TAXATION

Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works

"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit,
derived from such expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular
enterprise."
FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory
relief, with injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for
public works particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road
terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the
tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned
subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to
private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder
roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to the
main highway. The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because
people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of
the roads, and the government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to
be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the government.
ISSUE: Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the
purpose of justifying an expenditure of the government?
HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate
public revenue for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the
direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax,
and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the
general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be
ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state,
which results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is
whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the
furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals
might incidentally serve the public.

PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA [95 PHIL 46; NO.L-4817; 26 MAY 1954]
Facts: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398
together with the law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila). The ordinance imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising
various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the same. The law
authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose a
municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various professions. Petitioners,
having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The
lower court declared the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law

authorizing it.
Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class
legislation, and authorize what amounts to double taxation.
Held: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed,
and in its discretion may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and
leave others untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities
should be empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the
National Government. That matter is within the domain of political departments.
The argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is imposed by
the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is
nothing inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to
the same occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof.
Judgment of the lower court is reversed with regards to the ordinance and affirmed
as to the law authorizing it.

REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC v. The COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and The
COURT of TAX APPEALS. G.R. No. L-19201. June 16, 1965
FACTS:
M.B. Estate, Inc. donated P10,000.00 in cash to the parish priest of Victorias, Negros
Occidental, for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total
amount was actually spent for the purpose intended.
A year later, M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor's gift tax return. CIR issued an
assessment for donee's gift tax against the parish, of which petitioner was the
priest.
Petitioner filed a protest which was denied by the CIR. He then filed an appeal with
the CTA citing that he was not the parish priest at the time of donation, that there is
no legal entity or juridical person known as the "Catholic Parish Priest of Victorias,"
and, therefore, he should not be liable for the donee's gift tax and that assessment
of the gift tax is unconstitutional. The CTA denied the appeal thus this case.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner and the parish are liable for the donee's gift tax.
RULING: Yes for the parish. The Constitution only made mention of property tax and
not of excise tax as stated in Section 22, par 3. The assessment of the CIR did not
rest upon general ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the properties,
upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. A gift tax is not a
property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of
gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious
purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.

No for the petitioner. The Court ordered petitioner to be substituted by the Head of
Diocese to pay the said gift tax after the CIR and Solicitor General did not object to
such substitution.

Abra Valley College vs Aquino (G.R. No. L-39086)

FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly
incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a
complaint to annul and declare void the Notice of Seizure and the Notice of Sale
of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate
taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said Notice of Seizure by
respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was
issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial
court in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding
that the second floor of the building is being used by the director for residential
purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing
Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is not being used
exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner
availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational
purposes.
HELD: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution,
expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes.
Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends to
facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the main purposes. The use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes
is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of
the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The
test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in
the Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that
half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived
from the fact that the ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased)
and the second floor being used as incidental to education (residence of the
director).
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Ichong vs Hernandez

FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its
purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a
stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations
the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to
continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law,
until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after
the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this
Act. provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for
violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and
labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry. provision against the
establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and
behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act,
filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of
their liberty and property without due process
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business
thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the
equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental
differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative
classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are
treated alike. The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a
basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. Official statistics
point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It
is this domination and control that is the legislatures target in the enactment of the

Act. The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien
and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien
owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in
times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of
the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State. The alien
retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom
he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and
practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations economy
endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.

**Philippine Phospate Fertilizer Co. v Torres 231 SCRA 335 (1994)

Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the
supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to
represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation.
Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of a
certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding
therefrom the superintendents and the professional and technical employees.
However, the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it
sought to represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its
professional/technical and confidential employees. The parties therein agreed to
submit their respective position papers and to consider the amended petition
submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents. Mediator-Arbiter
Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a
certification election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts,
mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential
employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido
Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the
same was denied; hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due process on the
part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under.
Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process.
Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the
Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the
position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the

requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to

present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a
hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not;
instead it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides,
petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the
Secretary of Labor.

YNOT VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

148 SCRA 659
Date of Promulgation: March 20, 1987
Ponente: Cruz, J.
QuickGuide: Petitioner assails constitutionality of E.O. No. 626-A prohibiting the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. E.O. No.
626-A was held unconstitutional for violating the due process clause.
Facts:
13Jan1984: Petitioner Restituto Ynot had transmitted 6 carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander
of Barotac for violating Executive Order No. 626-A
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and
the slaughtering of carabaos. Carabao/carabeef transported in violation of E.O. 626A shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the govt, to be distributed to charitable institutions as Chairman of
National Meat Inspection may see fit (carabeef) and to deserving farmers as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit (carabao). This amended E.O. 626; the latter
prohibiting only the slaughter of carabaos of age.
Petitioner sued for recovery; RTC issued writ of replevin after petitioner filed
supersedeas bong of P12,000.00
Trial Court (TC): confiscation of carabaossustained; ordered confiscation of the
bond; declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O. for lack of authority and its
presumed validity
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC); IAC
upheld the TC.
Petitioners arguments:
1. E.O. is unconstitutional. It authorizes outright confiscation of carabao or carabeef
being transported across provincial boundaries.
2. Penalty is invalid. It is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
3. Improper exercise of legislative power by the former President.
Issue/s:
WON EO 626-A is constitutional.

Ruling:
EO 626-A is declared unconstitutional. CA decision reversed. Supersedeas bond
cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to petitioner.
Ratio:
On the power of courts to decide on constitutional matters
Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by lower courts subject
to review of the Supreme Court.
..while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the
same whenever warranted, subject only to the review of the highest tribunal.
Sec. 5[2(a)] Art VIII, 1987 Constitution.
On the presumption of constitutionality
Not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted
On due process
Provisions of the charter are to be cats in precise and unmistakable language to
avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation.
Clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient;
flexibility
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS: a) notice and b) hearing intended as safeguard against
official arbitrariness.
On the power used by President Marcos in promulgating EO 626-A
The challenged measure is denominated as an EO but it is actually a PD issued by
Pres. Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully
executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6.
But it was not shown that there is sufficient exigencies to exercise the
extraordinary power
Police power as used by the government to justify E.O. 626-A
Test: 1. Compelling state interest 2. Lawful method (as used in the case, but this is
the same with the fit between means and objective test)
1 = present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved
for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs.
Failed to comply with #2; there is no reasonable connection between conservation
of carabaos (not having them slaughtered) and the means: non-transportation of
carabaos.

Alonte vs. Sevillano. Jr.

FACTS: Petitioners were charged for rape before the RTC of Binan, Laguna. A petition
for a change of venue to RTC of Manila was filed by the offended party. During the
pendency of such petition, the offended party executed an affidavit of desistance.
The court granted the change of venue. Public respondent Judge Savellano issued
warrant of arrest for both petitioners. Alonte surrendered and Concepcion posted
bail.

They pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie
and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media
pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then
submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion Perpetua.
Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not
cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of
the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners-accused were denied of due process.
RULING: YES.
There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires
that it not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Mere
silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right,
and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. The case
is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is
nullified.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular,
require:
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power
to hear and determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and
deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and
indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in
the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met
without a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial.

Aniag Jr. v Comelec 237 SCRA 424 (1994)

Driver underwent illegal search and seizure on check pt. petitioner charged in
violation of Omnibus Election Code (gun ban) invokes deprivation of Constitutional
right on due process of law.
Facts: Upon the issuance of declaration of gun ban by the Comelec in connection to
the national & local election, the Sgt-at-Arms of the House of Representatives
requested petitioner to return the 2 firearms issued by the House to him. In
compliance, petitioner ordered his driver Arellano to pick up the firearms in his
house to return them to Congress. On his way back to the Batasan Complex,

Arellano was flagged down in a check point and police search the car. Upon finding
the guns, he was apprehended and detained and his case was referred for inquest
to the City prosecutor office. Petitioner was not made a party to the charge but was
invited to shed light on the incident. Petitioner explained the purpose how Arellano
came to have the firearms boarded on the car and wrote the prosecutor to
exonerate Arellano from the charges. The prosecutor recommended dismissing the
case. The Comelec however issued a resolution filing information in violation of the
gun ban against petitioner. Petitioner moves for reconsideration to the Comelec
which was denied hence this petition contending that the search on his car was
illegal and that he was not impleaded as respondent in the preliminary investigation
and his constitutional rights for due process was violated.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied of due process of law.
Held: The court held that as a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search
warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside
from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in
cases of (1) moving vehicles (2) the seizure of evidence in plain view and (3) search
conducted at police or military checkpoints which are not illegal for as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search, and (4) Stop-andsearch without warrant conducted by police officers on the basis of prior
confidential information which were reasonably corroborated by other attendant
matters is also recognized by the court to be legal. An extensive search without
warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist
was a law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. Because
there was no sufficient evidence that would impel the policemen to suspect Arellano
to justify the search they have conducted, such action constitutes an unreasonable
intrusion of the petitioners privacy and security of his property in violation of
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in
violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding. The manner by which COMELEC proceeded against
petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution. The facts show
that petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the
Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a
preliminary investigation for such offense. Thus the court declared the warrantless
search and seizure of the firearms as illegal hence inadmissible to court as evidence
in any proceeding against the petitioner.

CASE DIGEST : PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ

G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989 PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by
respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications
Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications.
Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein
respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications
Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to
Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order
was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the
jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed
under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme
Court said that although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rateswhen such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent
Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost
is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasijudicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary
since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and,
therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While respondents
may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of
petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from
the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent
has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing,
whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didnt
scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner

ANG TIBAY v COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

FACTS
- The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. prayed for the vacation of the judgment
rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of
Industrial Relations for a new trial. The union avers that: Teodoro's claim that there

was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to
temporarily lay off the members of the union is entirely false and unsupported by
the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather; that the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or
employer union dominated by Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are
illegal; that the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the
National Workers' Brotherhood; that important documents attached are inaccessible
to the respondents.
ISSUE : WON the union was denied procedural due process by the CIR
HELD NO.
The CIR, a special court created under CA 103, is more an administrative than a part
of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are
presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi - judicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but
its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter
controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees
or laborers, and regulate the relations between them. It may appeal to voluntary
arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official
investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific
controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in
reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from
the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act
requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable." It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made
by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award,
order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or
expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial
or agricultural disputes. And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this
Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules
recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative
purpose.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it,

entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due

process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more
fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a
grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but t
he evidence must be
substantial. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by
confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can
the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It
should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing
evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy.
Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only
advisory. (6) The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
- In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the
record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which

to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

- This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed
for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be
better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the
documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to
the main issue involved. The legislation which created the CIR is new. The failure to
grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial is grant ed,
and the entire record of the case shall be remanded to the CIR.
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG [222 SCRA
644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993]
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of
serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of
Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical
Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted
upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to
investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding
the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit
their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although
respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to filea reply.
In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written
statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case
against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law
School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required
to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a
Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board
found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School
Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in
view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of
dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all
respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they
are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners
from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary
restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the
charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was
requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the
Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due
process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process.
Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to
submit their written statement on theincident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent
students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and
cause of the accusationwere adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present
is the twin elements of notice and hearing.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant
petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for
reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the
Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case,
where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded
procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
anyaccusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee
orofficial designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

CUDIA VS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY

Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab
Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudias class had a lesson examination
in their Operations Research (OR) subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to
3pm.
However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR
teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia complied and as a
result, he was late for his next class (English). Later, the English teacher reported
Cudia for being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was
dismissed a bit late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter
concluded that Cudia lied when he said that their OR class was dismissed late
because the OR teacher said she never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was
meted with demerits and touring hours because of said infraction.
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not content
with the explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty he

incurred to the senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his
appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his OR
class was dismissed at 3pm while his English class started at 3pm also. To that the
TO replied: that on record, and based on the interview with the teachers concerned,
the OR teacher did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class
started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once a student
submitted his examination paper, he is dismissed from said class and may be
excused to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before
3pm; that it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed late because
again, on that day in the OR class, each student was dismissed as they submit their
examination, and were not dismissed as a class; that if Cudia was ordered by the
teacher to stay, it was not because such transaction was initiated by the teacher,
rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his query to the teacher), although
there were at least two students with Cudia at that time querying the teacher, the
three of them cannot be considered a class; Cudia could just have stated all that
instead of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The STO
sustained the decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMAs Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly
violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal when he said
his class was dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late for his next class.
The Honor Code is PMAs basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of
their cadets. Any violation thereof may be a ground to separate a cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of
nine (9) cadets, conducted an investigation. After two hearings and after the parties
involved were heard and with their witnesses presented, the HC reconvened and the
members cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1
acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules (Honor System), a dissenting vote means the
acquittal of Cudia. However, they also have a practice of chambering where the
members, particularly the dissenter, are made to explain their vote. This is to avoid
the tyranny of the minority. After the chambering, the dissenter was convinced
that his initial not guilty vote was improper, hence he changed the same and the
final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was immediately placed inside PMAs holding
center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the
Superintendent of the PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military
officers requesting for a re-investigation. It was their claim that there were
irregularities in the investigation done by the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case
of Cudia was referred to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).

Meanwhile, Cudias family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) where it was alleged that PMAs sham investigation violated Cudias rights
to due process, education, and privacy of communication.
Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief
of Staff. But on the other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHRs findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed
the said petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter of policy and
that the court should avoid interfering with military matters.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Cudias petitions is proper.
2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.
HELD: Mandamus is not proper
Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudias prayer that PMA should be
compelled to reinstate him as well as to give him his supposed academic awards is
not proper. The Courts, even the Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA to do so
because the act of restoring Cudias rights and entitlements as a cadet as well as
his awards is a discretionary act. Mandamus cannot be availed against an official or
government agency, in this case PMA, whose duty requires the exercise of
discretion or judgment. Further, such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to perform
is within PMAs academic freedom as an educational institution and such
performance is beyond the jurisdiction of courts.
Certiorari is allowed
The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or not PMA
and its responsible officers acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
Cudia. Under the Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide actual
controversies and to determine whether or not a government branch or
instrumentality acted with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, PMA cannot argue that
judicial intervention into military affairs is not proper as a matter of policy. Suffice it
to say that judicial non-interference in military affairs is not an absolute rule.
On the civil liberties of PMA cadets
One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets, when they enrolled in the PMA,
have surrendered parts of their civil and political liberties. Hence, when they are
disciplined and punished by the PMA, said cadets cannot question the same, much
less, question it in the courts. in short, they cannot raise due process.
On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a PMA cadet, by
enrolling at PMA, must be prepared to subordinate his private interests for the
proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a
greater degree than a student at a civilian public school. However, a cadet facing
dismissal from PMA, whose private interests are at stake (life, liberty, property)

which includes his honor, good name, and integrity, is entitled to due process. No
one can be deprived of such without due process of law and the PMA, even as a
military academy, is not exempt from such strictures. Thus, when Cudia questioned
in court the manner upon which he was dismissed from the PMA, such controversy
may be inquired upon by the courts.
(Authors note: PMA, in essence, raised that due process, as contemplated by the
Constitution, is not needed in dismissing a cadet yet, as can be seen in the below
discussion, PMA presented evidence that due process was, in fact, complied with.)
II. Yes. It is within PMAs right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet
is still worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this
case, the investigation of Cudias Honor Code violation followed the prescribed
procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report
submitted by his TO. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report
against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that the case
would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied
and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team
submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman.
The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the honor
case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct
the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge
against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his
side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a
thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the
Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the
Academy level from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the
Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation
was also conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the
directive of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a
review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body
composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to
conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to
appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings. And there
is no reason for the SC to disturb the findings of facts by these bodies.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may
be used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the
PMA; that Honor Code violation is not among those listed as justifications for the
attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System (manner
which PMA conducts investigation of Honor Code violations) do not state that a
guilty cadet is automatically terminated or dismissed from service.
Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has
regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law
(Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such power

by the President may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise
direct supervision and control over the cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic
freedom. Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of
universities and institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the
Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom. If
it determines that a cadet violates it, then it has the right to dismiss said cadet. In
this case, based on its findings, Cudia lied which is a violation of the Honor Code.
But Cudias lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie. It
punishes any form of lying. It does not have a gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the
discretion of the PMA as to what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia enrolled at
PMA, he agreed to abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus, while the
punishment may be severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and,
therefore, not in violation of due process -also considering that Cudia, as a cadet,
must have known all of these.