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Milagros Hosana, wife of Jose Hosana, sold a
conjugal property to Tomas Tan, as evidenced by a
deed of sale executed by Milagros herself and as
attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special Power
of Attorney executed by Jose in her favor.
The SPA was forged and the conjugal property
was sold without the consent of Jose.
Jose then filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register
of Deeds.
Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good
faith and for value and filed a cross-claim against
Milagros. RTC declared Milagros in default for her
failure to file her answer to Jose's complaint and
Tomas' cross-claim. Tomas claimed that he had paid
P700,000 while he noticed that the consideration
written by Milagros on the Deed of Sale was only
consideration paid. Milagros explained that it was
done to save on taxes.
RTC ruled in favor of Tomas and that the deed of
sale and the SPA were void.
Tomas appealed to CA. CA affirmed ruling on void
deed of sale and SPA. Modified RTC ruling directing
Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase
price of P200,000.00, with interest, under the
principle of unjust enrichment. Despite Tomas'
allegation that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject

lot, the CA found that there was no convincing

evidence that established this claim.
Tomas filed petition for review on certiorari to
challenge the CA ruling which ordered the
reimbursement of P200,000.00 only, instead of the
actual purchase price he paid in the amount of
Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the
deed of sale, including the consideration stated,
cannot be used as evidence since it was declared null
and void; second, the deed of sale was not
specifically offered to prove the actual consideration
of the sale; third, his testimony establishing the
actual purchase price of P700,000.00 paid was
uncontroverted; and, fourth, Jose must return the full
amount actually paid under the principle of solutio
ISSUE: (1) whether the deed of sale can be used as the
basis for the amount of consideration paid despite being a
void contract
(2) whether the testimony of Tomas is sufficient to
establish the actual purchase price of the sale.
YES. It is basic that if a void contract has
already "been performed, the restoration of what has
been given is in order." This principle springs from
Article 22 of the New Civil Code which states that
"every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same."
Hence, the restitution of what each party has given is
a consequence of a void and inexistent contract.

While the terms and provisions of a void contract

cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it
does not preclude the admissibility of the contract as
evidence to prove matters that occurred in the course
of executing the contract,
The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be
used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of the
consideration stated and its actual payment. The
purpose of introducing the deed of sale as evidence is
not to enforce the terms written in the contract, which
is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract.
The deed of sale, rather, is used as a means to
determine matters that occurred in the execution of
such contract, i.e., the determination of what each
party has given under the void contract to allow
restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue
and is not excluded by the law of these rules. There
is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which
excludes the admissibility of a void document. The
Rules only require that the evidence is relevant and
not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility
NO. The consideration stated in the notarized
Deed of Sale is prima facie evidence of the amount
paid by the petitioner.
The consideration stated in the deed of sale
constitutes prima facie evidence of the amount paid
by Tomas for the transfer of the property to his name.
Tomas failed to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut
or contradict the consideration stated as the actual
consideration and amount paid to Milagros and Jose.
The deed of sale was declared null and void by a
positive provision of law requiring the consent of both
spouses for the sale of conjugal property. There is,
however, no question on the presence of the
consideration of the sale, except with respect to the
actual amount paid. While the deed of sale has no

force and effect as a contract, it remains prima facie

evidence of the actual consideration paid.
As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his
claim that he paid to Milagros the amount of
P700,000.00, instead of the amount of P200,000.00
stated in the deed of sale. No documentary or
testimonial evidence to prove payment of the higher
amount was presented, apart from Tomas' sole
testimony. Tomas' sole testimony of payment is selfserving and insufficient to unequivocally prove that
Milagros received P700,000.00 for the subject
Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale
remains sufficient evidence of the actual amount the
petitioner paid and the same amount which should be
returned under the principle of unjust enrichment.
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Norberto
Mendoza on the ground of for Grossly Immoral
Conduct and Gross Misconduct.
Petitioners Laygo and Melgar (co-petitioners of
Tolentino) submitted their affidavits as their direct
testimony and were subjected to cross-examination
by respondent's counsel. The affidavits declared that
Mendoza is known as a practicing lawyer and a former
Municipal Trial Court Judge. Respondent has been
cohabiting with Marilyn dela Fuente, representing
themselves to be husband and wife, and from their
cohabitation, they produced two children. Melgar also
received a letter from a concerned citizen, informing
him that respondent was married to a Felicitas
Valderia but respondent abandoned his wife to
cohabit with Marilyn dela Fuente. Attached to the
letter was a photocopy of a Certification issued by the
Civil Register attesting to the marriage between

respondent and Felicitas Valderia. He also received

information that Marilyn dela Fuente is also legally
married to one Ramon G. Marcos, as evidenced by a
Certification from the Office of the Civil Register.
Respondent stated in his Certificate of Candidacy filed
with the COMELEC that he is still legally married to
Felicitas Valderia. Respondent has represented to all
that he is married to Marilyn dela Fuente. In
the Naujanews, a local newspaper where respondent
holds the position of Chairman of the Board of the
Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by said
newspaper as husband to Marilyn dela Fuente and the
father of the 2 children with her.
The witnesses also presented as evidence the
birth certificates of the two children and positively
identified Mendoza to be the father.
Mendoza averred that such evidence are
inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in
violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, which
provides as follows:
Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records.
(1) The records of a person's birth shall be kept
and no information
thereto shall be issued except on the request of any
of the following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person
authorized by him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever
absolutely necessary in administrative, judicial or
other official proceedings to determine the identity of
surrounding his birth; and
c. in case of the person's death, the nearest of kin.
(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of at least two months or
a fine in an amount not exceeding five hundred

pesos, or both in the discretion of the court. (Article

7, P.D. 603)
W/N the evidence birth certificates were
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides that "evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or
these rules." There could be no dispute that the
subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The
only question, therefore, is whether the law or the
rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth
certificates allegedly for having been obtained in
violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons
violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records,
but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth
records in violation of said rule would render said
records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand,
the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the
exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of
illegal searches and seizures. It should be
emphasized, however, that said rule against
unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to
protect a person from interference by the government
or the state
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not
provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth
certificates in question, said public documents are,
therefore, admissible and should be properly taken
into consideration in the resolution of this
administrative case against respondent.

Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara

Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and
respondent's Certificate of Candidacy dated March 9,
1995 wherein respondent himself declared he was
married to Felicitas Valderia, were never denied nor
rebutted by respondent. Hence, said public
documents sufficiently prove that he fathered two
children by Marilyn dela Fuente despite the fact that
he was still legally married to Felicitas Valderia at that



FACTS: Virgilio Rio collapsed while working at the

South Harbor, Manila. He was rushed to the Philippine
General Hospital because of "melena, fever, chills and
abdominal pains 8 days prior to confinement" He died
three days later. According to the Medical Certificate,
the cause of death was "uremia [secondary] to
chronic renal failure. Chronic glomerulonephritis"
Petitioner Beberisa Rio, his spouse, filed a claim for
death benefits before the SSS. However, the SSS
denied the claim in this wise:
"The cause of death of your husband cannot be
considered work-connected because based on the
clinical abstract you submitted, your husband had
already on and off attack of edema and hypertension
which are signs of kidney disease even before his
employment with the company.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner met the substantial
evidence requirement for her claim?

The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Rio's

death are not listed as occupational diseases. Hence,
evidence, or such relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion, showing that the nature of her
husbands employment or working conditions
increased the risk of uremia, chronic renal failure or
chronic glomerulonephritis. This the petitioner failed
to do.
Petitioner did not adduce any proof of a reasonable
connection between the work of the deceased and the
cause of his death. There was no showing that the
progression of the disease was brought about largely
by the conditions in Virgilio's job. Indeed, petitioner
presented no medical history, records or physicians
report in order to substantiate her claim that the
working conditions at the Port Area increased the risk
his disease.
a claimant must submit such proof as would
constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either
that the conditions of employment of the claimant
caused the ailment or that such working conditions
had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment.
What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute
an adequate basis for a reasonable man (not
necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the
other conclusion, can obviously be determined only
on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must,
however, be real and substantial, and not merely
apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or
work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real . . .
not merely apparent

FACTS: Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO)

members Ben Lumboy and William Capili informed
PO3 Edwin Birung, that they sighted two (2) former
CAFGU agents at nearby Barangay. Acting on the
information, PO3 Birung formed a team to track down
the two former CAFGUs.
Composed of PO3 Birung, Lumboy, Capili, the team
proceeded to the Barangay. Suddenly, an exchange of
gunfire ensued. PO3 Birung ordered his men to rescue
Lumboy and Capili. Capili was still alive and was
rushed to the Hospital for treatment. Unfortunately,
Lumboy was already dead. The following day, a
civilian informer named Palos informed PO3 Birung
that the two former CAFGUs the CVOs sighted were
Bernardino Caranguian and Victoriano Garcia, herein
appellant and co-accused.
After preliminary investigation, both Caranguian and
Garcia were charged with the crime of murder, for the
killing of Lumboy and with frustrated murder, for the
wounding of Capili. Appellant was acquitted of
frustrated murder but convicted of murder. Only the
murder case is now before us.
ISSUE: The crucial issue in this appeal pertains to the
sufficiency of evidence to convict appellant. More
particularly, we have to inquire whether there has
been sufficient identification of the appellant as the
perpetrator of the offense
RULING: The quantum of evidence required in
doubt. Section 2 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[p]roof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof

which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind."

The task of the prosecution is two-fold: first, to prove
that a crime was committed, and second, that
accused is the person responsible. Thus, the
prosecution must be able to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence beyond
reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the
In the case before us, the prosecution presented proof
that Lumboy was killed during the shooting incident.
However, we find that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that it was appellant who
perpetrated the killing.
The testimony given by the witness was a mere
hearsay since he was not able to see the shooting
himself but was only known by him from a statement
of a person who also did not actually and positively
witness the accused shoot the victim but only heard it
from others within the area.
While it is accepted that the testimony of a sole
eyewitness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to
sustain a judgment of conviction, it bears stressing
that such testimony must be clear, positive, and
credible. Hence, an identification of the appellant as
the gunman based on hearsay does not suffice for
FACTS: On 10 December, a confidential informant
went to the office of the PDEA SEU in and reported
that appellant was selling shabu. Upon receipt of said
information, a briefing on a buy-bust operation
against appellant was conducted. After the briefing,
the team, together with the confidential informant,
proceeded to Poblacion Dike for the execution of the
buy-bust operation.

When the team arrived at appellant's place, they saw

the appellant standing alone in front of the gate. The
informant and PO1 Tolentino approached appellant.
The informant introduced PO1 Tolentino to appellant
as his friend. PO1 Tolentino gave appellant P300.00
consisting of three marked P100 bills. The bills were
marked with "GT JR", PO1 Tolentino's initials. Upon
receiving the P300.00, appellant took out a plastic
sachet from his pocket and handed it over to PO1
Tolentino. As a pre-arranged signal, PO1 Tolentino lit a
cigarette signifying that the sale had been
consummated. PO1 Barreras arrived, arrested
appellant and recovered from the latter the marked
He claims that pictures of him together with the
immediately upon his arrest as shown by the
testimony of the lone prosecution witness. He adds
that PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Antonio Barreras, the
police officers who had initial custody of the drug
allegedly seized and confiscated, did not conduct a
physical inventory of the same in his presence as
shown by their joint affidavit of arrest. Their failure to
abide by said section casts doubt on both his arrest
and the admissibility of the evidence adduced against
(nagsabi din si appellant ng version niya ng ngyari
pero puro testimony lng ng asawa and pamangkin
niya tpos wlng ibang evidence)
ISSUE: w/n violation of section 21 of RA 9165 makes
the evidence inadmissible

RULING: In People v. Pringas, we explained that noncompliance with Section 21 will not render an
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case at bar,
appellant never questioned the custody and
disposition of the drug that was taken from him. We
would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21
of said law, particularly the making of the inventory
and the photographing of the drugs confiscated
and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible
in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules
of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to
the issue and is not excluded by the law or these
rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should
be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is
no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted
subject only to the evidentiary weight that will
accorded it by the courts.
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that
appellant was the subject of a buy-bust operation.
Having been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity
as seller of the shabu can no longer be doubted.
Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, appellant's plain denial of the offenses
charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and
convincing evidence, must simply fail. Frame-up, like
alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court,
because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.
Moreover, it is a common and standard line of
defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. For this claim to prosper, the defense must
adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome

the presumption that government officials have

performed their duties in a regular and proper
manner. This, appellant failed to do. The presumption
remained unrebutted because the defense failed to
present clear and convincing evidence that the police
officers did not properly perform their duty or that
they were inspired by an improper motive.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal
sale of drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of evidence of corpus
Facts: BSP through its representative, Ricardo
Bangayan filed a case of qualified theft against Sally
Go (bangayans wife), who was hired as the
corporations cashier and was engaged, among
others, to receive and account for the payments
made by the various customers of the company.
alleging that several checks representing the
aggregate amount of P1,534,135.50 issued by the
companys customers in payment of their obligation
were, instead of being turned over to the companys
coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited the
same to her personal banking account maintained at
Security Bank.
The prosecution moved for the issuance of
subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum against the
respective managers or records custodians of Security
Banks, as well as of the Asian Savings Bank (now

For her part, respondent claimed that the money

represented by the Security Bank account was neither
relevant nor material to the case, because nothing in
the criminal information suggested that the money
therein deposited was the subject matter of the
case. She invited particular attention to that portion
of the criminal Information which averred that she has
stolen and carried away cash money in the total
amount of P1,534,135.50. She advanced the notion
that the term cash money stated in the Information
was not synonymous with the checks she was
purported to have stolen from petitioner and
deposited in her personal banking account. Thus, the
checks which the prosecution had Marasigan identify,
as well as the testimony itself of Marasigan, should be
suppressed by the trial court at least for violating
respondents right to due process. More in point,
respondent opined that admitting the testimony of
Marasigan, as well as the evidence pertaining to the
Security Bank account, would violate the secrecy rule
under R.A. No. 1405
Issue: w/n the evidence is admissible
Ruling: We derive from the conflicting advocacies of
the parties that the issue for resolution is whether the
testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying
documents are irrelevant to the case, and whether
they are also violative of the absolutely confidential
nature of bank deposits and, hence, excluded by
operation of R.A. No. 1405. The question of
admissibility of the evidence thus comes to the
fore. And the Court, after deliberative estimation,
whether these pieces of evidence sought to be
suppressed in this case the testimony of Marasigan,
as well as the checks purported to have been stolen

and deposited in respondents Security Bank account

are relevant, is to be addressed by considering
whether they have such direct relation to the fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence; or whether they relate collaterally to a fact
from which, by process of logic, an inference may be
made as to the existence or non-existence of the fact
in issue.
Moreover, that there is no difference between cash
and check is true in other instances. In estafa by
conversion, for instance, whether the thing converted
is cash or check, is immaterial in relation to the
formal allegation in an information for that offense; a
check, after all, while not regarded as legal tender, is
normally accepted under commercial usage as a
substitute for cash, and the credit it represents in
stated monetary value is properly capable of
appropriation. And it is in this respect that what the
offender does with the check subsequent to the act of
unlawfully taking it becomes material inasmuch as
this offense is a continuing one. In other words, in
pursuing a case for this offense, the prosecution may
establish its cause by the presentation of the checks
involved. These checks would then constitute the best
evidence to establish their contents and to prove the
elemental act of conversion in support of the
proposition that the offender has indeed indorsed the
same in his own name.
Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our
purposes, as the Information in this case accuses
respondent of having stolen cash, proof tending to
establish that respondent has actualized her criminal
intent by indorsing the checks and depositing the
proceeds thereof in her personal account, becomes
not only irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that
score, inadmissible in evidence.

In taking exclusion from the coverage of the

confidentiality rule, petitioner in the instant case
posits that the account maintained by respondent
with Security Bank contains the proceeds of the
checks that she has fraudulently appropriated to
herself and, thus, falls under one of the exceptions in
Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 that the money kept in
said account is the subject matter in litigation.
in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, in
which the Court noted that the inquiry into bank
deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be
premised on the fact that the money deposited in the
account is itself the subject of the action. Given this
perspective, we deduce that the subject matter of the
action in the case at bar is to be determined from the
indictment that charges respondent with the offense,
and not from the evidence sought by the prosecution
to be admitted into the records. In the criminal
Information filed with the trial court, respondent,
unqualifiedly and in plain language, is charged with
qualified theft by abusing petitioners trust and
confidence and stealing cash in the amount
of P1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no
factual allegation that in some material way involves
the checks subject of the testimonial and
documentary evidence sought to be suppressed.
Neither do the allegations in said Information make
mention of the supposed bank account in which the
funds represented by the checks have allegedly been
Facts: Accused-appellant Joeral Galleno was charged
and convicted with the crime of rape of a 5-year old
child. He seeks reversal of the judgment of the
trial court alleging that he was deprived of a fair and

impartial trial since the judge discounted the accused

testimony and actively participated in the cross
examination of the accused-appellant.
Accused- appellant testified his version of what
happened, that while seated at the balcony, accusedappellant was approached by Evelyn, who knew him. He
cajoled her by throwing her up and down, his right hand
holding the child and his left hand covering her vagina. Upon
lifting up the child the first time, his left ring finger was
accidentally inserted into the vagina of child since his
fingernail was long and the child was not wearing any
underwear. Consequently, Evelyn began to cry because her
vagina started to bleed. Upon seeing this, he immediately
went down the house and got some bark or leaves of madre
de cacao tree and applied the sap on the child's wound. The
bleeding ceased and Evelyn stopped crying. Thereafter,
accused-appellant went home.
Issue: w/n accused-appellants testimony was
Ruling: The contention of accused Joeral Galleno
raises serious doubts to his credibility. He failed to
explain how his ring finger accidentally came in
contact with the genitalia of Evelyn, while it was
established by the prosecution that at that time
Evelyn was wearing shorts. Even assuming "ex gratia
argumente" that Evelyn was pantyless, how could it
be possible for his finger to penetrate to the vagina
for about one-fourth of an inch when she was in
shorts. The Supreme Court, in People vs. Fulgencio
Baquiran, (held that) evidence, to be believed must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself. Human
perception can be warped by the impact of events
and testimony colored by the unconscious workings of
the mind. No better test has yet been found to

measure the value of a witness' testimony than its

conformity to the knowledge and common experience
of mankind.
Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that
"(e)vidence must have such a relation to the fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or norexistence." This simply means that relevancy is
determinable by the rules of logic and human
experience. There is no precise and universal test of
relevancy provided by law. However, the
determination of whether particular evidence is
relevant rests largely at the discretion of the court,
which must be exercised according to the teachings of
logic and everyday experience.
Facts: De jesus filed cases against atty. Sanhez-malit
for malpractice, among others, for notarizing false
documents. Respondent filed her first Motion for
Reconsideration and
Reconsideration.She maintained that the additional
inadmissible, as they were obtained without
observing the procedural requisites under Section 4,
Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice).
Issue: w/n the evidence is admissible
Respondent argues that the additional documents
submitted in evidence by complainant are
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of
Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. A comparable argument was raised

in Tolentino v. Mendoza, in which the respondent

therein opposed the admission of the birth certificates
of his illegitimate children as evidence of his grossly
immoral conduct, because those documents were
obtained in violation Rule 24, Administrative Order
No. 1, Series of 1993.Rejecting his argument, the
Court reasoned as follows:
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides that evidence is admissible when
it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the
law or these rules. There could be no dispute that
the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue.
The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the
rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth
certificates allegedly for having been obtained in
violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons
violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records,
but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth
records in violation of said rule would render said
records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand,
the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the
exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of
illegal searches and seizures. It should be
emphasized, however, that said rule against
unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to
protect a person from interference by the government
or the state.
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no
provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents
obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly
considered in evidence the other notarized

documents submitted by complainant as additional

Facts: Accused was convicted of rape with homicide
of an 18 yr old child where he pleaded guilty.
According to the Supreme Court, the trial court failed
to mention and explain clearly to the appellant the
elements of the crime of rape with homicide as
charged in the information. As a result the appellant
was not properly accorded his fundamental right to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation
against him, which is an integral part of the due
process clause under the Constitution. Also the trial
court considered pieces of evidence that were
inadmissible in evidence for being proverbial "fruit of
a poisonous tree." Ultimately, the conviction of the
appellant for the crime charged rested primarily on
his plea of guilty that appeared to be improvidently
made. The decision of the trial court was annulled and
set aside by the Supreme Court and the case was
remanded to the court of origin for proper
arraignment and trial.
Issue: w/n the evidence is admissible
Ruling: The trial court lamentably considered pieces
of evidence that are inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." The
facts show that the appellant Roberto Samontaez
was actually arrested by police authorities at his
workplace. It does not appear from the record that the
appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights
during the police custodial investigation which are
enshrined in Article III, Section 12(1) of the 1987

Constitution. It also does not appear that he was

assisted by counsel during the said custodial
investigation. In the absence of a valid waiver, any
confession obtained from the appellant during the
police custodial investigation relative to the crime,
including any other evidence secured by virtue of the
said confession is inadmissible in evidence even if the
same was not objected to during the trial by the
counsel of the appellant. Thus, the personal
belongings of the victim that were recovered and
found inside the bag of the appellant when the police
authorities returned to the appellant's place of work
after they illegally obtained a confession from the
appellant. In the case of People vs. Alicando, the

Court had opportunity to reiterate the rule that

evidence gathered by virtue of an illegally obtained
confession is inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally
seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the
illegal act, whereas the " fruit of the poisonous tree" is
the indirect result of the same illegal act. The " fruit of
the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the
illegally seized evidence, but it is equally
inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that
evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be
used to gain other evidence because the originally
illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained.