicial courts in the Philippines
shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs until further orders
provided that they are not inconsistent with the present circumstances under the Japanese Military
Administration;" and, thirdly, in the explanation to Order No. 3 reminding that "all laws and
regulations of the Philippines has been suspended since Japanese occupation," and excepting the
application of "laws and regulations which are not proper act under the present situation of the
Japanese Military Administration," especially those "provided with some political purposes."
The suspension of the political law during enemy occupation is logical, wise and humane. The latter
phase outweighs all other aspects of the principle aimed more or less at promoting the necessarily
selfish motives and purposes of a military occupant. It thus consoling to note that the powers
instrumental in the crystallization of the Hague Conventions of 1907 did not forget to declare that
they were "animated by the desire to serve . . . the interest of the humanity and the over progressive
needs of civilization," and that "in case not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the
inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of
international law, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." These saving statements come to the aid of
the inhabitants in the occupied territory in a situation wherein, even before the belligerent occupant
"takes a further step and by appropriate affirmative action undertakes to acquire the right of
sovereignty for himself, . . . the occupant is likely to regard to himself as clothed with freedom to
endeavor to impregnate the people who inhabit the area concerned with his own political ideology,
and to make that endeavor successful by various forms of pressure exerted upon enemy officials
who are permitted to retain the exercise of normal governmental functions." (Hyde, International
Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1879.)
The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the
invading power, whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of the displaced
government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants
such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and
order, and for the proper administration of the country (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940,
article 297), and to demand all kinds of services "of such a nature as not to involve the population in
the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country" (Hague Regulations,
article 52);and if, as we have in effect said, by the surrender the inhabitants pass under a temporary
allegiance to the government of the occupant and are bound by such laws, and such only, as it
chooses to recognize and impose, and the belligerent occupant `is totally independent of the
constitution and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance
and safety of his forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be
promoted under all circumstances or conditions." (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 295),
citing United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, and quoting Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II.
Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944,p. 432.)
He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result if the people in an occupied
territory were required to obey two antagonistic and opposite powers. To emphasize our point, we
would adopt the argument, in a reverse order, of Mr. Justice Hilado in Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons (75 Phil., 285, 358), contained in the following passage:
To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never submitted
to the Japanese oppressors, by the laws, regulations, processes and other acts of those two
puppet governments, would not only have been utterly unjust and downright illegal, but
would have placed them in the absurd and impossible condition of being simultaneously

submitted to two mutually hostile governments, with their respective constitutional and
legislative enactments and institutions on the one hand bound to continue owing
allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth Government, and, on the other, to
owe allegiance, if only temporary, to Japan.
The only sensible purpose of the treason law which is of political complexion and taken out of the
territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to
a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupant (Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75
Phil., 494), must be the preservation of the nation, certainly not its destruction or extermination.
And yet the latter is unwittingly wished by those who are fond of the theory that what is suspended is
merely the exercise of sovereignty by the de jure government or the latter's authority to impose penal
sanctions or that, otherwise stated, the suspension refers only to the military occupant. If this were to
be the only effect, the rule would be a meaningless and superfluous optical illusion, since it is
obvious that the fleeing or displaced government cannot, even if it should want, physically assert its
authority in a territory actually beyond its reach, and that the occupant, on the other hand, will not
take the absurd step of prosecuting and punishing the inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it. If we
were to believe the opponents of the rule in question, we have to accept the absurd proposition that
the guerrillas can all be prosecuted with illegal possession of firearms. It should be borne in the mind
that "the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws
that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one. The territorial sovereign driven
therefrom, can not compete with it on an even plane. Thus, if the latter attempt interference, its
action is a mere manifestation of belligerent effort to weaken the enemy. It has no bearing upon the
legal quality of what the occupant exacts, while it retains control. Thus, if the absent territorial
sovereign, through some quasi-legislative decree, forbids its nationals to comply with what the
occupant has ordained obedience to such command within the occupied territory would not
safeguard the individual from the prosecution by the occupant." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III,
Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1886.)
As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to prosecute and punish the
inhabitants for "war treason" or "war crimes," as an incident of the state of war and necessity for the
control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupant, against which
prosecution and punishment such inhabitants cannot obviously be protected by their native
sovereign, it is hard to understand how we can justly rule that they may at the same time be
prosecuted and punished for an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code, but already taken out of
the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant.
In Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 296), we held that "the Constitution of the
Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the
Japanese forces or the belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States," and the meaning
of the term "suspended" is very plainly expressed in the following passage (page 298):
No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our
Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of the accused under that Constitution,
because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military occupation, as
we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of
the re-occupation of the Philippines by the virtue of the priciple of postliminium, because "a
constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear
intention that it should have a retrospective effect," (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
seventh edition, page 97, and a case quoted and cited in the foot-note), especially as
regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated completely.

In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been committed during the
Japanese military occupation against the United States or the Commonwealth Government, because
article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was not then in force. Nor may this penal provision be applied
upon its revival at the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle
of postliminium, because of the constitutional inhibition against any ex post facto law and because,
under article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws shall have a retroactive effect only in so
far as they favor the accused. Why did we refuse to enforce the Constitution, more essential to
sovereignty than article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in the aforesaid of Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons if, as alleged by the majority, the suspension was good only as to the military occupant?
The decision in the United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively supports our position. As
analyzed and described in United States vs. Reiter (27 Fed. Cas., 773), that case "was decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States the court of highest human authority on that subject
and as the decision was against the United States, and in favor of the authority of Great Britain, its
enemy in the war, and was made shortly after the occurrence of the war out of which it grew; and
while no department of this Government was inclined to magnify the rights of Great Britain or
disparage those of its own government, there can be no suspicion of bias in the mind of the court in
favor of the conclusion at which it arrived, and no doubt that the law seemed to the court to warrant
and demand such a decision. That case grew out of the war of 1812, between the United States and
Great Britain. It appeared that in September, 1814, the British forces had taken the port of Castine,
in the State of Maine, and held it in military occupation; and that while it was so held, foreign goods,
by the laws of the United States subject to duty, had been introduced into that port without paying
duties to the United States. At the close of the war the place by treaty restored to the United States,
and after that was done Government of the United States sought to recover from the persons so
introducing the goods there while in possession of the British, the duties to which by the laws of the
United States, they would have been liable. The claim of the United States was that its laws were
properly in force there, although the place was at the time held by the British forces in hostility to the
United States, and the laws, therefore, could not at the time be enforced there; and that a court of
the United States (the power of that government there having since been restored) was bound so to
decide. But this illusion of the prosecuting officer there was dispelled by the court in the most
summary manner. Mr. Justice Story, that great luminary of the American bench, being the organ of
the court in delivering its opinion, said: 'The single question is whether goods imported into Castine
during its occupation by the enemy are liable to the duties imposed by the revenue laws upon goods
imported into the United States.. We are all of opinion that the claim for duties cannot be sustained. .
. . The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of
the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants
who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a
temporary allegiance of the British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it
chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case no other laws could be obligatory upon
them. . . . Castine was therefore, during this period, as far as respected our revenue laws, to be
deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it by the inhabitants were subjects to such duties
only as the British Government chose to require. Such goods were in no correct sense imported into
the Unites States.' The court then proceeded to say, that the case is the same as if the port of
Castine had been foreign territory, ceded by treaty to the United States, and the goods had been
imported there previous to its cession. In this case they say there would be no pretense to say that
American duties could be demanded; and upon principles of public or municipal law, the cases are
not distinguishable. They add at the conclusion of the opinion: 'The authorities cited at the bar would,
if there were any doubt, be decisive of the question. But we think it too clear to require any aid from
authority.' Does this case leave room for a doubt whether a country held as this was in armed
belligerents occupation, is to be governed by him who holds it, and by him alone? Does it not so
decide in terms as plain as can be stated? It is asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States
with entire unanimity, the great and venerated Marshall presiding, and the erudite and accomplished
Story delivering the opinion of the court, that such is the law, and it is so adjudged in this case. Nay,

more: it is even adjudged that no other laws could be obligatory; that such country, so held, is for the
purpose of the application of the law off its former government to be deemed foreign territory, and
that goods imported there (and by parity of reasoning other acts done there) are in no correct sense
done within the territory of its former sovereign, the United States."
But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of the United
States vs. Rice should be construed to refer to the exercise of sovereignty, and that, if sovereignty
itself was meant, the doctrine has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in
1907. In answer, we may state that sovereignty can have any important significance only when it
may be exercised; and, to our way of thinking, it is immaterial whether the thing held in abeyance is
the sovereignty itself or its exercise, because the point cannot nullify, vary, or otherwise vitiate the
plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully
enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the
conquerors." We cannot accept the theory of the majority, without in effect violating the rule of
international law, hereinabove adverted to, that the possession by the belligerent occupant of the
right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an
exclusive one, and that the territorial sovereign driven therefrom cannot compete with it on an even
plane. Neither may the doctrine in the United States vs. Rice be said to have become obsolete,
without repudiating the actual rule prescribed and followed by the United States, allowing the military
occupant to suspend all laws of a political nature and even require public officials and inhabitants to
take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309). In fact, it is a
recognized doctrine of American Constitutional Law that mere conquest or military occupation of a
territory of another State does not operate to annex such territory to occupying State, but that the
inhabitants of the occupied district, no longer receiving the protection of their native State, for the
time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of the victorious
power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public
Law [1931], p.364.)
The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if not immaterial, in trying to
argue that the law of treason was obligatory on the Filipinos during the Japanese occupation. Thus it
is insisted that a citizen or subject owes not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and
permanent allegiance, and that "temporary allegiance" to the military occupant may be likened to the
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign to the territory wherein
he resides in return for the protection he receives therefrom. The comparison is most unfortunate.
Said foreigner is in the territory of a power not hostile to or in actual war with his own government; he
is in the territory of a power which has not suspended, under the rules of international law, the laws
of political nature of his own government; and the protections received by him from that friendly or
neutral power is real, not the kind of protection which the inhabitants of an occupied territory can
expect from a belligerent army. "It is but reasonable that States, when they concede to other States
the right to exercise jurisdiction over such of their own nationals as are within the territorial limits of
such other States, should insist that States should provide system of law and of courts, and in actual
practice, so administer them, as to furnish substantial legal justice to alien residents. This does not
mean that a State must or should extend to aliens within its borders all the civil, or much less, all the
political rights or privileges which it grants to its own citizens; but it does mean that aliens must or
should be given adequate opportunity to have such legal rights as are granted to them by the local
law impartially and judicially determined, and, when thus determined, protected." (Willoughby, The
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 360.)
When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of
treason committed in a foreign country or, in the language of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code,
"elsewhere," a territory other than one under belligerent occupation must have been contemplated.
This would make sense, because treason is a crime "the direct or indirect purpose of which is the
delivery, in whole or in part, of the country to a foreign power, or to pave the way for the enemy to

obtain dominion over the national territory" (Albert, The Revised Penal Code, citing 3 Groizard, 14);
and, very evidently, a territory already under occupation can no longer be "delivered."
The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or allegiance will enable the
military occupant to legally recruit the inhabitants to fight against their own government, without said
inhabitants being liable for treason. This argument is not correct, because the suspension does not
exempt the occupant from complying with the Hague Regulations (article 52) that allows it to
demand all kinds of services provided that they do not involve the population "in the obligation of
taking part military operations against their own country." Neither does the suspension prevent the
inhabitants from assuming a passive attitude, much less from dying and becoming heroes if
compelled by the occupant to fight against their own country. Any imperfection in the present state of
international law should be corrected by such world agency as the United Nations organizations.
It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the collaborators, an
alarming number of Filipinos were killed or otherwise tortured by the ruthless, or we may say
savage, Japanese Army. Which leads to the conclusion that if the Filipinos did not obey the
Japanese commands and feign cooperation, there would not be any Filipino nation that could have
been liberated. Assuming that the entire population could go to and live in the mountains, or
otherwise fight as guerrillas after the formal surrender of our and the American regular fighting
forces, they would have faced certain annihilation by the Japanese, considering that the latter's
military strength at the time and the long period during which they were left military unmolested by
America. In this connection, we hate to make reference to the atomic bomb as a possible means of
destruction.
If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately help in the liberation of the
Philippines, it was because the feigned cooperation of their countrymen enabled them to get food
and other aid necessary in the resistance movement. If they were able to survive, it was because
they could camouflage themselves in the midst of the civilian population in cities and towns. It is
easy to argue now that the people could have merely followed their ordinary pursuits of life or
otherwise be indifferent to the occupant. The fundamental defect of this line of thought is that the
Japanese assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to notice any such attitude. During belligerent
occupation, "the outstanding fact to be reckoned with is the sharp opposition between the inhabitants
of the occupied areas and the hostile military force exercising control over them. At heart they
remain at war with each other. Fear for their own safety may not serve to deter the inhabitants from
taking advantage of opportunities to interfere with the safety and success of the occupant, and in so
doing they may arouse its passions and cause to take vengeance in cruel fashion. Again, even when
it is untainted by such conduct, the occupant as a means of attaining ultimate success in its major
conflict may, under plea of military necessity, and regardless of conventional or customary
prohibitions, proceed to utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a convenient means of military
achievement." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition [1945], p. 1912.) It should
be stressed that the Japanese occupation was not a matter of a few months; it extended over a little
more than three years. Said occupation was a fact, in spite of the "presence of guerrilla bands in
barrios and mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left by
Japanese garrisons or by the detachments of troops sent on patrol to those places." (Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 371, 373.) The law of nations accepts belligerent
occupation as a fact to be reckoned with, regardless of the merits of the occupant's cause. (Hyde,
International Law, Second Revised Edition [1945], Vol. III, p. 1879.)
Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhere to will lead to an over-production of
traitors, have a wrong and low conception of the psychology and patriotism of their countrymen.
Patriots are such after their birth in the first place, and no amount of laws or judicial decisions can
make or unmake them. On the other hand, the Filipinos are not so base as to be insensitive to the

thought that the real traitor is cursed everywhere and in all ages. Our patriots who fought and died
during the last war, and the brave guerrillas who have survived, were undoubtedly motivated by their
inborn love of country, and not by such a thing as the treason law. The Filipino people as a whole,
passively opposed the Japanese regime, not out of fear of a treason statute but because they
preferred and will prefer the democratic and civilized way of life and American altruism to Japanese
barbaric and totalitarian designs. Of course, there are those who might at heart have been proJapanese; but they met and will unavoidably meet the necessary consequences. The regular
soldiers faced the risks of warfare; the spies and informers subjected themselves to the perils of
military operations, likely received summary liquidation or punishments from the guerrillas and the
parties injured by their acts, and may be prosecuted as war spies by the military authorities of the
returning sovereign; those who committed other common crimes, directly or through the Japanese
army, may be prosecuted under the municipal law, and under this group even the spies and
informers, Makapili or otherwise, are included, for they can be made answerable for any act
offensive to person or property; the buy-and-sell opportunists have the war profits tax to reckon with.
We cannot close our eyes to the conspicuous fact that, in the majority of cases, those responsible for
the death of, or injury to, any Filipino or American at the hands of the Japanese, were prompted
more by personal motives than by a desire to levy war against the United States or to adhere to the
occupant. The alleged spies and informers found in the Japanese occupation the royal road to
vengeance against personal or political enemies. The recent amnesty granted to the guerrillas for
acts, otherwise criminal, committed in the furtherance of their resistance movement has in a way
legalized the penal sanctions imposed by them upon the real traitors.
It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and by remembering that the
obedience and cooperation of the Filipinos were effected while the Japanese were in complete
control and occupation of the Philippines, when their mere physical presence implied force and
pressure and not after the American forces of liberation had restored the Philippine Government
that we will come to realize that, apart from any rule of international law, it was necessary to
release the Filipinos temporarily from the old political tie in the sense indicated herein. Otherwise,
one is prone to dismiss the reason for such cooperation and obedience. If there were those who did
not in any wise cooperate or obey, they can be counted by the fingers, and let their names adorn the
pages of Philippine history. Essentially, however, everybody who took advantage, to any extent and
degree, of the peace and order prevailing during the occupation, for the safety and survival of
himself and his family, gave aid and comfort to the enemy.
Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws of the Philippines
ineffective during the occupation, and restored to their full vigor and force only after the liberation.
Thus, in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, he ordained that "the laws now existing on the statute
books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . are in full force and effect and legally binding
upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," and that "all
laws . . . of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and
void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control."
Repeating what we have said in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113, 133), "it
is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative
of the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the
United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the
Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the President
of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907."
The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on the population to
take oath to the hostile power," was inserted for the moral protection and benefit of the inhabitants,
and does not necessarily carry the implication that the latter continue to be bound to the political
laws of the displaced government. The United States, a signatory to the Hague Conventions, has
made the point clear, by admitting that the military occupant can suspend all the laws of a political

nature and even require public officials and the inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States
Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309), and as already stated, it is a doctrine of American
Constitutional Law that the inhabitants, no longer receiving the protection of their native state, for the
time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of the victorious
power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. Indeed, what is prohibited is the application of force
by the occupant, from which it is fair to deduce that the Conventions do not altogether outlaw
voluntary submission by the population. The only strong reason for this is undoubtedly the desire of
the authors of the Conventions to give as much freedom and allowance to the inhabitants as are
necessary for their survival. This is wise and humane, because the people should be in a better
position to know what will save them during the military occupation than any exile government.
"Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which he warned against
the use of judicial process for non judicial ends, and attacked cynics who "see no reason why courts,
just like other agencies, should not be policy weapons. If we want to shoot Germans as a matter of
policy, let it be done as such, said he, but don't hide the deed behind a court. If you are determined
to execute a man in any case there is no occasion for a trial; the word yields no respect for courts
that are merely organized to convict." Mussoloni may have got his just desserts, but nobody
supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear that in mind as we go about punishing criminals. There
are enough laws on the books to convict guilty Nazis without risking the prestige of our legal system.
It is far, far better that some guilty men escape than that the idea of law be endangered. In the long
run the idea of law is our best defense against Nazism in all its forms." These passages were taken
from the editorial appearing in the Life, May 28, 1945, page 34, and convey ideas worthy of some
reflection.
If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and obedience during the
Japanese military occupation, they were at most borrowing the famous and significant words of
President Roxas errors of the mind and not of the heart. We advisedly said "feigning" not as an
admission of the fallacy of the theory of suspended allegiance or sovereignty, but as an affirmation
that the Filipinos, contrary to their outward attitude, had always remained loyal by feeling and
conscience to their country.
Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the Japanese military
occupation, the present Republic of the Philippines has no right to prosecute treason committed
against the former sovereignty existing during the Commonwealth Government which was none
other than the sovereignty of the United States. This court has already held that, upon a change of
sovereignty, the provisions of the Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, rebellion
and sedition are no longer in force (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887). It is true that, as contended
by the majority, section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "sovereignty
resides in the people," but this did not make the Commonwealth Government or the Filipino people
sovereign, because said declaration of principle, prior to the independence of the Philippines, was
subervient to and controlled by the Ordinance appended to the Constitution under which, in addition
to its many provisions essentially destructive of the concept of sovereignty, it is expressly made clear
that the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not then been withdrawn. The
framers of the Constitution had to make said declaration of principle because the document was
ultimately intended for the independent Philippines. Otherwise, the Preamble should not have
announced that one of the purposes of the Constitution is to secure to the Filipino people and their
posterity the "blessings of independence." No one, we suppose, will dare allege that the Philippines
was an independent country under the Commonwealth Government.
The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous than that existing under the
Jones Law, but its non-sovereign status nevertheless remained unaltered; and what was enjoyed
was the exercise of sovereignty over the Philippines continued to be complete.

The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. It has already been seen that the
exercise of sovereignty is conceived of as delegated by a State to the various organs which,
collectively, constitute the Government. For practical political reasons which can be easily
appreciated, it is desirable that the public policies of a State should be formulated and
executed by governmental agencies of its own creation and which are not subject to the
control of other States. There is, however, nothing in a nature of sovereignty or of State life
which prevents one State from entrusting the exercise of certain powers to the governmental
agencies of another State. Theoretically, indeed, a sovereign State may go to any extent in
the delegation of the exercise of its power to the governmental agencies of other States,
those governmental agencies thus becoming quoad hoc parts of the governmental
machinery of the State whose sovereignty is exercised. At the same time these agencies do
not cease to be Instrumentalities for the expression of the will of the State by which they
were originally created.
By this allegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the delegating State,
and the legal hypothesis is that this State possesses the legal competence again to draw to
itself the exercise, through organs of its own creation, of the powers it has granted. Thus,
States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to
themselves a right of control of so slight and so negative a character as to make its exercise
a rare and improbable occurence; yet, so long as such right of control is recognized to exist,
and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a grant and the continuing
consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of those mother countries over them is
complete and they are to be considered as possessing only administrative autonomy and not
political independence. Again, as will be more fully discussed in a later chapter, in the socalled Confederate or Composite State, the cooperating States may yield to the central
Government the exercise of almost all of their powers of Government and yet retain their
several sovereignties. Or, on the other hand, a State may, without parting with its sovereignty
of lessening its territorial application, yield to the governing organs of particular areas such
an amplitude of powers as to create of them bodies-politic endowed with almost all of the
characteristics of independent States. In all States, indeed, when of any considerable size,
efficiency of administration demands that certain autonomous powers of local selfgovernment be granted to particular districts. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of
Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75.).
The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth Government and the States of the
American Union which, it is alleged, preserve their own sovereignty although limited by the United
States. This is not true for it has been authoritatively stated that the Constituent States have no
sovereignty of their own, that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised
by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty, and that the
sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer
contested.
It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, and that
such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or
by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty. The Supreme Court of the
United States has held that, even when selecting members for the national legislature, or
electing the President, or ratifying proposed amendments to the federal constitution, the
States act, ad hoc, as agents of the National Government. (Willoughby, the Fundamental
Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.250.)

This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United States and the nonsovereign status of the individual States is no longer contested. (Willoughby, The
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 251, 252.)
Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this Constitution shall
be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines."
From this, the deduction is made that the Government under the Republic of the Philippines and
under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree. While the Commonwealth Government
possessed administrative autonomy and exercised the sovereignty delegated by the United States
and did not cease to be an instrumentality of the latter (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of
Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75), the Republic of the Philippines is an independent State not receiving
its power or sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed against the United States or
against its instrumentality, the Commonwealth Government, which exercised, but did not possess,
sovereignty (id., p. 49), is therefore not treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of
the Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order, merely, to make the Constitution applicable to the
Republic.
Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all laws of the Philippines
Islands shall remain operative, unless inconsistent therewith, until amended, altered, modified or
repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and on section 3 which is to the effect that all cases
pending in courts shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force, thereby
insinuating that these constitutional provisions authorize the Republic of the Philippines to enforce
article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. The error is obvious. The latter article can remain operative
under the present regime if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact remains, however,
that said penal provision is fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution, in that those liable for
treason thereunder should owe allegiance to the United States or the government of the Philippines,
the latter being, as we have already pointed out, a mere instrumentality of the former, whereas under
the Constitution of the present Republic, the citizens of the Philippines do not and are not required to
owe allegiance to the United States. To contend that article 114 must be deemed to have been
modified in the sense that allegiance to the United States is deleted, and, as thus modified, should
be applied to prior acts, would be to sanction the enactment and application of an ex post facto law.
In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of the United States has held in
the case of Bradford vs. Chase National Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38), that the Philippines had a
sovereign status, though with restrictions, it is sufficient to state that said case must be taken in the
light of a subsequent decision of the same court in Cincinnati Soap Co. vs. United States (301 U.S.,
308), rendered in May, 1937, wherein it was affirmed that the sovereignty of the United States over
the Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that the earlier case only be interpreted to
refer to the exercise of sovereignty by the Philippines as delegated by the mother country, the United
States.
No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President Roosevelt on August 12, 1943,
that "the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government
of other independent nations--in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood," since
said statement was not meant as having accelerated the date, much less as a formal proclamation
of, the Philippine Independence as contemplated in the Tydings-McDuffie Law, it appearing that (1)
no less also than the President of the United States had to issue the proclamation of July 4, 1946,
withdrawing the sovereignty of the United States and recognizing Philippine Independence; (2) it
was General MacArthur, and not President Osmea who was with him, that proclaimed on October
23, 1944, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; (3) the Philippines was not given

official participation in the signing of the Japanese surrender; (4) the United States Congress, and
not the Commonwealth Government, extended the tenure of office of the President and VicePresident of the Philippines.
The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State
Government, in the same way treason may have been committed against the sovereignty of the
United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth, is immaterial
because, as we have already explained, treason against either is not and cannot be treason against
the new and different sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-856

April 18, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-appellant.
Crispin Oben and Isidro Santiago for appellant.
Assistance Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th Division of the
People's Court sitting in Cebu City and sentenced to death by electrocution.
Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered evidence only on counts 1,
2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the court, were substantiated. In a unanimous decision, the
trial court found as follows:
"As regards count No. 1
Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other Filipinos, recruited,
apprehended and commandeered numerous girls and women against their will for the
purpose of using them, as in fact they were used, to satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual
desire of Colonel Mini, and among such unfortunate victims, were Felina Laput, Eriberta
Ramo alias Miami Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and Flaviana
Bonalos.
It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the victims of the accused; it
sufficient to reproduce here succinctly the testimony of Eriberta Ramo. She testified that on
June 15, 1942, the accused came to her house to get her and told her that she was wanted
in the house of her aunt, but instead, she was brought to the house of the Puppet Governor
Agapito Hontanosas; that she escaped and returned to Baclayon her hometown; that the
accused came again and told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk;
that she did not accept the job; that a week later the accused came to Baclayon to get her,
and succeeded in taking some other girls Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that

Governor Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his wife; that when she
was brought to Colonel Mini the latter had nothing on but a "G" string; that he, Colonel Mini
threatened her with a sword tied her to a bed and with force succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her; that on the following night, again she was brought to Colonel Mini and
again she was raped; that finally she was able to escape and stayed in hiding for three
weeks and only came out from the hiding when Colonel Mini left Tagbilaran.
"As regards count No. 2
Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That accused in company with some
Japanese and Filipinos took Eriberta Ramo and her sister Cleopatra Ramo from their home
in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance organized in honor of Colonel Mini by the
Puppet Governor, Agapito Hontanosas in order that said Japanese Colonel might select
those first who would later be taken to satisfy his carnal appetite and that by means of threat,
force and intimidation, the above mentioned two sister were brought to the headquarters of
the Japanese Commander at the Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran where Eriberta Ramo was
forced to lived a life of shame. All these facts alleged in count No. 2 were testified to by said
witnesses Eriberta Ramo her mother Mercedes de Ramo. It is not necessary here to recite
once more their testimony in support of the allegations in court No. 2; this Court is fully
convinced that the allegation in said count No. 2 were fully substantiated by the evidence
adduced.
"As regards count No. 4
Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two girls named Eduardo S.
Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were taken from their homes in Corella, Bohol, by the accused
and his companion named Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr.
Takibayas to satisfy his carnal appetite, but these two, the accused Susano Perez and his
companion Vicente Bullecer, before delivering them to said Japanese Officer, satisfied first
their lust; the accused Susano Perez raping Eduarda S. Daohog and his companion, Vicente
Bullecer, the other girl Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda S. Daohog, testifying, said: that while on the
way to Tagbilaran, the accused though force and intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited
house; that she resisted with all her force against the desire of the accused, but of no avail;
that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she was delivered to the Japanese Officer named Takibayas
who also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified that on July 16, 1942, the accused and his
companion, Bullecer, went to her house to take her and her sister; that her sister was then
out of the house; that the accused threatened her with a revolved if she refuses to go; that
she was placed in a car where Eduarda Daohog was; that while they were in the car, the
accused carried Eduarda out of the car, and their companion Bullecer took the other witness
(Eutiquia Lamay); that when the accused and Eduarda returned to the car, the latter;
Eduarda, covered her face, crying; that later, she and Eduarda were taken to the Governor's
house; that on arriving and in the presence of the Puppet Governor Hontanosas, the
Governor exclaimed: "I did not call for these girls": but the accused replied saying: "These
girls talked bad against the Japanese , and that is why we arrested them"; that the said
Governor Hontaosas then, said: "Take them to the Japanese "; that the accused and
Bullecer brought the two girls to the Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda was taken to one
room by the Japanese Captain called Dr. Takibayas, and she (Eutiquia Lamay) was taken to
another room by another Japanese living in that house; that she was raped by that Jap while
in the room; that she resisted all she could, but of no avail.
In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia
Lamay, all the allegations in Court No. 4 were fully proven beyond reasonable doubt.

"As regards count No. 5

Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said accused commandeered
Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana Bonalos on the pretext that they were to bee taken
as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the investigation of a case against a certain
Chinese (Insik Eping), and uponarriving at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the
aforesaid two girls to the residence of Colonel Mini, Commander of the Japanese Armed
Forces in Bohol and by means of violence threat and intimidation, said Japanese Colonel
abused and had sexual intercourse with Flaviana Bonalos; that the accused subsequently of
Colonel Mini and through violence, threat and intimidation, succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her against her will; that two days, later, upon the pretext of conducting the
unfortunate girls to their home, said accused brought the other girls Feliciana Bonalos to a
secluded place in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by mean of threat and violence
had carnal knowledge with her against her will.
Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that the accused came to get her on the
pretext that she was to be used as witness in a case affecting certain Chinaman before
Colonel Mini; that she and her younger sister Flaviana were brought in a car driven by the
accused; they were brought to the house of Colonel Mini; that sister Flaviana was conducted
into a room and after remaining in the same for about an hour, she came out with her hair
and her dress in disorder; that Flaviana told her immediately that she was raped against her
will by Colonel Mini; that she (Feliciana), after leaving the residence of said Jap officer, was
taken by Perez to an uninhabited house and there by threat and intimidation, the accused
succeeded in raping her; that when she returned to her (the witness), Flaviana was crying;
that the following day while conducting the two girls back to their hometown, she (Feliciana)
was also raped by the accused in an uninhabited house, against her will.
Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos) testified as following: That on
June 15, 1942, the accused came and told her that the Japanese needed her daughters to
be witnesses; that accordingly, he daughters, under that understanding, started for
Tagbilaran; that later, she went to Tagbilaran to look for her daughters and she found them in
the office of the Puppet Governor; that on seeing her, both daughters wept and told her that
they were turned over to the Japanese and raped them; that her daughter Flaviana told her
(the witness) that after the Japanese had raped her the accused also raped her (Flaviana) in
an uninhabited house; that the accused did not permit her two daughter to return home on
the pretext that the Puppet Governor was then absent and in the meanwhile they stayed in
the house of the accused Perez; that when her daughter returned to her house ultimately,
they related to her (mother) what happened; that both daughters told her they would have
preferred death rather than to have gone to Tagbilaran; that Feliciana told her (the mother)
that the accused had raped her.
The information give by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in evidence as a part of the res
gestae regardless of the time that had elapsed between the occurrence and the time of the
information. In the manner these two witnesses testified in court, there could be no doubt
that they were telling the absolute truth. It is hard to conceived that these girls would assume
and admit the ignominy they have gone through if they were not true. The Court is fully
convinced that all the allegations contained in Court No. 5 have been proven by the
testimonies of these two witnesses beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 6

Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his Filipino companion apprehended
Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the provincial
hospital, for not having attended a dance and reception organized by the Puppet Governor in
honor of Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking officers, which was held in Tagbilaran
market on June 25, 1942; that upon being brought the Puppet Governor, they were severely
reprimanded by the latter; that on July 8, 1942, against said nurses were forced to attend
another banquet and dance in order that the Jap officers Mini and Takibayas might make a
selection which girls would suit best their fancy; that the real purpose behind those forcible
invitations was to lure them to the residence of said Japanese Officer Mini for immoral
purposes.
Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P.A., testified at length. She declared: That on June
29, 1942, she and companion nurses, saw the accused coming to the hospital with a
revolver and took them on a car to the office of the Puppet Governor where they were
severely reprimanded by the latter for not attending the dance held on June and receptions
was to select from among them the best girl that would suit the fancy of Colonel Mini for
immoral purposes that she and her companions were always afraid of the accused Perez
whenever he came to said hospital; that on one occasion, one of the nurses on perceiving
the approach of the accused, ran up into her room, laid down on bed and simulated to be
sick; that said accused, not satisfied, went up into the room of that particular nurse and
pulled out the blanket which covered her and telling her that it was only her pretext that she
was sick.
The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully corroborated by that of Nicanora Ralameda.
Said testimony need not be reproduced here.
In a carefully written brief for the appellant these findings are not questioned, but it is contended that
the deeds committed by the accused do not constitute treason. The Solicitor General submits the
opposite view, and argues that "to maintain and preserve the morale of the soldiers has always
been, and will always be, a fundamental concern of army authorities, for the efficiency of rests not
only on its physical attributes but also, mainly, on the morale of its soldiers" (citing the annual report
of the Chief of Staff, United State Army, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933).
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because women's company
kept up their morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining them at parties, selling them food and
drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason. For any act of hospitality without doubt produces the
same general result. yet by common agreement those and similar manifestation of sympathy and
attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as treason.
In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political
intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. In the
nature of things, the occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts
between the invaders and the natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon
their nature degree and purpose. To draw a line between treasonable and untreasonable assistance
is not always easy. The scope of adherence to the enemy is comprehensive, its requirement
indeterminate as was said Cramer vs. United States. 89 Law. ed., 1441.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be to
render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in
furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give money to
an enemy as a friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal necessities is
to assist him as individual and is not technically traitorous. On the other hand, to lend or give him

money to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging war against the giver's country
enhance his strength and by same count injures the interest of the government of the giver. That is
treason. (See United States vs. Fricke, 259 F., 673; 63 C.J., 816, 817.)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first assignment of error is correct. His
"commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainment
helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more
than the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their
bodies or organized the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly
and materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United State. The acts
herein charged were not, by fair implication, calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its
army or to cripple the defense and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable effect the
defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial,
imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason,
which, in the absence of admission, may be gathered from the nature and circumstances of each
particular case.
But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay
and Flaviana Bonalos as principal by direct participation. Without his cooperation in the manner
above stated, these rapes could not have been committed.
Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express sanction in section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682, which says:
Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to support the
offense (treason) charged, the People's Court may, nevertheless, convict and sentence the
accused for any crime included in the acts alleged in the information and established by the
evidence.
All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and substantiated by the evidence.
Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his provision as violative of section 1, paragraph 17,
Article III of the Constitution, which guarantees to an accused the right "to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him." The contention is not well taken. The provision in requires
that the private crimes of which an accused of treason may be convicted must be averred in the
information and sustained by evidence. In the light of this enactment, the defendant was warned of
the hazard that he might be founded guilty of rapes if he was innocent of treason and thus afforded
an opportunity to prepare and meet them. There is no element of surprise or anomaly involved. In
facts under the general law of criminal procedure convicted for crime different from that designated
in the complaint or information is allowed and practiced, provided only that such crime "is included or
described in the body of the information, and afterwards justified by the proof presented during the
trial." (People vs. Perez, 45 Phil., 599.)
The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the offended girls but these assaults are not
charged against him and should be ruled out. The crime of coercion alleged and founded on count
No. 6. need not be noticed in view of the severity of the penalty for the other crimes which he must
suffer.
We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and sentence him for each of them to an
indeterminate penalty of from 10 year of prision mayor to 17 year and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify each of the offended women in the sum of

P3,000, and to pay the costs; it being understood that the total duration of these penalties shall not
exceed forty years.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., reserves his vote.
Montemayor, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
PABLO, M., disidente:
Disiento. En mi opinion, los hechos probados constituyen delito de traicion.
El acusado de buena reeputacion en Bohol para ponerlas a disposicion de los oficiales del ejercito
enemigo, ha ayudado a ellos en la obra de destruccion. En la guerra se emplea la destruccion para
triunfur, y la destruccion se realiza en las cosas y en las personas. Inutilizar para el trabajo o para la
guerra a los habitanesdel pais invandido es destruirles en mayor o menor grado y violar o deshonrar
a las mujereses tambien destruirles material y moralmente y es peor aun que matar y aniquilar. En
el caso presente, el acusado ayudoal Coronel Mini y Dr. Takibayas en deshonrar a varias
senoritas,poniendolas en una situacion peor que la de las esclavas. Si el reclutar a hombres o
mujeres para ser obligados a constuir trincheraspara el ejercito invasor constituye delito de traicion;
si el apoderarsedel arroz de los ciudadanos en sus casas para darselo a los soldadoshambrientos
del ejercito japones es traicion; por que no ha de constituirtraicion el reclutar a senoritas para ser
utilizadas por los enemigosen sus desos bestiales, como un medio de entretenimiento o alivio de
sus trabajos? Flaviana y Feliciana Bonalos, ilegalmente arrestadas y entregadas despues a los dos
oficiales-bestias, en su declaracion, han dicho que hubieran preferido morir que ser violadas.
El argumento del Procurador General, que merece seria consideracion, es del tenor siguiente:
In the United States Army, and we believe this is also true in the Japanese Imperial Forces, a
unit known as the United Services Organization (U.S.O.)functions with the primordial aim
and view to keep at peak the morale of the soldiers. To achieve this, varied forms of
entertainment like movies, dancer, stage show and the like are provided for at an enormous
expense. In fine, the soldiers are surrounded with all the comfort and opportunities that they
ordinarily enjoy in their civilian life. The reason for this is to tone their nerves and minimized
as much as possible, they heavy strain on them incident to the nature of their mission in time
of war. Such entertainment because the more imperative when it comes to soldiers who are
assigned overseas, on a foreign soil, in a no man's land, devoid of the inspiring association
of their families, girl friends and those dearest to them.
. . . Clearly, therefore, appellant provident them with what should have been the burden of
the Japanese Imperial Forces, relieving the latter of the trouble, expense, and difficulty of
sending over to these Islands Japanese women to entertain their soldiers to bolster up their
morale. In other words, the services of the Japanese women who were so replaced by ours,
through the efforts of the appellant could be diverted to other important phases of military
activities either in the homeland or in this sector. Hence, the aid and comfort to the enemy is
evident.

Si el Coronel Mini y Dr. Takibayas del ejercito japones no encontraban otroconsuelo o solaz para
olividar sus preocupaciones y ytritezas mas que en saciar su lujuria, entonces el proporcionarles
mujeres contra la voluntad de estas es ayudssrles en recuperar entusiasmos perdidos e infundirles
nuevo vigor para proseguir la guerra de conquista. Bien sabido esta que los soldados no son
maquinas de acero que pueden estar peleando todas las horasde todos los dias; necesitan tiempo
de descanso para recuperar fuerzas perdidas, de entretennimiento para olvidar lugubres
pensamientos y franco esparcimiento para vigorizar su espiritu. Si para el Coronel Mini y Dr.
Takibayas, el violar a las senoritas reclutadas por el acusado era buenarecompensa de sus
esfuerzos militares, entonces para ellos vale la penade exponer la vida en la luncha porque despues
de todo quedan bien compensados. Que mayor satisfaccion para ellos como la de disfrutar
libremente de las senoritas de la provincia con la ayuda del acusado? Poresa satisfaccion,
redoblarian sus enfuerzos de conquista para tener otras oportunidades de saciar sus apetitos
bestiales. Bajo tales inclinaciones morbosas, darles entretenimiento, solaz y esparcimiento es
ayudarles en la guerra.
No es exagerado suponer que dichos oficiales japoneses hayan dejado en su pais hijos, esposas y
madddres a quienes quieren de corazon, y en sus momentosde soledad, de tristeza y de nostalgia
no ess imposible que se acuerden de ellos y lleguen a decir para si mismos: "Que sacamos de
esta guerra de invasion, dejando a nuestros hijos, nuestros hijos, nuestras familias ynuestros
hogares abandonados solo para satisfacer las ambiciones de conquista del emperador? Cada vez
que nos damos cuenta de que no somos mas que unossimples instrumentos para sacrificar tantas
vidas y haciendas para la vanagloria del japon, se nos rebela la conciencia. Creemos que la guerra
es inicua, injusta: debemos abandonarla. No debemos continuarr invadiendo territorios." Si estos
pensamientos persistiesen en la mennte de dichos oficiales, indudablemente perderian su
entusiasmo, su eficiencia en el servicio: su obsesion les haria indiferentes, pasivos, inutiles para
laguerra. Pueden deponer su actitud, pueden cruzarse de brazos e inclusive pueden desertar, y eso
seria fatal para la nacion invasora. Pero si, porinclinacion natural, encuentran entretenimiento,
esparcimiento y alegria en violar mujeres, entonces el proporcionarseles es una ayuda efectiva.
Esdarles calor, entusiasmo y valor en la guerra de conquista.
Hay mayor traicion como el poner a disposicion de los enemigos al ser mas querido, a la mujer?
Que se apoderen de todas nuestros production nuestros recursos: de todo cuanto encuentran a su
paso; pero, por Dios, salvemosel honor de nuestras mujeres.
Voto por que el acusado sea condenado por el delito de traicion.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-399

January 29, 1948

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA), defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee.
TUASON, J.:

The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After pleading not guilty
he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to counts 4, 5,
and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts
5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty on
count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay the fine of P20,000.
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any single detail.
Juanito Albano, the first witness, testified that in March, 1945, the accused with other Filipino
undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and had the witness carry the
American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked behind the
sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to
the Kempetai headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to the flier. Valentin Cuison,
the next witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he saw the accused following an American
and the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last witness stated that the
American was walking as well as his captors. And there was no sled, he said, nor did he see Juanito
Albano, except at night when he and Albano had a drink of tuba together.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed to corroborate
each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz.,
4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of treason
complexed by murder and physical injuries," with "the aggravating circumstances mentioned above."
Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and physical injuries charged in the information, not
only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances. The Solicitor General
agrees with the decision except as to technical designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense
committed by the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:
1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, said accused being a member of the Japanese Military Police and acting as
undercover man for the Japanese forces with the purpose of giving and with the intent to
give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino
undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and
locating their hideouts; that said accused and his companions did apprehended Abraham
Puno, tie his hands behind him and give him fist blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno was
taken by the accused and his Japanese companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was
severely tortured by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back and from there he
was sent back to the Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and detained for 7 days;
2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, said accused acting as an informer and agent for the Japanese Military Police,
with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, the,
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a
group of Filipino undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla
suspects; that the herein accused and his companions did in fact apprehend Guillermo
Ponce and Macario Ponce from their house; that said accused and his companions did tie
the hands of said Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce behind their backs, giving them first

blows on the face and in other parts of the body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei
Tai Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the following day while his brother was
detained and thereafter nothing more was heard of him nor his whereabouts known;
3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to
the enemy and her military forces, said accused acting as an enemy undercover did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a
patrol of some 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, municipality of
Mandaue for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said patrol
did in fact apprehend as guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were
forthwith tied with a rope, tortured and detained for 6 days; that on the 7th day said Damian
Alilin and Santiago Alilin were taken about 1/2 kilometer from their home and the accused did
bayonet them to death;
7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the enemy and other
Filipinos undercovers, said accused did cause the torture of Antonio Soco and the killing of
Gil Soco for guerrilla activities.
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction of
physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason law
and under the United States constitution defining treason, after which the former was patterned,
there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the
other does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind
of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental
operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a
criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an
element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a
separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or
trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable
for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is
averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of course, preclude the
punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the government should elect to prosecute the
culprit specifically for those crimes instead on relying on them as an element of treason. it is where
murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be regarded
separately under their general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken as an
aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other atrocities on the victims instead of the
usual and less painful method of execution will be taken into account to increase the penalty under
the provision of article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since they, as in this case,
augmented the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal
objective.
This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. it is
true that the accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not be substantiated
while counts 5 and 6 were abandoned.

In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment because of the trial court's
failure to appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation of the
attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to be relieved for
obvious reasons."
The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the legality and regularity of
all the proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption that the accused was not denied the
right to have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It is presumed that the procedure prescribed by
law has been observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the contrary. (U.S. vs. Escalante, 36
Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his defense
expressed reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present counsel assumes, he did
not sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not sufficient to overcome this presumption. The
statement of the counsel in the court below did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty
to protect the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel "sincerely believes that
the said Attorney Carin did his best, although it was not the best of a willing worker." We do not
discern in the record any indication that the former counsel did not conduct the defense to the best
of his ability. if Attorney Carin did his best as a sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney
admits, that was enough; his sentiments did not cut any influence in the result of the case and did
not imperil the rights of the appellant.
In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as charged in counts
1,2,3 and 7. There being an aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be modified in this respect accordingly. In all other
particulars, the same will be affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs of this instance against the
appellant.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-322

July 28, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PEDRO MANAYAO, ET AL., defendants.
PEDRO MANAYAO, appellant.
J. Antonio Araneta for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and Solicitor Ramon L. Avancea for appellee.
HILADO, J.:

Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo Flores were charged with the high
crime of treason with multiple murder in the People's Court. The Floreses not having been
apprehended, only Manayao was tried. Convicted of the offense charged against him with the
aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a
band in the commission of the crime, he was sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P20,000, an
indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the persons named in the third paragraph of the decision,
and the costs. He has appealed from that decision to this Court.
On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the Japanese in Sitio Pulong Tindahan,
Municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan. In reprisal, Japanese soldiers and a number of Filipinos
affiliated with the Makapili, among them the instant appellant, conceived the diabolical idea of killing
the residents of Barrio Banaban of the same municipality (Exhibits A, C, and C-1). Pursuant to this
plan, said Japanese soldiers and their Filipino companions, armed with rifles and bayonets, gathered
the residents of Banaban behind the barrio chapel on January 29, 1945. Numbering about sixty or
seventy, the residents thus assembled included men, women and children mostly women
(Exhibits A, C, amd C-1; pp. 3-16, 29, 30, 65, 102, t.s.n.).
The children were placed in a separate group from the men and women the prosecution star
witnesses, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, were among the children (pp. 3, 40, t.s.n. ). Presently,
the Japanese and their Filipino comrades set the surrounding houses on fire (pp. 14, 48, 70, 71,
103, t.s.n.), and proceeded to butcher all the persons assembled, excepting the small children, thus
killing, among others, those known by the following names: Patricia, Dodi, Banda, Tana, Uyang,
Mina, Marta, Sana, Eufemia, Doroteo, Andres, Perly, Tisiang, Urado, Pisan, Dorang, Felisa, and
Eulalia (pp. 8, 10, 13, 14, 31, 32, 47, 48, 61, 63, t.s.n.).
Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom were Patricia and Dodi whom he bayoneted to
death in the presence of their daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, respectively (pp. 8, 10,
13, 31, 32, 35, 47, 48, t.s.n.). Patricia and Dodi pleaded with appellant for mercy, he being their
relative, but he gave the callous answer that no mercy would be given them because they were
wives of guerrillas (pp. 10, 42, 43, 49, t.s.n.).
Appellant would also have killed the small children including Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino if he
had been allowed to have his way. For when all but the small ones had been butchered, he
proposed to kill them too, but the Japanese soldiers interceded, saying that the children knew
nothing of the matter (pp. 15, 49, 51, 66, 67, t.s.n.). Appellant insisted in his proposal, arguing that
the children would be wives of guerrillas later when they grew up, but the Japanese decided to spare
them (p. 22, t.s.n.).
The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the testimony of eye-witnesses Clarita
Paulino, Maria Perez, and Policarpio Tigas to the ruthless massacre of Banaban. There is a
complete absence of evidence tending to show motive on the part of these witnesses for falsely
testifying against appellant such a motive is not even insinuated by the defendant. Indeed,
appellant's counsel frankly states (p. 3, brief) that he "does not dispute the findings of fact of the
People's Court." Speaking of the testimony of Clarita and Maria, both aged ten years, the People's
Court, who heard, observed and saw them testify, had the following to say:
The testimony of the last two in particular is entitled to very great weight. They are simple
barrio girls, only ten years old, whose minds have not yet been tainted by feelings of hatred
or revenge or by any desire to be spectacular or to exaggerate. They were straight-forward
and frank in their testimony and did not show any intention to appeal to the sentiments of the
court. They could not have been mistaken as to the presence and identity of the accused for
they know him so well that they referred to him by his pet name of "Indong Pintor" or Pedro,

the painter. They could not have erred in the narration of the salient phases of the tragic
events of January 29, 1945, in Banaban, for they were forced eye-witnesses to and were
involved in the whole tragedy, the burning of the houses and the massacre committed by the
accused and his Japanese masters took place in broad daylight and were not consummated
in a fleeting moment but during a time sufficient for even girls of tender age to retain a
trustworthy mental picture of the unusual event they could not help but witness.
Not only this, but the testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino is so clear, positive and
convincing that it would be sufficient for conviction without any further corroboration. Yet, there is
ample corroborative proof. Thus, Tomas M. Pablo declared that he had seen the corpses of the
massacred residents of Banaban shortly after the happening of the heinous crime (p. 136, t.s.n.).
And appellant himself admitted his participation in the massacre in two sworn statements one
made on August 28, 1945, before Lt. Jesus Cacahit, Detachment Commander of the Angat 23d MP
Command (Exhibit A; pp. 75-77, t.s.n.) and another made on September 5, 1945 before Feliciano F.
Torres, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan (Exhibits C, C-1; pp. 150-159, t.s.n.).
In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends that appellant was a member of
the Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the
People's Court; and in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant had lost his Philippine citizenship
and was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason. We cannot uphold either
contention. We are of the considered opinion that the Makapili, although organized to render military
aid to the Japanese Army in the Philippines during the late war, was not a part of said army. It was
an organization of Filipino traitors, pure and simple. As to loss of Philippine citizenship by appellant,
counsel's theory is absolutely untenable. He invokes in its support paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of section
1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, providing:
. . . A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign

country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
xxx

xxx

xxx

(6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy,
or Air Corps in time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been
granted.
There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of Japan. His counsel cites (Brief, 4) the fact that in Exhibit A "he subscribed an
oath before he was admitted into the Makapili association, "the aim of which was to help Japan in its
fight against the Americans and her allies.'" And the counsel contends from this that the oath was in
fact one of allegiance to support the constitution and laws of Japan. We cannot uphold such a farfetched deduction. The members of the Makapili could have sworn to help Japan in the war without
necessarily swearing to support her constitution and laws. The famed "Flying Tiger" who so bravely
and resolutely aided China in her war with Japan certainly did not need to swear to support the
Chinese constitution and laws, even if they had to help China fight Japan. During the first World War
the "National Volunteers" were organized in the Philippines, pledged to go to Europe and fight on the
side of the Allies, particularly of the United States. In order to carry out that mission although the

war ended before this could be done they surely did not have to take an oath to support the
constitution or laws of the United States or any of its allies. We do not multiply these examples, for
they illustrate a proposition which seems self-evident.
Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a commission "in the military, naval,
or air service" of Japan.
Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever been declared a deserter in the
Philippine Army, Navy or Air Corps nor even that he was a member of said Army, Navy, or Air
Corps.
Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most fundamental and elementary principles
governing the duties of a citizen toward his country under our Constitution. Article II, section 2, of
said constitution ordains:
"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service."
(Emphasis supplied.).
This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of war, but it is brought more
immediately and peremptorily into play when the country is involved in war. During such a period of
stress, under a constitution enshrining such tenets, the citizen cannot be considered free to cast off
his loyalty and obligations toward the Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without reflecting on
the patriotism and intelligence of the Legislature, that in promulgating Commonwealth Act No. 63,
under the aegis of our Constitution, it intended (but did not declare) that the duties of the citizen
solemnly proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional precept could be effectively cast off by him
even when his country is at war, by the simple expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the constitution or laws of a foreign country, and an enemy country at that, or by accepting a
commission in the military, naval or air service of such country, or by deserting from the Philippine
Army, Navy, or Air Corps.
It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the very fact
of committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of which under the circumstances
of record he does not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself
beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the shield that would
protect him from punishment.
But the laws do no admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts of itself to a
divestment of the character of citizen, and withdraws the criminal from their coercion. They
would never prescribe an illegal act among the legal modes by which a citizen might
disfranchise himself; nor render treason, for instance, innocent, by giving it the force of a
dissolution of the obligation of the criminal to his country. (Moore, International Law Digest,
Vol. III, p. 731.)
696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred the loss of his nationality, shall
take up arms against his native country; he shall be held guilty of a felony and treason, if he
does not strictly observe this duty. (Fiore's International Law Codified, translation from Fifth
Italian Edition by Borchard.)
As to the third assignment of error, the Solicitor General agrees with counsel that it is improper to
separately take into account against appellant he aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed
men and (2) the employment of a band in appraising the gravity of the crime. We likewise are of the

same opinion, considering that under paragraph 6 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code providing
that "whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of
an offense it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band," the employment of more than
three armed men is an essential element of and inherent in a band. So that in appreciating the
existence of a band the employment of more than three armed men is automatically included, there
being only the aggravating circumstance of band to be considered.
As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the contention is clearly unacceptable that appellant
acted in obedience to an order issued by a superior and is therefore exempt from criminal liability,
because he allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty incidental to his service for Japan as a
member of the Makapili. It is obvious that paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 11 of our Revised Penal
Code compliance with duties to or orders from a foreign sovereign, any more than obedience to an
illegal order. The construction contended for by appellant could entail in its potentialities even the
destruction of this Republic.
The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to obey his Japanese masters under
pain of severe penalty, and that therefore his acts should be considered as committed under the
impulse of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, is no less
repulsive. Appellant voluntarily joined the Makapili with full knowledge of its avowed purpose of
rendering military aid to Japan. He knew the consequences to be expected if the alleged
irresistible force or uncontrollable fear subsequently arose, he brought them about himself freely and
voluntarily. But this is not all; the truth of the matter is, as the Solicitor General well remarks, that "the
appellant actually acted with gusto during the butchery of Banaban." He was on that occasion even
bent on more cruelty than the very ruthless Japanese masters so fate willed it were the very
ones who saved the little girls, Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino, who were destined to become the
star witnesses against him on the day of reckoning.
Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we find appellant guilty of the crime of
treason with multiple murder committed with the attendance of one aggravating circumstance, that of
"armed band," thus discarding the first aggravating circumstance considered by the trial court. A
majority of the Court voted to affirm the judgment appealed from, imposing the death penalty,
convicting defendant and appellant to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of
each of the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the costs. But due
to the dissent of Mr. Justice Perfecto from the imposition of the death penalty, in accordance with the
applicable legal provisions we modify the judgment appealed from as regards the punishment to be
inflicted, and sentence defendant and appellant Pedro Manayao to the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessories of article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity
of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's
decision, and the costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

PARAS, J.:
I concur in the result because I am convinced that the appellant is guilty of multiple murder and he
even deserves the maximum penalty.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
The main facts in this case upon which the prosecution relies are based on the testimonies of three
witnesses, two ten-year-old girls, Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino, and Policarpio Tigas.
From the testimony of Maria Paulino we quote:
Q. You said that you are ten years old, do you know what is the meaning of telling a lie?
A. I do not know.
Q. Do you know the difference between falsity and truth? A. I do not know.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Do you know how to read? What, Sir?

Q. How to read. A. No, Sir.
Q. Do you know how to pray? A. I forgot how to pray."(Pages 44 and 45, t.s.n.)
From the testimony of Clarita Perez, we quote:
Q. Please state your name and your personal circumstances. A. Clarita Perez, 10 years of
age, and resident of the Sitio of Banaban.
Q. What town? A. I do not know.
JUDGE NEPOMUCENO:
Q. Is Banaban a sitio in the town of Malolos, or Quigua, or Bigaa? A. I do not know, sir.
Q. You do not know? A. I do not know, sir.
JUDGE ABAD SANTOS:
Q. What province? A. I do not know, sir. (Page 4, t.s.n.)
Witness Policarpio Tigas, municipal policeman, testified that about sixty persons, including his sister
Eufemia, were killed in Banaban, but he was not killed "because I was with my guerrilla outfit then."
He saw the killing "because on the 29th day of January, I came down from the mountains and went
to the barrio to see my family to take them away from the place, but upon arriving there I saw that
the people were being gathered and placed behind the chapel. After placing the people behind the
chapel I saw the massacre of the group begun. In my interest to ascertain the fate of my sister and
so that I would not be seen, I crept to a creek and stayed there to find out what would be the end of it
all. While I was thus hiding in that creek I saw my sister killed by Pedro Manayao, the painter. After
that, convinced of the fate of my sister and knowing the one who killed her was Pedro Manayao, and
because I was afraid that if I stayed there longer I might be caught by the people and knowing that if
I would be caught I would also be killed, I left the place." (Page 102, t.s.n.) He was fifty meters away

from the place of the massacre. "The dead bodies were burned. I left to go to the mountains. I first
put my mother in a safe place, and after that I joined my companions and together we returned to
the town." Eufemia "was buried by my father" on the "second day after the killing". (P. 103, t.s.n.)
The above are the facts testified in the direct testimony of the witness. That he should come from the
mountains and arrive at the place at the very instant when the massacre was about to be executed;
that he should have remained hidden in a creek, fifty meters away, to find out the final fate of his
sister; that, instead of remaining to witness the gory scene, he did not depart to call his coguerrilleros who, according to him, were well armed, in order to attack the mass killers and try to
save those who were gathered to be killed; that he left precisely after he saw his sister decapitated,
notwithstanding which he testified that the corpses were burned but that the body of his sister was
buried by his father the day after the killing, these, besides other details, are things that lead us to
doubt the veracity of the testimony of this witness, thus leaving to be considered only the testimonies
of the two girls.
Although we are inclined to believe that the appellant must have been seen by the two girls at the
place of the massacre in the company of the Japanese, we cannot reconcile ourselves in believing
all the details as narrated by them, so as to justify the inflicting of the supreme penalty upon
appellant. Although we are constrained to believe in the substantial truthfulness of the two grills,
considering their tender age which makes them highly susceptible to suggestions, and the additional
significant fact that Maria Paulino does not know "the meaning of telling a lie" nor "the difference
between falsity and truth," and history and experience have time and again shown that human
fallibility is more pronounced in children of tender age, we vote for the modification of the appealed
decision in the sense that appellant be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-477

June 30, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.
Remedios P. Nufable for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.
TUASON, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's Court sentencing the
accused to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.
The information charged:
That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the occupation of the Philippines
by the Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the
Island of Luzon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused, Apolinario Adriano, who is not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to
the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of said allegiance,
did then and there willfully, criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of
Japan in the Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United States were then at
war, giving the said enemy aid and comfort in the manner as follows:
That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and designed to assist
and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's war
efforts and operations against the United States and the Philippines, the herein accused bore
arm and joined and assisted the Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in armed
conflicts and engagements against the United States armed forces and the Guerrillas of the
Philippine Commonwealth in the Municipalities of San Leonardo and Gapan, Province of
Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of Luzon, Philippines, sometime between January and
April, 1945. Contrary to Law.
The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts alleged except that
of defendant's having joined the Makapili organization. What the People's Court found is that the
accused participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of personal property.
The court below, however, said these acts had not been established by the testimony of two
witnesses, and so regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy. But the court did
find established under the two-witness rule, so we infer, "that the accused and other Makapilis had
their headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili
military uniform; that he was armed with rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a
Japanese instructor; . . . that during the same period, the accused in Makapili military uniform and
with a rifle, performed duties as sentry at the Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in
Gapan, Nueva Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, by the American forces, the
accused and other Makapilis retreated to the mountains with the enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle
in hand, later surrendered to the Americans."
Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne out by the proof of two
witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of
treason imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that the accused took part in
raids and seizure of personal property, and performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to
acts allegedly committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one
specified deed. There is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a
Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point it cannot
be said that one witness is corroborated by another if corroboration means that two witnesses have
seen the accused doing at least one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just walking or
eating.
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence
to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his will, membership
in the Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the purposes for which the
organization was created, which, according to the evidence, were "to accomplish the fulfillment of

the obligations assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan;" "to
shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East
Asia;" "to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the
Philippines;" and "to fight the common enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved
by the oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be gather from the testimony of
one witness, or from the nature of the act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act.
(Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary, except
for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or committed
nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if he
placed himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the opportune time
came even though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by its very nature
gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort in the knowledge
that he had on his side nationals of the country with which his was at war. It furnished the
enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces augmented, and his courage was enhanced
by the knowledge that he could count on men such as the accused and his kind who were ready to
strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no difference from that of enlisting in the
invader's army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of two
witnesses. Does the evidence in the present case meet this statutory test? Is two-witness
requirement fulfilled by the testimony of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform
bearing a gun one day, another witness another day, and so forth?
The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look for guidance from
American sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial interpretation has been placed on the twowitness principle by American courts, and authoritative text writers have commented on it. We cull
from American materials the following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of authority.
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:
In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both witnesses to be to the
same overt act, was held to mean that there might be one witness to an overt act and
another witness to another overt act of the same species of treason; and, in one case it has
been intimated that the same construction might apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore
so succinctly observes: "The opportunity of detecting the falsity of the testimony, by
sequestering the two witnesses and exposing their variance in details, is wholly destroyed by
permitting them to speak to different acts." The rule as adopted in this country by all the
constitutional provisions, both state and Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall
testify to the same overt act. This also is now the rule in England.
More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section 2038, p. 271:
Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is separable, there
must be two witnesses to each part of the overt act.
Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed., 685), expressed the
same idea: "It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible
to piece bits together of the overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths; . . .."
(Copied as footnote in Wigmore on Evidence, ante.) And in the recent case of Cramer vs. United
States (65 Sup. Ct., 918), decide during the recent World War, the Federal Supreme Court lays

down this doctrine: "The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason
prosecution is that it shows sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a
finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every act, movement,
deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the
testimony of two witnesses."
In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of the trial court. To
the possible objection that the reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion savors of
sophism, we have only to say that the authors of the constitutional provision of which our treason law
is a copy purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely restrictive." This provision
is so exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence that where two or more
witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is believed by the court or jury, the
defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of
the culprit's guilt as gauged and tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are
familiar, of finding the truth. Natural inferences, however strong or conclusive, flowing from other
testimony of a most trustworthy witness or from other sources are unavailing as a substitute for the
needed corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another eyewitness to the same overt act.
The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the prosecution by a literal
interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said that the founders of the American government
fully realized the difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but because of the objections.
(Cramer vs. United States, ante.) More, the rule, it is said, attracted the members of the
Constitutional Convention "as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed against
legislative change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing Madison's Journal of
the Federal Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice Jackson, who delivered the majority
opinion in the celebrated Cramer case, said: "It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel
with this Constitutional provision. Perhaps the farmers placed rather more reliance on direct
testimony than modern researchers in psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a
quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or
that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle to conviction.
Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is severely restrictive." It must be remembered,
however, that the Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that "'Treason may
sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult as in a traitorous
correspondence with an enemy.' The provision was adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it
put in the way of prosecution but because of them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but
because one of the most venerated of that venerated group considered that "prosecutions for
treason were generally virulent.'"
Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American Constitution. By extension,
the lawmakers who introduced that provision into the Philippine statute books must be understood to
have intended that the law should operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity as the American
forefathers meant.
The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.

PIRACY
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17958

February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and
Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record
before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of
chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven
men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at
about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in
the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all
armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to
the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women,
were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a
matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lollo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the
offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the
Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the
Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment
was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment
(cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to
the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in
the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a
process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is
robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi,
and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done
in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in
law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind.
It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into
which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it
is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to
crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is
whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:

ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another
nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with
Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next
preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit
the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the
physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and
fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in
Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when
Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who,
according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be
considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of
a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the
former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the
Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government,
remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to
secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue
until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands,
etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the
Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding
General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered
territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment
of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new
order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and

practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations.
This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.
(Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt
Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant
to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not
only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil
law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor
to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.
(U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary
ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined
by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be
imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.)
The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of
piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy
are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction
of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever
"Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever
"Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United
States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case
of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal
Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers,
but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall
be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and
154, to be still in force in the Philippines.

The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154.
There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing
either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against
chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is,
therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death
should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack
of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life
imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission,
that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and
the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not
unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In
accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court
as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until
dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth
Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another
case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and
shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances.
So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-60100 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y MEDRANO and RICO
LOPEZ, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-60768 March 20, 1985

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DARIO DE REYES alias DARIO DECE RAYMUNDO y ELAUSA, accused- appellant.
G.R. No. L-61069 March 20, l985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PETER PONCE y BULAYBULAY alias PETER POWE, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:
Appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, Rico Lopez, Davao Reyes
alias Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power were
charged of the crime of piracy in an information filed before the then Court of First Instance of Sulu
and Tawi-Tawi, which reads:
That on or about 3:15 in the morning of August 31, 1981, at the vicinity of Muligin
Island and within the territorial waters of the Municipality of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi,
Province of Tawi-Tawi, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the abovenamed accused Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, alias Jaime Rodriguez (Jimmy) Dario
Dece Raymundo y Elausa; Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay
alias Peter Power being crew members of the M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of
Philippine registry, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another and armed with bladed weapons and high caliber firearms, to wit: three (3)
daggers, two (2) M-14, one (1) garand and one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle, with
intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation upon persons, did then and
there willfully and unlawfuflly, and feloniously take, steal and carry away against the
consent of the owners thereof, the equipments and other persona) properties
belonging to the crew members and passengers of the said M/V Noria 767,
consisting of cash money amounting to Three Million Five Hundred Seventeen
Thousand Three Hundred Pesos (P3,517,300.00), personal belongings of
passengers and crew amounting to One Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P130,000.00), the vessel's compass, navigational charts and instruments amounting
to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of the
aforementioned owners in the total amount of THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED
EIGHTY SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,687,300.00)
Philippine Currency; that by reason of and on the occasion of the said piracy and for
the purpose of enabling the abovenamed accused to take, steal and carry away the
properties abovementioned, the herein accused in pursuance to their conspiracy, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation, treacherously attack, assault, stab, shot and, taking advantage of
superior strength, use personal violence upon the persons of Abdusador Sumihag,
Vicente America, Perhan Tan, Marcos Que, Ismael Turabin, Mabar Abdurahman,
Wadi Aduk Rasdi Alfad, Kasmir Tan, Peter Paul Chiong, Juaini Husini Ismael Ombra,
Sabturani Ulag, Mutalib Sarahadil, Bajubar Adam, Quillermo Wee, Reuben Segovia
Ho, Michael Lao, Yusop Abubakar, Hahji Hussin Kulavan, Amjad Quezon, Rebuan
Majid Edgar Tan, Abdurasul Alialam Federico Canizares, Omar Tahil Gilbert Que,
Arajul Salialam, Masihul Bandahala, Asola Mohammaddin, Batoto Sulpicio, Sakirani
Bassal, Ibrahim Jamil, Saupi Malang and Gulam Sahiddan, thereby inflicting upon

them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their instantaneous death and likewise
causing physical injuries upon the persons of Inggal Issao Abduhasan Indasan Hadji
Yusop H. Alfad and Hadji Mahalail Alfad, thus performing all acts of execution which
could have produced the death of said persons, but nevertheless did not produce it
by reason or cause independent of the will of said accused, that is, by the timely and
able medical assistance rendered to said victims which prevented death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation, night time and the use of superior strength. (pp. 97-98, Rollo of L61069)
Upon arraignment on February 25, 1982, Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez, assisted by their
counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge, were convicted on March 5, 1982 and sentenced each "to
suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Dario Dece Raymundo, upon arraignment, interposed a plea of not guilty. However, he withdrew his
plea and substituted it with that of guilty. On March 10, 1982 he was convicted of the crime charged
and sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entered the plea of not guilty.
After trial, he was found guilty and was also sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
No pronouncement was made with respect to the civil liabilities of the four defendants because
"there was a separate civil action for breach of contract and damages filed with the same trial court
in Civil Case No. N-85 against the several defendants, including the four accused aforementioned."
(p. 26, L-61069)
The case of the four convicted defendants is now before Us on automatic review.
Evidence shows that on August 29, 1981, at about 7:30 in the evening, the vessel M/V Noria 767,
owned and registered in the name of Hadji Noria Indasan left Jolo wharf for Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi.
It arrived at the port of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi the following day, August 30, 1981, at around 2:00 in
the afternoon. In the evening of the same date, the vessel left for Labuan. On board the vessel were
several traders and crew members. Two or three hours after its departure, while sailing about 25
miles from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, a commotion occurred in one of the cabins of the vessel.
Three witnesses testified on what they saw and heard.
Mr. Clyde Que, a passenger, heard noises inside a cabin and, after awhile, he heard shots being
fired. He rushed to the motor launch to hide and on his way through the engine room, he saw
appellant Peter Ponce. Then appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Dario Dece and Rico Lopez, all armed
with rifles, started firing towards Que's companions after which they brought Que to the pilot's house
to handle the steering wheel. He was substituted by Usman, another passenger, while Que and the
other crew members were ordered to throw overboard sacks of copra and the dead bodies of Peter
Chiong, Michael Lao, Casmin Tan and Vicente America. At the time, appellant Peter Ponce, armed
with a M-14 rifle, stood guard.
Hadji Mahalail Alfad, another passenger, heard commotions from the motor launch, followed by
gunfire. He hid by laying down among the sacks of copra. He saw appellants Peter Ponce, Jaime
Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece coming down the stairs as they were firing shots until Fred

Canizares and Guilbert Que were hit, their bodies falling upon him. When he tried to move, he
realized that he was also hit on the right side of his stomach. Thereafter, he pretended to be dead till
daytime.
Emil Macasaet, Jr., the skipper of the vessel heard the commotion from one of the cabins. He
ordered his men to open the door but it could not be opened. After awhile, the door opened and he
saw a gun pointed at them. Whereupon, he hid behind the bags of copra until appellant Jaime
Rodriguez came and fired at him. Luckily, he was not hit. He and some of his men crawled and they
took cover in the bodega of copra. While in hiding there were gunfires coming from Dario Dece and
Peter Ponce. About four (4) hours later, his Chief Mate Usman persuaded him to come out otherwise
something worse would happen. He saw Jaime Rodriguez who ordered him to direct his men to
throw the copras as well as the dead bodies overboard.
About ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, the vessel reached an island where the four
appellants were able to secure pumpboats. Macasaet was ordered to load in one of the pumpboats
nine (9) attache cases which were full of money. Rico Lopez and Jaime Rodriguez boarded one
pumpboat, while Peter Ponce and Dario Dece boarded another, bringing with them: dressed
chicken, softdrinks, durian, boxes of ammunitions, gallons of water and some meat, as well as rifles.
Municipal Health Officer Leopoldo Lao went aboard the vessel M/V Noria when it arrived at Cagayan
de Tawi-Tawi on September 2, 1981 and saw at the wharf ten dead bodies, all victims of the seajacking, namely: Gulam Sahiddan, Arajul Naran Salialam, Mallang Saupi, Guilbert Que, Frederico
Canizares, Masihul Bandahala, Ribowan Majid Edgar Tan, Omar Sabdani Tahir and Abdurasul
Salialam.
In their brief, appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece claim that the trial court erred
(1) in imposing the death penalty to the accused-appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Wilfred de Lara,
Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Davao de Reyes, alias Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa despite their
plea of guilty; (2) in giving weight to the alleged sworn statements of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay,
Identified as Exhibits "C" to "C-10" and Exhibits "I to I-5", as evidence against Peter Ponce y
Bulaybulay; (3) in holding that accused-appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of the crime of
piracy; (4) in holding that the defense of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay was merely a denial; and, (5) in
holding that Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entrusted the P1,700.00 which was his personal money to
Atty. Efren Capulong of the National Bureau of Investigation.
There is no merit in this appeal of the three named defendants, namely: Jaime Rodriguez and Rico
Lopez in G.R. No. L-60100, and Dario Dece in G.R. No. L-60768.
Anent the first assigned error, suffice it to say that Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as
the Anti-Piracy Law, amending Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code and which took effect on
August 8, 1974, provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties.Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage
as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be punished by:
a) Piracy.The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods
shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on
the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape,
murder or no homocide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when
the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when
the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the crime of piracy where rape, murder
or homicide is committed is mandatory death penalty. Thus, the lower court committed no error in not
considering the plea of the three (3) defendants as a mitigating circumstance. Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code states that:
b) ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.In all cases in which
the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shag be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended
the commission of the deed.
With respect to the other assigned errors, We also find them to be devoid of merit. Appellants Peter
Ponce gave a statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") to the Malaysian authorities and another statement
(Exhibits "I" to "I-15") before the National Bureau of Investigation of Manila. When said statement
(Exhibits "C" to "C-11") was offered in evidence by the prosecution, the same was not objected to by
the defense, aside from the fact that Peter Ponce, on cross examination, admitted the truthfulness of
said declarations, thus:
Q And the investigation was reduced into writing is that correct?
A Yes. sir.
Q And you were investigated by the police authority of Kudat and
Kota Kinabalo, is that right?
A Yes, sir. Only in Kudat.
Q And that statement you gave to the authority at Kudat, you have
signed that statement, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what you stated is all the truth before the authority in Kudat?
A Yes, sir. (pp. 33-34, tsn, May 28, 1982)
Relative to the appeal of appellant Peter Ponce (G.R. No. L-61069), which We likewise declare to be
without merit, evidence shows that his participation in the commission of the offense was positively
testified to by the master of the vessel, Emil Macasaet, Jr., and a passenger, Hadji Mahalail Alfad.
Another witness, passenger Clyde Que also pointed to have seen him (Peter Ponce) armed with an
M-14 rifle.
Considering the testimonies of Clyde Que and Emil Macasaet, Jr. who actually saw appellant Peter
Ponce firing his weapon indiscriminately at the passengers and crew members in wanton disregard
of human lives and the fact that after the looting and killing, appellant Peter Ponce, still armed, joined
Dario Dece in one pumpboat, there can be no question that he was in conspiracy with the three
other defendants. After his arrest, Ponce gave a statement to the authorities stating therein his
participation as well as those of his companions (Exhibits "I" to "I-1").
The four (4) appellants were arrested and detained by the Malaysian authorities. On January 8,
1982, the National Bureau of Investigation authorities fetched and brought them to Manila where
they executed their respective statements after Rico Lopez and Peter Ponce delivered to the NBI,

P3,700.00 and P1,700.00, respectively, aside from the P527,595.00 and one Rolex watch which the
Malaysian authorities also turned over to the Acting In-Charge of the NBI in Jolo.
The statement of Ponce (Exhibit " I ") contains the questions and answers pertinent to Section 20 of
the 1973 Constitution, to wit:
l. QUESTION: Mr. Peter Ponce, we are informing you that you are
under investigation here in connection with the robbery committed on
the M/V Noria last August 31, 1981, where you are an Assistant
Engineer. You have a right to remain silent and to refuse to answer
any of our questions here. You have the right to be represented by
counsel of your choice in this investigation. Should you decide to be
represented by a lawyer but cannot afford one we will provide a
lawyer for you free. Should you decide to give a sworn statement, the
same shall be voluntary and free from force or intimidation or promise
of reward or leniency and anything that you saw here maybe used for
or against you in any court in the Philippines. Now do you understand
an these rights of yours?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
2. Q: Do you need the services of a lawyer?
A: No, sir.
3. Q: Are you willing to affix your signature hereinbelow to signify that
you so understand all your rights as above stated and that you do not
need the services of a lawyer?
A: Yes, sir. (p. 11 6, Rollo)
Thus, it is clear that Peter Ponce was fully advised of his constitutional right to remain silent and his
right to counsel.
Considering the written statements of all the appellants, (Exhibits "E", "F", "G", "H", "J" and "K"),
interlocking as they are with each other as each admits his participation and those of the other coaccused, there is no room for doubt that conspiracy existed among them. The conduct of appellant
Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is a circumstance showing the
presence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime. As a consequence, every one is responsible
for the crime committed.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI, accusedappellants.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Basilan, Judge
Jainal D. Rasul as ponente, imposing the death penalty.
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI
INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated
murder said to have been committed according to the information as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan,
Philippines, the above named accused, being strangers and without lawful authority,
armed with firearms and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring and
confederating together, aiding and assisting one with the other, with intent to gain
and by the use of violence or intimidation against persons and force upon things, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, fire their guns into the air and stop
the pumpboat wherein Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and
Antonio de Guzman were riding, traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-Baluk
towards Pilas, boarded the said pumpboat and take, steal and carry away all their
cash money, wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise and other personal belongings
amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine Currency; that the said
accused, on the occasion of the crime herein above-described, taking advantage that
the said victims were at their mercy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them to jump into the water, whereupon, the
said accused, fired their guns at them which caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro,
Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and wounding one Antonio de Guzman; thus
the accused have performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of Qualified Piracy with Quadruple Murder, but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reasons of causes in dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de
Guzman was able to swim to the shore and hid himself, and due to the timely
medical assistance rendered to said victim, Antonio de Guzman which prevented his
death. (Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide Siyoh and Omar-kayam
Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this Court finds the accused
Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murder as defined and penalized
under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 532, and hereby sentences each one
of them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. However, considering the provision
of Section 106 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or
extreme poverty of the accused who are members of the cultural minorities, under a
regime of so called compassionate society, a commutation to life imprisonment is
recommended. (Id, p. 130.)
In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)

The People's version of the facts is as follows:

Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at the Larmitan
Public Market, in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on July
10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de
Guzman received goods from his store consisting of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist
watch sets and stereophono with total value of P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn).
The goods were received under an agreement that they would be sold by the abovenamed persons and thereafter they would pay the value of said goods to Aurea and
keep part of the profits for themselves. However these people neither paid the value
of the goods to Aurea nor returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15, 1979,
Aurea was informed by Antonio de Guzman that his group was held up near BalukBaluk Island and that his companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn). On July 16, 1979, the
bodies of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman were brought
by the PC seaborne patrol to Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de
Guzman survived the incident that caused the death of his companions.
It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who
were also travelling merchants like him, were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of
Basilan, to sell the goods they received from Alberto Aurea. The goods they brought
with them had a total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for Pilas Island
at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that
night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together with Kiram and
Julaide Siyoh, started selling their goods, They were able to sell goods worth P
3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the group, again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh, went
to sell their goods at another place, Sangbay, where they sold goods worth P
12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon and again slept at Kiram's house. However that night Kiram did not sleep
in his house, and upon inquiry the following day when Antonio de Guzman saw him,
Kiram told the former that he slept at the house of Siyoh.
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to Baluk-Baluk, a
place suggested by Kiram. They were able to sell goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46,
tsn). They returned to Pilas Island for the night but Kiram did not sleep with them (p.
47, tsn).
The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk accompanied
by Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They used the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and
Siyoh were at that time armed with 'barongs'. They arrived at Baluk-Baluk at about
10:00 o'clock in the morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram and Siyoh going
ahead of the group went to a house about 15 meters away from the place where the
group was selling its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group
talking with two persons whose faces the group saw but could not recognize (pp. 5354, tsn). After selling their goods, the members of the group, together with Kiram and
Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas Island. They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh
positioned himself at the front while Kiram operated the engine. On the way to Pilas
Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green about 200
meters away from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after" Kiram turned off the
engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter two shots were fired from the other pumpboat
as it moved towards them (pp. 57-58, tsn). There were two persons on the other

pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized them to be the
same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When
the boat came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed
de Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to Mataja Island, Antonio
de Guzman and his companions were divested of their money and their goods by
Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de
Guzman to undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it
on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'. After that
remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio
de Guzman jumped into the water. As he was swimming away from the pumpboat,
the two companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he
was able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till nightfall. When he left the
mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and
Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought to the Philippine
Army station at Maluso where he received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to
the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province (pp. 66-68, tsn).
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf,
de Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were
arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he took
from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to
get back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn).
Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at
Isabela, Basilan and findings showed: 'gunshot wound, scapular area, bilateral,
tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M. Junio, Provincial
Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo
Hiolen and issued the corresponding death certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution).
(pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility of witnesses. Who
should be believed Antonio de Guzman who was the lone prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and
Kiram the accused-appellants who claims that they were also the victims of the crime? The trial court
which had the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified
assigned credibility to the former and an examination of the record does not reveal any fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which was overlooked or the significance of which was
misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the trial court's determination. Additionally, the following
claims of the appellants are not convincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on
any of the occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at
Kiram's house would make Kiram and his family immediately suspect and robbing the victims before
they had sold all their goods would be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while at
sea and after they had sold all their goods was both timely and provided safety from prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does not support this
assertion. For as the prosecution stated: "It is of important consequence to mention that the witness
presented by the defense are all from Pilas Island and friends of the accused. They claimed to be
members of retrieving team for the dead bodies but no PC soldiers were ever presented to attest this
fact. The defense may counter why the prosecution also failed to present the Maluso Police Daily
Event book? This matter has been brought by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but to
an army detachment. The Army is known to have no docket book, so why take the pain in locating

the army soldiers with whom the report was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also
makes this observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the defense to be true,
why the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman as having been allegedly helped by the accused testified
against them. Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred from the evidence of
the defense so far presented showing reason why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or
fabricate or manufacture such heinous crime as qualified piracy with triple murders and frustrated
murder? The point which makes us doubt the version of the defense is the role taken by the PC to
whom the report was allegedly made by the accused immediately after the commission of the
offense. Instead of helping the accused, the PC law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not
crediting the report of the accused or believing in the version of the report made by the lone survivor
Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently with the latter's report and placed the accused under
detention for investigation." (Expediente, pp. 127-128.)
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de Guzman, and
Primitiva de Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman informed
them shortly after the incident that their husbands were killed by the companions of Siyoh and
Kiram. The thrust of the appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were
the killers and not the former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among
the accused for as Judge Rasul has stated:
It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is sufficiently proved in this
case. In fact the following facts appear to have been established to show clearly
conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-witness Tony de
Guzman noticed that near the window of a dilapidated house, both accused were
talking to two (2) armed strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the
pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman
recognized their captors to be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom the two
accused talked in Baluk- Baluk Island near the dilapidated house; C) The two
accused, without order from the two armed strangers transferred the unsold goods to
the captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman and companion peddlers were divested
of their jewelries and cash and undressed while the two accused remained
unharmed or not molested. These concerted actions on their part prove conspiracy
and make them equally liable for the same crime (People vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57;
People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The convergence of the will of the conspirators in the
scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation of all of them the
act of any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp. 128-129.)
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and
Danilo Hiolen because his remains were never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that
Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner different from his companions. The
incident took place on July 14, 1979 and when the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981
Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is
not material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a
result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death regardless of the
number of victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by the victims; were
they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated for Rodolfo de Castro and
Danilo Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.)
The cause is consistent with the testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims were hacked; that
the appellants were armed with "barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with armalites.

WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts and the law, it is
affirmed with the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty imposed shall
be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay in solidum to the heirs of each of the
deceased indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 111709. August 30, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER P. TULIN,

VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accusedappellants.

DECISION
MELO, J.:

This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for
sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in
pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of
regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87. was
sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second
Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an
aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accusedappellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante,
Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew
and took complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew
members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear
portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was
then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was
forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the
ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to
the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the
Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative results. On March 9,
1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to
await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to
the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it
remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18
nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored
beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to
the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi
Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the
area, was completed on March 30,1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer
of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained
at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern
warning not to report the incident to government authorities for a period of two days or until
April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from the shoreline by
a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio
Changco, who brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of
the crew in proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-

appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places in Metro
Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were
brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident was also reported to the
National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn
statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present at
U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance, accused-appellant
Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way
by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby of
Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
On October 24 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential
Decree No. 532 (piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I.

LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN
HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No.
532), committed as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates
inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and armed
with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board
and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with
petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members, employing
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel
to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to
the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accusedappellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.

Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in

their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial, and
disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi
Pride." All of them claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to
the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with
Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the
seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were
told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with
additional compensation if they worked beyond that period. They agreed even though they had
no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran
errands for the officers. They denied having gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only
went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid
P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be
remitted to their addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the
parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home
sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he
studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the
course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years on board a vessel. He was
employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the
business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and
international markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and his
cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the
Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone operator on board the
vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who
offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the
company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph
Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but
failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his
return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel
oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered
to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore
Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board
"Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee"
would be making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port
authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port
clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the
brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass through the immigration. The
General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.

On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers then
told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil
transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called
"Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask
for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride"
and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby"
signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment to Paul Gan and
William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the
quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the firm
" from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first transfer was observed.
This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks, including beer, purchased by the
company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was completed on March
30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and
wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for
the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with
Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as
contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that
weekend. After being billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under
the name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to
be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI
agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby

rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the
crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree
No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under
Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory
death. However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot
impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, ]
r., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San
Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article
52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to
return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the
accused can no longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit,

jointly and severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of
P11,240,000.00 Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per
annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the accused
including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines,
Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said
cargo to said corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and
severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of
P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full.
After the accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to
Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National
Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case
provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With
costs against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants may be
summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin Virgilio Loyola Andres C. Infante Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial court
erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were being
represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of their constitutional
right to procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance as
counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the
trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after
Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend that
during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign
statements without being given the opportunity to read the contents of the same; were denied
assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in violation of their constitutional
rights,
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution
proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege

that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all
times. The crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged
pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime
committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and his cohorts
attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the
subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an
accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and
punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or
executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction
to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual
conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in fact are contrary to the
evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice under
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct
participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove any
participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues that
he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing the
crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with
qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to
Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside
Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been
committed within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal effects
and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial?;
(2) what are the legal effects and implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial
investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did
Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5)
can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and
when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and
territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was
executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991,

stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were represented by a nonlawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due
process clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During
the trial, accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical
manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of
the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They
also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992,
pp. 7-59). It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in
person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of
judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact
that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that
"[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil
Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the
accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that
he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy , but without
prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that
the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of
Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of
procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation
during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and
with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made (People vs.
Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may
not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.

Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U. S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to
the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during
custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution
even adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the
presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the
accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was
not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the socalled "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter
in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule,
once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary
or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the
principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence
because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained
(People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial
confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are
inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise
inadmissible in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient
evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound deduction
of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants
Tulin, Loyola, .and Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit the crime charged. In the
words of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals -

...The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and members
of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to the said
Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2,
1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its
cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew of the
vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the
shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon
which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the
price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991...
xxx
xxx
xxx

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on
board the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April
10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the
mind of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and
identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused were
taken into custody by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their
"Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said Accused as some
of the pirates.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused
admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening of
March 2 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its, destination, which
turned out to be off the port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is not
supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the
categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain
denial of participation in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296
[1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate
tale that they were hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon,
Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were
conversing with one another along the seashore at Apkaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to
work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said
accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of time
without even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing their destination or the
details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such
evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the
trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had
to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place
merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17,
he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite,
sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more
so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering
that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce

clear and convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically
impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he
was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the
highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the
demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is telling the truth
(People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every
detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part
to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there
are times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a
common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused- appellants Tulin, Loyola,
and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off
Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the
members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them
to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare
and food provisions on their way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accusedappellant Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an objective common to all other accusedappellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. Accusedappellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain
Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio
worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are approximately six or seven
kilometers away from each other. Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other
hand, has known Cecilio since their parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan,
Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity
.Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking case regarding
"M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio
Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at
large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of piracy
in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of
Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994) which
amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree
No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or
duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential
Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to
reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree
No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who

are members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659
shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement or passengers of the vessel,
hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:

Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. -The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize
a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the
whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 January 1, 1994), reads:

Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters.
-The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high
seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, being a member of its
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel,
its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Underscoring ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:

SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - The following shall mean and be understood, as

follows:
d. Piracy. -Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole
or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement
or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person. including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be
considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as
hereinafter provided (underscoring supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that
piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a
passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent
provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand,
under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy
embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in

Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is
covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise
no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential
decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the
citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in
one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms
of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under
the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as
separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to
state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee"
by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel
was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and
sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although
Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be
committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still
deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it
is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if
Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal
code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine
waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its
purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan,
278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same,
piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he was
convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he was
charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; ( c) and that his act was indispensable in the attack on
and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that accusedappellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and
his band of pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 532 which provides:

SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway

robbery brigandage. -Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects

pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the

movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives
property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit
therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or
highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal
officers and be punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section
has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is Within well-settle jurisprudence that if there is lack of
complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal
(People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in
the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v.
Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores,
40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No
532 which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided in said section has
performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant
Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the
commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the
stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He
profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3,
1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum products,
connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew
List to ensure that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities,
and supplied the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port
(tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and
Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services
personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities.
Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities
could have easily discovered the illegal activities that took place and this would have resulted in
his arrest and prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T
Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accusedappellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that on
March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels
of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list
of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong;
that the "General Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of

Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled
to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on board, and the
purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to unload and transfer
1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with' Emilio Changco
a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor prepared the "Quantity
Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride"
was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed
his signature on the "Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that
he then paid $150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco
also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival at
Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH",
Record), it was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the
high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons
of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed above. It
was likewise supervised by accused- appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco
supervised the transfer from his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his superiors
and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and
nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second,
considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any participation in the
cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired. He failed to
show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any contract of sale for the
purchase by the firm; he never bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation
relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo
whom he met for the first time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer
took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which a marine vessel of his
firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan
involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued therefor; he was not even aware if
Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should also be noted that the
value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$l,000,000.00 (computed at
P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than onehalf of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in
his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and money for transportation
-only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition to the act
of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo
that his firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders of
his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a
superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to
carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the
alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of
Philippine, but of international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippineoperated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally
unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk,

Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial
court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These circumstances
show that he must have realized the nature and the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng
Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the
transfer of the cargo to the Navi Pride. He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer
the consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on
record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.

ARBITRARY DETENTION
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO
DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS

V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.
ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIO, LT. COL. REX
D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer,
PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND
DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS
ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO:
ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro
Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT.
MALTRO AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.

Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.

The Solicitor General for the respondents.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:p
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions, seeking
reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which
dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No.
85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby
ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision
did not rule as many misunderstood it to do that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party
or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the
decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions.
Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar
organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this
connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as
the elected representative of the people not the Court that should repeal, change or modify
them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made
without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly
Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the
constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons
arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and
subversive documents found in their possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as
those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of
extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.

It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed
by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's
detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.

In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court
before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without
warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law,
would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or
authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by
law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon
which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said
Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without
warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was
committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like
rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit

such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them
apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the
overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without
warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That
Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA
member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would
shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this
sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense.
Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end
upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which

compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his
membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual
facts that will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case,
that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has
just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the
offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal
knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11

These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St.
Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was
received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said
hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the
said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols
the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along
Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same information, the wounded
man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old
of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member
("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable
and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to
engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by
circumstances are: first the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were
actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second a
wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated
in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third as the records of this case disclosed later,
"Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded
man was in reality Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate
attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in
St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the
law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the
officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed
to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly
perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been
ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the
requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an
information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed
against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was thus
promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On 31
August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The
judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their
arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued
by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their
persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without
warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that
a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in court against said
petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra
mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of these
petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former
NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain
house occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound,
Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their
safehouse; that in view of this information, the said house was placed under military
surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by
court, a search of the house was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then
confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions,
radio and other communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking
member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988,
and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the
rebel group.

3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of
Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of
Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and
she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when
they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agents frisked them,
subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess
them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises
ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject
of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence
and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the
reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information
given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and
the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information
as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or
occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the
information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the
Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine,
who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were
unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their
possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted
ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests,
they were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In
view of these circumstances, the corresponding informations were filed in court against said arrested
persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by
the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear
to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the aforenamed persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say
that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest.
That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action
against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of
executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting
the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in
the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5,
Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed
guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the
reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest
without warrant. 23

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested
persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24 But if they do
not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.

In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the
attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the
corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of
drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)

and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press
Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus
drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for
uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling
within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist,
during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech
regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers
to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still
another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times,
the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not
conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced
from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. For
Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not
appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the
hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been
provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo
Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00
o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing,
was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of
Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested
Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without
warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of
Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that
Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made
promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14)
days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of
Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an
information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the
killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was
denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to
post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same
trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf
of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian,

Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and
thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition
for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of
the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in
fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because
of the strength of the evidence against him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding
informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on
probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in
Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a
quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to
the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for
admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in
the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession
during her arrest, belonged to her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in
the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in
their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's
perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without
warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To
note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty
of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the
guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It
pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the
light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps
with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant
be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly look into and all
other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same the legality of the arrest without warrant so
that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are
not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then
the detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that
he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The
Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere
unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the
arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and
circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some
groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED.
This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

After a deep and thorough reexamination of the decision of Julv 9, 1990 and an exhaustive
evaluation of the motions for reconsideration of the said decision, I am inclined to agree with the,
majority's resolution on said motions for reconsideration except for the legality of the warrantless
arrests of petitioner Deogracias Espiritu for the crime of inciting to sedition and petitioner Alfredo
Nazareno for the crime of murder.
In the words of the resolution, Espiritu "was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any
'continuing offense,' but for uttering" the following: "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa
magkagulo na." Apparently, such statement was, in the perception of the arresting officers, inciting to
sedition. While not conceding the validity of such perception, realizing that it is indeed possible that
Espiritu was merely exercising his right to free speech, the resolution nonetheless supports the
authority of peace officers "only for purposes of the arrest."
I find this position to be adverse to the very essence of the resolution which sanctions warrantless
arrests provided they are made in accordance with law. In the first place, Espiritu mav not be
considered as having "just committed" the crime charged. He allegedly first uttered seditious
remarks at the National Press Club in the afternoon of November 12, 1988. The second allegedly
seditious remark aforequoted was made at around 5:00 o'clock in the same afternoon (Decision, pp.
23-24). Under these circumstances, the law enforcement agents had time, short though it might
seem, to secure a warrant for his arrest. Espiritu's apprehension may not therefore be considered as
covered by Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which allows warrantless arrests "when an offense has in fact
just been committed."

The same observation applies with greater force in the case of Nazareno who was arrested 14 days
after the commission of the crime imputed to him.
Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officer are not sure what particular
provision of law had beeri violated by the person arrested. True it is that law en.orcement agents and
even prosecutors are not all adept at the However, errneous perception, not to mention ineptitude
among their ranks, especially if it would result in the violation of any right of a person, may not be
tolerated. That the arrested person has the "right to insist during the pre-trial or trial on the merits"
(Resolution., p. 18) that he was exercising a right which the arresting officer considered as contrary
to law, is beside the point. No person should be subjected to the ordeal of a trial just because the law
enforcers wrongly perceived his action.
Thirdly, inciting to sedition is not a continuous crime for which the offender may be arrested without a
warrant duly issued by the proper authority. By its nature, a single act of urging others to commit any
of the acts enumerated in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code may suffice to hold anyone liable
for inciting to sedition. While the crime is aimed at anarchy and radicalism and presents largely a
question of policy (Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil, 524 [1951]), it should be remembered that any of
the prohibited acts in Article 142 may infringe upon the fundamental freedoms of speech and
expression. There arises, therefore, the necessity of balancing interests; those of the State as
against those of its individual citizen. Here lies the urgency of judicial intervention before an arrest is
made. Added to this is the subjectivity of the determination of what may incite other people to
sedition. Hence, while the police should act swiftly when a seditious statement has been uttered in
view of the jeopardy it may cause the government, speedy action should consist not in warrantless
arrests but in securing warrants for such arrests.
On the legality of warrantless arrests of violators of the Anti-Subversion Law, it should be
underscored that anyone who undertakes such arrest must see to it that the alleged violator
is knowing member of a subversive organization as distinguished from a nominal one (People vs.
Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382). Thus, a subversive may be arrested even if
has not committed overt act of overthrowing the government such as bombing of government offices
trie assassination of government officials provided there is probable cause to believe that he is in the
roll of members of a subversive organization. It devolves upon the accused to prove membership by
force or ciorcion. Certainly, one may not be in such a roll without undergoing the concious act of
enlistment.
It bears repeating theat warrantless arrests are governed by law and subject to stringent application.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure now requires that an offense "has in
fact just been committed. "connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under the old
rule where an offense 'has in fact been committed' no how long ago. Similarly, the arrestor must
have 'personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed it' (instead of just
'reasonable ground believe that the [arrestee] has committed it' under the old rule)." (Dissenting
opinion in Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349, 408).
I deem it aptherein to recall other Court rulings provide guidelines in effecting arrests without
warrants. In People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. 68955, September 4, 1986,144 SCRA 1), the Court
considered as illegal the warrantless arrest of a subversive not based on the arresting officer's
personal knowledge such subversion and held that any rule on arrests witho warrants must be
strictly construed. We categorically state therein that warrantless arrests should "clearly fall within
the situations when securing a warrant be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary was provided by the
Rules" (144 SCRA at 14). Moreover. "it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually (has just) been
committed first. That crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough

to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must
be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. (Supra,
at p. 15).
Earlier, in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile (G.R. No. 61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538), the Court laid out
the procedure to be observed the moment a person is arrested:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to imform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person shall have
the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arressted, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition on his behalf, or appointed the court upon the petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but
the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part shall be inadmissible evidence. (121
SCRA at 554).
These judicial pronouncements must be observed by everyone concerned: the military and civilian
components of the government tasked with law enforcement as well as the ordinary citizen who
faces a situation wherein civic duty demands his intervention to preserve peace in the community.
I am not unmindful of the fact that abuses occur in arrests especially of offenders of crimes with a
political or ideological element. Such abuses are more often than not, triggered by the difficulty in
finding evidence that could stand judicial scrutiny to pinpoint a subversive, police officers usually
have to make long persistent surveillance. However, for the orderly administration of government
and the maintenance of peace and order in the country, good faith should be reposed on the officials
implementing the law. After all, we are not wanting in laws to hold any offending peace officer liable
both administratively and criminally for abuses in the performance of their duties. Victims of abuses
should resort to legal remedies to redress their grievances.
If existing laws are inadequate, the policy-determining branches of the government may be exhorted
peacefully by the citizenry to effect positive changes. This Court, mandated b the Constitution to
uphold the law, can only go as far as inter pruting existing laws and the spirit behind them.
Otherwise, we hail be entering the dangerous ground of judicial legislation.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
The philosophy adopted in our Constitution is that liberty is an essential condition for order, It is
disturbing whenever the Court leans in the direction of order instead of liberty in har cases coming
before us.
People all over the world are fast accepting the theory that only as a society encourages freedom
and permits dissent can it have lasting security and real progress, the theory that enhancing order
through constraints on freedom is deceptive because restrictions on liberty corrode the very values
Govenment pretends to promote. I believe we should move with the people of the world who are fast
liberating themselves.

I, therefore, vote for the strict application of Section 5 (a) and (b) of Rule 113 on arrests without
warrant, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
xxx xxx xxx
Only in the cases found in the Rule should we allow arrests without warrants. In case of doubt, the
tendency should be to declare the warrantless arrest illegal.
Insofar as G.R. Nos, 84581-82, G.R. Nos. 84583-84 and G.R. No. 83162 involving Amelia Roque,
Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Vicky Ocaya are concerned, the
petitioners were arrested after having been apprehended while in possession of illegal firearms and
ammunitions. They were actually committing a crime when arrested. I concur in the denial of their
motions for reconsideration.
I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727 where Deogracias Espiritu was
arrested while urging jeepnev and bus drivers to join a strike of transport workers on the ground that
that was inciting to sedition.
This impresses me as Court validation of a clear infringement of an individual's freedom of speech.
"Inciting to sedition" is a term over which the most learned writers and jurists will differ when applied
to actual cases. I doubt if there are more than a handful of policemen in the whole country who
would know the full dimensions of the fine distinctions which separate the nation's interest in the
liberty to fully anfd freely discuss matters of national importance on one hand and the application of
the clear and present danger rule as the test when claims of national security and public safety are
asserted, on the other. In fact, the percentage of knowledgeability would go down further if we
consider that "inciting to sedition" requires the ability to define, among other (1) what kinds of
speeches or writings fall lander the term "inciting" (2) the meaning of rising publicly and tumultously;
(3,) when does a certain effort amount to force, intimidation. or illegal method; (4) what constitute
the five objects or ends of sedition; and (5) what is a scurrilous libel against the Philippines. If we
allow public speakers to be picked up simply because what they say is irritating or obnoxious to the
ears of a peace officer or critical of government policy and action, we will undermine all
pronouncements of this Court on the need to protect that matrix of all freedoms, which is freedom of
expression. At the very least, a warrant of arrest after a preliminary examination by a Judge is
essential in this type of offense.
Insofar as G.R. No. 81567 is concemed, I join the other dissenting Justices in their observations
regarding "continuing oftenses." To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of continuing offense is
to give a license for the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion. Rebellion, insurrection, or
sedition are political offenses where the line between overt acts and simple advocacy or adherence
to a belief is extremely thin. If a court has convicted an accused of rebellion and he is found roaming
around, he may be arrested. But until a person is proved guilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump to
a personal conclusion that the suspect is indeed a rebel and must be picked up on sight whenever
seen. The grant of authority in the majority opinion is too broad. If warrantless searches are to be

validated, it should be Congress and not this Court which should draw strict and narrow standards.
Otherwise, the non-rebels who are critical, noisy, or obnoxious will be indiscriminately lumped up
with those actually taking up arms against the Government.
The belief of law enforcement authorities, no matter how well grounded on past events, that the
petitioner would probably shoot other policemen whom he may meet does not validate warrantless
arrests. I cannot understand why the authorities preferred to bide their time, await the petitioner's
surfacing from underground, and pounce on him with no legal authority instead of securing warrants
of arrest for his apprehension. The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not the
warrantless arrest.
In G.R. No. 86332, Romulo Bunye was killed on December 14, 1988. The information that Narciso
Nazareno was one of the killers came to the attention of peace officers only on December 28, 1988
or fourteen (14) days later. To say that the offense "has in fact just been committed" even if 14 days
have lapsed is to stretch Rule 11 3 on warrantless arrests into ridiculous limits. A warrant of arrest is
essential in this case. I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.
The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not reach back into the past and
render legal what was illegal. The violation of the constitutional right against illegal seizures is not
cured by the fact that the arrested person is indeed guilty of the offense for which he was seized. A
government of laws must abide by its own Constitution.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, I VOTE TO:
(1) DENY the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 84581-82; G.R. No. 84583-84; and G.R. No.
83162;
(2) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727;
(3) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 86332;and
(4) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 81567.
CRUZ, J., Separate Opinion:
I reiterate my concurrence with the ponencia insofar as it dismissed the petitions of those who were
arrested in flagrante, or subsequently posted bail or chose to remain in the custody of the military, or
voluntarily permitted the search of the house without warrant. I do not think that under the applicable
circumstances the petitioners can validly complain that they are being unlawfully detained.
But I must again express may dissent to the continued observance of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, 121
SCRA 472, to justify the warrantless arrest and detention of the other petitioners on the ground that
they were apprehended for the continuing offenses of rebellion and other allied crimes.
We find in the said decision this partltularly disturbing observation, which was quoted with approval
in the original ponencia:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion, whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a

statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence
of probable cause before the issuance of arrest and the granting of bail of the offense
is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against govenment
forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The treatment suggested envisions an actual state of war and is justified only when a recognition of
beuigerency is accorded by the legitimate government to the rebels, resulting in the application of
the laws of war in the regulation of their relations. The rebels are then considered alien enemies-to
be treated as prisoners of war when captured-and cannot invoke the municipal law of the legitimate
government they have disowned. It is in such a situation that the processes of the local courts are
not observed and the rebels cannot demand the protection of the Bill of Rights that they are deemed
to have renounced by their defiance of the government.
But as long as that recognition has not yet been extended, the legitimate govenment must treat the
rebels as its citizens, subject to its municipal law and entitled to all the rights provided thereunder,
including and especially those guaranteed by the Constitution. Principal among these in our
country are whose embodied in the Bill of Rights, particularly those guaranteeing due process,
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, allowing bail, and presuming the innocence of the
accused. The legitimate government cannot excuse the suppression of these rights by the
"exigencies" of an armed conflict that at this time remains an intemal matter governed exclusively by
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
Treatment of the rebels as if they were foreign invaders or combatants is not justified in the
present situation as our government continues to prosecute them as violators of our own laws.
Under the doctrine announced in Garcia-Padilla, however, all persons suspected as rebels are by
such suspicion alone made subject to summary arrest no different from the unceremonious capture
of an enemy soldier in the course of a battle. The decision itself says that the arrest "need not follow
the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses" and "the absence of a judicial warrant is no
impediment" as long as the person arrested is suspected by the authorities of the "continuing
offense" of subversion or rebellion or other related crimes. International law is thus substituted for
municipal law in regulating the relations of the Republic with its own citizens in a purely domestic
matter.
As for the duration of the offenses, the decision contained the following pronouncement which this
Court has also adopted as its own:
. . . The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance on
the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which
set them apart from the common offenses, aside front their essentially involving a
massive conspiracy of nationwide manitude. (Emphasis supplied.)
The beginning of the "continuing offense" may be arbitrarily fixed by the authorities, usually by simply
placing the suspect "under surveillance," to lay the basis for his eventual apprehension. Once so
placed, he may at any time be arrested without warrant on the specious pretext that he is in the
process of committing the "continuing offense," no matter that what he may be actuallly doing at the
time is a perfectly innocent act.

In the case of Dural. the arrest was made while he was engaged in the passive and innocuous act of
undergoing medical treatment. The fiction was indulged that he was even then, as he lay supine in
his sickbed, engaged in the continuing offense of rebellion against the State. In further justification,
the Court says that the arresting officers acted on "confidential information" that he was in the
hospital, which information "was found to be true." This is supposed to have validated the
determination of the officers that there was "probable cause" that excused the absence of a warrant.
My own impression is that probable cause must be established precisely to justify the issuance of a
warrant, not to dispense with it; moreover, probable cause must be determined by the judge issuing
the warrant, not the arresting officer who says it is not necessary.
In the case of Espiritu, the arrest was made while he was actually sleeping, and for allegedly
seditious remarks made by him the day before. The Court says his case is not covered by the
Garcia-Padilla doctrine but approves the arrest just the same because the remarks were supposed
to continue their effects even to the following day. The offense was considered as having
been just committed (to make it come under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court) despite the
considerable time lapse.
It was worse in the case of Nazareno, who was also arrested without warrant, and no less
than fourteen days after the killing. In sustaining this act, the Court says that it was only on the day
of his arrest that he was identified as one of the probable killers, thus suggesting that the validity of a
warrantless arrest is reckoned not from the time of the commission of an offense but from the time of
the Identification of the suspect.
Section 5 of Rule 113 says that a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the latter
"has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" or when an offense
"has in fact just been committed." The requirement of immediacy is obvious from the word "just,"
which, according to Webster, means "a very short time ago." The arrest must be made
almost immediately or soon after these acts, not at any time after the suspicion of the arresting
officer begins, no matter how long ago the offense was committed.
I am also uneasy over the following observations in the present resolution which I hope will not be
the start of another dangerous doctrine:
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as
revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds
upon wmch the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported
by probable cause, i.e., that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court.
I can only repeat my own misgivings when I dissented in the recent case of People vs. Malmstedt,
G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991, where I noted: "The conclusion that there was probable cause may
have been influenced by the subsequent discovery that the accused was carrying a prohibited drug.
This is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. In other words, it was the fact of illegal possession
that retroactively established the probable cause that validated the illegal search and seizure. It was
the fruit of the poisonous tree that washed clean the tree itself."
I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla decision to justify the illegal arrests
made in the cases before us is a step back to that shameful past when individual rights were

wantonly and systematically violated by the Marcos dictatorship. It seems some of us have short
memories of that repressive regime, but I for one am not one to forget so soon. As the ultimate
defender of the Constitution, this Court should not gloss over the abuses of those who, out of
mistaken zeal, would violate individual liberty in the dubious name of national security. Whatever
their ideology and even if it be hostile to ours, the petitioners are entitled to the protection of the Bill
of Rights, no more and no less than any other person in this country. That is what democracy is all
about.
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result reached by the majority in the Resolution disposing of the Motion for
Reconsideration.
At the same time, however, I feel compelled to dissent from certain statements made by the majority
principally concerning the applicability of the "continuing crimes" doctrine to the problem of arrests
without warrants. It seems clear that these statements are really obiter dicta, since they are quite
unnecessary for sustaining the actual results reached in the majority Resolution. This was summarily
pointed out in my very brief statement concurring in the result reached in the original Decision of the
Court dated 9 July 1990. The subsequent developments in several of the cases here consolidated,
which are carefully detailed in the majority Resolution, make this even clearer. Nonetheless, the
majority Resolution has taken the time and trouble expressly to reiterate the "continuing crimes"
doctrine as applicable in respect of warrantless arrests. Although the above statements are obiter,
they have been made and, I believe, need to be addressed to some extent and the inter-relation of
the "continuing crimes" doctrine with constitutional rights explored.
1. We start at the beginning, that is, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable seizures of
persons. Article III Section 2 of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. (Emphais supplied)
Under the above provision, arrests, i.e., the constraint and seizure of the persons of individual
members of society, must, as a general rule, be preceded by the securing of a warrant of arrest, the
rendition of which complies with the constitutional procedure specified in Article III Section 2. Arrests
made without a warrant issued by a judge after complying with the constitutional procedure,
are prima facie unreasonable seizures of persons within the meaning of Article III Section 2.
2. There are, however, certain well-recognized exceptions to the norm that warrantless arrests are
unreasonable seizures of persons. Those exceptions are, in our day, essentially found in Section
5(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Section 5(a) and (b) mark out the situations where an
officer of the law, or a private person for that matter, may lawfully arrest a person without previously
securing a warrant of arrest. The full text of Section 5, Rule 113 follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
3. Before examining the scope and implications of Section 5(a) and (b), it is important to recall that
judicial interpretation and application of Section 5(a) and (b) must take those provision for what they
are: they are exceptions to a vital constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Exceptions to
such a norm must be strictly construed so as not to render futile and meaningless the constitutional
rule requiring warrants of arrests before the persons of individuals may be lawfully constrained and
seized. The ordinary rule generally applicable to statutory provisions is that exceptions to such
provisions must not be stretched beyond what the language in which they are cast fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision, rather than the exception. 1 This
rule must apply with special exigency and cogency where we deal, not with an ordinary statutory provision, but with a constitutional
guarantee. 2 Exceptions to such a guarantee must be read with especial care and sensitivity and kept within the limits of their language so to
keep vital and significant the general constitutional norms warrantless arrests. In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 3 this Court, stressing
that:

II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is
one of the highest duties and privileges of the court. these constitutional guaranties
should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual,
to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of, the rights
secured by them (State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231
Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule
that statutes authorizing searches and seizures or search warrants must be strictly
construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed. [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U.S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353;
Perry vs. U.S., 14 Fed. [2d], 88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613. (emphasis supplied)
held that:
. . . All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable whith lawful ones are
reasonable. 4
In People vs. Burgos, 5 this Court reiterated the above rule in the following terms:
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was
possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the
appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document. Neither was he commit ting any act which could be described
as subversive. He was, in fact plowing his field at the time of the arrest.

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule
which allows exceptions the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed.
Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would
be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally
construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the
cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and
set back a basic right so often vilated and so deserving of full protection. 6 (emphasis
supplied)

4. Section 5(a) relates to situations where a crime is committed or attempted to be committed in the
presence of the arresting officer. The fact of the occurrence of the offense, or of the attempt to
commit an offense, in the presence of the arresting officer, may be seen to be the substitute, under
the circumstances, for the securing of a warrant of arrest. In such situation, there is an obvious need
for immediate, even instantaneous, action on the part of the arresting officer to suppress the breach
of public order and to prevent further breaches then and there. Section 5(a) may, moreover, be seen
to refer to overt acts constitutive of a crime taking place in the presence of the arresting officer. The
term "presence" in this connection is properly and restrictively construed to relate to acts taking
place within the optical or perhaps auditory perception of the arresting officer. 7 If no overt, recognizably
criminal, acts occur which are perceptible through the senses of the arresting officer, such officer could not, of course, become aware at all
that a crime is being committed or attempted to be committed in his presence. 8 It is elementary that purely mental or psychological
phenomena, not externalized in overt physical acts of a human person, cannot constitute a crime in our legal system. For a crime to exist in
our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus. If no such overt acts are actually taking place in the
presence or within the sensor perception of the arresting officer, there would, in principle, be ample time to go to a magistrate and ask for a
warrant of arrest. There would, in other words, not be that imperious necessity for instant action to prevent an attempted crime, to repress the
crime being committed, or to capture the doer of the perceive criminal act, the necessity which serves as the justification in law of warrantless
arrests under Section 5(a).

5. Turning to Section 5 (b), two (2) elements must be coincide before a warrantless arrest may be
sustained under this subsection: 1) the offense must have "just been committed" when the arresting
officer arrived in the scene; and 2) the officer must have "personal knowledge" of facts indicating tha
the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In somewhat different terms, the first
requirement imports that th effects or corpus of the offense which has just been committed are still
visible: e.g. a person sprawled on the ground, dead of gunshot wound; or a person staggering
around bleeding profusely from stab wounds. The arresting officer may not ha seen the actual
shooting or stabbing of the victim, and thereto the offense can not be said to have been committed
"in [his] presence." The requirement of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer is a
requirement that such knowledge must have been obtained directly from sense perception the
arresting officer. That requirement would exclude informtion conveyed by another person, no matter
what his reputation for, truth and reliability might be. 9 Thus, where the arresting officer comes upon a person dead on
the street and sees a person running away with a knife from where the victim is sprawled the ground, he has personal knowledge of facts
which render it highly probable that the person fleeing was the doer of the criminal deed. The arresting officer must, in other words, perceive
through his own senses some act which directly connects the person to be arrested with the visible effects or corpus of a crime which has
"just been committed."

6. The use of the words "has in fact just been committed" underscores the requirement that the time
interval between the actual commission of the crime and the arrival of the arresting officer must be
brief indeed. In the first place, the word "just" was fairly recently inserted in Section 5(b) by the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedures, no doubt in order to underscore the point here being made. In the
second place, a latitudinarian view of the phrase "has in fact just been committed" would obviously
render pointless the requirement in Section 5(a) that the crime must have been committed "[in] the
presence" of the arresting officer. In G.R. No. 86332, the warrantless arrest of Alfredo Nazareno 14days after the occurrence of the killing with which he was charged along with other persons, cannot
by any standard be justified under Section 5(b). In G.R. No. 81567, Dural was arrested without
warrant while being treated in a hospital the day after the shooting of the policemen in which he was
suspected to have been a participant. While 1-day may be substantially different from 14-days, still it

must be pointed out that at the time Dural was arrested in the hospital, the killing of the two (2)
policemen in Caloocan City far away from the St. Agnes Hospital in Quezon City could not
reasonably be said to have been just committed. There was no showing, nor did the Court require it,
that the arresting officers had been in "hot pursuit" of Dural beginning at the scene of the killing and
ending the next day in the hospital.
7. It is worth noting that the requisite of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer who
is determining "probable cause" right at the scene of the crime, is in a sense more exacting than the
standard imposed by the Constitution upon the judge who, in the seclusion of his chambers,
ascertains "probable cause" by examining the evidence submitted before him. The arresting officer
must himself have "personal knowledge"; the magistrate may rely upon the personal knowledge of
the witnesses examined by or for him in issuing a warrant of arrest. In the present Resolution, the
majority begins with noting the requirement of "personal knowledge" in Section 5(b), but winds up in
the next page with a very diluted standard of "reasonable belief and "good faith" on the part of the
arresting officers. The stricter standard is properly applicable to the officers seizing a person without
a warrant of arrest, for they are acting in derogation of a constitutional right. That the person
unlawfully arrested without a warrant may later turn out to be guilty of the offense he was suspected
of in the first place is, course, quite beside the point. Even a person secretly guilty some earlier
crime is constitutionally entitled to be secure from warrantless arrest, unless he has in fact
committed physically observable criminal acts in the presence of the arresting officer or hadjust
committed such acts when the arresting officer burst upon the scene.
8. Examination of the utilization in the majotity Resolution of the doctrine of "continuing crimes,"
shows that doctrine is here being used as a substitute for the requirement under Section 5(a) that
the offense "has in fact just been presence of the arresting officer arrived, but rather because the
person to be arrested is suspected of having committed a crime in the future. The pertinent portion
of the majority Resolution reads:
. . . Dural did not cease to be, or because less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSE OF
ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital. . . . That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of
his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given
another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as
agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that
subversion like rebelion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense.
Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e., adultery, murder, arson, etc., which
generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an
ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and
violence until the overriding objectives of overthrowing organized government is
attained. (Emphasis supplied)
9. I respectfully submit that an examination of the "continuing crimes" doctrine as actually found in
our case law offers no reasonable basis for such use of the dotrine. More specifically, that doctrine,
in my submission, does not dispence with the requirement that overt acts recognizably criminal in
character must take place in the presence of the arresting officer, or must have just been committed
when the arresting officer arrived, if the warrantless arrest it to be lawful. The "continuing crimes"
doctrine in our case law (before rendition of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile 10 does not sustain warrantless arrests of
person to be arrested is, as it were, merely resting in between specific lawless and commit the moment he gets an opportunity to do so.

Our case law shows that the "continuing crimes" doctrine has been used basically in relation to two
(2) problems: the first problem is that of determination of whether or not a particular offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; the second problem is that of determining

whether a single crime or multiple crimes were committed where the defense of double jeopardy is
raised.
10. In respect of the first problem, the gist of our case law is that where some of the ingredients or
elements of an offense taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of one court and some other
ingredients or elements of the same offense occur in the territory of another court, (e.g., estafa or
malversation) either one of the two courts has jurisdiction to try the offense. Where all of the
essential elements of a crime take place within the territory of one court but "by reason of he very
nature of the offense committed" the violation of the law is deemed to be "continuing," then the court
within whose territorial jurisdiction the offense continues to be committed, has jurisdiction to try a
person charged with such offense. In the latter case, the offense is deemed to be continuing
because some or all of the elements constituting the offense occurred within jurisdiction of the
second court (e.g., kidnapping and illegal detention; libel; evasion of service of sentence). The
criminal acts are regarded as repeated or as continuing within the province or city where the
defendant was found and arrested. 11 Clearly, overt acts of the accussed constituting elements of the crime charged must be
shown to have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court where he is charged.

11. Turning to the second type of problem, the question is normally presented in terms of whether
one crime or multiple crimes were committed by the accused. Where the series of acts actually
alleged and proven to have been committed by the accused constituted only one and the same
crime, the defense of double jeopardy becomes available where a second information is filed
covering acts later in the series. Upon the other hand, where the acts of the accused constituted
discrete, multiple offenses, each act comprising a distinct and separate offense, the double jeopardy
defense is non-available. 12 The point worth stressing is that in passing upon the issue relating to the unity or multiplicity of
offense committed, the overt acts of the accused constitutive either of the single offense or of the plural offenses, must be shown.

12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing crimes," which has its own legitimate
function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for weakening and dissolving
the constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts comprising all or some
of the elements of the offense charged are shown to have been committed by the person arrested
without warrant, the "continuing crime" doctrine should not be used to dress up the pretense that a
crime, begun or committed elsewhere, continued to be committed by the person arrested in the
presence of the arresting officer. The capacity for mischief of such a utilization of the "continuing
crimes" doctrine, is infinitely increased where the crime charged does not consist of unambiguous
criminal acts with a definite beginning and end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding of
a person or kidnapping and illegal dentention or arson) but rather of such problematic offenses as
membership in or affiliation with or becoming a member of, a subversive association or organization.
For in such cases, the overt constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves, and the
unlawfulness of the acts a function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved. Note, for
instance, the following acts which constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any subversive
association:" 13
a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records,
correspondence, or any other document of the organization;
b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any form
whatsoever;
c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues,
assessments, loans or in any other forms;
xxx xxx xxx

f) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in

furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof;
xxx xxx xxx
h) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication
to promote the objectives and purposes of such association or organization;
xxx xxx xxx
k) Participating in any was in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of
such association or organization;
xxx xxx xxx
It may well be, as the majority implies, that the constitutional rule against warrantless arrests and
seizures makes the law enforcement work of police agencies more difficult to carry out. It is not our
Court's function, however, and the Bill of Rights was not designed, to make life easy for police forces
but rather to protect the liberties of private individuals. Our police forces must simply learn to live
with the requirements of the Bill of Rights, to enforce the law by modalities which themselves comply
with the fundamental law. Otherwise they are very likely to destroy, whether through sheer ineptness
or excess of zeal, the very freedoms which make our polity worth protecting and saving.
REGALADO, J.: Separate Opinion:
While I have heretofore concurred in the ponencia in the above-entitled cases and I reiterate such
concurrence, I wish to unburden myself of some reservations on the rationale adopted in G.R. No.
86332.
It is posited in this resolution that "(a)lthough the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988,
while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the
arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police
authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II."
I am afraid that there has been a misapplication of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which, while authorizing
a peace officer or a private person to effect a warrantless arrest, specifically conditions that grant of
authority upon the situation "(w)hen an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it."
It is significant that when the corresponding provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court were amended in
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the particular revision of paragraph (b) of the aforesaid
section consisted in imposing the requirements that the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just
been committed.
Now, according to the resolution, "the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988,
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5
o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing,
was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of
Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested
Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation."

Since, clearly, the arresting police agents merely acted upon the information imparted by one of the
suspects, Ramil Regala, the resolution has emasculated the requirement in Section 5(b) that the
person making the arrest must have had personal knowledge of factual indications regarding the
complicity or liability of the arrestee for the crime. Yet, that amendment requiring such personal
knowledge must have been designed to obviate the practice in the past of warrantless arrests being
effected on the basis of or supposed reliance upon information obtained from third persons who
merely professed such knowledge or, worse, concocted such reports for variant reasons not
necessarily founded on truth.
Further, and obviously as an added deterrent to the possibility that such arrest without a warrant may
result from imputations based on dubious motives, it is now required that the crime must have just
been committed. The recency contemplated here, in relation to the making of the warrantless arrest,
is the time when the crime was in fact committed, and not the time when the crime was in fact
committed, and not the time when the person making the arrest learned or was informed of such
commission. Otherwise, at the risk of resorting to reductio ad absurdum, such warrantless arrests
could be validly made even for a crime committed, say, more than a year ago but of which the
arresting officer received information only today.
The brevity in the interval of time between the commission of the crime and the arrest, as now
required by Section 5(b), must have been dictated by the consideration, among others, that by
reason of such recency of the criminal occurrence, the probability of the arresting officer acquiring
personal and/or reliable knowledge of such fact and the identity of the offender is necessarily
enhanced, if not assured. The longer the interval, the more attenuated are the chances of his
obtaining such verifiable knowledge. In the case under consideration, the obtention of information of
a crime committed fourteen (14) days earlier necessarily undermines the capacity of the arresting
officer to ascertain the reliability of the information he is acting upon and to acquire personal
knowledge thereof after such verification.
It may be granted, as an ad hoc proposition, that the arrest of Nazareno was based on probable
cause and it was not whimsical, at least, in this instance. It is correct to say that prevailing conditions
affecting national security and stability must also be taken into account. However, for the reasons
above elucidated, I take exception to the conclusion that the conditions in Section 5(b) of Rule 113
had been complied with in this case. It is true that the corresponding information was filed against
Nazareno shortly after his arrest but that, precisely, is another cause for controversy. Definitely, if the
rules on arrest are scrupulously observed, there would be no need for the usual invocation of Ilagan
as a curative balm for unwarranted incursions into civil liberties.
SARMIENTO, J.: dissenting:
I reiterate my dissent. I submit that in spite of its "clarificatory" resolution,

1 the majority has not shown why the

arrests in question should after all be sustained.

According to the majority, Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 815667) was validly arrested without a warrant
and that his arrest was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule
113, of the Rules of Court. According to the majority, he, Dural, was after all committing an offense
(subversion being supposedly a continuing offense) and that the military did have personal
knowledge that he had committed it. "Personal knowledge," according to the majority, is supposedly
no more than "actual belief or reasonable grounds . . . of suspicion," and suspicion is supposedly
reasonable:
. . . when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on

actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to

create the probable cause of guilty of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 2
As I said, I dissent.
First, and as I held, subversion, as an offense punished by Executive Order No. 167, as amended by
Executive Order No. 276, in relation to Republic Act No. 1700, 3 is made up of "overt acts." 4 In People
vs. Ferrer 5 this Court defined "overt acts" as follows:

. . . Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally

unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more would
suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has
to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the
accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined
the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic
objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing government by force, deceit, and other illegal
means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.
As Ferrer held, that above "overt acts" constitute the essence of "subversion," and as Ferrer has
taken pains to explain, the law requires more than mere membership in a subversive organization to
make the accused liable. I respectfully submit that for purposes of arrest without a warrant, that
above "overt acts" should be visible to the eyes of the police officers (if that is possible), otherwise
the accused can not be said to be committing any offense within the contemplation of the Rules of
Court, to justify police action, and otherwise, we would have made "subversion" to mean mere
"membership" when, as Ferrer tells us, subversion means more that mere membership.
I find strained that majority's interpretation of "personal knowledge," as the majority would interpret it,
as no more than "actual belief or reasonable suspicion," that is, "suspicion . . . based on actual
facts . . . [and] founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith . . . " 6 I submit that personal knowledge
means exactly what it says that the peace officer is aware that the accused has committed an offense, in this case, membership in a
subversive organization with intent to further the objectives thereof. It is to be noted that prior to their amendment, the Rules (then Section 6)
spoke of simple "reasonable ground" which would have arguably encompassed "actual belief or suspicion . . . coupled with good faith"
referred to by the majority. Section 5(b) as amended, however, speaks of "personal knowledge"; I respectfully submit that to give to "personal
knowledge" the same meaning as "reasonable ground" is to make the amendment as useless exercise.

What, furthermore, we have here was a mere "confidential information" that a "sparrow man" had
been wounded and was recuperating in the hospital, and that that person was Rolando Dural.
Clearly, what we have is second-hand, indeed, hearsay, information, and needless to say, not
personal knowledge.
I would like to point out that in the case of People vs. Burgos 7 this Court rejected a similar arrest because of lack of
personal knowledge, and, as the Court held, "[w]hatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers came in its entirety from the
information furnished by [another] . . ." 8 I do not see how We can act differently here.

I do not find the majority's reliance on the case of United States vs. Santos 9 to be well-taken. Santos involved
a prosecution for coercion (against a peace officer for affecting an arrest without a warrant). Santos, however, did in fact affirm the illegality of
the arrest but absolved the peace officer on grounds of good faith. Santos did not say that so long as he, the peace officer, was acting in
good faith, as the majority here says that the military was acting in good faith, the arrest is valid. Quite to the contrary, Santos suggested that
notwithstanding good faith on the part of the police, the arrest is nevertheless subject to question.

As far as the information leading to the arrest of Dural is concerned, the majority would quite
evidently swallow the version of the military as if in the first place, there truly was an information, and
that it was reliable, and that "it was found to be true;" 10 and as if, in the second place, the hospital authorities (the

alleged informants) could have legally tipped the military under existing laws. We have, it should be noted, previously rejected such a species
of information because of the lack of "compulsion for [the informant] to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal
prosecution." 11 Here, it is worse, because we do not even know who that informant was.

The majority is apparently unaware that under Executive Order No. 212, amending Presidential
Decree No. 169, hospital establishments are required to report cases of acts of violence to
"government health authorities" not to the military.
I am concerned that if the military were truly armed with reliable information and if it did have
personal knowledge to believe that Dural had committed an offense, there was no reason for the
military to ignore the courts, to which the Constitution after all, gives the authority to issue warrants.
As People vs. Burgos held:
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting
officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through
the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there
was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape.
Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. 12
I do not likewise see how the petitioners Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo,
Ramon Caspile, and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. Nos. 84581-82; 83162) could have been lawfully picked up
under similar circumstances. As the majority points out, the military had (again) acted on a mere tipthe military had no personal knowledge (as I elaborated what personal knowledge means). Second, I
do not think that the majority can say that since Amelia Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" (As
Roque, et al. allegedly admitted), immediate arrests were "prudent" and necessary. As I said, that
Roque, et al. were admitted "NPA's" is (was) the question before the trial court and precisely, the
subject of controversy. I think it is imprudent for this Court to pass judgment on the guilt of the
petitioners-since after all, and as the majority points out, we are talking simply of the legality of the
petitioner's arrests.
More important, that Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" is evidently, a mere say-so of the military,
and evidently, the Court is not bound by bare say-so's. Evidently, we can not approve an arrest
simply because the military says it is a valid arrest (the accused being "NPA's anyway") that would
be abdication of judicial duty and when, moreover, the very basis of the claim rests on dubious
"confidential information."
According to the majority, we are speaking of simple arrests; we are not talking of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. I certainly hope not, after the majority referred to Rolando Dural as a
"sparrow man" and having Amelia Roque, et al. admit to being NPA's."
It is to gloss over at any rate, the nature of arrest as a restraining on liberty. It is to me immaterial
that the guilt of the accused still has to be established, since meanwhile, the accused are in
fact being deprived of liberty. Arrest to me, is something to crow about, even if in the opinion of the
majority, it is nothing to crow about (a mere "administrative measure").
I can not, again, accept the validity of the arrests of Deogracia Espiritu or Narciso Nazareno (G.R.
Nos. 85727; 86332). Espiritu was supposedly picked up for inciting to sedition, in uttering
supposedly, on November 22, 1988, the following:
Bukas tuloy and welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na. 13

Espiritu however was arrested on November 23, 1988, a day later-and in no way is "inciting to
sedition" a continuing offense. Obviously, the majority is not saying that it is either, but that:
. . . Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the
language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then,
Espiritu has not lost the right to insist, during the trial on the merits, that he was just
exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it
was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without
warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing.
In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times,
the Court has, in this case, titled the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes
of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for
Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. 14
And obviously, the majority is concerned about whether or not Espiritu's speech was after all,
protected speech, but apparently, that is also of no moment, since: (1) that is a matter of defense; (2)
we are talking of mere arrests, and as far as arrests are concerned, "the Court has, in this case,
titled in favor of authority," 15 and (3) we have, anyway, given a reduced bail to the accused.
First, that the accused's statement is in the category of free speech is not only plain to my mind, it is
a question I do not think the majority can rightly evade in these petitions without shirking the Court's
constitutional duty. It is to my mind plain, because it does not contain enough "fighting words"
recognized to be seditious. 16 Secondly, it is the very question before the Courtwhether or not the statement in question
constitutes an offense for purposes of a warrantless arrest. It is a perfectly legal question to my mind and I am wondering why we can not
answer it.

What the majority has not answered, as I indicated, is that inciting to sedition is in no way a
continuing offense, and as I said, the majority is not apparently convicted that it is, either. Of course,
the majority would anyway force the issue: "But the authority of the peace officers to make the
arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another
thing." 17 First, Espiritu was picked up the following day, and in no way is "the following day" "soon thereafter". Second, we would have
stretched the authority of peace officers to make warrantless arrests for acts done days before. I do not think this is the contemplation of the
Rules of Court.

As in the case of Burgos in People vs. Burgos, 18 Espiritu was neither "on the verge of flight or escape" 19 and there was
no impediment for the military to go through the judicial processes, as there was none in the case of Burgos.

In the case of People vs. Aminnudin, 20 this Court held that unless there "was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed," and unless there existed an urgency as where a moving vehicle is involved, instant police action can not be justified.

"In the balancing of authority and freedom," states the majority, "the Court has, in this case, titled in
favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction)." 21 It is a strange declaration, first, because
it is supported by no authority (why the Court should "tilt" on the side of Government), and second, because this Court has leaned, by
tradition, on the side of liberty as the custodian of the Bill of Rights even if we were talking of "simple" arrests.

I do not understand why this Court should "tilt" . . . the scale in favor of authority . . . in this
case," 22 as if to say that normally, this Court would have tilted the scales the other way. I do not understand why these cases are
apparently, special cases, and apparently, the majority is not telling us neither. I am wondering why, apart from the fact that these cases
involved, incidentally, people who think differently from the rest of us.

The majority goes on:

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's
arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the

arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988
that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those
guilty in the killing of Bunye II. 23
With all due respect, I do not think that the majority is aware of the serious implications of its
pronouncement on individual rights (and statutory construction in general), and I feel I am
appropriately concerned because as a member of the Court, I am co-responsible for the acts of my
colleagues and I am afraid that I may, rightly or wrongly, be in time made to defend such an
indefensible pronouncement.
Section 5(b) of Rule 113 is clear and categorical: the offense must have been "just committed" and
the authorities must have "personal knowledge."
In no way can an offense be said to have been "just committed" fourteen days after it was in fact
(allegedly) committed. In no way can the authorities be said to have "personal knowledge" two
weeks thereafter; whatever "personal knowledge" they have can not possibly be "personal
knowledge" of a crime that had "just been committed;" whatever "personal knowledge" they have is
necessarily "personal knowledge" of a crime committed two weeks before.
In no way can Nazareno's arrest be said to be an arrest sanctioned by the exceptional provisions of
the Rules.
I am not saying that the military can not act in all cases, and it is sheer ignorance to suppose that I
am saying it, (or worse, that I am "coddling criminals"). I am not saying that a suspected criminal, if
he can not be arrested without a warrant, can not be arrested at all but that the military should
first procure a warrant from a judge before effecting an arrest. It is not too much to ask of so-called
law enforcers.
As it is, the majority has enlarged the authority of peace officers to act, when the Rules have
purposely limited it by way of an exception, precisely, to the general rule, mandated by the
Constitution no less, that arrests may be done only through a judicial warrant. As it is, the majority
has in fact given the military the broadest discretion to act, a discretion the law denies even
judges 24 today it is fourteen days, tomorrow, one year, and sooner, a decade. I submit that a year, a decade, would not be in fact
unreasonable, following the theory of the majority, since the military can claim anytime that it "found out only later," as the majority did not
find it unreasonable for the Capital Command to claim that it "came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of
Bunye II" 25and none of us can possibly dispute it.

I would like to stress strongly that we are not talking of a simple "administrative measure" alonewe
are talking of arrests, of depriving people of libertyeven if we are not yet talking of whether or not
people are guilty. That we are not concerned with guilt or innocence is hardly the point, I respectfully
submit, and it will not minimize the significance of the petitioners' predicament.
With respect to Wilfredo Buenaobra, I submit that the majority has, as in the cases of Amelia
Roque, et al., ignored the fact that Buenaobra's alleged "admission" (actually, an uncounselled
confession) was precisely, the basis for Buenaobra's arrest. It is to beg the question, I respectfully
submit, to approve the military's action for the reason that Buenaobra confessed, because
Buenaobra confessed for the reason that the military, precisely, pounced on him. I am not to be
mistaken for prejudging Buenaobra's innocence (although it is supposed to be presumed) but I can
not imagine that Buenaobra would have voluntarily proclaimed to the military that he was an NPA
courier so that the military could pounce on him.
I respectfully submit that the cases Garcia vs. Padilla 26 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 27 have been better days. I do not see
how this court can continuously sustain them "where national security and stability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor

from the communist rebels." 28 First and foremost, and as the majority has conceded, we do not know if we are in fact dealing with
"Communists." The case of Deogracias Espiritu, for one, hardly involves subversion. Second, "Communism" and "national security" are old
hat the dictator's own excuses to perpetuate tyranny, and I am genuinely disappointed that we would still fall for old excuses. Third, Garcia
and Ilagan rested on supposed grounds that can not be possibly justified in a regime that respects the rule of law that the Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) is a valid presidential document (Garcia) and that the filing of an information cures a defective arrest (Ilagan).
Fourth and finally, it is evident that neither "Communist threat" nor "national security" are valid grounds for warrantless arrests under Section
5(b) of Rule 113.

I most respectfully submit that Garcia and Ilagan have not only been diluted by subsequent
jurisprudence (e.g., People vs. Burgos, supra), they are relics of authoritarian rule that can no longer
be defended, if they could have been defended, in Plaza Miranda or before our own peers in the bar.
"What is important," says the majority, "is that every arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality,
via habeas corpus proceedings." 29 I supposed that goes without saying. But it is also to patronize the petitioners and simply, to
offer a small consolation, when after all, this Court is validating their continued detention. 30 With all due respect, I submit that it is nothing for
which the public should be elated.

A Final Word
As I began my dissent, in this Resolution and the Decision sought to be reconsidered, I reiterate one
principle: The State has no right to bother citizens without infringing their right against arbitrary State
action. "The right of the people," states the Constitution, "to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searchers and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable . . . ." 31 "The State," the Charter likewise states, "values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights." 32 The Constitution states the general rule the majority would make the exception the rule, and
the rule the exception. With all due respect, this is not what constitutionalism is all about.

I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority refers to are, in the first place,
doubtful, the "actual facts and circumstances" being no more than "confidential information"
(manufactured or genuine, we have no way of telling) and in the second place, any information with
which the military (or police) were armed could no more than be hearsay, not personal, information. I
submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority insists on can not justify the arrests in
question under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, the rule the majority insists is the applicable rule.
Apparently, Section 5(b) is not the applicable rule, as far as Deogracias Espiritu and Narciso
Nazareno are concerned; certainly, it is not the Section 5(b) I know. As I indicated, Espiritu was
arrested one day after the act, allegedly, inciting to sedition; Nazareno was picked up fourteen days
after it (allegedly, murder). Yet, the majority would approve the police's actions nonetheless because
the police supposedly "found out only later." I submit that the majority has read into Section 5(b) a
provision that has not been written there.
"More than the allure of popularity of palatability to some groups," concludes the majority, "what is
important is that the Court be right." 33
Nobody has suggested in the first place, that Umil was and is a question of popularity or palatability.
Umil is a question, on the contrary, of whether or not the military (or police), in effecting the arrests
assailed, had complied with the requirements of law on warrantless arrests. Umil is a question of
whether or not this Court, in approving the military's actions, is right.
In spite of "EDSA", a climate of fear persists in the country, as incidences of disappearances, torture,
hamletting, bombings, saturation drives, and various human rights violations increase in alarming
rates. In its update for October, 1990, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines found:
An average of 209 arrested for political reasons monthly since 1988, 94% of them illegally;

Four thousand four hundred eight (4,408) political detentions from January, 1989 to September,
1990, 4,419, illegally;
Of those arrested, 535 showed signs of torture; 280 were eventually salvaged, 40, of frustrated
salvage, and 109 remained missing after their arrest;
Forty (40) cases of massacres, with 218 killed; 54 cases of frustrated massacre, in which 157 were
wounded;
The victims belonged to neighborhood and union organizations;
Since February, 1986, 532 of those illegally arrested were women;
From January to June 1990, 361 children were detained for no apparent reason;
One million ten thousand four hundred nine (1,010,409) have been injured as a consequence of
bombing, shellings, and food blockades undertaken by the military since 1988. 34
It is a bleak picture, and I am disturbed that this Court should express very little concern. I am also
disappointed that it is the portrait of the Court I am soon leaving. Nonetheless, I am hopeful that
despite my departure, it will not be too late.
Motions denied.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11 th Judicial
Region, Digos, Davao del Sur convicting defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of The crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos sufficiently established
beyond reasonable doubt, of the offense charges , pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 9, in relation to General Order No. 6, dated September 22, 1972, and General
Order No. 7, dated September 23, 1972, in relation further to Presidential Decree No.

885, and considering that the firearm subject of this case was not used in the
circumstances as embraced in paragraph I thereof, applying the provision of
indeterminate sentence law, accused Ruben Burgos is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as minimum
penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum penalty, pursuant to sub-paragraph B, of
Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with accessory penalties, as provided
for by law.
As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this case (Homemade
revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered
confiscated in favor of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Likewise, the subversive documents, leaflets and/or propaganda seized are ordered
disposed of in accordance with law.
The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal possession of firearm in
furtherance of subversion in an information which reads as follows:
That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above- named accused with
intent to possess and without the necessary license, permit or authority issued by the
proper government agencies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
keep, possess, carry and have in his possession, control and custody one (1)
homemade revolver, caliber .38, make Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221,
which firearm was issued to and used by the accused at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, his area of operations by one Alias Commander Pol for the New People's Army
(NPA), a subversive organization organized for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines through lawless and violent means, of
which the accused had knowledge, and which firearm was used by the accused in
the performance of his subversive tasks such as the recruitment of New Members to
the NPA and collection of contributions from the members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of the lower court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, it appears
that by virtue of an intelligent information obtained by the Constabulary and INP
units, stationed at Digos, Davao del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok
personally and voluntarily surre0ndered to the authorities at about 9:00 o'clock A.M.
at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters, stating that he was forcibly
recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the
use of firearm against his life, if he refused.
Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one (1) chopa of rice
and one peso (P1.00) per month, as his contribution to the NPA TSN, page 5,
Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units,
composed of fifteen (15) members, headed by Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC),
on the following day, May 13, 1982, was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to

arrest accused Ruben Burgos. The team left the headquarter at 1:30 P.M., and
arrived at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM where through the help of Pedro
Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to locate accused, who was plowing
his field. (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team and Pat. Bioco
asked accused about his firearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused
denied possession of said firearm but later, upon question profounded by Sgt.
Alejandro Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a place below
their house where a gun was buried in the ground. (TSN, page 8, Hearing-October
14, 1982).
Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and dug the grounds,
after which he recovered the firearm, Caliber .38 revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for
the prosecution.
After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive
documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of qqqcogon at a distance of three
(3) meters apart from his house. Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath said
cogon grass and likewise recovered documents consisting of notebook colored
maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the prosecution; a pamphlet consisting of
eight (8) leaves, including the front and back covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan
ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo, Leninismo
Kaisipang Mao qqqZedong dated December 31, 1980, marked as Exhibit "C", and
another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang Mindanao, March
and April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages, marked as Exhibit "D" for the
prosecution.
Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its recovery, readily
admitted the same as issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a
certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's
Army, responsible in the liquidation of target personalities, opposed to NPA
Ideological movement, an example was the killing of the late Mayor Llanos and
Barangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos, Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16,
Hearing-October 14,1982).
To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a former NPA convert
was presented, who declared that on March 7, 1972, in his former residence at
Tiguman Digos, Davao del Sur, accused Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his
companions Landrino Burgos, Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his house
at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and called him downstair. Thereupon, accused told
Masamlok, their purpose was to ask rice and one (1) peso from him, as his
contribution to their companions, the NPA of which he is now a member. (TSN, pages
70, 71, 72, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their group otherwise, he
and his family will be killed. He was also warned not to reveal anything with the
government authorities. Because of the threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlok
joined the group. Accused then told him, he should attend a seminar scheduled on
April 19, 1982. Along with this invitation, accused pulled gut from his waistline a .38
caliber revolver which Masamlok really saw, being only about two (2) meters away
from accused, which make him easily Identified said firearm, as that marked as

Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 72, 73, and 74, Hearing-January 4,
1983).
On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied by his father,
Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went to the house of accused and
attended the seminar, Those present in the seminar were: accused Ruben Burgos,
Antonio Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and one alias
Jamper.
The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very distinctly that he is an
NPA together with his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he
encouraged the group to overthrow the government, emphasizing that those who
attended the seminar were already members of the NPA, and if they reveal to the
authorities, they will be killed.
Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and documents, then
finally shouted, the NPA will be victorious. Masamlok likewise Identified the
pamphlets as those marked as Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for the prosecution.
(TSN, pages 75, 76 and 77, Hearing-January 4, 1983)
Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar Gomez, who
likewise expounded their own opinions about the NPA. It was also announced in said
seminar that a certain Tonio Burgos, will be responsible for the collection of the
contribution from the members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing- January 4, 1983)
On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to Captain Bargio of the
Provincial Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove that on May 19,
1982, he administered the subscription of th extra-judicial confession of accused
Ruben Burgos, marked as Exhibit "E " for the prosecution, consisting of five (5)
pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his confession, Fiscal
Lovitos, realizing that accused was not represented by counsel, requested the
services of Atty. Anyog, whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist
accused in the subscription of his extra-judicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from English to
Visayan language, resulting to the deletion of question No. 19 of the document, by an
inserted certification of Atty. Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his having
understood, the allegations of his extra-judicial statement.
Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to him his
constitutional rights to remain silent, right to counsel and right to answer any question
propounded or not.
With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty.
Anyog and Fiscal Lovitos, without the presence of military authorities, who escorted
the accused, but were sent outside the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the
accused. (TSN, pages 36-40, nearing November 15, 1982)

Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the subject firearm, Sgt.
Epifanio Comabig in-charge of firearms and explosives, NCO Headquarter, Philippine
Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, was presented and testified, that among the
lists of firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in the name of accused
Ruben Burgos, neither was his name included among the lists of persons who
applied for the licensing of the firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1745.
After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its case and offered its
exhibits, which were all admitted in evidence, despite objection interposed by
counsel for accused, which was accordingly overruled.
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case against him is stated in the decision
as follows:
From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought
him to the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur, and arrived there at about 3:00
o'clock, on the same date. At about 8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was
investigated by soldiers, whom he cannot Identify because they were wearing a
civilian attire. (TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June 15, 1983)
The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was detained with
respect to the subject firearm, which the investigator, wished him to admit but
accused denied its ownership. Because of his refusal accused was mauled, hitting
him on the left and right side of his body which rendered him unconscious. Accused
in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity, crying and with emotional attachment,
described in detail how he was tortured and the ordeals he was subjected.
He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again confronted with subject
firearm, Exhibit "A", for him to admit and when he repeatedly refused to accept as his
own firearm, he was subjected to further prolong (sic) torture and physical agony.
Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black cloth with pungent effect on his
eyes. He was undressed, with only blindfold, pungent water poured in his body and
over his private parts, making his entire body, particularly his penis and testicle,
terribly irritating with pungent pain.
All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The process of beating,
mauling, pain and/or ordeal was repeatedly done in similar cycle, from May 13 and
14, 1982. intercepted only whenever he fell unconscious and again repeated after
recovery of his senses,
Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and physical ordeal he
was seriously warned, if he will still adamantly refuse to accept ownership of the
subject firearm, he will be salvaged, and no longer able to bear any further the pain
and agony, accused admitted ownership of subject firearm.
After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but accused was made to sign
his affidavit marked as Exhibit "E" for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages,
including the certification of the administering officer, (TSN, pages 141-148, HearingJune 15, 1983)
In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him, accused, by way of
explanation and commentary in details, and going one by one, the allegations and/or

contents of his alleged extrajudicial statement, attributed his answers to those

questions involuntarily made only because of fear, threat and intimidation of his
person and family, as a result of unbearable excruciating pain he was subjected by
an investigator, who, unfortunately he cannot Identify and was able to obtain his
admission of the subject firearm, by force and violence exerted over his person.
To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive activities, and also
to support his denial to the truth of his alleged extra-judicial confession, particularly
questions Nos. 35, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, along with qqqs answers to
those questions, involving Honorata Arellano ahas Inday Arellano, said Honorata
Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the above-questions embraced in
the numbers allegedly stated in the extrajudicial confession of accused, involving her
to such NPA personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true because on
the date referred on April 28, 1982, none of the persons mentioned came to her
house for treatment, neither did she meet the accused nor able to talk with him.
(TSN, pages 118- 121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez, and that she was
personally charged with subversion in the Office of the Provincial Commander,
Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, but said charge was dismissed
without reaching the Court. She likewise stated that her son, Rogelio Arellano, was
likewise charged for subversion filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao del
Sur, but was likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122, in relation to her cross-examination, Hearing-May
18, 1983)
To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay Captain of
Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Salvador qqqGalaraga was presented, who
declared, he was not personally aware of any subversive activities of accused, being
his neighbor and member of his barrio. On the contrary, he can personally attest to
his good character and reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio, being a
carpenter and farmer thereat. (TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot of arrests made by
the authorities in his barrio involving subversive activities but they were released and
were not formally charged in Court because they publicly took their oath of allegiance
with the government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation to page 136, Hearing-May 18,
1983)
Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his wife, Urbana Burgos,
was presented and who testified that the subject firearm was left in their house by
Cesar Masamlok and one Pedipol on May 10, 1982. It was night time, when the two
left the gun, alleging that it was not in order, and that they will leave it behind,
temporarily for them to claim it later. They were the ones who buried it. She said, her
husband, the accused, was not in their house at that time and that she did not inform
him about said firearm neither did she report the matter to the authorities, for fear of
the life of her husband. (TSN, page 24, November 22, 1983)
On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the recovery of the firearm,
was wearing a mask, she can still Identify him. (TSN, page 6, Hearing-November 22,
1983)

After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally rested his case in
support of accused's through counsel manifestation for the demurrer to evidence of
the prosecution, or in the alternative for violation merely of simple illegal possession
of firearm, 'under the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4, reflected in the manifestation of counsel for accused. (TSN, pages 113-114,
Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following assignments of error, to wit:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE ARREST OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE HOUSE OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR FIREARM WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE
LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION TO
GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his house and the subsequent
confiscation of a firearm and documents allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and valid
manner? Does the evidence sustaining the crime charged meet the test of proving guilt beyond
reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of Ruben Burgos
for the purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar Masamlok that the accused
allegedly recruited him to join the New People's Army (NPA), they did not have any warrant of arrest
or search warrant with them (TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61, November 15, 1982).
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy
and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. This Court explained in Villanueva vs.
Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be
also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's
home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293
[19661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is
allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert
itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of
objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such

have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life, (Cf. Schmerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616,
630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and
Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966], could fitly characterize this constitutional
right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no legs than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).
The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without any warrant as falling under one of
the instances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 6 * of the
Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that "the
authorities received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable
source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is
lawfully within the ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and applicable
jurisprudence on the matter."
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive
documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Section 12, which
states:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing,
or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also
be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The
location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in
fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation
of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set
back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Section
6(b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that. the information given by Cesar Masamlok
was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact
or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led
the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for
evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis
of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful, If an arrest without
warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered
afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought
to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a
warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly
committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on
the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused
were unknown,
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who
was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state
truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982).
Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of
arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal.
The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be
deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be
searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda.
de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his

house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil.
770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia V. Locsin (supra)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56
C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."
(Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).
That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at the time of his
arrest is evident from the records:
A CALAMBA:
Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were not
armed with an arrest warrant?
A None Sir.
Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?
A No Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when you
went there?
A But he was twenty meters away from his house.
Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?
A Yes Sir.
Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?
A Yes Sir.
Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?
A No Sir.
Q What did you tell him?

A That we received information that you have a firearm, you

surrender that firearm, first he denied but when Sgt. Buncalan
interviewed his wife, his wife told him that it is buried, I dug the
firearm which was wrapped with a cellophane.
Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his rights
under the constitution considering that he was purposely under
arrest?
A I did not.
Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?
A Yes Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?
A It was buried down in his horse.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was buried?
A Yes Sir.
(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)
Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in
violation of the accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows
that they are inadmissible as evidence.
There is another aspect of this case.
In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, the prosecution
presented the two arresting officers who testified that the accused readily admitted ownership of the
gun after qqqs wife pointed to the place where it was buried. The officers stated that it was the
accused himself who voluntarily pointed to the place where the alleged subversive documents were
hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his
constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership
of the gun and pointed to the location of the subversive documents after questioning, the admissions
were obtained in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV
of the Bill of Rights winch provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.. . .
The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in
evidence. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions made by the
appellant cannot be used against him.

The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as inadmissible in
evidence. The court stated that the appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical terror,
violence, and third degree measures may not have been supported by reliable evidence but the
failure to present the investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the "provocative
presumption" that indeed torture and physical violence may have been committed as stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the
custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty.
Anyog, to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office
was too late. It could have no palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of
the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.
With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents inadmissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge of Illegal
Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Subversion is the testimony of Cesar Masamlok.
We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. It is true
that the trial court found Masamlok's testimony credible and convincing. However, we are not
necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated
in People vs.. Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):
xxx xxx xxx
. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to question of credibility the
findings of the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious
reason th+at it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the
witnesses during the trial. But we have also said that this rule is not absolute for
otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must reject
the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and
substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court.
The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous to that found in People vs.
Capadocia (17 SCRA 98 1):
. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony, and the issue hinges
on how much credence can be accorded to him. The first consideration is that said
testimony stands uncorroborated. Ternura was the only witness who testified on the
mimeographing incident. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He knew his fate depended
upon how much he cooperated with the authorities, who were then engaged in a
vigorous anti-dissident campaign. As in the case of Rodrigo de Jesus, whose
testimony We discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura cannot be considered
as proceeding from a totally unbiased source. . . .
In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok
surrendered to the military certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the
authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. The trade-off appears to be his
membership in the Civil Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83, January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be

considered as an interested witness. It can not be said that his testimony is free from the opportunity
and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom.
Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar of April 19,
1982 i.e., Masamlok's father ,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74, January 4,
1983) who could have corroborated Cesar Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in
furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never
presented any other witness.
This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):
It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v. Dramayo (42 SCRA
59), where after stressing that accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt, it was made clear: 'Only if the judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by
the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of
conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly
taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must
be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What
is required then is moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81;
People v. Joven, 64 SCRA 126; People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People vs.
Godov 72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205; People v. Poblador, 76 SCRA
634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513; People v. Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484; People
vs. Gabilan 115 SCRA 1; People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and People vs. Ibanga
124 SCRA 697).
We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in Davao del Sur where there appears to
be a well-organized plan to overthrow the Government through armed struggle and replace it with an
alien system based on a foreign ideology. The open defiance against duly constituted authorities has
resulted in unfortunate levels of violence and human suffering publicized all over the country and
abroad. Even as we reiterate the need for all freedom loving citizens to assist the military authorities
in their legitimate efforts to maintain peace and national security, we must also remember the dictum
in Morales vs. Enrile (1 21 SCRA 538, 569) when this Court stated:
While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the
rebels, and the lawless with an the means at its command, it should always be
remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of
our Constitution and our laws.
Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude towards
constitutional liberties and protections will only fan the increase of subversive activities instead of
containing and suppressing them.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime
with which he has been charged.

The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with
Serial No. 8.69221) and the alleged subversive documents are ordered disposed of in accordance
with law.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37007

July 20, 1987

RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and ARMANDO
VALDEZ,petitioners,
vs.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA, SR., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Third Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. D-529 entitled "The People of the Philippines versus

Juan Tuvera, Sr., et al.," granting the motion to quash the information filed by accused Juan Tuvera,
Sr., herein respondent. The issue is whether a barrio captain can be charged of arbitrary detention.
The facts are as follows:
On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr.,
Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads as
follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and
Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag, Pangasinan, of the crime of ARBITRARY
DETENTION, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in barrio
Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with the aid of some other private persons,
namely Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one Armando Valdez
by hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows and immediately thereafter, without legal
grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive said Armando Valdez of his constitutional liberty,
accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat,
members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and lock said
Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11)
hours. (Emphasis supplied.)
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C.
Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.
(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA
Assistant Provincial Fiscal
All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to
support the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an
opposition thereto.
Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary
Detention, respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order dated
April 25, 1973.
Hence, this petition.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a
person.1 The elements of this crime are the following:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds. 2

The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion to quash the information which
was sustained by respondent Judge, is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, 3 that is,
that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the elements of Arbitrary Detention.
The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat.
Mangsat, who are members of the police force of Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining petitioner
Valdez for about eleven (11) hours in the municipal jail without legal ground. No doubt the last two
elements of the crime are present.
The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain is a public officer who can be liable
for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the
detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of
the law, the judges or mayors.4
Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent Tuvera as such public officer when
the former made this finding in the questioned order:
Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six (6) hours, Juan
Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to do with the same because he is not in any way connected with
the Police Force of Manaoag, Pangasinan. Granting that it was Tuvera, Sr., who ordered
Valdez arrested, it was not he who detained and jailed him because he has no such authority
vested in him as a mere Barrio Captain of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan. 5
In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private respondent Tuvera asserts that
the motion to quash was properly sustained for the following reasons: (1) That he did not have the
authority to make arrest, nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio captain; 6 (2) That he is
neither a peace officer nor a policeman,7(3) That he was not a public official;8 (4) That he had nothing
to do with the detention of petitioner Valdez;9 (5) That he is not connected directly or indirectly in the
administration of the Manaoag Police Force;10 (6) That barrio captains on April 21, 1972 were not yet
considered as persons in authority and that it was only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree
No. 299 that Barrio Captain and Heads of Barangays were decreed among those who are persons in
authority;11 and that the proper charge was Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention. 12
We disagree.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named
barrio captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various
cases, this Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention.
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario Braganza, a municipal
councilor, arrested Father Feliciano Gomez while he was in his church. They made him pass through
the door of the vestry and afterwards took him to the municipal building. There, they told him that he
was under arrest. The priest had not committed any crime. The two public officials were convicted of
Arbitrary Detention.14
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the help of Filoteo Soliman, bound
and tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a rope at around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him to the

justice of the peace. Sixto was detained during the whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of the next day
when he was ordered released by the justice of the peace because he had not committed any crime,
Gellada was convicted of Arbitrary Detention.16
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and
duties of a barrio captain include the following: to look after the maintenance of public order in the
barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the
performance of their duties in such barrio; 17 to look after the general welfare of the barrio; 18 to enforce
all laws and ordinances which are operative within the barrio; 19 and to organize and lead an
emergency group whenever the same may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and order
within the barrio.20
In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration, Professor Jose M. Aruego has this to
say about the above-mentioned powers and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of public order in the barrio. For
public disorder therein, inevitably people blame him.
"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a threat to disturb public order,
what can the barrio captain do? Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures. He may take
preventive measures like placing the offenders under surveillance and persuading them, where
possible, to behave well, but when necessary, he may subject them to the full force of law.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. As such, he
may make arrest and detain persons within legal limits.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other
public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this
crime.22 A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to
those of a barrio captain23 except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller.
Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to
detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself
admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of
petitioner Valdez.24
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can
be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to quash was validly granted as the
facts and evidence on record show that there was no crime of Arbitrary Detention; 25 that he only
sought the aid and assistance of the Manaoag Police Force; 26 and that he only accompanied
petitioner Valdez to town for the latter's personal safety.27
Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a defense at the trial as they
traverse what is alleged in the Information. We have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a
motion to quash, cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not
appear on the face of the information. This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission
of the facts alleged in the information. 28 Matters of defense cannot be proved during the hearing of
such a motion, except where the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability,
prescription, and former jeopardy.29 In the case of U.S. vs. Perez,30 this Court held that a motion to
quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not

only different but diametrically opposed to those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of only
one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the prosecution. 31
lawphi1

Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court's granting of the motion to quash jeopardy
has already attached in his favor32 on the ground that here, the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of denial,
is a final order. It is not merely interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused
cannot claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at his
instance.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned
Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded
to the appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 154130. October 1, 2003]

BENITO
ASTORGA, petitioner,
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

vs.

PEOPLE

OF

THE

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
the reversal of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986,

dated July 5, 2001, as well as its Resolutions dated September 28, 2001 and
July 10, 2002.
[1]

On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the following
Information against Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram, Samar, as well as a
number of his men for Arbitrary Detention:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for sometime subsequent thereto,
at the Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being
the Municipal Mayor of Daram, Samar, in such capacity and committing the offense
in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with unidentified
persons, who are herein referred to under fictitious names JOHN DOES, who were
armed with firearms of different calibers, with deliberate intent, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz,
Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENR Employees, at the
Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them to leave the place, without any legal and
valid grounds thereby restraining and depriving them of their personal liberty for nine
(9) hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[2]

On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of

the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Office No. 8,
Tacloban City sent a team to the island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct
intelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with the
governments campaign against illegal logging. The team was composed of
Forester II Moises dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest Ranger
Renato Militante, and Tree Marker Crisanto Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon,
Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as team
leader. The team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo
Capoquian.
[3]

The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at 2:00 p.m.,
where they saw two yacht-like boats being constructed. After consulting with
the local barangay officials, the team learned that the boats belonged to a
certain Michael Figueroa. However, since Figueroa was not around at the
time, the team left Brgy. Bagacay.
[4]

En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two more
boats being constructed in the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar,
between 4:30-5:00 p.m., prompting them to stop and investigate. Thus,
Maniscan and Militante disembarked from the DENRs service pump boat and

proceeded to the site of the boat construction. There, they met Mayor
Astorga. After conversing with the mayor, Militante returned to their boat for
the purpose of fetching Simon, at the request of Mayor Astorga.
[5]

When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1

Capoquian, approached Mayor Astorga to try and explain the purpose of their
mission, Simon was suddenly slapped hard twice on the shoulder by Mayor
Astorga, who exclaimed, Puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha
Tacloban. Ano, di ka maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamo
makauli yana kay puwede kame e charge ha misencounter. (I can make you
swim back to Tacloban. Dont you know that I can box? I can box. Dont you
know that I can declare this a misencounter?) Mayor Astorga then ordered
someone to fetch reinforcements, and forty-five (45) minutes later, or between
5:00-6:00 p.m., a banca arrived bearing ten (10) men, some of them dressed
in fatigue uniforms. The men were armed with M-16 and M14 rifles, and they
promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at the team members. At this,
Simon tried to explain to Astorga the purpose of his teams mission. He then
took out his handheld ICOM radio, saying that he was going to contact his
people at the DENR in Catbalogan to inform them of the teams
whereabouts. Suddenly, Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed Simons radio,
saying, Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri somabut an iyo opisina kon
hain kamo, bis diri kamo maka aro hin bulig. (Its better if you have no radio so
that your office would not know your whereabouts and so that you cannot ask
for help). Mayor Astorga again slapped the right shoulder of Simon,
adding, Kong siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samar kay diri
kamo puwede ha akon. (If you are tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it to
Samar because I will not tolerate it here.) Simon then asked Mayor Astorga
to allow the team to go home, at which Mayor Astorga retorted that they would
not be allowed to go home and that they would instead be brought to Daram.
Mayor Astorga then addressed the team, saying, Kon magdakop man la
kamo, unahon an mga dagko. Kon madakop niyo an mga dagko, an kan
Figueroa dida ha Bagacay puwede ko liwat ipadakop an akon. (If you really
want to confiscate anything, you start with the big-time. If you confiscate the
boats of Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will surrender mine.) Simon then tried
to reiterate his request for permission to leave, which just succeeded in irking
Mayor Astorga, who angrily said, Diri kamo maka uli yana kay dad on ko
kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro istorya. (You cannot go home now
because I will bring you to Daram. We will have many things to discuss there.)
[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

The team was brought to a house where they were told that they would be
served dinner. The team had dinner with Mayor Astorga and several others at
a long table, and the meal lasted between 7:00-8:00 p.m. After dinner,
[14]

Militante, Maniscan and SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from the
house, but not to leave the barangay. On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and
the rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finally allowed
to leave.
[15]

[16]

Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against

Mayor Astorga and his men, which led to the filing of the above-quoted
Information.
Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000, wherein he
pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. At the trial, the prosecution
presented the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well as
their Joint Affidavit. However, the presentation of Simons testimony was not
completed, and none of his fellow team members came forward to
testify. Instead, the members of the team sent by the DENR RSOG executed
a Joint Affidavit of Desistance.
[17]

[18]

[19]

On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision, disposing

of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
BENITO ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary Detention, and in the absence
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto
mayor as minimum to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correctional as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.

[20]

The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11,

2001 which was denied by the Sandiganabayan in a Resolution dated
September 28, 2001. A Second Motion for Reconsideration dated October
24, 2001 was also filed, and this was similarly denied in a Resolution dated
July 10, 2002.
[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a sole error for
review:
5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the accused guilty of Arbitrary
Detention as defined and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code,
based on mere speculations, surmises and conjectures and, worse, notwithstanding the
Affidavit of Desistance executed by the five (5) complaining witnesses wherein the
latter categorically declared petitioners innocence of the crime charged.
[25]

Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the required

quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, especially in light of
the fact that the private complainants executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance.
Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the records of the case is there any
competent evidence that could sufficiently establish the fact that restraint was
employed upon the persons of the team members. Furthermore, he claims
that the mere presence of armed men at the scene does not qualify as
competent evidence to prove that fear was in fact instilled in the minds of the
team members, to the extent that they would feel compelled to stay in Brgy.
Lucob-Lucob.
[26]

[27]

[28]

[29]

Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who,

without legal grounds, detains a person. The elements of the crime are:
[30]

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.
[31]

That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was
then Mayor of Daram, Samar is not disputed. Hence, the first element of
Arbitrary Detention, that the offender is a public officer or employee, is
undeniably present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that
his acts were spurred by some legal purpose. On the contrary, he admitted
that his acts were motivated by his instinct for self-preservation and the feeling
that he was being singled out. The detention was thus without legal grounds,
thereby satisfying the third element enumerated above.
[32]

What remains is the determination of whether or not the team was actually
detained.
In the case of People v. Acosta, which involved the illegal detention of a
child, we found the accused-appellant therein guilty of kidnapping despite the
lack of evidence to show that any physical restraint was employed upon the
victim. However, because the victim was a boy of tender age and he was
warned not to leave until his godmother, the accused-appellant, had returned,
he was practically a captive in the sense that he could not leave because of
his fear to violate such instruction.
[33]

[34]

In the case of People v. Cortez, we held that, in establishing the intent to

deprive the victim of his liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be
kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. At the time of
her rescue, the offended party in said case was found outside talking to the
[35]

owner of the house where she had been taken. She explained that she did not
attempt to leave the premises for fear that the kidnappers would make good
their threats to kill her should she do so. We ruled therein that her fear was not
baseless as the kidnappers knew where she resided and they had earlier
announced that their intention in looking for her cousin was to kill him on
sight. Thus, we concluded that fear has been known to render people
immobile and that appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to
kill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual force or violence.
[36]

The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the

curtailment of the victims liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon
the victims person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce
such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent
that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in
accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents
and purposes, detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of
their pleas, the witnesses and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner
to go home. This refusal was quickly followed by the call for and arrival of
almost a dozen reinforcements, all armed with military-issue rifles, who
proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the
witnesses. Given such circumstances, we give credence to SPO1
Capoquians statement that it was not safe to refuse Mayor Astorgas orders.
It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect
these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear was
indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent that they felt
compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent the departure of
the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.
[37]

[38]

[39]

Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private

complainants, suffice it to say that the principles governing the use of such
instruments in the adjudication of other crimes can be applied here. Thus,
in People v. Ballabare, it was held that an affidavit of desistance is merely an
additional ground to buttress the defenses of the accused, not the sole
consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances
which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the
truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the
judge. Here, there are no such circumstances. Indeed, the belated claims
made in the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such as the allegations that the
incident was the result of a misunderstanding and that the team acceded to
Mayor Astorgas orders out of respect, are belied by petitioners own
admissions to the contrary. The Joint Affidavit of Desistance of the private
[40]

[41]

complainants is evidently not a clear repudiation of the material points alleged

in the information and proven at the trial, but a mere expression of the lack of
interest of private complainants to pursue the case. This conclusion is
supported by one of its latter paragraphs, which reads:
11. That this affidavit was executed by us if only to prove our sincerity and
improving DENR relations with the local Chiefs Executive and other
official of Daram, Islands so that DENR programs and project can be
effectively implemented through the support of the local officials for the
betterment of the residence living conditions who are facing difficulties
and are much dependent on government support.
[42]

Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court to the evidence,
pointing out that the Sandiganbayans reliance on the testimony of SPO1
Capoquian is misplaced, for the reason that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of
the private complainants in the case. He also makes much of the fact that
prosecution witness SPO1 Capoquian was allegedly not exactly privy to, and
knowledgeable of, what exactly transpired between herein accused and the
DENR team leader Mr. Elpidio E. Simon, from their alleged confrontation, until
they left Barangay Lucob-Lucob in the early morning of 2 September 1997.
[43]

[44]

It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial courts factual findings are

conclusive and binding upon appellate courts unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted. Nothing in the case at bar prompts us to
deviate from this doctrine. Indeed, the fact that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of
the private complainants is completely irrelevant. Neither penal law nor the
rules of evidence requires damning testimony to be exclusively supplied by
the private complainants in cases of Arbitrary Detention. Furthermore, Mayor
Astorgas claim that SPO1 Capoquian was not exactly privy to what transpired
between Simon and himself is belied by the evidence. SPO1 Capoquian
testified that he accompanied Simon when the latter went to talk to petitioner.
He heard all of Mayor Astorgas threatening remarks. He was with Simon
when they were encircled by the men dressed in fatigues and wielding M-16
and M-14 rifles. In sum, SPO1 Capoquian witnessed all the circumstances
which led to the Arbitrary Detention of the team at the hands of Mayor
Astorga.
[45]

[46]

[47]

[48]

Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team was in fact prevented
from leaving Brgy. Lucob-Lucob or whether they had simply decided to while
away the time and take advantage of the purported hospitality of the accused.
On the contrary, SPO3 Cinco clearly and categorically denied that they were
[49]

simply whiling away the time between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and
their departure early the following morning. SPO1 Capoquian gave similar
testimony, saying that they did not use the time between their dinner with
Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following morning to enjoy the
place and that, given a choice, they would have gone home.
[50]

[51]

Petitioner argues that he was denied the cold neutrality of an impartial

judge, because the ponente of the assailed decision acted both as magistrate
and advocate when he propounded very extensive clarificatory questions on
the witnesses. Surely, the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is not an idle
arbiter during a trial. It can propound clarificatory questions to witnesses in
order to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of the court cannot be assailed on
the ground that clarificatory questions were asked during the trial.
[52]

Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Arbitrary Detention. Article 124 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that, where the detention has not exceeded
three days, the penalty shall be arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, which has a range of four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is entitled to a minimum term to be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, or arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, which has a range of one (1) month and one (1) day to
four (4) months. Hence, the Sandiganbayan was correct in imposing the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words of Justice Perfecto
in his concurring opinion in Lino v. Fugoso, wherein he decried the impunity
enjoyed by public officials in committing arbitrary or illegal detention, and
called for the intensification of efforts towards bringing them to justice:
The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention committed by
government officers form part of our statute books even before the advent of
American sovereignty in our country. Those provisions were already in effect during
the Spanish regime; they remained in effect under American rule; continued in effect
under the Commonwealth. Even under the Japanese regime they were not repealed.
The same provisions continue in the statute books of the free and sovereign Republic
of the Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the complaints often heard of violations
of said provisions, it is very seldom that prosecutions under them have been instituted
due to the fact that the erring individuals happened to belong to the same government
to which the prosecuting officers belong. It is high time that every one must do his
duty, without fear or favor, and that prosecuting officers should not answer with cold

shrugging of the shoulders the complaints of the victims of arbitrary or illegal

detention.
Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125 of the
Revised Penal Code will it be possible to reduce to its minimum such wanton
trampling of personal freedom as depicted in this case. The responsible officials
should be prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees right to the indemnity to
which they may be entitled for the unjustified violation of their fundamental rights.

[53]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby

DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986,
dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2128

May 12, 1948

MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,

vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF CITY
OF MANILA, respondents.

Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.

Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Naawa and D. Guinto Lazaro for
respondents.
FERIA, J.:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of
robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2,
1948, and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948,
when the petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners were still
detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an information
with the proper courts justice.
This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient number of
Justices to form a quorum in Manila, And it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting in
division here in Baguio for deliberation and decision. We have not until now an official information as
to the action taken by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the Dumlao against the
petitioners. But whatever night have been the action taken by said office, if there was any, we have
to decide this case in order to lay down a ruling on the question involved herein for the information
and guidance in the future of the officers concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide whether or not the
petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of manila
a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next proceeding
article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of
six hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted article, the precept of our
Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest
and habeas corpus, we are of the opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article,
mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary
detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, "the
Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of the old Penal Code
formerly in force of these Islands, which penalized a public officer other than a judicial officer who,
without warrant, "shall arrest a person upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to
the judicial authority within twenty four hours after his arrest." There was no doubt that a judicial
authority therein referred to was the judge of a court of justice empowered by law, after a proper
investigation, to order the temporary commitment or detention of the person arrested; and not the
city fiscals or any other officers, who are not authorized by law to do so. Because article 204, which
complements said section 202, of the same Code provided that "the penalty of suspension in its
minimum and medium degrees shall be imposed upon the following persons: 1. Any judicial officer
who, within the period prescribed by the provisions of the law of criminal procedure in force, shall fail
to release any prisoner under arrest or to commit such prisoner formally by written order containing a
statement of the grounds upon which the same is based."

Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not been incorporated
in the Revised Penal Code the import of said words judicial authority or officer can not be construed
as having been modified by the mere omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons...against unreasonable seizure shall not be violated, and no warrant [of
arrest, detention or confinement] shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after the examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may
produce." Under this constitutional precept no person may be deprived of his liberty, except by
warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the
complainant and his witness. And the judicial authority to whom the person arrested by a public
officers must be surrendered can not be any other but court or judge who alone is authorized to
issue a warrant of commitment or provisional detention of the person arrested pending the trial of the
case against the latter. Without such warrant of commitment, the detention of the person arrested for
than six hours would be illegal and in violation of our Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court, which, referring to the
duty of an officer after arrest without warrant, provides that "a person making arrest for legal ground
shall, without unnecessary delay, and within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the
person arrested to the proper court or judge for such action for they may deem proper to take;" and
by section 11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by the defendant and his delivery to the
Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also informed
of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or
to present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the
witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and
subscribed by him.
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
According to the provision of said section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend any person to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and
"if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgement or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or make
the order, the writ shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario sensu means that, otherwise, the writ
shall be allowed and the person detained shall be released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed to
include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of
arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention
of a person arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz. 13th
Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214). The
investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation proper
provided for in section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person charged with offenses
cognizable by the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere investigation made
by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding information against the defendant with
the proper municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation so
warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court a warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is
provided by a law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of the preliminary investigation proper to avoid
or prevent a hasty or malicious prosecution, since defendant charged with offenses triable by the
courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper preliminary investigation.

The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case of
temporary absence of both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the
municipality, town or place, are the municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a
warrant of arrest of the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6, Rule 108, and
section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation which a city fiscal may conduct under section 2,
Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the proceeding paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by the
courts of Manila is not filed with municipal court or the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as
above stated, the latter do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint
must be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or through one of his assistants,
makes the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing with
the proper court the necessary information against the accused if the result of the investigation so
warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the officer or person making the
arrest should, as abovestated, without unnecessary delay take or surrender the person arrested,
within the period of time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having
jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the
court or judge shall try and decide the case if the court has original jurisdiction over the offense
charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court having no original
jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the
provisions of section 13, Rule 108.
In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court of
First Instance, the officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the
person arrested to the city fiscal, and the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and
file, if proper, the corresponding information within the time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of the
accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall make the investigation forthwith, unless it is
materially impossible for them to do so, because the testimony of the person or officer making the
arrest without warrant is in such cases ready and available, and shall, immediately after the
investigation, either release the person arrested or file the corresponding information. If the city fiscal
has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having committed the offense charged, or is not
ready to file the information on the strength of the testimony or evidence presented, he should
release and not detain the person arrested for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal
Code, without prejudice to making or continuing the investigation and filing afterwards the proper
information against him with the court, in order to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course,
for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six
hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of
arrested and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the
fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into
consideration.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period longer
than that permitted by law without any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city
fiscal, may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting
the person arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks
without any process issued by a court or judge.

A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the
offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or
the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly
with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal
has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest even if he finds, after due investigation, that
there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a
police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint
of the offended party or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers
who intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good
faith, in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the
mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and
the latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being actually detained when the said
policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are being
illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained
by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice. So ordered.
Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J.:, concurring:
Petitioners Melencio Sayo and Joaquin Mostero were apprehended at 11:30 in the morning of April
2, 1948, upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, for the crime of alleged robbery.
The fact is alleged expressly in respondent's answer supported by the affidavit of Benjamin Dumlao
(Exhibit 1), the patrolman who made the arrest. Therein it is also alleged that petitioners were
"finally" placed under arrest at 4:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. respectively, on the same day, April 2, l948.
The distinction between the two arrests, the apprehension made at 11:00 a.m. and the "final arrest at
4:30 and 5:00 p.m., is purely academic or imaginary. There was but one arrest, effected at 11:00
a.m., April 2, 1948, and continued without interruption until the petition had been filed with us April 5,
1948, at the hearing on the next day. Until the moment we are writing this opinion we have not heard
that petitioners have been released at any time.
Respondents allege also that on April 3, 1948, at about 8:30 a.m., a criminal complaint was filed with
the fiscal's office of Manila, and that by said filing their duty to deliver arrested persons, within six
hours from their arrest, to a proper judicial authority has been duly complied with.
There is no dispute that no warrant of arrest has ever been issued for the apprehension of
petitioners.
Petitioners pray for their immediate release, alleging that, as the six-hour period provided in article
125 of the Revised Penal Code had expired, their continued detention is illegal.

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the penalty of arresto mayor or in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal, or from 4 months and 11 days to 20 years imprisonment, for the crime
of a public officer or employee who, after detaining a person, "shall fail to deliver such person to the
proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours."
Both parties implying from the above provision that after six hours of said failure, petitioners shall be
entitled to be released, discussed the question whether there is such failure or not.
Upon the very facts alleged by respondents and supported by documentary evidence accompanying
it, there should not be any dispute that there is such failure.
(a) Respondents have not delivered the persons of petitioners to any authority, and much less to any
judicial authority.
(b) Their filing of a complaint with the office of the fiscal of Manila is not a delivery of the persons of
petitioners. Said persons are not a complaint. A complaint, whether oral or written, can never be
elevated to the category of the person. No one is crazy enough to confuse or identify a person with a
complaint.
(c) Even in the false hypothesis that respondents, by filing the complaint, intended to make a
delivery of the persons of petitioners, if not actually, constructively, the fiscal's office is not a judicial
authority.
(d) Under our Constitution and laws, judicial authorities comprehend only courts of justice, such as
the Supreme Court and all other inferior Court, and justices and judges. The authority possessed
and exercised by judicial authorities is judicial, and the Constitution(section 1, Article VIII) vests the
judicial power exclusively "in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established
by law."
Respondents' pretension in making the fiscal of Manila a judicial authority is absolutely groundless,
upon the clear letter of the fundamental law. Counsel for respondents himself had to admit that said
officer belongs to the administrative or executive department. Under the tripartite system of the
government established by the Constitution, it is extreme absurdity to make an administrative or
executive officer, or any officer of the executive department or branch, a judicial authority. Such will
make of separation of powers a madman's illusion.
That a fiscal is not a judicial authority has been unmistakably declared in the decision in Lino vs.
Fugoso, L-1159, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214. The statement made therein that there was yet no purpose of
deciding whether a fiscal is a judicial authority or not, is just a rhetorical figure that is a judicial
authority or not, is just a rhetorical figure that should not deceive any one. All those who can read,
will that the decision has made the declaration. It is there stated in plain language that the fiscal is
"unlike" a judicial authority.
"Unlike" means, as an elementary school student knows, not like, dissimilar, diverse, different.
No warrant of arrest having been issued by any competent tribunal for the apprehension of
petitioners, said apprehension appears to be illegal.
At any rate, even under the hypothesis that it was legal and continued to be so for six hours, this
time having expired seven days ago, the continued detention and confinement of petitioners is

clearly illegal, and not only illegal but criminal, involving an offense committed by public officers and
heavily punished by the Revised Penal Code.
Regarding the question as to legality of the arrest, counsel for respondents has advanced the
shocking theory that police officers may arrest any person just for questioning or investigation,
without any warrant of arrest.
The theory is absolutely unconstitutional and could have been entertained only under the "Kempei"
system implanted by the brutal Japanese army occupation. Such theory represents an ideology
incompatible with human dignity. Reason revolts against it.
Respondents are ordered, upon notice of the decision, to immediately release the two petitioners
and to report to this Court the time when the release shall have been effected.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

I dissent on the grounds stated in my dissent in Lino vs. Fugoso et al., Off. Gaz., 1214.

RESOLUTION
August 27, 1948
FERIA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of our decision which holds that the phrase "judicial authority"
used in the article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, to whom a person arrested without warrant shall
be delivered by the officer making the arrest within the period of six hours from the arrest, means a
competent court or judge, and the City Fiscal is not such a judicial authority.
We have already held, in the United States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472,477-479, that the provisions
of the Provisional Law for the application of the provisions of the Spanish Penal Code in the
Philippines by Royal Decree of September 4, 1884, are in force of this Islands insofar as they have
not been repealed or amended by implication by the enactment of the body of laws put in force in
these Islands since the change from Spanish to American sovereignty. According to the ruling of this
court in said case, a person may be arrested without warrant in the cases specified in Rules 27 and
28 of said provisional law and section 37 of Act No. 183 (Charter of Manila). The provisions of said
Rules 27 and 28 are substantially the same of those contained in section 6 Rule 109 of the Rules of
Court which superseded them; and the provisions of section 37 of Act No. 183 above reffered to
have been incorporated in section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code. Both section 6 of Rule
109, and the pertinent provisions of said section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code are now
the laws in force on the subject.
Article 30 of said Provisional Law for the application of the Penal Law in the Philippines also
provides:

The executive authorities or the agents detaining a person shall release the same or else
turn him over to the judicial authorities within twenty four hours after the arrest if made in the
head town of the district, or within as brief a period as the distance and transportation
facilities permit.
And the next article 31 of the same law reads as follows:
Within twenty four hours after the person arrested has been surrendered to the competent
judge of Court of First Instance, the latter shall order the commitment or release of the
prisoner by warrant containing the grounds on which it is based (auto motivado).
If it is impossible to do so because of the complexity of the facts, the number of defendants
or any other serious cause, which must be made of record, the time of detention may be
extended to three days. Upon the expiration of that period of time the judge shall order the
commitment or the release of the defendant. The warrant of commitment shall be ratified
after the defendant has been heard within the period of sixty two hours from the time the
defendant has been committed to prison.
Said Rule 30 has been modified by section 17, Rule 109, which provides that "Any person making
arrest for legal ground shall, without unnecessary delay and within the time prescribed in the
Revised Peal Code, take the person arrested to the proper court or judge for such action as they
may deem proper to take," and by article 125 of the Revised Penal Code already quoted.
But the provisions of Rule 31 above quoted are still in force because they may have not been
repealed, either expressly or by implication, by any law or the present Rules of Court, except the last
sentence, thereof which is no longer in force. The procedure of hearing the accused after he has
been committed to prison referred to in said last sentence, is a sort preliminary investigation by the
judge or justice of the peace according to the present procedure. Persons arrested or accused in the
City of Manila are not entitled to such investigation. In provinces the justice of the peace or judge
shall, according to section 2 of Act No. 194, "make the preliminary investigation of the charge as
speedily as may be consistent with the right and justice, but in any event he must make the
investigation within three days of the time the accused was brought before him, unless the accused
or complainant shall ask for delay in order that witnesses may be obtained, or for other good and
sufficient reason, in which event a continuance for a reasonable time may be allowed." This
provision of section 2 of Act No. 194 is still in force, because no law has been enacted amending or
repealing it. (Marcos vs. Cruz [May 13, 1939] 1st Supp., 40 Off. Gaz., 174, 182.) The Rules of Court
on Criminal Procedure do not undertake to dispose of all subjects of preliminary investigation, and
repeal all laws on the subject not incorporated therein; especially those that, like the said provisions
of section 2, Act No. 194, confer substantive rights upon defendants which can not be diminished,
increased or modified by the Rules of Court (section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution).
In view of the provisions of section 17, Rule 109, Rule 31 of the Provisional Law, article 204 of the
old Penal Code, from which article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was taken, and section 1 (3)
Article III of the Constitution, there can be no doubt that the judicial authority within the meaning of
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code must be a judge who has authority to issue a written warrant
of commitment or release containing the ground on which it is based (auto motivado). Because said
section 17 of Rule 109 expressly provides that the officer making the arrest without warrant shall,
within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person arrested to a court or
judge for such action as the latter may deem proper to take; Rule 31 expressly states that, within
twenty four hours or at most three days after the person arrested has been delivered to the judge of
Court of First Instance (and also the justice of the peace now), the latter shall order the commitment
or release of the prisoner by a warrant containing the ground upon which the commitment or release

is based (auto motivado); article 204 of the Penal Code (not incorporated in the Revised Penal
Code), penalize the judicial authority or judge who fails to comply with the provisions of said Rule 31;
and section 1(3) Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affidavit of the complainant
and witnesses he may produce," in order to safeguard "the right of the people to be secured in their
person ... against unreasonable seizure" or detention for a longer period than that fixed or
considered by law as reasonable (six hours according to section 125 of the Revised Penal Code).
It is obvious that the city fiscal is not a city judge, and has no power to issue order or commitment or
release by a written warrant containing the ground on which it is based. As a matter of fact the city
fiscal has never exercised such power since that office was created. In justice to the city fiscal, we
have to state that the latter did not and does not contend in his motion for reconsideration that it has
the power to issue such a warrant, as contended in the dissenting opinion.
To consider a city fiscal as a judicial authority within the meaning of article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, would be to place a person arrested in provinces without warrant in a better position than
those arrested in the City of Manila. Because, as there is no law requiring the city fiscal to act or file
an information against such person within a limited period of time, after the arresting officer has
taken the prisoner to the city fiscal within six hours, the prisoner may be held under detention without
any warrant for days and weeks and possibly months until such time as the city fiscal may take
action, either by releasing the prisoner without filing any information, or filing an information with the
proper city court and obtain a warrant of commitment. While a person arrested outside of the City of
Manila has to be delivered by the arresting person or peace officer to the competent judge within six
hours after his arrest, and the latter shall have to investigate the charge and issue a warrant of
release or commitment of the prisoner within the period of twenty four hours or at most three days
prescribed in said article 31 of the Provisional Law.
It is obvious that the surrender or delivery to the judicial authority of a person arrested without
warrant by a peace officer, does not consist in a physical delivery, but in making an accusation or
charge or filing of an information against the person arrested with the corresponding court or judge,
whereby the latter acquires jurisdiction to issue an order of release or of commitment of the prisoner,
because the arresting officer can not transfer to the judge and the latter does not assume the
physical custody of the person arrested. And in the City of Manila it does consist in delivering
physically the body of the prisoner to the city fiscal, for the latter will not assume the responsibility of
being the custodian of the prisoner; nor in making or lodging a complaint against him with the said
fiscal, because the latter has no power to order the commitment or release of the prisoner by a
warrant containing the ground on which it is based (auto motivado). Such delivery is a legal one and
consists in making a charge or filing a complaint against the prisoner with the proper justice of the
peace or judge of Court of First Instance in provinces, and in filing by the city fiscal of an information
with the corresponding city courts after an investigation if the evidence against said person so
warrants. Upon the filing of such information will the prisoner be deemed deliver to a judicial
authority in the City of Manila within the meaning of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
The city court or judge need not make an investigation of the facts alleged in the information, which
the judge or justices of the peace in provinces have to make before issuing the proper warrant,
because the law vest the power in the city fiscal, but said city judge shall determine only the legal
question whether said facts constitute an offense or violation of ordinances, and issue a warrant of
commitment if they do, or of release if they do not.
As a peace officer can not deliver directly the person arrested to the city courts, he shall deliver him
to said court through the city fiscal, and if the latter does not take the prisoner in time to the latter so
that the proper investigation may be made and information filed within six hours, he has to release

the prisoner in order to avoid criminal liabilty for violation of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
The city fiscal is not an agent of the arresting officer, but as prosecuting officer, he will be recreant to
his duty if he does not do his best to make the investigation and file the corresponding information in
time against the person arrested without warrant, in order to effect the delivery of the prisoner to the
city courts within the period of six hours prescribed by law, and thus prevent his being released by
the officer making the arrest. If the city fiscal does not file the information within said period of time
and the arresting officer continues holding the prisoner beyond the six-hour period, the fiscal will not
be responsible for violation of said article 125, because he is not the one who arrested and illegally
detained the person arrested, unless he has ordered or induced the arresting officer to hold and not
release the prisoner after the expiration of said period.
Section 2640 of the Revised Administrative Code which specifies the powers and duties of chief of
police of the City of Manila, authorizes the latter "to take good and sufficient bail for the appearance
before the city court of any person arrested for violation of any city ordinance: Provided, however,
That he shall not exercise this power in cases of violation of any penal law except when the fiscal of
the city shall so recommend and fix the bail to be required of the person arrested." These provisions
do not authorize, either expressly or by implication, the city fiscal to order the detention of the
prisoner if bond is not given, not only because they refer to the powers of the chief of police of
Manila and not of the city fiscal, but because the only incidental authority granted to the latter is to
recommend the granting of the bail to be required of the person arrested for violation of any penal
law in order that the chief of police may release the latter on bail. If no bail is given by the person
arrested, neither the chief of police, who is only authorized to release on bail, has power to detain
the person arrested for more than six hours; nor the city fiscal, who is only empowered to fix and
recommend the bail to the chief of police, has authority to order the detention of persons arrested for
violation of a penal law.
The above-quoted provisions of section 2640 of the Revised Administrative Code refers evidently to
persons arrested without warrant, for accused arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the courts
may be released on bail only by order of the court or judge that issued the warrant and has exclusive
jurisdiction or control over the person arrested. The purpose of the law in empowering the chief of
police of Manila to release the prisoner if he sets up a bail, is to relieve the officer making the arrest
from the necessity of taking the prisoner to the city fiscal, and the latter from filing an information with
the proper courts within the period of time prescribed by law.
The dissenting opinion calls a general principle of law an excerpt of the Corpus Juris Secundum
quoted therein which says that "the officer however need not necessarily have personal knowledge
of the facts constituting the offense in the sense of having seen or witnessed the offense himself, but
he may if there are no circumstances known to him by which materially impeach his information,
acquire his knowledge from information imparted to him by reliable and credible third persons or by
the information together with other suspicious circumstances" (6 C.J.S., 599, 600), and after the
quotation adds: "This is a common law rule implanted in the Philippines along with its present form of
government, a rule which has been cited and applied by this Court in a number of cases (U. S. vs.
Santos, 36 Phil., 853; U. S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil., 46; U. S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516).
The above-quoted excerpt is not a general principle of law or a common law rule implanted in the
Philippines. It is a summary of the ruling of several State courts based on statutory exceptions of the
general rule. "It is the general rule, although there are statutory exceptions and variations, that a
peace officer has no right to make an arrest without a warrant, upon a mere information of a third
person" (5 C.J., p. 404), because "statutes sometime authorize peace officer to make arrest upon
information" (4 Am. Jur., p. 17). In none of the cases cited in the dissenting opinion has this Court
quoted and applied it. In U.S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472, this Court, after quoting Rules 27 and 28
of the "Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Law" and section 37, Act No. 183, as the law

in force in force in these Islands providing for cases in which a person may be arrested without a
warrant, said:
These provisions quite clearly set out the powers usually conferred by American and English
law upon "peace officers" including "constables," in making arrests without warrants; and
since similar powers are clearly included in the powers conferred upon "agents of authority"
in the above cited articles of the "Provisional Law," there can be no doubt that the
Commission, in imposing the duty of maintaining order and preserving and protecting life and
property within their respective barrios upon municipal councilors and their lieutenants of
barrios, conferred upon such officials authority to make arrests without warrant not less
extensive than that conferred upon peace officers in Manila in the above-cited provisions of
the Manila Charter. (United States vs. Vallejo, No. 4367, decided by this court on September
3, 1908; also United States vs. Burgueta, 10 Phil., 188.) (Emphasis ours.)
The case of U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516, one of the cases cited in the last paragraph of the
dissenting opinion, does not contain anything about the implantation in these Islands of the so-called
common law rule. In the case of U.S. vs. Battallones (not Ballesteros) 23 Phil., 46, cited also therein,
this Court, following the ruling in U.S. vs. Fortaleza, said:
In a former case we held that officials in these Islands, who, "by direct provisions of law or by
appointment of competent authority are charged with the maintenance of public order and
the protection and security of life and property," have authority to make arrests without
warrant substantially similar to the authority generally conferred upon "peace officers" in the
United States, and more especially that class of `peace officers' known to American and
English law as constables; and that "the provisions of section 37 of Act No. 183" (the Charter
of Manila) "quite clearly set forth the powers usually conferred by American and English law
upon "peace officers" including "constables" in making arrests without warrants," and provide
that they "may pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or
under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has
committed or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace; may arrest, or cause to
be arrested without warrant, any offender, when the offense is committed in the presence of
a peace officer or within his view". (U.S. vs. Fortaleza, 12, Phil., 472, 479.)
And in the case of U.S. vs. Santos, 36 Phil., 853, this Supreme Court has reiterated the ruling in the
previous cases and held:
The powers of peace officers in the Philippines, generally stated, are the same as those
conferred upon constables under the Anglo-American Common Law. The extent of their
authority to make arrests without warrant and the limitations thereon, as held by the
Supreme Court, are as stated in the language of the Legislature in the Charter of the City of
Manila. (U.S. vs. Fortaleza [1909], 12 Phil., 472). The Administrative Code (section 2204,
edition of 1916; section 2258, edition of 1917) enjoins municipal policemen to "exercise
vigilance in the prevention of public offenses".
The provisions above quoted of section 37 of Act No. 183 have been incorporated in section 2463 of
the Revised Administrative Code and those of Rules 27 and 28 were substantially incorporated in
section 6, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court. Section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as
follows:
SEC. 2463. Police and other officers Their powers and duties. The mayor, the chief
and assistant chief of police, the chief of the secret service, and all officers and members of
the city police and detective force shall be peace officers. Such peace officers are authorized

... to pursue and arrest, without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under
suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is
about to commit, any crime or breach of the peace; to arrest or cause to be arrested, without
warrant, any offender when the offense is committed in the presence of a peace officer or
within his view;
And section 6 of Rule 109 provides:
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant When lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
These are the only provisions of law in force these Islands which enumerate the cases in which a
peace officer may arrest a person without warrant, and the so called common law relating to other
cases of arrest without warrant cited in the dissenting opinion has no application in this jurisdiction.
Therefore, all the considerations set forth in the said opinion about the disastrous consequences
which this Court's interpretation of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code will bring to a law
enforcement, because "the entire six hours might be consumed by the police in their investigation
alone," or that "even if the city fiscal be given the chance to start his assigned task at the beginning
of the six hours period, this time can not insure proper and just investigation in complicated cases
and in cases where the persons arrested are numerous and witnesses are not at hand to testify,"
since "the police is not authorized to round up the witnesses and take them along with the prisoner
to the city fiscal," are without any foundation. Because they are premised on the wrong assumption
that, under the laws in force in our jurisdiction, a peace officer need not have personal knowledge
but may arrest a person without a warrant upon mere information from other person. "The right to
make arrests without a warrant is usually regulated by express statute, and except as authorized by
such statutes, an arrest without a warrant is illegal." (5 C.J., pp. 395, 396.) And statutory construction
extending the right to make arrest without a warrant beyond the cases provided by law is derogatory
of the right of the people to personal liberty (4 Am. Jur., p. 17).
The investigation which the city fiscal has to make before filing the corresponding information in
cases of persons arrested without a warrant, does not require so much time as that made upon a
complaint of the offended parties for the purpose of securing a warrant of arrest of the accused. In all
cases above enumerated in which the law authorizes a peace officer to arrest without warrant, the
officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence or within his view, or of the
time, place or circumstances which reasonably tend to show that such person has committed or is
about to commit any crime or breach of the peace. And the testimony of such officer on the
commission of the offense in his presence or within his view by the person arrested, or on the facts
and circumstances that tend reasonably to show that said person has committed or is about to
commit an offense, would be sufficient evidence or basis for the city fiscal to file an information
without prejudice to his presenting of their evidence or witness, if any, during the trial to insure the
conviction of the defendant. If the city fiscal does not believe the testimony of the officer making the

arrest or consider it sufficient, or has any doubt as to the probability of the prisoner having committed
the offense charged, and is not ready to file an information against him on the strength of the
testimony or evidence presented, there would be no legal reason or ground for him to wait until
further evidence may be secured before dismissing the case against the prisoner, or detaining the
person arrested without warrant without violating the precept of article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.
After the release of the prisoner, the city fiscal may make or continue the investigation and file
afterwards the proper information against him with the corresponding court, if the result of the
investigation so warrants, in order to secure a warrant of arrest of the same. Of course, as we have
said in our decision for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of a peace officer detaining a
person for a longer period of time than the six hours prescribed by article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, "the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and other circumstances such as
the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in
time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration." The period originally fixed by our
Penal Code was twenty four (24) hours, and if the city fiscal believes that the period now prescribed
by article 125 of the Revised Penal Code is short, and that the law must be amended so as to
extend it, it would be proper for the interested parties to take the case to Congress, since it can not
be done by judicial legislation.
Motion for reconsideration is denied.
Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.

PERFECTO, J.:
We agree with the above resolution except that which may be at variance with our concurring
opinion in this case and with our written opinion in the case of Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, 43 Off. Gaz.,
1214.

BRIONES, M., concurring:

Estoy enteramente conforme con la resolucion. En la opinion concurrente que dicte en el asunto de
Lino contra Fuguso y otros (43 off. Gaz., 1235, 1244) donde se discutio por primera vea el
importante punto legal debatido en el presente asunto, dije lo siguiente y lo reafirmo en esta
ocasion, saber:
Sin discutir la responsabilidad de la Fiscalia por la demora si esta se puede o no justificar
administrativamente es cuestion que no nos compete considerar ni resolver vamos a
limitarnos a comentar y discutir la fase juridica legal. Esta en orden naturalmente el hacer la
siguiente pregunta: es correcta, es acertada la asercionde que el "Promotor Fiscal de Manila
es un funcionario judicial (judicial officer)," que, por tanto, la entrega al mismo de la persona
de undetenido dentro del periodo de 6 horas equivale a la entrega a las autoridades
judiciales correspondentes (proper judicial authorities) de que habla el ariticulo 125 del
codigo penal revisado? Creemos que no: no por su letra ni por su espiritu puede aplicarse

por extension la fraseologia de ese articulo al Fiscal de la Ciudad de Manila o a cualquier

otro Fiscal; ese articulo no puede referirse mas que a un tribunal, a u juzgado, se municipal,
sea de primera instancia. Asi que story de perfecto acuerdo con la ponencia cuando
positivamente sienta la doctrina de que "si bien un arresto puede hacerse sin orden cuando
hay motivos razonalbes apra ello (regla 109, articulo 6, reglamento de los tribunales), el
detenido no puede ser recluido fuera del periodo prescrito por la ley, a menos que una orden
de arresto se obtenga antes de un tribunal competente" (veanse las autoridades que se
citan), y que "en el presente caso el Fiscal de la Ciudad no tenia autoridad para expedir
ordenes de arresto y carecia de facultad para convalidar tal detencion ilegal con solo
presentar las querellas, o con una orden de su propia cuenta, ora tacita, ora expresa"
(veanse asimismo las authoridades que se citan).
De lo dicho se sigue que cuando la policia entrega a la Fiscalia de la ciudad despues del
periodo de 6 horas prescrito por la ley los papeles sobre un detenido arestado sin previa
orden al efecto, no por ello se cura la ilegalidad del arresto y detencion, sino que dicha
ilegalidad continua y persiste hasta que el Fiscal presenta la querella y obtiene una orden de
arresto del tribunal competente, o que, tratandose de delito, mediante la prestacion de una
fianza cuya cuantia se fijare y recommendare por dicho Fiscal, la policia soltare al detenido,
a tenor de lo previsto en el articulo 2460 del codigo administrativo.
Puede ocurrir, sin embargo, que la policia entregue los papeles a la Fiscalia de la ciudad
dentro del periodo de 6 horas, pero que la Fiscalia no solo deja pasar dicho periodo, sin que
transcurren dias, hasta semanas sin actuar sobre el caso en uno u otro sentido. La cuestion
en orden naturalmente es la siguiente: es legal o ilegal la detencion del arrestado en tal
caso? En otras palabras: queda suspenidod el periodo de 6 horas durante el tiempo que el
Fiscal de la Ciudad tarda en actuar sobre el caso? La contestacion tiene queser
necesariamente negativa. La rigidez., la inflexibilidad del periodo de 6 horas reza no solo
para la policia, sinohast para cualquier otra agencia o ramo oficial, sin excluir a la Fiscalia de
la ciudad de Manila. Si por cualquier motivo la Fiscalia dejare de actuar dentro de dicho
periodo, el deber de la policia o del que tenga la custodia del detenido es soltarle, quiera o
no quiera el Fiscal, lo recomiende o no lo recomiende. De otra manera, la restriccion que
estatuye la ley a favor de los detenidos sin previa orden de arresto restriccion que
implementa las garantias de la libertad establecidas en la Constitucion resultaria un mito.
La filosofia de la ley es, a saber: solamente se verifica un arresto sin previa orden cuando
hay motivos razonalbes para ello, v. gr., cuando un individuo es cogido in fraganti
cometiendo un delito. La ley presupone, por tanto, que el Estado tiene a mano todos los
elementos necesarios para decider que accion ha de tomar dentro del periodo de 6 horas,
ya entregando la persona del detenido a las autoridades judicales correspondientes
mediante la querella procedente, a tenor del articulo 125 del Codigo Penal Revisado: ya
poniendole en libertad provisional bajo una fianza razonable, de acuerdo con el citado
articulo 2460 del Codigo Administrativo; o ya poniendole compoletamente en la calle por
falta de meritos en el caso. Si ninguna de estas cosas puede hacer el Estado en 6 horas no
puede ser mas que por dos motivos: o poor que se quiere cometer una arbitrariedad, o la
maquinaria oficial se halla en un deplorable estado de confusion, indeptitud of impotencia.
Se arguye con enfasis que bajo esta interpretacion la prosecucion del crimen sufriria un
serio quebranto, sobre todo en la Ciudad de Manila; que materialmente la Fiscalia no puede
actuar adecuadamente sobre algunos casos en el plazo percentorio de 6 horas. Si esto es
verdad el remedio no es infringer la ley como cosa inevitable, rutinaria; el remedio seria o
recabar de la Legislatura que se reforme la ley en la forma que se estime conveniente, o
implementar ya perfeccionar la maquinaria de la prosecucion criminal, colocandola a la
altura de las circunstancias. No hay nada mas anarquico, mas subversivo y fatal para el
principio de la autoridad y del buen gobierno que el tener leyes que no se cumplen, leyes

que se infringen hasta por los llamados a ponerlas en vigor. "To be or not to be, that is the
question." O existe la ley y hay que cumplirla; o si la ley es mala o impracticable, hay que
reformarla o derogarla. Lo que no se debe permitir es el disolvente espectaculo de la diaria
inobservancia de la ley.
Se me ocurre ahora aadir otras observaciones en refuerzo de la arriba transcritas. Creo que ni
siquiera es necesario enmendar la ley en el sentido de alargar el periodo de 6 horas provisto en el
articulo 125 del Codigo Penal Revisado. Creo que con un poco mas de esfuerzo y buena voluntad la
presente ley se podria cumplir en la Ciudad de Manila. La Fiscalia de la Ciudad podria, por ejemplo,
establecer turnos semanales o mensuales, segun como se estime conveniente, destinando fiscales
que se hagan cargo exclusivamente de los casos de individuos detenidos sin previa orden de
arresto, para los efectos de presentar la correspondiente querella contra ellos, o de soltarlos si se
viere que no existen meritos suficientes para la prosecucion, sin perjuicio desde luego de ulteriores
procedi mientos. Si para realizar satisfactoriamente este trabajo fuese necesario aumentar el
personal de la Fiscalia, yo no creo que el gobierno escatimaria el dinero para una atencion tan
importante.
Esincreible que dentro de 6 horas si hay voluntad de trabajar y sobre todo de hacer buena y
efectiva la ley la Fiscalia no pueda hacr su composicion de lugar en tales casos, bien para
proseguir, bien para no proseguir, de finitivamente o en el entretanto. Hay que tener en cuenta que
se trata de casos en que el individuo es detenido, ora porque ha sido sorprendido in
fraganti cometiendo una infraccion o un delito, ora poroque se le ha cogido " en lugares
sospechosos o bajo cirunstancias sospechosas, que tiendan razonablemente a demostrar que el
mismo ha cometido o esta para cometer cualquier crimen o atentado contra el orden y la paz" (E.
U. contra fortaleza, 12 Jur. 486). Que es lo que neceista entonces la Fiscalia en tales casos? No
esta alli el testimonio del policia, constabulario o agente del orden aprehensor? De modo que la
cuestion, en ultimo resultado, es que la Fiscalia tenga o no fe en la integridd y verracidad del agente
de la ley. Si la tiene que motivo hay para no formular inmediatamente la querella y obtener asi del
juzgado la correspondiente orden de arresto? Y si no la tiene que razon hay para pisotear la
libertad individual reteniendo la causa sin accion mas alla de las 6 horas y causando asi una
inecesaria vejacion al ciudadano?
La cuestion se puede simplificar mas todavia. Todo se reduce, en ultimo termino, a que la Fiscalia
pueda contar con la ayda de una policia eficiente, integra y honrada sobre todo, que persiga el
crimen si cuartel, pero que tenga el maximo respeto a los derechos del ciudadano. Si la Fiscalia
puede tener un modus vivendi con una policcia de semejante tipo y de tales quilates, no hay miedo
de que una rigida observancia del requerimiento legal de 6 horas facilitie la inmunidad de
los tulisanes, bandidos, gangsters y criminales del bajo mundo, y se ponga en grave peligro la
eficaz prosecucion del crimen y la seguridad y sosiego del pueblo. Dentro de las 6 horas hay tiempo
mas que suficiente para meter en cintura a toda la canalla ... pero por Dios que no se violen ni
pisoteen las garantias consitucionales por miedo a los gansters!
Desde luego que se debe dar cierto margen de viabilidad a la ley. Por ejemplo, si se verifica una
detencion sin previa orden de arresto a medianoche, creo que la ley estaria cumplida si en las
primeras horas de la maana siguiente se tomara enseguida accion, aungque ello rebassara un
poquito el periodo de 6 horas.
Se deniega la mocion de reconsideracion.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.
In my dissent from the decision of this Court I contended myself with citing my dissenting opinion
in Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1197, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214, 1246, as grounds for my disagreement. As the
present decision has gone farther than that decision and contains new statements and conclusions, I
deem it convenient to enlarge on my dissent.
The term "judicial officers" has been defined to be, in its popular sense, officers of a court (Hitt vs.
State, Miss. 181, So. 331) and in its strict sense, "judges and justices of all courts and all persons
exercising judicial powers by virtue of their office." (Settle vs. Van Evrea, 49 N.Y., 280.) The city fiscal
is a judicial officer in both senses. In the popular or larger sense, he is a judicial officer because he is
a part of the legal machinery created for the administration of justice. A prosecuting attorney,
charged with the administration of justice and invested with important discretionary power in a
motion for a nolle prosequi, is a judicial officer. (State ex rel. Freed vs. Circuit Court of Martin
Country, Ind., 14 N.E. 2d 910; State vs. Ellis, 112 N.E., 98, 100; 184 Ind., 307.)
In the strict legal sense, the city fiscal is a judicial officer when making preliminary examination
because he performs the function of a justice of the peace assuming, as the majority seem to
assume, that the conduct of preliminary examination is a judicial function. By express provision of
section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code, the city fiscal "shall cause to be investigated all
charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and have the necessary information
or complaints prepared or made against the persons accused." In addition, section 2, Rule 108, of
the Rules of Court states that "every justice of the peace, municipal judge or city fiscal shall have
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of all offenses alleged to have been committed,
within his municipality or city, cognizable by the Court of First Instance."
The city fiscal is not any the less a judicial officer simply because he can not issue warrant of arrest.
The power to issue warrant of arrest is not essential ingredient of a judicial office. This is especially
so when, as in cases like the present, the accused is already under arrest when the city fiscal
intervenes and there is no need of issuing an order of arrest. As to power to commit a detained
person to prison, if that be necessary, the majority are not exactly right when they affirm that the city
fiscal is not clothed with it. I shall come to this later.
However that may be, the city fiscal is a "judicial authority" within the contemplation of article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code. This is the inevitable result from the fact that in the City of Manila, the city
fiscal under the existing scheme of the government is the only officer to whom the person arrested
without warrant may be presented. The majority opinion admits that the municipal court and the
Court of First Instance of Manila "do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper," and
criminal complaints are not filed with them but with the city fiscal. Reasoning from another angle, we
reach the same conclusion. We are to presume that in using the generic term "judicial
authorities" and in plural instead of more specific word "justice," "judge," or "court", the
lawmaker intended to include in the operation of the article under consideration all officers who are
named to receive the prisoner from the arresting officer. We have to adopt this construction if we are
to give effect to the law and the rule of court I have cited, and if we are to avoid what I might call,
without meaning offense, an absurdity.
Under no canon of statutory construction is there justification for this Court's opinion that the police
and the city fiscal have to share the six hours fixed in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The
language, the nature and the object of this provision unerringly point to the theory that the six hours
mentioned in the Revised Penal Code are meant exclusively for the police officer who made the

arrest. I can discern absolutely no indication of any intention to have the city fiscal squeeze in his
action within this brief period, a period which, in many cases, is not even sufficient for the police.
Read separately or in conjunction with the entire criminal procedure, article 125 does not furnish the
slightest indication of legislative intent to place the city fiscal and the police under the same category.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was devised for one purpose; section 2465 of the Revised
Administrative Code and section 2, Rule 108, of the Rules of Court for another. Article 125 is a penal
provision designed to prevent and punish police abuses for which the police are noted. The
investigation by the city fiscal is strictly and essentially procedural. It is an integral part of the
procedure for bringing the case to trial.
Little reflection will disclose the disastrous consequences which this Court's interpretation of article
125 of the Revised Penal Code will bring to law enforcement. It nullifies the role of the fiscal in the
administration of criminal law. For sheer lack of time, the release of the prisoner arrested without
warrant will, in a great number of cases, be inevitable, unless the city fiscal files charges without
sufficient and adequate investigation. The alternative will be for the city fiscal to be on a 24-hour
watch lest in his sleep the time for him to act might slip by.
But this is only a poor alternative. Regardless of any vigilance on his part the opportunity for the city
fiscal to make the required investigation cannot always be assured. The law gives the police
absolute power to detain a prisoner for six hours without incurring penal liability. There is no law
which obliges the police to take the prisoner to the city fiscal before the expiration of six hours from
the time of arrest. There can be cases where the entire six hours might be consumed by the police in
their investigation alone, or just in the chasing, collection and transportation to the police station of
the law breakers. This can happen in tumultuous and other mob offenses in which many people are
involved and there is necessity of screening the guilty ones.
Supposing then that the police should deliver the prisoner or prisoners to the city fiscal at the last
minute of the six hours through the negligence or by force of circumstances, what time is there for
this functionary to comply with his duty? And even if the city fiscal be given the chance to start his
assigned task at the beginning of the six hour period, can this time insure proper and just
investigation in complicated cases and in cases where the persons arrested are numerous and
witnesses are not on hand to testify? It is well to remember that the police are not authorized to
round up witnesses and take them along with the prisoners to the city fiscal.
In the light of these consequences I can not imagine that the meaning which this Court attaches to
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code so much as entered the thought of the legislature. No soundminded legislature could have intended to create such situation, which is easy to perceive unless we
assume that the legislative purpose was to tie up the hands of the law and give lawlessness full
sway; unless the legislature wanted to coddle and pamper lawless elements to a calamitous
extreme. When the Court says that the prisoner, after being released at the end of six hours from the
time of his arrest may be rearrested should the city fiscal find sufficient evidence and prefer charges
against him, it takes for granted that underworld characters and hardened criminals are honorable
men who would keep themselves ready and handy for a second arrest.
The Court says:
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a
period longer than that permitted by law without any process issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction. The city fiscal may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an
information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter had been
illegally detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge.

What is that "proper process" referred to in the above quoted portion of the decision? Whatever is
meant by "proper process," we should note that there is no fundamental difference between the
proceeding before a justice of the peace and the procedure followed by the city fiscal. There is
nothing important the justice of the peace may do in the interest of the accused in the cases triable
before the Court of First Instance which the city fiscal may not do. If the city fiscal can not issue an
order of arrest, the justice of the peace himself does not do so to give the detention the stamp of
legality. At least, I am aware of no law which tells him to take this step, and I can see no material
advantage which an accused could derive from this ceremony. All the justice of the peace does
which matters to the accused is admit him to bail, if the crime be bailable, and proceed to an
investigation.
But the city fiscal does just that; and if the necessary to order the commitment of the prisoner
pending ascertainment of his guilt, the city fiscal no less than the justice of the peace or judge of first
instance has the authority also, as I propose to show later. In actual practice, a person arrested
without warrant in a regular municipality frequently suffers greater injustice and is subject to, and
frequently goes through, greater hardships than his counterpart in the City of Manila. We are witness
to the common spectacle of cases being dismissed on motion of the provincial fiscal for want of
sufficient evidence after the prisoner had been bound by the justice of the peace over to the Court of
First Instance for trial and after he had languished in jail for months or years. Prisoner's detention in
that case is not considered illegal.
This anomaly seldom takes place in cities where the preliminary investigation is entrusted to the city
fiscal. Rarely in the City of Manila is a case dropped for insufficiency of evidence after it has been
determined in a preliminary investigation that the prisoner should be held for trial. On the whole, the
method by which the preliminary investigation is conducted by the prosecuting attorney is more
conducive to efficiency, minimizes or eliminates conflicts of opinion in the existence of probable
cause, and better insures prompt dispatch of criminal cases to the lasting benefit of the prisoner.
Only physical impossibility, as I understand it, is in the way for the adoption of this method
throughout the country.
It is a mistake, in my humble judgment, to confuse a prisoner's detention during the six-hour period
fixed in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and his continued detention after he is turned over to
the city fiscal. As I have said, article 125 regulates the time within which a police officer may hold the
prisoner under his responsibilty, and it applies to the police alone. It will hardly be contended that this
article, or any other law, or the constitution limits the period within which a prisoner may be detained
after he is delivered to the justice of the peace. If that is so, and since the city fiscal acts in lieu of a
justice of the peace, there is no sound basis, legal or practical, for denying to the former the same
time and the same freedom of action that is enjoyed by the latter.
By the same token, there is no sound reason for denying to the proceeding by the city fiscal the
same attributes which adhere to the proceeding before the justice of the peace. After the arresting
officer produced the prisoner before the city fiscal, the law takes its course in the same manner that
it does when the examining officer is the justice of the peace or judge of first instance. From that time
the arresting officer ceases to have any control over the prisoner save to keep him in custody
subject to the orders of the city fiscal. The police step out and the law steps in and extends to the
prisoner the mantle of protection against inquisitory examination by the police. From that time on he
enjoys the rights granted by law to all accused persons the right to give bail and the right to testify
freely uninfluenced by any fear of violence or other forms of maltreatment. The danger envisioned by
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code is past.
The proceeding before the city fiscal does not lose its character of due process of law by its being
conducted by the city fiscal instead of a judge. For one thing, preliminary investigation is not a trial. It

is a constitutional right. It is purely a matter of statutory regulation. (Potenciana Dequito vs. Hugo O.
Arellano et al., G.R. No. L-1336; 32 C.J.S., 456.) A judicial proceeding which lies within the power of
the legislature to provide or withhold without infringing the fundamental law may be placed in the
hands of any officer other than a judge.
The jurisdiction to make a preliminary examination or investigation is not even considered judicial.
Judges who perform this function do not do so as judicial officers. Municipal executives here and in
the United States are conferred this power. "The power to examine and to commit persons charged
with crime is not judicial, but is one of the duties of the conservators of the peace, and it may be, and
usually is, vested in persons other than courts, as, for instance, justices of the peace or police
magistrates, or persons exercising jurisdiction analogous to that exercised by justices of the peace,
or who are ex officio justices of the peace, such as mayors, notaries public, or court commissioners.
Power to hold preliminary examinations may be exercised by the United States commissioners, and
United States district judges who, while making the preliminary examination, exercise the powers of
commissioners only." (16 C.J., 319-320.)
There is no basis for the fear that "the city fiscal may not, after due investigation, find sufficient
ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter
had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge." This
statement overlooks the consistent and general practice heretofore followed with clear, express
statutory sanction. Section 2640 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes the chief of police of
the City of Manila "to take good and sufficient bail for the appearance before the city court of any
person arrested for violation of any city ordinance," while in cases of violation of any penal law,
according to the same article, the fiscal of the city may, and does, recommend and fix the bail to be
required of the person arrested. Power to fix bail necessarily implies power to recommend or order
the detention of the prisoner if bond is not given. This in its working is no more nor less than the
power to commit an accused to prison pending investigation of this case, power which the majority
erroneously say is not possessed by the city fiscal.
The constitutional and statutory provisions and rules cited by the majority are of general application
which are good only in the absence of specific enactments. The controlling provisions in the case at
bar are sections 2460 and 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code and section 2, Rule 108, of the
Rules of Court.
The decision further says:
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon
complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly
authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with
the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and
other political subdivisions. If the city fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the
arrest of a person charged with having committed a public offense even if he finds, after due
investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is
guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged
with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though, after
investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
I do not think the foregoing paragraph is relevant to the instant case. We are not dealing with the
authority of a police officer to make arrest without warrant. There is no question raised against the
legality of the petitioners' arrest. Our problem concerns the time in which the city fiscal may make his
investigation and the scope of his power.

Assuming the above-quoted statement to be pertinent to the issues, the same can not, in my humble
view, pass unchallenged. Under certain, well-defined circumstances, an officer may and constantly
does make arrests without a court order, with or without complaint. An officer in good faith may arrest
without warrant when he believes that a person is guilty of a crime, and his belief rests on such
grounds as would induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man, under the circumstances, to
believe likewise. (6 C.J.S., 596.) This practice is not derived from any express authority but on the
necessity of catching law violators before they disappear and hide. I have not come across any law
naming specific offenses for committing which the offenders shall be arrested without court orders.
It is also a general principle of law that an officer need not necessarily have personal knowledge of
the facts constituting the offense himself, in the sense of having seen or witness the offense himself,
but he may, if there are no circumstances known to him which materially impeach his information,
acquire his knowledge from information imparted to him reliable and credible third persons, or by
information together with other suspicious circumstances. (Id., pp. 599, 600.) This principle ought to
serve as a qualification to the ruling laid down by this Court, that "a peace officer has no power to
arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any other person." Under
the rule I have quoted, a police officer certainly may arrest a person pointed to him as having
committed a crime provided that the information or complaint comes from a reliable source and
under circumstances as to make an ordinary reasonable man to believe it to be well-founded. When
the victim of a robbery or aggression, for example, should subsequently spot the criminal and
request an officer to arrest him, the officer would not have to seek or wait for a warrant of arrest
before detaining the man, provided again that there was good ground to believe the truth of the
accusation.
This is a common law rule implanted in the Philippines along with its present form of government, a
rule which has been cited and applied by this Court in a number of cases. (U.S. vs. Santos, 35 Phil.,
853; U.S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil., 46; U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516.)
Padilla, J., concurs.

SUPPLEMENTARY
TUASON, J., dissenting:
When I filed my dissent from the decision of the Court on the occasion of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, it was my understanding that there was going to be only a minute resolution. I make
this remark not as a complaint but as my explanation for writing my dissent in advance of the
reasoned resolution. Even then I would contend myself with resting my dissent on what I have
already stated did the resolution contain new propositions to be answered and disclose
misunderstanding of some of many statements to be cleared. As this is in the nature and reply,
topics will be treated without regard to continuity of thought.
The resolution says that article 30 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code in the
Philippines has been repealed by section 17 of Rule 109, but that section 31 is still in force except
the last sentence. And so, according to the resolution, is section 2 of Act No. 194.
Without discussing the materiality of those laws, I disagree that they are still in effect. Like article 30,
article 31 of the Provisional Law and section 2 of Act No. 194 deal with procedure in justice of the
peace courts in general covered by the new Rules of Court. The Rules of Court, in the words of their

introductory section, concern "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines, and
the admission to practice law therein." These Rules are complete revision and a complete reenactment of the entire field of procedure, and there is every reason to believe that they were
intended to replace, with some exceptions, all previous laws on the subject, especially Spanish laws
which had long been out of harmony with the new mode of pleading and practice. If the last
sentence of article 31 is repealed, as the resolution says, I see no valid ground for not holding the
other parts of that article repealed so. "Where a later act covers the whole subject of earlier acts,
embraces new provisions, and plainly shows that it was intended, not only a substitute for the earlier
acts, but to cover the whole subject then considered by the legislature, and to prescribe the only
rules in respect thereto, it operates as a repeal of all former statutes relating to subject matter. The
rule applies not only where the former acts are inconsistent or in conflict with the new act, but also
even where the former acts are not necessarily repugnant in express terms, or in all respects, to the
new act." (59 C.J., 919-920.) "While, as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later
act is not favored, yet `if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier act and is clearly
intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier'." Posadas vs. National City
Bank of New York, 296 U.S., 497; 80 Law ed., 351.)
As the Rules of Court took effect on July 1, 1940, the case of Marcos vs. Cruz, decided on May 30,
1939, and cited in the resolution, is no authority for the opinion that no law has been enacted
amending or repealing section 2 of Act No. 192.
But this rule of implied repeal holds good only as regards laws of general application. Another well
known rule of the statutory construction tells us that preliminary investigations in Manila and other
chartered cities are to be excluded from the operation of the Rules of Court. Such investigations are
provided for the special enactments which, because of their special nature and limited application,
must be excepted from and prevail over the general provisions. "When the provisions of a general
law, applicable to the entire state, are repugnant to the provisions of a previously enacted special
law, applicable in a particular locality only, the passage of such general law does dot operate to
repeal the special law, either in whole or in part, unless such appeal is provided for by express
words, or arises by necessary implication. An intention to repeal local acts generally is not intolerable
from the fact that the general acts specifically excludes one locality from its operation." (59 C. J. .
934.) There is no apparent intention in the Rules of Court to repeal the laws under which preliminary
investigations in Manila have to be conducted by the city fiscal. The contrary contention is evidenced
by section 2 of the rule 108, which provides that "Every justice of the peace, municipal judge or city
fiscal shall have jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of all offenses alleged to have been
committed within his municipality or city, cognizable y the Court of First Instance," (Espiritu vs. De La
Rosa [July 31, 1947], L-1156, 45 Off. Gaz., 196; Hashim vs. Boncan [Nov. 22, 1941], 40 Off. Gaz.,
13th Supp., p. 13.) In the first of these cases, Mr. Justice Padilla, speaking for the court, categorically
held that the Rules of Court had not repealed and supplanted the provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code regarding the power and authority of the City Fiscal to conduct preliminary
investigation." And in Hashim vs. Boncan, the Court, through Mr. Justice Laurel, said:
The framers of the Rules could not have intended to brush aside these lessons of
experience and to tear down an institution recognized by law and decision and sanctioned by
years of settled practice. They could not have failed to keep intact in effective machinery in
the administration of criminal justice, as expeditious and simple as any reform they have
infused into the new Rules.
The term "proper court or judge" in section 17, Rule 109, of the Rules of Court 1 should be interpreted
to mean, in the case of Manila, city fiscal, under the last mentioned canon of interpretation. In
Manila, the city fiscal performs the duties devolving on justices of the peace in regular municipalities
in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and all criminal charges by the police and offended

parties are filed with him. And it is admitted that prisoners arrested without warrant in Manila may be
taken only to the city fiscal by the arresting officer. Let it be noted also in this connection that section
17 of Rule 109 regulates the taking of persons arrested to the court or judge, not the filing of
complaint.
In view of this circumstances; in view of the fact that neither the judges of first instance nor the
municipal judges of Manila are authorized to conduct preliminary hearings other than the purpose of
determining the amount of bail (section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code), the result of
applying section 17 of Rule 109 to Manila would be virtually to eliminate preliminary investigation in
this city of persons arrested without a warrant. The decision creates a vacuum, a situation which this
Court on another occasion refused to countenance in the forceful language above quoted in
Hashim vs. Boncan et. al. There, the Court continued:
To sustain the theory of repeal is to wipe out these advantages. Not only this. If neither
section 11 nor section 13 of Rule 108 is applicable to the preliminary investigation conducted
by the City Fiscal, as we have above shown, and if existing legislation thereon is to be
deemed repealed, then the matter would be left uncovered by rule or law. There would thus
be a void crying for urgent reform. There would be no such void if the old and tried procedure
is kept in being, untouched by the new Rules. Withal, our own knowledge of the history of
this portion of the Rules here involved does not warrant an interpretation not contemplated
when we drafted and deliberated upon these Rules. And while, perhaps, the language could
have been clearer and the arrangement made more logical, consideration to expediency and
the avowed purpose of preliminary investigation point to the already trodden path
hereinabove indicated.
The resolution has interpreted article 125 of the Revised Penal Code with meticulous adherence, at
best, to its latter, and open disregarded, at worst, of its spirit and of the pernicious results that follow
from such interpretation. The construction which the majority give to the term "judicial authority"
makes it impossible for the city fiscal to perform his assigned duties with the consequence that for
lack of time, malefactors will have to be turned loose before proper investigation in conducted, or
prosecution filed on insufficient evidence, in many cases.
Nevertheless, I am not pleading, in the case, for a departure from the letter of the law. I merely
submit that the city fiscal, as was emphasized in my dissent from the decision, is a judicial officer or
judicial authority both in the popular and the legal sense of the term, and that it is unjust,
unwarranted by any rule of interpretation, absolutely disastrous to the administration of criminal law
to identify the city fiscal with the police, forcing him to file an information or release the prisoner
within the six hours intended for the arresting officer alone. I do not contend that the term "judicial
authority" be expanded beyond its literal and legal meaning, although if necessary this might be
done to carry out the obvious purpose of the law, but I take exception to the unjustified restriction
and limitation placed on the meaning of "judicial authority" which not only does violence to the letter
and spirit of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code but leads to an extremely anomalous, not to say
impossible, situation. We do not have to look outside for the meaning of "judicial authority," as a
simple reading of article 125 of the Revised Pena Code and section 2474 of the Revised
Administrative Code yields the clear intent of the legislature. This intent, as manifested in laws that
have been amended by section 2465 and section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code,
crystalized in a system of practice that have received "the imprint of judicial approval" in various
decisions of this Court. (U. S. vs. McGoven, 6 Phil. 261; U. S. vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil. 122;U. S. Carlos,
21 Phil. 553; Hashim vs. Boncan, ante; Espiritu vs. De la Rosa, ante.)
The resolution, as a solution to the quandary in which it places the city fiscal, would have him go to
Congress. But, as I trust I have shown, the laws on the subject need no supplementation and

implementation. They have no gaps to be filled or ambiguities to be cleared. The loopholes exist only
as a direct result of this Court's new ruling. Section 2474 of the revised Administrative Code and its
predecessors have operated smoothly, without a hitch for nearly half a century. Not even when the
arresting officer had 24 hours to take arrested persons to a judicial authority was it ever imagined,
much less asserted, that the city fiscal had to borrow his time from the police.
The resolution in laying down the rule that the city fiscal has no power to issue warrant of arrest or
"an order or commitment of release by a written warrant containing the ground on which it is based,"
thinks it is necessary to advert, "in justice to the city fiscal," that this official does not pretend to
possess such authority, since it is only in the dissenting opinion, it says, where the claim is made.
At the outset I deny that I attributed to the city fiscal power to issue warrant of arrest; and did not say
in an unqualified manner that he has power to issue commitment. On the first point, what I said was
an implicit aknowledgment of the opposite. Let me quote from the second paragraph of page 2 of my
dissenting opinion what I did say:
The city fiscal is not any the less a judicial officer simply because he can not issue warrant of
arrest. The power to issue warrant of arrest is not essential ingredient of a judicial office.
On the power to commit prisoners, the same paragraph of my opinion shows what I said.
As to the power to commit a detained person to prison, if that be necessary, the majority are
not exactly right when they affirm that the city fiscal is not clothed with it. It shall come to this
later.
And taking the matter up again on page 11, I said:
Section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes the chief of police of the City of
Manila "to take good and sufficient bail for the appearance before the city court of any
person arrested for violation of any city ordinance," while in cases of violation of any penal
law, according to the same article, the fiscal of the city may, and does, recommended and fix
the bail necessarily implies power to recommend or order the detention of the prisoner if
bond is not given. This i its working is no more nor less than the power to commit an accused
to prison pending investigation of his case, power which the majority erroneously say is not
possessed by the city fiscal.
There is nothing in this statement any outright affirmation that the city fiscal has power to issue
commitment papers. There is, on the contrary, an implied admission that the power, as it is ordinarily
exercised by a judge or court, does not exist. I merely submitted as my personal opinion and
interpretation of section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code, regardless of what the city fiscal
thinks, that it confers upon the latter official a power which, performed in conjunction with the power
of the chief of police, amounts in its practical operation to a power to commit a man to prison. And I
said this in answer to the sweeping assertion (which apparently was made in the decision in
complete oblivion of section 2460, supra), that to give the city fiscal unlimited time might result in
injustice, since, the decision says,
The city fiscal may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information
or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegal detained
for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge.

I intended to emphasize by citing section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code, that a prisoner
could secure his released, pending investigation of his case, in the same manner and with the same
facilities that he could if the complaint or information had been filed with a court. In citing and stating
my interpretation of section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code, I wished to show what I
considered an erroneous ruling that
If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having committed the
offense charged, or is not ready to filed the information on the strength of the testimony or
evidence presented, he should release and not detain the person arrested for a longer
period than that prescribed in the Penal Code.
The majority come back with the assertion that the provisions of section 2460 of the Revised Penal
Administrative Code2
do not authorize, either expressly or by implication, the city fiscal to order the detention of the
prisoner if the bond is not given, not only because they refer to the power of the chief of
police of Manila and not of the city fiscal, but because the only incidental authority granted to
the latter is to recommend the granting of the bail by the chief of police may release the latter
on bail.
I disagree again. I do not believe that a provision is rendered nugatory by the mere fact that it is
foreign to the subject of the main provision or to the title or caption of the section, if otherwise the
language is clear. The title or caption is important only in determining the meaning of laws which are
ambiguous and uncertain. The provision of section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code quoted
in the resolution does not suffer from such infirmity.
In truth, the proviso in section 2460 is not alien to the enacting clause. The proviso relates to the
chief of police, conferring on him power of the same nature as does the enacting clause, with the
only difference that, in cases of violations of a municipal ordinance the chief of police acts
independently, on his own responsibility, while in cases of violations of a penal law, he acts with the
advice of the city fiscal and the latter fixes the amount of bail. The intervention of the city fiscal was
only inserted, in my opinion, in view of the gravity of the latter class of cases.
As to the other reason given in the resolution why, it says, continued detention of a prisoner beyond
six hours is not authorized namely, that the authority granted to the city fiscal to recommend the
granting of bail by the chief of police and to fix the amount of bail to be required of the person
arrested, is only incidental my comment is that, whether the power to take bail or release
prisoners belongs to the city fiscal or the chief of police, is inconsequential. To my mind, the
important point is that the accused, as the resolution admits, may be released on bond. From this
power, irrespective of who possess it, is implied the power to keep the prisoner under detention if he
does not file a bond.
When the resolution concludes that if no bond is given by the person arrested, "neither the chief of
police, who is only authorized to release on bail, has power to detain the person arrested for more
than six hours; not the city fiscal, who is empowered to fix and recommend the bail to the chief of
police has authority to release person arrested in violation of penal law," I can not follow. In a
nutshell, the majority's reasoning, as I understand it, is that the law authorizes the city fiscal to
recommend and fix the bail "in order that the chief of police may release the latter (prisoner) on bail,"
but that if the prisoner does not put up a bond to be set at large just the same. The filing of bail is not
a meaningless gesture which may be taken advantage of by an accused at pleasure with the same
effect. The privilege to put a bond extended to an accused must be the price or condition of his

temporary release. The law does not have to say in so many words that if he does not put a bond he
would be kept in confinement in order that we may be warranted in reaching this result.
The resolution says that "the purpose of the law in empowering the chief of police of Manila to
release the prisoner if he puts up a bail, is to relieve the officer making the arrest the necessity of
taking the prisoner to the city fiscal, and the latter from filing an information with the proper courts
within the period of time prescribed by law."
I have reflected closely on the meaning of this statement to be sure that I did not misunderstand it.
Unless I still fail to grasp the idea, I think the statement is self-annulling and self contradictory. The
filing of bail cannot relive the arresting officer from the necessity of taking the prisoner to the city
fiscal for the simple reason that such bail, in cases of violations of penal laws, can be filed only on
recommendation of, and its amount can be fixed by, the city fiscal. In other words, the prisoners
necessarily has to be taken to the city fiscal before any bond can be executed. And it would be
underestimating the intelligence of an accused to expect him to file a bond within six hours from the
time of his arrest if he is aware that, if at the end of those hours the city fiscal had not preferred any
charges against him and no order of commitment had been issued by the proper judge, he
(accused) had to be released. In the face of the latter theory, no prisoner would, even if he could,
perfect a bond within six hours knowing that if he did not, he would be a free man, at leased
temporarily, within what remains of six hours, while if he did, the bond would enable the city fiscal to
take his time to file case against him in court.
The gravamen of the court's argument seems to be that a commitment by a court or judge is
essential to validate the detention beyond the time specified in the Revised Penal Code. I do not
share this opinion. Neither such commitment by a judge nor a formal complaint is required by the
constitution in order that a person may lawfully be kept in jail pending investigation of his case. An
opportunity to file a bond in reasonable amount satisfies the constitutional demands. Nor does the
bail have to be fixed or granted by a court. Sheriffs and police officers have been authorize by
statutory enactments in other jurisdiction to take bail. At least one court has gone so far as to uphold,
"independently of statue, a practice of long standing on the part of the sheriff to take bail in criminal
cases of prisoners committed for not filing bail, and release them from confinement." (Dickinson vs.
Kingsbury, 2 Day [Com., 1.] Now then, under section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
chief of police of Manila, as already shown, is allowed to take bail by himself in cases violation of a
municipal ordinance and with the intervention of the city fiscal in other cases. Under this provision
and this practice, a detention prisoner arrested without warrant is not deprived of any privilege of
benefit guaranteed by the constitution. The lack of formal complaint does not in the least prejudice
him or deprive him of any benefit enjoined by his counterparts in the provinces. On its legal aspect,
let it be observed that all the proceedings conducted by the city fiscal is a preliminary and summary
inquiry which is purely a matter of statutory regulation. Preliminary investigation by the prosecuting
attorney when authorized by law is due process no less than one conducted by a judge. It may be
suppressed entirely, and if it may be suppressed, it may be entrusted to any officer, provided only the
constitutional right to give bail is carefully safeguarded. As this Court has said in Hashim vs.
Boncan, supra, and U.S. vs. Ocampo, supra:
The prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila is presumed to be as competent to conduct a
preliminary investigation as the average person designated by law to conduct a "preliminary
examination" under the provisions of General Orders No. 58. He is a sworn officer of the
court, and the law imposes upon him the duty of making such investigations. For such
purpose the legislature may designate whom it pleases within the judicial department.
The resolution has taken pain to cite and explain in detail what it says are the laws on arrests in the
Philippines, and takes me to task for quoting from 6 Corpus Juris Secundum, 599-600 and citing the

decisions of this Court. We are told the effect that the excerpts from my dissenting opinion, quoted
on page 16 of the resolution are without any foundation because, it is said,
they are premised on the wrong assumption that, under the laws in force in our jurisdiction, a
place officer need not have personal knowledge but may arrest a person without a warrant
mere information from other person.
The resolution assumes that those excerpts are predicated on what I call the common law rule, on
Corpus Juris Secundum, and on decisions of the Supreme Court.
I commend a reading to my dissenting opinion. It will be seen that I did not base on those laws, rules
or decisions my statements, "The entire six hours might be consumed by the police in their
investigation alone;" "Even if the city fiscal be given the chance to start his assigned task at the
beginning of the six hour period, this time can not insure proper and just investigation in complicated
cases and in cases where the persons arrested are numerous and witnesses are not on hand to
testify," and "The police is not authorized to round up witnesses and take them along with the
prisoner to the city fiscal." It will be seen that far from using as my premise those laws, rules and
decisions, which I said contain in brief outlines the powers of police officers to make arrests, I said
clearly on page 12 of my dissenting opinion:
I do not think the foregoing paragraph is relevant to the instant case. We are not dealing with
the authority of the police officer to make arrest without warrant. There is no question raised
against the legality of the prisoner's arrest. Our problem concerns the time period within
which the city fiscal may make his investigation, and the scope of his power.
It was the majority decision which brought the question of the authority of the police to make arrests
into the discussion. I only met the decision on its own territory though I regarded that territory as
outside the legitimate circle of the present dispute. I cited Corpus Juris Secundum and decisions of
this Court, which I said are derived from common law, to refute the statement,
a fortiori, a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an
offense upon complaint of the offended party or other person seven though after
investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
I especially wanted to express my disagreement with the thesis in the decision that
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon
complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly
authorized by law.
It was my humble opinion that the rules I cited and the rules on which the decisions of this Court are
predicated, were general provisions of law applicable to varying and changed circumstances, and I
wanted to deny the insinuation that there were, or there might be, arrests without warrant "expressly
authorized by law"; so I countered that "I have not come across any law naming specific offenses for
committing which the offenders shall be arrested without court orders." This is my concept of express
provisions authorizing arrests without a warrant.
Section 6 of Rule 109, section 2463 of the Revised Administrative code, and the provisional Law on
the subject of arrest, cited in the resolution in an attempt to show the error of my citations, can not be
a source of comfort to the majority. Rather, I should think, they reinforce my position, for I believe
that the rules and decisions I cited the rules and laws called to our attentions as the real thing, are in

substantial agreement. My mistake was in not citing, myself, Rule 109, section 6, of the Rules of
Court, section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code, and the Provisional Law. I might have found
and cited them had I thought the matter worthy of more than a passing notice.
Now that the resolution has gone into this subject at length, I shall devote a few more lines to it at
the peril of tiring the reader on what I believe an impertinent topic.
My citation from Corpus Juris and my comment that "this is a common law rule implanted in the
Philippines along with its present form of government, a rule which have been cited or applied by this
Court in a number of case," has met with decision. I am informed that my quotation is "not a general
principle of law or common law rule implanted in the Philippines"; that "it is the summary of the ruling
of several states courts based on statutory exceptions of the general rule."
I do not think I wise wide off the mark when I said that the common law rule has been transplanted to
this country along with the present form of government and that the rules and decisions I have
quoted spring from the common law. And the majority are not closer to the marked when they
affirmed that my quotation from Corpus Juris Secundum, and section 2463 of the Revised
Administrative Code are purely statutory creation.
There was common law before there were statutes. Common law in England and in the U. S.
preceded statement statutes and constitutions. Statutes and constitutions in matters of arrest came
afterwards, restating, affirming, clarifying, restricting or modifying the common law.
The English common law has been adopted as the basis of jurisprudence in all the states of
the Union with the exception of Louisiana "where the civil law prevails in civil matters." (11
Am. Jur., 157.) And
in England, under the common law, sheriffs, justices of the peace, coroners, constables and
watchmen were entrusted with special powers as conservators of the peace, with authority to
arrest felons and persons reasonably suspected of being felons. Whenever a charge a
felony was brought to their notice, supported by reasonable grounds of suspicion, they were
required to apprehend the offenders, or at the least to raise hue and cry, under the penalty of
being indicted for neglect of duty.
See the footnote on pp. 2512-2513, Vol. 2, of Jones Blackstone and the numerous cases therein
cited. It is a footnote appended o the statement of a common law principle which of the same tenor
as that just noted. Treatises on arrest not infrequently start with a statement of the common law rule
and speak of statute and constitutions in the sense I have mentioned. Moran's Commentaries on the
Rules of Court mention of the common law. (Vol. 2, p. 577) in connection with the power to make
arrest without a warrant.
The doctrine taken from 5 C. J., 395-396-that "the right to make arrest without a warrant is usually
regulated by express statute, and, except as authorize by such statutes, an arrest without a warrant
is illegal" is not at war with the proposition that the authority of peace officers to make arrest
originated at common law and that constitutions and statutes merely re-stated and defined that the
authority with greater precision, naming the officers who may make arrest, the grades of offenses for,
and the circumstances under, which arrest may be effected, etc. Arrests made by officers not
designated or under circumstances not coming within the terms of the statute or constitution are
illegal.
Even then, broad constitutional or statutory inhibition against search and seizure of property or
persons without a warrant has exceptions, as can be inferred from the two sentences preceding the

above sentence quoted in the resolution. This exceptions are cases where the public security has
demanded the search and seizure.
Well established exceptions to this rule have been long recognized in cases of felony, and of
breaches of the peace committed in the presence of the party making the arrest. (5 C. J.,
395.)
Arrests under such circumstances are authorized in spite of statutes and constitutions. The power to
make such arrest is deeply rooted in the unwritten or common law, which "includes those principles,
usage and rules of action applicable to the government and security of person and property which do
not rest for their authority an any express or positive declaration of the will of the legislature."
Although acting at his peril, the powers to arrest on" probable cause of suspicion" even by a private
person are "principles of the common law, essential to the welfare of society, and not intended to be
altered or impaired by the Constitution." (Wakely vs. Hart, 6 Binn. [Pa.,], 316.)
I have remarked that there is no fundamental difference between my citations, on the other hand,
and section 6 of Rule 109 and section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code, Cited by the
majority of the Court, on the other hand. There is only a difference in phraseology. The very case of
U. S. vs. Fortaleza relied upon in the resolution speaks of barrio lieutenant's power to make arrest as
not inferior to that usually conferred on peace officers known to American and English law as
constables.
The resolution quotes this from 5 C. J., 404:
It is a general rule, although there are statutory exceptions and variations that a peace officer
has no right to make an arrest without a warrant upon mere information of a third person.
This is only a part of the sentence. The omitted portion is more important from my point of view and
contradicts the point of view and contradicts the point stressed by the majority. The complete
sentence in.
It is a general rule, although there are exceptions and variations, that a peace officer has no
right to make an arrest without a warrant, upon mere information of a third person or mere
information of committed, that right being limited to arrests for offenses of the grade of
felony, as elsewhere shown.
It will be noticed that the quoted portion relates to arrest for misdemeanor. For further proof, I invite
attention to the title of the Section on page 401, paragraph (a), which reads: "For
Misdemeanor aa. In General." Let it be noted that the power to arrest for misdemeanor is different
from, and more restricted than, the power to arrest for felony, as is further demonstrated by the last
clause of the full sentence above quoted. This clause refers us back to section 30, p. 399, which
says:
"At common law, (here again common law mentioned), and subject to the provisions of any
applicatory statute, and subject officer may arrest, without a warrant, one whom he has reasonable
or probable grounds to suspect of having committed of felony, even though the person suspected is
innocent, and generally, although no felony has in fact been committed by any one, although, under
some statutes a felony must have been actually committed, in which case an may arrest, without a
warrant, any person he has reasonable cause for believing to be the person who committed it."

As is elsewhere stated, section 6 of Rule 109 and section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code,
like the authorities I have cited, do not limit the power of a police officer to make arrest tho those
cases where he saw with his own eyes or heard with his own ears the commission of an offense.
Section 6 of a Rule 109 and section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code empowers police
officers.
to pursue and arrest, without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under
suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is
about to commit, any crime or breach of the peace,
and section 6 of Rule 109 authorizes a peace officer or a private person to make arrest when
an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it
Rule 28 of the Provincial Law itself empowers judicial and administrative authorities "to detain, or
cause to be detained person whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense" or
"when the authority or agent has reason to believe that unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been
committed."
To make arrest on suspicion or on information is not new; it is an everyday practice absolutely
necessary in the of public security and firmly enshrined in the jurisprudence of all civilized societies.
The power to arrest on suspicion or on reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed is authority to arrest on information. Information coming from reliable sources maybe, and
it often is, the basis reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed or of reasonable
ground of suspicion that a person is guilty thereof. Suspicion reasonable ground and information are
interviewed within the same concept.
The necessary elements of the ground of suspicion are that the officer acts upon the belief of
the person's guilt, based either upon facts or circumtances within the officers own
knowledge, or information imparted by a reliable and credible third person provided there are
no circumstances known to the officer sufficient to materially impeach the information
received, It is not every idle and unreasonable charge which will justify an arrest. An arrest
without a warrant is illegal when it is made upon mere suspicion or belief, unsupported by
facts, circumstances, or credible information calculated to produce such suspicion or belief.
Failure to take these principles into account has led to the belief that:
The investigation which the city fiscal has to make before filing the corresponding information
in cases of persons arrested without a warrant, does not require so much time as that made
upon a complaint of the offended parties for the purpose of securing a warrant of arrest of
the accused. In all cases above enumerated in which the law authorizes a peace officer to
arrest without warrant, the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge that the
person arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in
his presence or within his view, or of the time, place or circumstances which reasonably tend
to show that such person has committed or is about to commit any crime or breach of the
peace. And the testimony of such officer on the commission on the offense in his presence or
within his view by the person arrested, or on the facts and circumstances that tend
reasonably to show that said person has committed or is about to commit an offense, would
be sufficient evidence or basis for the city fiscal to file an information without prejudice to his
presenting of other evidence of the defendant. (Pp. 16-17 of the Resolution.).

Section 6 of Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
well as the authorities I have quoted, show the fallacy of the idea that the arresting officer knows, or
should know, all the facts about the offense for the perpetration, or supposed perpetration, of which
he has made the arrest. The resolution fails to realize that in the great majority of cases an officer
makes arrest on information or suspicion; that "suspicion implies a belief or opinion as to the guilt
based upon facts or circumstances which DO NOT AMOUNT TO PROOF," and that information and
suspicion by their nature require verification and examination of the informers and other persons and
circumstances. While an officer may not act on unsubstantial appearances and unreasonable stories
to justify an arrest without a warrant, obviously in the interest of security, an officer who has to act on
the spot and cannot afford to lose time, has to make arrest without satisfying himself beyond
question that a crime has been committed or that the person suspected is guilty of such crime. A
police officer can seldom make arrest with personal knowledge of the offense and of the identity of
the person arrested sufficient in itself to convict. To require him to make an arrest only when the
evidence he himself can furnish proves beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, would
"endanger the safety of society." It would cripple the forces of the law to the point of enabling
criminals, against whom there is only moral conviction or prima facie proof of guilt, to escape. Yet
persons arrested on necessarily innocent so that the prosecuting attorney should release them.
Further and closer investigation not infrequently confirm the suspicion or information.
The majority of arrests are not as simple as a police officer catching a thief slipping his hand into
another's pocket or snatching someone else's bag, or suprising a merchant selling above the ceiling
price, or seizing a person carrying concealed weapons. Cases of frequent occurrence which confront
the police and the prosecution in a populous and crime-redden city are a great deal more
complicated. They are cases in which the needed evidence can only be supplied by witnesses,
whom the arresting officer or private persons has not the authority or the time to round up and take
to the city fiscal for examination with in what remains, if any, of six hours.
Let me give two examples.
1. A murder with robbery is reported to the police. An alarm is broadcasted giving a description of the
murderer. Later a police officer is told that the wanted man is in a store. He proceeds to the store
and. besides believing in good faith of his informant, detects in the man's physical appearance some
resemblance to the description given in the alarm. All this occurs at the holy hours of night.
Should the officer refrain from making an arrest because he is not certain beyond reasonable doubt
of the identity of the suspected murderer? Should the city fiscal order the release of the prisoner
because of insufficiency of evidence and because the six hours are expiring, or should he prefer
formal charges (if that can be done at midnight) on the strength of evidence which, as likely as not,
may be due to a mistaken identify? Should not the prosecuting attorney be given, as the law clearly
intends, adequate time to summon those who witnessed the crime and who can tell whether the
prisoner was the fugitive?, allowing the prisoner to give bail, if he can.
2. A police officer is attracted by screams from a house where a robbery has been committed. The
officer rushed to the place, finds a man slain, is told that the murderers have filed. The officer runs in
the direction indicated and finds men with arms who, from appearances, seem to be the perpetrators
of the crime. The people who saw the criminals run off are not sure those are the men they saw. The
night was dark, for criminals like to ply their trade under cover of darkness.
The officer does not, under these circumstances, have to seek an arrest warrant or wait for one
before detaining the suspected persons. To prevent their escape he brings them to the police station.
On the other hand, would the fiscal be justified in filing an information against such persons on the
sole testimony of the police officer? It is not his duty to wait for more proofs on their probable

connection with the crime? Should the city fiscal file an information on sufficient evidence, or should
he as the only alternative, order the release of the prisoners? Does either course subserve the
interest of justice and the interest of the public? If the arrested persons are innocent, as they may
be, is either interest be served by hasty filing of information against them, or would they rather have
a more thorough investigation of the case?
Cases like these with varying details can be multiplied ad infinitum. They form the bulk of underworld
activities with which the forces of law have to cope and with which the general public is vitally
concerned. The public would not be secure in their homes and in the pursuit of their occupations if
his Court, through unreasoning worship of formalism, throws down a method, practice and
procedure that have been used here and elsewhere from time immemorial to the end of service and
in the interest of public security. The public security. The public is not much interested in such minor
offenses as pick-pocketing, fist fights and misdemeanors or violations of municipal ordinances for
which arrests can be made by police officers only when committed in their presence or within their
hearing.
The decision of this Court leaves the city fiscal no alternative between releasing prisoners for
insufficiency of evidence due to lack of time to secure more, and filing information against persons
who may be innocent of the crimed charge. The latter course, defeats directly the very aims of
preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppresive
prosecution and to protect him from open and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble,
expense, anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive
prosecutions. (Hashim vs. Boncan, No. 47777, January 13, 1941; 40 Off. Gaz., 13th Supp. p. 13;
U.S. vs. Mendez, 4 Phil.; 124; U.S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 11 Phil. 122; U. S. vs. Marfori, 35 Phil.
666; People vs. Colon, 47 Phil. 443.) Even more deplorable would be the acquittal of guilty accused
due to lack of proofs which the prosecution, if it had been afforded sufficient time, could have
gathered.
The foregoing goes, too, for the concurring opinion. There is only one more point to which we wish to
address ourselves briefly. The concurring opinion contains this passage:
Dentro de las 6 horas hay tiempo mas que suficiente para meter en cuenta atoda la
canalla ... Pero; por Dios que no se violen ni pisoteen lasgarantias constitucionales por
miedo a los gangsters!
No one can disagree with this though as an abstract proposition. The only trouble is that the
opinion does not cite any concrete constitutional provision or guaranty that is infringed by our
dissent. I take the suggestion in the resolution that "it would be proper for the interested parties to
take the case to Congress, since it can not be done by judicial legislation" to be a tacit recognition
that the matter is purely one of statute and that no constitutional impediment is in the way of
changing the law and enlarging the power of the city fiscal in the premises. And let it be said that the
objection in the concurring opinion to this suggestion is rested, not on constitutional grounds but on
the supposition that the law is good enough to be left alone. All which tempts us to paraphrase the
famous apostrophe of that equally famous woman in French history, and exclaim, "Oh Constitution!
what grievous mistakes are committed in thy name!"
The concurring opinion is in error when it sees shadows of fear gangster in our dissent. Society no
less than a natural person has the right to protect itself, and the arrest and punishment of
transgressors of its laws is one of its legitimate means of self-protection and self-preservation. As far
as the insinuation of fear may reflect on those who are duty bound to have part in such arrest and
punishment, the application of criminal laws without quarters to the end which they are intended to
serve, is not in strict logic a sign of apprehension. Such course, rather than tolerance, leniency or

indifference towards crimes and appeasement of lawless and other elements and groups who wield
the power of physical and verbal relations, calls for exactly the opposite quality of fright.
Padilla, J., concurs.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 153524-25. January 31, 2005]

RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO

DESIERTO in his capacity as Head of the Office of the
Ombudsman, HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO in his capacity as
Deputy Ombudsman for Military, P/INS. JEFFREY T. GOROSPE,
SPO2 ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1 ALFREDO B. ALVIAR, JR.,
PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B. CARDENAS, PO1
JOSEPH A. BENAZA, SPO1 FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4
PEDRO PAREL, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of
the Ombudsman in its finding of lack of probable cause made during
preliminary investigation. And, yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored
practice of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations by our
prosecutory bodies absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion on their
part.
Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,[1] contend precisely that
the public respondents herein officers of the Office of the Ombudsman gravely
abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of detained persons) against
private respondents herein, members of the Philippine National Police
stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur.
From the respective pleadings[2] of the parties, the following facts appear to
be indubitable:
1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day before the
14 May 2001 Elections[3]), petitioners were arrested without a warrant by respondents
police officers for alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition;
2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal. revolver (a
crime which carries with it the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period)
and for violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
the Commission on Election Resolution No. 3328 (which carries the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than one [1] year but not more than six [6] years);
3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine pistol
UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal. revolver with ammunition;

4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos Sur,
Police Station. It was at the Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista was identified by
one of the police officers to have a standing warrant of arrest for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;
5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election day),
petitioners were brought to the residence of Provincial Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in
San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a Joint-Affidavit against them was subscribed and
sworn to by the arresting officers. From there, the arresting officers brought the
petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutors Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at about
6:00 p.m. the Joint-Affidavit was filed and docketed;
6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria
was released upon the order of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary
investigation, while petitioner Bista was brought back and continued to be detained at
the Santa Police Station. From the time of petitioner Sorias detention up to the time of
his release, twenty-two (22) hours had already elapsed;
7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was brought
before the MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where the case for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner Bista posted bail and an Order of Temporary Release
was issued thereafter;
8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with petitioner
Bistas arrest for alleged illegal possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon of
the same day (15 May 2001), an information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-S, was filed against petitioner
Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in the
afternoon, informations for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and
violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No.
2268-N, respectively, were filed in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;
9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in
Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No. 4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.
10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code against herein private respondents.

11. After considering the parties respective submissions, the Office of the
Ombudsman rendered the first assailed Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002
dismissing the complaint for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code for lack
of merit; and
12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which
was denied for lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public
officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail
to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve
(12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent;
eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or
their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and
shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel.
It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria
was arrested without warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their
equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or information should be filed with the
proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. Neither is it in dispute
that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Bista was arrested are punishable
by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only be
detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints or information having been
filed with the proper judicial authorities.
The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the
12-18-36 periods. With respect specifically to the detention of petitioner Soria
which lasted for 22 hours, it is alleged that public respondents gravely erred in
construing Article 125[4] as excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in
the computation of the periods prescribed within which public officers should
deliver arrested persons to the proper judicial authorities as the law never
makes such exception. Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear
and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any
attempts at interpretation.[5] Public respondents, on the other hand, relied on
the cases of Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,[6] and Sayo v. Chief of Police of

Manila[7] and on commentaries[8] of jurists to bolster their position that

Sundays, holidays and election days are excluded in the computation of the
periods provided in Article 125,[9] hence, the arresting officers delivered
petitioners well within the allowable time.
In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to
petitioner Bista, petitioners maintain that the filing of the information in court
against petitioner Bista did not justify his continuous detention. The
information was filed at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May 2001 but the orders for his
release were issued by the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June 2001. They argued that based on law
and jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the prosecutor within the period
fixed by law, the arresting officer must release the detainee lest he be charged
with violation of Article 125.[10] Public respondents countered that the duty of
the arresting officers ended upon the filing of the informations with the proper
judicial authorities following the rulings in Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military,[11] and People v. Acosta.[12]
From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident
that public respondents did not abuse their discretion in dismissing for lack of
probable cause the complaint against private respondents.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion or hostility.[13]
No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public
respondents. Their disposition of petitioners complaint for violation of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of
thin air as it was properly backed up by law and jurisprudence. Public
respondents ratiocinated thus:
As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is
concerned, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special
holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for
the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a
no-office day. (Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while it appears
that the complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and

Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m.,
he had already been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by
the respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there could
be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to
speak of.[14]
Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,[15] that
. . . The arresting officers duty under the law was either to deliver him to the proper
judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is that
he was not released. From the time of petitioners arrest at 12:00 oclock p.m. on
November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the information against him for
murder actually was in court, over 75 hours have elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8
was declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election day) was also an official
holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for
his clerk and stenographer, draft the information and search for the Judge to have him
act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the case and
have the order of commitment prepared. And then, where to locate and the uncertainty
of locating those officers and employees could very well compound the fiscals
difficulties. These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that
Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the very first
office day following arrest.
And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila[16] -. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer
detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the
means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and other circumstances, such
as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the
investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into
consideration.
As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the
information has already been filed in Court, public respondents acted well
within their discretion in ruling thus:
In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation
of Article 125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period
prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his
arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of

arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m.
that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of Release. Obviously, however, he
could only be released if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his
continuous detention.
The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and
COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and
Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001 (Annexes G and I,
Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar Bista) but he was released from detention only on
June 8, 2001, on orders of the RTC and MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur (Annexes J and
K, Complaint-Affidavit). Was there a delay in the delivery of detained person to the
proper judicial authorities under the circumstances? The answer is in the negative. The
complaints against him was (sic) seasonably filed in the court of justice within the
thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law as discussed above. The duty of the
detaining officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaints. Further
action, like issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial authority (People
v. Acosta [CA] 54 O.G. 4739).[17]
The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military,[18] wherein we ordained that
. . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the
intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is
informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the court,
he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC
to order his release when he applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail.
Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of
the complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the position of the Ombudsman that
such filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said
Article.
All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have
no choice but to defer to the Office of the Ombudsmans determination that the
facts on hand do not make out a case for violation of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
As we have underscored in numerous decisions -We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and
prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This policy is
based on constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We are mindful that the
Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide

latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative,

executive or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure and
improper influence. Moreover, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic
judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused
must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a
matter of law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional
judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless
clothed with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will
be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it. In much the same way, the courts will be swamped with
cases if they will have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file an information in court or
dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. [19] (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint Resolution dated 31 January
2002 and the Order dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman are
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SEARCH WARRANT MALICIOUSLY

OBTAINED

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for
respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 hereinafter referred to
as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges 2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges
issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution
and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners
in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners
filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction,
and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the

effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted
to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants
and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of
Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid
and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were
cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of
the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the
use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they
were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear
that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have
been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights
of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not
been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment,
when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of
the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the
personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.
1wph1.t

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants
and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this
connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth
in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it
is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision
of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen,
in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it,
even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even
if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation,
however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should
not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other
than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance,
without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other
laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are
led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in
a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this
Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that
the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due
Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to
federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in
violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by
avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed
dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches state
or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an
essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the
right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional
Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States,
and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any
police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for
a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given
crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant
should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause,
and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But,
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee
under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents
of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power
they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually but,
understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the
fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered
down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29,
1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey
Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners,
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that,
furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of
the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution
sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged
affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners
herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should
we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being
best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with
the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is
hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers

and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and
that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents,
papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of
the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section
1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants
were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is
declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners
are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against
the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made
permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that
they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects
seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written
by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such warrants
served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and
leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the
search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches
and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and
prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral developments of this case
should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for
future cases and future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are
admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably
outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the
petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of
the papers, things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in

any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the
intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners
possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures
were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that
"legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the
lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this
Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the
documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and
interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the
pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved
person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were
directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally,
followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation.
The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in
all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General
Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The
searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)
(narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d.
650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant
was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not
belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized
from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d
680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the
defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that
under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself

or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or
his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man
relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area,
be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his
desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable
search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate
the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private
papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other
cases which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing
factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately
invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we
either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be
applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have
been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except
to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises
searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey
Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC,
USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in
which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their
respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners'
proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore independently gives them
standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the
interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what
it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the
Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are
persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private
property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by
distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due
consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common
law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform
Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee",
"licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in
fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman
vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the
property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the
corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli,
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully
moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized
from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful.
The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained
should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the
articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But
in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix
Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under
against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and
was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones
vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere
guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary
rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure"
was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a
mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate
property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that
the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First he had a sufficient interest in the
property seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in
the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had
seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by
an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded
from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and
records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books
and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962).
In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment;
the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including
himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that
there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the
search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at
682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto
Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury

subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the
petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the
custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the
contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the
books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to
produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which
attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. *
Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm which,
according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers turned
out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of certain
unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records were
seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held
that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing"
to move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs.
U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S.,
supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and
exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the
law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used "in
committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails
by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of
America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to
suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with
Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers
v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct.
93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not
appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present
petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not
petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY
AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed
in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the
premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the

documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers)
were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners
all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from
their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn
statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that
amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places
were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects
of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family
residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the
void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and
things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or
return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear
legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General
Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal
prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do
not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo,
Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
[Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other
written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publishereditor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for
the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer,
Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City,
their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined
from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other
accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People
v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea
for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset
to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned
articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of
the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction
was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to
this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent

judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should
have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum"
offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence
of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the
words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is
always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from
its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid
on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition
impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six
[6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition
thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation]
with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after
the petitioners' premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this
long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other
remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in
this country, from release of public funds to release of detained persons from
custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the
President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel
Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles.
And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief
Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were
further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court.
[pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no
ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts
exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to
the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as
evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from
challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These
documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with

them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any
way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This objection, however, may properly be
considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9,
1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his
witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter
address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b]
which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing
the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and
concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were
applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would
be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and
the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set
forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed
the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is
more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was
applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address
appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that
respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer
is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who
issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the
executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the
warrant as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants
were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos,
Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized
under a search warrant, to wit:

Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the
offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing
an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in
relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed
warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which
may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where
this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes
immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a
tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the
agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to
the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col.
Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was accompanied by
the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security
Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on
December 7, 1982.

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue
in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an

offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the
case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner
"is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications
and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is
a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for
respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in
the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and
collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things
above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy
with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement,
Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the
issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause."
As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this
Court in Alvarez case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is
that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to
be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters,
cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper
and any and all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to
the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to
promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with
marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts,
lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the
U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703
or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which
could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a
general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be
characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the
era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown
were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the
literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not
be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that
speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure,
these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of
said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is
essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they
have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in
subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance
with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It
is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than
President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property
seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of
the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information
Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in
Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the
premises.
Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at
the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the
reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S.

Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM
" case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our
authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and
materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent
judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The
prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all
articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.