8.

The following officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
are authorized to approve applications for homestead and free patents:
1. Up to 5 hectares Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO)
2. More than 5 Ha. to 10 Ha. Regional Executive Director of the DENR
3. More than 10 Has. - DENR Secretary

9. Special Patent is a patent to grant, cede, and convey full ownership of alienable and
disposable lands formerly covered by a reservation or lands of the public domain and
is issued upon the promulgation of a special law or act of Congress or by the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources as authorized by an Executive Order
of the President. Thus, the DENR is tasked to issue special patents in favor of
government agencies pursuant to special laws, proclamations, and executive orders.

10. The following are qualified to apply:

a. Republic of the Philippines, its agencies, branches, and instrumentalities
b. LGUs such as provinces, cities and municipalities

11. According to R.A 10023, Section 6- All applications shall be filed immediately after the
effectivity of this Act before the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR. The CENRO is mandated to process the application within one
hundred and twenty (120) days to include compliance with the required notices and other
legal requirements, and forward this recommendation to the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO), who shall have five (5) days to approve or disapprove the
patent. In case of approval, patent shall be issued; in case of conflicting claims among
different claimants, the parties may seek the proper judicial remedies.

Carino vs. Insular Government 441 SCRA 3

Facts: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the Province of Benguet, went to the
Court of Land Registration(CLR) to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146-hectare land
he has been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory
information and no other documentation.
The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation.
The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant
should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation. Mateo Carino, contests
dismissal of application of registration of their ancestral land through writ of error. Carinos
ancestors maintained fences for cattle, cultivated some parts, and pastured parts for cattle
for more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris (April 11, 1899). This land is also used for
inheritance in accordance to Igorot custom. In 1901, plaintiff alleged ownership under
mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but it only established possessory title.
The lower court granted the application of land registration on March 4, 1904. An appeal was
filed in behalf of Government of the Philippines and as US having taken possession of
property for military and public purposes. Thus the application of registration was dismissed.
Respondents argues that given that Spain assumed and asserted that they had title to all
the land in the Philippines except to permit private lands to be acquired. No prescription
against the Spanish Crown. Decree of June 25, 1880 required registration within a limited
time to make the title good and US succeeded the title of Spain (through Treaty of Paris).
Also, Benguet was never brought under civil or military government of the Spanish Crown,
so it is not certain whether registration granted was under Spanish laws. Plaintiff argues that
it seems to amount to denial of native titles throughout an important Island of Luzon.
Issue: Whether or Not Carino is qualified to register the land
Ruling: YES. Plaintiff Carino should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of
what by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a
refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain. The grant to the plaintiff was the
result of the principle of Prescription as mentioned in the royal cedula of 1754, which states:
Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they
shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription. Moreover, the Decree of
June 25, 1880 states that possessors for certain times shall be deemed owners; if a
cultivated land 20 years, if uncultivated 30 years. Here, plaintiffs father was the owner of
the land by the very terms of this decree. Obiter Writ of error is the general method of
bringing cases to this court (Federal SC), and appeal the exception, confined to equity in the
main. Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like present.
The court said that the reason for taking over the Philippines was different (compared to
occupation of white race against Native Americans). Our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives not to exploit their country for
private gain. The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.

Director of Lands vs. Funtillar 142 SCRA 57 G.R. No. L-68533 May 23, 1986

Facts:
In 1972, Mariano Funtillar, Magdalena Funtillar, and the Heirs of Felipe Rocete
applied for the registration of a parcel of land, originally belonging to one Candida Fernandez
whose ownership and possession began sometime during her lifetime and extended until
1936 when she died. The present applicants are the grandchildren of Candida Fernandez. In
1936, after the death of Candida Fernandez, her real property was declared in the name of
the "Heirs of Candida Fernandez under Tax Declaration No. 9622, with an area of thirty (30)
hectares. Sometime in 1940 or 1941, the parcel of land was forfeited in favor of the
government for failure to pay real estate taxes. However, the same was redeemed in 1942
by Vitaliano Aguirre, one of the three children of Candida Fernandez, who was then the
administrator of the property. A final deed of sale was executed by the Provincial Treasurer of
Tayabas in 1944 in favor of Vitaliano Aguirre. It had been agreed among the heirs that the
property would first be held by Vitaliano in trust for the others until such time that partition
among them was effected. The heirs of Candida Fernandez later partitioned the property
among themselves. The particular lot now disputed in this petition was adjudicated in favor
of the applicants-respondents. The Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development
filed an opposition alleging that neither applicants nor their predecessor-in-interest
possessed sufficient title to the land, not having acquired the same under any of the
recognized Spanish titles under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894; that neither
applicants, nor their predecessors have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding
the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines. Donaciano Pumarada, with three others also filed an
opposition alleging that they have registrable title on account of their possession since time
immemorial. Rafael M. Morales filed a separate opposition, alleging that there was no actual
survey of the land applied for; and that he is entitled to registration on account of his
occupation and that of his predecessor. On November 26, 1982, the trial court rendered its
decision adjudicating the land to applicants. The IAC affirmed said decision.

Issue: Whether or not the IAC is correct in granting the land registration

Ruling: Yes. The land sought to be registered was declared alienable and disposable 33
years ago. It is not forest land. It has been possessed and cultivated by the applicants and
their predecessors for at least three generations. The attempts of humble people to have
disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their names should not only
be viewed with an understanding attitude but should, as a matter of policy, be encouraged.
The fact of possession is bolstered by the forfeiture in 1940 of the land in favor of the
government. It would be rather absurd under the circumstances of this case to rule that the
government would order the forfeiture of property for non-payment of real estate taxes if the
property is forest land. It is also reasonable to rule that the heirs of Candida Fernandez

redeemed the property because they wanted to keep the land of the deceased in the
possession of their family, thus continuing prior possession. From 1936 and earlier up to
1972 is more than the required period. As a matter of fact, the applicants' witnesses testified
to their personal knowledge of more than 50 years possession. More important is the
petitioners' allegation that the property sought to be registered was unclassified public
forest until September 15, 1953 when L C Project No. 16-0, L C Map No. 1634 declared it
alienable and disposable. It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an
applicant files his application for registration, the burden shifts totally to the government to
prove that the land forms part of the unclassified forest zone. The Regalian doctrine which
forms the basis of our land laws and, in fact, all laws governing natural resources is a
revered and long standing principle. It must, however, be applied together with the
constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way
as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice.

Oposa vs. Factoran

(G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
Plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents.
Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that
they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that
continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance
and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. The plaintiffs prayed that judgment
be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting
in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
TLAs. The defendant, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question. The RTC Judge sustained
the motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked
the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES: Whether the plaintiffs have a cause of action

RULING: Yes.

The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said
right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among
many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. The Court finds it to
be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

Miners Association vs. Secretary Factoran 240 SCRA 100

Facts:
On July 10, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her then legislative
powers under Article II, Section 1 of the Provisional Constitution and Article XIII, Section 6 of
the 1987 Constitution, promulgated Executive Order No. 211 prescribing the interim
procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development
and utilization of minerals pursuant to the 1987 Constitution in order to ensure the
continuity of mining operations and activities and to hasten the development of mineral
resources. On July 25, 1987, President Aquino likewise promulgated Executive Order No. 279
authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or
production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral
resources, and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements
involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals. Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive
Order No. 279, the DENR Secretary issued on June 23, 1989 DENR Administrative Order No.
57, series of 1989, captioned "Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under
Executive Order No. 279."Under the transitory provision of said DENR Administrative Order
No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing mining leases or agreements which were
granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211,
except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry
resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be converted into
production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.
On November 20, 1980, the Secretary of the DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of
1990, laying down the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation.
Section 3 of the aforementioned DENR
Administrative Order No. 82 enumerates the persons or entities required to submit Letter of
Intent (LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSAs) within two (2) years from
the effectivity of DENR Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991. Failure to do so
within the prescribed period shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and
gravel claims. The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative
Order Nos. 57 and 82 after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners
Association of the Philippines, Inc. to file the instant petition assailing their validity and
constitutionality before the SC. In a petition for certiorari, petitioner Miners Association of
the Philippines, Inc. mainly contends that respondent Secretary of DENR issued both
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power under Section 6 of

Executive Order No. 279. On the assumption that the questioned administrative orders do
not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner contends that both orders
violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987
Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing
mining agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements
within one (1) year from its effectivity date. On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 82
declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreements
within two (2) years from the date of effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall
cause the abandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.
Issue: Whether or not the Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued by the DENR
Secretary in the exercise of his rule-making power are tainted with invalidity
Ruling:
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The SC ruled that the questioned
administrative orders are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the
law under which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of
the public, their economic growth and welfare. The validity and constitutionality of
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be sustained, and their force and effect upheld.
Nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which would lead to conclude
that the questioned order authorizes the automatic conversion of mining leases and
agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211, to production-sharing agreements. The provision in Article 9 of Administrative
Order No. 57 that "all such leases or agreements shall be converted into production sharing
agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines" could not possibility
contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of the Government that all existing mining
leases and agreements are automatically converted into production-sharing agreements. On
the contrary, the use of the term "production-sharing agreement" if they are so minded.
Negotiation negates compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by petitioner in the
instant petition. A mineral production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires a meeting of the
minds of the parties after negotiations arrived at in good faith and in accordance with the
procedure laid down in the subsequent Administrative Order No. 82