Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994

TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, respondents.
Oscar A. Inocentes & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Efren A. Santos for private respondent.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse the decision * of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 entitled "Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez versus Hon.
Romeo F. Zamora, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and Rafael S. Ortanez".
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:
On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on
grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided over by
respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to "M".
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone
conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence on 9 June
1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence.
A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992.
A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the admission in
evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

On 10 June 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment which is the subject of the present petition,
which in part reads:
It is much too obvious that the petition will have to fail, for two basic reasons:
(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can
be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and
offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and
the even handed administration of justice.
(2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in
admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory;
neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned
in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil action
of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an
error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.Otherwise, we will have
the sorry spectacle of a case being subject of a counterproductive "ping-pong" to and
from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any
of its rulings with respect to evidentiary matters in the course of trial. This we cannot
sanction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari being devoid of merit, is hereby DISMISSED.

From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for review, stating:
Grounds for Allowance of the Petition
10. The decision of respondent [Court of Appeals] has no basis in law nor previous
decision of the Supreme Court.
10.1 In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined
by the Supreme Court as the question of admissibility in evidence of tape
recordings has not, thus far, been addressed and decided squarely by
the Supreme Court.
11. In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of Appeals has
likewise rendered a decision in a way not in accord with law and with applicable decisions
of the Supreme Court.
11.1 Although the questioned order is interlocutory in nature, the same
can still be [the] subject of a petition for certiorari. 2
The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.

The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial
court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in
said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would
not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress. 3
In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by
private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified
persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends
from the military to wire tap his home telephone. 4
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings
inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by
using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of
the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the
law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the
telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned Republic Act in Section 2 thereof imposes
a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and up to six (6) years for violation of said Act. 5
We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties, involving the applicability of American
jurisprudence, having arrived at the conclusion that the subject cassette tapes are inadmissible in
evidence under Philippine law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 is hereby SET ASIDE. The
subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 121087. August 26, 1999]

FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

COURT

OF APPEALS

and

the

PEOPLE

OF THE

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated December 14, 1994,
which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Lucena City, dated July 27, 1992, finding
petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentencing him to ten (10) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, but increased the death indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Enrique Ike Lingan,
from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
The information against petitioner alleged
That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a member of the
Lucena Integrated National Police, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault
one Ike Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where authorities are supposed to be engaged in the discharge
of their duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in the head with the butt of a gun and thereafter when the said victim
fell, by banging his head against the concrete pavement, as a consequence of which said Ike Lingan suffered
cerebral concussion and shock which directly caused his death.
The evidence shows that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique Ike
Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the
Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a
table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed
her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture.[2]
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and
demanded to know why he took a picture. [3] Jalbuena replied: Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job.[4] Sioco
pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him. [5] When Jalbuena saw that Sioco
was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companions.[6]
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the policemen on duty,
including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his
companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Aonuevo, to report the incident. In a
while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle.[7]
Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen minutes.
Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: Putang ina,
kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?[9] Petitioner Navarro then pulled out
his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said,Ano, uutasin na kita?[10]
[8]

At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: Huwag namang ganyan, pumarito kami para
magpa-blotter, I am here to mediate.[11] Petitioner Navarro replied: Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo.[12] He
then turned to Sgt. Aonuevo and told him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan. [13]
This angered Lingan, who said: O, di ilagay mo diyan.[14] Petitioner Navarro retorted: Talagang ilalagay ko.
[15]
The two then had a heated exchange.[16] Finally, Lingan said: Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at
magsuntukan na lang tayo.[17] Petitioner Navarro replied: Ah, ganoon?[18]
As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above the left
eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a
fist blow on the forehead which floored him.[19]
Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan ang
naghamon.[20] He said to Sgt. Aonuevo: Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter, sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike
Lingan ang naghamon.[21] He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the
blotter.[22] Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print.
[23]

Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan
to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy Casaada, arrived and, learning that Lingan
had been taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries.[24]
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the
deceased.[25] The following is an excerpt from the tape recording:
Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.
Navarro: Who is that abusing?
Lingan: Im here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. Im out of the problem.
....
Navarro: Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . . .
Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare. Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay. Do not fight with me. I just came
here to ayusin things. Do not say bad things against me. Im the number one loko sa media. Im the best
media man. . . .
Navarro: Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-takotan! Huwag mong sabihing loko
ka!
Lingan: Im brave also.
Navarro: Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang masasabi sa akin dahil nag-tatrabaho lang
ako ng ayon sa serbisyo ko.
Lingan: You are challenging me and him. . . .

Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito sinasabihan kita na may balita tayong
maganda. Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang minomonopoly mo eh.
Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.
Navarro: Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!
Lingan: You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?
Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba!
Lingan: Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo, sige.
Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!
(Sounds of a scuffle)
Navarro: Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan, testigo kayo. Alisin ko daw ang
baril ko. Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan, hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo,
hinamon ako. Pulis tayo eh. Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni Alex, ni Joe, ni
Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare, hinamon ako, kinig nyo ha. Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital
yan.
Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) was
able to duck both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice, each time hitting his head on the
concrete.[26]
In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated:
After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense, this court
finds that the evidence for the prosecution is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to create that moral certainty
in the mind of the court that accused herein is criminally responsible.
The defenses evidence which consists of outright denial could not under the circumstance overturn the strength of
the prosecutions evidence.
This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly Stanley Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make false
accusation, distort the truth, testify falsehood or cause accusation of one who had neither brought him harm or
injury.
Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms the detailed
account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan sustained head injuries.
Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of Jalbuena sufficiently belie the claim of the defense that the
head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the latters falling down on the concrete pavement head first.
The Court of Appeals affirmed:

We are far from being convinced by appellants aforesaid disquisition. We have carefully evaluated the conflicting
versions of the incident as presented by both parties, and we find the trial courts factual conclusions to have better
and stronger evidentiary support.
In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself a victim of appellants aggression does not impair the
probative worth of his positive and logical account of the incident in question. In fact, far from proving his
innocence, appellants unwarranted assault upon Jalbuena, which the defense has virtually admitted, clearly betrays
his violent character or disposition and his capacity to harm others. Apparently, the same motivation that led him
into assailing Jalbuena must have provoked him into also attacking Lingan who had interceded for Jalbuena and
humiliated him and further challenged him to a fist fight.
....
On the other hand, appellants explanation as to how Lingan was injured is too tenuous and illogical to be
accepted. It is in fact contradicted by the number, nature and location of Lingans injuries as shown in the postmortem report (Exh. D). According to the defense, Lingan fell two times when he was outbalanced in the course of
boxing the appellant. And yet, Lingan suffered lacerated wounds in his left forehead, left eyebrow, between his left
and right eyebrows, and contusion in the right temporal region of the head (Exh. E). Certainly, these injuries could
not have resulted from Lingans accidental fall.
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. ITS CONCLUSION IS A FINDING
BASED ON SPECULATION, SURMISE OR CONJECTURE; THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS MANIFESTLY
MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ITS
JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS; ITS FINDING IS CONTRADICTED BY
EVIDENCE ON RECORD; AND ITS FINDING IS DEVOID OF SUPPORT IN THE RECORD.
The appeal is without merit.
First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a
biased witness, having a grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of the
accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable. [27] Trial courts, which have the opportunity to observe the facial
expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her
testimony should be given credence.[28] In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred
in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena.
Indeed, Jalbuenas testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. It may be asked whether the
tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law
provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof,
of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents
thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or
trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
....
SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. [29] Since the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of
a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded;
and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. [30] In the instant case,
Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; [31] that the tape played in court was the one he
recorded;[32] and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. [33] A sufficient foundation was
thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange between
petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that
some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of Lingan, issued a medical
certificate,[34] dated February 5, 1990, containing the following findings:
Post Mortem Findings:
= Dried blood, forehead & face
= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth
= Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral, eyebrow, Left
= Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between the left & right eyebrow
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth, forehead, Left
= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toes

CAUSE OF DEATH:
= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK
= BLOW ON THE HEAD
Dr. Yamamoto testified:
Q Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this findings number one, which is oozing of blood
from the forehead?
A It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a hard object, sir.
Q Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No. 1?
A It is possible, sir.
Q And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on a concrete floor?
A Possible, sir.
FISCAL:
What could have been the cause of the contusion and swelling under your findings No. 2 doctor?
WITNESS:
It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.
Q Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor?
A The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a butt of a gun because the butt of a gun is small, sir.
Q How about this findings No. 4?
A By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.
Q And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?
A Same cause, sir.
Q This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?
A Same thing, sir.
Q How about this last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and toes, what could have caused it doctor?

WITNESS:
It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.
FISCAL:
In this same post mortem report and under the heading cause of death it states: Cause of Death: Cerebral
concussion and Shock, will you explain it?
A Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog naalog ang utak or jarring of the brain, sir.
Q What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?
A It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.
Q What about the shock, what could have caused it?
A It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir.
Q Could any one of both caused the death of the victim?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of the deceased?
A May be, sir.
Q How about shock?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL:
Which of these two more likely to cause death?
WITNESS:
Shock, sir.
Q Please explain further the meaning of the medical term shock?
A It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said earlier, sir.
....
FISCAL:

Could a bumping or pushing of ones head against a concrete floor have caused shock?
WITNESS:
Possible, sir.
How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock?
A Possible, sir.[35]
The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner Navarro hit Lingan with the handle
of his pistol above the left eyebrow and struck him on the forehead with his fist.
Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party immediately preceding the act should have been appreciated in favor of petitioner
Navarro. Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of
exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone.[36] The provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act.
[37]
People v. Paga, 79 SCRA 570 (1977).37 To be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the
wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity.[38]And it must immediately precede the act so much so
that there is no interval between the provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the
accused.[39]
In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constituted
sufficient provocation. In People v. Macaso,[40] we appreciated this mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused,
a policeman, who shot a motorist after the latter had repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence, this
mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor of petitioner Navarro.
Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed should also be appreciated in favor of petitioner. The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the
scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this mitigating
circumstance should be taken into account in determining the penalty that should be imposed on petitioner
Navarro. The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is consistent with the rule that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.[41] In People v. Castro,[42] the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed was appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him guilty of homicide.
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the public authorities are
engaged in the discharge of their duties should be appreciated against petitioner Navarro. The offense in this case
was committed right in the police station where policemen were discharging their public functions. [43]
The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty
under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As there were two mitigating circumstances and
one aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be fixed in its minimum period. [44] Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within
the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the maximum of which is reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.[45]

The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 is in accordance with
current jurisprudence.[46]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner
Felipe Navarro is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison term of 8 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years
and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her
from private respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic
and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial,
rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of
the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those further described in the Motion to
Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately
return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral
damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier
issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined
from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and
consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private
respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in

evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts decision,
petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this Court ruled that the documents
and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to J-7 of respondents comment in that case) were admissible in
evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice
or gross misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondents complaint.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other
things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the
documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the
injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of
the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be impressed with merit: 2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was
admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex A-I to
J-7. On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this
Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court.
Hence, during the enforceability of this Courts order, respondents request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and
authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally
admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that point in time, would it have been malpractice
for respondent to use petitioners admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is- not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under
oath. Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him.
Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husbands admission and
use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration
that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins admission as to their
genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no
means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents
and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO
issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial
courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and
papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable 3is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition

in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law.4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to
the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION G.R. No. 160792
FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES)
CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES)
CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA
LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN
CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA
LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN
HOMOBONO ADAZA, and
ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO,
Petitioners,
Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Puno,
Panganiban,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus - Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY,

GEN. NARCISO ABAYA,

SEC. ANGELO REYES, and Promulgated:
SEC. ROILO GOLEZ,
Respondents. August 25, 2005
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review[1] seeks to nullify the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 17 September 2003
and Resolution dated 13 November 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution
dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed by lawyers Homobono Adaza and Roberto Rafael Pulido (petitioners)
on behalf of their detained clients Capt. Gary Alejano (PN-Marines), Capt. Nicanor Faeldon (PN-Marines), Capt.
Gerardo Gambala (PA), Lt. SG James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (PA), and Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV
(PN) (detainees).
Petitioners named as respondent Gen. Pedro Cabuay (Gen. Cabuay), Chief of the Intelligence Service of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), who has custody of the detainees. Petitioners impleaded Gen. Narciso
Abaya (Gen. Abaya), Sec. Angelo Reyes and Roilo Golez, who are respectively the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Secretary of National Defense and National Security Adviser, because they have
command responsibility over Gen. Cabuay.

Antecedent Facts

Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took
control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale apartment complex, located in the
business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive
devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration
and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several
negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted.
The soldiers then returned to their barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place while
military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers involvement in the Oakwood incident.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup detat with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government
prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup detat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later

issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (Trillanes) and Capt.
Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP.
On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military
personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who were
to remain under the custody of ISAFP.
On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. On 12 August 2003, the
Court issued a Resolution, which resolved to:
(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require respondents to make a RETURN of
the writ on Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the Court of Appeals; (c) refer the case
to the Court of Appeals for RAFFLE among the Justices thereof for hearing, further proceedings
and decision thereon, after which a REPORT shall be made to this Court within ten (10) days
from promulgation of the decision.[3]

Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents to make a
return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the
scheduled date for hearing and further proceedings.
On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court granted.
On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their Return of the Writ
and Answer to the petition and produced the detainees before the Court of Appeals during the scheduled hearing.
After the parties filed their memoranda on 28 August 2003, the appellate court considered the petition submitted for
decision.
On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the petition. Nonetheless, the
appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention
Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 026304. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours
and the detainees right to exercise for two hours a day.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that the detainees
are already charged of coup detat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this
case as the detainees confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do
not even question.
The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the appropriate remedy to assail the
legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. However, the appellate court held that the
constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detainees liberty. The
appellate court ruled that the regulation of the detainees right to confer with their counsels is reasonable under the
circumstances.

The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes letter is an abhorrent violation
of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation
does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered Gen. Cabuay to fulfill the promise he made in
open court to uphold the visiting hours and the right of the detainees to exercise for two hours a day. The dispositive
portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Respondent Cabuay is hereby ORDERED to faithfully adhere to his commitment to uphold the
constitutional rights of the detainees in accordance with the Standing Operations Procedure No.
0263-04 regarding visiting hours and the right of the detainees to exercise for two (2) hours a day.
SO ORDERED.[4]

The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:
A.
B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING AND

REVERSING A DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT;
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACKNOWLEDGING
APPROPRIATENESS OF THE REMEDY PETITIONERS SEEK; and

THE

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSERTING THE LEGALITY OF THE

CONDITIONS OF THE DETAINED JUNIOR OFFICERS DETENTION.[5]

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners claim that the Courts 12 August 2003 Order granted the petition and the Court remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing. Petitioners thus argue that the Courts Order had already
foreclosed any question on the propriety and merits of their petition.
Petitioners claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 Order shows that the Court referred to
the Court of Appeals the duty to inquire into the cause of the junior officers detention. Had the Court ruled for the
detainees release, the Court would not have referred the hearing of the petition to the Court of Appeals. The Court
would have forthwith released the detainees had the Court upheld petitioners cause.

In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a preliminary step in the
hearing of the petition.[6] The respondent must produce the person and explain the cause of his detention. [7] However,
this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by the remedy. Thus,

the Courts order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of the
remedy of habeas corpus.
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination
of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue the
writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas
corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are
estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address
the detainees complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy
of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. [8] The purpose of the writ is to
determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. [9] If the inquiry reveals that the detention is
illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas
corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error.[10] Neither can it
substitute for an appeal.[11]
Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writs application to circumstances where there is deprivation of a
persons constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more
of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary
but are also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.[12]
However, a mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will
extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess. [13] Whatever situation the
petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the
entire proceedings.[14]
Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the detention of the detainees. Neither do they
dispute the lawful indictment of the detainees for criminal and military offenses. What petitioners bewail is the
regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing petitioners as lawyers from seeing the
detainees their clients any time of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the detainees right to counsel
and violates Republic Act No. 7438 (RA 7438).[15] Petitioners claim that the regulated visits made it difficult for
them to prepare for the important hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission.
Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees right to
privacy of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo
Maestrecampo (Maestrecampo). Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP officials violated the detainees right against
cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees from having contact with their
visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron grills of the detention
cells, limiting the already poor light and ventilation in the detainees cells.
Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement. [16] However, the fact that
the detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than those of the public. [17] RA 7438, which specifies the
rights of detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the power of the detention officer to
adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. Section 4(b) of
RA 7438 provides:
Section 4. Penalty Clause. a) x x x
b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family
of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or
religious minister or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any
member of his immediate family with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering
to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the

penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of
four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial
responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape. (Emphasis supplied)
True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from visiting a detainee client at any
hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night. However, the last paragraph of the same Section 4(b) makes the
express qualification that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4(b), the detention officer has the power to
undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape.
The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a clear standard. The regulations governing a
detainees confinement must be reasonable measures x x x to secure his safety and prevent his escape. Thus, the
regulations must be reasonably connected to the governments objective of securing the safety and preventing the
escape of the detainee. The law grants the detention officer the authority to undertake such reasonable measures or
regulations.
Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the detainees right to effective representation
when petitioners visits were limited by the schedule of visiting hours. Petitioners assert that the violation of the
detainees rights entitle them to be released from detention.
Petitioners contention does not persuade us. The schedule of visiting hours does not render void the
detainees indictment for criminal and military offenses to warrant the detainees release from detention. The ISAFP
officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees right to counsel. The purpose of the regulation is not to
render ineffective the right to counsel, but to secure the safety and security of all detainees. American cases are
instructive on the standards to determine whether regulations on pre-trial confinement are permissible.
In Bell v. Wolfish,[18] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court held that regulations must be reasonably
related to maintaining security and must not be excessive in achieving that purpose. Courts will strike down a
restriction that is arbitrary and purposeless. [19] However, Bell v. Wolfish expressly discouraged courts from
skeptically questioning challenged restrictions in detention and prison facilities.[20] The U.S. Supreme Court
commanded the courts to afford administrators wide-ranging deference in implementing policies to maintain
institutional security.[21]
In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to make regulations
in detention centers allowable: such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the detainees safety and
prevent his escape. In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably
connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees.
While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the detainees still have faceto-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of detainees right to
counsel. Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00
p.m. The visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours when lawyers normally entertain clients in their
law offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners
could always seek permission from the ISAFP officials to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours.
The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time
to confer with the detainees. The detainees right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the
hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission,[22] petitioners were given time to confer with the
detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit.[23] Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their right to
counsel.
Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the boarding of the
iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to unusual and excessive punishment. This argument fails to impress
us. Bell v. Wolfish pointed out that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in

accordance with due process of law, detention inevitably interferes with a detainees desire to live comfortably.
[24]
The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees desire to live comfortably does not
convert those restrictions into punishment.[25] It is when the restrictions are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will
infer intent to punish.[26] Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to
the alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose. [27] Jail officials are thus not
required to use the least restrictive security measure. [28] They must only refrain from implementing a restriction that
appears excessive to the purpose it serves.[29]
We quote Bell v. Wolfish:
One further point requires discussion. The petitioners assert, and respondents concede,
that the essential objective of pretrial confinement is to insure the detainees presence at trial.
While this interest undoubtedly justifies the original decision to confine an individual in some
manner, we do not accept respondents argument that the Governments interest in ensuring a
detainees presence at trial is the only objective that may justify restraints and conditions once the
decision is lawfully made to confine a person. If the government could confine or otherwise
infringe the liberty of detainees only to the extent necessary to ensure their presence at trial, house
arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally justified form of detention. The Government
also has legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in which the individual
is detained. These legitimate operational concerns may require administrative measures that go
beyond those that are, strictly speaking, necessary to ensure that the detainee shows up at trial. For
example, the Government must be able to take steps to maintain security and order at the
institution and make certain no weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees. Restraints that are
reasonably related to the institutions interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more,
constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions that the
detainee would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting trial. We need not here
attempt to detail the precise extent of the legitimate governmental interests that may justify
conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention. It is enough simply to recognize that in addition to
ensuring the detainees presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once the
individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions
of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment. [30]

An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or disability,
and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. [31]Punishment also requires that the harm or disability be
significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.[32]
Block v. Rutherford,[33] which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blanket restriction on contact visits as
this practice was reasonably related to maintaining security.The safety of innocent individuals will be jeopardized if
they are exposed to detainees who while not yet convicted are awaiting trial for serious, violent offenses and may
have prior criminal conviction.[34] Contact visits make it possible for the detainees to hold visitors and jail staff
hostage to effect escapes.[35] Contact visits also leave the jail vulnerable to visitors smuggling in weapons, drugs, and
other contraband.[36] The restriction on contact visits was imposed even on low-risk detainees as they could also
potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and weapons. [37] The security consideration in the imposition of
blanket restriction on contact visits was ruled to outweigh the sentiments of the detainees. [38]
Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational connection to the legitimate
goal of internal security.[39] This case reaffirmed the hands-off doctrine enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of
judicial self-restraint, based on the premise that courts should decline jurisdiction over prison matters in deference to
administrative expertise.[40]
In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees from their visitors by
iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors
prevent direct physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical
contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not even a strict non-contact

visitation regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation on the detainees physical contacts with visitors is a
reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns.
The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This
measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on contraband and weapons
from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The
diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do not constitute
punishments on the detainees.
We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center
are not inhuman, degrading and cruel. Each detainee, except for Capt. Nicanor Faeldon and Capt. Gerardo Gambala,
is confined in separate cells, unlike ordinary cramped detention cells. The detainees are treated well and given
regular meals. The Court of Appeals noted that the cells are relatively clean and livable compared to the conditions
now prevailing in the city and provincial jails, which are congested with detainees. The Court of Appeals found the
assailed measures to be reasonable considering that the ISAFP Detention Center is a high-risk detention facility.
Apart from the soldiers, a suspected New Peoples Army (NPA) member and two suspected Abu Sayyaf members are
detained in the ISAFP Detention Center.
We now pass upon petitioners argument that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the
detainees right to privacy when the ISAFP officials opened and read the letters handed by detainees Trillanes and
Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out that the letters were not in a sealed
envelope but simply folded because there were no envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners contend that
the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citizens privacy rights unless authorized by law. The Solicitor
General does not deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters.
Courts in the U.S. have generally permitted prison officials to open and read all incoming and outgoing
mail of convicted prisoners to prevent the smuggling of contraband into the prison facility and to avert coordinated
escapes.[41] Even in the absence of statutes specifically allowing prison authorities from opening and inspecting mail,
such practice was upheld based on the principle of civil deaths. [42] Inmates were deemed to have no right to
correspond confidentially with anyone. The only restriction placed upon prison authorities was that the right of
inspection should not be used to delay unreasonably the communications between the inmate and his lawyer.[43]
Eventually, the inmates outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court officials received respect.
The confidential correspondences could not be censored. [45]The infringement of such privileged communication
was held to be a violation of the inmates First Amendment rights. [46] A prisoner has a right to consult with his
attorney in absolute privacy, which right is not abrogated by the legitimate interests of prison authorities in the
administration of the institution.[47] Moreover, the risk is small that attorneys will conspire in plots that threaten
prison security.[48]
[44]

American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights enjoyed by convicted
inmates and pre-trial detainees. The case of Palmigiano v. Travisono[49] recognized that pre-trial detainees, unlike
convicted prisoners, enjoy a limited right of privacy in communication. Censorship of pre-trial detainees mail
addressed to public officials, courts and counsel was held impermissible. While incoming mail may be inspected for
contraband and read in certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees could not be inspected or read at all.
In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell,[50] involving convicted prisoners, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that prison officials could open in the presence of the inmates incoming mail from attorneys to inmates.
However, prison officials could not read such mail from attorneys. Explained the U.S. Supreme Court:
The issue of the extent to which prison authorities can open and inspect incoming mail from attorneys
to inmates, has been considerably narrowed in the course of this litigation. The prison regulation
under challenge provided that (a)ll incoming and outgoing mail will be read and inspected, and no
exception was made for attorney-prisoner mail. x x x
Petitioners now concede that they cannot open and read mail from attorneys to inmates, but contend
that they may open all letters from attorneys as long as it is done in the presence of the prisoners. The
narrow issue thus presented is whether letters determined or found to be from attorneys may be

opened by prison authorities in the presence of the inmate or whether such mail must be delivered
unopened if normal detection techniques fail to indicate contraband.
xxx
x x x If prison officials had to check in each case whether a communication was from an attorney
before opening it for inspection, a near impossible task of administration would be imposed. We think
it entirely appropriate that the State require any such communications to be specially marked as
originating from an attorney, with his name and address being given, if they are to receive special
treatment. It would also certainly be permissible that prison authorities require that a lawyer desiring
to correspond with a prisoner, first identify himself and his client to the prison officials, to assure that
the letters marked privileged are actually from members of the bar. As to the ability to open the mail
in the presence of inmates, this could in no way constitute censorship, since the mail would not be
read. Neither could it chill such communications, since the inmates presence insures that prison
officials will not read the mail. The possibility that contraband will be enclosed in letters, even those
from apparent attorneys, surely warrants prison officials opening the letters. We disagree with the
Court of Appeals that this should only be done in appropriate circumstances. Since a flexible test,
besides being unworkable, serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of the possible constitutional
rights enumerated by respondent, we think that petitioners, by acceding to a rule whereby the inmate
is present when mail from attorneys is inspected, have done all, and perhaps even more, than the
Constitution requires.[51]
In Hudson v. Palmer,[52] the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has no reasonable expectation of
privacy inside his cell. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that prisoners necessarily lose many protections of the
Constitution, thus:
However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is also
clear that imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights. These
constraints on inmates, and in some cases the complete withdrawal of certain rights, are justified by
the considerations underlying our penal system. The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a
practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities,
chief among which is internal security. Of course, these restrictions or retractions also serve,
incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of justice, deterrence and retribution are factors in
addition to correction.[53]
The later case of State v. Dunn,[54] citing Hudson v. Palmer, abandoned Palmigiano v. Travisono and made
no distinction as to the detainees limited right to privacy.State v. Dunn noted the considerable jurisprudence in the
United States holding that inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of a substantial government interest such
as security or discipline. State v. Dunn declared that if complete censorship is permissible, then the lesser act of
opening the mail and reading it is also permissible. We quote State v. Dunn:
[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with
the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional
security and internal order. We are satisfied that society would insist that the prisoners expectation
of privacy always yield to what must be considered a paramount interest in institutional security.
We believe that it is accepted by our society that [l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are
inherent incidents of confinement.

The distinction between the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and a convicted inmate has been
blurred as courts in the U.S. ruled that pre-trial detainees might occasionally pose an even greater security risk than
convicted inmates. Bell v. Wolfish reasoned that those who are detained prior to trial may in many cases be
individuals who are charged with serious crimes or who have prior records and may therefore pose a greater risk of

escape than convicted inmates.[55] Valencia v. Wiggins[56] further held that it is impractical to draw a line between
convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security.
American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees non-privileged mail poses a
genuine threat to jail security.[57] Hence, when a detainee places his letter in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the
detainee knowingly exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials. [58] A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable
expectation of privacy for his incoming mail. [59] However, incoming mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited
protection such that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents
without violating the inmates right to correspond with his lawyer. [60] The inspection of privileged mail is limited to
physical contraband and not to verbal contraband.[61]
Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the detainees letters in the
present case violated the detainees right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The
inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for
the inspection of contraband.
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was
merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In
the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only
open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rights [62] is a guarantee
that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of
those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or
imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished
expectation of privacy rights.
In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to infringe on the
constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courtsbalance the guarantees of the Constitution
with the legitimate concerns of prison administrators. [63] The deferential review of such regulations stems from the
principle that:
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis
would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative
solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.[64]
The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup
detat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua.[65] The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible
leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial
district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War.[66]
Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA.
Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP
Detention Center. The military custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the
junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate regulations depend
largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the
absence of patent arbitrariness.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from
petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention and prison facilities that
violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case
basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and

inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement. [67] The
writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement.[68]
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 78545.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.