People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil.

19
Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code
Facts:

On June 30, 1920, sixer vintas intercepted two Dutch boats which were
on its way in the middle of the islands of Buang and Bikid in Dutch East
Indies. Six Vintas were handled by 24 Moros. The Moros asked for food
at first but when they boarded the Dutch boats, they wanted to sieze the
entire cago. They attacked majority of the men and violated two women.
All of the people, other than two young women were left on the boat,
where they made holes to leave them to drown.Two of the Moro
marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At
Maruro, the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi,
Sulu. They were arrested there and were charged in the Court of First
Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.
Issue:

Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime of

piracy alleged in this case.
Held:

Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction on the case. Piracy is a

villainy not against any particular state but against all mankind. It should
be tried and punished in the sufficient tribunal of any country where the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction
of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits.

People V Tulin 364 SCRA 10

Facts:
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested in the afternoon of the
27th of February, year 1990. The warrant had issued on an information with the
crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed
during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10,
1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on
Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the
information and none fixed in the arrest warrant.
Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein alleging that he
was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been: (a) held to answer
for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books; (b) charged with a
criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or
preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process; (c) denied
his right to bail; and (d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of
probable cause.
On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return which urged that
the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is
putting it very simply-the information in Hernandez charged murders and other
common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion,
whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated
murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion
Issues:
Whether the crime committed was rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder or simple rebellion
Held:
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People
vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce
Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple
rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a
matter of right
Ratio:
Accused-appellant Hiong ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of piracy .

BENITO ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 154130-August 20, 2004

FACTS
On September 1, 1997, private offended parties together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1
Rufo Capoquian, were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence
operations on possible illegal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats
measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob.
There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of
the boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for
reinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at
the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioners house in Daram, where they had dinner
and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Arbitrary Detention
Held: Petitioner Benito Astorga is acquitted of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear.
After a careful review of the evidence on record, the court find no proof that petitioner instilled fear
in the minds of the private offended parties. The court fail to discern any element of fear from the
narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the DENR Team during their
mission. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam around the
barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that
petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by
boat.
Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to whether
petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure,
capable to two interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the private offended parties
were taken to petitioners house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning, it is
equally plausible, if not more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and
drinks to the team at his house. He could have advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea
travel was rendered unsafe by the heavy rains and ate together with the private offended parties and
even laughed with them while conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a hostile
confrontation between the parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served alcoholic
drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.
As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the
presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a
matter of right. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of
which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the
presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man
than to convict an innocent man.

Milo V Salanga

G.R. No. L-37007

July 20, 1987
FACTS
Information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against a private respondent
(accused Barrio Captain Tuvera, Sr.) and some other private persons for
assaulting petitioner Valdez by hitting him with stocks of their guns and
puches. Immediately thereafter, without legal grounds and with deliberate
intent to deprive the latter of his constitutional liberty, accused respondent
and two members of the police force of Mangsat conspired and helped one
another in lodging and locking petitioner inside the municipal jail of
Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.
Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute the elements of said crime
and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to
support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst. Provincial Fiscal Milo
filed an opposition thereto. Consequently, averring that accused-respondent
was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention,
respondent Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable
for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
HELD
Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with
authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime.
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention.
It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with
abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers
and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a
barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction
is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must
be and are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is
the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the
aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of
petitioner Valdez

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABDILA SILONGAN, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 137182, Apirl 24, 2003
Facts:
On March 16, 1996, Alexander Saldaa, a businessman, traveled to Sultan Kudarat with three
other men to meet with Macapagal Silongan alias Comander Lambada. They arrived in the
morning and were able to talk to Macapagal concerning the gold nuggets that purportedly being
sold by the latter. The business transaction was postponed and continued in the afternoon due
to the death of Macapagals relative and that he has to pick his brother in Cotabato City.
Then at around 8:30 PM, as they headed to the highway, Macapagal ordered the driver to stop.
Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his three companions were ordered to go out
of the vehicle, they were tied up, and blindfolded. Macapagal and Teddy were also tied and
blindfolded, but nothing more was done to them. Alexander identified all the abductors
including the brothers of Macapagal.
The four victims were taken to the mountain hideout in Maguindanao. The kidnappers
demanded P15, 000,000 from Alexanders wife for his release, but the amount was reduced to
twelve million. The victims were then transferred from one place to another. They made
Alexander write a letter to his wife for his ransom. But on several occasions, a person named
Mayangkang himself would write to Alexanders wife. The two other victims managed to escape
but Alexander was released after payment of ransom. The trial court convicted Macapagal and
his companions of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention.
Issue:
Whether it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of Kidnapping.
Held:
No, it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of Kidnapping. For the
crime to be committed, at least one overt act of demanding ransom must be made. It is not
necessary that there be actual payment of ransom because what the law requires is merely the
existence of the purpose of demanding ransom. In this case, the records are replete with
instances when the kidnappers demanded ransom from the victim. At the mountain hideout
where Alexander was first taken, he was made a letter to his wife asking her to pay ransom of
twelve million. Also Mayangkang himself wrote more letters to his family threatened the family
to kill Alexander if the ransom was not paid.

People vs Oliva, 344 SCRA 435

Criminal Case Digest
Digested Cases
Criminal Law

Facts:
The father of the complainant M, Lorenzo Oliva was charged and
convicted of rape. The accused filed an appeal, and on it, the
accused quetioned the testimony of his daugter M and further
alleged thatit was not him who had commited the crime, and that
it was his brother in law, Benjamin.
Issue:
WON the testimonies and credibility of the complainant witness
is in doubt and questionable.
Held:
Courts usually give credence to the testimony of a girl who is a
victim of sexual assault particularly if it constitutes incestuous
rape, because normally no person would be willing to undergo
the humiliation of public trial and to testify on the details of her
ordeal, were it not to condemn an injustice. The gravamen of
rape is carnal knowledge of a woman under any circumstances
provided by law.
In addition, mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, has no weight in law and cannot be given
any greater evidentiary value than the positive testimony of a
rape victim.
Wherefore, the decision of the court of appeals dated April 21,
2008, finding the accused-appellant Lorenzo Oliva, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each
crime.

Case of People of the Philippines vs. Elias Lovedioro y Castro

G.R.No. 112235 29November1995 (People vs. Lovedioro 250 SCRA 389)
Rebellion -- Art.134 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS OF THE CASE:
SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was shot by Elias Lovedioro along with 3 other accomplices along
Burgos St. away from Daraga, Albay Public Market. The victim died on the same
day due to excessive blood loss. On November 6, 1992, Elias Lovedioro was then
charged of the crime of murder, and subsequently found guilty. Lovedioro then
appealed the decision, contesting the verdict of murder instead of rebellion. It
was confirmed by the prosecutions principal witness that Lovedioro was a member
of the New Peoples Army.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder, instead of
rebellion?
- Yes. Because, overt acts and purpose are essential components of the crime of
rebellion, with either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does not
exist.
- Political motive should be established before a person charged with a common
crime- alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty- could
benefit from the laws relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. If no
political motive is established or proved, the accused should be convicted of the
common crime and not of rebellion.
- In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself
suffice.
- The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered no
contribution to the achievement of the NPAs subversive aims, in fact, there were
no known acts of the victims that can be considered as offending to the NPA.
- Evidence shows that Lovedioros allegation of membership to the N.P.A was
conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated September 14,
1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.

Rivera vs. People, 462 SCRA 350

Facts:
In March 1993, Police Inspector Leygo, Deputy Chief of Police for Operation and Patrol of the La
Trinidad Police Station and SPO1 Basquial came upon a truck unloading sacks of chicken dung at
the stall of accused Rivera. Inspector Leygo advised the driver to stop unloading the manure as it
violates La Trinidad Municipal Ordinance No. I-91. The driver complied with the police directive
and was escorted by the police. However, members of the police under Inspector Leygo later saw the
same truck. After a chase, Inspector Leygo asked the accused why he insisted on defying the ban on
the unloading and loading of chicken manure. Instead of answering however, the accused pointed a
finger on the policeman and uttered words like Babalian kita ng buto, Ilalampaso kita, and
Pulis lang kayo, and other unsavory and insulting words. Inspector Leygo who was a little bit
angry warned the accused to stop uttering further insulting words and cautioned him to take it easy
and then informed him that he was being arrested for violation of the chicken dung ordinance. The
accused removed his jacket, placed it inside the vehicle, assumed a fighting stance and challenged
the policeman. Inspector Leygo then approached the accused and warned him anew that he was
being arrested. The accused responded by punching Inspector Leygo on his face, particularly on his
lip. The two then grappled as Inspector Leygo tried to hold the accused. Finally, with the help of
other policemen, the accused was subdued. The accused was then pushed into one of the police cars
but he resisted until Castro, one of the chicken dung dealers in the area, boarded the police car to
accompany him. The trial court convicted petitioner of the crime of direct assault. On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the
trial court.
Held:
No. Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any person
or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of
any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate
or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such performance. Petitioners case falls under the second mode, which is
the more common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a
weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand
upon a person in authority.
At the time of the assault, Lt. Leygo was engaged in the actual performance of his official duties. He
was wearing the designated police uniform and was on board a police car conducting a routinary
patrol when he first came upon the truck unloading chicken manure. Because the unloading of
chicken dung was a violation of La Trinidad Municipal Ordinance No. 1-91, the lieutenant ordered
the truck driver to return from where he came, but petitioner, in defiance of such lawful order,
commanded the truck driver to return to Shilan, the place where the truck was first intercepted, and
on being informed that the same truck had returned, the lieutenant had every reason to assume it
did return for the purpose of unloading its cargo of chicken dung, thus stopped it from doing so.

People vs. Abalos, 258 SCRA 523

By LLBe:LawLifeBuzzEtcetera
Facts:
In the evening of March 20, 1983, while accused Tiburcio Abalos and his father, Police Major Cecilio
Abalos, were having a heated argument, a woman shouted Police officer, help us! Somebodys
making trouble here. The victim, P/Pfc. Labine, then appeared at the scene and asked Major
Abalos, What is it, sir? The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face him. As
Major Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine, accused hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood,
about two inches thick, three inches wide and three feet long, from a nearby Ford Fiera vehicle. He
then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind,
hitting the policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconscious in a
heap, and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from that blow. The trial court
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of direct assault with
murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of direct assault with murder.
Held:
No. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under Article
148 of the RPC. The first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except that
there is no public uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more common way of
committing assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in the attack, or the
offender is a public officer, or the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. Appellant
committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of
force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault was
made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such performance; and
the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must
have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent
of a person in authority. Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan,
Samar and, thus, was an agent of a person in authority pursuant to Article 152 of the RPC. There is
also no dispute that he was in the actual performance of his duties when assaulted by appellant, that
is, he was maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant himself
testified that he personally knew Labine to be a policeman and, in fact, Labine was then wearing his
uniform. These facts should have sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his defiant
conduct clearly demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to assault and injure an agent of
the law.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there
arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide. The killing in the instant case
constituted the felony of murder qualified by alevosia through treacherous means deliberately
adopted Pfc. Labine was struck from behind while he was being confronted at the same time by
appellants father. The evidence shows that appellant deliberately went behind the victim whom he
then hit with a piece of wood which he deliberately got for that purpose.

People vs Dural (direct assault)

Facts:
At about 12 o'clock in the afternoon of January 31, 1988 both of them (prosecution witnesses Rener
Ramos and Dennis Santos) were at the Macaneneng Street in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City as they
were supposed to go a (sic) "tupadahan" however, they were not able to arrive at the tupadahan because
while on their way or from a distance of twelve (12) arms-length they heard successive gunfires ( sic) so
they run (sic) and hid themselves in a concrete fence near a store; from the place they were hiding or
from a distance of ten (10) arms-length they saw three (3) men each of them armed with .45 ( sic) pistol,
firing upon at (sic) the two Capcom soldiers on board a Capcom mobile car which was then on a full stop
although its engine was still running; two of the gunmen positioned themselves beside each of the side of
the mobile car while the third gunman whom they identified as accused Rolando Dural otherwise known
as Ronnie Javelon (Dural for brevity) claimed the hood of the mobile car and positioned himself in front of
the car; after the two Capcom soldiers were immobilized, the gunman standing near the driver's seat
opened the left front door of the car and got the .45 (sic) service pistol and armalite of the Capcom
soldiers; thereafter, the three gunmen left; during the shooting incident they also noticed the presence of
two persons, one was inside an owner jeep while the other one whom they identified as accused
Bernardo Itucal, Jr. (Itucal for brevity) was standing near the scene of the incident with one of his arm ( sic)
raised while one of his hand (sic) was holding a .45 caliber pistol; immediately after the three (gunmen)
who fired at the Capcom soldiers left; (sic) the man who was riding on the owner jeep told accused Itucal
that he was leaving and instructed Itucal to take care of everything; witness Dennis Santos even quoted
the very word (sic) of the man on board the owner jeep Pare, bahala ka na diyan; after that, the accused
Itucal walked away; two days after the incident or on February 3, 1988 eyewitnesses Ramos and Santos
voluntarily went at (sic) the Capcom headquarters at Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan City to narrate what they
have witnessed, consequently the investigator brought them at (sic) the Capcom headquarters at Bicutan
then at (sic) Camp Panopio Hospital; at the said hospital, they saw one of the three gunmen (referring to
accused Dural) who shot the two Capcom soldiers; then they went back at (sic) Bicutan headquarters
where they gave their respective statements
w/n there was direct assault upon an agent in authority?
Yes
There is no doubt in Our minds that appellant Dural and the two (2) other gunmen knew that the victims,
T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Mangligot, were members of the Philippine Constabulary detailed
with the CAPCOM as they were then in uniform and riding an official CAPCOM car. The victims, who were
agents of persons in authority, were in the performance of official duty as peace officers and law
enforcers. For having assaulted and killed the said victims, in conspiracy with the other two (2) gunmen,
appellant Dural also committed direct assault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The crimes he
committed, therefore, are two (2) complex crimes of murder with direct assault upon an agent of a person
in authority. Pursuant then to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum of the penalty for the
more serious crime which is murder, should be imposed. The maximum of the penalty prescribed for
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is death penalty, 34 the proper imposable penalty
would be reclusion perpetua.
The prosecution has failed to successfully discharge that burden in this case, leaving this Court
unconvinced, due to reasonable doubt, of the guilt of Itucal
SC ruling: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) AFFIRMING, insofar as accused-appellant ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE JAVELON) is
concerned, the Decision of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City in Criminal Case No.
C-30112, subject to the above modification of the death penalty.
(2) ACQUITTING, on the ground of reasonable doubt, accused-appellant BERNARDO ITUCAL, JR.; and
(3) Ordering accused-appellant ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE JAVELON) to pay one-half
(1/2) of the costs.

Mark Clemente y Martinez v. People of the

Philippines, G.R. No. 194367, June 15, 2011.
Illegal possession and use of false bank notes. The
elements of the crime committed under Article 168 of the
Revised Penal Code are the following: (a) that any
treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and
security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to
order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is
forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender
knows that any of the said instruments is forged or
falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with
intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments.
Illegal possession and use of false bank notes. In this
case, the Supreme Court, citingPeople v. Digoro, reversed
and set aside the findings of the lower courts and
acquitted petitioner of the crime of Illegal possession and
use of false bank notes defined and penalized under
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. In Digoro,
possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without
anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute
an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession
must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank
notes. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show
that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he
intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to
whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500 bill to buy
soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the
jail officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz
that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the
Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500 bill. In short, the
jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner
asked Francis dela Cruz to use the P500 bill. Their
account, however, is hearsay and not based on the
personal knowledge.

Hernandez vs. Hernandez

G.R. No. 158576:March 9, 2011.
CORNELIA M. HERNANDEZ, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES H.
CASTILLO, Petitioner, v. CECILIO F. HERNANDEZ, Respondent.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
On 11 November 1993, the owners of the Hernandez property, which
includes petitioner Cornelia Hernandez, executed a letter indicating: (1)
respondent Cecilio Hernandez as the representative of the owners of the
land; and (2) the compensation he gets in doing such job. Such property
was subject of an expropriation case for a DPWH project. During the
course of the expropriation proceedings, an Order was issued by the
RTC, Cecilio was appointed as one of the commissioners in the
expropriation case. On 18 October 1996, Cornelia, and her other coowners who were also signatories of the 11 November 1993 letter,
executed an irrevocable Special Power of Attorney (SPA) appointing
Cecilio Hernandez as their "true and lawful attorney" with respect to the
expropriation of the subject property. There was no mention of the
compensation scheme for Cecilio, the attorney-in-fact.
The just compensation for the condemned properties was fixed
subsequently, with Cornelias share amounting to P7,321,500.00the
amount apro-indivisoowner is to receive. At this point, Cecilios SPA was
revoked by Cornelia. On 7 February 2000, however, Cornelia received
from Cecilio a check amounting to P1,123,000.00. The check was
accompanied by a Receipt and Quitclaimdocument in favor of Cecilio.In
essence it states that: (1) the amount received will be the share of
Cornelia in the just compensation paid by the government in the
expropriated property; (2) in consideration of the payment, it will release
and forever discharge Cecilio from any action, damages, claims or
demands; and (3) Cornelia will not institute any action and will not
pursue her complaint or opposition to the release to Cecilio or his heirs
or assigns.
In a Letterdated 22 June 2000after she learned of her true share in the
expropriation proceedingsCornelia demanded the accounting of the
proceeds.The letter was left unanswered.She then decided to have the
courts settle the issue.A Complaint for the Annulment of Quitclaim and
Recovery of Sum of Money and Damages was filed before the RTC.
Cecilio was declared in default, but this was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding the validity of the receipt
and quitclaim document
HELD:

The petition is granted.

CIVIL LAW: Voidable contracts.
A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable. In determining
whether consent is vitiated by any of the circumstances mentioned,
courts are given a wide latitude in weighing the facts or circumstances in
a given case and in deciding in their favor what they believe to have
actually occurred,considering the age, physical infirmity, intelligence,
relationship, and the conduct of the parties at the time of the making of
the contract and subsequent thereto. Here, the service contract of 11
November 1993 (appointing Cecilio as representative), as well as the
quitclaim and receipt, are voidablethe first due to mistake, the second
due to fraud.
First, the service contract gave Cecilio compensation based on "1998
skyrocketing" prices that essentially will give Cecilio 83.07% of the just
compensation due Cornelia as the co-owner of the land. No evidence on
record would show that Cornelia agreed, by way of the 11 November
1993 letter, to give Cecilio 83.07% of the proceeds of the sale of her
land. Second, quitclaims are also contracts and can be voided if there
was fraud or intimidation that leads to lack of consent.The facts show
that a simple accounting of the proceeds of the just compensation will be
enough to satisfy the curiosity of Cornelia.However, Cecilio did not
disclose the truth and instead of coming up with the request of his aunt,
he made a contract intended to bar Cornelia from recovering any further
sum of money from the sale of her property.
Moreover, when Cecilio accepted the position as commissioner, he
created a barrier that prevented his performance of his duties under the
SPA. Cecilio could not have been a hearing officer and a defendant at
the same time.Indeed, Cecilio foisted fraud on both the Court and the
Hernandezes when, after his appointment as commissioner, he accepted
the appointment by the Hernandezes to "represent" and "sue for" them.
The decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Tamani vs. Salvador

G.R. No. 171497 April 4, 2011
MARIA LOURDES TAMANI, CONCEPCION TAMANI, ESTRELLA
TAMANI, TERESITA TAMANI, AZUCENA SOLEDAD, DOLORES
GUERRERO, CRISTINA TUGADE DAMIETA MANSAANG, MANUEL
TAMANI, VALERIANA CASTRO, AURORA SANTIAGO and ROSARIO
CASTILLO, Petitioners, v. ROMAN SALVADOR and FILOMENA
BRAVO, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
The respondent spouses filed a Complaint for quieting of title was
against the petitioners, who were legal heirs of the spouses Demetrio
Tamani and Josefa Caddauan, over a 431 sq. m. parcel of land located
at Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.
Respondents and the Spouses Tamani are co-owners of an undivided
parcel of land with an area of 776 sq. m. Based on the TCT, respondents
own 345 sq. m. of the property whereas the Spouses Tamani own the
remaining 431 sq. m. (disputed property). The spouses Tamani allegedly
sold the disputed property to Milagros Cruz (Cruz) as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale for a consideration of Php 2,500.00.
Subsequently, Cruz sold the disputed property to respondents through a
Deed of Absolute Sale for the same consideration. Thus, the
respondents acquired ownership over the whole area of 776 sq. m.
In the meantime, Benigno Magpale (Magpale) and Leoncia Velasco
(Velasco) filed a complaint for specific performance against the Spouses
Tamani in the RTC compelling the Spouses Tamani to execute a deed of
sale over a residential land which was alledgedly sold to them without
documentation. Since the dismissal of their complaint, the respondents
have remained in possession over the disputed property.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring the Deed of Sale null
and void and directing the RD to cancel the TCT under the name of the
respondents. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court
declaring the said documents valid.
Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale was null and void
Held: The petition is granted.
CIVIL LAW: Sales
Based on the foregoing, as aptly argued by petitioners, the following
circumstances would show that the alleged deed of sale was spurious:
First, Cruz never took action to possess the property from 1959 to 1980;

Second, even after the supposed sale, Tamani was continuously

declaring the land in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes
due thereon; any reasonable person who had sold his property would
not undertake the unnecessary burden of continuing to pay real property
taxes on the same; Last, the land was allegedly sold to Cruz for
P2,500.00 in 1959 and yet twenty-one years (21) after, Cruz sold the
land to respondents for the same amount of P2,500.00. One who alleges
forgery has the burden of establishing his case by a preponderance of
evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than
that which is offered in opposition to it. Based on the preceding
discussion, this Court finds that petitioners have satisfactorily discharged
such burden.
The deed of sale may have been notarized and it is true that a notarial
document is considered evidence of the facts expressed therein. A
notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and
due execution ,and only clear and convincing evidence will overcome
such legal presumption. Nonetheless, given the highly questionable
circumstances present in the case at bar such prima facie presumption
was properly put in dispute.
Given the manner by which petitioners presented and defended their
case, the Court is of the opinion that respondents should have presented
the individual who acted as witness to the deed of sale and the notary
public who acknowledged the instrument to shed light on the
circumstances of the same. However, when Cruz was asked if she
remembered the person who acted as a witness to the deed of sale,
Cruz peculiarly said that she did not know or remember who the
individual was.
CIVIL LAW : Sales; Purchaser in Good Faith
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another,
without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such
property, and pays the full and fair price for it at the time of such
purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the
person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could
convey title to the property. He cannot close his eyes to facts that should
put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.
It is undisputed that respondents were neighbors of petitioners and even
co-owners of land. Respondents have also dealt with the Tamanis in the
past, having mortgaged their property together when respondents
availed of a loan from the Government Service Insurance System. Thus,
it is inconceivable for respondents not to know that petitioners had been
exercising open, continuous and notorious possession over the property.
Like Cruz, respondents should have ascertained the lands identity and
character given that houses were standing on the land in dispute and
petitioners had been leasing the same to tenants.

Therefore, the petition is granted and the Resolution of the CA is

reversed and set aside.

G.R. NOS. 174730-37, FEBRUARY 09, 2011

ROSALIO S. GALEOS, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NOS. 174845-52]
PAULINO S. ONG, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
[VILLARAMA, JR.]
Facts:
The consolidated petitions seek to reverse the seek to reverse the decision of the
Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioners of falsification of public documents under Article 171
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Ong was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu on April
16, 1986. He was elected Mayor of the same municipality in 1988 and served as such until 1998. On
June 1, 1994, Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico T. Rivera (Rivera) for
the positions of Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Office of the
Municipal Engineer. In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the
year 1993, Galeos answered "No" to the question: "To the best of your knowledge, are you related
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the government?" while
Rivera indicated "n/a" on the space for the list of the names of relatives referred to in the said query. In
the subsequents SALNs the said query was either marked No or left blank by Galeos and Rivera.
Ong's signature appears in all the foregoing documents as the person who administered the oath when
Galeos and Rivera executed the foregoing documents.
Ong and HR Officer-Designate Editha C. Garcia signed a certification addressed to the CSC
Region 7 that pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991, all restrictions/requirements relative to creation of positions, hiring and issuance of
appointments, Section 325 on the limitations for personal services in the total/supplemental
appropriation of a local government unit; salary rates; abolition and creation of positions, etc.; Section
76, organizational structure and staffing pattern; Section 79 on nepotism; Section 80, posting of
vacancy and personnel selection board; Section 81 on compensation, etc. have been duly complied
with in the issuance of this appointment. The certification also states that faithful observance of these
restrictions/requirements was made in accordance with the requirements of the Civil Service
Commission before the appointment was submitted for review and action.
Acting upon a complaint filed by the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naga, the OICDeputy Ombudsman for the Visayas filed criminal charges against petitioners for falsification of public
documents consisting of the SALN filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to
before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts, when in truth and in fact, accused very well knew that they are related with each other, since
accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused
Paulino S. Ong. Both petitioners said that they were not aware that they were relatives within the fourth
degree of consanguinity.

On August 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioners guilty of the crime charged.
Issue/s:
Whether the petitioners lack of knowledge of their relationship at the time of the execution of
the public document could exempt them from the criminal liability of falsification of public documents.
Ruling:
Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that falsification of
public documents by a public officer includes making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts. The elements of falsification are: (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated
by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false. In addition to the afore-cited elements, it
must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in
making the falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken
advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene
in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.
The prosecution was able to establish all the elements of falsification in the case at bar. The
required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity" in the SALN involves merely a description of such relationship. When a government employee
is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore
qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his 1993 SALN and left it blank in
other years if he has relatives in the government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he
made an untruthful statement therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal
mayor, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are
sisters). By withholding information on his relative/s in the government service as required in the SALN,
Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal
Mayor Ong would have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article
168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which specifically provides that no person shall be appointed in the local
government career service if he is related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the
appointing power or recommending authority.
The second element of legal obligation to disclose the truth is also present as there is a law
requiring it. Permanent employees employed by local government units are required to file the
following: (a) sworn statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN); (b) lists of relatives within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service; (c) financial and business
interests; and (d) personal data sheets as required by law. A similar requirement is imposed by Section
8 (B) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.
The evidence on record clearly showed that Galeos' negative answer reflected in his SALN
is absolutely false. During the trial, both Ong and Galeos admitted the fact that they are first cousins
but denied having knowledge of such relationship at the time the subject documents were executed.
The Sandiganbayan correctly rejected their defense of being unaware that they are related within the
fourth degree of consanguinity. Given the Filipino cultural trait of valuing strong kinship and extended
family ties, it was unlikely for Galeos who had been working for several years in the municipal
government, not to have known of his close blood relation to Ong who was a prominent public figure

having ran and won in the local elections four times (three terms as Mayor and as Vice-Mayor in the
1998 elections), after serving as OIC Mayor of the same municipality in 1986 until 1988.
The same thing can be said of Ong whose statement of having no knowledge of their
relationship as cousins is unthinkable being a resident of Naga, Cebu since birth. Despite his
knowledge of the falsity of the statement in the subject SALN, Ong still administered the oath to Galeos
and Rivera who made the false statement under oath. The Sandiganbayan thus did not err in finding
that Ong connived with Galeos and Rivera in making it appear in their SALN that they have no relative
within the fourth degree of consanguinity/affinity in the government service.
By Ongs issuance of the certification that the appointee is not related to him despite the fact
that they are, he was also guilty of falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in a
narration of facts. He also took advantage of his official position as the appointing authority who, under
the Civil Service rules, is required to issue such certification.
The petitions were DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED.

GARCIA v. CA
G.R. Nos. L-82282-83. November 24, 1988.
167 SCRA 815
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
Chemark Electric Motors, Inc. availed and was granted a credit line by Security Bank and
Trust Company. Subsequently, Chemark defaulted on its payments when they became due and
refused to pay despite repeated demands by SBTC. Antonio Garcia, on the other hand bound
himself jointly and severally with Chemark to pay SBTC and like Chemark has failed and
refused to pay his obligations despite demands made upon him by SBTC. The same is true with
Dynetics and Matrix; they bound themselves jointly and severally with Chemark to pay SBTC
and has failed and refused to do so. In an action to enforce the indemnity agreements executed by
the above parties with SBTC, the latter prayed for a summary judgment which was consequently
granted. In answer Dynetics, Inc., Matrix Management and Trading Corporation and Antonio
Garcia sought a judicial declaration that they were not liable to Security Bank and Trust
Company under said indemnity agreements they executed in favor of Chemark Electric Motors,
Inc. which had been extended a credit accommodation of about 20, 000, 000.00 Php by SBTC.
This was dismissed by the Court of Appeals ordering Dynetics, Matrix and Garcia to pay SBTC.
Hence, the case was elevated to the SC where one of the assigned errors by the plaintiffs
(Dynetics, Matrix and Garcia) to the appellate court's assailed decision is the awards of penalty
charges claiming that such charges are excessive.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the penalty charges awarded were excessive and thus must be reduced.
HELD:
Yes, In the case at bar, the penalty charges are excessive and unconscionable and so the
interest charges are enough punishment for the petitioners' failure to comply with their
obligations.
Penalty interests are in the nature of liquidated damages and may be equitably reduced by
the courts if they are iniquitous and unconscionable. Article 1229 of the New Civil Code states
that "The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly
or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the
penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROLDAN

MORALES y MIDARASA G.R. No. 172873. March
19, 2010
FACTS:
Quezon City RTC found Roldan Morales guilty of possession and sale of dangerous
drugs.
The testimonies of PO1 Eduardo Roy and PO3 Armando Rivera were presented by the
prosecution.
They held a buy-bust operation in which Morales was caught having 2 sachets of shabu
and the marked money.
Morales, in his statement, said that two male persons in civilian clothing who identified
themselves as police (Roy and Rivera) handcuffed and frisk him. Nothing was found but
on their to the station, Roy produced a sachet of shabu from his pocket and when once
at the station presented it as evidence against Morales.
The trial court found him guilty and when he appealed with the Court of Appeals,
affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether Roldan Morales is guilty of possession and sale of illegal drugs.
RULING:
No. Morales claims that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
arresting officers did not place the proper markings on the alleged shabu and
paraphernalia.
The Court points out that to be guilty of sale of illegal drugs, there should be proof that
the transaction took place and the illegal drug is presented in court as evidence. While
for possession, it should be established that the person possesses an illegal drug and is
freely aware of it.
The person who Roy and Rivera gave the drugs for delivery of seized items was not
present in court nor did they testify that they properly marked the drugs after appellants
arrest. They did not also take photographs and had no representative from the media
and Department of Justice or public official to sign an inventory of the seized items.
Prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody which is fatal to its cause.

People vs Amadeo Peralta, et al.

G.R. No. L-19069
October 29, 1968
Facts:
On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, two known warring
gangs inside the New Bilibid Prison as Sigue-Sigue and OXO were preparing to attend a
mass at 7 a.m. However, a fight between the two rival gangs caused a big commotion in the
plaza where the prisoners were currently assembled. The fight was quelled and those involved
where led away to the investigation while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their
respective quarters.
In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, OXO members, Amadeo Peralta,
Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six
among the twenty-two defendants charged therein with multiple murder), are also convicts
confined in the said prisons by virtue of final judgments.
They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with evident
premeditation and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously killed Sigue-Sigue sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa
and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing, and striking
them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby
inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which directly caused their deaths.
Issues
(a) Whether of not conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple murder?
(b) Whether or not an aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the
commission of the crime?
Held:
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime unless
when the law specifically provides a penalty thereof as in treason, rebellion and sedition.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or
more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes a pivotal importance in the
determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Once an express or implied conspiracy is
proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character
of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime/s perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
The collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted
action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their
evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held
solidarity liable. However, in order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending
moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by
exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to executing the
conspiracy.
Conspiracy alone, without execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in

special instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, do not include robbery.
Reverting now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the
commission of the murders. To wit, although there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court
can safely say that there are several circumstances to show that the crime committed by the
accused was planned. First, all the deceased were Tagalogs and members of sympathizers of
Sigue-Sigue gang (OXO members were from either Visayas or Mindanao), singled out and
killed thereby, showing that their killing has been planned. Second, the accused were all armed
with improvised weapons showing that they really prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused
accomplished the killing with team work precision going from one brigade to another and
attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for liquidation and lastly, almost the
same people took part in the killing of the Carriego, Barbosa and Cruz.
In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstances of quasi-recidivism, as all of
the six accused at the time of the commission of the offenses were serving sentences in the
New Bilibid Prison by virtue of convictions by final judgments that penalty for each offense must
be imposed in its maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of
the RPC. Hence, severe penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of the
perversity and incorrigibility of the crime.
Accordingly, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres
Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each
pronounced guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to
three death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the
three deceased victims in the sum of P12,000; each will pay one-sixth of the costs.

PEOPLE, petitioner, vs. GUTIERREZ, ET. AL., respondents.

FACTS:

1.

In the morning of May 22, 1970, a group of armed persons set fire to various

inhabited houses in barrio Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur.

2.

On

the

afternoon

of

the

same

day,

several

residential

houses

were

likewise burned in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, which resulted
to the destruction of various houses and resulted in the death of an old woman.

3.

Two informations were filed in the Court of First Instance (one for arson with

homicide and the other for arson), charging the 17 private respondents, together with 82
other unidentified persons,
confederating, conspiring, constabulating and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or caused to be burned several residential houses,
knowing the said houses to be occupied.

4.

Two of the accused furnished bail and voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge,

were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

5.

The Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing the Judge

of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District to hold a special in Ilocos Sur.

6.

Three days after, the Secretary of Justice further issued Administrative Order No.

226, authorizing respondent Judge to transfer the criminal cases to the Circuit
Criminal Court.

7.

The prosecution moved the respondent Judge for a transfer of said cases to the

Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the above-mentioned administrative Orders and calling
attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses
for reason of security and personal safety.

8.

The accused opposed such transfer and the respondent Judge declined the

transfer sought on the ground that said Administrative Order only provided for transfer of
cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for more
expeditious disposalof the cases; and in the cases involved the accused had already
pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a change
of venue from the Supreme Court under Sec. 4 of RA No. 5179 the same should have
been done right at the very inception of these cases.
RA 5179 created the Criminal Circuit Courts for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the
CFI, and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, but
nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the
circuit courts.

9.

In view of the lower courts denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Criminal

Court,the

prosecution

resorted

to

the

SC

for

writs

of

certiorari

and

mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying to set aside the order of denial of
transfer and to compel the CFI to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Secondary Judicial District.

10.

Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that

the Administrative Order merely authorized the court below, but did not require or
command it.

ISSUE:
Whether the lower court committed abuse of discretion in denying to transfer cases to the
Circuit Criminal Court.

RULING:
YES. Respondent Judge, in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not
mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the EOs
mentioned. HOWEVER, in refusing to consider Department AO No. 226 of the Secretary of
Justice as mandatory, respondent Judge failed to act upon the contention of the prosecuting
officers that the cases should be transferred to the Criminal Circuit Court of the Second
Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the prosecution
witnesses to testify in the court where they felt their lives would be endangered.

This refusal by the witnesses to testify due to security and safety manifest the imperious
necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to
be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the State is to
be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.
The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the SC, and such inferior courts as may be
established by law, and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent
attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts can by
appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to
make the judiciary an effective institution of government.
One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of
cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the
imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so
demands.

Thus, the SC held:

1.

That RA No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does not,

authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and individual cases;

2.

That the SC, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon it

and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the
trial and disposition of a case pending in a CFI be transferred to another CFI within the
same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious
and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over
the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.

3.

That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of

the hearing of th.e said criminal cases of the CFI of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court
of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and justice

MARIFOSQUE vs. PEOPLE

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, which assails the

September 23, 2002, decision and the January 3, 2003, Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner Nazario Marifosque guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery, defined
and penalized under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code. Petitioner averred that said money was not
for him but as reward money for the police asset who
demanded that he be given 350 pesos per cylinder tank.
Petitioner further averred that he was only collecting on behalf of
the police asset and that he already gave an advance of 1,000
pesos to said asset and only collecting the balance of 4,800.

The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting petitioner of

direct bribery, with an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 3
years, 6 months, and 5 days of prision correccional
medium and maximum periods as the minimum and 7 years, 8
months, and 9 days of prision mayor minimum and medium
periods as the maximum and a fine of 3000 pesos. He shall also
suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification. With the
motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed this
appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

- Is the act of petitionerreceipt of the sums of money for

delivery to his assetconstitute an offense defined and penalized
under 2nd paragraph of Art 210 of the Revised Penal Code?
- Did the Sandiganbayan err in convicting the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery?

Held:

Petitioner cannot feign innocence and profess good faith since all
the indicia point to his guilt and malicious intent. Petitioner did
not introduce his asset or mention his name to Yu So Pong or his
daughter at the time of the illegal transaction. His claim that he
previously gave 1000 pesos to his asset, which purportedly
represented a partial payment of the reward money, was not
corroborated by his asset. One of the arresting CIS officers
testified that petitioner attempted to give back the money to Yu
So Pong when they were about to arrest him, which showed that
he was well aware of the illegality of his transaction because had
he been engaged in a legitimate deal, he would have faced
courageously the arresting officers and indignantly protested the
violation of his person, which is the normal reaction of an
innocent man. His solicitous and overly eager conduct in pursuing
the robbery incident, even though he was no longer on duty,
betrays an intention not altogether altruistic and denotes a
corrupt desire on his part to obtain pecuniary benefits from an
illegal transaction. The petitioner's persistence in obtaining the
monetary reward for the asset although the latter was no longer
complaining about the 1000 pesos that he supposedly received
earlier.

Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not err in giving full weight and
credence to their version of the events. Petitioner's conviction
must be affirmed. The act of receiving money was connected with
his duty as a police officer. With regard to the fine, the amount of
the fine is erroneous. Paragraph 1 of Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to paragraph 2 thereof, provides that if the
act does not constitute a crime, the fine shall not be less than 3
times the value of the amount received. Evidence shows that
petitioner received an aggregate amount of 5800 pesos. He
should, therefore, be ordered to pay a fine not less than 3 times
its value, which is a fine of 18000 pesos.

SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [131 SCRA 184;

G.R. NO.L-65952; 31 JUL 1984]
Facts:

Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner,

who was an Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to investigate. In the
course of the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000
from Tan as price for dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the
NBI which set up an entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000,
marked bill, and he had supplied the other half. The
entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
decision finding the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A motion
for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence
this
instant
petition.

Issue:

Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the

petitioner can be regarded as contract or transaction within the
purview
of
.RA.3019.

Held:

R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful: xxx b. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving
any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for
other person, in connection with any contract or transaction
between the Govt. and any other party wherein the public
officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct
bribery under Art.210 of the RPC and not a violation of R.A.
3019 sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not the offense
charged and is not included in the offense charged which is
violation
of
R.A.3019
sec.3
(b).
The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not
limited to commercial or business transaction, but includes all
kinds
of
transaction
whether
commercial,
civil,
or
administrative in nature.

The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the

investigation conducted by the petitioner was neither a contract
nor transaction. A transaction like a contract is one which
involves some consideration as in credit transactions. And this
element is absent in the investigation conducted by the
petitioner.
Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under
Art.210 of the RPC.

LEONOR FORMILLEZA VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,

First Division and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 75160, MARCH 18, 1988
FACTS:

Petitioner Leonor Formilleza has been with the government service for
around 20 years. She was the personnel supervisor of the regional office of the
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in Tacloban City, Leyte since October 1,
1982. Her duties include the processing of the appointment papers of
employees.
A certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia was employed with NIA on a project basis and
she was terminated on December 31, 1983. Pursuant to the verbal instructions
of the regional director of the Administration, however, she continued working.
According to Mrs. Mutia, she took steps to obtain either a permanent or at the
least a renewed appointment. When she approached the regional director about
it, she was advised to see the petitioner but the latter refused to attend to her
appointment unless given some money. On February 27, 1984, Mrs. Mutia
reported her problem to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) authorities in the
province. The PC officials, who are colleagues of Mrs. Mutias husband, arranged
for an entrapment with marked money bills worth P100 as the entrapment
equipment. On February 29, 1984, the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia agreed to meet
at the canteen at 9:00am. Mrs. Mutia then notified the PC authorities, Sergeants
Eddie Bonjoc, Efren Abanes and Ignacio Labong about the arrangement. At the
canteen, petitioner and Mrs. Mutia occupied a table and were joined by some
officemates Mrs. Florida Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano, while the PC officials
occupied separate tables. Sergeant Abanes brought along a camera to
document the entrapment. Mrs. Mutia maintains that after taking the snacks
she handed the marked money bills under the table with her right hand to the
petitioner who received the money with her left hand. At that moment, the PC
officials approached the petitioner and held her hand holding the money.
Sergeant Abanes took photographs of the sequence of events. The petitioner
was arrested and was brought to the PC crime where she was found positive for
ultra-violet powder.
The respondent court found the petitioner guilty of Indirect Bribery and
sentenced her to four months of arresto mayor, suspension from public office,
profession or calling, including the right of suffrage, and public censure. The
petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court by way of the Instant Petition
for Review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner accepted the supposed bribe money.
HELD:

Petitioner Leonor Formilleza is ACQUITTED. The Decision of the

Sandiganbayan is SET ASIDE.
An exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be raised in
a petition of this character calls for application in this case. There are
substantial facts and circumstances which appear to be favorable to the accused
but which were not carefully considered by the Sandiganbayan. The failure to do
so is most unfortunate considering that the Sandiganbayan is the first and last
recourse of the accused before her case reaches the Supreme Court where
findings of fact are generally conclusive and binding. The essential ingredient of
indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the
public officer concerned must have accepted the gift of material consideration.
There must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so
offered and consider the same as his own property from then on, such as putting

away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt
unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstances or act to show such
acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of
indirect bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise will encourage
unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting within
their physical custody some gift, money or other property.
If the petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money from Mrs.
Mutia at the canteen, the petitioner would not have invited her officemates Mrs.
Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano to join them. According to Mrs. Sevilla she did not see
the alleged passing of the money under the table. What she was sure was that
when they were about to leave the canteen, two men approached petitioner, one
of whom took pictures and the petitioner shouted at Mrs. Mutia, What are you
trying to do to me? The reaction of petitioner is far from one with a guilty
conscience. Without the standard of certainty, it may not be said that the guilt
of the accused in a criminal proceeding has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.

GREGORY JAMES POZAR vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

GUERRERO, J.
Facts:
That on or about the 17th day of December, 1979, in the City of Angeles, the
above-named accused, being then an applicant for probation after he was convicted of
an offense feloniously give to the complainant, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, the City Probation
Officer, the sum of P100.00 in a paper bill under circumstances that would make the
said City Probation Officer, liable for bribery.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused violates Art. 212 of Revised Penal Code.
Held:
No. We can fairly deduce that the procedure for processing petitioner's
application for probation in the Probation Office at Angeles City was not precise, explicit
and clear cut and since the accused petitioner is a foreigner and quite unfamiliar with
probation rules and procedures, there is reason to conclude that petitioner was
befuddled, if not confused so that his act of providing and advancing the expenses for
whatever documentation was needed further to complete and thus hasten his probation
application, was understandably innocent and not criminal.
WHEREFORE, accused acquitted.

Teves vs. Comelec

FACTS:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of
Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio
G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan,
he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is
prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was
sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from
running for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which
carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the
position of member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his
Certificate of Candidacy. It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007
congressional elections for the position of member of the House of Representatives of the
Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant Motion for Reconsideration
moot and academic.
The petitioner filed a petition which the court found to have merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.
HELD:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane
or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or
after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a
public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the
Constitution or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A.
3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity
in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction.

The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or
by law.
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. (a) It shall be unlawful for any local
government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
xxxx
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit.
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the AntiGraft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest.
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same
involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of
the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are
not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in
the instant case.
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to
gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his
interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife considering
that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting
possession of such interest.
The crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve
moral turpitude.

VIOLETA BAHILIDAD VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 185195, March 17, 2010
Malversation of Public Funds
Facts:
Acting on a complaint filed by a Concerned Citizen of Sarangani
Province with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against Mary Ann Gadian,
Amelia Carmela Zoleta, both assigned to the Office of the Vice-Governor, and a
certain Sheryll Desiree Tangan, from the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
for their alleged participation in the scheme of giving fictitious grants and donations
using funds of the provincial government, a special audit was conducted in
Sarangani province. The Special Audit Team, created for the purpose, conducted its
investigation from June 1 to July 31, 2003. Included in the list of alleged fictitious
associations that benefited from the financial assistance given to certain NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Peoples Organizations (POs), and Local
Governmental Units (LGUs) was Women in Progress (WIP), which received a check
in the amount of P20,000.00, issued in the name of herein petitioner Bahilidad, as
the Treasurer thereof. Based on its findings, the Special Audit Team recommended
the filing of charges of malversation through falsification of public documents
against the officials involved. Issue: Is petitioner guilty of malversation of public
funds? Ruling:
NO. In the instant case, petitioner was found guilty of
conspiring with Zoleta and other public officials in the commission of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents. The trial
court relied on the dictum that the act of one is the act of all. It is necessary that a
conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect
contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of
active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of
moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the
crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence, the
mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it,
without any active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of
conviction.
In the instant case, we find petitioners participation in the crime not adequately
proven with moral certainty. Undeniably, petitioner, as a private individual, had no
hand in the preparation, processing or disbursement of the check issued in her
name. A cursory look at the disbursement voucher (No. 101-2002-01-822) reveals
the following signatures: signature of Board Member Teodorico Diaz certifying that
the cash advance is necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision;
signature of Provincial Accountant Camanay certifying to the completeness and
propriety of the supporting documents and to the liquidation of previous cash
advances; signature of Moises Magallona, Jr. over the name of Provincial Treasurer
Cesar M. Cagang certifying that cash is available; signature ofConstantino, with the
initials of Zoleta adjacent to his name, certifying that the disbursement is approved
for payment, and with petitioners signature as the payee.
The Sandiganbayan faulted petitioner for immediately encashing the
check, insisting that she should have deposited the check first. Such insistence is
unacceptable. It defies logic. The check was issued in petitioners name and,
as payee, she had the authority to encash it.
All told, there is reasonable
doubt as to petitioners guilt. Where there is reasonable doubt, an accused must be
acquitted even though his innocence may not have been fully established. When
guilt is not proven with moral certainty, exoneration must be granted as a matter of
right. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DIONISIO CALONGE G.R. No. 182793, July
5, 2010 Parricide Facts:
Rosita A. Calonge was appellants legitimate wife,
with whom he had three children. On December 1, 2001 at around 6:00 oclock in
the morning, the Villaverde Police Station received a radio call from
the barangay captain of Cabuluan that a massacre took place in their
locality. Rositas bloodied body was found lying on the ground about fifteen (15)
meters away from their house. Her right hand was loosely clasping a knife. Lying
on his back near the stairs was appellant who was also wounded but still
conscious. Beside him were a bolo and a flashlight, both stained with blood. While
the windows of the house were locked with a piece of tie wire, the door was already

opened. Inside the two bedrooms of the house separated only by a curtain, they
found the lifeless bodies of the two young girls, Kimberly and Dony Rose. The other
child, Melody, was also bloodied but alive and conscious. They brought Melody to
the Veterans Regional Hospital where she was treated and confined for seventeen
days. Melodys grandparents said they knew it was appellant because they had
heard Rosita shouting that appellant will kill them. On the other hand, when
appellant was asked what happened and who attacked him, he answered he does
not know. Appellant was charged with parricide and frustrated parricide. Issue: Is
the accused guilty of the crime charged? Ruling:
YES. Parricide is
committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of
accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the
victim. All the elements of the crime were clearly and sufficiently proved by the
prosecution.
Even granting arguendo that Melody did not see the actual
stabbing of her mother and two (2) sisters, the attendant circumstances point to no
one else but the appellant as the perpetrator. Direct evidence of the actual killing is
not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can
sufficiently establish his guilt. The oft-repeated rule has been that circumstantial
evidence is adequate for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the
facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven and the combination
of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence
which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion
that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person.
In the
killing of victims in this case, the trial court was correct in appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the attack is so
sudden and unexpected that the victim had no opportunity either to avert the
attack or to defend himself. Indeed, nothing can be more sudden and unexpected
than when a father stabs to death his two young daughters while they were sound
asleep and totally defenseless. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS LUIS ANTONIO
GARCHITORENA G.R. No. 184172, May 8, 2009 Parricide Facts: On appeal is the
21 January 2008 Decision of the Court of affirming the conviction of appellant Luis
Antonio Garchitorena of the crime of parricide by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City.
The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the16th day of [August 2000], in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused, being then the legitimate husband of FLORDELIZA
TABLA GARCHITORENA, with intent to kill, did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
said FLORDELIZA TABL[A] GARCHITORENA, his wife, by then and there shooting
her with a gun, hitting her on the head, thereby inflicting upon her serious and
mortal wound, which was the direct and immediate cause of her untimely death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said FLORDELIZA TABLA GARCHITORENA.
Issue: Is accused guilty of parricide? Ruling: YES.The elements of the crime of
parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and
(3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of
the accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.
All the above elements were sufficiently proven by the prosecution. It was
stipulated during the pre-trial that appellant and the victim are married on 24
August 1999. That the appellant killed the victim was proven specifically by
circumstantial evidence.
As aptly stated by the trial court:

In the instant case, the totality of the circumstances warrant a finding that accused
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fact that accused and
the deceased were the only persons in the bedroom when the shooting incident
occurred is undisputed. Secondly, there was an argument between the spouses, as
narrated by the accused to the police investigator and during trial. Thirdly,
accused, giving no logical excuse, got a gun. In this, the Court finds criminal
purpose. Also, there is a finding by this Court of improbability of the deceased
shooting herself.

While admittedly there is no direct evidence presented by the prosecution

on the killing of the deceased by the accused, the established circumstances
aforestated, however, constituted an unbroken chain, consistent with each other
and with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other
[hypothesis] that he is not. And when circumstantial evidence constitutes an
unbroken chain of natural and rational circumstances corroborating each other, it
cannot be overcome by inaccurate and doubtful evidence submitted by the
accused.

Agullo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 132926, July 20, 2001

FACTS: Petitioner, Elvira, was harge of malversation germinated from an audit conducted on 14 July 1986 by Ignacio
Gerez, Auditing Examiner III, as a result of which a P26,404.26 cash shortage was discovered on petitioners
accountability. In the course of the pre-trial, petitioner Agullo conceded the fact of audit and admitted the findings in
the Report of Cash Examination and the facts set forth in the Letter of Demand. In effect, she admitted the fact of
shortage in the amount stated in the Information. Notwithstanding, petitioner Agullo, at all stages of the criminal
indictment, persistently professed her innocence of the charge and categorically denied having malversed or
converted the public funds in question for her own personal use or benefit. With petitioners admission of the fact of
cash shortage, the prosecution then rested its case For its part, the defense, in its bid to overturn the presumption of
malversation and shatter the prima facie evidence of conversion, offered the testimony of the following witnesses:
petitioner Elvira Agullo; Rene Briones Austero, Cashier III of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
Region VIII; and Engracia Camposano-Camaoy, Barangay Captain of Hinabuyan, Dagame, Leyte. Striking down the
defense as incredible and without basis, the Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed decision, convicting petitioner
Agullo of the crime of malversation of public funds, ratiocinating principally that no evidence has been presented
linking the loss of the government funds with the alleged sudden heart attack of the accused (herein petitioner).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan disregarded or overlooked certain evidence of substance which violates
the petitioners constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked certain evidence
of substance which, to a large extent, bear considerable weight in the adjudication of petitioners guilt or the
affirmation of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Upon thorough scrutiny of the
evidence adduced by both prosecution and defense, we hold that petitioner Agullo has satisfactorily overcome and
rebutted by competent proof, the prima facie evidence of conversion so as to exonerate her from the charge of
malversation. To this end, petitioner presented evidence that satisfactorily prove that not a single centavo of the
missing funds was used for her own personal benefit or gain. Notably, the Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner,
obviously relied more on the flaws and deficiencies in the evidence presented by the defense, not on the strength
and merit of the prosecutions evidence This course of action is impermissible for the evidence of the prosecution
clearly cannot sustain a conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
All told, this Court, through the scholarly ponencia of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz in People vs. De Guzman, inked in
vivid prose the premium accorded to the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to
wit:
The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude meant only to embellish the Bill of Rights. Its
purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted
against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all
the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be
proved beyond the whisper of doubt.

Tabuena V Sandiganbayan

Facts: Luis Tabuena as General Manager of MIAA received direct order from
Marcos to pay directly to his office sum of 55mio in cash to pay for MIAAs
liability to PNCC. He then received Presidential Memorandum from Fe
Gimenez (secretary). The money was delivered in cash in three withdrawals,
no vouchers prepared to support the disbursement although Gimenez issued
a receipt on the third delivery for the entire amount. Tabuena was accused
and convicted of the crime of malversation by Sandiganbayan for defrauding
the government, taking and misappropriating money when there is no
outstanding obligation between MIAA and PNCC. Petitioner contended that
he was acting in good faith when the office of the president directed him to
deliver the said amount to his office person who acts in obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan violated due process on the ground of
departing from that common standard of fairness and impartiality?
Decision: Sandiganbayan decision reversed and set aside. Tabuena and
Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation. The majority believes
that the interference by the Sandiganbayan Justices was just too excessive
that it cannot be justified under the norm applied to a jury trial, or even
under the standard employed in a non-jury trial where the judge is
admittedly given more leeway in propounding questions to clarify points and
to elicit additional relevant evidence.
It is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a prosecuting
attorney. However anxious a judge may be for the enforcement of the law,
he should always remember that he is as much judge in behalf of the
defendant accused of crime, and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge
in behalf of the state, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of
society.

Tetanngco V Sandiganbayan
AMADEO TETANGCO Vs. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 156427 January 20, 2006
FACTS: This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Order, of public respondent
Ombudsman which dismissed the Complaint of petitioner Amando Tetangco against private
respondent Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., for violation of Article 220 2 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).
On March 8, 2002, petitioner filed his Complaint before the Ombudsman alleging that on January 26,
2001, private respondent Mayor Atienza gave P3,000 cash financial assistance to the chairman and
P1,000 to each tanod of Barangay 105, Zone 8, District I. Allegedly, on March 5, 2001, Mayor
Atienza refunded P20,000 or the total amount of the financial assistance from the City of Manila
when such disbursement was not justified as a lawful expense.
In his Counter-Affidavit, Mayor Atienza denied the allegations and sought the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for forum-shopping. He asserted that it was the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), not the Ombudsman that has jurisdiction over the case and the same case
had previously been filed before the COMELEC. Furthermore, the Complaint had no verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping. The mayor maintained that the expenses were legal and justified,
the same being supported by disbursement vouchers, and these had passed prior audit and
accounting.
The Investigating Officer recommended the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of evidence and
merit. The Ombudsman adopted his recommendation.
The Office of the Ombudsman, through its Over-all Deputy Ombudsman, likewise denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CHARGE AGAINST RESPONDENT MAYOR
ATIENZA FOR VIOLATION OF ART. 220 OF THE RPC DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF A PRIMA
FACIE CASE AND PROBABLE CAUSE TO INDICT HIM FOR THE CRIME CHARGED OR, AT THE
VERY LEAST, FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(e) OF R.A. NO. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT).
HELD: In this case, the action taken by the Ombudsman cannot be characterized as arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic. The Ombudsman found no evidence to prove probable cause.
Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged. 11 Here, the Complaint merely alleged that the disbursement for
financial assistance was neither authorized by law nor justified as a lawful expense. Complainant did
not cite any law or ordinance that provided for an original appropriation of the amount used for the
financial assistance cited and that it was diverted from the appropriation it was intended for.
The Complaint charges Mayor Atienza with illegal use of public funds. On this matter, Art. 220 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. Any public officer who shall apply any public fund or
property under his administration to any public use other than that for which such fund or property
were appropriated by law or ordinance shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period or a fine ranging from one-half to the total of the sum misapplied, if by reason of such
misapplication, any damages or embarrassment shall have resulted to the public service. In either
case, the offender shall also suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification.
If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the penalty shall be a fine from 5
to 50 percent of the sum misapplied.

The elements of the offense, also known as technical malversation, are: (1) the offender is an
accountable public officer; (2) he applies public funds or property under his administration to some
public use; and (3) the public use for which the public funds or property were applied is different from
the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance. It is clear that for
technical malversation to exist, it is necessary that public funds or properties had been diverted to
any public use other than that provided for by law or ordinance. To constitute the crime, there must
be a diversion of the funds from the purpose for which they had been originally appropriated by law
or ordinance. Patently, the third element is not present in this case.
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

Abdulla vs People
Convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of illegal use of public funds,
appellant Abdulla is before the Court on petition for review under Rule 45.
Appellants co-accused, Aguil and Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant
was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellants sentence by deleting
the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied,
appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime
charged.
Issue: Is there a presumption of criminal intent in malversation cases?
Ruling: No. The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to
all charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for
public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have
committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State
College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees
were entitled to under existing civil service laws. In the absence of any
presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of proving by competent evidence
that appellants act of paying the terminal leave benefits of employees of the
Sulu State College was done with criminal intent rests upon the prosecution.

Parungao vs Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
The petitioner, Oscar Parungao, a public officer, was charged of malversation of
public funds for allegedly appropriating to his personal use the amount of Php185,
250.00 for the construction of the Jalung road in Porac, Pampanga. Parungao
admitted that he received the said amount, but was disbursed for the materials to
be used, and the rest was used to pay, upon the insistence of the municipal mayor
of Porac, for the labor of the different barangays in the municipality. Sandiganbayan
acquitted him but convicted him for the crime of illegal use of public funds
(Art.220). Hence, this appeal. Parungao claims that he cannot be convicted of a
crime different and distinct from that charged in the information.
ISSUE:
WON the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him for on the violation of Art.220.
HELD:
The accused has the constitutional right that he can only be convicted of the crime
with which he is charged, unless they have both have the same essential elements
which are alleged in the information. Whereas, the elements of the crime of
malversation of public funds and illegal use of public funds are distinct. Hence, the
petition was granted. The decision of Sandiganbayan was reversed. And Oscar
Parungao was acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant, G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
153 SCRA 735
1.

Legal Issue
Shall the accused suffer the penalty of arresto mayor subject by his criminal liability?
2.

Legal Facts
That on or about 15th day of July 1984 in the city of Tacloban Leyte Philippines, the accused

Francisco Abarca went to the bus station and travel to Dolores Eastern Samar to fetch his
daughter in the morning. Unfortunately, the trip was delayed at 2 pm because of his failure to
catch the trip plus the engine trouble which causes him to proceed at his fathers house, and then
later went home. When he reaches home the accused caught his wife in the act of sexual
intercourse with Khingsley Koh in the meantime his wife and Koh notice him, that makes her
wife push her paramour and got his revolver. Abarca peeping above the built-in cabinet in their
room jumped and ran away to look for a firearm at the PC soldiers house to where he got the M16 rifle. The accused lost his wife and Koh in vicinity at his house and immediately proceeded to
a mahjong house where he caught the victim aimed and shoot Koh with several bullets on his
different parts of his body causing Mr. Khingsley Kohs instantaneous death. By that time,
Arnold and Lina Amparado had inflicted multiple wounds due to stray bullets causing Mr.
Amparados one and one-half month loss of working capacity including his serious
hospitalization and the latters wife who had slighter physical injuries from the incident. The
RTC hereby sentenced Abarca to death for Murder with double Frustrated Murder and must
indemnify the Amparado Spouses and Heirs of Kho.
3. Holding
The Supreme Court modified the appealed decision of destierro to arresto mayor from the
lower court sentencing four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor indemnifying
Amparado spouses for expenses and damages.
4. Reasoning
The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a
rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, the rule presupposes
that the act done amounts to a felony. The accused-appellant is totally free from any
responsibility performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim but he cannot be entirely
without fault. It appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words which is not
enough of a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. The acts of
execution which should have produced the crimes of murders as a consequence, nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will; nonetheless, the Court finds
negligence on his part. He is liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365 that is
less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. For the separate injuries
suffered by the Amparado spouses impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum period to being the graver penalty.

People of the Philippines vs

Rufino Mallari
404 SCRA 170 Criminal Law Aggravating Circumstance Use of Motor
Vehicle
On July 7, 1996 at 4 pm, Joseph Galang admonished Mallari for driving so
fast in front of the farmers house. Mallari got irked and challenged Galang
into a fist fight. Galang did not accede and apologized instead. At about
6:30 pm, Mallari returned and tried to stab Galang but Galang was able to
run. Mallari boarded his truck and drove after Galang until he was able to
catch up with him. He bumped him and crushed Galangs head. Galang
voluntarily surrendered. He was convicted for murder and was sentenced
to death.
ISSUE: Whether or not evident premeditation is attendant.
HELD: No. Evident premeditation and treachery was not proven to be
present. However, Mallaris use of a motor vehicle which is his truck
qualifies him for the crime of murder. He used his truck in killing Galang.
Voluntary surrender is to be appreciated in favor of Mallari. He is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. STEPHEN MARK WHISENHUNT

FACTS: On November 19, 1993, accused-appellant was formally charged with

the murder of Elsa Santos-Castillo. During the trial the following
circumstances were successfully proven by the prosecution without a shadow
of doubt, to wit: that Elsa Santos Castillo was brought to accused-appellants
condominium unit on September 23, 1993; that on September 24, 1993,
accused-appellants housemaid was looking for her kitchen knife and
accused-appellant gave it to her, saying that it was in his bedroom; that on
September 25, 1993, accused-appellant and Demetrio Ravelo collected the
dismembered body parts of Elsa from the bathroom inside accusedappellants bedroom; that accused-appellant disposed of the body parts by a
roadside somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna; that accused-appellant also
disposed of Elsas personal belongings along the road going to Bagac,
Bataan; that the mutilated body parts of a female cadaver, which was later
identified as Elsa, were found by the police and NBI agents at the spot where
Demetrio pointed; that hair specimens found inside accused-appellants
bathroom and bedroom showed similarities with hair taken from Elsas head;
and that the bloodstains found on accused-appellants bedspread, covers
and in the trunk of his car, all matched Elsas blood type. On January 31,
1996, the trial court promulgated the appealed judgment, convicting
accused-appellant of the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the
deceased actual damage, moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court is correct in appreciating the crime to
be murder with qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
outraging and scoffing at the victims person or corpse?

HELD: Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is inequality of forces

between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that the victim
was a woman does not, by itself, establish that accused-appellant committed
the crime with abuse of superior strength. There ought to be enough proof of
the relative strength of the aggressor and the victim. Abuse of superior
strength must be shown and clearly established as the crime itself. In this
case, nobody witnessed the actual killing. Nowhere in Demetrios testimony,
and it is not indicated in any of the pieces of physical evidence, that
accused-appellant deliberately took advantage of his superior strength in
overpowering Elsa. On the contrary, this Court observed from viewing the
photograph of accused-appellant that he has a rather small frame. Hence,
the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
was not adequately proved and cannot be appreciated against accusedappellant.

However, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of

the victim was correctly appreciated by the trial court. The mere decapitation
of the victims head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the
victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder. In this case, accused-appellant
not only beheaded Elsa, he further cut up her body like pieces of meat. Then,
he strewed the dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road in the
countryside, leaving them to rot on the ground. The sight of Elsas severed
body parts on the ground, vividly depicted in the photographs offered in
evidence, is both revolting and horrifying. At the same time, the viewer
cannot help but feel utter pity for the sub-human manner of disposing of her
remains. In a case with strikingly similar facts, the Court ruled that Even if
treachery was not present in this case, the crime would still be murder
because of the dismemberment of the dead body. One of the qualifying
circumstances of murder under Article 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code
is "outraging or scoffing at the person or corpse of the victim.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC finding accused-appellant guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS on damages and civil
indemnity.

People vs. Claudio Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08 [October 6, 1995]
FACTS:
In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at Campanilla
Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman went with them. When they entered
the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop about a block away from her house, as she wanted to
walk the rest of the way for she did not want her parents to know that she was going home that
late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio.
While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car,
driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the middle
of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: Who are you? Show
me your I.D. When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the I.D., without
bothering to look at it.
Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: Why
are you bothering us? Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at
him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: Why did you shoot
me? Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused
ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He
pointed gun at him and asked: Do you want a trouble? Leino said no and took a step
backward.
The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became
hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: Oh, my God, hes got a gun.
Hes going to kill us. Will somebody help us? All the while, accused was pointing his gun to
and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on
the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away
from him. Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of
accuseds car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around the accuseds car,
trying to put some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually,
accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino.
Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk.
For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot
Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose
consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to
see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drives away. Leino struggled to
his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw the incident.
ISSUE: Whether or not Claudio Teehankee, Jr. is guilty for murder of Roland Champman and
for two frustrated murders of Jussi Leino and Maureen Hultman.

HELD:

Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland
John Chapman. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following
amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for the victims death; and, P1,000,000 as moral
damages.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the
shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts:
P50,000 as indemnity for her death; P2,350,461.83 as actual damages; P564,042.57 for
loss of earning capacity of said deceased; P1,000,000 as moral damages; and P2,000,000
as exemplary damages.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery,
for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
8 years of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the said offended party the following amounts: P30,000 as
indemnity for his injuries; P118,369.84 and equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S.

$55,600.00, both as actual damages; P1,000,000 as moral damages; and, P2,000,000 as

exemplary damages.
In all three cases, to pay each of the 3 offended parties the sum of P1,000,000, or a total
of P3,000,000, for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and
To pay the costs in all 3 cases.

People vs. Manero (G.R. Nos. 86883-85)

Facts: On 11 April 1985, the Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo
Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao, were inside the eatery of one
Reynaldo Diocades. They were conferring with three others of a plan to liquidate a number of
suspected communist sympathizers.
Among their targets are: Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred
Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected
of having links with the communist movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is
the complaining witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the
others are simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's
proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his
stead. They later on nailed a placard near the carinderia bearing the names of their intended victims.
Later, at 4:00 pm, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants, all with assorted firearms,
proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim, which was also in the vicinity of Deocades' carinderia.
After a heated confrontation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of Bantil who was able to parry and
was hit at the lower portion of his ear. Bantil tried to run but he was again fired upon by Edilberto. Though Bantil was
able to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo Gomez, Norberto Jr. ordered his men to surround the house so
that Bantil would die of hemorrhage. Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him
with a burst of gunfire from his M-14 Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with both hands clenched at the
back of his head. This again drew boisterous laughter and ridicule from the dreaded desperados. At 5:00 o'clock, Fr.
Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr.,
and his co-accused Pleago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the
gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and
rejoiced. Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped
backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre
(What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your
head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands
clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted
over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst
of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted
the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their
comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance.
From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao
appealed with respect to the cases for Murder and Attempted Murder. The Manero brothers as well as Rodrigo Espia
did not appeal; neither did Norberto Manero, Jr., in the Arson case. Consequently, the decision as against them
already became final.
Issue: Whether or not the appellants can be exculpated from criminal liability on the basis of defense of alibi which
would establish that there is no conspiracy to kill.
Held: The court did not appreciate the defense of alibi of the Lines brother, who according to them, were in a farm
some one kilometre away from the crime scene. The court held that It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the
defense of alibi must not only be at some other place but that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. There is no physical impossibility where the accused can be at the
crime scene in a matter of 15-20 minutes by jeep or tricycle. More important, it is well-settled that the defense of alibi
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses. In this case,
there were two eyewitnesses who positively identified the accused.

Contrary to the claim of the Lines brothers, there is a community of design to commit the crime. Based on the findings
of the lower court, they are not merely innocent bystanders but in fact were vital cogs in the murder of Fr. Fuvali.
They performed overt acts to ensure the success of the commission of the crimes and the furtherance of the aims of
the conspiracy. While accused-appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action
showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It is
not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an
accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present
While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter Geremias whom the
group targetted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good substitute in the murder as he was an Italian
priest. The accused agreed that in case they fail to kill the intended victims, it will be suffice to kill another priest as
long as the person is also Italian priest.