Oxygen Valves Flex Hose Failures

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Gas Industries Association
Oxygen valves & Flex hose failures in

Oxygen-Service & practices for prevention
Femin Benedict
Praxair India Pvt. Limited
Oxygen Safety Seminar 2013
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Introduction
Agenda
EIGA IGC Doc 42/04/E Design Spec.

PTFE-lined flexible hose failure modes
Oxygen hose flashes and issues
associated with oxygen service
Actions taken
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EIGA IGC Doc 42/04/E Design Spec.

PTFE-lined flexible hose failure modes
Oxygen hose flashes and issues associated with oxygen service
Actions taken
Covers flexible connections to transmit compressed gas in range of 40C to 65C
Provides guidance on design and material constraints
Failure mode information
Design specification and manufacturing control requirements
Material compatibility and cleanliness aspects
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PTFE Lined Flex Hose for O2 Service

Design/Material Requirements for O2 Flex Hose:
Virgin PTFE liner
Stainless steel braiding
End fitting material compatible with service gas
Swage or crimped connections required
Cleanliness complies with IGC Doc 33/06
Cleaning of Equipment for O2 ServiceGuidelines (100-500mg/m2).
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PTFE Lined Flexible Hose
Figure Reference: IGC Document 42/04/E

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Flex Hose Failure Modes
Fatigue of stainless steel braiding/connector

components
Mechanical/pressure overload
In-service abuse
Liner abrasion wear against the braiding
Environmentally assisted cracking of fittings
Manufacturing defects
Oxygen ignition event
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Environmentally Assisted Cracking

Chloride induced stress corrosion cracking
of a martenstic stainless steel crimp collar
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Fatigue
Failure of the stainless steel braiding
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Mechanical Overload and Abuse

Hose rupture at the crimp joint and kinking
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PTFE Lined Hose Failure-SS Braid Wear
5 years in service. Ruptured on opening

cylinder, 207 Bar. (He application)
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PTFE Lined Oxygen Hose Flash
PTFE
is ignitable/combustible in oxygen
under elevated pressure conditions
Events
can occur when venting, filling, and
sampling cylinders
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PTFE Liner Ignition- Causes And Contributing

Factors
Adiabatic Compression
Particle Impingement
Liner Breach (abrasion, creep, mechanical
overload, particles) High velocity gas
leak PTFE ignition Steel braid ignition
Cleanliness; Hydrocarbon Contamination
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Oxygen Hose Flash 1

Flash occurred during process of diverting
oxygen from filled cylinder at 200 bar to the
sample line (off manifold) for analysis.
Immediate flash on opening cylinder valve.
Hose flash/rupture occurred adjacent to the
connection to the lower pressure manifold
side.
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Oxygen Hose Flash 1

Event caused by adiabatic compression and/or
contamination/particle induced ignition
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Vendor Design Change

PTFE wall thickness for a 250 bar rated hose
changed from 1 mm to 2 mm
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Oxygen Hose Flash 2
Reported the incident occurred under

static conditions 220 Bar
Evidence of both mechanical overload

and PTFE liner/SS braid ignition
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Oxygen Hose Flash 2
220 bar Oxygen

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Oxygen Hose Flash 2-Boroscope Views
Video boroscope images of PTFE liner surface condition, post incident.

Heavy residue found on liner surface near the manifold connector.
Image on right is typical appearance of the entire length of PTFE liner
from manifold connector to burn zone.
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Oxygen Hose Flash-Key Causal Factors

Cleanliness, Particulate Matter
PTFE Liner Abrasion
Liner Thickness
Mechanical Stress/Overload
Adiabatic Compressive Heating
Abuse, External Braid Wear
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Global Actions
Hose failures centrally reported and investigated
Recertification of hose suppliers
Purchasing procedures requiring notification of
design changes
Replacement policy implemented
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Supplier Qualification Testing

Physical fit and finish test
Hose bend around 7.6cm aperture
No kinks or other visual defects
Drop Test
Using T-cylinder with hose at MAWP
Burst pressure exceeds 4X MAWP
Oxygen Cleaning Inspection
Cleaning process conforms to EIGA guidelines
Contamination level must be 100-500 mg/m2
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Supplier Qualification Testing

Burst Test
Exceeds 4X MAWP
Cycle Test
25,000 cycles @ MAWP
Burst Test exceeds 4X MAWP
Chemistry Test
Liner material confirmed as virgin PTFE
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Summary
Validate suppliers to EIGA IGC Doc 42/04/E
requirements
Minimize particle impact and adiabatic
compression ignition mechanisms
Maintain component and system cleanliness
per IGC Doc 33/06 requirements
Define and implement replacement policies
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Oxygen Cylinder Valve

Fires
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Introduction
Agenda
Oxygen Manifold Valve Fire
Oxygen Cylinder Valve Fire (2 events)
Incident Overviews, analysis/Observations,
Conclusions and Recommendations
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Oxygen Manifold Valve Fire

Flash occurred on closing manifold valve
following cylinder filling operation
Pressure = 152 Bar
Valve in service for 6 years, refurbished 10
months prior to incident
Valve was reported to be leaking through stem
area on closure, just prior to flash
Viton seal consumed, 316SS stem burn/melt
damage
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Incident Oxygen Manifold Valve
Sample 2 Swab
Area for FTIR
Burnt Area
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Post Incident Valve Stem Damage
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Conclusions and Ignition Scenario

o Post incident stem analysis shows hydrocarbon contamination in stem
area (750mg/m2)
o Valve leaking through stem area on closure
o Ignition Mechanisms:
LeakHigh Velocity GasFlow Friction (Heat)
Mechanical friction on closing (Heat)
o Stem alloy (316SS) for this pressure (152 Bar)
o Kindling chain: Hydrocarbon contamination Viton fibers/particles
316SS combustion
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Recommendations
Review vendor cleaning procedure; audit vendor
Remove valves with 316SS stems from O2 service
Review materials of construction and ensure all alloys
are compatible for high pressure oxygen applications
Change stem material to Monel 400 or equivalent
Consider seal design change from Viton to PTFE,
Kalrez, or Graphite. Monitor seal leakage frequency.
Ensure no hydrocarbon containing compounds enter
valve stem area (LDFs, spray lubricants)
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Oxygen Cylinder Valve Fires

1. Energy release during the final phase of a routine
oxygen filling process- Europe, 2005
Occurred during closing of the cylinder valve
Involved European manufactured valve and
316SS quick connector assembly
Major combustion of the 316SS quick connector
Minor burn injury to operator
2. Similar event, same location and valve type, later the
same year
No combustion of a Brass/Monel quick connector
No injury
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First O2 Cylinder Valve Fire

Service pressure 207 Bar. Fire on closure.Valve seat
and EPDM O-ring consumed. Partial combustion of
316SS quick connector.
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First O2 Cylinder Valve Fire

Incident valve disassembled and examined
Seat completely combusted and extensive melt
damage to brass seat retainer
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Valve Inspection at Plant

97 out of service valve seats (same manufacturer) inspected at
the plant; 70% showed signs of oxidation, 30% cracks in brass
retainer, 5% burn/melt appearance
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Valve Seat Material Analysis

Seat material not identifiable.
Presumed to be a mixture of materials
Not any of following common seat materials
Nylon
Polychlorotrifluoroethylene (PCTFE)
Filled polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE)
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Valve Seat Material Analysis

Seat material was confirmed by the valve manufacturer
to be a mixture of compounds-O2 compatibility concern:
Rubber
Sulfur
Linseed oil
Carbon and Chalk filler
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Second O2 Cylinder Valve Fire

Same European Valve Manufacturer
Same Circumstances as Previous Fire
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Second O2 Cylinder Valve Fire

Post incident brass seat retainer shows complete
combustion of non-metallic seat and multiple
crack formation
Suspect stress corrosion cracking (SCC) due to
sulfur component in valve seat material
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Failure Mode & Ignition Scenario

SCC Primary seat retainer fracture
Force on closing applied during valve
closure Secondary cracks
Degraded valve and cracked retainer Leak
Ignition of flammable seat material occurs
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Conclusions
316 SS is not an acceptable material for
quick connectors in this application
Valve seat material undergoes oxidative
degradation over time. Hydrocarbon oils can
leach out creating an ignition prone surface.
Sulfur component can induce SCC of brass
seat retainer
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Conclusions
Degraded seat along with weakened
cracked retainer results in high velocity O2
leak on valve closure
Flow friction and/or particle impact are
likely ignition mechanisms
Seat is flammable and if ignited can
promote ignition of ancillary equipment
such as connectors and hoses
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Actions and Recommendations

Switch from 316SS connectors to Brass/Monel
Withdraw current European manufacturer valve
design from O2 service (2005-2006)
Replace incident O2 valve types with different
valve design using seat materials approved for
O2 applications
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Actions and Recommendations

EIGA Safety Alert SA-06 Rev 1 issued August, 2006
(Informing European Industrial Gas Community)
Progressively remove all valves from oxygen
and
oxidizing
service
which
were
manufactured before 8/2005 design change
Up to individual companies to program the
valve withdrawal in a timely fashion
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References
EIGA Info 21/08 Cylinder Valves-Design
Considerations
CGA V-9 Standard for Compressed Gas
Cylinder Valves
CGA P-1 Safe Handling of Compressed
Gases in Containers
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Original presentation by
Joseph Million (Praxair Inc., USA)
at EIGA Workshop 2012
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THANK YOU!
Questions ?
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Oxygen Valves Flex Hose Failures

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