India DA (DDI CT Lab)

1NC Shell:
The current relationship between China, India, and the US
is zero-sum US/China relations seen as abandonment
Madan, 15 (Tanvi Madan, fellow in the Project on International Order and
Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, and
director of The India Project, focuses studies on India, US, and China relations,
The U.S.-India Relationship and China, 1/20/15, Brookings Institution Think
Tank, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-indiarelationship-and-china-madan accessed 7/19/16, AG)
The Peoples Republic of China has shaped the U.S.-India relationship since it
came into existence in 1949. Fifty five years ago, for example, a senator from Massachusetts argued that
there was a struggle between India and China for the economic and political leadership of the East, for

He asserted
that it was crucial that the U.S. help India win that contest with China . A few
the respect of all Asia, for the opportunity to demonstrate whose way of life is the better.

months later, that senator would be elected president. The man he defeated, Richard Nixon, had earlier
also highlighted the importance of the U.S. helping India to succeed in the competition between the two
great peoples in Asia. This objective was made explicit in Eisenhower and Kennedy administration
documents, which stated that it was in American national interest to strengthen Indiaeven if that country
wasnt always on the same page as the U.S. Today, both India and the U.S. have relationships with China
that have elements of cooperation, competition and, potentially, conflictthough in different degrees.
Each country has a blended approach of engaging China, while preparing for a turn for the worse in
Chinese behavior. Each sees a role for the other in its China strategy. Each thinks a good relationship with
the other sends a signal to China, but neither wants to provoke Beijing or be forced to choose between the
other and China.

Each also recognizes that Chinaespecially uncertainty about its

behavioris partly what is driving the India-U.S. partnership. Arguably, there
have been three imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust relationship with
India and for supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in the context of
the rise of China; economic interest; and shared democratic values. Indian
policymakers recognize that American concerns about the nature of Chinas rise are responsible for some
of the interest in India. New Delhis own China strategy involves strengthening India both security-wise and
economically (internal balancing) and building a range of partnerships (external balancing)and it

Some Indian policymakers highlight another

benefit of the U.S. relationship: Beijing takes Delhi more seriously because
Washington does. But India and the U.S. also have concerns about the other when it comes to China.
envisions a key role for the U.S. in both.

Both sides remain uncertain about the others willingness and capacity to play a role in the Asia-Pacific.
Additionally, Indian policymakers worry both about a China-U.S. condominium (or G-2) and a China-U.S.

There is concern about the reliability of the U.S., with the

sense that the U.S. will end up choosing China because of the more
interdependent Sino-American economic relationship and/or leave
India in the lurch. Some in the U.S. also have reliability concerns about India. They question
crisis or conflict.

whether the quest for strategic autonomy will allow India to develop a truly strategic partnership with
the U.S. There are also worries about the gap between Indian potential and performance. Part of the
rationale for supporting Indias rise is to help demonstrate that democracy and development arent

As
things stand, neither India nor the U.S. is interested in the others relationship
with China being too hot or too coldthe Goldilocks view. For New Delhi, a
too-cosy Sino-U.S. relationship is seen as freezing India out and impinging on
its interests. It would also eliminate one of Washingtons rationales for a
stronger relationship with India. A China-U.S. crisis or conflict, on the other hand, is seen as
mutually exclusive. Without delivery, however, this rationaleand Indias importancefades away.

potentially destabilizing the region and forcing India to choose between the two countries. From the U.S.

perspective, any deterioration in Sino-Indian relations might create instability in the region and perhaps

Too much Sino-Indian bonhomie, on the other hand, would

potentially create complications for the U.S. in the bilateral, regional and
multilateral spheres.
force it to choose sides.

Strong US-India relations by allow for pressure for

restraint saves millions of lives India Pakistan most
likely conflict for escalation
Barno and Bensahe 15 (David and Nora, THE PINK FLAMINGO ON THE
SUBCONTINENT: NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN, War on the
Rocks, NOVEMBER 3 2015, online:http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/thepink-flamingo-on-the-subcontinent-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan/,
DDI TM)
A pink flamingo is the term recently coined by Frank Hoffman to describe predictable but
ignored events that can yield disastrous results. Hoffman argues that these situations are fully
visible, but almost entirely ignored by policymakers. Pink flamingos stand in stark contrast to black swans the

The tense nuclear

standoff between India and Pakistan may be the most dangerous pink
flamingo in todays world. The Indian subcontinent home to both India and Pakistan
remains among the most dangerous corners of the world, and continues to pose a
deep threat to global stability and the current world order. Their 1,800-mile border is the only
place in the world where two hostile, nuclear-armed states face off every day.
And the risk of nuclear conflict has only continued to rise in the past few years, to the point
that it is now a very real possibility. India and Pakistan have fought three
wars since they gained independence in 1947, including one that ended in 1971 with Pakistan losing approximately
half its territory (present-day Bangladesh). Today, the disputed Line of Control that divides the
disputed Kashmir region remains a particularly tense flash point. Both the
Kargil crisis of 1999 and the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by
Pakistan-supported militants brought both nations once again to the brink of
war. Yet unlike earlier major wars, these two crises occurred after both India
and Pakistan became nuclear-armed states. Quick and forceful diplomatic
intervention played a pivotal role in preventing a larger conflict from erupting
during each crisis. These stakes are even higher, and more dangerous, today .
Since 2004, India has been developing a new military doctrine called Cold Start, a
limited war option designed largely to deter Islamabad from sponsoring
irregular attacks against New Delhi. It involves rapid conventional retaliation
after any such attack, launching a number of quick armored assaults into
Pakistan and rapidly securing limited objectives that hypothetically remain
below Pakistans nuclear threshold. In accordance with this doctrine, the Indian military is meant to
mobilize half a million troops in less than 72 hours. The problem is, unlike its neighbors India and China, Pakistan
has not renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. Instead,
Pakistani leaders have stated that they may have to use nuclear
weapons first in order to defend against a conventional attack from
India. Therefore, both to counter Cold Start and help to offset Indias
growing conventional superiority, Pakistan has accelerated its
nuclear weapons program and begun to field short-range, low yield tactical nuclear weapons (TNW).
unpredictable, even unforeseeable shocks whose outcomes may be entirely unknown.

Pakistan will
reportedly have enough fissile material by 2020 to build more than
200 nuclear warheads more than the United Kingdom plans to have by that time. It is not simply the
Some observers now judge this nuclear program to be the fastest growing in the world.

pace of the buildup that should cause concern. Pakistans arsenal of short-range tactical nuclear weapons is a game-changer

Pakistan clearly intends to use these weapons on its own

soil if necessary to counter Cold Starts plan for sudden Indian
armored thrusts into Pakistan. The introduction of these weapons
has altered the long-standing geometry between the two nuclear
powers, and increases risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange in a
crisis. Beyond the risks of runaway nuclear escalation, Pakistans
growing tactical nuclear weapons program also brings a wide array
of other destabilizing characteristics to this already unstable mix : the
in other ways.

necessity to position these short-range weapons close to the border with India, making them more vulnerable to interdiction;

the
prospects of local commanders being given decentralized control of
the weapons a use it or lose it danger if facing an Indian
armored offensive. Furthermore, large numbers of small nuclear
weapons scattered at different locations increases the risk that
some will fall into the hands of violent extremists. A terrorist group
gaining control of a nuclear weapon remains one of the most
frightening potential spinoffs of the current arms race. Perhaps the
most dangerous scenario that could lead to catastrophe is a replay
of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. In November 2008, 10
terrorists launched attacks that left 166 people dead before the last of attackers
the need to move and disperse these weapons during a crisis, thereby signaling a nuclear threat; and

were finally killed by Indian security forces almost 60 hours after the attacks began. By that time, there was strong evidence
that the attackers were Pakistani and belonged to a Pakistan-supported militant group. Indian public outrage and humiliation

Only through the combination of diplomatic pressure

from the United States and immense restraint exerted by thenIndian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was an Indian retaliatory
strike averted. The chances of such Indian government restraint in a
similarly deadly future scenario are unlikely. Experts such as Stephen Cohen of the
were overwhelming.

Brookings Institution and former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill agree that if there were another Mumbai, Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi would not step back from using military force in response, unlike his predecessors. Indian
public opinion would demand retaliation, especially after the unpopular degree of restraint exercised by the Singh
government after the Mumbai attacks. But there remains no meaningful senior-level dialogue between the two states last
Augusts planned meeting between the two national security advisers was cancelled after disagreements about Kashmiri
separatists. There may be little the United States or the world can do to forestall this conflict still looming just over the
horizon. Nevertheless, the tremendous dangers of this situation require U.S. policymakers to devote more time and energy in
trying to do so, and some small steps may help. The United States should work hard to catalyze confidence-building measures
between the two sides, seeking to open more peacetime channels to create dialog and potential conflict mediation options for
the future. Neither nations military currently has any direct communications. Quiet, off-the-record meetings between senior
military leaders would help lessen tensions and establish some degree of mutual dialog and understanding before a crisis
erupts. The United States should also sponsor unofficial tabletop exercises involving representatives of each side to explore
how escalation in a nuclear conflict could unfold. The United States should also reach out to current (and former) civil and
military decision-makers on both sides to develop and grow bilateral relationships that could prove vital in the next crisis.
Both the United States and NATO should also emphasize the limited battlefield utility of TNW, as well as their well-researched
estimates of the damage that would have been wrought by using them to defend Western Europe from a Soviet armored
invasion. And the United States should continue to encourage Pakistan to slow its fielding of tactical nuclear weapons, and
keep them under tight central control well away from vulnerable forward-deployed positions. The lack of any tangible results

A
nuclear war between India and Pakistan would dramatically alter the
world as we know it. The damage from fallout and blast, the deaths
of potentially millions, and the environmental devastation of even a
few weapons detonations would suddenly dwarf any other global
problem. There are no shortage of conflicts and crises around the
world demanding the attention of policymakers in Washington and
from the U.S. governments recent outreach to Pakistan on this topic should only encourage renewed efforts.

other capitals. But the stakes of a war between two of the worlds
most hostile nuclear powers deserves attention before the next
inevitable flare-up. Taking a series of modest steps now to try to avert the worst outcomes from this
dangerous pink flamingo hiding in plain sight is an investment well worth making.

Uniqueness:
US relations with China and India are zero-sum
Varadarajan, 13 Editor, The Hindu. He covers a broad range of
international issues, such as the relationship between India and China in Asia
and India's foreign policy. Prior to joining The Hindu, he worked at The Times
of India for nine years. In May 2011, he was appointed editor in chief, as the
first non-family, professional editor (Siddharth, 3/28. India's Foreign and
Strategic Policy in Asia The India-China-U.S. Troika and Japan.
http://www.wochikochi.jp/english/relayessay/2013/05/india-in-asia.php)

The India-U.S. relationship has recovered considerably in this past

decade. During the second term of the George W. Bush
administration, the United States made a decision to try and
influence, or even limit, the kind of strategic choices that India
could make at a given moment in time. The United States was
conscious of the need to have India as a partner to hedge against China's
rise. And the nuclear deal it offered in July 2005 was leveraged as

a means to, in a way, accomplish this. There were other

calculations on the U.S. side too but it is not accidental that IndiaChina relations, which had recovered from the dip which
happened after the 1998 nuclear tests, suffered as a
consequence of the new India-U.S. relationship. In the U.S.
Congress, and among U.S. strategic analysts, this was a constant theme -that we are befriending India, we are building a partnership with India, as a
hedge against China. But such a framing was not healthy for India. After all,
if the American reaching out to India is a function of its relationship with
China and is contingent in some way on Washington's desire to hedge against
Beijing, what happens if tomorrow the United States decides for reasons of its
own that it now needs to strengthen its relationship with China? The India
relationship would be a casualty.

Current US India partnership stronger than ever - k2

maintaining peace in Indo-Pacific and ensuring a
neutralized China.
Carafanoet al 2013 (James Jay, Vice President for the Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, Beyond
the Plateau in U.S. India Relations, April 26, 2013, 7/26/2016
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations)
At the core of the revitalized relationship must be a strengthened economic
engagement. The economic crisis in the United States and the slowdown in

India's growth have increased the value of a deepening partnership. Plenty of

good ideas are around; these include the conclusion of a bilateral investment
treaty, the negotiation of a free trade agreement, promotion of energy
security at a moment the U.S. is likely to emerge as a major exporter of
natural gas, and liberalization of American work visas for Indian service
professionals. These proposals, however, must be related to a renewed
commitment to economic liberalization on both sides. Despite the intense
politicization of economic policy in both countries, it should be possible to
find many convergences and work on them. At the political and strategic
level, India, like so many other nations after the Cold War, has often worried
about unconstrained American power. At this juncture, though, India must
concern itself more with the consequences of a potentially precipitous decline
in American power or the loss of U.S. political will. India needs an America
strong enough to protect its own multiple global and regional interests. As the
U.S. continues its role as chief defender of the global commons, India must do
its share, particularly in the IndoPacific region. The U.S.Indian partnership is
indispensible to regional peace, security, and prosperity. In two critical
regionsSouthwest Asia and East Asiathe convergence of Indian and
American interests has been stronger than ever before. These include the:
Management of the regional consequences of growing Iranian power,
especially in the Persian Gulf, where India has huge stakes; Dampening of
religious and sectarian extremism that is gathering traction; Stabilization of
Afghanistan; Promotion of economic modernization and political moderation
in Pakistan; Encouragement of responsible Chinese behavior and peaceful
management of its territorial disputes; Prevention of the neutralization of
the Chinese periphery; Avoidance of the breakdown of the nuclear order in
East Asia; and Security of the maritime commons of the IndoPacific. All
these challenges demand innovative thinking, more intensive bilateral
political consultation, and stronger policy coordination. The authors of this
Special Report are hopeful that it will help begin this critical task.

US India collaboration on Agricultural program show

strong cooperation and relations
New Kerala 2016 (India-US launch innovative agriculture programme to
address global challenges ,http://www.newkerala.com/news/2016/fullnews95537.html 7/26/16)
New Delhi, July 25 : The Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare and the
U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) on Monday launched the
second phase of the Feed the Future India Triangular Training Programme,
bringing specialized agriculture training to 1,500 agricultural professional
across Africa and Asia. Secretary of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare S.K
Pattanayak and U.S Ambassador to India Richard R. Vera launched the
programme together at the National Agriculture Science Complex in New
Delhi. Speaking on the occasion, Secretary of Agriculture and Farmers
Welfare said that in order to continue our successful partnership programme
covering more countries in Africa and Asia, MANAGE as lead institution

representing Govt. of India and USAID representing US Government signed a

Limited Scope Cooperation Agreement( LSCA) on 7th November, 2005.
The new programme will be called as Feed The Future: India Triangular
Training Programme, in which 32 Training programme of 15 days duration will
be conducted in India and 12 Training programs of 10 days duration will be
conducted in selected African and Asian Countries during 2016-20 i.e., for 4
years. The entire expenditure including participants travel, insurance,
lodging, boarding, local travel and programme fee will be met by USAID and
MANAGE. The training areas will be identified based on demand analysis
conducted in participating countries. S.K Pattanayak informed that 17
countries covered under the programme are Kenya, Malawi, Liberia, Ghana,
Uganda, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Tanzania,
Sudan, Botswana, Ethiopia in Africa and Afghanistan, Cambodia, Lao PDR,
Myanmar, Mongolia, and Vietnam in Asia. Also faculty of MANAGE visited
Cambodia and Vietnam in Asia and Tanzania and Mozambique in Africa as
part of Demand analysis. U.S Ambassador Richard R. Verma said that by
harnessing the expertise and innovation of out two great countries, we are
unlocking new opportunities to address global development challenges,
bringing us closure to our shared objective of eliminating global poverty and
hunger. Verma emphasized that the United States and India remain
committed to their partnership of working, together to break the vicious cycle
of poverty and hunger. Through sharing agriculture innovations worldwide,
the U.S and India will help other countries develop their agriculture sectors,
helping promote global prosperity and stability.

US India cooperation and investment in trade shows

strong relations
Ebinger and Mehta, 15 (Charles K., Vikram Singh, Senior Fellow,
Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative, Chairman, Brookings
India
Senior Fellow, Time to Act on India-U.S. Energy Cooperation, January 2015,
7/26/16 http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-indiaenergy-cooperation-ebinger-mehta)
Energy Dialogue: Past Cooperation and New Opportunities Since May 2005,
the U.S. and India have engaged in a high level dialogue to promote
increased trade and investment in the energy sector. The dialogue comprises
five working groups: oil & gas, coal, power & energy efficiency, new
technologies & renewable energy, and civil nuclear co-operation. Since its
formation, a new working group on sustainability has been established.
LNG During the Presidents visit, India will seek special exemption to import
LNG from the U.S., though it is unclear why the Indian Government believes
there are any real obstacles to buying LNG today, other than a cumbersome
regulatory process. To date, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has
approved export of LNG from seven liquefaction terminals, for exports to
countries with which the U.S. does not have a free trade agreement (FTA).

Two of these permits include off-take agreements with Cheniere Energy of 3.5
million metric tons and Dominion Energy of 2.3 million metric tons with the
Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL.) These terminals are expected to be
complete and in a position to export cargo by late 2016/early 2017. Despite
the openness of the market, there is a perception that the US has too
stringent a licensing process and that India would benefit from greater US
export volumes since they would be cheaper than imports from elsewhere.
Nothing could be further from reality. Only market forces will determine where
LNG flows. SHALE GAS The development of shale gas has been
transformative for the U.S. domestic and international gas market.
Nonetheless fracking remains extremely controversial, especially with new
developments, such as New York State recently announcing a ban on fracking
throughout the state despite the fact that it has some of the most prolific
reserves in the nation. As fracking has progressed, concerns over water
availability and contamination have ebbed as new technologies using far less
or no water at all have begun to be developed. Additionally, the U.S. has a
wealth of regulatory experience at the state level which could be shared with
Indian counterparts. Already Indian companies the Indian Oil Corporation,
Reliance Industries, and Oil India have stakes in US shale gas projects
having invested in commercial fracking operations in both U.S. oil and gas
fracking technology. The U.S. government could sponsor a number of visits
for high level Indian officials and commercial concerns to major fracking
regions and help to establish interaction with local and state regulators to
learn more about this technology. STRATEGIC RESERVES For some years
India has contemplated developing strategic reserves. While the caverns
have been dug, they have not been filled. With oil prices likely to drop further
in the short run, now is the time for Delhi to begin fast tracking the process of
filling its reserves. The U.S. has years of managing strategic crude oil
reserves and this expertise could prove invaluable to India. Likewise, if India
were to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or
seek an exemption allowing it to join the International Energy Agency (IEA)
with strong support from the U.S. it would be eligible to join the IEA oil
sharing mechanism, which could prove invaluable during a supply crisis.
Membership though would also obligate India to fill its reserves and
potentially in a supply crisis share them with other IEA states. NUCLEAR
ENERGY Both President Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi have
reaffirmed their interest in implementation of the civil nuclear agreement.
The deal, negotiated some years ago, was designed to promote the sale of
US reactor technology and then was left to founder over a number of critical
issues. Both leaders should remove the red tape and move to implement the
agreement. CARBON CAPTURE, UTILIZATION AND SEQUESTRATION
(CCUS) India and the U.S. have a shared interest in further developing CCUS
technology to help address the air quality problems that accompany
abundant fossil fuel usage. Though in recent years natural gas has become
more competitive price-wise as a fuel to generate electricity in the US, it is
important to note that until 2035 coal is expected to remain the dominant
fuel. In India coal usage will continue to grow since it is available domestically

(though India does also import coal), is a cheap resource, and much of Indias
existing electricity generation capacity is coal based. Given these facts, it is
vital that both nations find ways to accelerate R&D into CCUS technology to
prove that the technology is both technologically and commercially viable in
order to offset further air quality contamination. CLEAN ENERGY Owing to
the vital importance of increasing energy access, reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, and improving resilience in the face of climate change, President
Obama and Prime Minister Modi agreed to a new and enhanced strategic
partnership on energy security, clean energy, and climate change in the
September 2014 joint statement. They have pledged to strengthen and
expand the highly successful U.S.-India Partnership to Advance Clean Energy
(PACE) through a series of new programs including a new Energy Smart Cities
Partnership to promote efficient urban energy infrastructure; a scaling-up of
renewable energy integration into Indias power grid; cooperation in
upgrading Indias alternative energy institutes; development of new
innovation centers and a host of other energy efficiency programs. Expansion
of this program could yield benefits to both countries since the government of
India under its Green Energy Mission has made solar and wind power
development key priorities. The challenge however will be to pick the right
technologies and to define clearly the level of support that the government
should provide and what incentives might be put in place for the private
sector to augment the governments involvement. The U.S. has tremendous
experience in the financing of green energy investments and could share
these with the Indian government and Indian entrepreneurs. It is also vital to
determine the multiple incentives that may be required to reach the stated
objectives of the overall Green Energy Mission including the level of
investment in new engines, smart and efficient infrastructure, battery storage
and to develop innovative financing schemes.

Links:

Link Engagement (General)

Shift to closer US China ties undermines Indias
perception of its security
Mohan, 2012 (C. Raja, Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research
Foundation, The New Triangular Diplomacy: India, China and America at Sea,
November 05, 2012, 7/14/2016 http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/the-newtriangular-diplomacy-india-china-and-america-on-the-high-seas/1/; DDI - AH )
While Indias main interest is in securing its primacy in the Indian Ocean littoral, its navy is making frequent forays into
the Western Pacific. Delhis deepening bilateral naval engagement with Vietnam, which is mired in territorial disputes
with China, its support to the principle of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and its frequent joint naval
exercises with Japan and the United States do raise eyebrows in Beijing. Even as China and India build up their naval
capabilities and step on each others toes in the Indo-Pacific, neither of them is in a position to supplant the United States

The U.S. military rebalance towards Asia

is marked by a profound wariness of Chinas growing power and great
enthusiasm to strengthen the partnership with India. This has set in motion
what could be a consequent triangular dynamic in the Indo-Pacific. Like
as the dominant maritime power in both the oceans.

everyone else in Asia, India wants to benefit from Chinas economic growth but would like to limit the prospects for
Beijings dominance of the region. As the strategic gap between India and China growsfor China is rising much faster
than IndiaDelhi can only bridge it through a combination of internal and external balancing. An alliance with

India is concerned about the inconstancy of

American policy towards China, the fiscal and political sustainability of the
pivot to Asia in Washington. Delhi is acutely aware of the dangers of a
potential Sino-U.S. rapprochement that could leave India exposed. It
therefore seeks simultaneous expansion of security cooperation with the
United States while avoiding a needless provocation of Beijing. China,
clearly, has the upper hand in the current triangular dynamic with India and
the United States. It could accommodate either Delhi or Washington to limit
the depth of a prospective India-U.S. strategic partnership. Given the
current ambiguities in Washington, Beijing and Delhi, there is much
uncertainty surrounding the direction of the triangular dynamic between
them. One thing, though, is certain. The emergence of China and India as naval powers and the intersection of
Washington, then, would seem natural for Delhi. But

their maritime policies with those of the United States are bound to churn the security politics of the Indo-Pacific for
decades to come.

China expansion is key to the alliance the plan

independently fracture US/India mutual interest
Wilson, 4/16 (James Wilson, founder of the The Economist and chief
writer, specializing in politics, foreign affairs, and international politics, A
suitable boy? 4/16/16, The Economist,
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21697031-pentagon-wooing-indiabride-still-coy-suitable-boy accessed 7/19/16, AG)
They seem such a promising pair, India and America. The two biggest and
noisiest democracies are linked by language and blood : 125m Indians speak English,
and over 3m Americans claim Indian descent. They share a belief in the rule of law and (most
of the time) in free enterprise, as well as common regional concerns over such things as fighting Islamist
extremism and accommodating the rise of China.

But as much as a match of American

wealth and know-how with Indian brawn and drive would make sense, and
ought to bolster global security, Indian pride and American prejudice have
repeatedly got in the way. Yet with regional stars realigning, Indian pride has grown less prickly
and American prejudice less smug. Pivoting to Asia during Barack Obamas
presidency, America has sought new friendships just as Indias prime
minister, Narendra Modi, finds it lacks the punch to back his bigger ambitions
for India on the wider stage. There will be no flashy wedding between the two in the near future.
But what is emerging is a quiet, cautious meeting of mutual interests.
American officials call it a strategic handshake, Indian ones a strategic partnership. Neither would utter the
word alliance, but if the relationship continues to thicken, that is what conceivably might take shape
somewhere down the road. The latest development is small but significant. During a visit to India between

the American defence secretary, Ashton

Carter, joined his Indian counterpart, Manohar Parrikar, in promising quickly
to sign a logistics agreement to enable smoother mutual support between the
two armed forces. Two other pacts, covering communications and protocols for
digital mapping, are also close to conclusion. Together they will make it easier
for the two countries forces to co-operate, and allow India access to a bigger
range of American equipment. Indian logic rules America has similar arrangements with dozens
April 10th and 12th, his second in less than a year,

of countries. But in Indias case it has taken a decade of haggling to get this far. Before concluding the
logistics deal, India insisted on a change of names to distinguish its own version. It is to be a Logistics
Exchange Memorandum of Agreement rather than the usual Logistics Support Agreement. We changed
the initials so we dont seem to follow the same logic as US allies, says C. Uday Bhaskar, a military analyst
and former Indian naval officer.

He added that there remain strong views in our

services about too close an embrace with America. Those views have a long history.
After independence, India prided itself on being non-aligned, while turning to the Soviet Union for
military supplies. It has been wary of other countries causes, a wariness reinforced by watching America
bungle in Vietnam and later in Iraq and Afghanistan. Trounced by China in a brief but bloody border war in
1962, India is also cautious about provoking its big neighbour, or being seen as part of an American-led
gang-up. Most of all India resents the continued military support America gives to Pakistan, even in the
face of evidence that Pakistan has sponsored anti-Indian terror attacks and worked to undermine

The latest
agreements come on top of a growing pile of protocols that go beyond
defence co-operation to include a joint strategic vision for Asi a signed in January
American-led efforts to bring peace to Afghanistan. Yet disdain for America is weakening.

2015. American armed forces now hold more joint exercises with India than with any other country. And
two years ago India overtook Pakistan as a buyer of American weaponry. It helps that America has the
kinds of goods that Indias armed forces want as they seek to project power more widely in the Indian
Ocean, including long-range patrol aircraft and drones, maritime helicopters, aircraft-carrier technology
and anti-submarine gear. America has also moved nimbly to accommodate Indias plans (see article) for
strengthening its own defence industry. Aside from half-a-dozen existing partnerships involving such things
as jet-engine design and avionics, the two sides have suggested jointly producing fighter aircraft, probably

The trigger for all this is the growing boldness of

China. With a GDP that is now five times Indias, the regional heavyweight
has courted Indias smaller neighbours with aid. Chinese warships now
regularly push into the Indian Ocean, and the Chinese government has
sought to build a network of bases or, at the least, friendly ports extending from Myanmar to
Pakistan to Djibouti. India has mostly stayed aloof from troubles outside its
immediate waters. When American officials jumped the gun in February by claiming that India would
an Indian version of the F-18.

join patrols in the South China Sea, where China is pressing maritime claims over the objections of

It is
over China that Indian and American interests converge most . Mr
Bhaskar says that Americans want India to become more capable and carry a
bigger load. They may seek more than that. Speaking last month in Delhi, the Indian capital,
everyone else, India issued a vigorous denial. But Chinese pressure closer to home raises alarms.

Admiral Harry Harris, who heads Americas Pacific Command (responsible, he said,
for American military operations from Hollywood to Bollywood), described expanded military
co-operation with India as arguably the defining partnership for America in
the 21st century.

U.S. India relations are Goldilocks nowplan leaves India

in the lurch with concerns about China
Madan 15 (Tanvi Madan is a fellow in the Project on International Order
and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, and
director of The India Project. The U.S.-India Relationship and China,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-india-relationshipand-china-madan , January 20, 2015 )
both India and the U.S. have relationships with China that have elements
of cooperation, competition and, potentially, conflictthough in different degrees. Each country has a
blended approach of engaging China, while preparing for a turn for the worse in Chinese behavior. Each sees a role for the
other in its China strategy. Each thinks a good relationship with the other
sends a signal to China, but neither wants to provoke Beijing or be forced to choose
between the other and China. Each also recognizes that Chinaespecially uncertainty about its behavioris
Today,

partly what is driving the India-U.S. partnership. Arguably, there have been three imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust relationship with
India and for supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in the context of the rise of China; economic interest; and shared democratic
values. Indian policymakers recognize that American concerns about the nature of Chinas rise are responsible for some of the interest in India.
New Delhis own China strategy involves strengthening India both security-wise and economically (internal balancing) and building a range of
partnerships (external balancing)and it envisions a key role for the U.S. in both. Some Indian policymakers highlight another benefit of the
U.S. relationship: Beijing takes Delhi more seriously because Washington does. But India and the U.S. also have concerns about the other when
it comes to China. Both sides remain uncertain about the others willingness and capacity to play a role in the Asia-Pacific. Additionally,

Indian policymakers worry both about a China-U.S. condominium (or G-2) and a ChinaU.S. crisis or conflict. There is concern about the reliability of the U.S., with the sense
that the U.S. will end up choosing China because of the more interdependent Sino-American
economic relationship and/or leave India in the lurch. Some in the U.S. also have reliability concerns about
India. They question whether the quest for strategic autonomy will allow India to develop a truly strategic partnership with the U.S. There
are also worries about the gap between Indian potential and performance. Part of the rationale for supporting Indias rise is to help
demonstrate that democracy and development arent mutually exclusive. Without delivery, however, this rationaleand Indias importance

As things stand, neither India nor the U.S. is interested in the others relationship with China
too hot or too coldthe Goldilocks view. For New Delhi, a too-cosy Sino-U.S.
relationship is seen as freezing India out and impinging on its interests.
fades away.
being

It would also eliminate one of Washingtons rationales for a stronger relationship with India. A China-U.S. crisis or conflict, on the other hand, is
seen as potentially destabilizing the region and forcing India to choose between the two countries. From the U.S. perspective, any
deterioration in Sino-Indian relations might create instability in the region and perhaps force it to choose sides. Too much Sino-Indian
bonhomie, on the other hand, would potentially create complications for the U.S. in the bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres. However,

both India and the U.S. do share an interest in managing Chinas rise . Neither
would like to see what some have outlined as President Xi Jinpings vision of Asia, with a dominant China and
the U.S. playing a minimal role. India and the U.S. recognize that China will play a crucial role in Asiait is the nature
of that role that concerns both countries. Their anxiety has been more evident since 2009, leading the two sides to discuss Chinaand the
Asia-Pacific broadlymore willingly. They have an East Asia dialogue in place. There is also a trilateral dialogue with Japan and talk of

The Obama
administration has also repeatedly stated that it sees India as part of its
rebalance strategy. In November 2014, President Obama, speaking in Australia, stressed that the
U.S. support[ed] a greater role in the Asia Pacific for India. The Modi government, in turn,
upgrading it to ministerial level and including Japan on a more regular basis in India-U.S maritime exercises.

has made the region a foreign policy priority. Prime Minister Modi has implicitly criticized Chinese behavior in the region (and potentially in the
Indian Ocean), with his admonition about countries with expansionist mindsets that encroach on others lands and seas. In a departure from
its predecessor, his government has shown a willingness to express its support for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in joint
statements with Vietnam and the U.S. In an op-ed, the prime minister also stated that the India-U.S. partnership will be of great value in
advancing peace, security and stability in the Asia and Pacific regions and, in September, President

Obama and he

reaffirm[ed] their shared interest in preserving regional peace and stability,

which are critical to the Asia Pacific region's continued prosperity .

India perceives strong US-China relations as zero-sum.

Close Us China ties erodes India and US relations
Madan 2015 (Tanvi ,ellow in the Project on International Order and
Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, The U.S.India Relationship and China, January 20, 2015, 7/14/2016
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-india-relationshipand-china-madan; DDI AH)
Today, both India and the U.S. have relationships with China that have
elements of cooperation, competition and, potentially, conflictthough in
different degrees. Each country has a blended approach of engaging China,
while preparing for a turn for the worse in Chinese behavior. Each sees a role for the
other in its China strategy. Each thinks a good relationship with the other sends a signal to China, but neither wants to
provoke Beijing or be forced to choose between the other and China. Each also recognizes that Chinaespecially
uncertainty about its behavioris partly what is driving the India-U.S. partnership. Arguably, there have been three
imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust relationship with India and for supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in
the context of the rise of China; economic interest; and shared democratic values. Indian policymakers recognize that
American concerns about the nature of Chinas rise are responsible for some of the interest in India. New Delhis own
China strategy involves strengthening India both security-wise and economically (internal balancing) and building a range
of partnerships (external balancing)and it envisions a key role for the U.S. in both. Some Indian policymakers highlight
another benefit of the U.S. relationship: Beijing takes Delhi more seriously because Washington does .

But India
and the U.S. also have concerns about the other when it comes to China.
Both sides remain uncertain about the others willingness and capacity to
play a role in the Asia-Pacific. Additionally, Indian policymakers worry both
about a China-U.S. condominium (or G-2) and a China-U.S. crisis or conflict.
There is concern about the reliability of the U.S., with the sense that the U.S.
will end up choosing China because of the more interdependent SinoAmerican economic relationship and/or leave India in the lurch. Some in the
U.S. also have reliability concerns about India. They question whether the
quest for strategic autonomy will allow India to develop a truly strategic
partnership with the U.S. There are also worries about the gap between
Indian potential and performance. Part of the rationale for supporting Indias rise is to help
demonstrate that democracy and development arent mutually exclusive. Without delivery, however, this rationaleand
Indias importancefades away. As things stand, neither India nor the U.S. is interested in the others relationship with

New Delhi, a too-cosy Sino-U.S.

relationship is seen as freezing India out and impinging on its interests. It
would also eliminate one of Washingtons rationales for a stronger
relationship with India. A China-U.S. crisis or conflict, on the other hand, is seen as potentially destabilizing
China being too hot or too coldthe Goldilocks view. For

the region and forcing India to choose between the two countries. From the U.S. perspective, any deterioration in SinoIndian relations might create instability in the region and perhaps force it to choose sides. Too much Sino-Indian
bonhomie, on the other hand, would potentially create complications for the U.S. in the bilateral, regional and multilateral
spheres.

India views US relations as a strategic counterweight to

Chinathe plans engagement disrupts that
Chatterjee, 12 (Ananya Chatterjee, sessional lecturer, School of
Continuing Education at the University of Oxford, India-China-United States:
The Post-Cold War Evolution of Strategic Triangle, 2/27/12, Political

Perspectives, http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/Evolution-India-China1.pdf)
Therefore, it can be concluded that the

United States remains a major factor in the

evolving India - China - U.S. triangle and both India and China seeks to
maximise the benefits from this bilateral relationship with the United States
in the context of the present international political system. On the other hand,
Washington's engagemen t of the world's two most populous nations, each experiencing strong economic
growth and a raised profile on the international stage, is strategically significant. As the U.S. Government's
National Intelligence Council pointed out earlier in 2005 in its re port Mapping the Global Future , the
likely emergence of China and India as new major global players will transform the geopolitical landscape
in the early 21st century (US National Intelligence Council [online]) . The Report predicting a rising Asia by
2020 points out that China will continue to strengthen its military through developing and acquiring
modern weapons, including advanced fighter aircraft, sophisticated submarines, and increasing numbers
of ballistic missiles. China will overtake Russia a nd others as the second largest defence spender after the
United States over the next two decades and will be, by any measure, a first - rate military power. With
regards to India, the Report outlines that as Indias economy grows governments in Southeast Asia
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and other countries may move closer to India to help build a potential
geopolitical counterweight to China. At the same time, India will seek to strengthen its ties with countries
in the region without excluding China. A new, dynamic pattern of interaction has, thus, begun between
the United States and Asia's two largest continental powers. The task for all three is, therefore, to manage
ties as a virtuous circle rather than a competitive triangle (Inder furth and Sha mbaugh, 2005). Inderfurth

there are some geopolitical thinkers in

each capital who seek to use improved bilateral relations against the third
party. Some in Beijing and New Delhi see strengthened Sino - I ndian ties as a constraint on American
hegemony. Others in Washington and New Delhi are suspicious of China and seek
to build U.S. - India relations (particularly military ties) as a strategic
counterweight to growing Chinese power. While the U.S. - India and China India relationships steadily improve, Sino - American relations seem to be
entering another strained and turbulent phase in their long, chequered relationship. A
and Shambaugh in their article continue to argue that

new wave of anti - China acrimony is currently gripping Washington, especially in the Congre ss, fuelled by
assertions about China's military build - up, threatened posture towards Taiwan, unfair trading practices,
product pirating, human rights violations and attempted buyouts of U.S. companies. Despite these
concerns, there is no turning back from the growing interdependence of the three countries, including in
the vital area of energy supplies. Managing these expanding relations will increasingly be a key challenge
for Washington, Beijing and New Delhi.

US China cooperation and relations alienates India

FEIGENBAUM, 15 (EVAN A., Nonresident Senior Associate Asia Program, U.S.India Ties in the Age of Xi Jinping, September 22, 2015, 7/15/16
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/09/22/u.s.-india-ties-in-age-of-xijinping/ii7f; DDI - AH )
These are just some of the issues on the agenda for Xis state visit to
Washington. But heres the catch: some issues on that agenda could bring
Washington and New Delhi closer, but others could drive them apart as
American coordination with Beijing risks creating wedges between the United
States and India. One example of the former involves domestic investment
rules in China. Beijing has deployed regulations and standards as a non-tariff
barrierto the detriment of U.S. and Indian investment alike. But an example
of the latter involves intensifying climate change coordination in the run-up to
Decembers multilateral negotiations in Paris: the United States and China are
moving into alignment on climate, even as New Delhi stands apart and flirts

with seeking exceptional treatment. That points to a challenge that the

United States and India must now confront: At the strategic level, Chinas rise
has brought Washington and New Delhi closer. But at the tactical leveland
sometimes, even at the strategic levelU.S. and Indian goals and choices are
not always in alignment. One problem is political. It is difficult to imagine a
major East Asian security contingencyTaiwan, Korea, the South or East
China Seasto which U.S.-India operational coordination would be relevant.
India would almost certainly keep itself aloof, influenced by many of the same
Indian voices that helped to scuttle refueling support of the United States in
the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Another problem involves Indian perceptions of
American ambivalence about India-China security tensions. The United
States, for its part, would likely try to remain aloof from a blowup on the
India-China border, not wishing to be caught in the middle. That would,
predictably, raise hackles in New Delhi about U.S. unreliability, further
fueling Indian skepticism of Americas China policy. Washington encountered
precisely this suspicion full force in 2009, when it issued a U.S.-China joint
statement that included references to South Asia. Many in India choked on
this statementfirst, because they suspected a U.S.-China condominium on
New Delhis security equities; second, because few, if any, in India regard
Beijing as a neutral party in South Asia; and third, because many fret that
Washington could sideline New Delhi, working against Indian interests in
pursuit of expanded U.S.-China cooperation.

Link - Diplomatic Engagement

The plans diplomatic engagement has a far-reaching
impact on US-Sino-China relationship
Chatterjee 11 (Ananya Chatterjee-Sessional Lecturer, School of
Continuing Education at University of Oxford, Research/Teaching and Learning
Support at University of Reading, formerly a Sessional Lecturer University of
Reading. India-China-United States: The Post-Cold War Evolution of a
Strategic Triangle http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/Evolution-India-China1.pdf )
Diplomatic meetings between the leaders of India, China and the United States in recent years
have drawn worldwide attention . Although critics said that the visits were more symbolic in nature, few
would question their far-reaching impact on reshaping the bilateral
relationships between America and the two rising global powerhouses:
China and India. Therefore, it can be concluded that the United States remains a major factor in the
evolving India-China-U.S. triangle and both India and China seeks to
maximise the benefits from this bilateral relationship with the United States
in the context of the present international political system. On the other hand, Washington's engagement of the
world's two most populous nations, each experiencing strong economic growth and a raised profile on the
international stage, is strategically significant . As the U.S. Government's National Intelligence Council pointed out earlier
in 2005 in its report Mapping the Global Future, the likely emergence of China and India as new major global players will transform the
geopolitical landscape in the early 21st century (US National Intelligence Council [online]). The Report predicting a rising Asia by 2020 points
out that China will continue to strengthen its military through developing and acquiring modern weapons, including advanced fighter aircraft,
sophisticated submarines, and increasing numbers of ballistic missiles. China will overtake Russia and others as the second largest defence
spender after the United States over the next two decades and will be, by any measure, a first-rate military power. With regards to India, the
Report outlines that as Indias economy grows governments in Southeast AsiaMalaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and other countriesmay
move closer to India to help build a potential geopolitical counterweight to China. At the same time, India will seek to strengthen its ties with
countries in the region without excluding China.

Link Green Tech/Energy

US India cooperation and investment in energy and
technology k2 relations. Green tech with China trades-off
Ebinger and Mehta, 15 (Charles K., Vikram Singh, Senior Fellow,
Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative, Chairman, Brookings
India
Senior Fellow, Time to Act on India-U.S. Energy Cooperation, January 2015,
7/26/16 http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-indiaenergy-cooperation-ebinger-mehta)
Energy Dialogue: Past Cooperation and New Opportunities Since May 2005,
the U.S. and India have engaged in a high level dialogue to promote
increased trade and investment in the energy sector. The dialogue comprises
five working groups: oil & gas, coal, power & energy efficiency, new
technologies & renewable energy, and civil nuclear co-operation. Since its
formation, a new working group on sustainability has been established.
LNG During the Presidents visit, India will seek special exemption to import
LNG from the U.S., though it is unclear why the Indian Government believes
there are any real obstacles to buying LNG today, other than a cumbersome
regulatory process. To date, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has
approved export of LNG from seven liquefaction terminals, for exports to
countries with which the U.S. does not have a free trade agreement (FTA).
Two of these permits include off-take agreements with Cheniere Energy of 3.5
million metric tons and Dominion Energy of 2.3 million metric tons with the
Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL.) These terminals are expected to be
complete and in a position to export cargo by late 2016/early 2017. Despite
the openness of the market, there is a perception that the US has too
stringent a licensing process and that India would benefit from greater US
export volumes since they would be cheaper than imports from elsewhere.
Nothing could be further from reality. Only market forces will determine where
LNG flows. SHALE GAS The development of shale gas has been
transformative for the U.S. domestic and international gas market.
Nonetheless fracking remains extremely controversial, especially with new
developments, such as New York State recently announcing a ban on fracking
throughout the state despite the fact that it has some of the most prolific
reserves in the nation. As fracking has progressed, concerns over water
availability and contamination have ebbed as new technologies using far less
or no water at all have begun to be developed. Additionally, the U.S. has a
wealth of regulatory experience at the state level which could be shared with
Indian counterparts. Already Indian companies the Indian Oil Corporation,
Reliance Industries, and Oil India have stakes in US shale gas projects
having invested in commercial fracking operations in both U.S. oil and gas
fracking technology. The U.S. government could sponsor a number of visits
for high level Indian officials and commercial concerns to major fracking
regions and help to establish interaction with local and state regulators to

learn more about this technology. STRATEGIC RESERVES For some years
India has contemplated developing strategic reserves. While the caverns
have been dug, they have not been filled. With oil prices likely to drop further
in the short run, now is the time for Delhi to begin fast tracking the process of
filling its reserves. The U.S. has years of managing strategic crude oil
reserves and this expertise could prove invaluable to India. Likewise, if India
were to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or
seek an exemption allowing it to join the International Energy Agency (IEA)
with strong support from the U.S. it would be eligible to join the IEA oil
sharing mechanism, which could prove invaluable during a supply crisis.
Membership though would also obligate India to fill its reserves and
potentially in a supply crisis share them with other IEA states. NUCLEAR
ENERGY Both President Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi have
reaffirmed their interest in implementation of the civil nuclear agreement.
The deal, negotiated some years ago, was designed to promote the sale of
US reactor technology and then was left to founder over a number of critical
issues. Both leaders should remove the red tape and move to implement the
agreement. CARBON CAPTURE, UTILIZATION AND SEQUESTRATION
(CCUS) India and the U.S. have a shared interest in further developing CCUS
technology to help address the air quality problems that accompany
abundant fossil fuel usage. Though in recent years natural gas has become
more competitive price-wise as a fuel to generate electricity in the US, it is
important to note that until 2035 coal is expected to remain the dominant
fuel. In India coal usage will continue to grow since it is available domestically
(though India does also import coal), is a cheap resource, and much of Indias
existing electricity generation capacity is coal based. Given these facts, it is
vital that both nations find ways to accelerate R&D into CCUS technology to
prove that the technology is both technologically and commercially viable in
order to offset further air quality contamination. CLEAN ENERGY Owing to
the vital importance of increasing energy access, reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, and improving resilience in the face of climate change, President
Obama and Prime Minister Modi agreed to a new and enhanced strategic
partnership on energy security, clean energy, and climate change in the
September 2014 joint statement. They have pledged to strengthen and
expand the highly successful U.S.-India Partnership to Advance Clean Energy
(PACE) through a series of new programs including a new Energy Smart Cities
Partnership to promote efficient urban energy infrastructure; a scaling-up of
renewable energy integration into Indias power grid; cooperation in
upgrading Indias alternative energy institutes; development of new
innovation centers and a host of other energy efficiency programs. Expansion
of this program could yield benefits to both countries since the government of
India under its Green Energy Mission has made solar and wind power
development key priorities. The challenge however will be to pick the right
technologies and to define clearly the level of support that the government
should provide and what incentives might be put in place for the private
sector to augment the governments involvement. The U.S. has tremendous
experience in the financing of green energy investments and could share

these with the Indian government and Indian entrepreneurs. It is also vital to
determine the multiple incentives that may be required to reach the stated
objectives of the overall Green Energy Mission including the level of
investment in new engines, smart and efficient infrastructure, battery storage
and to develop innovative financing schemes.

Link Climate Policy

India feels sidelined by US-China cooperation on global
warming
Feigenbaum, NONRESIDENT SENIOR ASSOCIATE-ASIA PROGRAM, 2015
(Evan A., U.S.-India Ties in the Age of Xi Jinping, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, September 22, 2015,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/09/22/u.s.-india-ties-in-age-of-xijinping/ii7f, accessed: 7-6-16, IP)
When Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Washington this week, the United
States and India will have an opportunity to assessand then bolstertheir nascent cooperation
in Asia. The fact is, this triangular relationship matters. It has often been argued
that the United States and India dont need China as a rationale for
cooperation. Two continental-sized countries, with deep maritime traditions and a diverse array of energy, economic, and security
interests, have numerous reasons to cooperate and coordinate. But there can be no denying that China
looms large in the strategic calculations of both countries. Feigenbaums work focuses
principally on China and India, geopolitics in Asia, and the role of the United States in East, Central, and South Asia. His previous positions
include deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia, deputy assistant secretary of state for Central Asia, and member of the secretary of
states policy planning staff with principal responsibility for East Asia and the Pacific. Evan A. Feigenbaum Nonresident Senior Associate Asia
Program More from this author... China as a Responsible Stakeholder? A Decade Later The New Asian Order And How America Can Compete

Chinas growing strength confronts

Washington and New Delhi with sometimes distinct, but increasingly shared,
strategic and economic challenges. So too does the prospect of Chinese weaknessfor example, if Beijing fails to
Why America No Longer Gets Asia Lenins Chinese Heirs For one thing,

shift toward a new economic model as its current approach runs out of steam. The good news is that the United States and India have
recognized the potential for cooperation in Asiapartly, it should be acknowledged, because they share interests and concerns about what
kind of power China might become. Much has been made of the joint statement on cooperation in the Asia-Pacific issued during President
Obamas January visit to India. But that emphasis on the Pacific is not new. It dates back over a decade, so there is depth and longevity to the
issues and concerns that have fostered a growing alignment of interests. As early as November 2001, U.S.-India joint statements emphasized
common goals in Asia. A landmark 2002 speech by then-Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill positioned Asian geopolitics squarely at the
center of the argument for strengthened partnership: Peace within Asiaa peace that helps perpetuate Asian prosperityremains an

China is important to U.S. and Indian

calculations about the Pacificand to their calculations about one anothers
interests, intentions, and goals. Why is China so central? Start with economics. Asias relationship to the world
objective that a transformed U.S.-India relationship will help advance. So

economy has changed dramatically since the mid-2000s. For decades, G-7 countries beat a path to Asias door. But the other foot now wears
the shoe as many economies, including Western economies, increasingly rely on Asian industrial and household consumers. Asian countries
have become much more than traders. They are investors, builders, lenders, and, in some areas, a growth engine. China is a central player in
this Asian drama. Indeed, for all its challenges, including a pronounced economic slowdown, China is the top trading partner of more than sixty
countries, many of them in Asia. Overcapacity and slackening Chinese demand have rocked numerous economies, especially commodity
producers. But If China succeeds in rebalancing its economy toward a new model, it will foster some new demand drivers, for example through
the accelerated growth of household consumption. Nor is Chinas slowdown, or its recent stock market turbulence, likely to alter its
increasingly central role as an investor and builder of infrastructure. These could ultimately change Asias economic face, not least in South
Asia, as Beijings One Belt, One Road infrastructure initiative converges with other efforts, including a $40 billion Silk Road Fund and the new
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and BRICS Bank, both of which India has joined as a founding member. Chinas foreign and economic
policies are converging in unprecedented ways. Beijing burned a sizeable chunk of its $4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves amid the
summers market turbulence. But it retains reservessome now being recycled into investments offshorelarger than the nominal GDPs of
India, South Korea, and Thailand combined, and equivalent in size to the worlds fourth-largest economy. Chinas abundance of capital is an
extension of Beijings foreign policy: it will continue to leverage state-backed financial vehicles for economic and strategic ends. Now, take
security. From the maritime commons to the cyber domain, U.S.-China security competition has become increasingly intense. But India, along
with some others in Asia, shares elements of these American concerns. Washington and Beijing have some clashing security concepts in Asia,
not least in the South China Sea. So too do New Delhi and Beijing in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. These are just some of the issues on

issues on that agenda could bring

Washington and New Delhi closer, but others could drive them apart as
American coordination with Beijing risks creating wedges between the United
States and India. One example of the former involves domestic investment rules in China. Beijing has deployed regulations and
the agenda for Xis state visit to Washington. But heres the catch: some

standards as a non-tariff barrierto the detriment of U.S. and Indian investment alike. But an example of the latter involves

intensifying climate change coordination in the run-up to Decembers

multilateral negotiations in Paris: the United States and China are moving into

alignment on climate, even as New Delhi stands apart and flirts with seeking
exceptional treatment.

Link Space
US China space cooperation represents a realignment in
policy that alienates India
Pakhomov 15
(Evgeniy, The Dragon vs. the Elephant, Brics Magazine, 7/15/16
http://bricsmagazine.com/en/articles/the-dragon-vs-the-elephant; DDI AH)
It is hard to imagine now that New Delhi and Beijing were once considered good
friends, and even spoke amiably of a close partnership. In 1951, India turned a blind
eye to the Chinese armys takeover of Tibet and limited its reaction to formal
statements bilateral relations seemed to be more important to New Delhi. The
famous slogan, Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai! (Indians and Chinese are brothers!), that
remained popular for many years first appeared during that period. However, the
Chinese dragon and the Indian elephant soon abandoned that brotherly sentiment
each country started taking decisive steps to assert their right to leadership in Asia.
As early as 1962, the first armed conflict broke out on the Chinese-Indian border
when each country began to carve up the Himalayan foothills and it became clear
that the bhai-bhai era had run its course. Military forces on both sides of the border
even now continue to monitor each other nervously. From time to time, there are
reports of border violations in mountainous areas by troops from both sides. At the
official level, India and China still speak of cooperation, but in reality, it is the
Peoples Republic and not Pakistan that India views as its most serious potential
adversary. Yet in recent years, neither of these two Asian heavyweights has ventured
to sever relations entirely, and the standoff has extended to the economic domain.
After becoming the worlds biggest assembly line, China moved ahead, owing to its
ability to copy nearly any Western technological novelty. India, on the other hand, has
left China behind in offshore programming, thanks to its successes in the IT sector.
Meanwhile, both countries are making a great effort to maintain the image of a
superpower they have both acquired nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers and are
now building their own supersonic fighter jets and ballistic missiles, each with a
watchful eye on the other. And now, the dragon and the elephant are poised to move
their rivalry into space.

Indias space rivalry with China means it perceives

changes in US China cooperation
Rajagopalan, 2016
(Rajeswari, Senior Fellow and Head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative
at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi., n Interview with
Rajeswari Rajagopalan by Xiaodon Liang India's Space Program: Challenges,
Opportunities, and Strategic Concerns, The National Bureau of Asian
Research, http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=651; DDI - AH)
The wake-up call for India came when China conducted its first anti-satellite
(ASAT) missile test in January 2007. The test clearly illustrated the challenges
right in India's own neighborhood. Beijing came under a huge amount of
criticism on two counts: one, for not announcing the test, and two, and more
importantly, for creating long-lasting debris in low-earth orbit. While the test

generated anger and public outcry, it did not result in any real punitive
measures. The informal moratorium on ASAT tests, which had lasted for two
and a half decades, was broken by the Chinese ASAT test. Thereafter, the
United States tested an ASAT missile in 2008, which the international
community was much more comfortable with because it was done openly and
did not lead to the creation of long-lasting debris. For India, however, China
has been of particular concern. Beijing's activities in recent years have been
driven by competition with the United States, so the capabilities it is
developing are much more advanced than what are necessary to deter India.
Nonetheless, India has to be mindful of Chinese advances. Following China's
ASAT test, the scientific and technical communities and the Indian Air Force
leadership, as well as sections of the political leadership, started debating
whether India should be developing its own ASAT capability, and whether this
capability should be demonstrated or simulated. India has a missile defense
system under development, and the potential for India to acquire an ASAT
capability is linked to its missile defense capabilities. The Indian Defence
Research and Development Organisation has been developing missile
defense capabilities independently but is also increasingly looking to partner
with the United States and other countries. In contrast, China has followed
the route of developing an ASAT capability first and later developing missile
defense based on its ASAT capability. How do China's space capabilities play
into the regional politics of the subcontinent? India is closely monitoring
China's space cooperation initiatives in South Asia. China launched a satellite
for Pakistan in 2011, and another for Sri Lanka in 2012. Our concerns are
informed by the nuclear precedent; cooperation with China was critical for
the Pakistani program. India feels that if Pakistan, which today has very
limited space capabilities, cooperated with China, it could become a capable
power in the space realm. The two major concerns are an independent
Pakistani ASAT capability and further development of Pakistan's long-range
missile capabilities. An ASAT capability is not quite as simple as rocket
technology, but it would not be the hardest thing for Pakistan to achieve
either. For China, Sri Lanka is extremely important in the maritime security
context, and for the Maritime Silk Road program. IndiaSri Lanka relations
have gone through ups and downs, but the new president, Maithripala
Sirisena, and new prime minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, both have a friendly
disposition toward India. Nonetheless, there are strict limits to Indian
influence in Colombo. Critically, Sri Lanka is in dire need of economic
opportunities and faces huge developmental challenges. Even if India had all
the goodwill to support and help Sri Lanka, it does not have the deep pockets
that China does. India is concerned that space cooperation may become yet
another path for China to make inroads in Colombo.

Space militarization would anger India

GSN 11 [Global Security Newswire, January 20, India Urges Strengthening
Outer Space Treaty, GSN.com, last accessed 7/24/16,
http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110120_5990.php]
The former head of India's air force yesterday called on the international
community to amend the international Outer Space Treaty to further prohibit
the militarization of space, Asian News International reported (see GSN, July
14, 2010). "India would like to appeal to [the] international community to see
what holes must be plugged" in the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and other Celestial Bodies, retired Air Marshal S. Krishnaswamy said in
a speech at a New Delhi symposium on outer space. "We also need a
strong policing force in the U.N. If somebody crosses the line, we need to
bring [them] down quickly," he told the audience. Member nations to the
treaty "undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install
such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in
any other manner." "The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by
all states parties to the treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes," according
to Article 4 of the agreement. "The establishment of military bases,
installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the
conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use
of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes
shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for
peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be
prohibited." However, the treaty by implication permits some military
operations such as the movement through space of intercontinental and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles, Krishnaswamy said. "The authors of
the treaty have left some gaps in the treaty. And probably with a sense of
purpose. After all, law is very clever," he said. Additionally, the pact fails to
adequately the deployment of conventional weapons in space, according to
the former air chief said. "The treaty also allows testing of all weapons in
space and floating military bases," Krishnaswamy said. "There is no ban on
antisatellite, antimissile weapons as the treaty says outer space is free for all
nation states." "We all should get together and work for peaceful use of
space," he argued. "If something bad (from space) happens, it will be
devastating. Indeed, the Earth will burn off"

Link Cybersecurity
High levels of mistrust and lack of transparency in
cybersecurity causes tensions and wariness between US,
China, and India
Menon, 2015 (Shivshankar , Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy, at the
Brookings Institution. , China and Indo-U.S. Relations: An Emerging Triangle?,
An Interview with Shivshankar Menon By John Ryan, June 26, 2015,
http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=582; DDI - AH )
The Chinese ambassador to India, Le Yucheng, stated that trilateral relations
between India, China and the United States will contribute a lot to world
peace and development. What kind of trilateral cooperationon
Afghanistan, HA/DR, climate change, renewable energy, or energy security,
for exampleis possible between the United States, India, and China and
could mediate competition and foster trust? Beyond the areas listed
above, a key opportunity for trilateral cooperation is cybersecurity. There are
high levels of mistrust and lack of transparency in this new domain, where
the rules and nature of contention are still very opaque. There are optimists
who feel that an international attempt to develop rules of the road would be
useful. It may well be useful in provoking us to think through these issues,
but so long as there is no common understanding of what is acceptable
behavior in this domain and cyberwarfare is regarded as a force multiplier
and even equalizer by many states, we are unlikely to see meaningful
international agreement on rules of the road that will be respected in
practice. Despite these difficulties, it is worth starting a conversation even
without the expectation of immediate results or solutions. If all these issues
are taken together, there is an agenda for what a regional security
architecture should address. Whether as track 1.5 or track 2, this trilateral
dialogue is worth initiating with an eye toward more institutional, official
structures.

US India cyber relations all time low because of scandal

and distrust engagement with China makes India angry
because of historical Chinese espionage
Curtis, 14 (Lisa, Senior Research Fellow Asian Studies Center, The Cyber
Bridge to Improved India-U.S. Cooperation, 7/23/2016
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/10/the-cyber-bridge-toimproved-india-us-cooperation)
India boasts the world's third-largest population of online users, and
Indians' increasing reliance on the internet leaves the country
increasingly vulnerable to cyber warfare. The threat comes from
criminal hackers, terrorist networks, and nation-states conducting
espionage or trying to disrupt critical infrastructure. Cyber warfare

can take an enormous toll on commercial activity, military readiness,

and public safety. Guarding against increasingly sophisticated cyber
attacks has therefore become a focal point of Indian and U.S.
national security strategy. India was among the biggest victims of
GhostNet, a global cyber espionage campaign that targeted governmental,
research and military organizations. Beyond this campaign, Chinese
espionage likely wrought India's most serious cyber breaches,
including the March 2013 hacking of India's Defense Research and
Development Organization's computer systems. In June 2012, cyber
attacks were reported on the systems of the Indian Navy's Eastern
Command, which is responsible for maritime activities in the South
China Sea. Further, the internet helps militant groups spread propaganda,
communicate with one another, and recruit members. Washington and Delhi
share this concern, but the Indian domestic terrorist group Indian Mujahideen
(IM) is particularly adept at using social media to communicate and recruit. IM
members reportedly use Facebook and other chat sites to exchange cryptic
messages while relying on proxy internet providers and software to mask
their locations. Overcoming Suspicions While the U.S.-India engagement
on cyber security issues stretches back more than a decade,
concrete cooperation remains minimal. There are specific reasons for
this. A 2006 spying scandal that involved U.S. and Indian officials
participating in a cyber security forum dampened cooperation for
several years. Indian officials have since remained highly suspicious
of U.S. motives and believe that Washington will look for ways to
exploit any cyber security cooperation for the purposes of its own
intelligence gathering. A recently-published study by the Heritage
Foundation and New Delhi-based think tank Observer Research Foundation,
titled Indo-U.S. Cooperation on Internet Governance and Cyber Security,
argues that the growing challenges pertaining to global cyber security
demand that India and the United States build a foundation of
mutual trust and cooperation on intelligence and counterterrorism.
The report highlights the need to expand Indo-U.S. cyber security dialogue to
cover the international dimensions of the problem. The bilateral dialogue has
so far focused narrowly on technical issues. The authors acknowledge,
however, that the vast difference in cyber capabilities of both countries - as
well as deep divisions within the United States over whether to pursue
unilateral or multilateral approaches - hinder their ability to forge a
consensus on international cyber norms and regulations. Dr. Raja Mohan, an
Indian strategic thinker, notes the likely tension between India's tradition of
favoring multilateralism and the imperative to build its domestic cyber
security capabilities. In other words, Mohan writes, "India's national interests
(on cyber security issues) may not be aligned with the collective positions of
the South." Another author of the report, Dr. Steven Bucci, Heritage's director
of foreign and national security policy studies, makes a strong case for
rejecting a regulatory approach. Instead, he recommends developing a
legislative framework that "harnesses the power of U.S. and Indian

industry and ingenuity, while safeguarding the freedoms and privacy

of individual citizens."

2NC Extensions

Link extensions Engagement (General)

China has the upper hand in the triangular dynamic in
Asia already. Engagement with China exposes India in the
pacific region undermining Indias security and trust
towards US foreign policy. This disrupts US-India relations
and upsets the triangular relationship. Mohan, 2012
China expansion in the squo is drawing US-India
cooperation. Obamas pivot to Asia has incorporated India
as a strategic partner. US-China engagement would be
perceived as a fracture of US-India mutual interests.
Wilson, 4/16
US-India relations goldilocks now, the two countries dont
want to choose between the other and China. Plan makes
Indian policy makers perceive US-China cooperation as
abandoning India and its interest. Madan 15
India perceives strong US-China relations as zero-sum.
US-China economic interdependence already perceived as
a step closer towards US-China condominium. Closer Us
China ties will erodes India and US relations and interests.
Madan 15
India-US relations are a strategic counterweight to
Chinas growth in Asia. The plans engagement with China
would trade off with US-India relations isolating India.
Chatterjee, 12
China is deploying regulations to hurt US-India
investment. US China cooperation would only fuel India
skepticism of Americas commitment to India. This
alienates India security interests and US reliability.
FEIGENBAUM, 15

Link extensions - Diplomatic Engagement

The plans diplomatic engagement upsets the triangular
relationship. Allowing China to maximize its benefits from
US-China relationship would reshape bilateral
relationships with India and destroy Washingtons
strategic approach. Chatterjee 11

Link extensions Green Tech/Energy

US investment in Indias energy sector show strong
relations. The US gov along with US companies have
shared new energy technology with Indias companies.
But Green tech engagement with China trades-off with
cooperation with India. Ebinger and Mehta, 15

Link Extensions Climate Policy

US-China cooperation on global warming will be seen as a
wedge in US-India relations.
Feigenbaum 2015

Link Extensions Space

India and China view each other as adversaries for the
image of a superpower in Asia. US China space
cooperation would be perceived as abandonment by India
and increase tensions.
Pakhomov 15
Indias space rivalry with China means it perceives
changes in US China cooperation as problematic. India
worries China would upgrade space capabilities of
Pakistan and that would threaten Indias leadership in
Space and military technology
Rajagopalan, 2016

The former head of Indias airforce has already warned

that apace militarization would anger India. This means
US China cooperation would be perceived as a threat.
GSN 11

Link Cybersecurity
US China cooperation in cybersecurity would be trade off
with trilateral cyber cooperation. That means India feels
left out. This causes tensions and wariness between US,
China, and India and creates uncertainty in the use of
cyberwarfare.
Menon, 2015
US India cyber relations all time low because of scandal
and distrust engagement with China makes India angry
because of historical Chinese espionage. 2012 and 13 are
filled with examples of China hacking into Indian military
and critical infrastructure. ie South China Seas and Indian
military.
Curtis, 14

Internal Links:

Internal link Indo Pak war

A political transformation of Pakistan can only be
accomplished through US-India coop
Joshi et al 13 (Sunjoy, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis
and Derek Scissors, Ph.D. "Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,"
Heritage Foundation, April 26,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations, DDI-PN)
This concern is rooted in India's historic wariness about the U.S.Pakistan
relationship. While Washington's policy of de-hyphenation (developing
separate policies toward India and Pakistan) has helped ease these concerns,
the time has come for New Delhi and Washington to construct a new
approach. Despite their strong interests in the stability of Pakistan, India and
the United States have never engaged in a productive dialogue on Pakistan
itself. During the Cold War, the two sides argued endlessly about Pakistan,
and in the last decade chose to put it aside. There is now, however, an
opportunity to begin a productive IndiaU.S. dialogue on Pakistan's future.
The current, profoundly negative, trends in Pakistan demand that India and
the U.S. find ways to work together to promote political moderation,
economic modernization, and democratic transformation in Pakistan. There is
no divergence between New Delhi and Washington on these goals, and
neither has the power to unilaterally alter Pakistan's current trajectory. It is
only by coordinating their respective approaches toward Islamabad that New
Delhi and Washington can help engineer a positive evolution of Pakistan.

Impacts:

Impact - Indo-Pak War

War between India and Pakistan would be catastrophic,
even a limited war kills millions and spills over
Korb & Rothman 12
(Lawrence J. & Alexander No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in
South Asia, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 68(2) 2012 3442 DDI TM
even a relatively small skirmish
could escalate into a nuclear conflict. For example, earlier this year, Pakistan announced it had tested a small
nuclear warhead designed to be used against invading troops on Pakistani soil . A nuclear war between India and
Pakistan would be an absolute catastrophe. A Natural Resources Defense Council study
found that even a limited nuclear exchange consisting of as few as
10 warheads could result in about three million casualties (Natural Resources
Defense Council, 2002). Moreover, the effects of such a conflict would not be
confined to South Asia: According to a recent article in Scientific American, a major regional nuclear
conflict could spark a global nuclear winter, with worldwide
implications for agriculture (Robock and Toon, 2010). Given the terrible effects of a
nuclear exchange, much ink has been spilled articulating policies to
prevent war, particularly a nuclear war, between India and Pakistan.
As these countries develop more advanced nuclear capabilities, chances increase that

However, little has been written about how the United States should respond if diplomacy fails that is, if a nuclear war breaks out between India and Pakistan, how can the
United States contain the conflict so it does not come to involve other nations with alliances or interests in the region and significantly larger nuclear arsenals?

Even a limited war leaves billions dead from famine, ruin

the atmosphere and the end of civilization
Ashgar, 16 (Rizwan Asghar, Rizwan Asghar is a Pakistani
investigative journalist, political scientist, nuclear security expert,
and military and defence analyst, Rethinking Deterrence Stability,
1/21/16, The News, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/132512-Rethinkingdeterrence-stability,)
A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would set off a global famine that
could kill two billion people and effectively end human civilization , a study said .
Even if limited in scope, a conflict with nuclear weapons would wreak havoc
in the atmosphere and devastate crop yields, with the effects multiplied as
global food markets went into turmoil, the report said. The Nobel Peace Prize-winning International Physicians
for the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social Responsibility released an initial peer-reviewed study in April 2012 that predicted a
nuclear famine could kill more than a billion people. In a second edition, the groups said they widely underestimated the impact in China and

"A billion people dead in the

developing world is obviously a catastrophe unparalleled in human history.
But then if you add to that the possibility of another 1.3 billion people in
China being at risk, we are entering something that is clearly the end of
civilization," said Ira Helfand, the report's author. Helfand said that the study looked at India and Pakistan due to the longstanding
calculated that the world's most populous country would face severe food insecurity.

tensions between the nuclear-armed states, which have fought three full-fledged wars since independence and partition in 1947. But Helfand
said that the planet would expect a similar apocalyptic impact from any limited nuclear war. Modern nuclear weapons are far more powerful
than the US bombs that killed more than 200,000 people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. "With a large war between the United States and
Russia, we are talking about the possible, not certain, but possible, extinction of the human race. "

In this kind of war,

biologically there are going to be people surviving somewhere on the planet

but the chaos that would result from this will dwarf anything we've ever seen ,"
Helfand said. The study said that the black carbon aerosol particles kicked into the atmosphere by a South Asian nuclear war would reduce US
corn and soybean production by around 10 percent over a decade. The particles would also reduce China's rice production by an average of 21
percent over four years and by another 10 percent over the following six years. The updated study also found severe effects on China's wheat,

China's wheat production would plunge by

50 per cent the first year after the nuclear war and would still be 31 per cent below baseline a decade
later, it said. The study said it was impossible to estimate the exact impact of nuclear war. He called for further research, voiced
alarm that policymakers in nuclear powers were not looking more thoroughly
at the idea of a nuclear famine. But he said, ultimately, the only answer was the abolition of nuclear weapons.
"This is a disaster so massive in scale that really no preparation is possible.
We must prevent this," he said. President Barack Obama pledged in 2009 to work toward abolition but said that the United
which is vital to the country despite its association with rice.

States would keep nuclear weapons so long as others exist. Nine countries are believed to possess nuclear weapons, with Russia and the
United States holding the vast majority.

india Pakistan risks nuclear war empirics

Wittner, 2011
(Lawrence S, "COMMENTARY: Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?"
Huntington News November 28, 2011 http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446
accessed 7-12-16 TM)
Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nucleararmed nations; and, admittedly, there havent been very manyat least not yet. But the Kargil War of
1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should
convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict
almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistans foreign secretary threatened
that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use any weapon in its
arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border ,
while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan.

Impact Asian Stability

Sino-US relations disrupt trilateral cooperation kills
Indias participation in Asia
Chaulia, 2011 (Sreeram, Professor and Vice Dean at the Jindal School of
International Affairs in Sonipat, India, Talking without the elephant 5/17/2011,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ME17Df04.html 7/15/16; DDI AH )
The recently concluded round of United States-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue in Washington covered the entire gamut of bilateral and global
problems concerning the world's two most formidable powers, trade, market
access, currency valuation, regional security in the Asia-Pacific, military
strategy and human rights. In terms of the high-level attendance of
American and Chinese government and business officials as well as the
breadth of issues under the scanner, this annual dialogue stood out as ground
zero of global policymaking. Yet, the elephant in the room of this most
consequential of all diplomatic forums was literally the elephant. There was
no seat for India at the table, even though all prognoses indicate that India
will join China and the US in a triumvirate of the world's largest economies in
the coming decades. The purely bilateral framing of the whole event in
Washington belied awareness that changes to contemporary strategic
relations among China, India and their traditional third-party interlocutor - the
United States - militate towards engagement in trilateral dialogue. The
parallel rises of China and India and the global implications of their
problematic relations require three-way dialogue channels, instead of plain
bilateralism, involving the two Asian principals and their chief global
reference point, the US. During the presidency of George W Bush, India
relied on antagonism between the US and China for competitive strategic
advantage. In its relations with Washington, Delhi often acted on expectations
that the former favored alliance with a democracy and remained wary of an
authoritarian and faster-growing Beijing. But this reading is now obsolete,
as the Barack Obama administration has softened its predecessor's approach
to China, showing a willingness to overlook human-rights violations and
crafting a bilateral re-engagement with China. The US helplessly rests on
Chinese shoulders to keep East Asia's black sheep, North Korea, in check. The
financial meltdown since 2008 introduced delicate edges into China-US
interdependence, premised on extensive Chinese holdings of US Treasury
bonds. American author and economist Zachary Karabell sees "superfusion"
between the Chinese and American economies and contends that this holds
the symbiotic union key to anchor the shaky global economy. Since the
Sino-Indian relationship had long been mediated/buffered/wedged by
favoritism on one side or the other on the part of the US, and this trend has
now changed, vulnerabilities emerge with which India must reckon.
Dependence on US counter-balancing tactics against China is no longer a
viable option for New Delhi. The zero sum assumptions of the Sino-USIndian triangle are giving way to complex three-way dynamics in which it is in

the best interests of the three countries to engage in comprehensive

strategic dialogue about major world issues. India must prevent the dreaded
"Group of 2" formation (joint governance of the world by China and US) from
materializing and hindering its own position as a global player that is worth
consulting on all major international policies.

Increased US-China coop kills US-India relations- border

conflict has left India and China in tension
Curtis 14 (Lisa, Senior Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center,
Priorities for Prime Minister Modis Visit: U.S. and India Must Cooperate for
Asian Stability, The Heritage Foundation. September 24.
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/09/priorities-for-primeminister-modis-visit-us-and-india-must-cooperate-for-asian-stability, DDI-PN)
Against this backdrop, Chinese President Xi Jinpings three-day visit to India
last week did not go as well as anticipated, largely due to a flare-up in border
tensions. Chinese leaders had put on a charm offensive toward India shortly
after the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power. Recognizing that Indias
clout on the world stage is likely to grow under Modi, the Chinese sought to
focus on cooperation, not competition. President Xis decision to skip Pakistan
on his visit to South Asiaeven though it was likely due to concerns about
the internal security situationplayed well in India. As the Chinese
Presidents visit approached, however, SinoIndian border tensions
intensified. About 1,000 Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) troops set up
camps in mountainous regions in Ladakh on the Indian side of the Line of
Actual Control (LAC), and an equal number of Indian troops deployed to
forward positions in the area. The border standoff was reported in the Indian
press and took the sheen off of Xis visit. PM Modi called on China to
demarcate the LAC, which further dampened the atmosphere and took the
focus away from the economic and trade agenda. SinoIndian border tensions
previously had flared in April 2013 when Chinese troops camped for three
weeks several miles inside Indian territory in the Ladakh region. That border
spat was defused when India agreed to destroy some military structures
along the border and both sides withdrew their troops, clearing the way for a
planned visit to India by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang.

Strong India-United States relations are key to stability in

Asia
Curtis 14 (Lisa, Senior Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center,
Priorities for Prime Minister Modis Visit: U.S. and India Must Cooperate for
Asian Stability, The Heritage Foundation. September 24.
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/09/priorities-for-primeminister-modis-visit-us-and-india-must-cooperate-for-asian-stability, DDI-PN)
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modis visit to the United States next week
provides an opportunity to strengthen U.S.India ties, which stagnated during
the second term of Modis predecessor, Manmohan Singh. During the visit,

President Barack Obama should demonstrate the importance the U.S.

attaches to the bilateral relationship and offer cooperation on economic,
defense, and security issues. The Obama Administration has at times relegated the relationship with India to a lower
category of priority than it merits, but both sides have shown interest in moving beyond negative atmospherics and specific irritants, like the
revocation of Modis U.S. visa over the 2002 Gujarat riots and last years arrest of a U.S.-based Indian diplomat. The visit will be observed

It is
important that the ObamaModi summit demonstrate the strength of U.S.
India ties at a time when the power dynamics in Asia are shifting. Warm Welcome
closely by other Asian powers: namely, China and Japan, both of which recently held high-level bilateral visits of their own with Modi.

President Obama is scheduled to meet Prime Minister Modi on September 29 and 30 following a major speech that Modi will give the day
before to around 20,000 people, most of them Indian Americans, in Madison Square Garden. In an official announcement of the ObamaModi
meetings, a U.S. National Security Council official said that Modis White House engagements over a two-day period are a sign of the
importance the Administration attaches to its relations with India. Although Modi will not address a joint session of Congress (as the Indian
American community had earlier hoped) because Congress is out of session, the U.S. Senate passed a bipartisan resolution last week
designating September 30 as U.S.India Partnership Day and noting that the relationshipmade up of a special and permanent bondwill
continue to define the 21st century. Busy Foreign Policy Agenda Modis visit to the U.S. is part of a hectic foreign policy schedule. In early
September, Modi made a successful five-day visit to Japan, where he and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe agreed to elevate their dialogue
to a Special Strategic and Global Partnership. Japan committed to investing $35 billion in Indian projects over the next five years, and the
two sides agreed to explore elevating their trilateral dialogue with the U.S. to the foreign minister level, a step that Washington would
welcome. Many viewed Modis remark that Japan and India were focused on economic development, not expansionism, as an oblique criticism

Modi appears to be interested in improving

strategic ties with Japan as a hedge against China. Border disputes between
India and China continue to simmer, despite a substantial improvement in
their trade and economic ties (bilateral trade has increased from around $5 billion in 2002 to over $66 billion in
2013). Modi and his senior advisers may calculate that cooperating more closely
with Japan in areas like maritime cooperation, nuclear issues, and stronger
economic and investment ties will strengthen New Delhis hand in dealing
with Beijing and help to deter any potential Chinese border aggression. Against
of China and its approach to territorial disputes.

this backdrop, Chinese President Xi Jinpings three-day visit to India last week did not go as well as anticipated, largely due to a flare-up in
border tensions. Chinese leaders had put on a charm offensive toward India shortly after the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power.
Recognizing that Indias clout on the world stage is likely to grow under Modi, the Chinese sought to focus on cooperation, not competition.
President Xis decision to skip Pakistan on his visit to South Asiaeven though it was likely due to concerns about the internal security

SinoIndian border tensions

intensified. About 1,000 Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) troops set up
camps in mountainous regions in Ladakh on the Indian side of the Line of
Actual Control (LAC), and an equal number of Indian troops deployed to
forward positions in the area. The border standoff was reported in the Indian press and took the sheen off of Xis visit.
situationplayed well in India. As the Chinese Presidents visit approached, however,

PM Modi called on China to demarcate the LAC, which further dampened the atmosphere and took the focus away from the economic and

SinoIndian border tensions previously had flared in April 2013 when

Chinese troops camped for three weeks several miles inside Indian territory in
the Ladakh region. That border spat was defused when India agreed to destroy some military structures along the border and
both sides withdrew their troops, clearing the way for a planned visit to India by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. Build IndoU.S. Ties It is in
the U.S. interest to build closer ties with India, for numerous reasons. India is
an emerging economy that provides opportunities for U.S. trade and investment, a strategically important country
in maintaining a stable balance of power in the Asia Pacific, and a democratic nation with a
large Muslim minority that provides a model of an ethnically and religiously diverse society that maintains freedom for its citizens. The
recent shifting power dynamics in the region characterized by Modis
successful Japan visit and simmering SinoIndian border tensions drive home
the important role that India plays in the U.S. Asia rebalance strategy. During Modis
trade agenda.

visit, the U.S. should: Highlight the opportunity to expand economic and business relations so long as Modi remains committed to a proliberalization agenda. A major part of the visit will consist of Modi interacting with the U.S. business community in New York and Washington in
an effort to encourage greater U.S. investment, especially in Indias infrastructure sector. U.S. leaders must make clear to Modi that U.S.
businesses are looking for signs that India will maintain momentum on economic reform and provide a stable and private-sector-friendly
business environment. Emphasize defense cooperation in an atmosphere of strategic understanding, building on steps announced by U.S.
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel during his visit to India in August. Modi has highlighted the need to modernize Indias armed forces, and the
U.S. is poised to play a significant role in helping to fill Indian defense requirements. During his August visit to India, Secretary Hagel discussed
dozens of proposals for India to consider with regard to co-production of defense items and transfer of technology. Hagel said that the U.S. is

It is important
that both sides continue to demonstrate understanding of the strategic
willing to be patient while India considers its security needs and would respect Indias desire for strategic autonomy.

context in which each is operating. While BJP leaders may calculate that it is in Indias interest
to draw closer to the U.S., they also will point out that India shares a border
with China and thus must be cognizant of Chinese perceptions of Indias
foreign policy. Coordinate on strategies to counter terrorist movements in South Asia, especially in Afghanistan as U.S. and NATO
forces draw down. Given al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiris recent pledge to launch a South Asia wing and the Islamic State gaining ground
in Iraq, the imperative for close U.S.India counterterrorism cooperation has never been stronger. Obama and Modi must coordinate their
responses to these brewing threats and seek ways to cooperate in preventing the Taliban from staging a comeback in Afghanistan. Manage
expectations on visit outcomes to avoid a sense of disappointment. In the past, the relationship has suffered from each side having overly
optimistic expectations of what the other side can deliver to solidify ties. While the two sides have largely convergent strategic interests, the
fact that they are both large democracies means that institutional change can be complex and slow. For this reason, initiatives like the
Defense Trade and Technology Initiative aimed at breaking down bureaucratic obstacles to defense cooperation are particularly important, but
these initiatives also require patience and persistence and take time to bear fruit. Conclusion The stage is set for a successful Modi visit to
Washington, but the White House must guard against allowing the myriad international crises happening around the globe to overshadow the

Engaging with a strategically like-minded partner such

as India takes on greater importance as the U.S. grapples with multiple global
challenges. U.S.India cooperation is particularly important when it comes to
countering international terrorism and maintaining a stable balance of power in the Asia Pacific.
visit and weaken IndoU.S. bilateral ties.

Chinese growth has led to Asia Pacific regional instability

World Finance 2016 (Harriet King, IMF comments on stability in the
Asia-Pacific region, July 13, 2016, http://www.worldfinance.com/home/imfcomments-on-financial-stability-in-the-asia-pacific-region 7/23/2016)
Mitsuhiro Furusawa, Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, recently
commented on the challenges of financial reform and financial
stability in the Asia-Pacific region, only to conclude that the area could
teach Europe how to withstand volatility. According to Furusawas speech:
One core lesson that is particularly important to a region that has
experienced extraordinary success and financial instability over the
past generation: neither financial stability nor economic growth
cannot be achieved by standing still. It is only through a process of
constant vigilance and reform that continued success can be
assured. The IMF believes Asias ability to recover from financial
instability is down to policy frameworks that allow more flexible
exchange rates, and the promotion of financial stability through the
strengthening of bank capital. Southeast Asia has reportedly been a
bright spot with vigorous momentum in ASEAN countries as domestic
demand has helped to offset slower exports, in turn helping favourable
demographics and societies seeking higher standards of living. A threat to
stability But while emerging and developing economies within Asia
continue to provide the most important contribution to global
growth, Asias growth has slowed due to Chinas deceleration
towards six percent growth. China therefore poses a risk to Asias
growing stability, due to the countrys economic rebalancing and
global economic and financial conditions. Additionally, growth has
slowed due to world trade, weak commodity prices and tighter credit
conditions. Nevertheless, the IMF believes that Chinas corporate debt is
manageable. Initiatives to maintain Asias reputation on the global growth
scale include the financing of infrastructure development, deeper markets
and inclusive financing. According to the IMF, the region must go beyond

traditional banking practices for both consumers and corporations. The IMF
believes innovation is crucial; Asia needs to commit to expanding financial
services, thus giving everyone a stake in the economy, as well as launching
new macro and technological financing such as mobile banking.

Impact Laundry List

US-India relations key to increase ethnical diversity,
improve the economy, and fight terror
Curtis 14 (Lisa, Senior Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center,
Priorities for Prime Minister Modis Visit: U.S. and India Must Cooperate for
Asian Stability, The Heritage Foundation. September 24.
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/09/priorities-for-primeminister-modis-visit-us-and-india-must-cooperate-for-asian-stability, DDI-PN)
It is in the U.S. interest to build closer ties with India, for numerous reasons.
India is an emerging economy that provides opportunities for U.S. trade and
investment, a strategically important country in maintaining a stable balance
of power in the Asia Pacific, and a democratic nation with a large Muslim
minority that provides a model of an ethnically and religiously diverse society
that maintains freedom for its citizens. The recent shifting power dynamics in
the region characterized by Modis successful Japan visit and simmering Sino
Indian border tensions drive home the important role that India plays in the
U.S. Asia rebalance strategy. During Modis visit, the U.S. should: Highlight
the opportunity to expand economic and business relations so long as Modi
remains committed to a pro-liberalization agenda. A major part of the visit
will consist of Modi interacting with the U.S. business community in New York
and Washington in an effort to encourage greater U.S. investment, especially
in Indias infrastructure sector. U.S. leaders must make clear to Modi that U.S.
businesses are looking for signs that India will maintain momentum on
economic reform and provide a stable and private-sector-friendly business
environment. Emphasize defense cooperation in an atmosphere of strategic
understanding, building on steps announced by U.S. Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel during his visit to India in August. Modi has highlighted the need
to modernize Indias armed forces, and the U.S. is poised to play a significant
role in helping to fill Indian defense requirements. During his August visit to
India, Secretary Hagel discussed dozens of proposals for India to consider
with regard to co-production of defense items and transfer of technology.
Hagel said that the U.S. is willing to be patient while India considers its
security needs and would respect Indias desire for strategic autonomy. It is
important that both sides continue to demonstrate understanding of the
strategic context in which each is operating. While BJP leaders may calculate
that it is in Indias interest to draw closer to the U.S., they also will point out
that India shares a border with China and thus must be cognizant of Chinese
perceptions of Indias foreign policy. Coordinate on strategies to counter
terrorist movements in South Asia, especially in Afghanistan as U.S. and
NATO forces draw down. Given al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiris recent
pledge to launch a South Asia wing and the Islamic State gaining ground in
Iraq, the imperative for close U.S.India counterterrorism cooperation has
never been stronger. Obama and Modi must coordinate their responses to
these brewing threats and seek ways to cooperate in preventing the Taliban
from staging a comeback in Afghanistan.

Impact Middle East War

US-India relations opens up opportunity for coop on
nuclear prolif in Iran and overall stability in the Middle
East
Joshi et al 13 (Sunjoy, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis
and Derek Scissors, Ph.D. "Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,"
Heritage Foundation, April 26,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations, DDI-PN)
There was much misunderstanding in Washington of the nature of India's
relationship with Iran, and insufficient appreciation in New Delhi of President
Obama's attempt to craft a different American approach to Iran. Washington
appreciates New Delhi's need to maintain a reasonable relationship with Iran,
which shares borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, is a major source of
hydrocarbons, provides India access to Western Afghanistan and Central Asia,
and is a potential partner for New Delhi in coping with the consequences of
internal change in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of American combat
troops. New Delhi in turn appreciates American concerns about the
consequences of a nuclear Iran for the balance of power in the Gulf and the
Middle East. India has implemented the United Nations sanctions against Iran
and has decreased its imports of Iranian oil. As a result, it has avoided
American sanctions. Unlike Russia and China, India has not sought to use Iran
as a bargaining chip in its relations with the United States. While the
sanctions have been effective and put Iran's economy under considerable
strain, Iran is unlikely to surrender its nuclear weapons program easily. While
the use of force must remain an option of last resort, negotiation with Tehran
is the preferable way of halting it and establishing a stable balance of power
in the Gulf and the Middle East. The problem that Iran poses is not just one of
nuclear proliferation. As the Middle East faces the turbulence generated by
the Arab awakening and the schism between the Shia and Sunni communities
is exacerbated across the region, both Washington and New Delhi will benefit
from framing the Iran challenge within this larger context. Focusing on the
regional balance of power would open a much broader template and generate
new possibilities for collaboration between New Delhi and Washington.
Because the use of force will greatly complicate the prospects for forging this
balance of power, a mature U.S.India partnership on the issue puts the onus
on both countries to facilitate a peaceful end to Iran's nuclear program. For
the sake of U.S.India cooperation, it is necessary for New Delhi to
understand that the U.S. will not tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran.

Impact- Terrorism
US-India cooperation has been crucial in developing the
counterterrorism groups on both sides
Joshi et al 13 (Sunjoy, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis
and Derek Scissors, Ph.D. "Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,"
Heritage Foundation, April 26,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations, DDI-PN)
IndiaU.S. cooperation in counterterrorism increased significantly after 9/11.
The U.S.India Cyber Security Forum was set up in 2002, but experienced
setbacks that have dampened some of the enthusiasm for cooperating in this
particular arena. The 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai and the extent of help
sought and given by the U.S. in the investigations, as well as diplomatic
efforts by India, culminated in the Bilateral Counterterrorism Cooperation
Agreement in 2010. Other joint initiatives include interactions between
security and intelligence officials, exchange visits of senior leadership of
security and intelligence units, joint training exercises, and U.S. assistance to
India in enhancing critical investigation skills. A key component of this
cooperation has been the State Department's Anti-Terrorism Country
Assistance Plan for India for training more than 2,000 officials from various
intelligence, police, paramilitary, and security agencies. These Indian officials
have undergone training in forensic analysis, evidence gathering, bomb blast
investigations, human rights, extradition, and prosecution. In 2012, training
capsules widened to include air and seaport security. There is now a strong
working relationship between the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team
and India's Computer Emergency Response Team.

US-India coop solves the Middle Eastern and Pakistani

nuclear terrorism threat
Joshi et al 13 (Sunjoy, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis
and Derek Scissors, Ph.D. "Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,"
Heritage Foundation, April 26,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations, DDI-PN)
One promising area for expanded U.S.India cooperation is the prevention of
nuclear terrorism. Given the level of terrorist activity in the region and India's
vulnerability to Pakistan-based and state-supported terrorism, as well as the
question of the safety of Pakistan's nuclear assets, there is strong concern in
New Delhi about the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Furthermore, New Delhi
is concerned about partial state support to terrorist groups that might be
interested in gaining access to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The vulnerability of
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is a growing concern, especially given the number

of Pakistani Taliban attacks on Pakistan's military facilities. A few years ago,

the U.S. had put in place contingency plans for the recovery of Pakistan's
nuclear weapons in the event of a crisis of governance or, worse, an
extremist takeover of the country. India and the U.S. must institute measures
that would ensure that nuclear weapons are in responsible hands. Helping to
strengthen Pakistan's command-and-control structure is an important task. In
the unlikely event of a Taliban takeover, India and the U.S. would have to
work with both the civilian and military institutions to gain complete control
of the weapons, failing which, India and the U.S. would have to physically
take control of the weapons and neutralize them. With the U.S. set to draw
down forces in Afghanistan, India's concerns about the potential for nuclear
terrorism in the region will only grow. The U.S., and India to a lesser extent,
are also concerned about the possibility that Iran might transfer its emerging
nuclear capabilities to terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah. There is strong
potential for India and the U.S. to increase their cooperation to deal with this
common threat, including establishing certain contingency measures in the
event of a catastrophic development, as well as preparing means to secure
vulnerable nuclear facilities.

US India relations necessary for combatting terror and

checking Chinese power in the region
Political Perspectives 2011(India-China-United States: The Post-Cold
War Evolution of a Strategic Triangle, 7/15/16
http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Evolution-IndiaChina1.pdf; DDI - AH )
The Indo-U.S. defence agreement signed in Washington on June 28, 2005
between the Defence Ministers of the two countries has significant
ramifications for the strategic framework involving China, India and the
United States. India has an obvious interest in enhancing cooperation with
the world's sole superpower, as India strives to become a major regional
power and eventually a powerful global entity. To achieve this goal, India
seeks American support to join the Security Council as a permanent member,
and also to acquire high technology from the United States and its G-8
partners, including military technology and civilian nuclear energy. The
operationalization of the 123 Agreement between India and US on October
10, 2008 marked a watershed achievement in the history of their bilateral
relations. The American interest in enhancing Indo-U.S. ties is two-fold. It
seeks that India join the coalition forces in their counter-terrorism efforts as
India is one of the very few nations in the world that has the trained
manpower and logistics to contribute effectively to the cause of uprooting
the seeds of violence. U.S. interest also lies in encouraging India to counter
China to establish a new balance of power in Asia that would better serve
American interests. However, the U.S. Ambassador in India Robert Blackwill
had stated that U.S.-India friendship will not be directed against any third
party (Blackwill, 2001). Although both the United States and India share

certain common interests, it is not imperative that they codify their

commitments toward each other. In todays era of open boundaries and
economies, states have diffuse interests and threats and need to maintain
fluid foreign relations.

Impact Economy
US-India relations key to increased economic liberalization
Joshi et al 13 (Sunjoy, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis
and Derek Scissors, Ph.D. "Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,"
Heritage Foundation, April 26,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations, DDI-PN)
If the IndiaU.S. relationship was imagined in the past decade in abstract
terms and lofty possibilities, the reality today is that both New Delhi and
Washington need each other even more than before. In the 2000s, the
United States was at the peak of the unipolar moment. What drove
Washington to re-craft the relationship with New Delhi was not the prospect
of immediate gain or an urgent need for Indian partnership, but the perceived
value of a long-term strategic investment in India. For New Delhi, the
affections of George W. Bush and the civil nuclear initiative constituted an
unexpected and significant political bonus at a moment when India's
international trajectory was on an upward trend. Today, when Washington and
New Delhi find themselves in more difficult circumstances, their bilateral
partnership acquires greater salience. It is no longer aspirational, but an
important mutual need. At the core of the revitalized relationship must
be a strengthened economic engagement. The economic crisis in the
United States and the slowdown in India's growth have increased the value of
a deepening partnership. Plenty of good ideas are around; these include the
conclusion of a bilateral investment treaty, the negotiation of a free trade
agreement, promotion of energy security at a moment the U.S. is likely to
emerge as a major exporter of natural gas, and liberalization of American
work visas for Indian service professionals. These proposals, however, must
be related to a renewed commitment to economic liberalization on both
sides. Despite the intense politicization of economic policy in both countries,
it should be possible to find many convergences and work on them. At the
political and strategic level, India, like so many other nations after the Cold
War, has often worried about unconstrained American power. At this juncture,
though, India must concern itself more with the consequences of a potentially
precipitous decline in American power or the loss of U.S. political will.

Impact Space Debris

Cooperation could help minimize and prevent space debris
Glover 10 [Jessica, a Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Research Intern at the Center for a
New American Security. She holds an M.A. in Middle East Studies from the
George Washington University Elliot School of International Affairs, November
11, For U.S.-India Cooperation, Space is the Next Frontier, Center for New
American Security, last accessed 6/24/11,
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2010/11/us-india-cooperationspace-next-frontier.html] TD
Beyond this,

encouraging India to play a leading role in the development of

space technology can arguably help better define and enshrine norms
surrounding the use of outer space. Potentially, such a leadership role could
include encouraging stewardship of free access in outer space minimizing
orbital debris that could threaten the placement of future satellites and discouraging behaviors in
space that contribute to orbital debris creation.

Debris will destroy our satellites- they are key to hegemony and readiness
Imburgia 11{Lieutenant Colonel Joseph S. Imburgia, (B.S., United States Air Force
Academy (1994); J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law (2002); LL.M., The Judge
Advocate Generals Legal Center & School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Va. (2009)) is a Judge
Advocate in the United States Air Force and is presently assigned as a legal exchange officer to
the Directorate of Operations and International Law, Defence Legal, Australian Defence Force,
Canberra, Australia. He is a member of the Tennessee and the Supreme Court of the United
States bars, and he is a member of the Australian and New Zealand Society of International
Law. Prior to becoming a Judge Advocate, Lieutenant Colonel Imburgia was a Targeting Officer,
United States Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., Space Debris and Its Threat to
National Security: A Proposal for a Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk,
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F
%2Flaw.vanderbilt.edu%2Fpublications%2Fjournal-of-transnational-law%2Fdownload.aspx
%3Fid%3D6574&rct=j&q=Joseph%20S.%20Imburgia%20is%20usaf%20University%20of
%20Tennessee%20College%20of
%20Law&ei=m9wITqmzFsfV0QHt4KnbCw&usg=AFQjCNEglOEqH_3OfmcbgE6HXwiHKrBz8g&sig
2=NRXHp8brVZYLKQSpoUqqFA&cad=rja}RC
These gloomy prognostications about the threats to our space environment should be troubling to

The United States relies on the unhindered use of outer space for
national security.151 According to a space commission led by former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, [t]he [United States] is more dependent on space than any other
nation.152 According to Robert G. Joseph, former Undersecretary for Arms Control and International
Security at the State Department, space capabilities are vital to our national security
and to our economic well-being.153 Therefore, a catastrophic collision between
space debris and the satellites on which that national security so heavily
depends poses a very real and current threat to the national security
interests of the United States. Since the [1991] Gulf War, the [United States] military
has depended on satellites for communications, intelligence and navigation
for its troops and precision-guided weapons.154 Satellites are also used for
reconnaissance and surveillance, command and control, and control of
Americans.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.155 According to the United States Space Commands Fact Sheet:
Satellites provide essential in-theater secure communications, weather and
navigational data for ground, air and fleet operations and threat warning.
Ground-based radar and Defense Support Program satellites monitor ballistic missile launches around the
world to guard against a surprise missile attack on North America. Space surveillance radars provide vital
information on the location of satellites and space debris for the nation and the world. Maintaining space
superiority is an emerging capability required to protect our space assets. With the modern speed of
warfare, it has become difficult to fight conflicts without the timely intelligence and information that space
assets provide. Space-based assets and space-controlled assets have created among U.S. military
commanders a nearly insatiable desire for live video surveillance, especially as provided from remotely

military forces have

become so dependent on satellite communications and targeting capabilities
that the loss of such a satellite would badly damage their ability to respond
to a military emergency.158 In fact, the May 2008 malfunction of a
communications satellite demonstrates the fragile nature of the satellite
communications system.159 The temporary loss of a single satellite
effectively pulled the plug on what executives said could [have been] as
much as 90 percent of the paging network in the United States. 160 Although this
piloted vehicles like the Predator and now the Reaper.157 Moreover,

countrys paging network is perhaps not vital to its national security, the incident demonstrates the
possible national security risks created by the simultaneous loss of multiple satellites due to space debris
collisions.

Aff

Not Zero Sum

Relations arent zero sumSino Indian coop increasing
reject their authors hype
Maini 16 (Tridivesh Maini, The Diplomat, 3-13-2016, "What the US Gets
Wrong About India's Relationship With China," Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/what-the-us-gets-wrong-about-indiasrelationship-with-china/, DDI NB)
The India-China relationship is a far more complex and multi-layered one than
many U.S. analysts realize. Both countries are trying to find common
ground in a number of areas. It was surprising to discover that the views of many U.S.
analysts mirror skeptics in the strategic community in India . Both tend to view
the India-China relationship solely from the prism of security issues and
territorial disputes while ignoring key state-level economic ties. I met off-the-record with
about 40 strategic analysts and policymakers in Washington, D.C., during a SAV visiting fellowship at the Stimson Center. Some Americans, I
found, had a good grasp of South Asian politics, while others were way off the mark. Perhaps the greatest misconception I came across in D.C.
concerns the India-China relationship. Most conversations focused on the contentious aspects of the relationship, and ignored an unnoticed
transformation taking place between Beijing and Delhi. If Americans fail to recognize the nuances in the relationship between China and India,
their Asia policy is bound to be heavy-handed and Washington could lose an opportunity to shape regional politics in a positive way. I found
that there are a handful of reasons why U.S. analysts are out of sync with the changes taking place in the Beijing-New Delhi relationship. First,

a focus on hard security issues and territorial disputes detracts from

serious analysis of the India-China economic relationship and progress in
other areas. While there are certainly major divergences in the strategic sphere apart from
territorial disputes between the two countries, the strongest stress on the relationship does relate
to Chinas inroads into South Asia. Many strategic analysts in India believe that China has designs of encircling
India; they often cite the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to buttress this point. Indias increasing role in Southeast Asia, specifically
in the South China Sea, also puts pressure on the relationship. One clear instance of this is the decision of Vietnam to award exploration
projects to Indias state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Company in the South China Sea, an action which China has raised objections to time and
again. In May 2015, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman categorically stated that Any oil and gas exploration work should get approval first

New Delhi and Washington have found common ground on

both strategic and economic issues. However, this does not necessitate a skeptical view of the New
Delhi-Beijing relationships potential. Beijing and Washington have dissonance on many strategic issues, but still
share a robust economic relationship. Neither India nor the United
States should look at Sino-Indian relations as a zero-sum game. Former
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao wisely stated that the world is big enough for
both India and China to grow. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has
emphasized that India and China will need to work jointly in the 21st century.
China and India both understand the need for connectivity. In this context, both
countries seem to have made some progress on the Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar
(BCIM) Corridor, an important component of Chinas One Belt, One Road project. A number of U.S. analysts told me that India
from China. Meanwhile,

should focus on the BCIM Corridor instead of worrying over Chinas investment in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Efforts are also being made to increase connectivity between both

countries by increasing the number of flights. In the economic sphere, there is much room for
(CPEC).

improvement between New Delhi and Beijing. The balance of trade is presently skewed in favor of China. For the period April 2015-January
2016, Indias trade deficit was $44.7 billion, with Indias exports to China standing at a mere $7.56 billion while imports stood at $52.26 billion.
For 2014-2015, the trade deficit for New Delhi was estimated at $48.48 billion. However, Chinese investments in India are increasing.

India-China relations are no longer restricted to New Delhi and Beijing;

interactions between the two countries states and provinces are also
increasing. India is seeking to reach out to Chinese provinces with whom it
did not have links previously. Increasing ties between Indian states and
Chinese provinces enriches and supports high-level diplomatic ties.
Already, a number of Indian chief ministers have visited China . During Modis visit last year to

China, an annual State and Provincial Leaders forum was inaugurated. Speaking at the launch, the Indian prime minister made a significant
point: A number of decisions can be taken quickly by the State governments. These interactions also make the State governments more
sensitive and aware of the international dynamics and requirements. Liberalizing visa regimes will also help strengthen people-to-people
contacts and trade. India has bolstered the relationship by beginning an e-visa facility for Chinese citizens. This improvement is evident in the
increase in number of tourists arriving in India on e-visas, which has gone from a little over 2,700 in October 2014 to 56,477 in October 2015.
It is important for members of the strategic community and the government in the United States who study India to interact with analysts

It is also critical to understand the increasing links between a number of state

India and China. Finally, U.S. and Indian analysts alike will benefit from
realizing that there is no contradiction between India strengthening its ties
with the United States while also keeping a reasonable and open relationship with
China.
outside Delhi.

governments in

India seeks better relations with China and doesnt want a

partnership with the US assumes border clashes
Boggs and Burns 15 (Robert Boggs and Nicholas Burns, ROBERT
BOGGS is Professor of South Asia Studies at the Near East South Asia Center
for Strategic Studies, in Washington, D.C., and previously worked for the U.S.
State Department for 32 years. January/February 2015, "Friends Without
Benefits," Foreign Affairs, Heinonline Database) DDI JT
Burns suggests that an increasingly powerful China may spur a stronger U.S.Indian nexus in Asia. But even though border clashes with China have
aggravated security concerns in New Delhi, Modi openly admires China's
development model and may prefer to engage China diplomatically and
economically rather than try to contain it. And many Indian analysts do not
believe that the United States would come to India's defense if a U.S.-Indian
military partnership provoked Chinese aggression. Modi still remains a
mystery to U.S. policymakers. He appears to want the United States to help
revitalize India's economy, but it is unclear if he wants the longer-term
political and defense partnership that the United States seeks in South Asia.
A staunch Hindu nationalist, Modi likely wants to continue India's quest for
regional dominance, a move that would not endear him to the United States.
His endorsement of his party's vision of Akhand Bharat, or "undivided India,"
which sees most of South Asia as belonging to India, does not bode well for a
more accommodative regional foreign policy. Of course, India is firmly within
its rights to define its own interests and chart its own strategies. But U.S.Indian relations-and U.S. strategic interestswould be best served by a realistic
appraisal of Indian values and goals, which Burns fails to provide. Contrary to
Burns' assertions, India is unlikely to become a "critical partner" to the United
States anytime soon. New Delhi will strengthen its ties with Washington only
if doing so serves its interests; Washington should do the same.

India focused internally not on US policy to other

countries AND dont care about competition with China
Rovere 15 (Crispin Rovere, 3-16-2015, "India is no ally of the US," No
Publication, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/16/India-is-no-allyof-the-US.aspx, DDI NB)
In the continuing debate between Hugh White and Shaskank Joshi regarding US-India strategic
cooperation, I would associate myself closely with the views of White and what he sees as the eventual limits

of the relationship. But I would take it one step further. In the long-term, an anti-US coalition consisting of China, Russia and
India cannot be discounted. India presently fears China's growing power. Accordingly, India
hedges by deepening relations with the US and status quo middle powers
such as Australia. However, India does not perceive itself as a status quo
power, but as an emerging great power. As India's confidence grows it will be
acting in its own interests, not those of the collective West. Of course there are clear areas of
strategic tension in the bilateral China-India relationship. These include unresolved border disputes, China's patronage of Pakistan and China's
growing maritime presence in the Indian Ocean region. But these issues are being managed between the parties and may well be resolved,
probably in that order, over the next 10 to 20 years. It is very hard to see a similar outcome between China and the US. Last September, Prime
Minister Modi and President Xi said they would 'seek an early settlement to the boundary question,' with both countries subsequently

negotiations continue, and there is

no reason to believe they will not ultimately succeed . After all, China has settled its land border
appointing new envoys to help manage the dispute. Despite a recent setback,

with 12 of the 14 countries on its periphery, sitting in stark contrast with increasing Chinese maritime assertiveness in the East and South
China seas. As for Pakistan, India's view of China's patronage is complicated. India holds grievances over such issues as China's support for
Pakistan's nuclear program, yet it is dangerous for India if Pakistan feels overly threatened. Making Pakistan feel secure is extremely
challenging, especially as India's power grows. Thus a transparent Chinese role in Pakistani affairs is in India's long-term interest
transparency that will depend highly on India improving bilateral relations with China. Finally, China's naval presence in the Indian Ocean is
another major concern for India; an expansion due mainly to China's dependency on energy imports from the Middle East. The long-term
trajectory of this issue depends on a combination of China reducing its reliance on sea-borne oil imports, and on the improving strength and
assertiveness of India. As China has no maritime claims in the Indian Ocean, maritime tension will likely be a consequence of fissures in the

As for India and the US, I find it astonishing that after more
than 50 years of being repeatedly burned, some Americans still have not
learned their lesson (though many have), and continue insisting that China
and India are 'natural competitors'. This is false. China and India are historical
competitors, but such competition is not necessarily 'natural' and certainly
nothing like the strategic competition that exists between China and the US.
After all, any Chinese expansion in the Western Pacific will be at America's
expense. It is hard to argue that India's expansion into the Indian Ocean is
being actively resisted by China. India is not a pro-Western democratic
bulwark, and never will be. India has one true strategic partner Russia. That
relationship is deep, multifaceted and as old as ANZUS. Modi calls Russia 'a pillar of
strength' and India's 'most important defence partner.' Russia has supplied a
significant portion of India's military hardware, is supplying most of India's
nuclear reactors, and continues to play a significant role in India's militaryindustrial complex, including submarine and ballistic missile programs.
Likewise, Russia's relationship with China is 'the best it's been in 450 years.'
broader relationship, not a cause.

Once you remove the immediate barnacles in the China-India relationship, an interesting coalescence of interests emerge between China,
India and Russia. All three countries have a strong preference for a multipolar world order and the dilution of American hegemony. All three
countries consider the principle of state sovereignty to be the pre-eminent norm of international relations, have a mercantile bent to their
economic policies and already cooperate on many of these issues through the BRICS grouping. There are certainly significant pitfalls and risks
in the China-India relationship. But should those be navigated successfully, the US may well find itself with a worse relationship with India,
Russia and China than the three have with each other. This is because strategic tension between India and China is finite, while their shared
interests are broad and enduring.

China and India cooperation beyond military means that

relations not zero sum
Maini 16 (Tridivesh Maini, The Diplomat, 3-13-2016, "What the US Gets
Wrong About India's Relationship With China," Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/what-the-us-gets-wrong-about-indiasrelationship-with-china/, DDI NB)
The India-China relationship is a far more complex and multi-layered one than
many U.S. analysts realize. Both countries are trying to find common ground
in a number of areas. It was surprising to discover that the views of many U.S. analysts mirror
skeptics in the strategic community in India. Both tend to view the India-China relationship

solely from the prism of security issues and territorial disputes while ignoring
key state-level economic ties. I met off-the-record with about 40 strategic analysts and policymakers in
Washington, D.C., during a SAV visiting fellowship at the Stimson Center. Some Americans, I found, had a good grasp of
South Asian politics, while others were way off the mark. Perhaps the greatest misconception I came across in D.C.

Most conversations focused on the contentious

aspects of the relationship, and ignored an unnoticed transformation taking
place between Beijing and Delhi. If Americans fail to recognize the nuances in the relationship between
concerns the India-China relationship.

China and India, their Asia policy is bound to be heavy-handed and Washington could lose an opportunity to shape
regional politics in a positive way. I found that there are a handful of reasons why U.S. analysts are out of sync with the
changes taking place in the Beijing-New Delhi relationship. First,

a focus on hard security issues and

territorial disputes detracts from serious analysis of the India-China economic
relationship and progress in other areas. While there are certainly major divergences in the
strategic sphere apart from territorial disputes between the two countries, the strongest stress on the relationship does
relate to Chinas inroads into South Asia. Many strategic analysts in India believe that China has designs of encircling
India; they often cite the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to buttress this point. Indias increasing role in
Southeast Asia, specifically in the South China Sea, also puts pressure on the relationship. One clear instance of this is the
decision of Vietnam to award exploration projects to Indias state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Company in the South China
Sea, an action which China has raised objections to time and again. In May 2015, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman
categorically stated that Any oil and gas exploration work should get approval first from China. Meanwhile, New Delhi
and Washington have found common ground on both strategic and economic issues. However, this does not necessitate a
skeptical view of the New Delhi-Beijing relationships potential. Beijing and Washington have dissonance on many

Neither India nor the United States

should look at Sino-Indian relations as a zero-sum game. Former Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao wisely stated that the world is big enough for both India and China to grow. Indian
strategic issues, but still share a robust economic relationship.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has emphasized that India and China will need to work jointly in the 21st century. China and
India both understand the need for connectivity. In this context, both countries seem to have made some progress on the
Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor, an important component of Chinas One Belt, One Road project. A
number of U.S. analysts told me that India should focus on the BCIM Corridor instead of worrying over Chinas investment
in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Efforts are also being made to increase connectivity
between both countries by increasing the number of flights. In the economic sphere, there is much room for improvement
between New Delhi and Beijing. The balance of trade is presently skewed in favor of China. For the period April 2015January 2016, Indias trade deficit was $44.7 billion, with Indias exports to China standing at a mere $7.56 billion while
imports stood at $52.26 billion. For 2014-2015, the trade deficit for New Delhi was estimated at $48.48 billion. However,
Chinese investments in India are increasing. India-China relations are no longer restricted to New Delhi and Beijing;
interactions between the two countries states and provinces are also increasing. India is seeking to reach out to Chinese
provinces with whom it did not have links previously. Increasing ties between Indian states and Chinese provinces enriches
and supports high-level diplomatic ties. Already, a number of Indian chief ministers have visited China. During Modis visit
last year to China, an annual State and Provincial Leaders forum was inaugurated. Speaking at the launch, the Indian
prime minister made a significant point: A number of decisions can be taken quickly by the State governments. These
interactions also make the State governments more sensitive and aware of the international dynamics and requirements.
Liberalizing visa regimes will also help strengthen people-to-people contacts and trade. India has bolstered the
relationship by beginning an e-visa facility for Chinese citizens. This improvement is evident in the increase in number of
tourists arriving in India on e-visas, which has gone from a little over 2,700 in October 2014 to 56,477 in October 2015. It
is important for members of the strategic community and the government in the United States who study India to interact
with analysts outside Delhi.

It is also critical to understand the increasing links between

a number of state governments in India and China. Finally, U.S. and Indian
analysts alike will benefit from realizing that there is no contradiction
between India strengthening its ties with the United States while also keeping
a reasonable and open relationship with China.

US-India-China relations not zero sum bilateral relations

come first
Menon, 2015 (Shivshankar , Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy, at the
Brookings Institution. , China and Indo-U.S. Relations: An Emerging Triangle?,
An Interview with Shivshankar Menon By John Ryan, June 26, 2015,
http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=582; DDI - AH )

Although China is not the primary issue in the India-U.S. relationship, there is
a growing strategic convergence between the United States and India on this
subject. John Garver of Georgia Tech, for instance, identified a weak U.S.China-India triangle emerging (as opposed to the strong strategic triangle of
the Soviet Union, China, and the United States in the Cold War). Do you
agree? Is India in a period of strategic vulnerability vis--vis China? How can
India engage China while hedging against its rise? I am not really sure you
can think of the relationship between India, the United States, and China as a
triangle, weak or otherwise, for several reasons. First, there is an evident
asymmetry in the relationships and relative power between the three.
Second, both China and India are more comfortable talking to the United
States. India is not a major issue in China-U.S. relations, and I do not think
China is a key driver of India-U.S. relations, although it is an issue discussed
bilaterally. While security is a subjective concept without an absolute metric, I
do not see the next ten years as a period of strategic vulnerability for India;
in fact, I believe Indian vulnerability has reduced over time in every respect.
From the Indian point of view, India-U.S. relations primarily are about bilateral
actions and the ways this relationship assists in the transformation of India.
Nonetheless, there is no question that there is increasing strategic
congruenceIndia and the United States share fundamental values, including
the desire for an open and inclusive security order in Asia. All that is true, but
I do not see a U.S.-India-China triangle yet.

US-India relations resilient

No link and no impact economic interdependence makes
US India relations inevitable
Delisle 11 (Jacques Delisle, director of the Asia Program at FPRI and
professor of law and political science at the University of Pennsylvania., 1-162011, "The Elephant in the Room: Summitry and China's Challenging
Relations with Great Powers in Asia," Foreign Policy Research Institute,
http://www.fpri.org/article/2011/01/the-elephant-in-the-room-summitry-andchinas-challenging-relations-with-great-powers-in-asia/) DDI - JT
But the most decisive disanalogies between U.S.-China-India relations today
and the Cold War strategic triangle stem from the positive and dense ties
between the U.S. and China and between China and India that had no parallel
in the thin and hostile relations between the U.S. and the USSR and between
China and the Soviet Union. During an era of high international economic
interdependence, U.S.-PRC trade and investment relations are among the
very largest globally-with China ranking as the U.S.s second largest, and the
U.S. ranking as Chinas largest, trading partner in goods, and the U.S. being
among Chinas top sources of foreign investment and China among the U.S.s
largest creditors. China-India economic connections have been developing
rapidly from low baselines, with trade having grown from less than $2 billion
at the beginning of the decade to over $60 billion now and with China having
become Indias biggest trading partner. Their expansion and deepening was a
focus of Wens visit, including announcements of a goal of $100 billion in
bilateral trade by 2015 (a figure consistent with recent trends), $16 billion in
business deals, and plans to expand Chinese investment and economic
activity in India, particularly in the fast-growing area of infrastructure
construction. Such patterns contrast sharply with the low and often near-zero
levels of economic engagement between the U.S. and USSR and between the
USSR and the PRC during an earlier era. Although they also spawn conflicts,
the large and growing economic linkages between the U.S. and China and
between India and China have created national interests and powerful
domestic political constituencies that favor good relations and weigh against
strongly adversarial stances toward China in Washington and New Delhi. Such
economic considerations are likely all the more central at this moment, when
India has an economist prime minister and the U.S. has a president whose
political fortunes hinge on improvement in a recently dismal national
economy.

US India relations strong common interests and US

commitment mean that dialogue prevents escalation
Teja, 2014 (Jaskaran, secretary in Indias Ministry of External Affairs, New
Delhi, United StatesIndia: Enhancing a Strategic Partnership, 27 Jun 2014,

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10803920.2014.925346re
7/20/2016; DDI - AH )
At the heart of a U.S.India strategic partnership and dialogueand its
occasional deficitlies the dynamics of democratic politics with similar
impulses but different contexts: one is a highly developed post-industrial
society and the leading world power; the other, a large developing nation
with a major power potential and aspirations. For India, the key words are
economic growth and social transformation. Its principal challenge is to
regain higher economic growth and improve living conditions for its huge
population. India needs a big step forward to redevelop industry, modernize
agriculture, and promote science and technology, while ensuring national
security in a changing strategic scenario. Political stability and economic
development at home and a stable geopolitical environment in the region
are critical national interests. The United States broadly shares these goals
and has participated in Indias development efforts in the past decades.
President Obama has called the U.S.India relationship one of defining
moments of the twenty- first century. There has been a broad consensus in
Indiafrom the days of Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Manmohan Singhs
governmentthat the United States and India are natural allies or
indispensable partners. Singh and Obama have pledged to develop a
comprehensive global strategic partnership and make the next decade
equally transformative ... [in] security cooperation, bilateral trade and
investment, energy and environment, higher education and global
architecture.2 There are, of course, differences of perception and approach
on some issues in bilateral relations or on third country questions in our
extended neighborhood but that does not represent a clash of interests and
can be addressed through dialogue and negotiations without losing sight of
the longer-term strategic convergence. Maintaining the strategic
partnership, like any relationship, needs constant tending and avoiding the
willful neglect that leads to estrangement. In short, both countries need to
pay heed to each others sensitivities and remain engaged to work around
problems. It will be a test of statesmanship.

US-India relations resilient despite controversial issues in

the past
Desai 14 (Ronak D., Affiliate, the Belfer Centers India and South Asia
Program, Harvard University, U.S.-India Relations Will Endure Despite the
Khobragade Controversy, Mar 15, 2014,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ronak-d-desai/devyanikhobragade_b_4578443.html 7/24/2016 )
Indias close relationship with Iran, for example, long constituted a major
irritant in ties between Washington and New Delhi. At a time when the United
States was leading international efforts to isolate Iran over its disputed
nuclear program, American officials were chagrined to see India continue to
import Iranian oil to meet its voracious energy demands. Some experts

predicted an inevitable train wreck in U.S.-India relations over New Delhis

relationship with Tehran, which would lead to long-term damage in U.S.-India
ties. The train wreck never occurred. On the contrary, American and Indian
officials collaborated closely together in a manner consistent with
Washingtons goals regarding Irans nuclear program, while accommodating
Indias legitimate concerns about its energy supply. The stringent liability
legislation enacted by Indias parliament shortly after passage of the
landmark U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal has also posed a potent challenge to
bilateral relations for more than five years. Inconsistent with governing
international standards on nuclear liability, the Indian law effectively
precludes American companies from entering Indias lucrative nuclear market
and realizing the benefits of the historic nuclear accord. While some
observers worried that the liability legislation would derail U.S.-India ties by
rendering the centerpiece of the strategic partnership fundamentally
irrelevant, these fears proved to be unfounded. Officials in both capitals
refused to allow the relationship to be hijacked by one single issue, focusing
instead on other opportunities for cooperation, including within the nuclear
energy arena. More recently, documents leaked by former National Security
Agency contractor Edward Snowden revealed that India was among one of
the NSAs top surveillance targets and that its United Nations mission in New
York and embassy in Washington were bugged and monitored by the agency.
While similar revelations of American surveillance on other friends and allies
abroad provoked outrage and condemnation in capitals around the world,
New Delhis tepid response highlighted its resolve not to let the disclosures
impact U.S.-India ties. Each one of these challenges implicated equities more
central to core American and Indian national interests than the ones
supposedly affected by the Khobragade arrest. Officials in both capitals,
however, remembered the larger value of the strategic partnership to both
countries and found a way to move it forward. In fact, profound differences
continue to exist between the United States and India on a host of issues,
including climate change, intellectual property protection for American
pharmaceuticals sold in India, and global trade, for instance. But while these
differences are serious ones unlikely to be resolved anytime soon, decisionmakers in Washington and New Delhi have so far not allowed them to
compromise the overall integrity and forward momentum of the relationship.
Viewed within this context, dire predictions regarding the future of U.S.-India
relations appear exaggerated and inconsistent with the history of the
strategic partnership. Ultimately, the overall trajectory of the U.S.-India ties is
unlikely to be affected by the brewing controversy in the long-term. The
underlying strategic logic of bilateral ties remains unchanged despite
Khobragades arrest and the ongoing spat between the two countries. Robust
U.S.-India ties remain as important as ever with issues like the pending
withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, regional stability, terrorism,
and managing Chinas rise continuing to top the agenda for both countries.
American and Indian leaders would be wise to remember this as tensions
continue to persist even after Khobragades departure from the United
States. To be sure, the current diplomatic dispute is a significant one that has

put genuine strain on the strategic partnership. But U.S.-India relations have
proven remarkably durable and resilient in the face of even more daunting
challenges. The Khobragade controversy is unlikely to change that.

Non unique relations low now

US India cyber relations all time low because of scandal
and distrust engagement with China makes India angry
because of historical Chinese espionage
Curtis, 14 (Lisa, Senior Research Fellow Asian Studies Center, The Cyber
Bridge to Improved India-U.S. Cooperation, 7/23/2016
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/10/the-cyber-bridge-toimproved-india-us-cooperation)
India boasts the world's third-largest population of online users, and
Indians' increasing reliance on the internet leaves the country
increasingly vulnerable to cyber warfare. The threat comes from
criminal hackers, terrorist networks, and nation-states conducting
espionage or trying to disrupt critical infrastructure. Cyber warfare
can take an enormous toll on commercial activity, military readiness,
and public safety. Guarding against increasingly sophisticated cyber
attacks has therefore become a focal point of Indian and U.S.
national security strategy. India was among the biggest victims of
GhostNet, a global cyber espionage campaign that targeted governmental,
research and military organizations. Beyond this campaign, Chinese
espionage likely wrought India's most serious cyber breaches,
including the March 2013 hacking of India's Defense Research and
Development Organization's computer systems. In June 2012, cyber
attacks were reported on the systems of the Indian Navy's Eastern
Command, which is responsible for maritime activities in the South
China Sea. Further, the internet helps militant groups spread propaganda,
communicate with one another, and recruit members. Washington and Delhi
share this concern, but the Indian domestic terrorist group Indian Mujahideen
(IM) is particularly adept at using social media to communicate and recruit. IM
members reportedly use Facebook and other chat sites to exchange cryptic
messages while relying on proxy internet providers and software to mask
their locations. Overcoming Suspicions While the U.S.-India engagement
on cyber security issues stretches back more than a decade,
concrete cooperation remains minimal. There are specific reasons for
this. A 2006 spying scandal that involved U.S. and Indian officials
participating in a cyber security forum dampened cooperation for
several years. Indian officials have since remained highly suspicious
of U.S. motives and believe that Washington will look for ways to
exploit any cyber security cooperation for the purposes of its own
intelligence gathering. A recently-published study by the Heritage
Foundation and New Delhi-based think tank Observer Research Foundation,
titled Indo-U.S. Cooperation on Internet Governance and Cyber Security,
argues that the growing challenges pertaining to global cyber security
demand that India and the United States build a foundation of
mutual trust and cooperation on intelligence and counterterrorism.

The report highlights the need to expand Indo-U.S. cyber security dialogue to
cover the international dimensions of the problem. The bilateral dialogue has
so far focused narrowly on technical issues. The authors acknowledge,
however, that the vast difference in cyber capabilities of both countries - as
well as deep divisions within the United States over whether to pursue
unilateral or multilateral approaches - hinder their ability to forge a
consensus on international cyber norms and regulations. Dr. Raja Mohan, an
Indian strategic thinker, notes the likely tension between India's tradition of
favoring multilateralism and the imperative to build its domestic cyber
security capabilities. In other words, Mohan writes, "India's national interests
(on cyber security issues) may not be aligned with the collective positions of
the South." Another author of the report, Dr. Steven Bucci, Heritage's director
of foreign and national security policy studies, makes a strong case for
rejecting a regulatory approach. Instead, he recommends developing a
legislative framework that "harnesses the power of U.S. and Indian
industry and ingenuity, while safeguarding the freedoms and privacy
of individual citizens."

Non-unique other disputes

Disputes over Pakistan and mismatches in capacity have
killed US-Indian terror coop
Joshi et al 13 (Sunjoy, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis
and Derek Scissors, Ph.D. "Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,"
Heritage Foundation, April 26,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations, DDI-PN)
Despite the successes in U.S.Indian counterterrorism cooperation, the true
potential of this relationship remains unfulfilled. There are several reasons for
this gap between expectations and achievementsome of them are
historical, a few because of divergent perceptions, and the rest caused by
structural mismatch. Indian policymakers, strategists, and analysts are
unable to reconcile their perception of U.S. policy on terrorism and its attitude
toward Pakistan. Washington's over-eagerness to accommodate Pakistani
demands and perceptions accompanied by an inability or unwillingness to
penalize Pakistan, despite the harsh reality of Pakistan's continued support
for terrorism, remains inexplicable to most Indians. This continued support by
the U.S. has emboldened Pakistan to resist demands to dismantle its terrorist
infrastructure. The U.S. handling of the case of Pakistani-American David
Headley, who conspired with LeT in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, also
disappointed Indian counterterrorism professionals. The U.S. reluctance to
allow India free access to Headley only strengthened Indian doubts about U.S.
credibility in prosecuting terrorism cases linked to Pakistan. The alacrity with
which Headley was allowed a plea bargain and the refusal to facilitate Indian
investigation of his links to LeT and his role in the Mumbai attacks remain
sore points in New Delhi. Finally, there is a mismatch in structure and
capacity of Indian and U.S. nodal agencies of cooperation. Capacity
deficiencies, archaic methods of training, and poor instructors within the
police force have made it difficult for India to raise a strong and capable
security bulwark against terrorism. Indian institutions remain ill-equipped to
make full use of cooperation from the U.S., which has led to less than optimal
results from bilateral cooperation.

India consistently opposes US objectives and interests

and shows no interest in cooperation
Boggs and Burns 15 (Robert Boggs and Nicholas Burns, ROBERT
BOGGS is Professor of South Asia Studies at the Near East South Asia Center
for Strategic Studies, in Washington, D.C., and previously worked for the U.S.
State Department for 32 years. January/February 2015, "Friends Without
Benefits," Foreign Affairs, Heinonline Database) DDI JT
Like many advocates of stronger U.S.- Indian ties, Burns fails to recognize
that two countries with the same system of government do not necessarily

develop similar interests or policies. In the case of India, the burdens of

colonialism and economic underdevelopment have led it to oppose much of
the U.S. agenda. Like China, India continues to view the United States as a
presumptuous superpower and competitor. And if India realizes its goal of
becoming an economic powerhouse with global influence, New Delhi's rivalry
with Washington, particularly in South Asia, will likely intensify. Although
Burns writes that "the United States and India should continue to strengthen
their defense and political coordination in the Asia-Pacific region," he neglects
to mention that India appears uninterested in cooperating on this front. The
United States has included India in multilateral strategic discussions on the
Asia-Pacific region, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, with Australia
and Japan, which sought to respond to increased Chinese power, but India
has not made such meetings a priority. New Delhi has also been
conspicuously absent from the two combined naval task forces the United
States assembled to combat terrorism and piracy in the Indian Ocean. And
despite providing development assistance to Afghanistan, India has refused
to participate in the International Security Assistance Force, NATO'S security
mission in Afghanistan. When India does participate in multilateral
organizations, it routinely opposes initiatives proposed by the United States
and other Western powers. India's opposition to interfering in other countries'
domestic affairs has led New Delhi to vote against human rights resolutions in
the UN General Assembly and to openly criticize UN involvement in such
crises as the civil wars in Libya and Syria. New Delhi has also opposed the
West on many economic issues, working with the other so-called BRICS
nations - Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa to create alternatives to the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other Bretton Woods
institutions. Still, Burns holds out hope that Obama and Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi will "work together to promote stability in India's South Asian
neighborhood." If India's actions are anything to go on, however, it appears
that the country prefers to work alone to maintain its regional dominance-and
it views the United States as a threat. As a U.S. diplomat serving in South
Asia from 1985 to 2004, I watched Indian officials repeatedly pressure
neighboring countries not to cooperate with Washington, often because New
Delhi believed, erroneously, that such cooperation would raise the U.S.
military's profile in South Asia. In early 2014, India protested U.S. calls for fair
and inclusive elections in Bangladesh because it feared that voters would not
elect a pro-India party. To gain leverage over its neighbors, India has had its
foreign intelligence agency provide financial support to antigovernment
insurgencies in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Two of the insurgent groups
India has backed-Maoist militants in Nepal and Tamil separatists in Sri Lankahave killed thousands of civilians and been designated as terrorists by the
U.S. government.

No Impact Middle East War

Middle East war wont escalateregional militaries are
too weak
Rovner & Talmadge, 14 -- *John Goodwin Tower Distinguished Chair of
International Politics and National Security, Associate Professor of Political
Science, and Director of Studies at the Tower Center for Political Studies @
Southern Methodist University, **Assistant Professor of Political Science and
International Affairs at the George Washington University
(*Joshua, **Caitlin, Less is More: The Future of the U.S. Military in the Persian
Gulf, The George Washington University, http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/less-morefuture-us-military-persian-gulf)

The major regional

powers all suffer from serious shortcomings in conventional military
power, meaning that none of them will be able to seriously threaten
the balance for the foreseeable future. Irans military has suffered
greatly from decades of war and sanctions. Iraqs fledgling security
services are almost exclusively focused on internal problems. And Saudi
Arabia, the richest country in the region, seems content to rely on a dense network of
defenses and proxies rather than pursue any real power projection
capabilities. While there are reasons to worry about internal stability, especially given the ongoing fight against ISIS (the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria), there is very little chance of a major interstate war . Moreover,
threats to oil shipping in the Gulf are real but not overwhelming . All of this
Happily, however, the situation for the United States today is more like the 1950s than the 1970s.

points to a simple and optimistic conclusion: the United States can protect its core interest in the free flow of oil without having to commit to a
large and enduring naval or ground presence to the Gulf.

Middle East escalation empirically denied

Kevin Drum September 9 2007 The Washington Monthly, The Chaos
Hawks
Needless to say, this is nonsense. Israel has fought war after war in the
Middle East. Result: no regional conflagration. Iran and Iraq fought one of the
bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional
conflagration. The Soviets fought in Afghanistan and then withdrew. No
regional conflagration. The U.S. fought the Gulf War and then left. No regional
conflagration. Algeria fought an internal civil war for a decade. No regional
conflagration.

No Impact Asia Stability

Chinese growth has led to Asia Pacific regional instability
World Finance 2016 (Harriet King, IMF comments on stability in the
Asia-Pacific region, July 13, 2016, http://www.worldfinance.com/home/imfcomments-on-financial-stability-in-the-asia-pacific-region 7/23/2016)
Mitsuhiro Furusawa, Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, recently
commented on the challenges of financial reform and financial
stability in the Asia-Pacific region, only to conclude that the area could
teach Europe how to withstand volatility. According to Furusawas speech:
One core lesson that is particularly important to a region that has
experienced extraordinary success and financial instability over the
past generation: neither financial stability nor economic growth
cannot be achieved by standing still. It is only through a process of
constant vigilance and reform that continued success can be
assured. The IMF believes Asias ability to recover from financial
instability is down to policy frameworks that allow more flexible
exchange rates, and the promotion of financial stability through the
strengthening of bank capital. Southeast Asia has reportedly been a
bright spot with vigorous momentum in ASEAN countries as domestic
demand has helped to offset slower exports, in turn helping favourable
demographics and societies seeking higher standards of living. A threat to
stability But while emerging and developing economies within Asia
continue to provide the most important contribution to global
growth, Asias growth has slowed due to Chinas deceleration
towards six percent growth. China therefore poses a risk to Asias
growing stability, due to the countrys economic rebalancing and
global economic and financial conditions. Additionally, growth has
slowed due to world trade, weak commodity prices and tighter credit
conditions. Nevertheless, the IMF believes that Chinas corporate debt is
manageable. Initiatives to maintain Asias reputation on the global growth
scale include the financing of infrastructure development, deeper markets
and inclusive financing. According to the IMF, the region must go beyond
traditional banking practices for both consumers and corporations. The IMF
believes innovation is crucial; Asia needs to commit to expanding financial
services, thus giving everyone a stake in the economy, as well as launching
new macro and technological financing such as mobile banking.

No Impact IndoPak War

Build up doesnt put Indo-Pak on the brink
Smith 11 (Terrence P. Smith is a research intern with the South Asia Program at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies Feb 1, 2011Pakistan Joins
the Nuclear 100 Club http://csis.org/blog/pakistan-joins-nuclear-100-club)

In the eyes of the Pakistani military, India is the main adversary. Thus,
theoretically, India should have the most to fear from the strengthening of
Pakistani capabilities. However, Nitin Pai, editor of the Indian National Interest
Review, responded to the news by saying, We stopped counting after
Pakistan's first one." He continued, If Pakistan is stockpiling nukes, it's the
West that needs to be scared. India cannot be scared more than it has been
since 1985 (when Pakistan first weaponized)."

South Asian deterrence is robust It solves war; two

conflicts since 1998 prove.
Ganguly 08 [Sumit Ganguly is a professor of political science and holds the
Rabindranath Tagore Chair at Indiana University, Bloomington. International
Security Fall 2008]

nuclear deterrence is robust

in South Asia. Even though the 1999 crisis erupted into a war, its scope and
dimensions were carefully circumscribed
India chose not to
cross the Line of Control
and it avoided
horizontal escalation
a highly jingoistic regime
chose to
exercise restraint because of Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons. In
2001, despite grave Pakistani provocation
India could only
respond with a strategy of coercive diplomacy
nuclear
tests
lifted the veil of opacity that had long
characterized the two countries' nuclear weapons programs
An examination of the onset, evolution, and termination of the 1999 and 2001-02 crises between India and Pakistan suggests that

. Despite its conventional capabilities,

(the de facto international border in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir),

of the conflict. India's restraint cannot be attributed either to timely U.S. intervention or to a concern about avoiding a bellicose international image. Instead
, which had defied international public opinion the previous year through a series of nuclear tests,

through a series of terrorist attacks,

. On May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducted a series of five

. Pakistan followed with six tests of its own on May 30 and 31. 1 These tests effectively

. 2 The reactions of the global community, led by

the United States, were swift and condemnatory. Policymakers and analysts alike united in issuing harsh indictments of the tests. Their misgivings were twofold: first, they expressed grave concerns about the impact
of these tests on the global nonproliferation regime; second, they argued that the tests would further destabilize an already fraught security environment in South Asia. To induce both states to eschew their nuclear
weapons programs, the international community imposed a raft of bilateral and multilateral sanctions. Simultaneously, the United States embarked on a dialogue with India and Pakistan in an attempt to convince
them to dismantle their nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and to reduce Indo-Pakistani tensions. 3 Yet despite thirteen rounds of arduous talks, neither India nor Pakistan agreed to abandon its ongoing
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Worse still for nonproliferation advocates, two crises punctuated India-Pakistan relations, in 1999 and 2001-02. Indeed, the 1999 crisis erupted into a limited war. 4

A decade has passed since the two adversaries crossed the nuclear Rubicon

Accordingly, it may be a propitious moment to take stock of the security environment in the region, especially because South Asia has witnessed much political turbulence since then--including a military coup in
Pakistan in October 1999. 5 Moreover, since the dramatic terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the region, and in particular Pakistan and Afghanistan, has become a major focus of U.S.

Is South Asia the "most dangerous place on earth

Or has the overt nuclearization of the region dramatically reduced the
possibilities of full-scale war?
foreign and security policy concerns. 6

," as President Bill Clinton once

characterized it? 7

The preponderance of scholarship on the subject suggests that the likelihood of full-scale war with the possibility of escalation to the

nuclear level has become significantly higher in the region since the nuclear tests of May 1998. 8 A smaller corpus of scholarship holds that the overt presence of nuclear weapons has contributed to strategic

nuclear weapons have reduced the risk

of full-scale war in the region and have therefore contributed to strategic
stability
nuclear deterrence in South
Asia should remain robust
stability in the region. 9 In this article I argue that, contrary to the views of the proliferation pessimists,

. I also contend that, barring India's acquisition and deployment of viable antiballistic missile capabilities,
. 10

No Impact Economy
Economic collapse doesnt cause war
Drezner, Tufts IR professor, 2014
(Daniel, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great
Recession, World Poltiics, 66.1, January, proquest)

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect
of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial
stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would
lead states to increase their use of forc e as a tool for staying in power.42
They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead
to an increase in conflictwhether through greater internal repression,
diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict.
Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even
the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in
global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however.
The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level
of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43
Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial
crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies
confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent
conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is
one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44
The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has
not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date
generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that
might have been expected."43

Economic collapse doesnt cause war

Bazzi et al., UCSD economics department, 2011
(Samuel, Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from
Commodity Prices, November,
http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAnd
Conflict.pdf?9d7bd4)
VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The state is not a prize?
Warlord politics and the state prize logic lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and

we see no evidence for this idea in

economic shocks, even when looking at the friendliest cases: fragile and
unconstrained states dominated by extractive commodity revenues. Indeed,
we see the opposite correlation: if anything, higher rents from commodity
prices weakly 22 lower the risk and length of conflict. Perhaps shocks are the
political transitions in economics and political science. Yet

wrong test. Stocks of resources could matter more than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined
with emerging evidence that war onset is no more likely even with rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys
2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard the state prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political economy models
may need a new engine. Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict
onset and ending results include sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly
influential in income and should provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is difficult to find a better-

Moreover, other
time-varying variables, like rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations with
conflict in spite of suffering similar empirical drawbacks and generally smaller
sample sizes (Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus we take the absence of evidence
seriously. Do resource revenues drive state capacity?State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the
measured, more abundant, and plausibly exogenous independent variable than price volatility.

value of the capturing the state, but have ignored or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a
growing empirical political science literature takes just such a revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom
times permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring political order and
stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current revenues are affected while long term
value is not. Our findings are partly consistent with this state capacity effect. For example, conflict intensity is most
sensitive to changes in the extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect household
incomes more directly. The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a
large, consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state
prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend to cancel one another out. Opportunity cost: Victory by default?
Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not
exclusively so. As we noted above, the relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent
with the state capacity view. Moreover, we shouldnt mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and
incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same correlation is consistent with psychological theories
of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories of relative deprivation and anomie
(Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed to distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons
for a null result.Ultimately, however, the fact that commodity

price shocks have no

discernible effect on new conflict onsets, but some effect on ongoing conflict, suggests that
political stability might be less sensitive to income or temporary shocks
than generally believed. One possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes
with considerable risk, costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that the counterfactual is still conflict

If a nation is so
fragile that a change in prices could lead to war, then other shocks
may trigger war even in the absence of a price shock. The same argument has
onset. In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous.

been made in debunking the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing nations in the

these findings should heighten our

concern with publication bias in the conflict literature. Our results run against
a number of published results on commodity shocks and conflict, mainly because
of select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions,
and, most importantly, alternative measures of instability . Across the social and hard
1980s.19 B. A general problem of publication bias? More generally,

sciences, there is a concern that the majority of published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis

a published finding is less likely to be true when there is a

greater number and lesser pre-selection of tested relationships; there is
greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models; and when
more teams are involved in the chase of statistical significance. The crossnational study of conflict is an extreme case of all these . Most worryingly, almost no
paper looks at alternative dependent variables or publishes systematic
robustness checks. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of published conflict results are
(2005) demonstrates that

fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant regressors and not the time-varying shocks that have grown in popularity. We
are also concerned there is a file drawer problem (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule: scholars that discover
robust results that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees) worry
about problems with the data or empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If further analysis produces a

the consequences are dire: a

lower threshold of evidence for initially significant results than ambiguous
ones.20
robust result, it is published. If not, back to the file drawer. In the aggregate,