DEPRA V.

DUMLAO 136 SCRA 475

The properties of Francisco Depra and Agustin Dumlao were adjoining each other. In 1972, Dumlao
built his house however, he unwittingly built the kitchen portion of his house on Depras land. Depra
then sued Dumlao for unlawful detainer. During pre-trial, the parties agreed that Dumlao was a builder
in good faith.
Eventually, the trial court ruled that both parties were in good faith but then a forced lease was ordered
whereby Dumlao retains the kitchen but he shall pay a rental to Depra at P5.00 per month. But Depra
refused to receive the rental payments from Dumlao, instead, Depra filed an action for quieting of title
against Dumlao. In his defense, Dumlao raised the defense of res judicata considering that the nature
and purpose of the initial unlawful detainer case and that of the subsequent quieting of title case is
ejectment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the order of forced lease decreed in the unlawful detainer case is valid.
2. Whether or not the subsequent case of res judicata is barred by prescription due to the prior case of
unlawful detainer.

HELD:
1. No. The judgment of forced lease is improper. A forced lease, just like co-ownership is not favored. It
should be considered that the parties themselves stipulated that Dumlao, the builder, was in good faith
and it was later found that Depra, the owner, was also in good faith. Hence, what applies is the
provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code, which provides in sum that:
a. Builder in good faith entitled to retain the possession of the land on which he built in good faith until
he is paid the value of the building he built in good faith;
b. Owner in good faith has the option to either (i) pay for the building OR (ii) sell his land to the builder
in good faith but builder cannot be forced to buy said land if the same is considerably more than the
value of the building.
Forced rent only comes in if the owner exercises his right to sell the land but the builder rejects it by
reason of the price thereof being considerably more than the value of the building in such case, the
parties shall agree to the terms of the lease, if they cant agree then they may bring the issue to court.
2. No. The action for quieting of title is not barred by reason of res judicata. The cause of action in the
unlawful detainer case involves possession while the cause of action in the quieting of title case
involves ownership. Furthermore, the Rules of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer case
shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land.

SPOUSES DEL CAMPO V. ABESIA 160 SCRA 379

Facts:
This case involves a parcel of land, situated at the corner of F. Flores and Cavan Streets, Cebu City. An
action for partition was filed by plaintiffs in the CFI of Cebu. Plaintiffs and defendants are co-owners pro
indiviso of this lot in the proportion of and 1/3 share each, respectively. The trial court appointed a
commissioner in accordance with the agreement of the parties. ,the Id commissioner conducted a
survey, prepared a sketch plan and submitted a report to the trial court on May 29, 1976,
recommending that the property be divided into two lots: Lot 1161-A with an area of 30 square meters
for plaintiffs and Lot No. 1161-B with an area of 15 square meters for the defendants. The houses of
plaintiffs and defendants were surveyed and shown on the sketch plan. The house of defendants
occupied the portion with an area of 5 square meters of Lot 1161-A of plaintiffs. The parties manifested
their conformity to the report and asked the trial court to finally settle and adjudicate who among the
parties should take possession of the 5 square meters of the land in question.
Issue: Whether or Not Article 448 of the Civil Code is applicable to a builder in good faith when the
property involved is owned in common.
Held: When the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of defendants
overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the
defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should
apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even
when there was co-ownership if good faith has been established.

Applying the aforesaid provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs have the right to appropriate said
portion of the house of defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as provided for in Article
546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land
occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of
the portion of the house of defendants built thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land.
The defendants shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiff upon such terms and conditions that
they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course,
defendants may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their own expense, if they so
decide.
Article 448 of the New Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.

SPOUSES NUGUID vs. CA G.R. No. 151815

FACTS: Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment
building. For failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction by the City Treasurer of
Quezon City to Mamerto Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it for P103,000 to the spouses Juan
and Erlinda Nuguid.
Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC upheld the
spouses title but declared that the four-door two-storey apartment building was not included in the
auction sale. This was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals and thereafter by this Court.
The Nuguids became the uncontested owners of the commercial lot. The Nuguid moved for delivery of
possession of the lot and the apartment building. The trial court, ruled that the Spouses Nuguid
were to reimburse Pecson for his construction cost and also directed Pecson to pay monthly
rentals to the Nuguids as paid by the tenants occupying the apartment units and allowed the offset of
the due from the Nuguids against the amount of rents collected by Pecson from the
tenants of the apartment. The CA affirmed the order of payment of construction costs but rendered
the issue of possession moot on appeal.
Upon review, the SC handed down the decision remanding to the trial court for it to determine the
current market value of the apartment building on the lot which the Spouses must pay to Pedro Pecson
else petitioner shall be restored to the possession of the apartment building until payment of the
required indemnity.
The RTC ordered the spouses to pay the sum ofP1,344,000 as reimbursement of the unrealized
income of Pecson The Court of Appeals reduced the rentals from P1,344,000 to P280,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are liable to pay rent over and above the current market value of
the improvement and that such increased award of rentals by the RTC was reasonable and equitable.
HELD: Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to appropriate the improvement as
his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor in good
faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all
the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention until full reimbursement
is made.
While the law aims to concentrate in one person the ownership of the land and the improvements
thereon in view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, it guards against
unjust enrichment insofar as the good-faith builders improvements are concerned. The right of
retention is considered as one of the measures devised by the law for the protection of builders in good
faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits the actual possessor to
remain in possession while he has not been reimbursed (by the person who defeated him in the case
for possession of the property) for those necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him
on the thing possessed. Accordingly, a builder in good faith cannot be compelled to pay rentals during
the period of retention nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering him to vacate. In addition,
as in this case, the owner of the land is prohibited from offsetting or compensating the necessary
and useful expenses with the fruits received by the builder-possessor in good faith. Otherwise,

the security provided by law would be impaired. This is so because the right to the expenses and the
right to the fruits both pertain to the possessor, making compensation juridically impossible; and one
cannot be used to reduce the other.
Since petitioners opted to appropriate the improvement for themselves as early as June 1993, when
they applied for a writ of execution despite knowledge that the auction sale did not include the
apartment building, they could not benefit from the lots improvement, until they reimbursed
the improver in full, based on the current market value of the property.
Despite the Courts recognition of Pecsons right of ownership over the apartment building,
the petitioners still insisted on dispossessing Pecson by filing for a Writ of Possession to cover both the
lot and the building. Clearly, this resulted in a violation of respondents right of retention. Worse,
petitioners took advantage of the situation to benefit from the highly valued, income-yielding,
four-unit apartment building by collecting rentals thereon, before they paid for the cost of the
apartment building. It wasonly four years later that they finally paid its full value to the respondent.
Given the circumstances of the instant case where the builder in good faith has been clearly denied his
right of retention for almost half a decade, we find that the increased award of rentals by the RTC was
reasonable and equitable. The petitioners had reaped all the benefits from the improvement introduced
by the respondent during said period, without paying any amount to the latter as reimbursement for his
construction costs and expenses. They should account and pay for such benefits.

Sps Alviola vs CA G.R. No. 117642 A

Facts: In this petition for review on certiorari , petitioners assail the decision, of the Court of Appeals
dated April 8, 1994 which affirmed the decision of the lower court ordering petitioners to peacefully
vacate and surrender the possession of the disputed properties to the private respondents. On April 1,
1950, Victoria Tinagan purchased from Mauro Tinagan 2 parcels of land. One parcel of land contains
an areaof 5,704 square meters, more or less; while the other contains 10,860 square meters.
Thereafter, Victoria and her son Agustin, took possession of said parcels of land. Sometime in 1960,
petitioners occupied portions thereof whereat they built a copra dryer and put up a store whereinthey
engaged in the business of buying and selling copra. On June 23, 1975, Victoria died. On October 26,
1975, Agustin died, survived by herein private respondents. On December 24, 1976, petitioner Editha
assisted by her husband filed a complaint for partition and damages, claiming to be an acknowledged
natural child of deceased Agustin Tinagan and demanding the delivery of her shares in the properties
left by the deceased.
This case was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that recognition of naturalchildren may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parent and petitioner Editha did not fall in any of the
exceptions enumerated in Article 285 of the Civil Code.
On March 29, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Editha
and her husband Porferio, praying, among others, that they be declared absolute owners of the said
parcels of land, and that petitioners be ordered to vacate the same, to remove their copra dryer and
store, to pay actual damages (in the form of rentals),moral and punitive damages, litigation expenses

and attorney's fees. In their answer, petitioners contend that they own the improvements in the disputed
properties which are still publicland; that they are qualified to be beneficiaries of the comprehensive
agrarian reform program and that they are rightful possessors by occupation of the said properties for
more than twenty years. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the private
respondents. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N the lands in question are public lands and W/N the petitioners are rightful possessors by
occupation for more than 20 years.
Held: No
Ratio: Petitioners aver that respondent court erred in declaring private respondents the owners of the
disputed properties. They contend that ownership of a public land cannot be declared by the courts but
by the Executive Department; and that the respondent court erred in not considering that private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Victoria Tinagan, during her lifetime, ceded her right to the
disputed properties in favor of petitioners.

Sps Alviola vs CA G.R. No. 117642 B

Facts:- Victoria Tinagan bought 2 parcels of land and took possession thereof with her son, Agustin
- after 10 years, Alviola occupied portions thereof, built a copra dryer and store, tolerate occupancy by
Victoria and Agustin
- after 15 years, Victoria and Agustin died
- wife of Agustin (referred as Tinagan) filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Alviola
RTC/CA: in favor of Tinagan, Alviola to vacate and remove store and dryer, pay rentals until
improvements are removed
- Alviola contends that Victoria ceded her right over the property in favor of Alviola, Tinagans tolerated
their occupancy making the landowners in bad faith and they, Alviolas in good faith, copra store and
dryer are of permanent structures thus cannot be removed
Issue; W/n Article 454 may be applied where the landowner is in bad faith, the BPS in good faith? NO
Held:- Tax declarations of the 2 parcels of land declared to be in the name of the Tinagans
- bad faith on the part of Alviola upon construction of improvements despite being fully aware that the
parcels of land belonged to Victoria Tinagan
- bad faith also on the part of Tinagans (wife of Agustin and children) because they had knowledge of
the constructions and still tolerated their occupancy thereon
-in pari delicto, treated as if both parties acted in good faith, 448 is applicable not 454
- but 448 will not apply upon the dryer and store being transferable in nature

- to fall under 448, the construction must be of permanent character, attached to the soil
- if transitory, there is no accession and the builder must remove the construction
- proper remedy was an action to eject the builder from the land

Sarmiento vs. Agana 129 scra 122

Facts:
ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the latter's mother had told him the couple could build a
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE whom Ernesto did construct a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on the LAND at a cost
of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 who probably assumed that the wife's mother was the owner of the LAND
and that, it would be transferred to the spouses. Subsequently turned out that the LAND had been titled
in the name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C. Santo, Jr. who, sold the same to petitioner SARMIENTO.
SARMIENTO filed an Ejectment suit against them. In the evidentiary hearings before the Municipal
Court, SARMIENTO submitted the deed of sale of the LAND in her favor, which showed the price to be
P15,000.00. On the other hand, ERNESTO testified that the then cost of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE
would be from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00.Sarmiento refuse to pay and give option to buy the property.
Issue: 1.Whether or not Ernesto was in good faith.
2.Whether or not Sarmiento could exercise both refusal to pay the spouses and give option to
purchase.
Held:
1.Yes. We agree that ERNESTO and wife were builders in good faith in view of the peculiar
circumstances under which they had constructed the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE. As far as they
knew, the LAND was owned by ERNESTO's mother-in-law who, having stated they could build on the
property, could reasonably be expected to later on give them the LAND.
In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Code provides:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to
pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or
planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of
the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties
shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof.
2.No. The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is
entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453
(now Article 546). The owner, of the land. upon, the other hand, has the option, under article 361 (now
Article 448), either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot,

as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner
of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when,
after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. We hold, therefore,
that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their buildings
from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such
buildings nor to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be
executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now Article 448) and 453 (now Article
546) of the Civil Code.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby ordered dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

BENITEZ V CA (SPS. MACAPAGAL) 266 SCRA 242 January 16, 1997

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA.
FACTS
- Jan. 22, 1986: petitioners Rafael and Avelina Benitez (Sps. Benitez) purchased a 303-sq. m. parcel of
land with improvements, covered by TCT 41961.- Subsequently, respondents Renato and Elizabeth
Macapagal (Sps. Macapagal) bought a 361-sq. m. lot covered by TCT 40155. On Sept. 18, 1986 they
filed a civil case with the Pasig RTC against Sps.Benitez for the recovery of possession of an
encroached portion of the lot they purchased. The parties were able to reach a compromise in which
Sps. Macapagal sold the encroached portion to Sps. Benitez at P1K per sq. m.- Jul. 17, 1989: Sps.
Macapagal purchased another property covered by TCT 3249-R adjacent to that of Sps. Benitez. A
relocation survey was conducted, and Sps. Macapagal discovered that 46.5 sq. m. of their property was
occupied by petitioners house. Despite verbal and written demands, petitioners refused to vacate.Oct. 26, 1989 : a last notice to vacate was sent to petitioners on Oct. 26, 1989.Jan. 18, 1990: Sps. Macapagal filed with the San Juan MeTC a civil case for ejectment against
petitioners. MeTC decided in favor of Sps. Macapagal, and ordered the Sps. Benitez to vacate and
surrender possession of the subject premises tothe plaintiffs as well as to pay them the amount of P930
a month until they finally vacate the subject premises (and P5K for attorneys fees).On appeal the Pasig RTC affirmed said decision , and said that the controversy was not an
encroachment or overlapping of two adjacent properties owned by the parties. It was a case where a
part of the house of the defendants is constructed on a portion of the property of the plaintiffs. As new
owners, Sps. Macapagal have the right to demand the Sps. Benitez remove the portion of the house
standing on plaintiffs realty.CA found no merit in Sps. Benitez appeal.

It said that Sps. Benitez cannot claim good faith as against Sps. Macapagal, and therefore they cannot
demand Sps. Macapagal to sell the disputed portion. Builders in bad faith can be ordered to dismantle
said structure at their own expense, or pay reasonable rent until they remove the structure.
Petitioners Claim: MeTC had no jurisdiction overthe case because its real nature is accion publicianaor
recovery of possession, not unlawful detainer.- Not forcible entry because respondents did nothave
prior possession.- Not unlawful detainer because petitioners were not private respondents tenants nor
vendee unlawful withholding possession.
Respondents Comments: Petitioners are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC after
they voluntarily participated in the trial on the merits and lost.- Petitioners were in bad faith because
they waived intheir deed of sale the usual sellers warranty as to the absence of any and all liens.
ISSUE(S)
1.WON the possession of the portion of Sps.Macapagals land encroached by Sps. Benitezhouse can
be recovered through an action of ejectment, not accion publiciana.
HELD 1.MeTC has jurisdiction.
Reasoning
- Requirements for ejectment as alleged in the facts:after conducting a relocation survey, private
respondents discovered that a portion of their land was encroached by petitioners house; notices were
sent to petitioners, the last one dated Oct. 26, 1989;private respondents filed ejectment suit against
petitioners on Jan. 18, 1990 (a year within lastdemand).- Sps. Macapagals cause of action springs
from Sec.1 of Rule 70, RoC:
Sec. 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when .
Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any
land or building by force, intimidation threat, strategy, or stealth, or a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express of implied, or thelegal
representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time
within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring anaction in the
proper inferior court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or
any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with
damages and costs.- That petitioners occupied the land prior to private respondents purchase thereof
does not negate the latter's case for ejectment. Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non
in ejectment. In forcible entry, because there is deprivation of physical possession, a person must
allege and prove prior possession. In unlawful detainer, defendant unlawfully withholds possession after
expiration of his right. Prior physical possession is not required.- Possession can also be acquired, not
only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thingies subject to the action of ones will or by
the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.- Considering that private
respondents are unlawfully deprived of possession of the encroached land and that the action for the
recovery of possession thereof was made within the one-year elementary period, ejectment is the

proper remedy, and MeTC has jurisdiction. And Sps. Benitez are estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the MeTC after voluntarily submitting themselves to its proceedings.
2.Compensation for Occupancy
- The award of P930 is technically not rental, but damages. Damages are recoverable in ejectment
cases under Sec. 8, Rule 70, RoC. These damages arise from the loss of the use and occupation of the
property, and not the damages which privateres pondents may have suffered but which have no direct
relation to their loss. In the context of Sec. 8, it is limited to rent or fair rental value for the use and
occupation of the property.
3.Option to Sell Belongs to Owner
- Art. 448 of the Civil Code is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on which another in good faith
builds, plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner.
Art. 448
. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided
for in Art. 546 and 548,or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
who sowed, the proper rent.
Art. 450
. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the
demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in orderto replace things in their
former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the
builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.- No compulsion can be
legally forced on him, contrary to what petitioners asks from this Court. Such an order would be invalid
and illegal.
4.Review of Factual Findings Unwarranted
- After careful deliberation on the issue, the Court found the petition for review inadequate as it failed to
show convincingly a reversible error on the part of the CA. The decision of the CA did alter nor affect
the MeTCs disposition. The mere fact that petitioners bought their property ahead of respondents does
not establish good faith. Petitioners presented mere allegations without sufficient evidence to support
them.

Rosales vs Castelltort : 157044 : October 5, 2005

Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-Rosales (petitioners) are the registered
owners of a parcel of land with an area of approximately 315 square meters, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36856 and designated as Lot 17, Block 1 of Subdivision Plan LRC Psd55244 situated in Los Baos, Laguna.

On August 16, 1995, petitioners discovered that a house was being constructed on their lot, without
their knowledge and consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort (Castelltort).
It turned out that respondents Castelltort and his wife Judith had purchased a lot, Lot 16 of the same
Subdivision Plan, from respondent Lina Lopez-Villegas (Lina) through her son-attorney-in-fact Rene
Villegas (Villegas) but that after a survey thereof by geodetic engineer Augusto Rivera, he pointed to
Lot 17 as the Lot 16 the Castelltorts purchased.
Admittedly, the appellants house erroneously encroached on the property of the appellees due to a
mistake in the placement of stone monuments as indicated in the survey plan, which error is directly
attributable to the fault of the geodetic engineer who conducted the same. This fact alone negates bad
faith on the part of appellant Miguel.
ISSUE: Whether Castelltort is a builder in good faith.
RULING:
Yes, The records indicate that at the time Castelltort began constructing his house on petitioners
lot, he believed that it was the Lot 16 he bought and delivered to him by Villegas.
As correctly found by the CA, both parties having acted in good faith at least until August 21, 1995, the
applicable provision in this case is Article 448 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.
Under the foregoing provision, the landowner can choose between appropriating the building by
paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless its value
is considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the builder in good faith shall
pay reasonable rent. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the
court must fix the terms thereof.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e.,
that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the
landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either
option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land.
The raison detre for this provision has been enunciated thus:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the
owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice
to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the

law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements
after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the
sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is
authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession,
he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.